

THE  
COMMENTARIES OF PROCLUS

ON THE  
TIMÆUS OF PLATO,  
IN FIVE BOOKS;

CONTAINING A TREASURY OF  
PYTHAGORIC AND PLATONIC PHYSIOLOGY.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,

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BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

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Ἐμοὶ πρὸς φιλοσόφους ἐστὶ φιλία· πρὸς μὲντοι σοφίστας, ἢ γραμματιστάς, ἢ τοιοῦτο γένος ἑτέρον  
ἀνθρώπων κακοδαίμονων, οὔτε νῦν ἐστὶ φιλία, μήτε ὑστέρων ποτε γένοιτο.

Apollonius Tyaneus.

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TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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## INTRODUCTION.

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OF that golden chain of philosophers, who, having themselves happily penetrated, luminously unfolded to others the profundities of the philosophy of Plato, Proclus is indisputably the largest and most refulgent link. Born with a genius transcendently great, and accompanied through life with a fortune singularly good, he exhibited in his own person a union of the rarest kind, in which power concurred with will, the benefit resulting from genuine philosophy with the ability of imparting it, and in which Wisdom was inseparable from Prosperity. The eulogium therefore of Ammonius Hermeas, "that Proclus possessed the power of unfolding the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific judgment of the nature of things, in the highest perfection possible to humanity,"<sup>1</sup> will be immediately assented to by every one, who is an adept in the writings of this incomparable man.

I rejoice therefore, in the opportunity which is now afforded me of presenting to the English reader a translation of one of the greatest productions of this Coryphean philosopher; though unfortunately like most of his other works, it has been transmitted to us in a mutilated state. For these Commentaries scarcely explain a third part of the *Timæus*; and from a passage in Olympiodorus On the *Meteors* of Aristotle,<sup>2</sup> there is every reason to believe that Proclus left no part of the

<sup>1</sup> Εὰ δὲ τε καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνήθειμεν εἰσενεγκεῖν περὶ τὴν τοῦ βιβλίου σαφήνειαν, ἀπονημιγενέσαστες τῶν ἐξηγήσεων τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν διδασκάλου Προκλου τοῦ πλατωνικοῦ διαδόχου, τὸν εἰς ἀκρον τῆς αἰθρωπίνης φύσεως τὴν τε ἐξηγητικὴν τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς παλαιοῖς δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὄντων κρίσιν ἀσκησάντοί, πολλὴν αὖ τῃ λογίῳ θεῷ χάριν ὁμολογήσασμεν. Ammon. de Interpret. p. 1.

For important particulars respecting this extraordinary man, see my translation of his *Commentary* on the first book of Euclid. He was born about the year 412 of Christ.

<sup>2</sup> See this passage in the notes to my translation of the *Meteors* of Aristotle.

Timæus without his masterly elucidations. This is likewise more than probable, from what Marinus says in his life of him, "that he was a man laborious to a miracle;" for it cannot be supposed that such a man would leave the greater part of one of the most important dialogues of Plato unelucidated, and particularly as these Commentaries were written by him (as the same Marinus informs us) in the flower of his age, and that he preferred them beyond all his other works.<sup>1</sup> Fortunately however, the most important part of this work is preserved; or that part in which the demiurgic, paradigmatic, and final causes of the universe are unfolded; the corporeal nature of it is represented as fabricated with forms and demiurgic sections, and distributed with divine numbers; and soul is produced from the Demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic ratios, and divine and fabricative symbols. The whole mundane animal too, is here shown to be connected, according to the united comprehension which subsists in the intelligible world; and the parts which it contains are so disposed as to harmonize with the whole, both such as are corporeal, and such as are vital. For partial souls such as ours, are introduced into its spacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane Gods, and become mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected. The progression of the elements likewise from their first incorporeal subsistence to their subterranean termination, and the nature of the heavens and heavenly bodies, are beautifully developed. And as the result of the most scientific reasoning, it is shown that every planet is surrounded with satellites,<sup>2</sup> that the fixed stars have periodic revolutions on their axes, though the length of their duration is to us unknown; and that the stars, which at times disappear and again become visible, are the satellites of other fixed stars of a more primary dignity, behind the splendors of which they are occasionally concealed.<sup>3</sup> These and many other most interesting particulars, are unfolded in these Commentaries, with an accuracy and perspicuity which have seldom been equalled, and have never been excelled.

<sup>1</sup> The late Dr. Charles Burney, on being once asked by me, whether he had ever read these Commentaries, candidly replied, "that they were too much for him;" at the same time exclaiming, "What a giant was Proclus compared to Longinus!" This confession, as the Doctor had never studied the philosophy of Plato, displayed a degree of good sense, which is seldom to be met with in a grammarian and philologist, on such an occasion; and his candour is still more remarkable, when it is considered that he had been a Reviewer.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 270. Vol. 2. in which it is said, "that in each of the planetary spheres, a number analogous to the choir of the fixed stars, subsists with appropriate circulations." See also p. 280 and 281, of the same volume, in which this is more fully asserted.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 299. Vol. 2.

When I speak however, of the perspicuity with which these particulars are developed, I do not mean that they are delivered in such a way, as to be obvious to every one, or that they may be apprehended as soon as read; for this pertains only to the fungous and frivolous productions of the present day; but my meaning is, that they are written with all the clearness, which they are naturally capable of admitting, or which a genuine student of the philosophy<sup>1</sup> of Plato can desire. And this leads me to make some remarks on the iniquitous opinion which, since the revival of letters, has been generally entertained of the writings of Proclus and other philosophers, who are distinguished by the appellation of the latter Platonists, and to show the cause from which it originated.

The opinion to which I allude is this, that Plotinus and his followers, or in other words, all the Platonists that existed from his time to the fall of the Roman empire, and the destruction of the schools of the philosophers by Justinian, corrupted the philosophy of Plato, by filling it with jargon and revery, and by ascribing dogmas to him, which are not to be found in his writings, and which are perfectly absurd. It might naturally be supposed that the authors of this calumny were men deeply skilled in the philosophy, the corruptors of which they profess to have detected; and that they had studied the writings of the men whom they so grossly defame. This however is very far from being the case. For since the philosophy of Plato, as I have elsewhere shown, is the offspring of the most consummate science, all the dogmas of it being deduced by a series of geometrical reasoning, some of them ranking as prior, and others as posterior, and the latter depending on the former, like the propositions in Euclid, certain preparatory disciplines are requisite to the perfect comprehension of these doctrines. Hence a legitimate student of this philosophy must be skilled in mathematics, have been exercised in all the logical methods, and not be unacquainted with physics. He must also be an adept in the writings of Aristotle, as preparatory to the more sublime speculations of Plato. And in addition to all this, he must possess those qualifications enumerated by Plato in the 7th book of his Republic; viz. he must have naturally a good memory, learn with facility, be magnificent and orderly, and the friend and ally of justice, truth, fortitude, and temperance. Since the revival of letters however, this philosophy has not been studied by men, who have had the smallest conception that these requisites were indispensably

<sup>1</sup> It is well said by Petwin, alluding to this philosophy, "that there are certain truths acquired by a long exercise of reason, both in particular, and likewise in those subjects that are most general, as much, perhaps, out of the reach of the greatest mathematician, as the speculations of Newton are above the capacity of some that are now called mathematicians."

necessary, or who have attempted the acquisition of it, in this regular and scientific method. Hence, they have presumed to decide on the excellence of works, with the true merits of which, as they were thus unqualified, they were wholly unacquainted, and to calumniate what they could not understand. They appear likewise to have been ignorant, that Plato, conformably to all the other great philosophers of antiquity, wrote in such a way as to conceal the sublimest of his doctrines from the vulgar, as well knowing, that they would only be profaned by them without being understood; the eye of the multitude, as he says, not being sufficiently strong to bear the light of truth. Hence, as Proclus well observes, <sup>1</sup> "it is needless to mention, that it is unbecoming to speak of the most divine of dogmas before the multitude, Plato himself asserting that all these are ridiculous to the many, but in an admirable manner are esteemed by the wise. Thus also, the Pythagoreans said, that of discourses some are mystical, but others adapted to be delivered openly. With the Peripatetics likewise, some are esoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himself, wrote some things conformable to truth, but others to opinion; and Zeno calls some assertions true, but others adapted to the necessary purposes of life." The men therefore, who have defamed the latter Platonists, being thus unqualified, and thus ignorant of the mode of writing adopted by the great ancients, finding from a superficial perusal of the most genuine disciples of Plato many dogmas which were not immediately obvious in his writings, and which were to them incomprehensible, confidently asserted that these dogmas were spurious, that the authors of them were delirious, and that they had completely corrupted and polluted the philosophy of their master. It may also be added, as Olympiodorus justly observes, that the writings of Plato like those of Homer, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and in short, multifariously; and that he who does not thus consider them, will in vain attempt to unfold the latent meaning they contain. By the latter Platonists however, they have been explored in this way, and he who is capable of availing himself of the elucidations of these most benevolent and most sagacious men, will find the arduous sublimities of Plato accessible, his mystic narrations conformable to scientific deductions, and his apparent obscurity, the veil of conceptions, truly

<sup>1</sup> Οτι δε απρεπη τα θειωτατα των δογματων εστιν, εις ακους φερομενι των πολλων, ουδεν δει λεγειν, αυτου Πλωτωνος ειποτος, ως πασα ταυτα καταχελυστα μεν εστι τοις πολλοις, θανμαστως δε αξια τοις σοφεις. ουτω δε και οι Πυθαγορειαι των λογων τους μεν εφασκον ειναι μυστικους, τους δε υπαιθριους, και οι εκ του Περιπατου, τους μεν εσωτερικους, τους δε εξωτερικους, και αυτος Παρμενιδης, τα μεν προς αληθειαν εγραφε, τα δε προς δεξιν, και ο Ζηνων δε τους μεν αληθεις ελαλει των λογων, τους δε χρειωδεις.

Procl. MS. Comment. in Parmenid.

luminous and divine. And thus much as to the cause of the prevailing iniquitous opinion, respecting the writings of the latter Platonists; for the authors of it, I have not been able to discover. But of this I am certain, and posterity will confirm the decision, that whoever they were, they were no less ignorant than arrogant, no less contemptible than obscure.

With respect to the following translation, I have only to observe, that I have endeavoured to the utmost of my ability to unite in it faithfulness with perspicuity, and to preserve the manner as well as the matter of the original. Independent of the difficulties inseparable from such an undertaking, and which arise from the abstruseness of the subjects that are discussed in this work, the original abounds with errors, not of a trifling, but of the most important nature; errors, which so materially affect the sense, that no one can read these Commentaries, unless he corrects them, and yet no one can correct the greater part of them, unless he is well acquainted with the philosophy of Plato. Of this the reader may be convinced by perusing the notes which accompany this translation, in which he will find upwards of eleven hundred *necessary* emendations. I call them *necessary*, because they are not the offspring of conjecture, but such as the sense indubitably demands. Of translations too, of this work, I could not avail myself; for of the whole of it there are none; and a Latin translation of a part of the 3d book, by Nicholaus Leonicius 'Thomæus,' is the only aid that has been afforded me in this arduous undertaking. From this translation I have been able, as the learned reader will perceive, to give many important emendations of the printed original, and not unfrequently to add to it, not only particular words, but entire sentences that were wanting.

And now I shall conclude with observing, that though like most others who have laboured greatly for the good, not merely of their country, but of all mankind, I have only met with ingratitude from the public for those labours; and that though on this account I am not much indebted,<sup>1</sup> yet I sincerely wish well to my native land, and to every individual in it. That I have neither been influenced by the expectation of sordid emolument, nor of the honours of the multitude, in the prosecution of these labours, must be evident from the nature of them, to the most careless observer. The most perfect conviction indeed, that a greater good than the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was never imparted by divinity

<sup>1</sup> This translation forms the last part of the *Opuscula* of Thomæus, printed at Venice in the year 1525; which work is so scarce, that Fabricius in his account of the *Life and Writings of Proclus*, (*Biblioth. Græc. Tom. 8.*) says, he never saw it.

<sup>2</sup> According to Plato in the 7th Book of his *Republic*, "that which springs up spontaneously, should not be forward to pay any one for its nurture."

to man, and the consequent persuasion, that I could not confer a more real benefit on the present age and posterity than by a dissemination of it in my native tongue, as they induced me to engage in such a difficult undertaking, have also been attended with the purest delight, from a conviction that I was acting rightly, and therefore in a way pleasing to divinity. Hence in accomplishing this Herculean task, I have been satisfied with exploring myself, and imparting to others, the treasures of ancient wisdom; and with endeavouring to deserve the favourable regard of that ineffable principle, whose approbation is not only the highest honour that either mortals or immortals can obtain, but the most durable and substantial gain.



## NAMES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS QUOTED BY PROCLUS IN THESE COMMENTARIES.

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- ADRASTUS APHRODISIENSIS, one of the genuine Peripatetics, according to Simplicius On the Categories of Aristotle.
- AGLAOPHEMUS, one who initiated Pythagoras in the mysteries of Orpheus.
- ALBINUS, a Platonic philosopher, who flourished about the time of Galen.
- ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, a Peripatetic philosopher, who flourished under the Emperor Severus.
- AMELIUS, a Platonic philosopher, and a disciple of Plotinus.
- AMMONIUS SACCAS, the preceptor of Plotinus.
- ANAXAGORAS, the Clazomenian, flourished about the 70th Olympiad.
- ANTONINUS, a disciple of Ammonius Saccas.
- ARISTOTLE, the disciple of Plato, was born in the first year of the 99th Olympiad.
- ARISTOTLE, the Rhodian.
- ATTICUS, a Platonic philosopher, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.
- CHRYSIPPUS, a celebrated Stoic philosopher, died in the 143rd Olympiad.
- CRANTOR SOLENSIS, the first interpreter of Plato, also a fellow disciple with Xenocrates of Plato, and an auditor of Polemo.
- DEMOCRITUS, the celebrated philosopher of Abdera, flourished about the 80th Olympiad.
- EMPEDOCLES, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, was an auditor when a young man of Pythagoras.
- EPICURUS, was born in the 109th Olympiad.
- EUDEMUS, the Rhodian, a disciple of Aristotle, and to whom Aristotle inscribed his Eudemian Ethics.
- EURYMACHUS, the Epicurean.
- GALEN, the physician, who was also a Platonist. He wrote 200 Volumes, most of which were burnt in the temple of Peace, and flourished under the Emperor Adrian.
- HARPOCRATION, the Platonist, an Argive, and the familiar of Augustus Cæsar.
- HERACLIDES PONTICUS, a disciple of Plato and Speusippus.
- HERACLITUS EPHESIUS, surnamed *the obscure*, flourished about the 70th. Olympiad.
- HERMES TRISMEGISTUS.
- JULIAN, the Theurgist, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.
- IAMBlichus, a Platonic philosopher, surnamed *the divine*, flourished under the Emperor Constantine.

**NICOMACHUS**, the Pythagorean, was, according to Fabricius, somewhat posterior to the age of Antoninus Pius.

**NUMENIUS**, a Pythagoric and Platonic philosopher, flourished prior to Plotinus.

**OCELLUS LUCANUS**, an auditor of Pythagoras, and one of his most eminent disciples.

**ORIGEN**, (not a father of the Church,) a disciple of Plotinus.

**PARMENIDES**, the Elean, a Pythagoric philosopher, flourished about the 70th Olympiad.

**PEREGRIDES**, the Syrian, the preceptor of Pythagoras.

**PHILOLAUS**, of Tarentum, an eminent Pythagorean philosopher, and an auditor of Pythagoras.

**PLATO**, was born in the 4th year of the 88th Olympiad, and died in the 108th Olympiad.

**PLOTINUS**, one of the most eminent of the Platonic philosophers, flourished under the Emperors Gordian and Galienus.

**PLUTARCH**, of Charonea, in Bœotia, the preceptor of Trajan, and the celebrated biographer.

**PORPHYRY**, a disciple of Plotinus, and distinguished by the appellation of *the philosopher*.

**POSIDONIUS**, a Stoic philosopher, flourished under the reign of Julius Caesar.

**PRAXIPHANES**, a disciple of Theophrastus.

**PROCLUS MALLOTES**, is mentioned by our Proclus as one of the ancient philosophers.

**PYTHAGORAS**, the father of philosophy, flourished about the 60th Olympiad.

**SEVERUS**, a Platonist, but the time in which he flourished is not known.

**SOCRATES**, the celebrated preceptor of Plato, was born in the 4th year of the 77th Olympiad.

**SOCRATES**, the Platonist, was posterior in time to Amelius.

**SOLOON**, the Legislator, flourished about the 46th Olympiad.

**STRATO LAMPSACENS**, an auditor and successor of Theophrastus.

**SYRIANUS**, the preceptor of Proclus. See the notes to this work.

**THALES**, was born in the first year of the 35th Olympiad, and died in the 58th Olympiad.

**THEODORUS ASINÆUS**, a disciple of Plotinus, and surnamed *the great*.

**THEOPHRASTUS**, the celebrated disciple and successor of Aristotle.

**XENARCHUS**, a Peripatetic philosopher, and the friend of Augustus Caesar.

**XENOCRATES**, a disciple, and successor of Plato.

**XENOPHANES**, the Colophonian, author of the Eleatic method of reasoning, flourished in the 60th Olympiad. For an account of this method, see the additional notes on this work.

**ZENO ELEATES** was an auditor of Parmenides, and flourished about the 86th Olympiad.

N. B. The Olympic games were restored by Iphiclus, 442 years after their first institution, and about 777 years before Christ. From this last institution the Greeks began to reckon by Olympiads, each of which contained the space of 4 years. And this continued even to the reign of Constantine.

## AN EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN TERMS USED BY PROCLUS IN THIS WORK.

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- το αναγωγικόν. **THE ANAGOGIC.** That which elevates the soul from sensibles to intelligibles.
- αλλοιωσις. **ALLIATION.** Change in quality.
- αποκαταστασις. **APOCATASTASIS.** Restitution to a pristine form, or condition of being.
- το γενεσιουργικόν. **THE GENESIURGIC.** That which is effective of generation.
- ο δαιμονιος Αριστοτέλης. **THE DÆMONIACAL ARISTOTLE.** This philosopher was thus denominated by the ancients, from his transcendent physiological knowledge; nature being proximately governed by *dæmons*, or those powers that subsist between Gods and men.
- γένεσις. **GENERATION.** A flowing condition of being, or a subsistence in becoming to be. Hence, το γιγνισθαι signifies an extension in subsistence, or a tendency to being.
- δημιουργος των όλων. **THE DEMIURGUS OF WHOLES.** The maker of the universe is thus denominated, because he produces the universe, so far as it is a *whole*, and likewise all the *wholes* it contains, by his own immediate energy, other subordinate powers co-operating with him in the production of parts. Hence he produces the universe *totally* and *at once*.
- διανοια. **DIANOIA.** The discursive energy of reason; or it is that power which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect.
- δοξα. **OPINION.** Is the last of the gnostic powers of the rational soul; and knows *that* a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or *why* it is. For the knowledge of the *ὅτι*, or *why* a thing is, belongs to διανοια.
- το επιθυμητικόν μέρος της ψυχης. **THE EPITHYMETIC PART OF THE SOUL,** or that part of the soul which is the principle of all-various desires. But *desire* is well defined, by the Pythagoreans, to be a certain tendency, impulse, and appetite of the soul, in order to be filled with something, or to enjoy something present, or to be disposed according to some sensitive energy. They add, that there is also a desire of the contraries to these, and this is a desire of the *evacuation* and *absence*, and of having no sensible perception of certain things.
- εικονικως. **ICONICALLY.** A thing is said to subsist *iconically*, when it subsists after the manner of an image.
- ειδολικως. **IDOLICALLY.** Adumbratively.
- ενθεαστικως. **ENTHEASTICALLY.** In a divinely-inspired manner.
- ενιαίως. **UNICALLY.** In a way conformable to the nature of *the one*.
- το μετακίνητον. **THE ALTER-MOTIVE.** That which is moved by another thing, and not by itself.
- θυμος. **ANGER.** An appetite of the soul directed to the avengement of incidental molestations.
- λογoi. **REASONS.** Productive principles or powers; and they also signify forms.
- μορφη. **MORPHE.** Pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies..

πολυδυναμος. **MULTIPOTENT.** Possessing much power.

νοερα επιβολη. **INTELLECTUAL PROJECTION.** The immediate energy of intellect is thus denominated, because it is an intuitive perception, or an immediate darting forth, as it were, to its proper object, the intelligible.

νους. **INTELLECT.** In the human soul is the summit of *dianoia*, and is that power by the light proceeding from which, we perceive the truth of axioms. But in divine natures it is a self-subsistent, impartible, eternal essence, perceiving all things at once.

ολοτης. **WHOLENESS.** A whole which has a perpetual subsistence, and which comprehends in itself all the multitude of which it is the cause.

πληρωμα. **PLENITUDE, OR COMPLETENESS.** Is a whole which gives completion to the universe.

το κρητον, η νοερον, η ψυχικον πλατος. **THE INTELLIGIBLE, OR INTELLECTUAL, OR PSYCHICAL BREADTH;** i. e. the extent of the progression of the intelligible, of intellect and of soul, and of each of these according to its own order, and not according to a progression into an inferior order.

το συνδυεν. **THE COMPOSITE.** I have used the word *composite* instead of *compounded*, because the latter rather denotes the mingling, than the contiguous union of one thing with another, which the former through its derivation from the Latin word *compositus*, solely denotes.

τελεστικη τεχνη. **THE TELESTIC ART.** Is the art pertaining to mystic operations.

φιλοπολεμικης. **PHILOPOLEMIC.** An epithet of Minerva, signifying that she is a *lover of war*; just as she is also called *philosophic*, as being a *lover of wisdom*.

υπαρξις. **HYPARXIS.** The first principle, or foundation, as it were, of the essence of a thing. Hence also, it is the summit of essence.

# PROCLUS

ON

## THE TIMÆUS OF PLATO.

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### BOOK I.

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THAT the design of the Platonic Timæus embraces the whole of physiology, and that it pertains to the theory of the universe, discussing this from the beginning to the end, appears to me to be clearly evident to those who are not entirely illiterate. For this very treatise of the Pythagoric Timæus *Concerning Nature*, is written after the Pythagoric manner; and Plato being thence impelled, applied himself to write the Timæus, according to Sillographus.<sup>1</sup> On this account we have prefixed the treatise of Timæus to these Commentaries, in order that we may know what the Timæus of Plato says that is the same with what is asserted in the treatise of Timæus [the Locrian], what it adds, and in what it dissents. And that we may investigate not in a careless manner the cause of this disagreement. All this dialogue, likewise, through the whole of itself, has physiology for its scope, surveying the same things in images and in paradigms, in wholes and in parts. For it is filled with all the most beautiful boundaries<sup>2</sup> of physiology, assuming things simple for the sake of such as are composite, parts for the sake of wholes, and images for the sake of paradigms, leaving none of the principal causes of nature uninvestigated.

<sup>1</sup> *Viz.* Timon, who was so called from writing scurrilous comic poems.

*Tim. Plat.*

VOL. I.

<sup>2</sup> *I. e.* Final intentions.

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But that the dialogue deservedly embraces a design of this kind, and that Plato alone preserving the Pythagoric mode in the theory concerning nature, has prosecuted with great subtilty the proposed doctrine,—ought to be considered by those who are more sagacious and acute. For since, in short, physiology receives a threefold division, and one part of it is conversant with matter and material causes, but another part also adds the investigation of form, and evinces that this is the more principal cause; and again, since a third part demonstrates that these have not the relation of causes, but of concauses, and admits that there are other causes, which are properly so called, of things generated by nature, viz. the effective, paradigmatic and final cause;—this being the case, among the multitude of physiologists prior to Plato, that directed their attention to matter, there was a diversity of opinion respecting the subject of things. For Anaxagoras, who appears to have seen, while the rest were asleep, that intellect is the first cause of generated natures, made no use of intellect in his explanation of things, but rather employed certain airs and aethers as the causes of things that are generated, as Socrates says in the *Phædo*. But of those posterior to Plato, who were the patrons of a sect, not all, but such of them as were more accurate than the rest,\* thought fit to survey physical form in conjunction with matter, referring the principles of bodies to matter and form. For if they any where mention the producing cause, as when they say that nature is a principle of motion, they rather take away its efficacious and properly effective power [than allow the existence of it] by not granting that it contains the reasons [or productive principles] of the things effected by it, but admitting that many things are generated casually. To which we may add, that they do not acknowledge that there is a pre-existing producing cause of, in short, all physical things, but of those only that are borne along in generation. For of eternal natures they clearly say, that there is no effective cause; in asserting which they are ignorant that they must either give subsistence to the whole of heaven from chance, or evince that what is casual is itself productive of itself.

Plato however alone, following the Pythagoreans, delivers indeed, as the concauses of natural things, a universal recipient, and material form, which are subservient to causes properly so called, in the generation of things. But prior to these, he investigates principal causes, viz. the producing cause, the paradigm, and the final cause. Through these also, he places a demiurgic intellect over

\* Viz. Aristotle, and his followers.

the universe, and an intelligible cause in which the universe primarily subsists, and *the good*, which is established prior to the producing cause, in the order of the desirable. For since that which is moved by another thing, is suspended from the power of that which moves, as it is evidently not adapted either to produce, or perfect, or save itself, in all these it is in want of a producing cause, and is conducted by it. It is therefore, that the concauses of natural things, should be suspended from true causes, from which they are produced, with a view to which they were fabricated by the father of all things, and for the sake of which they were generated. Justly, therefore, are all these delivered, and investigated with accuracy by Plato; and the remaining two, form and the subject-matter, suspended from these. For this world is not the same with the intelligible or intellectual worlds, which, according to some, subsist in pure forms; but one thing in it has the relation of reason and form, and another, of a subject. But that Plato very properly delivers all these causes of the fabrication of the world, viz. *the good*, the intelligible paradigm, the maker, form, and the subject nature, is evident from the following considerations. For if he had spoken concerning the intelligible Gods, he would have evinced that *the good* alone is the cause of these; for the intelligible number is from this cause. But if concerning the intellectual Gods, he would have shown that *the good* and the intelligible are the causes<sup>1</sup> of these. For the intellectual multitude proceeds from the intelligible unities, and the one fountain of beings. And if he had spoken concerning the supermundane Gods, he would have produced them from the intellectual and total fabrication, from the intelligible Gods, and from the cause of all things. For this cause gives subsistence to all things of which secondary natures are generative, but in a primary, ineffable, and inconceivable manner. But since he discusses mundane affairs and the whole world, he gives to it matter and form, descending into it from the supermundane Gods, suspends it from the total<sup>2</sup> fabrication, assimilates it to intelligible animal, and demonstrates it to be a God by the participation of *the good*; and thus he renders the whole world an intellectual, animated God. This, therefore, and such as this, is, as we have said, the scope of the Timæus.

This however being the case, the order of the universe is appropriately indicated in the beginning of the dialogue, through images; but in the middle of it,

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *αὐτὴ τούτων* in this place, it is necessary to read *αἰτίας τούτων*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ὅλης* here, it is necessary to read *ολῆς*.

the whole fabrication of the world is delivered; and in the end, partial natures, and the extremities of fabrication, are woven together with wholes. For the resumption of the discourse about a polity, and the narration respecting the Atlantic island, unfold through images the theory of the world. For if we direct our attention to the union and multitude of mundane natures, we must say that the polity which Socrates summarily discusses, is an image of their union, establishing as its end the communion which pervades through all things; but that the war of the Atlantics with the Athenians, which Critias narrates, is an image of the division of mundane natures, and especially of the opposition<sup>1</sup> according to the two co-ordinations of things. But if we divide the universe into the celestial and sublunary regions, we must say that the [Socratic] polity, is assimilated to the celestial order; for Socrates says, that the paradigm of it is established in the heavens; but the war of the Atlantics, to generation, which subsists through contrariety and mutation. These things therefore, for the reasons we have mentioned, precede the whole of physiology.

But after this, the demiurgic, paradigmatic and final causes of the universe are unfolded, in consequence of the pre-existence of which, the universe is fabricated both according to the whole and the parts of it. For the corporeal nature of it is fashioned with forms, and divided by divine numbers; soul also is produced from the Demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic reasons, and divine and demiurgic symbols; and the whole animal is woven together conformably to the united comprehension of it in the intelligible world. The parts likewise of it, are arranged in a becoming manner in the whole, both such as are corporeal and such as are vital. For partial souls being introduced into the world, are arranged about their leading Gods, and through their vehicles become mundane, imitating their presiding deities. Mortal animals likewise, are fabricated and vivified by the celestial Gods; where also man is surveyed, and the mode of his subsistence, and through what causes he was constituted. Man indeed is considered prior to other things, either because the theory respecting him pertains to us who make him the subject of discussion, and are ourselves men; or because man is a microcosm, and all such things subsist in him partially, as the world contains divinely and totally. For there is an intellect in us which is in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same<sup>2</sup> father, and the same vivific Goddess, as the soul

<sup>1</sup> For *antitheton* here, it is obviously requisite to read *antitheton*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αὐτῷ πατρὶ* here, it is necessary to read *αὐτῷ πατρὶ*.



of the universe; also an æthereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body derived from the four elements, and with which likewise it is co-ordinate. If therefore, it is necessary that the universe should be surveyed multifariously, in the intelligible, and in the sensible world, paradigmatically, iconically, totally and partially, it will be well, if the nature of man is perfectly discussed in the theory of the universe.

You may also say that conformably to the Pythagoric custom, it is necessary to connect the discussion of that which surveys with that which is surveyed. For since we are informed what the world is, it is requisite I think to add also, what that is which considers these things, and makes them the subject of rational animadversion. But that Plato directs his attention likewise to this, is evident from what he says near the end of the dialogue, that it is necessary that the intellect of him who intends to obtain a happy life, should be assimilated to the object of his intellection. For the universe is always happy; and our soul will likewise be happy, when it is assimilated to the universe; for thus it will be led back to its cause. For as the sensible man is to the universe, so is the intelligible man to animal itself. But these secondary natures always adhere to such as are first, and parts subsist in unproceeding union with their wholes, and are established in them. Hence, when the sensible man is assimilated to the universe, he also imitates his paradigm after an appropriate manner, becoming a world through similitude to the world, and happy through resemblance to that blessed god [the universe.] The ends also of fabrication are subtly elaborated by Plato, according to genus and species, and also what pertains to meteors, together with productions in the earth, and in animals, such things as are preternatural, and such as are according to nature; in which part of the *Timæus*, likewise, the principles of medicine are unfolded. For the physiologist ends at these; since he is a surveyor of nature. For a subsistence according to nature, exists together with nature; but the preternatural is a departure from nature. It is the business, therefore, of the physiologist to understand in how many modes this aberration subsists, and how it becomes terminated in moderation and a natural condition. But it is the province of the medical art to unfold such particulars as are consequent to these. And in these things especially, Plato has something in common with other physiologists. For they were conversant with the most material, and the ultimate works of nature, neglecting the whole heaven, and the orders of the mundane Gods, in consequence of directing their attention to matter; but they bade farewell to forms and primary causes.

It also appears to me that the demoniacal Aristotle, emulating as much as possible the doctrine of Plato, thus arranges the whole of his discussion concerning nature, perceiving that the things which are common to every thing that has a natural subsistence are, form and a subject, that from whence the principle of motion is derived, motion, time, and place; all which are delivered by Plato in this dialogue, viz. interval, and time which is the image of eternity, and is consubistent with the universe; the various species of motion; and the concauses of things which have a natural subsistence. But with respect to the things peculiar to substances according to an essential division, of these Aristotle discusses in the first place such as pertain to the heavens, in a way conformably to Plato; so far as he calls the heaven unbegotten, and a fifth essence. For what difference is there between calling it a fifth element, or a fifth world, and a fifth figure, as Plato denominates it? But in the second place, he discusses such things as are common to every thing that has a generated subsistence. And with respect to things of this kind, Plato deserves to be admired, for having surveyed with much accuracy the essence and powers of them, and for having rightly preserved their harmony and contrarieties. And of these, such indeed as pertain to meteors, Plato has delivered the principles, but Aristotle has extended the doctrine respecting them beyond what is fit. But such as pertain to the theory of animals, are distinguished by Plato according to all final causes and concauses, but by Aristotle are scarcely, and but in few instances, surveyed according to form. For his discussion for the most part stops at matter; and making his exposition of things that have a natural subsistence from this, he shows to us that he deserts the doctrine of his preceptor. and thus much concerning these particulars.

In the next place it is requisite to speak of the form and character of the dialogue, and to show what they are. It is universally acknowledged, then, that Plato receiving the treatise of the Pythagoric Timæus, which was composed by him after the Pythagoric manner, began to write his Timæus. Again, it is also acknowledged by those who are in the smallest degree conversant with the writings of Plato, that his manner is Socratic, philanthropic, and demonstrative. If, therefore, he has any where mingled the Pythagoric and Socratic peculiarity, he appears to have done this in the present dialogue. For there are in it from the Pythagoric custom, elevation of conception, the intellectual, the divinely inspired, the suspending every thing from intelligibles, the bounding wholes in numbers, the indicating things mystically and symbolically, the anagogic, the transcending

partial conceptions, and the enunciative or unfolding into light. But from the Socratic philanthropy, the sociable, the mild, the demonstrative, the contemplating beings through images, the ethical, and every thing of this kind. Hence it is a venerable dialogue; forms its conceptions supernally from the first principles; and mingles the demonstrative with the enunciative. It also prepares us to understand physics, not only physically, but likewise theologically. For Nature herself who is the leader of the universe, being suspended from, and inspired by the Gods, governs the corporeal-formed essence. And she neither ranks as a Goddess, nor is without a divine peculiarity, but is illuminated by the truly-existing Gods.

If, likewise, it be requisite that discourses should be assimilated to the things of which they are the interpreters, as Timæus himself says, it will be fit that this dialogue also should have the physical, and should also have the theological; imitating nature, which is the object of its contemplation. Farther still, according to the Pythagoric doctrine, things receive a threefold division into intelligibles, things physical, and such as are the media between these, and which are usually called mathematical. But all things may be appropriately surveyed in all. For such things as are media, and such as are last, presubstist in intelligibles after a primordial manner, and both these substist in the mathematical genera; first natures indeed iconically, but such as rank as the third, paradigmatically. In physical entities, also, there are images of the essences prior to them. This, therefore, being the case, Timæus, when he constitutes the soul, very properly indicates its powers, its productive principles, and its elements through mathematical names. But Plato defines its peculiarities by geometrical figures, and leaves the causes of all these primordially pre-existing in the intelligible and demiurgic intellect. And thus much concerning these things; since when we descend to particulars, we shall be able to know more perfectly the manner of the dialogue. But the hypothesis of it is as follows:

Socrates having come to the Piræus for the sake of the Bendidian festival and solemn procession, discoursed there concerning a polity with Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, Glauco and Adimantus, and likewise Thrasymachus the sophist. But on the day after this, he narrates the conference in the Piræus, as it is laid down in the Republic, in the city, to Timæus, Hermocrates and Critæas, and to another fourth anonymous person. Having, however, made this narration, he calls upon the other associates, to feast him in return on the day after this, with the banquet of discourse. The auditors therefore and speakers assembled together

on this day, which was the third from the conference in the Piræus. For in the Republic it is said, "I went down yesterday to the Piræus;" but in this dialogue, "Of those who were received by me yesterday at a banquet of discourse, but who ought now in their turn to repay me with a similar repast." Not all of them however, were present at this audition, but the fourth was wanting through indisposition. What, therefore, you will say, are these three auditors of a discussion about the whole world? I reply, that it is fit the father of the discussion should be considered as analogous to [the Demiurgus, or] the father of works. For the fabrication of the world in words, is the image of the fabrication of it according to intellect. But the triad of those that receive the discussion of Timæus, is analogous to the demiurgic triad which receives the one and total motion of the father; of which triad Socrates is the summit, through an alliance of life immediately conjoining himself to Timæus, just as the first of the paradigmatic triad is united to the father, who is prior to the triad. These things, however, if the Gods please, we shall render more manifest through what follows. As we have therefore spoken concerning the scope and management of the dialogue, have shown how admirable the character of it is, and what is the whole of the hypothesis, and have indicated the adaptation of the persons to the present discussion, it will be proper that, betaking ourselves to the words of Timæus, we should investigate every particular to the utmost of our power.

Since, however, the word *nature*, being differently understood by different persons, disturbs those who love to contemplate the conceptions of Plato, let us in the first place show what it appeared to him to be, and what his opinion was of its essence. For the knowledge of what nature is, whence it proceeds, and how far it extends to productions, will be adapted to the dialogue, which has for its object the physical theory. For of the ancients, some indeed, as Antipho, called matter nature; but others form, as Aristotle, in many places. Others again called the whole of things nature, as some prior to Plato, of whom he speaks in the Laws. Others' denominated nature things which subsist by nature. But others gave the appellation of nature to physical powers, such as gravity and levity, rarity and density, as some of the Peripatetics, and still more ancient physiologists. Others called things which have a natural subsistence the art of God; others soul; and others something else of this kind. Plato, however, does not think fit to give the appellation of nature primarily, either to matter, or material

<sup>1</sup> For *οτι δη* here, it is necessary to read *οτι δε*.

form, or body, or physical powers, but is averse to call it immediately soul. Placing, however, the essence of it in the middle of both, I mean, between soul and corporeal powers, the latter being inferior to it, in consequence of being divided about bodies, and incapable of being converted to themselves, but nature surpassing things posterior to it, through containing the reasons or productive principles of all of them, and generating and vivifying all things, he has delivered to us the most accurate theory concerning it. For, according to common conceptions, nature is one thing, and that which subsists according to, and by nature, another. For that which is artificial, is something different from art, and the intellectual soul is one thing, and nature another. For nature, indeed, verges to bodies, and is inseparable from them. But the intellectual soul is separate from bodies, is established in herself, and at one and the same time belongs to herself and to another. She belongs to another, indeed, in consequence of being participated, but to herself, through not verging to the participant; just as the father of soul is of himself being imparticipable, and, if you are willing, prior to him the intelligible paradigm itself of the whole world. For these follow each other, viz. *itself*; *of itself*; *of itself and of another*; *of another*; *another*. And with respect to the last of these, it is evident that it is every thing sensible, in which there is interval and all-various division. But of the next to this, [viz. that which is of another,] it is nature which is inseparable from bodies. That which immediately precedes this [viz. that which is both of itself and of another,] is soul which subsists in herself, and imparts by illumination a secondary life to another thing. The next to this [or that which is of itself,] is the demiurgic intellect who abides [as Plato says] in himself in his own accustomed manner. And the next to this [or itself,] is the intelligible cause of all things, which is the paradigm of the productions of the Demiurgus, and which Plato on this account thinks fit to call animal itself.

Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this corporeal-formed and sensible essence. She is also the boundary of the extent of incorporeal essences, and is full of reasons and powers through which she directs and governs mundane beings. And she is a Goddess indeed, in consequence of being deified, but she has not immediately the subsistence of a deity. For we call divine bodies Gods, as being the statues of Gods. But she governs the whole world by her powers, containing the heavens indeed in the summit of herself, but ruling over generation through the heavens; and every where weaving together partial natures with wholes. Being however such, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess [Rhea.] [For according to the Chaldaean oracle] "Immense Nature is suspended from the

back of the Goddess;" from whom all life is derived, both that which is intellectual, and that which is inseparable from the subjects of its government. Hence, being suspended from thence, she pervades without impediment through, and inspires all things; so that through her, the most inanimate beings participate of a certain soul, and such things as are corruptible, remain perpetually in the world, being held together by the causes of forms which she contains. For again the Oracle says, "Unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws downward, that Heaven may run an eternal course," &c. So that if some one of those who assert that there are three demiurgi, is willing to refer them to these principles, viz. to the demiurgic intellect, to soul, and to total nature [or to nature considered as a whole,] he will speak rightly, through the causes which have been already enumerated. But he will speak erroneously, if he supposes that there are three other demiurgi of the universe, beyond soul. For the Demiurgus of wholes is one, but more partial powers, distribute his whole fabrication into parts. We must not therefore admit such an assertion, whether it be Amelius or Theodorus [Asinaus] who wishes to make this arrangement; but we must be careful to remain in Platonic and Orphic hypotheses.

Moreover, those who call nature demiurgic art, if indeed they mean the nature which abides in the Demiurgus, they do not speak rightly; but their assertion is right, if they mean the nature which proceeds from him. *For we must conceive that art is triple, one kind subsisting in the artist, in unproceeding union; another, proceeding indeed, but being converted to him; and a third being that which has now proceeded from the artist, and subsists in another thing.* The art therefore, which is in the Demiurgus, abides in him, and is himself, according to which the sensible world<sup>1</sup> is denominated the work of the artificer, and the work of the artificer of the fiery world. But the intellectual soul is art indeed, yet art which at the same time both abides and proceeds. And nature is art which proceeds alone; on which account also it is said to be the organ of the Gods, not destitute of life, nor alone alter-motive, but having in a certain respect the self-motive, through the ability of energizing from itself. For the organs of the Gods are essentialized in efficacious reasons, are vital, and concur with the energies of the Gods.

As we have therefore shown what nature is according to Plato, that it is an incorporeal essence, inseparable from bodies, containing the reasons or productive principles of them, and incapable of perceiving itself, and as it is evident from

<sup>1</sup> It appears to me, that the words *τον αισθητον κοσμον*, are wanting here in the original.

these things that the dialogue is physical, which teaches us concerning the whole mundane fabrication,—it remains that we should connect what is consequent with what has been said. For since the whole of philosophy is divided into the theory concerning intelligible and mundane natures, and this very properly, because there is also a twofold world, the intelligible and the sensible, as Plato himself says in the course of the dialogue,—this being the case, the Parmenides comprehends the discussion of intelligibles, but the Timæus that of mundane natures. For the former delivers to us all the divine orders, but the latter all the progressions of mundane essences. But neither does the former entirely omit the theory of the natures contained in the universe, nor the latter the theory of intelligibles; because sensibles are in intelligibles paradigmatically, and intelligibles in sensibles iconically. But the one is exuberant about that which is physical, and the other about that which is theological, in a manner appropriate to the men from whom the dialogues are denominated: to Timæus, for he wrote a treatise of this kind about the universe; and to Parmenides, for he wrote about truly-existing beings. The divine Iamblichus, therefore, says rightly, that the whole theory of Plato is comprehended in these two dialogues, the Timæus and Parmenides. For every thing pertaining to mundane and supermundane natures, obtains its most excellent end in these, and no order of beings is left uninvestigated. To those also who do not carelessly inspect these dialogues, the similitude of discussion in the Timæus to that in the Parmenides, will be apparent. For as Timæus refers the cause of every thing in the world to the first Demiurgus, so Parmenides suspends the progression of all beings from *the one*. And this is effected by the former, so far as all things participate of the demiurgic providence; but by the latter, so far as beings participate of a uniform hyparxis, [or of an hyparxis which has the form of *the one*.] Farther still, as Timæus, prior to physiology, extends through images the theory of mundane natures, so Parmenides excites the investigation of immaterial forms, prior to theology. For it is requisite after having been exercised in discussions about the best polity, to be led to the knowledge of the universe; and after having contended with strenuous doubts about forms, to be sent to the mystic theory of the unities [of beings.] Having however, said thus much, it is now time to consider the words of Plato, and investigate their meaning to the utmost of our ability.

"[I see] One, two, three, but where, friend Timæus,' is the fourth

\* In all the editions of the Timæus, *ἡμιν* follows after *οὐ φιλεῖ Τιμαίε*, but is wanting in these Commentaries of Proclus.

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person of those who having been received by me yesterday at a banquet of discussion, ought now to repay me with a similar repast?"

Plato here, together with the grace and beauty of the words, raises and exalts the whole period. Praxiphanes however, the disciple of Theophrastus, blames Plato, first because he makes an enumeration of one, two, three, in a thing which is manifest to sense and known to Socrates. For what occasion had Socrates to numerate, in order that he might know the multitude of those that assembled to this conference? In the second place he blames him, because he makes a change in using the word *fourth*, and in so doing, does not accord with what had been said before. For the word *four*, is consequent to one, two, three; but to the *fourth*, the first, second, and third are consequent. These, therefore, are the objections of Praxiphanes. The philosopher Porphyry however directly replies to him, and in answer to his second objection observes, that this is the Grecian custom, for the purpose of producing beauty in the diction. Homer<sup>1</sup> therefore has said many things of this kind:

Full of the brass descending from above,  
Through *six* bull hides the furious weapon drove,  
Till in the *seventh* it fix'd.

And in a similar manner in many other places. Here also the mutation has a cause. For to numerate the persons that were present, was to point them out. For to say one, two, three, is indicative; but he signifies the person that was absent (since it was impossible to point him out) through *the fourth*. For we use the term *the fourth*, of one that is absent. But to the former objection Porphyry replies, that if as many had been present as was requisite, it would have been superfluous to numerate them, but one of them being absent, of whose name we are ignorant, the enumeration of those that are present contains a representation of the one that is wanting, as desiring that which remains, and as being in want of a part of the whole number. Plato therefore indicating this, represents Socrates enumerating the persons that were present, and requiring him who was wanting. For if he had known him, and had been able to manifest him by name, he would perhaps have said, I see Critias, and Timæus, and Hermocrates, but that man I do not see. Since however, he who was absent was a stranger, and unknown to

<sup>1</sup> Iliad. viii. 247.



him, he only knew through number that he was wanting, and manifests to us that so many were present. All these observations, therefore, are elegant, and such others of the like kind as may be devised by some in subserviency to the theory of the words before us. But it is necessary to remember that the dialogue is Pythagorean, and that it is requisite interpretations should be made in a way adapted to the philosophers of that sect.

Such ethical Pythagoric dogmas therefore, as the following, may be derived from the present text: Those men established friendship and a concordant life, as the scope of all their philosophy. Hence Socrates prior to every thing else adduces this, by giving Timæus the appellation of *friend*. In the second place, they thought that the compacts which they made with each other, should be stably preserved by them; and for the fulfillment of these, Socrates desires the presence of the fourth person. In the third place, they embraced communion in the invention of dogmas, and the writings of one, were common to all of them. This also Socrates establishes, calling on them to become both guests and hosts, those that fill, and those that are filled, those that teach, and those that learn. Others, therefore, have written arts concerning disciplines through which they think they shall improve the manners of those that are instructed by them; but Plato delineates the forms of appropriate manners, through the imitation of the most excellent men, which have much greater efficacy than those which are deposited in mere rules alone. For imitation disposes the lives of the auditors, conformably to its own peculiarity. Hence, through these things it is evident what that is about which the philosopher is especially abundant, that it is about the hearing of discussions, and what he conceived to be a true feast; that it is not such as the multitude fancy it to be; for this is of an animal and brutal nature; but that which banquets in us the [true] man. Hence too, there is much in Plato about the feast of discourse. These therefore, and such particulars as these, are ethical.

But the physical Pythagoric dogmas are as follow: They said that every physical production was held together by numbers, and that all the fabrications of nature subsisted conformably to numbers. These numbers however are participated, just as all mundane forms are participable. Very properly, therefore, does the dialogue at its commencement proceed through numbers, and use numbers as things numbered, and not those very things themselves of which they participate. For the monad, duad, and triad are one thing, and one, two, three, another. For the former are simple, and each of these subsists itself by itself;

but the latter participate of the former. Aristotle therefore, is not right in asserting, that these men considered numbers as subsisting in sensibles. For how could this be admitted by those who celebrate number as the father of Gods and men, and the tetractys, as the fountain of ever-flowing nature? But since the dialogue is physical, it makes its commencement from participated numbers, such as are all numbers that are physical. Farther still, these men venerated physical communion, both that which is in generation, according to which all things are rendered effable and commensurate with each other, and that which is in celestial natures. For these impart to each other their proper powers. Rightly therefore, and in a way adapted to the thing proposed, does Socrates think fit, that the same persons should become both hosts and guests.

From these things also, you may survey such theological conceptions as the following: These men generated all things through the first numbers, and which also rank as rulers and leaders; and from three Gods, gave subsistence to all mundane natures. Of these three, the monad, duad and triad, are indicative; so that it is requisite to begin from these, and that he who surveys nature inwardly should look to these. Farther still, the concourses of natural things were also contemplated by other philosophers, as by Anaxagoras and Zeno; but the final, the paradigmatic, and the producing<sup>1</sup> cause, were peculiarly investigated by Plato. These causes therefore are manifested through the above numbers. The final, indeed, through the monad; for it presides over numbers in the order of *the good*. But the paradigmatic through the duad; for the difference of beings separates the primary causes of wholes. And besides this, the duad is the principle of the tetractys of intelligible paradigms. But the producing cause is signified through the triad. For intellect is adapted to the triad, since it is the third from being through life as the medium, or from the father through power, or from the intelligible through intelligence. For as the monad is to the duad, so is being to life, father to power, and the intelligible to intelligence. But as the duad is to the triad, so is life, and also power and intelligence, to intellect. Again, all divine natures are in all, and are united to each other, so that all of them are in one, and each is in all, and they are connected together through divine friendship. The sphere also which is there, comprehends the one union of Gods. Hence Socrates who looks to divinity, very properly begins from communion and concord, and likewise calls the other persons of the dialogue to this. Moreover, the words

<sup>1</sup> For παραποιος here, it is necessary to read ποιητικος.

*feasting and banquet*, are words adapted to the Gods, and especially to the mundane Gods. For they proceed together with the liberated Gods to the banquet and delicate food, as Socrates says in the *Phædrus*: and the feasting on the nativity of Venus, was in conjunction with the great Jupiter. These things therefore, Socrates thinks should subsist analogously with them, in their mutual participations of divine conceptions. And it is not at all wonderful that *Timæus* should feast others, and be feasted by them. Farther still, communications and participations of powers are celebrated by theologists, divine natures filling and being filled by each other. For thus we hear from poets inspired by *Phœbus*, that the Gods communicate with each other in intellectual or providential energies in the works which they effect in the universe.

In golden cups the Gods each other pledge,  
And while they drink their eyes are fix'd on *Troy*.<sup>\*</sup>

They also know and intellectually perceive each other.

For Gods are to each other not unknown.<sup>\*</sup>

But the intelligible according to the Chaldæan oracle is nutriment to that which is intellective. From all which it is evident, that a reciprocation of banqueting, subsists primarily in the Gods. And of men, those that are more wise, imitating in this respect the Gods, impart to each other in unenvying abundance, their own proper intellectual conceptions.

“*TIM.* A certain infirmity has befallen him, Socrates: for he would not willingly be absent from such an association as the present.”

The philosopher *Porphyry* says, that what is apposite is delineated in these words: that this is the one cause with wise men of relinquishing such like associations, viz. infirmity of body; and that it is requisite to think that every thing of this kind depends on circumstances and is involuntary. Another thing also is delineated, that friends should make fit apologies for friends, when they appear to have done any thing rightly, which is contrary to common opinion. The present

<sup>\*</sup> *Iliad* iv. 2 seq.

<sup>\*</sup> *Odyss.* v. 79.

words therefore, comprehend both these, indicating the manners of Timæus, and the necessity of one being absent; exhibiting the former as mild and friendly to truth, but the latter, as an impediment to the life of a lover of learning. But the divine Iamblichus speaking loftily on these words, says that those who are exercised in the survey of intelligibles, are unadapted to the discussion of sensibles; as also Socrates himself says in the Republic, "that those who are nurtured in pure splendor, have their eyes darkened when they descend into the cavern through the obscurity which is there; just as it likewise happens to those who ascend from the cavern, through their inability to look directly to the light." Through this cause therefore, the fourth person is wanting, as being adapted to another contemplation, that of intelligibles. It is also necessary that this his infirmity, should be a transcendency of power, according to which he surpasses the present theory. For as the power of the wicked, is rather impotency than power, thus also imbecillity with respect to things of a secondary nature, is transcendency of power. According to Iamblichus therefore, the person who is wanting, is absent in consequence of being incommensurate to physical discussions; but he would have been willingly present, if intelligibles were to have been considered. And nearly with respect to every thing [in this dialogue] prior to physiology, one of these, i. e. Porphyry, interprets every thing in a more political manner, referring what is said to the virtues, but the other, Iamblichus, in a more physical way. For it is necessary, that every thing should accord with the proposed scope: but the dialogue is physical, and not ethical. Such therefore, are the conclusions of the philosophers about these particulars. For I omit to mention those who labour to evince, that this fourth person was Theætetus, because he was known to those who came out of the Eleatic<sup>1</sup> school, and because we are informed [elsewhere] that he was ill. Hence he is said to have been now absent on account of illness. For thus Aristocles infers, that the absent person was Theætetus, who a little before the death of Socrates, became known to Socrates, and to the Elean stranger. But admitting that he had been long before known to the latter, what is there in common between Timæus and him? The Platonic Ptolemy however, thinks that the absent person was Clitophon: for in the dialogue which bears his name, he is not thought deserving of an answer by Socrates. But Dercyllides is of opinion that it was Plato: for he was absent through illness,

<sup>1</sup> See the beginning of the 7th book of the Republic.

<sup>2</sup> For ἀνεστρατον here, it appears to me to be necessary to read ἐκστρατον.

when Socrates died. These, therefore, as I have said, I omit; since it is well observed by those prior to us, that these men neither investigate what is worthy of investigation, nor assert any thing that can be depended on. All of them, likewise, attempt a thing which is of a slippery nature, and which is nothing to the purpose, even if we should discover that which is the object of their search. For to say that it was either Theætetus or Plato, on account of illness, does not accord with the times. For of these, the former is said to have been ill when Socrates was judged, but the latter when Socrates was dead. But to say it was Clitophon is perfectly absurd. For he was not present on the preceding day, when Socrates narrates what Clitophon said the day before, during the conference in the Piræus; except that thus much is rightly signified by Atticus, that the absent person appears to have been one of those strangers [or guests] that were with Timæus. Hence Socrates asks Timæus where that fourth person was; and Timæus apologizes for him, as a friend, and shows that his absence was necessary, and contrary to his will. And thus much for what is said by the more ancient interpreters.

What, however, our preceptor [Syrianus] has decided on this subject, must be narrated by us, since it is remarkably conformable to the mind of Plato. He says, therefore, that in proportion as the auditions are about things of a more venerable and elevated nature, in such proportion the multitude of hearers is diminished. But the discussion in the Timæus becomes, as it proceeds, more mystic and arcane. Hence in the former discussion of a polity during the conference in the Piræus, the hearers were many, and those who had names were six. But in the second conference, which is narrated by Socrates, those who receive the narration are four in number. And in the present conference, the fourth person is wanting; but the auditors are three. And by how much the discussion is more pure, and more intellectual, by so much the more is the number of auditors contracted. For every where that which is discussed is a monad.—But at one time, it is accompanied with contention; on which account also, the auditors have the indefinite, and the definite is extended into multitude, in which the odd is complicated with the even. At another time, however, the discussion is narrative, yet is not liberated from opposition, and dialectic contests. Hence also, the auditors are four in number; the tetrad through its tetragonic nature, and alliance to the monad, possessing similitude and sameness; but through the nature of the even, possessing difference and multitude. And at another time<sup>\*</sup> the discussion

<sup>\*</sup> It is necessary to supply in this place, the words *οὐκ ἔστιν*.

is exempt from all agonistic doctrine, the theory being unfolded enunciatively, and narratively. Hence, the triad is adapted to the recipients of it, since this number is in every respect connascent with the monad, is the first odd number, and is perfect. For as of the virtues, some of them subsist in souls the parts of which are in a state of hostility to each other, and measure the hostility of these parts; but others separate indeed from this hostility, yet are not perfectly liberated from it; and others are entirely separated from it;—thus also of discussions, some indeed are agonistic, others are enunciative, and others are in a certain respect media between both. Some, indeed, being adapted to intellectual tranquillity, and to the intellectual energy of the soul; but others to doxastic energies; and others to the lives that subsist between these. Moreover, of auditors likewise, some are commensurate to more elevated auditions, but others to such as are of a more groveling nature. And the auditors indeed of grander subjects, are also capable of attending to such as are subordinate; but those who are naturally adapted to subjects of less importance, are unable to understand such as are more venerable. Thus also with respect to the virtues, he who has the greater possesses likewise the less; but he who is adorned with the inferior, is not entirely a partaker also of the more perfect virtues.

Why, therefore, is it any longer wonderful, if an auditor of discussions about a polity, should not be admitted to hear the discussion about the universe? Or rather, is it not necessary that in more profound disquisitions, the auditors should be fewer in number? Is it not likewise Pythagoric, to define different measures of auditions? For of those who came to the homacoion [or common auditory of the Pythagoreans] some were partakers of more profound, but others of more superficial dogmas. Does not this also accord with Plato, who assigns infirmity as the cause of the absence of this fourth person? For the imbecility of the soul with respect to more divine conceptions, separates us from more elevated conferences, in which case the involuntary also takes place. For every thing which benefits us in a less degree, is not conformable to our will. But the falling off from more perfect good is involuntary; or rather it is itself not voluntary. But the falling off which not only separates us from greater goods, but leads us to the infinity of vice, is involuntary. Hence also Timæus says, that this fourth person was absent not willingly from this conference. For he was not absent in such a way as to be perfectly abhorrent from the theory, but as unable to be initiated in greater speculations. It is possible, therefore, for an auditor of disquisitions about the fabrication of the world, to be also an auditor of discussions about a

polity. But it is among the number of things impossible, that one who is adapted to receive political discourses, should through transcendency of power, omit to be present at auditions about the universe. This fourth person, therefore, was absent through indigence, and not as some say, through transcendency of power. And it must be said, that the imbecility was not the incommensuration of the others to him, but the inferiority of him to the others. For let there be an imbecility both of those that descend from the intelligible, and of those that ascend from the speculation of sensibles, such as Socrates relates in the Republic; yet he who becomes an auditor of political discussions, cannot through a transcendency unknown to those that are present, be absent from the theory of physics. It likewise appears to me, that the words "*has befallen him*," sufficiently represent to us the difference between him and those that were present, with respect to discussions, and not with respect to transcendency. His being *anonymous* also, seems to signify, not his being exempt from and circumscribed by those that were present, but the indefiniteness and inferiority of his habit. Plato, therefore, is accustomed to do this in many places. Thus in the Phædo, he does not think him deserving of a name, who in that dialogue answered badly. He also mentions indefinitely,<sup>1</sup> the father of Critobulus, who was absent from the discussion of the subjects that were then considered; and likewise very many others. An auditor therefore of this kind would in vain<sup>2</sup> have been present at these discussions; since of those that were present, Critias indeed himself says something; but Hermocrates is silently present, differing only from him who is absent in a greater aptitude to hear, but being inferior to all the rest, through his inability to speak.

"Soc. It is your business, therefore, O Timæus, and that of the company present, to fill up the part of this absent person."

This also accords with what we have said. For in natures which are more causal and divine, quantity is always contracted, and multitude diminished, but power transcends. And this also is a dogma of the Pythagoreans, with whom the triad is more venerable than the tetrad, the tetrad than the decad, and all the numbers within, than those posterior to the decad. And in short, that which is

<sup>1</sup> For *apistos* here, it is necessary to read *απιστος*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *ο δη τοιοντος ακροατη, ου ματην αν παρεγενετο τοις λογοις*, it appears to me to be necessary to read *ο δη τοιοντος ακροατης ουκ, ματην κ. λ.*

nearer to the principle, has a more primordial nature. But that which is more primordial is more powerful; since all power is antecedently comprehended in the principle, and from the principle is imparted to other things. If, therefore, the principle of things was multitude, it would be requisite that what is more multitudinous, should be more primordial and powerful than what is less so. Since, however, the principle is a monad, that which is more monadic, is more excellent and more powerful than things which are more separated from their cause. Hence Socrates very properly makes a diminution of number to be a symbol of superior perfection, which antecedently comprehends according to power all secondary natures, and fills up their deficiency. But since, as we have before observed, Socrates is the summit of this triad of auditors, and he conjoins himself to the monad that disposes the conference, conformably to the image of demiurgic Gods, it is worth while to observe, how he exempts Timæus from the rest, and how he is extended to him, as to the dispensator of the whole discussion. He conjoins, however, the other auditors to himself, as being inferior to him in desert. For these things may be referred to divine causes, in which the first of the [demiurgic] triad is united to the primary monad, and extends the other parts of the triad to it. It also calls forth, indeed, the productive energy of the monad, but excites the energies of the rest to fabrication. These things, therefore, are conformable to what has been before said. But according to Porphyry, the ethical doctrine contained in these words is this, that friends ought to endure all things for each other, both in words and deeds, and to supply their wants, and cause them to be unindigent, by filling up their deficiency.\* For these are the peculiarities of pure and genuine friendship. Iamblichus, however, having supposed that the anonymous person was superior to those that were present, and was a lover of the contemplation of intelligibles, says, that Socrates indicates by these words, that though generated fall short of the nature of truly-existing beings, yet a certain similitude is divulged from these beings. And conformably to this, the theory which is conversant with nature, participates in a certain respect of the science of intelligibles, and this the filling up the part of the absent person manifests.

17 E "TIM. Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment

\* For το ἐκείνων here, it is necessary to read το ἐλλείπων.



unaccomplished. For it would not be just, that we, who were yesterday entertained by you, in such a manner as guests ought to be received, should not return the hospitality with readiness and delight."

The manners of Timæus are indicated by these words; for they are shown to be superb and modest, elevated and elegant, friendly and philanthropic. For the words "*Entirely so*," indicate his promptitude respecting the absent person, and the perfection of the science according to which he is readily disposed to fill up what is wanting in others; and they also indicate his genuine sincerity. But the words, "*We shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment unaccomplished*," sufficiently present to our view, his firmness in the fulfilment of his promises, and his modesty in speaking of himself. Such, therefore, are the ethical indications that may be surveyed in these words. But the physical indications are these, that the remuneration of discussion, conveys an image of the communion and compensation of powers, through which all things are co-ordinated, and contribute to the one harmony of the universe. Likewise, that the energies of nature are changed according to time, different energies operating at different times on different subjects. For to these indications the words, "*return the hospitality to you, by whom we were yesterday entertained in such a manner as guests ought to be received*," are similar. That which is theologically indicated is this, that the demiurgic cause proceeds through, and fills all things, and cuts off every deficiency through his own power, and his prolific abundance, according to which he leaves nothing destitute of himself. For he is characterised by the super-plenary, the sufficient, and the all-perfect. Moreover, the expression, *return the hospitality*, is derived from the banqueting in divine fables, according to which the Gods pledge each other:

In golden goblets they each other pledge. Iliad IV. v. 2.

being filled with nectar from the mighty Jupiter. Nor is it simply said, *to feast*, but *to return the hospitality* (or *to feast in return*). For a reciprocation of feasting,<sup>1</sup> comprehends the entire, and completely perfect plenitude of banqueting. But this also is seen in wholes. For the visible orders of things call forth invisible powers, through their own consummate aptitude; and the latter through transcendency of goodness perfect the former. All these likewise, are conjoined with each other, and the communication of perfection, becomes the retribution of

<sup>1</sup> For *ἀποτίνας* here, it is necessary to read *ἀναποτίνας*.

calling forth. Farther still, to do all these things, accompanied with justice, conveys an image of the Justice which arranges all things in conjunction with Jupiter. But the *becoming* [or in such a manner as guests *ought* to be received] is an image of the cause which illuminates wholes with demiurgic beauty. And the term *guests*, is an image of the variety which is defined according to divine peculiarities. For each of the divine natures possesses appropriate powers and energies. As therefore Socrates feasted Timæus with the discourses of his own philosophy, thus also each of the Gods, energizing conformably to his proper powers, contributes to the one and transcendent providential attention of the Demiurgus to the whole of things. And these particulars are exhibited as an exercise to the theory of things, which presents itself to the view<sup>1</sup> after the manner of an image, in the introduction to the dialogue.

From these things likewise, the times of the dialogues, the Republic, and the Timæus, are manifest; since the one is supposed to have taken place during the Bendidian festival in the Piræus, but the other on the following day of the festival. For that the Bendidian festival was celebrated in the Piræus on the 19th of April, is acknowledged by those who have written concerning festivals, so that the Timæus must be supposed to have taken place on the 20th of the same month. But if, as will be observed in what follows, this dialogue is supposed to have taken place during the Panathenæan festival, it is evident that this was the less Panathenæa. For the greater were celebrated on the 28th of June, according to the narration of those whom we have just mentioned.

“Soc. Do you remember, therefore, the magnitude and quality of the things which I proposed to you to explain?”

In the first place, it is requisite to attend to the order of the heads of what is said, of which, that concerning the multitude of those that form the conference, is the leader. The next to this pertains to the filling up the part of him who is absent. And the third is that which is now added, and respects the explication of the things proposed to be discussed. But these are in continuity with each other. And with reference to the order, it is requisite to understand the accuracy of the words. For the words “*Do you remember,*” exhibit distributed knowledge in the participations of discourse. For in the Demiurgus the recollection of all

<sup>1</sup> For *εμφανισμενα* in this place, I read *εμφανισμενη*.

things, is a separate, exempt, and uniform knowledge, according to the Mnemosyne which he contains, and which is the firm establishment of divine intelligence. And this in the secondary Gods, is a subordinate intellection; of both which the present persons are images. Through this memory likewise, which pre-exists in the universe, whole souls are established in intelligibles, and the demiurgic reasons, [or productive principles] possess an immutable and an immoveable nature; so that such<sup>1</sup> beings as are deprived of it, as is the case with partial souls, and the natures of things that are generated, fall off from their proper causes. But the terms "*such things*," and "*about which*," are indicative of the quantity and quality of the productive principles, which proceed indeed from the total fabrication, and also proceed from more partial Gods. And with respect to the words "*which I proposed to you to explain*," if they were addressed to Critias and Hermocrates, it is evident how they are to be referred to things, and to the principles of the fabrication of the world; but if also to Timæus, they are not a symbol of transcendence [in Socrates], but of an evocation of the intellectual conceptions of Timæus. Besides these things, however, let us survey the answer of Timæus.

"TIM. Some things indeed, I recollect; but such as I have forgotten, do you recall into my memory."

That which is ethical in these words, you will find to be this, as Porphyry says, that they are a medium between irony and arrogance. For Timæus does not say that he recollects every thing, nor that he recollects nothing; but that he recollects some things, and not others. That which is logical in them is, that they afford a pretext for the summary repetition of the problems: for to do this is the province of dialectic. The physical indication of the words is this, that physical productive principles always remain, and are always refluxive, just as the present remembrance [of Timæus] is partly preserved, and partly lost. For what is said by the man must be transferred to the whole of nature. And the theological indication is, that the one fabrication [which is that of the Demiurgus] possesses indeed from itself, the immutable and undefiled in its generations; but through secondary and third powers, is sustained as it proceeds, and is in itself separate; these powers attending it as guards, and running as it were before it repress the tumult of generated natures. Or rather, that this fabrication is such,

<sup>1</sup> For *οὗτοι* here, it is necessary to read *οὗτοι*.

through placing secondary powers over the subjects of its government. Farther still, *the recalling into the memory*, brings with it an image of the renovation of the productive principles in the universe. For that which is effluxive in them, is circularly recalled to the same, and the similar. And the order of generation remains never-failing, through the circular motion of the heavens. But this motion subsists always after the same manner through intellect which connectedly contains and adorns all its circulation, by intellectual powers. It is very properly, therefore, Socrates that recalls into the memory the discussions, who is the narrator of the polity, of which the celestial is the paradigm.

“ Or rather, if it be not too much trouble, run over the whole in a cursory manner from the beginning, that it may be more firmly established in our memory.”

The polity [of Socrates] being triple, the first description of it was truly difficult on account of sophistical contests; the second was easier than that which preceded it; but the third was [perfectly] easy; containing in itself contractedly every species of a polity. The recapitulation however of it pertains to physical things, through the regeneration which is in them, and the circular return to the same form; from which also, forms permanently remain in the world, revolution recalling their efflux and their destruction. Through this cause likewise, the heavens are perpetually moved, and evolving many periods, return to the same life. What, however, is the reason that in the [first] narration of a polity, Socrates neither makes mention of the persons, nor the promises, but here adds both these? It is because in wholes, paradigms indeed comprehend all the productive principles of images, but the things which proceed from them, have not strength sufficient to comprehend all the power of their causes. As, therefore, in the second description of a polity, mention is made of the persons that were in the first conference in the Piræus, thus also in the third, he commemorates those that were passed over in silence in the first. For effects may be surveyed more perfectly in their more superior causes. You may also say theologically, that Timæus, as being established analogous to the total fabrication, comprehends all the persons, the promises, and the discussions themselves. But Socrates in the Republic, being arranged analogous to the summit<sup>1</sup> of the triple fabrication, fashions only

<sup>1</sup> For ἀκρότης here, it is necessary to read ἀσπορής.

the form of a polity, this form being celestial. Here, therefore, as in one all-perfect animal, all things are comprehended, viz. things first, middle, and last, and all the evolution of wholes. But how, and through what cause is a polity narrated the third time? Is it because the life also<sup>1</sup> of the soul is triple? The first indeed, being that which represses and adorns the irrational<sup>2</sup> part by justice, and governs it in a becoming manner. But the second being that which is converted to itself, and desires to perceive itself intellectually, in consequence of subsisting according to its own justice. And the third ascending to its causes, and establishing in them its proper energies. To which may be added, that "to speak *in a cursory manner*," brings with it an image of a life conspiring to one intellect, which comprehends all things through an intelligible essence. The words also "*run over the whole*" afford an admirable indication of an elevation to the highest end, of perfection, and if you are willing so to speak, of a more eternal intelligence. For this signifies to be more established, and to possess that which is more firm and more eternal about the same things.

"Soc. Let it be so. And to begin: the sum of what was said by me yesterday is this, What kind of polity appeared to me to be the best, and of what sort of men such a polity ought to consist."

Some, considering the resumption of a polity in a more ethical point of view, say that it indicates to us, that those who apply themselves to the theory of wholes, ought to be adorned in their manners. But others think that it is placed before us as an image of the orderly distribution of the universe. And others, as an indication<sup>3</sup> of the whole of theology. *For it was usual with the Pythagoreans, prior to scientific doctrine, to render manifest the proposed objects of enquiry, through similitudes and images; and after this, to introduce through symbols the arcane indication respecting them.* For thus, after the excitation of the intellection of the soul, and the purification of its eye, it is requisite to introduce the whole science of the things which are the subjects of discussion. Here, therefore, the concise narra-

<sup>1</sup> For αἰ τῆς ψυχῆς, it is requisite to read καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς.

<sup>2</sup> For τὸν λόγον here, we must read τὸν αἶσθητον.

<sup>3</sup> In the original οἱ δὲ ἀξιῶσιν ὡς εἰκόνα τῆς τοῦ παντός διακοσμητικῆς προκεισθαι τῆς συμπάσης θεολογίας. But this, in the latter part, is evidently defective. After προκεισθαι therefore, it appears to me to be necessary to add the words, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐνδείξιν, agreeably to the above translation.

tion of a polity, prior to physiology, iconically places us in the fabrication of the universe; but the history of the Atlantics accomplishes this symbolically. For it is usual with fables to indicate many things through symbols. So that the physiologic character pervades through the whole of the dialogue; but differently in different places, according to the different modes of the doctrine which is delivered. And thus much concerning the scope of the proposed words.

That in the present discussion, however, the summary repetition of a polity very properly takes place, may be multifariously inferred. For the political science subsists primarily in the Demiurgus of the universe, as we may learn in the Protagoras. And true virtue shines forth in this sensible world. Hence also Timæus says, that the \* world is known and is friendly to itself through virtue. Farther still, the polity of Socrates being triple, and the first being referred to the total fabrication, as we have elsewhere shown, the form of this is very properly delivered here contractedly, where it is proposed to survey the whole Demiurgus, generating and adorning the universe. These things, therefore, are capable of being still farther discussed. Let us however return to the text, and the words of Socrates. But in these, there is much contention among the interpreters, who oppose each other about a certain punctuation, and with reference to this differently explain the scope of the discussion. For some, making a stop at the word *polity*, define the scope of it to be conformable to the inscription, and adduce Plato as a witness that it is concerning a polity. Others again, making a stop at the words *what was said*, evince that the scope of it is about justice; and that Socrates has given a certain summary of what was said about justice, which is concerning a polity. If, however, it is requisite not to trifle in asserting and contradicting, it must be said that both concur with each other. For the discourse concerning justice, is a disquisition of the polity which is within the soul. For it rightly disposes the communion of the powers that we contain. The discourse, likewise, about a polity, is a discussion of the justice which subsists in multitude. Both, therefore, pertain to the same thing. And *the same thing is indeed justice in the soul, a polity in a city, and gracefulness in the world*. Nor is it fit to separate from each other, things which are conjoined by nature. And thus much for this particular.

\* By an unaccountable mistake the original has Σωπαρην instead of κοσμον in this place, which latter is evidently the true reading.

Longinus however and Origen contend with each other from another principle, about what kind of polity Socrates speaks, in these words; whether about the first, or the middle polity. For in the latter, the polity is seen living physically, politically, and intellectually. Longinus therefore thinks, that what is here said pertains to the middle polity, because Socrates calls the assistants guardians, and says that the guardians are warriors. But Origen is of opinion that what is said respects the first polity. For in this Socrates delivers disciplines to the guardians. We however say in answer to such-like assertions, that it is not proper to divulge the one polity; nor to separate the continuity of life from itself. For the polity is one, perfecting itself, and co-augmenting itself by more perfect additions. But the whole polity possesses the physical in the mercenaries, the warlike in the auxiliaries, and the intellectual in the guardians. So that the discussion is about the whole polity. And it is not proper to contend about these things, but rather to consider this, how the polity may very properly be said to be both subordinate to, and superior to physiology.\* For so far as it has for its matter human concerns, and is desirous of adorning these, it has an order secondary to, and more partial than physiology. But so far as it subsists in universal reasonings, and is arranged incorporeally, and immaterially, it is superior to, and more total than physiology. The world also is a certain polity, and a partial polity [with reference to the intelligible world], because every body is partial. In short, the polity *pre-exists* indeed in the intelligible, but *exists* in the heavens, and subsists in the last place in human lives. So that if it is superior to physical fabrication, it was very properly discussed prior to the Timæus; but if it is inferior to it, because it is an ethical world, but the other is mundane and all-perfect, we are very properly required to recur from things subordinate to such as are of a more venerable nature. And both are true, through the above-mentioned causes. Since, however, as we have said, the form of the polity is universal, and is impressed in a partial matter, hence also Socrates employs the words *what kind* for the sake of the form, but the words *of what sort of men* on account of the matter.

“TIM. And what was said, Socrates, was in the opinion of all of us very conformable to intellect.”

A narration conformable to intellect, but neither conformable to pleasure, nor

\* Here also the original has erroneously *θεολογιας* instead of *φυσιολογιας*.

the decision of the vulgar, indicates the admirable perfection and intellectual nature of the discussion [contained in it]. And prior to this, it obscurely signifies the concordant congress of all secondary causes about one intellect, and one united fabrication. The word *very* too, which is added, unfolds the transcendent union, through which all demiurgic causes converge as to one centre, and one paternal cause of all things.

“ Soc. Did we not then, in the first place, separate husbandmen and other artificers from the belligerent genus?”

The discourse about a polity, and the conglomerated and concise repetition, in a summary way, of the genera contained in it, contributes to the whole narration of the mundane fabrication. For it is possible from these as images to recur to wholes. This very thing also was in a remarkable degree adopted by the Pythagoreans, who investigated the similitudes of beings from analogies, and betook themselves from images to paradigms; which likewise is now in a prefatory manner effected by Plato, who points out to us, and gives us to survey in human lives those things which take place in the universe. For the politics of worthy men are assimilated to the celestial order. It is necessary, therefore, that we also should refer the images which are now mentioned [to their paradigms], and in the first place, what is said about the division of the genera. For this section of genera, imitates the demiurgic division in the world, according to which incorporeal natures are not able to pass into the nature of bodies, nor mortal bodies to leave their own essence, and migrate into an incorporeal hypostasis. According to which, also, mortal natures remain mortal; immortal natures eternally continue to be never-failing; and the different orders of them have paradigmatic causes pre-subsisting in wholes. For if you are willing to arrange the whole city analogous to the whole world; since it must not be said that man is a microcosm, and a city not; and to divide it into two parts, the upper city and the lower, and to assimilate the former to the heavens, and the latter to generation, you will find that the analogy is perfectly appropriate. Likewise, according to a division of it into three parts, you may assume in the city, the mercenary, the military, and the guardian: but in the soul, the epithymetic part, which procures the necessities of the body; the irascible part, whose office is to expel whatever is injurious to the animal, and is also ministrant to our ruling power; and the rational part, which is essentially philosophic and has a regal authority over the whole of our life. In every multi-



tude of souls, however, there are, that which performs the part of a mercenary about generation, that which is ministrant to the mundane providence of the Gods, and that which is elevated to the intelligible. But in all mundane natures, there are, in short, the tribe of mortals, the tribe of daemons,<sup>1</sup> and the order of the celestial Gods; for they are truly the guardians and saviours of the whole of things. And again, daemons precede as in a solemn procession the fabrication of the celestial Gods, and suppress all the confusion and disorder in the world. There is likewise a certain physical providence of mortal natures, which generates and comprehends them conformably to a divine intellect.

Farther still, according to another division, the agricultural tribe of the city is analogous to the Moon, which comprehends the sacred laws of nature, the cause of generation. But the inspective guardian of the common marriages, is analogous to Venus, who is the cause of all harmony, and of the union of the male with the female, and of form with matter. That which providentially attends to elegant allotments, is analogous to Hermes, on account of the lots of which the God is the guardian, and also on account of the fraud which they contain. But that which is disciplinative and judicial in the city, is analogous to the Sun, with whom, according to theologists, the mundane Dice, *the elevator and the seven-fold* reside. And that which is belligerent, is analogous to the order proceeding from Mars,<sup>2</sup> which governs all the contrarieties of the world, and the diversity of the universe. That which is royal, is analogous to Jupiter, who is the supplier of ruling prudence, and of the practical and adorning intellect. But that which is philosophic, is analogous to Saturn, so far as he is an intellectual God, and ascends as far as to the first cause. These things, therefore, may thus be assumed through analogies. Plato, however, appears to have divided the city into two parts, and to have established as one genus, that which is agricultural and that which pertains to the arts, which is called *demiurgic*; but that which is belligerent, as another; not that he now recapitulates the military polity, as Longinus says, but because through the word *belligerent*, he comprehends the auxiliaries and the guardians. For of these, the former war with their hands, but the latter by their counsels. Just as also among the Greeks, Ajax indeed fights, as being the barrier of the Greeks, and Nestor likewise fights, who is the guardian of the Greeks; the latter as a defender, repelling the enemy by his counsels; but the former, by employing his hands. Unless it should be said, that Plato now

<sup>1</sup> For το δαιμον φύλον in this place, it is necessary to read το δαιμονίων φύλον.

<sup>2</sup> For γεωργική, which occurs here by a strange mistake, it is obviously necessary to read ἀρχική.

peculiarly makes mention of the military tribe, because he wishes to narrate the warlike actions of a polity of this kind.

“ Soc. And when we had assigned to every one that which is accommodated to his nature, and had prescribed one employment only to each of the arts,<sup>1</sup> we likewise assigned to the military tribe one province only.”

In the first place, there is a two-fold reading of these words. For it either is “ And when we had prescribed one employment conformable to nature to each of the citizens, in order that each might perform his proper work,” or, “ When we had prescribed to each to pursue an employment conformable to nature, which is adapted to each according to the present aptitude of his nature.” In the next place, it must be enquired through what cause Socrates makes such a division, or on what account he says, “ *that each employment is rightly pursued by him who is naturally adapted to it, and who in a becoming manner engages in it.*” For neither is diligent attention, when deprived of aptitude, able to accomplish with rectitude any thing perfect, nor can dexterity without diligent attention proceed into energy. The end, therefore, is from both. If, however, this be the case, it is not possible for him who engages in many works, to be similarly adapted to all of them, or to pay attention similarly to all; in consequence of his ardor being divided about a multitude of things. Hence in this case, the pursuits of the citizens must necessarily appear to be of a viler nature. But if this is not right, one employment should be assigned to each of the citizens, to which he to whom it is distributed is adapted, and he should be ordered to extend all his care and attention to one thing. For he who is properly adapted to this particular life, and pursues it in a becoming manner conformably to nature, will, it is likely, perform in the best way his proper work. In human politics, therefore, it is easy to survey a division of this kind; for our nature is partible. But how is this true with respect to the Gods? For a divine nature is all-powerful and all-perfect. Or may we not say that with the Gods all things are in all of them, but that each is all things according to the peculiarity of himself, and possesses the cause of all things, one after a Solar, but another after a Mercurial manner? For peculiarity originating from the divine unities, proceeds through intellectual essences, through divine souls, and through the bodies of these souls. Hence of these,

<sup>1</sup> The words *κααστη τεχνη* are omitted in the text of Proclus.

some participate of demiurgic, others of prolific, others of connective, and others of a dividing power. And after this manner they energize about generation. In divine natures themselves therefore peculiarity pre-exists, defining the unities according to the infinity which is there, and the divine duad. But in intellects, difference is pre-existent, which separates wholes and parts, and distributes intellectual powers, imparting a different peculiar order to a different intellect, through which the purity of intellects is not confounded. In souls progression and division pre-subsist, according to a different life in different souls, some of them being allotted a divine, others an angelic, others a demoniacal, and others a different hyparxis. But in bodies, interval pre-exists, producing different powers in different bodies. For in these, there are ultimate representations of intelligibles, according to which this particular body is effective of this thing, but another of that. And this body has a sympathy with this thing, but another sympathizes with something else. As, therefore, in this universe, each thing acts according to nature upon that which it was arranged by the fabrication of things to act upon; thus also in the city, the employments of the citizens are divided, and each is arranged to perform that for which he is naturally adapted. What, therefore, the works are of the military tribe, Timæus clearly shows in what follows:

“I mean that they ought to be only guardians of the city, so as to protect it from the hostile incursions both of external and internal enemies; but yet in such a manner as to administer justice mildly to the subjects of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with war-like fierceness towards their enemies in battle.”

In these words Plato is willing that the guardians and auxiliaries should be judges of those that act ill within the city, but contenders against those that are out of it; in one way the auxiliaries, and in another the guardians, as we have before observed. To be *only guardians*, however, is not a diminution of power. For when we assert of the first cause that he is one alone, we do not by this diminish him, and entirely enclose him within narrow bounds; since neither is that which is *only* the most excellent, diminished by being so. But on the contrary, every addition to a thing of this kind is a diminution; so that by asserting *not only* of a thing which was such from the beginning, you diminish its excellence. And thus much for such-like particulars.

Again, however, it is requisite to consider how we may survey what is now

said in wholes. For what is that which is external in the universe? And how can it be said that the universe does not comprehend all things? May we not reply, that evil has a two-fold subsistence in the world, viz. in souls and in bodies? And it is necessary that those who exterminate confusion and disorder from the universe, should extend justice and measure to souls, but should be antagonists to the unstable nature of matter. For some souls, indeed, are naturally adapted to the intelligible, on which account, also, they may be said to be *internal*, and to belong to the extent of the intelligible universe; but others, being material and remote from the Gods, are in a certain respect aliens, strangers, and external. Hence, those who are the accomplisners of justice, use the former mildly, as being naturally friends; but are severe to those that are borne along in bodies in a confused and disorderly manner, as being incommensurate towards them, and as entirely abolishing their privation of order, and amputating the inexhaustible avidity of matter. For some things, indeed, cannot sustain ornament of this kind, but immediately vanish into non-entity. But others, which are moved confusedly and disorderly, are repressed by the justice which prevails in the universe, and by the invincible<sup>1</sup> strength of the order of guardian powers. Hence he now says, that they are *severe* to those who are hostile to the city. For they are such as cannot endure to behold them. In short, there are elevating and cathartic powers about souls, and also inspective guardians of judgment and justice. And it is evident, that some of these are analogous to guardians, but others to auxiliaries. About bodies, too, some are connective, but others dissolving powers: and it is manifest that some of these are analogous to guardians, but others to those that are belligerent. For these powers expand into the universe, things which are no longer able to remain in their proper series, in order that all things may have an arrangement, and that nothing may be indefinite or confused. If, likewise, you direct your attention to the Demiurgus himself of wholes, and to the immutable and invariable nature of the intellects, which divine poetry calls the guards of Jupiter, you will also have in the father [of the universe] the pre-existent cause of these two-fold genera. For through the demiurgic *being* which he contains, he adorns all things; but through the immutable guard which is established in himself, every eternal order remains, all disorder being entirely abolished. You may also see there Justice governing all things in conjunction with Jupiter. For Justice follows him, being

<sup>1</sup> For ἀνάρηστον here, it is necessary to read ἀνατάρηστον.

the avenger of the divine law. At the same time too, you may perceive the armed order with which he arranges the universe, as those assert who have written the wars of the Titans and Giants. These things, however, we shall hereafter discuss.

The words, however, *external* and *internal*, may be understood as follows: The confused and disordered flux of bodies, at one time arises from the impotence of the reasons, [or productive principles participated by bodies,] and at another, from the inexhaustible avidity of matter. Reasons, however, are familiar and allied to producing causes; but matter, through the indefiniteness of itself, and the remoteness of its diminution, is a stranger to its adorning causes. Hence, the invincible strength of the Gods, and the immutable guard of fabrication, all-variously subverting its confusion, renovates the reasons of matter, and remedies their imbecility; but vanquishes the avarice of matter. Not that matter resists the Gods who produced it, but that because on account of its indefiniteness it flies from ornament, it is vanquished by forms through the demiurgic guard, against which nothing is able to prevail. But it is necessary that all things in the world should be obedient to it, in order that they may perpetually remain, and that the Demiurgus may be the father of eternal natures.

“Soc. For we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be of such a nature, as at the same time to be both irascible and philosophic in a remarkable degree; so that they might be mild to their friends, and severe to their enemies.”

The philosophic and the irascible comprehend both the genera, viz. the auxiliary, and that which is peculiarly called the guardian genus, just as the epithymetic accords with the third genus, which is called the mercenary. For because Socrates distinguishes the upper from the lower city, he manifests by these two-fold names the differences of the orders contained in the city; just as if some one having divided the world into heaven and generation, should say that in the former there are daemoniacal and divine orders, and should call both of them the guardians of generation and the universe. For the universe is guarded by the Gods, and it is also guarded by dæmons. By the former indeed totally, unically, and exemptly; but by the latter partially, multitudinously, and in a manner more proximate to the natures that are guarded by them. For about every God a multitude of dæmons is arranged, which divides his one and total

providence. The term philosophic, therefore, pertains to the Gods, so far as they are united to the intelligible, and so far as they are filled with being. But the irascible pertains to demons, so far as they exterminate all confusion from the universe, and so far as they are the saviours of the divine laws, and of the sacred institutions of Adrastia. Through these causes, however, they are mild to their familiars, aptly applying a remedy to their imbecility, as being allied to them by nature, but severe to those that are external [i. e. to those that are strangers to them] as abolishing the indefiniteness of their nature, in an exempt manner, and according to supreme transcendency.

“Soc. But what did we assert concerning their education? Was it not that they should be instructed in gymnastic exercises, in music, and all other becoming disciplines?”

The assertions that have been already made, are certain common types, extending to all things, according to the deniurgic allotment, and divine difference, defining employments adapted to every one, and distributing powers appropriately to the recipients. But in the present words, the life of the citizens is unfolded, through education, employments, communion, and the procreation of children, proceeding in a becoming manner from the beginning to the end. What then is education, and how is it assimilated to the universe? For in the [Socratic] city, it is the discipline of the soul, rightly adorning the irrational part through music and gymnastic, the former giving remission to the strength of anger, but the latter exciting desire, and rendering it as it were elegant and commensurate with anger, in consequence of its being vehemently remiss, and through its descent to a material nature, filled from thence with a privation of life. But this discipline adorns reason through the mathematical sciences, which have something of an attractive nature, are capable of exciting in us the recollection of true being, and elevate our intellectual part to that which is itself the most splendid of being. All which is evident to those who are not entirely forgetful of the arrangements in the Socratic republic.

It is now, however, our business to investigate, what education, gymnastic and music are in the universe, and what the disciplines are of the guardians of the universe. Perhaps, therefore, we shall speak rightly if we say, that education is the perfection which fills each thing with the good pertaining to it, and causes it to be sufficient to itself, according to intellectual perceptions and providential

energies. But with respect to music and gymnastic, that the former causes the lives in the universe to be harmonious, and the latter renders divine motion rythmical and elegant, so as always to preserve the same form, and the same immutable habit of the divine vehicles. For through these things Plato elsewhere calls divine souls Sirens, and shows that the celestial motion is harmoniously elegant; for gymnastic is indeed in them. But medicine is in things sublunary in consequence of their receiving that which is preternatural. If, therefore, we assert these things, we shall, as I have before observed, perhaps speak rightly. For powers proceed supernally from intelligibles to all heaven, and impart to the celestial lives by illumination the most excellent harmony, and to their vehicles undecaying strength. But the disciplines which are in the universe, are the intellectual perceptions of souls, and of celestial natures, according to which they run back to the intelligible, following the mighty Jupiter, and surveying number characterized by unity, the truly-existing heaven, and intellectual figure. Hence you may say, that the most true arithmetic, astronomy and geometry are in them. For they behold swiftness itself, and slowness itself, which are the paradigms of the celestial periods. And, in short, they survey the primordial and intellectual circulation, divine number, and intellectual figures. You may likewise say, that prior to these, they contain dialectic, according to which they intellectually perceive the whole of an intelligible essence, and are united to the one cause of all the unities. And if it is necessary to speak by making a division, we may say, that through such like disciplines they energize about first natures; but through gymnastic, preside over things secondary with undefiled purity; and through music, harmonically contain the colligation of wholes.

“Soc. We likewise established, that those who were so educated, should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a similar kind, as their own private property.” 18B

Those things which are to be ordained in a city governed by the most equitable laws, have an evident cause, and were mentioned by Socrates in the Republic. But how can we transfer them to the heavens? Must it not be by surveying through what cause men pursue the acquisition of gold and silver, and from what conceptions they are induced to cherish this infinite love? It is evident that it is because they wish to supply their wants, and desire to procure such things as may administer to their pleasures. *For on this account, they are stupidly astonished*

*about much-beloved wealth.* They say, therefore, conformably to Cephalus, that the rich have many consolations. If, however, these things thus subsist, the perfection of the celestial Gods, since it is sufficient to itself, and is converted to the beautiful and the good, is not at all in want of this adventitious and apparent self-sufficiency, nor does it look to convenience, or regard as its scope vulgar utility; but being established remote from all indigence and material necessity, and replete with good, it has a leading and ruling order in the universe. Moreover, it does not admit partible and divided good. But it pursues that which is common and impartible, and extends to wholes, and is especially characterized according to this. Hence it harmonizes with what is now said, "*that those who are so educated should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a similar kind, as their own private property.*"

If you are willing also, it may be said, that *gold and silver, and each of the metals, as likewise other things, grow in the earth, from the celestial Gods, and from an effluxion thence derived.* It is said therefore that gold pertains to the Sun, silver to the Moon, lead to Saturn, and iron to Mars. Hence these are generated from thence. But they subsist in the earth, and not in the celestial Gods who emit the effluxions. For they do not receive any thing from material natures. And all things there, are indeed from all, but at the same time a different peculiarity has dominion in a different divinity,—here, in a Saturnian, but there, in a solar manner; to which those who love to contemplate these things directing their attention, refer one material substance to this, but another to a different power. These things, therefore, are not the private, but the common property of the Gods; for they are the progeny of all of them. Nor do they subsist in them. For as they produced them, they are not in want of them; *but the metals which are here, derive their concretion from the effluxions of the celestial Gods.* Why, therefore, are these things earnestly pursued by men in a partible manner? It is because they have a material life, and are extended to a partial nature, apostatizing from the whole. For on this account there is much among them of *mine* and *not mine.* But they abandon the union and communion of life.

"But that rather, after the manner of auxiliaries, they should receive the wages of guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve; and that their recompense should be as much as is sufficient for temperate men. That besides this, they should spend their stipend in com-



mon, and live cohabiting with each other, and neglecting other pursuits should pay attention to virtue alone."

It is not at all wonderful that in human lives there should be donation and retribution, and a reward of beneficence. For it is well said by Socrates in the Republic, that the mark at which he aims is to render the whole city happy, but not one particular genus of it, such as the guardian. If, however, this be right, it will be requisite that some persons in the city should be the saviours of it by their providential care and prudence, but that others by ministrant aid and servitude, should supply the saviours of the polity with the necessities of life; just as the nature which is in us, by fashioning and preserving the organ, prepares milk for the energies adapted to it. But in the world, what retribution can there be, or what recompense can be made by mortals to the celestial Gods? For may we not say that these are the peculiarities of human imbecility, in consequence of not possessing self-sufficiency, but that every God is sufficient to himself, and in conjunction with the self-sufficient is superfull? Hence through the union of superplentitude with self-sufficiency, he fills all secondary natures with good, but receives nothing from them. Or it may be said, that though divinity receives nothing, as being sufficient and unindigent, yet at the same time he requires certain remunerations from us, retributions of beneficence, the acknowledgment of thanks, and equity, through which we are converted to him, and are filled with greater good. For being good,<sup>1</sup> he is desirous that all things should look to him, and should remember that all things are from him and on account of him. For the preservation of the natures posterior to him, is for each of them to be suspended from a divine cause. If, however, we interpret these things after this manner, referring remunerations to conversions, and the acknowledgment of thanks, how can it still further be inferred, that the Gods cohabit with us in common, and spend a remuneration of this kind? It is better, therefore, to understand remuneration in a more physical way. For since effluxions proceed from the heavens to the mortal place, but exhalations ascend thither, and through these the fabrication of the Gods about mortal natures receives its completion, hence Socrates calls such-like mutations and transitions of terrestrial natures, remunerations or wages from sublunary matter,<sup>2</sup> which are perfected by the heavens, in order that generation

<sup>1</sup> It is necessary after *τῷ αὐτῷ* here to supply the word *υπερπληρὴς*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ἀγαθὸν γὰρ οὐ*, it is obviously requisite to read *ἀγαθόν, κ. λ.*

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *ἀπο τῆς οὐλῆς* in this place, I read *ἀπο τῆς οὐλῆς τῆς ὑποσέληνης*.

may never fail. But it must be said, that the cohabiting in common, is the one conspiracy of divine fabrication, and the concordant providence of the celestial Gods, through which every thing that undergoes a mutation from the earth is consumed, and generation is variously changed through the harmonious dance of the celestial divinities ; to which also Timæus looking says, "*that the whole world is friendly and known to itself through virtue, and that its corruption is the source of its nutriment, in consequence of effecting all things in, and suffering all things from itself.*"

What then is the end of this one and common life of the citizens ? Socrates says virtue, viz. divine virtue. For virtue subsists first with the Gods ; afterwards from them, in the genera superior to man ; and a certain portion of it descends also to us. The guardians of the world, therefore, living conformably to this, are also unoccupied by other pursuits. For they do not look to convenience, nor to externals ; for all things are within themselves. They likewise are the saviours of all things, and fill them with what is beautiful and good, being ministrant to, and co-operating with the one father and Demiurgus of wholes. Since, however, they give measure to the mutations of the earth, not in so doing departing from, but being converted to themselves, and subsisting in themselves, on this account Socrates says, "*a recompense such as is sufficient for temperate men.*" For being temperate and prudent in what relates to themselves, they measure secondary natures, comprehending their all-various mutations in the simplicity of their own life. Thus therefore what is said may be explained in this way. But in another way we may say, that piety and a conversion to the Gods, especially contain a measure, and are occupied by *the good*. This measure, however, is defined by the Gods themselves according to divine prudence, since the Gods are able both to save themselves and others.

170 11 " Soc. Of women too we asserted, that they should be educated in such a manner that their natures might be aptly conformed so as to be similar to those of men ; with whom they should perform in common both the duties of war, and whatever else belongs to the business of life."

Plato very properly thought that the virtues of men and women are common, since he evinces that both have one human form, but not the male one, and the female another. For things which have a different perfection according to form, are also different in species. But things which are the same in species, have like-

wise one and the same perfection. This, however, is denied by others, who assert that there is a difference according to form between men and women, though Plato has shown that it is both possible and advantageous for women to have the same virtues as men. It is possible, indeed, because this, history confirms. For there have been found well-educated women, who have been far superior to men. But it is advantageous, because it is better to have double than half the number of those who exhibit virtue in their works. As therefore we form the male guardians from such a particular education, and from such particular disciplines, thus also we form the female guardians from the same: and in a similar manner, the female warriors from the same institutes as the male.

In order, however, that we may admire in a greater degree the conceptions of Plato, we must betake ourselves to wholes, and to the order of the universe, where we may survey a wonderful conspiracy of the male and female nature. For in the Gods, indeed, these are so connascent with each other, that the same divinity is called both male and female, as is the case with the Sun and Mercury, and certain other Gods. Where also they are distinguished from each other, the works of the male and female that are of the same order, are common, so as that they primarily proceed from the male, but in an inferior degree from the female. Hence, likewise, in mortals, nature evinces that the female is more imbecile in all things than the male. Whatever, therefore, proceeds from the male, this the female also can produce in a diminished degree. Hence Juno proceeds together with Jupiter, generating all things in conjunction with the father. Hence, too, she is said to be equal in rank with Jupiter, as is likewise Rhea with Saturn. For this Goddess is the bosom of all the Saturnian power. Earth also is equal in dignity with Heaven. For Earth is the mother of all things, of which Heaven is the father. And prior to these elements, if we direct our attention to bound and infinity, which rank in the order of principles, we shall find that all things whatever, which proceed into existence, are generated from both these. You have therefore, in the intelligible, in the intellectual, and in the supermundane Gods, the harmonious conjunction of the male with the female. You may also see the same in the heavens. For the whole of generation is governed by the Sun and Moon; in a greater and paternal degree by the former; but secondarily, by the latter. Hence also, the Moon is denominated by some, a lesser Sun. *And among the male divinities in the Sun, there are likewise lunar Gods, and analogous orders.* But if you direct your attention to daemons, you will every where see the providence of these two-fold genera conjoined. For divine female daemons, unitedly effect all

things in a secondary degree, which are accomplished by divine male dæmons primarily. Female psychical likewise, and female corporeal dæmons, have to the males the relation of mothers to fathers, and of duads to monads. For they generate all things with diminution, which the males produce paternally and unitedly. If therefore we before rightly assimilated the guardians to the celestial Gods, but the auxiliaries to dæmons their attendants, and who are ministrant to their providential energies, Plato very properly embraces in these genera, a similar conjunction of the male with the female, and imparts to both common virtue, and common employments; just as Nature binds these genera to, and causes them to procreate the same things in conjunction with each other. But she does not divide the one from the other, since whatever is generated from both is unprolific, when either of them is separated; though there is a greater difference in the physical organs than in the lives of these; yet at the same time in these also, Nature makes the work of them to be common. Much more, therefore, does the communion of them in their employments, and the whole of their life, deserve to be honoured.

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 “Soc. But what did we establish concerning the procreation of children? Though perhaps you easily remember this on account of its novelty.’ For we ordered that the marriages and children should be common; as we were particularly careful that none might be able to distinguish their own children, but that all might consider all as their kindred. That hence those of an equal age might regard themselves as brothers and sisters; but that the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and grandfathers, and the elder might esteem the younger as their children and grandsons.

“TIM. These things indeed, as you say, are easily remembered.”

If some one should inquire why that which is unusual is easily remembered, it is not difficult to reply, that it excites our phantasy in a greater degree as being unexpected; and inserts in us a clearer impression of itself. Moreover, it is easy conformably to Plato, to show how what is here said of marriages and children being common, applies to women. For he wished, according to the intention of

\* In the text of Proclus, αληθειαν is erroneously printed for αληθειαν.

the rulers, that their connexion with men should take place in definite times, accompanied with sacrifices and prayers; and that the woman that had connexion with a man, should not be the property of any one man, but should be separated after connexion, and dwell apart, and again at other times should be copulated with that man whom the guardians might approve. But these things are thus indicated in what is said in the Republic.

Referring, however, the theory of these particulars to nature, let us show how they pertain to the order of the universe. For these things by a much greater priority exist in the Gods, on account of the union of the divinities. For all things<sup>1</sup> are the progeny of all the Gods, though different things are characterized by a different peculiarity. All the Gods likewise are in all, and all are united to all, in conjunction with an unmingled purity adapted to all, to which Socrates directing his attention, embraces this communion, and this distribution of employments, assigning one to each of the arts, conformably to nature. For not to know their own progeny as peculiarly their own, takes place with the Gods. On which account, indeed, their intellectual perceptions, and also their productions are common. Each of them, however, benefits and preserves that which is generated, as being the common offspring of all of them. Moreover, to consider all those as brothers and sisters that are of an equal age, those that are elder as fathers and grandfathers, and the younger as children and grandsons, originates from the Gods, and is transferred from thence to this polity. For similitude of essence, derived from the same cause, is that which is fraternal in them. But prolific cause, is in them that which is analogous to father and grandfather. And an efflux of essence proceeding into a second and third series, exhibits the form of offspring. For that the same Goddess is conjoined with different Gods, or the same God with many Goddesses, may be assumed from mystical treatises, and from what are called Sacred Marriages in the mysteries, which Plato as much as possible imitating in what he ordains about politics and marriages, calls the marriages *sacred*. In physical productive powers also, we may see that there is one and the same recipient of different powers; and one productive power presenting itself to the view in a multitude of recipients, and pervading through many receptacles. But forms are analogous to males, and receptacles to females. Why therefore is this very thing beheld in the universe, but is paradoxical in human lives! I say it is because these lives are cut off from wholes, and every human soul is partible.

<sup>1</sup> For *παντα* here, it is necessary to read *παντα*.

Hence the dogmas which embrace this communion appear to it most difficult to be admitted. If, therefore, some one should take away the condition of his present subsistence, and elevate himself to the whole of things, he would immediately admit this communion, and despise the sympathy which is divided by the multitude. So far, however, as each of us is extended, and minutely distributed about a part, and thus relinquishes the whole and one, so far also he leaps to a life of this kind, which is an unrestrained habitude, a disorderly arrangement, and an indivisible division.

97 "Soc. But that they might from their birth acquire a natural disposition as far as possible the best, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed over the marriage rites should, through the means of certain lots, take care that in the nuptial league, the worthy were mingled with the worthy; that no discord may arise in this connexion, when it does not prove prosperous in the end, but that all the blame may be referred to fortune, and not to the guardians of such a conjunction."

Plato particularly assumes in his Republic similitude, sameness, and geometrical, in conjunction with arithmetical equality, in order that the similitude of it to the heavens, as in sensibles, or to the intelligible, as in super-celestial lives, may be perfectly preserved. For through this cause, in marriages also, he preserves the union of the best woman with the best man, and of the less excellent woman with the less excellent man. For in the Gods likewise, primary natures are more consascent with those of the first rank, and secondary with those of the second rank; and together with union there is unmingled purity. Hence in the second genera after the Gods, a distribution of this kind conformably to the intention of the Gods, is effected according to desert. On this account, divine female demons are co-arranged with divine male demons, psychical female with psychical male, and material female with material male demons. And every where, the analogous in order proceeds as far as to the last of things. To which we may add that the rulers contriving that this connexion may take place latently, sufficiently adumbrates to us that the cause of such a conjunction of genera subsists unapparently with the Gods; being thence primarily derived, but secondarily from demons,<sup>1</sup> and from the order of each, which *the lot* indicates; possess-

<sup>1</sup> It is necessary here to insert the words, *απο των δαιμονων*.

ing the power of colligation from similitude of life, according to which each is co-arranged with the similar, the divine with the divine, the material with the material, and that which has a middle subsistence, with the middle. On this account, likewise, all sedition and dissension is removed from divine natures, each loving that which is allied to itself, according to its own order, perceiving that this order is spontaneous, and not adventitious and devised; of all which, the citizens being conjoined in marriage by lot, and not looking to elegance and ornament in the connexion, is an image. For in natural things, also, receptacles are distributed to forms appropriately; and each form may ascribe the cause of its own co-ordination to material variety. At the same time, likewise, this is effected according to causes<sup>1</sup> which preside over the whole fabrication of things, and which are analogous to guardians. And thus much, therefore, has been said, for the sake of the theory of wholes.

Longinus, however, doubts here, whether Plato was of opinion, that souls are emitted together with the seed: for in order that they may become most excellent, he conjoins similars with similars. And Porphyry replies indeed to the doubt, but not satisfactorily. Our preceptor, however, thinks that in the first place it should be observed, that Plato himself adds, "In order that they might acquire a *natural* disposition as far as possible the best." *For children receive a physical similitude from their parents, and participate of a certain dignity and excellence from their begetters, according to the physical virtues.* In the next place, it must be observed, that though it is not true that souls are emitted together with the seed, yet there is a distribution of the organs according to desert. For all souls are not introduced into casual organs, but each into that organ which is adapted to it.

εσθλα μὲν εσθλὸς εἴνει, χεῖρα δὲ χεῖρσιν ὁσκειν,<sup>2</sup>

says Homer. Farther still, *as an initiator into the mysteries, by placing certain symbols about statues, renders them more adapted to the participation of superior powers, thus also total nature fashioning bodies, by physical productive powers, the statues of souls, disseminates a different aptitude in different bodies for the reception of different*

<sup>1</sup> For τα αἰτιατα here, it is requisite to read τα αἰτια.

<sup>2</sup> Iliad, xiv. vs. 382. i. e. "He gave the good [i. e. the brave] man, good things, but the less excellent character, things of a less excellent nature. In the text of Proclus it is erroneously εσθλα μὲν εσθλα εἴνει, κ. λ.

*souls, the better and the worse*; which the politician likewise rightly understanding, pays attention to the emission of seed in the city, and to all physical aptitude, in order that the most excellent souls may be generated for him in the most excellent natures. And thus much in answer to the doubt of Longinus. But why does Plato conceive it is better to think that Fortune is the cause of this distribution to the citizens? Shall we say it is, because it is advantageous to us to know the cause of things which we think to be good, but better to conceive the presence of such as we apprehend to be evil, to be causeless, than to accuse the cause which distributes these [seeming evils] for a good purpose? For this excites to a contempt, or rather to a hatred of the giver; because every one avoids that which becomes to him productive of evil.

///A "Soc. Moreover, we ordered that the children of the good should be educated, but that those of the bad should be secretly sent to some other city."

These things also are established in the Republic, but by a much greater priority take place in the universe. With respect, therefore, to the productions of Gods and Damons, some genera abide in them, pure and remote from generation, which on this account are called undefiled; but others descend into generation, not being able to remain in the heavens without a downward inclination. And some of these are the offspring of good, but others of less excellent powers. For the term *bad* is indicative of *less excellent*. The horses, therefore, and charioteers of the Gods, are all of them good; but those of partial souls are of a mixed nature.<sup>1</sup> Hence in these, there is preponderation, a verging downward, and a defluxion of wings, which the celestial Gods send into generation, and damons who preside over the descent of souls. The celestial and undefiled genera of souls, therefore, are nourished following the Gods to the banquet and delicious food, as it is said in the Phædrus. And those that are subservient to generation, communicate with it, being latently sent into it from the heavens, as Socrates says, indicating by the word *latent* the invisible and occult cause in the Gods of the psychical descents, and that souls which thence descend, become subject [latently] to another providential inspection, and to other guardians who preside over generation.

<sup>1</sup> This is asserted in the Phædrus. See this explained, in the notes at the end of this Translation.



" Yet so that such of the adult among these as should be found to be of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile ; while, on the contrary, those who were retained from the first in the city as good, but proved afterwards bad, should be similarly banished."

In the Republic, Socrates makes a transition not only from those that were distributed from the upper into the lower city, but also from those of the golden race that were born there. Here, however, the reference is made to those who are recalled from exile. Do these things, therefore, accord with each other ? Perhaps, indeed, it is possible to reconcile what is here said, with what is there determined, if we understand the word *adult*, as not only pertaining to those sent from the upper city, but likewise to all those that are educated in the lower city. For, in short, the natural disposition is to be considered of those adults who were born in the lower city, or of those who were sent from the upper into the lower city, and thus those that are worthy are to be recalled from exile. But if some one is willing to understand the words according to our first explanation of them, it must be said, that what Socrates now delivers is conformable to the things proposed to be considered. For descending [rational] souls again ascend, but not such souls as had their 'ypostasis from the beginning in generation, and about matter, such as are the multitude of irrational souls. And thus much for the words themselves. See, however, how the same things take place in wholes, as those which Socrates ordains in his polity. For some things always have the same order in the heavens, remaining divine and immutable ; but others are always conversant with generation ; and others are in a certain respect the media between both ; at one time, indeed, being suspended from divine natures themselves, but at another being mingled with those that embrace generation. It is not, therefore, the damoniactal genus which ascends or descends, nor is this to be asserted of multiform lives, nor are demons subject to death, but partial souls, which are at one time conversant with generation, and at another are transferred into a divine damoniactal allotment ; which things being known by Socrates in the Republic, he legislatively ordains that which is analogous to them. For the celestial Jupiter presides over the Gods in the heavens, over demons that elevate partial souls [to their paternal port], and also over others that lead souls into generation, in order that the ascents and descents of souls may be never failing in the universe. " For though you should see this particular soul restored to its pristine perfection, yet

the father sends another to be annumerated," according to the divinely-inspired indication<sup>1</sup> about these things.

" Soc. Have we, therefore, again sufficiently resumed the epitome of the discussion of yesterday, or do we require any thing further, friend Timæus, which has been omitted?"

The resumption of the polity teaches us, through images, how the universe is filled with the most excellent productive powers. For generated natures in it are separated from each other, and each communicating with other things, energizes according to its own peculiarity. And primary, indeed, are exempt from secondary natures, yet employ their energies, as necessary to the completion of the universe. But secondary are adorned by primary natures. The most excellent, however, of mundane beings, are connascently conjoined with the most excellent, middle with middle, and last with such as are last. But the same productive powers pervade through many subjects, and the same recipients participate of many productive powers. Lives, also, at different times have different allotments, according to their desert. All these particulars, therefore, sufficiently place before our view the order of the universe. For in definite heads, Socrates has, in a becoming manner, epitomized every form of the polity, recurring to intellectual impartibility, in order that he might imitate the God who adorns the celestial polity intelligibly and paternally. But since every where measures and perfection are definitely imparted to secondary natures from [primary] causes, on this account also Socrates requests Timæus to inform him, whether he has comprehended [in his epitome] every form of the polity. For every intellect being firmly fixed in the deity prior to itself, defines itself by looking to it. To which we may add, that to speak summarily is a symbol of the first parts, and the head of the universe being adorned by the fabricator of the heavens; which the Demiurgus of the universe adorns in a more perfect manner, looking to the whole, and the one life of the world. And thus much respecting the analogy of partial natures to wholes.

The investigation, however, is not attended with any difficulty, whether the words mean, "*Have we now epitomized the polity which we discussed yesterday?*" or "*Have we again epitomized to-day, the polity which we epitomized yesterday?*" For

<sup>1</sup> i. e. According to the Chaldean Oracles.

whether yesterday Socrates spoke more diffusely, but now summarily, or he spoke summarily in both, the divine Iamblichus approves of either of the readings, and we do not at all differ from him. Perhaps, however, the latter construction is more consonant. For again to discuss the polity summarily, manifests that it was summarily discussed yesterday. And it is not at all wonderful, that the summary discussion which took place in the Republic, should not be brought to light. For many other things which are asserted here, as being said on the former day, are not to be found in that dialogue. Unless it should be said that the word *again*, does not refer to the *epitomizing*, but to *resuming* the *discussion*. For he *resumes*, who narrates at great length what had been before said; but he *again resumes*, who summarily contracts the narration. But whichever of the constructions is adopted, neither of them is attended with any difficulty.

“ Soc. Hear now, then, how I am affected towards this polity which we have discussed.”

What Socrates says in the words that follow, comprehends, that I may speak summarily, these five particulars. First, what that is which in what has been said, he desires should take place, after the narration of the polity. Secondly, that he is not sufficient to effect this himself. Thirdly, that neither is any one of the poets sufficient. Fourthly, that it is not proper to commit a work of this kind to the sophists. Fifthly, that the auditors alone can accomplish that which is earnestly desired by Socrates, in a becoming manner. What, therefore, is this? For it is necessary, in the first place, to speak concerning that which Socrates desires to see after this polity, viz. to see, as he says, a city of this kind in motion, engaging in contests and labors, and warlike actions, in order that after the peaceful life which he had delivered, he might have to narrate the energies of the city arising from circumstances of times and places. This, therefore, is what he wishes to see accomplished.

Some one, however, may doubt to what the desire of Socrates is directed, and on what account he wishes this to be accomplished. Porphyry therefore dissolves the doubt by saying, that energies perfect habits, not only those energies that are prior to habits, but also those that proceed from them. For the perfection in habit, is in conjunction with energy, since otherwise habit will be in a certain respect in capacity, and at rest through remission of energy. Socrates therefore, in order that he may survey the polity truly perfect, requires that in

words it may be beheld in motion, engaged in warlike actions, and contending with others. And it appears, says he, from hence, to be manifest that Plato does not admit that the habit of virtue by itself, but when energizing, is sufficient to felicity. It may, however, be said, in answer to Porphyry, that if the end was military, it would be requisite to assert that war gives perfection to the polity. But if the end of it is peace, what occasion is there to solve Platonic doubts by introducing Peripatetic explanations? Or though the end is not military, yet war exhibits the magnitude of virtue in a greater degree than peace, just as mighty waves and a tempest, show in a stronger light the skill of the pilot's art. And in short, this is effected by circumstances, as the Stoics also are accustomed to say, "Give circumstances, and take the man." For that which is not subdued by things which enslave others, manifests a life in every respect worthy. Perhaps, however, it is absurd to refer the cause to these things alone, though they have a political reason, and not to look to the whole scope of Plato, according to which the God who adorns the polity in the heavens, is willing also that generation should be governed by the celestial Gods, and that the war of forms in matter should always subsist; in order that the circle of generation may adumbrate the celestial circulation. And this it is to see the city excited to war, to see generation co-arranged with the celestial regions, and the whole of it governed from thence. It appears likewise, that this is analogous to what is shortly after said by the Demiurgus of the universe, "*That when the generating Father understood that this generated resemblance [the world] of the eternal Gods moved and lived, he was delighted with his work.*" In a similar manner, therefore, Socrates wished to see his city moving and energizing; just as the God who comprehends the celestial polity wished to behold the natures which it contains energizing, and adorning the contrariety produced by generation. Such an analogy, therefore, as this, takes place in the present instance.

If, however, we arranged before, the lower city as analogous to generation, but now as analogous to war, you must not wonder. For the same things may be safely arranged among different things according to different analogies. For generation also, according to the lives in it which are inseparable from matter, resembles the lower city; but according to its contrarieties and material tumult, it is similar to war, and warlike dissensions. That we may, however, co-adapt every thing to the theory of mundane wholes, prior to the consideration of every particular, let us direct our attention to the second thing said by Socrates, and see how it accords with this theory. For since Socrates is analogous to the first

of the three fathers who adorn the first of things, he says he is not sufficient to fashion what follows. For the divinity who gives subsistence to all things, is different from him who constitutes things of a middle nature; and this God again is different from him who is the cause of things that rank as the third. But the third particular is, that neither are the poets sufficient for this purpose. Nor, in the fourth place, the sophists. The former, indeed, because they imitate the things in which they have been nourished; but the latter, because they are wanderers, and not at one and the same time, philosophers and politicians.

Again, therefore, let us see how these things are conformable to what has been before said. For it is necessary that the powers that are to preside over generation should not be separable<sup>a</sup> from material natures, but conversant with them. For these powers are analogous to poets who invent fables, and to imitators. For these are employed about images, alone praise material and partible natures which they only know, and are unable to ascend from matter. Nor is it fit that these powers should be inseparable,<sup>a</sup> and very mutable, at different times ascending or descending to different orders, such as are partial souls, who are assimilated to sophists; because they also possess all-beautiful productive powers, but at different times wander to different parts of the world. Hence it is necessary that the powers that connectedly contain generation, which is governed by the heavens, should at one and the same time be philosophical and political; in order that through the philosophic characteristic, they may be separate from the subjects of their government, but may energize providentially through the political peculiarity, performing the duties pertaining to their allotments according to intellect. For that which is physical, being productive, is inseparable from matter; but the form of partial souls being sophistical, is abundantly wandering. It is necessary, however, prior to things which are moved, that there should be the invariable and perpetually-permanent providence of the Gods, and immutable prior to mutable allotments. In the fifth place, therefore, Socrates delivers to us who those are, that are able to effect this. For these things are to be transferred from words to deeds; because the Demiurgus of the universe, and the rest of the fathers, fabricate totally and exemptly; the second of which fathers gives subsistence to middle, but the third to last natures. And to these Timæus, Critias, and

<sup>a</sup> For ἀχωρίστους here, it is necessary to read χωρίστους, and to supply ἀλλὰ, so as instead of οὐτε ἀχωρίστους αὐτῶν εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς στρεφόμενας, to read οὐτε χωρίστους αὐτῶν εἶναι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κ. λ.

<sup>a</sup> Hence for χωρίστας in this place, it is necessary to read ἀχωρίστας.

**Hermocrates**, are analogous. But of these, the first is praised in an admirable manner, Socrates also adding, "*in my opinion*;" but the second, in a middle way, conformably to his order; and the third, in the last degree, i.e. according to the testimony of others.

"For I will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose then that some one, on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a picture or really alive, but in a state of rest, should desire to behold them in motion, and engaging in some one of those contests which pertain to bodies."

Longinus says, that Plato here decorates and beautifies his diction, through similitudes and the gracefulness of the words. But Longinus says this in answer to certain Platonists, who contend, that this mode of expression is spontaneous, and not the result of art. For Plato, he observes, pays attention to the selection of words, and does not employ them casually. It may, however, be said, that Plato made choice of this form of words from a mode of diction which was at that time common and usual, and that he was very attentive to what was customary. For the atoms of Epicurus would more rapidly by their concurrence produce the world, than nouns and verbs would form a correct sentence by a casual composition. But some blame Plato for employing metaphors in the use of words; though with respect to composition, all admire him. At the same time, however, it may be inferred, not from this circumstance alone, but from such care and industry as are exhibited in the present words, that he paid great attention to diction. For Socrates does not simply say, that he desires to see this accomplished by those that were with Timæus; but he speaks like one decorating his words and alluring the hearer, when he says: "*For I will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose that some one on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a picture, or really alive*," &c. And thus much for Longinus.

Origen, however, grants indeed, that Plato is attentive to the grace of diction, not as regarding that which is pleasing, as the end of it, but that he employs this image for the sake of exhibiting the manner in which he was himself affected.

\* The text of Proclus has, erroneously, *και τοι των τοις σωμασι δοκουντων αηκειν κατα την αγωνιαν αθλευντων*, instead of *και τι των τοις σωμασι δοκουντων προσηκειν κατα την αγωνιαν αθλευντα*.

And we say, that this similitude was written for the sake of the imitation of divine natures; that the grace of the words presents to us an image of the grace imparted by the Demiurgus to celestial natures; and that the artifice of the diction, which is mingled with the spontaneous, adumbrates divine production, which has indeed a boundary from itself, and also a progression from being and essence. If, likewise, you direct your attention to the image itself, *beautiful animals* manifest those natures that are resplendent with [divine] beauty; but *those represented in a picture, or really alive*, indicate corporal images, and true lives prior to these imitations. For the figures of the Gods are resemblances of the animals that are in them. But those that are in a *state of rest* exhibit to us the natures that are full of intellectual arrangement, and of an equable and continued life; those that are *in motion* such as proceed into another order, and a second fabrication; and *those which engage in some one of the contests pertaining to bodies*, are images of those that impart to more imperfect natures their own proper effluxions and powers, and operate by their own powers on other things. And thus much respecting the image. But the words *whether represented in a picture or really alive*, are rightly asserted in both respects of divine bodies. For they are depicted by the dodecahedron, and they possess efficacious and demiurgic lives. If, however, you consider the words separately, they will signify that the before-mentioned polity is indeed fashioned in words, and is assimilated to the heavens, but *exists, if not in human, yet in true or daemoniacal lives*. Farther still, *to desire to see the city in motion*, is analogous to the words [in another part of this dialogue] "*as soon as the father saw the universe moving, he was delighted, and wished to assimilate it in a still greater degree to its paradigm.*" For thus also the adorning of the heavens wished to see them in motion, and through motion governing the war of generation. But the words "*engaging in some one of the contests pertaining to bodies,*" are employed, because of contests some belong to souls, but others to bodies; and the latter are such as running, wrestling, and gymnastic.

"In such a manner am I also affected towards the city which we have discussed. For I should gladly hear any one relating the contests of our city with other cities, when it engages in a becoming manner in war, and acts during such an engagement in a way worthy of its education and discipline, both with respect to practical achievements, and verbal negotiations."

We have before shown through what cause, and with reference to what paradigm, Socrates wished to see his republic contending in war. Because cities, however, employ against their enemies both works and words; words indeed in embassies, in compacts, in exhortations to battle, and in every thing of this kind; but works in the pitching of camps, in spears, and the hurling of missive weapons; on this account Socrates wishes that a city of this kind should be celebrated according to both these. In words indeed, as prudent, cautious, magnanimous, and strenuous; but in deeds, as brave, vehement, and well exercised. For thus, according to both, it will imitate its paradigm, who, shining with physical and intellectual productions, adorns all the war of generation.

“ For, indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to praise such men and such a city according to their desert.”

This is the second of the proposed heads, of which we have before assigned the cause, and shall now again explore it according to another method. For now some of the more ancient [interpreters] have said, that the encomiastic form of writing is robust, superb, and magnificent; but the Socratic character of diction is slender, accurate, and dialectic. The latter, therefore, is contrary to the former. Hence [say they] Socrates avoids panegyric, as knowing the power he possessed, and the subjects to which it was naturally adapted. Those, however, who assert this, in addition to their being directly refuted by the Menexenus, appear to me not to have perceived the magnificence of the diction of Socrates in the Phædrus. There are also those who say it is fit that the artificer of such-like encomiums, should be skilled in warlike affairs. Hence many historians err in their disposition of armies, through ignorance of tactics. But Socrates having fought at Delos and Potidaea, was not unskilled in all such-like particulars. Others again assert, that Socrates speaks ironically, just as he said with respect to other things, that he was ignorant of them, so here he says, that he did not know how to praise this city according to its desert. The irony, however, of Socrates was employed against sophists and young men, and not against wise and scientific men. It is better, therefore, instead of these things to say, that he guards against becoming the third from the truth. For the works of a rightly instituted city, are the third from the paradigm of truth [i. e. of the true or intelligible polity]. Hence, wishing to remain in the second from the truth, he says, he is not able to bear the



descent to the third species of life. And an impotency of this kind is an abundance of power. For to be able to abide in paradigms, is effected through power which is transcendent. You may likewise see how this accords with what has been before said by us respecting the analogy of these things to wholes. For the second fabrication is assimilated to the first, and on this account is proximate to it. For the whole demiurgic series is one, possessing union together with separation. Very properly, therefore, is Socrates precedaneously extended to Critias and Hermocrates, and he rightly thinks it fit that they should weave together the particulars that are next in order. For Timæus is about to deliver these things in a more universal and elevated manner, and not through images, in consequence of directly preserving his analogy to the Demiurgus of wholes, who paints the heavens with the dodecahedron, but generation with appropriate figures.

“ Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not wonderful, since the same imbecility seems to have attended poets, both of the past and present age. Not that I despise the poetic genus; but it is perfectly evident, that the imitative tribe easily and in the best manner imitate things in which they have been educated. But that which is foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds, and still more difficult in words.”

This is the third of the before-mentioned heads of discussion, in which Socrates shows that none of the poets have been adequate to the praise of men and cities of this kind, which have casually been engaged in warlike actions. Longinus, however, and Origen, doubt, whether Plato comprehends Homer among the poets, when he says, that he has not only the same opinion of the poets then existing (for this is nothing novel), but likewise of those of former times, so that Porphyry informs us that Origen passed three whole days exclaiming, blushing and toiling, asserting that the hypothesis and the doubt were great, and being ambitious to show that the imitation in the poetry of Homer is sufficient for virtuous actions. For who speaks more magnificently than Homer, who, representing the Gods as contending and fighting with each other, does not err in his imitation, but speaks loftily conformably to the nature of things? Porphyry, however, in reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative bulk, but that he is not capable

of delivering an impassivity which is intellectual, and which energizes according to a philosophic life. But I should wonder if Homer is not sufficient for these things, but Critias is, or Hermocrates, and should be thought fit to speak about them. It appears, therefore, to me, that Plato divides poetry into the divinely-inspired, and the artificial. And having made this division, he refers the magnificent diction and sublimity derived from inspiration, to the Gods. For oracles in a remarkable degree possess grandeur, vehemence, and magnificence of language. But he evinces that the poetry proceeding from human art, is not adequate to the praise of the fortitude of this city, and of the great deeds of the men that are educated in it. For if there is any artificial sublimity in some one of the poets, it has much of contrivance in it, and grandeur of diction, and makes great use of metaphors, as is the case with Antimachus. But Socrates requires a panegyrist, who exhibits in his praise a spontaneous sublimity, and a magnificence of language, which is free from compulsion and pure; just as actions [in his Republic] have magnificence, not casually, but adapted to the education and discipline of the men. That Socrates, however, does not reject the divinely-inspired poet, nor the whole of poetry, but that only which is artificial, he manifests, I think, when he says, "*that he does not despise the poetic genus.*" The poetic genus, therefore, is divine, as he elsewhere says. But he despises the imitative species of poetry; nor yet this simply; but that which is nourished in depraved manners and laws. For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

The last part, however of the words of Socrates, being in a certain respect difficult, may be rendered perspicuous as follows: But the words are, "*that which is foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds, and still more difficult in words.*" For it seems to be easy to imitate words or deeds. Not a few, therefore, act sophistically, by exhibiting virtue as far as words, but in deeds being entirely alienated from it. Will it not, therefore, be better to interpret these words thus, viz.: To suppose *the most excellent education* is implied in the words, *that which is foreign to the education of any one*; but to assume, *in deeds and in words*, as equivalent to, *conformably to deeds, and conformably to words*; and *to imitate well*, as having the same meaning with *to be well imitated*? And thus we may collect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated, it is difficult indeed according to deeds, but it is still more difficult for it to be well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thing

proposed to be effected in poetry. And you may see how this accords with things themselves. For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most excellent men, composes a history. But he who narrates the speeches of these men, if he intends to preserve the manners of the speaker, assumes a disposition similar to the speaker. For words are seen to differ according to the inward dispositions. For thus we deride most of those, except Plato, who have written the Apology of Socrates, as not preserving the Socratic manner in their composition. Though the narration of this very thing, that Socrates was accused, made an apology, and was sentenced to die, would not be thought worthy of laughter, but the dissimilitude of imitation in the composition, renders the imitators ridiculous. Since, also, to say of Achilles, that he came forth armed after such a manner, and that he performed such deeds, is not difficult; but to narrate copiously what he said, when detained in the river, is not easy. But this is the province of one who is able to assume the manners of the hero, and to write conformably to what he would have said. This also is evident from Socrates in the Republic, very much blaming Homer respecting the imitation of words. But as to the Gods, it is said to be easy by language to *imitate* the words or the deeds of the Gods. For who can *delineate* their works according to their desert? Or it may be said that it is the same thing with respect to the Gods, to imitate their words or deeds. For since their words are intellections, and their intellections are productions, the imitator of their words is also the imitator of their productions. So that by how much he fails in the one, by so much also is he deficient in the imitation of the other. Longinus, however, has the following doubts with respect to the proposed words. For if poets are not worthy imitators of the works pertaining to such a city as this, because they are not educated in the manners of the city, neither will Critias and his associates be able to effect this. For neither did they live performing the office of magistrates in it. But if it is because they have not science, but are imitators alone, why by receiving types from us, may they not be able to imitate, since they possess an imitative power? In answer to these doubts, it may be said, that the imitation of such a polity proceeds through a life concordant with its paradigms. For he who does not live according to virtue, is incapable of adducing words adapted to worthy men. It is not, therefore, sufficient merely to hear what form of life the polity possesses, in order to imitate it, as the doubt of Longinus says it is. But Porphyry adds, that as all things, such for instance as the diurnal light, are not imitated by painters, so neither is the life of the most excellent polity imitated by poets, in consequence of transcending their power.

“ But with respect to the tribe of sophists, though I consider them as skilled both in the art of speaking, and in many other beautiful arts, yet as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, I am afraid, lest with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns, which wise and politic men are engaged in with individuals in warlike undertakings, both in deeds and words.”

With respect to the sophists, some of them frequently pretended to be skilled in astronomy, others in geometry, others in politics, and others in the art of dividing. Hence they are now said to be skilled in many beautiful arts. Since, however, they did not possess a scientific knowledge of these, it is added, that they are *skilled* in them. For *skill* manifests an irrational occupation in mere words, unaccompanied with the knowledge of *the why*. Because, however, they not only lived at different times in different cities, but were full of deception, of false opinion, and unscientific wandering, they are justly called *wanderers*. But as they led a disorderly and inconsiderate life, energizing according to passion, they are very properly said not to have a *settled abode*; since it is requisite that every one should arrange himself prior to other things. For all such particulars, as are in a family and a city, are likewise in manners, and these prior to externals ought to be fitly governed. Who then are the proper imitators of the deeds and words of the best polity, if neither the poets nor the sophists are? They are such as are both politicians and philosophers. For the union of both these is necessary, in order that through the political character they may be able to perceive the works of the citizens; but through the philosophic, their words, in consequence of inwardly pre-assuming their life. And through the former, indeed, they comprehend their practical wisdom, but through the latter, the intellectual energy of the rulers. But from these images we should make a transition to demiurgic causes. For it is necessary that these also should be total and intellectual, in order that the universe may be consummately perfect, and that generation may possess ironically such things as the heavens primarily contain.

“ The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the same time participates of both these, by nature and by education.”

Longinus, not disdaining to survey these words, and those that precede them, says, that in that part of them beginning with, "*But with respect to the tribe of sophists, I am afraid, as they are wanderers,*" &c. there is a difference of expression through the desire of dignity and gravity in the diction. That in the words that follow, "*Lest with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns,*" &c. there is a distortion of phrase from what is natural. And that the third part, "*The genus therefore of your habit remains,*" &c. is perfectly unusual. For it is not at all dissimilar to the strength of Hercules, to *μεγὴ ἐς Τηλεμαχίῳ*, the sacred strength of Telemachus,\* and other such like expressions. But Origen admits, that the form of expression in the proposed words, is conformable to the manner of historians. For such like periphrases are adapted to a narration of this kind, as well as to poetry. We, however, say, that Plato everywhere changes his mode of diction, so as to be adapted to his subjects; and in unusual things, studies mutations of expression. But we do not admit that the proposed words are a periphrasis. For they do not manifest the same thing as the expression *you, like the strength of Hercules*; from which there would only be an ability of giving that which is adapted to the imitation of the best polity. For those who are both philosophers and politicians, by energizing according to the habit which they possess, and which differs from the poetical and sophistical habit, will be able to effect that which Socrates desires. And thus much for the words themselves.

Looking, however, to the conceptions which they contain, we must say, that Socrates excites Critias and Hermocrates to what remains to be accomplished in the polity. But he likewise calls on Timæus to assist the undertaking. And this is the fifth head of the things proposed for elucidation. You may also see how magnificently Socrates celebrates the men from the very beginning, calling [the wisdom which they possess] a *habit*, in order that he may exempt them from sophistical wandering. But he says that they are partakers of the political science, both by nature and education, in order that you may contradistinguish it from poetical imitation, which is nourished by less excellent laws. And *he designates the perfect from nature and education; lest depriving nature of education, you should cause it to be lame;† or you should think that education ought to be thrown into an*

\* *Odys.* II. 409.

† For *χολήν* here, it is necessary to read *χολήν*.

unapt and incongruous recipient. And thus much has been said in common respecting the men. But if you wish to speak, proceeding to paradigms, the demiurgic genus, which is total and intellectual, *remains* to be arranged according to a providential attention to wholes. Let us, however, survey separately every particular.

“ For Timæus here of Locris, an Italian city, governed by the best of laws, exclusive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has obtained in his own city the greatest honours, and the highest posts of government; and, in my opinion, has arrived at the summit of all philosophy.”

What testimony, therefore, can be more admirable than this, or what praise can be greater? Does it not, in the first place, evince that Timæus was a political character; in the second place, that he possessed intellectual knowledge [in a most eminent degree], by saying, that he had arrived at the summit of all philosophy; and adding, *in my opinion*, which places a colophon on all the panegyrics? What other image also than this among men, is more capable of being assimilated to the one Demiurgus? For, in the first place, by *the political* and *the philosophic*, the image is Jovian. In the next place, by asserting that Timæus belonged to a city governed by the best of laws, it imitates the god who was nurtured in the intelligible byAdrastia. And by Timæus excelling in nobility of birth, it adumbrates the total, intellectual, and unical nature of the god. For all these the Demiurgus possesses, by participating of the fathers prior to himself. By asserting also that Timæus had obtained the highest posts of government, it represents to us the royal power of the Demiurgus, and which has dominion over wholes; his sceptre, according to theologists, consisting of four and twenty measures. But to add likewise that he had enjoyed the greatest honours, presents us with an image of that transcendency which is exempt from wholes, both in dignity and power. It is the Demiurgus, therefore, who also distributes honours to others. And it may be said, that the assertion that Timæus had arrived at the summit of philosophy, assimilates him to the god, who at once perfectly contains all knowledge in himself. So that, from all that has been said, you may apprehend, as from images, who the Demiurgus of the universe is; that he is an intellect comprehensive of many intellects, and arranged among the intellectual Gods; that he is full of

the first intelligibles; and that he has a royal establishment, as surpassing in dignity the other demiurgic gods. If, however, Plato calls the city of Timæus Locris, it not being usual with the Greeks thus to denominate it, but to call it Locri only, in order to distinguish it from the Locris opposite to Eubœa, we must not wonder. For Plato changes many things for the purpose of signifying in a clearer manner the thing proposed. But that the Locrians were governed by the best laws is evident; for their legislator was Zaleucus.

“ Besides, we all know that Critias is not ignorant of any of the particulars of which we are now speaking.”

Critias, indeed, was of a generous and grand nature. He likewise engaged in philosophic conferences, and was called, as history informs us, an ideot among philosophers, but a philosopher among ideots. He tyrannized also, being one of the thirty. It is not, however, just to accuse Socrates on this account, because he now thinks him deserving of a certain praise. For, in the first place, we should attend to the manner in which he praises him. For he says, that “ *he is not ignorant of any of the particulars of which we are now speaking,*” both on account of his natural disposition, and his association with philosophers. In the next place, we should observe, that the tyrannical character is an argument of an excellent nature, as we learn from the fable in the [10th book of the] Republic, which particularly leads souls descending from the heavens to a tyrannical life. For being accustomed there to revolve with the Gods, and to govern the universe in conjunction with them, in these terrestrial regions also, they pursue apparent power; just as those who possess the remembrance of intelligible beauty, embrace visible beauty. That Critias, however, pertains, according to analogy, to the middle fabrication of things, may be learnt, in the first place, from his succeeding to the discourse of Socrates; in the next place, from his narrating the Atlantic history, the Atlantics being the progeny of Neptune; and, in the third place, from his own proper life. For the ruling peculiarity, and that which extends to many things, are the characteristics of this life. Power, likewise pertains to media, and therefore he possesses the middle place in the encomiums. For to assert of him, that he was not one of the vulgar, but a partaker of the prerogatives of Timæus, shows his inferiority to the first person of the dialogue. But that he was not entirely removed from him, indicates his alliance to him.

“Nor is this to be doubted of Hermocrates, since a multitude of circumstances evince that he is, both by nature and education, adapted to all such concerns.”

Hermocrates was a Syracusan general, desirous of living conformably to law. Hence also he participates, in a certain respect, of the political science and philosophy. He must be <sup>\*</sup> referred, therefore, according to analogy, to the third fabrication <sup>\*</sup> of things. For the command of an army is a power allied to the god, who arranges the last and most disorderly parts of mundane fabrication; and *to be testified by a multitude of circumstances*, indicates an analogy to the power that produces fabrication into all multitude, and an ultimate division. We therefore make this arrangement, in order that the men may have an analogy to the things. But others arrange Critias as inferior to Hermocrates; though the absent person was neither adapted to speak nor to hear, and of those that are present [at a conference], he who is an auditor, indeed, but is silent, is secondary to him who is both an auditor and a speaker, and in this respect imitates those that are about Socrates and Timæus. In the next place, this also must be considered, that Socrates gives the preference to Critias, in what he says, praising him immediately after Timæus. There are likewise those who attribute such an order as the following to these persons, viz. they arrange Timæus according to the paradigmatic cause, Socrates according to the efficient, and Critias according to the formal cause; for he leads into energy those that have been rightly educated; but Hermocrates according to the material cause. Hence also he is adapted indeed to hear, but not to speak. For matter receives productive powers externally, but is not naturally adapted to generate. And this arrangement indeed will be found to be very reasonable, if we abandon the former conceptions [relative to the analogy of the men].

<sup>\*</sup> Instead of *διο και πολιτικη πως μετειχε, και φιλοσοφιας ετεχεν ουν κ. λ.*, it is necessary to read *διο και πολιτικη πως μετειχε και φιλοσοφιας. ετεχεν ουν κ. λ.*

<sup>\*</sup> Timæus is analogous to Jupiter, the Demiurgus of the universe; but Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates, are analogous to the three ruling fathers, or demiurgi, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, who form the summit of the supermundane order of Gods. For, according to the arcana of the Grecian theology, there is a twofold Jupiter; one being the Demiurgus, and existing at the extremity of the intellectual order; but the other being the first of the supermundane demiurgic triad. See the 6th Book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.



"Hence when you yesterday requested me to discuss what pertains to a polity, I readily complied with your request; being persuaded that the remainder of the discourse could not be more conveniently explained by any one than by you, if you were but willing to engage in its discussion. For when you have properly adapted the city for warlike purposes, there is no one in the present age but you from whom it can acquire every thing fit for it to receive. As I have, therefore, hitherto complied with your request, I shall now require you to comply with mine in the above-mentioned particulars. Nor have you, indeed, refused this employment; but have, with common consent, determined to repay my hospitality with the banquet of discourse. I now, therefore, stand prepared, in a decorous manner, to receive the promised feast."

The summary repetition of the polity appears, indeed, as Socrates now says, to have been made for the sake of the discussion of the contests in war of a rightly constituted city. Both the concise comprehension, however, of the polity, and the Atlantic war, refer us to the one fabrication of the world. For, as we have before observed, it is better, prior to the whole fabrication, and all the form of the production of the world, to make a survey from parts and images. Socrates, therefore, resuming the polity in certain forms, and, first, through this imitating the universe, very properly establishes himself, as it were, in essence; but excites others to the discussion, who celebrate the power of such a city, and imitate those who arrange the universe according to the middle demiurgic form, and uniformly comprehend the contrarieties and multiform motions which it contains. As, therefore, Jupiter, in Homer, being seated in his citadel on the summit of Olympus, and abiding in his own accustomed unity, sends the Gods who preside over the mundane contrariety to the Grecian war; thus also Socrates, being purely established in the intelligible form of a polity, prepares those after him that are able, to celebrate the motion and power of this polity, calling forth, indeed, the science of Timæus, to the survey of wholes totally, but preparing the others to the total and concise comprehension of partial natures. For as he had discussed the polity totally, after this manner also, he wishes that the power of it should be celebrated by the rest. Since, however, all these discourses bring with them an image of demiurgic works, and the whole conference adumbrates the fabrication of the

world, Socrates very properly says, "*that he stands prepared, in a decorous manner; to receive the promised feast,*" his words being invested with modesty, as a form adapted to virtue.

"HERM. But we, O Socrates, as Timæus just now signified, shall cheerfully engage in the execution of your desire; for we cannot offer any excuse sufficient to justify neglect in this affair. For yesterday, when we departed from hence, and went to the lodging of Critias, where we are accustomed to reside, both in his apartment and in the way thither, we discoursed on this very particular."

It was requisite that Hermocrates should say something, and not be silently present, like the unemployed persons in a comedy. Hence also he is represented speaking to Socrates. And this indeed is logographic [or pertaining to the art of writing]; but it is likewise adapted to what has been before said. For it represents to us, as in an image, that the last parts, of the fabrication of things, follow the one father of wholes, and, through similitude to him, converge to the one providence of the world. For Hermocrates, following Socrates, says, that nothing shall be wanting, either of alacrity or power, to the accomplishment of the narrations investigated by Socrates. For these two things become especially impediments to us in our mutual energies, viz. our indolence, and any external impediment. Removing, therefore, both these, he says, that there cannot be any excuse sufficient to justify their neglect, or prevent them from accomplishing the mandate of Socrates. Very properly, therefore, does he call upon Critias for the narration respecting the city of the ancient Athenians, in which the mandate of Socrates terminates; just as Socrates calls on Timæus, and makes himself a partaker of his discourse. For on the preceding day, Hermocrates says, they discoursed on this very particular together with Critias, just as the third Demiurgus in the universe communicates with the production of the second. For the whole of generation is entirely in want of returns from the subterranean world. If, however, these things subsist after this manner, the Atlantic history will appear to have had the third narration. But those numbers, the duad and the triad, are said to be adapted to the middle fabrication, the former through power, and the latter through its demiurgic providence, and which is also perfective of mundane natures. So that whether you assign to this history a double or a triple narration

you will, from either of the numbers, be able to recur to the conception of the intervening medium.

"He therefore narrated to us the following particulars from ancient rumour, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his request.

"CRI. It is requisite to comply, if agreeable to Timæus, the third associate of our undertaking.

"TIM. I assent to your compliance."

You will find in these words an admirable indication, as in images, of divine natures. For, as in them, such as are secondary call forth the prolific powers of such as are primary, and produce them to the providential inspection of the subjects of their government; thus also here Hermocrates calls on Critias to speak, and gives completion to what was promised to Socrates. And as, among divine natures, effects convert themselves to the reception of their causes, thus also here, Hermocrates is extended to Critias, but Critias looks to the mandate of Socrates. As likewise all demiurgic causes are suspended from the one father of the universe, and govern all things conformably to his will; after the same manner here also all the persons fly to Timæus, and to his nod, or consent, or will, in order that, being impelled from that as from a root, they may dispose their narration agreeably to his desire. For thus what is going to be said will contribute to the discourse about the whole fabrication of the world. Moreover, the words "*from ancient rumour*," if the narration is historical, signify ancient according to time. But if they are an indication of what takes place in the universe, they will obscurely signify the reasons or productive powers which are from eternity inherent in souls. And if, likewise, they bring with them an image of divine causes, they show that these demiurgic causes, being supernally filled from more ancient Gods, impart also to secondary natures their own providential energies.

"CRI. Hear, then, O Socrates, a narration surprising indeed in the extreme, *yet in every respect true*, which was once delivered by Solon, the wisest of the seven wise men."

With respect to the whole of this narration about the Atlantics, some say, that it is a mere history, which was the opinion of Crantor, the first interpreter of Plato, who says, that Plato was derided by those of his time, as not being the inventor of the Republic, but transcribing what the Egyptians had written on this subject; and that he so far regards what is said by these deriders as to refer to the Egyptians this history about the Athenians and Atlantics, and to believe that the Athenians once lived conformably to this polity. Crantor adds, that this is testified by the prophets of the Egyptians, who assert that these particulars [which are narrated by Plato] are written on pillars which are still preserved. Others again, say, that this narration is a fable, and a fictitious account of things, which by no means had an existence, but which bring with them an indication of natures which are perpetual, or are generated in the world; not attending to Plato, who exclaims, "*that the narration is surprising in the extreme, yet is in every respect true.*" For that which is in every respect true, is not partly true, and partly not true, nor is it false according to the apparent, but true according to the inward meaning; since a thing of this kind would not be perfectly true. Others do not deny that these transactions took place after this manner, but think that they are now assumed as images of the contrarieties that pre-exist in the universe. For war, say they, is the father of all things, as Heraclitus also asserted. And of these, some refer the analysis to the fixed stars and planets: so that they assume the Athenians as analogous to the fixed stars, but the Atlantics to the planets. They likewise say, that these stars fight on account of the opposition in their circulation, but that the fixed stars vanquish the planets on account of the one convulsion of the world. Of this opinion, therefore, is the illustrious Amelius, who vehemently contends that this must be the case, because it is clearly said in the Critias, that the Atlantic island was divided into seven circles. But I do not know of any other who is of the same opinion. Others, again, as Origen, refer the analysis to the opposition of certain demons, some of them being more, but others less, excellent. And some of them being superior in multitude, but others in power: some of them vanquishing, but others being vanquished. But others refer it to the discord of souls, the more excellent being the pupils of Minerva, but the inferior kind being subservient to generation; who also pertain to the God that presides over generation [i. e. to Neptune]. And this is the interpretation of Numenius. Others, mingling, as they fancy, the opinions of Origen and Numenius together, say, that the narration refers to the opposition of souls to demons, the latter drawing down, but the former being drawn down. And

with these men, *dæmon* has a triple subsistence. For they say, that one kind is that of divine *dæmons*; another, of *dæmons* according to habitude, to which partial souls give completion, when they obtain a *dæmoniack* allotment; and another is that of depraved *dæmons*, who are also noxious to souls. *Dæmons*, therefore, of this last kind, wage this war against souls, in their descent into generation. And that, say they, which ancient theologists refer to *Osiris* and *Typhon*, or to *Bacchus* and the *Titans*, this, *Plato*, from motives of piety, refers to the *Athenians* and *Atlantics*. Before, however, souls descend into solid bodies, those theologists and *Plato*, deliver the war of them with material *dæmons* who are adapted to the west; *since the west, as the Egyptians say, is the place of noxious dæmons.*<sup>1</sup> Of this opinion is the philosopher *Porphry*, respecting whom, it would be wonderful, if he asserted any thing different from the doctrine of *Numenius*. These [philosophers] however, are in my opinion, very<sup>2</sup> excellently corrected by the most divine *Iamblichus*.

According to him, therefore, and also to our preceptor *Syrianus*, this contrariety and opposition are not introduced for the purpose of rejecting the narration, since on the contrary, this is to be admitted as an account of transactions that actually happened; but, as we are accustomed to do, we must refer that which precedes the subject of the dialogue, to the scope itself of the dialogue. Hence, they are of opinion, that this contrariety which is derived from human affairs, should, according to a similar form, be extended through the whole world, and especially through the realms of generation. That in consequence of this, we should survey every where how things participate of contrariety, according to the variety of powers. For since all things are from *the one*, and from the *duad* after *the one*, are in a certain respect united to each other, and have an opposite nature; as in the genera of being, there is a certain opposition of sameness to difference, and of motion to permanency, but all things participate of these genera;—this being the case, we must survey after what manner mundane natures possess the contrariety which pervades through all things.

Moreover, if we consider the polity of *Plato* as analogous in every respect to the world, it is necessary that we should survey this war as existing in every nature. For the polity is analogous to existence and essences, but war, to the powers of these essences, and as *Plato* says, to their motions. We must, like-

<sup>1</sup> For *ἐκεῖ καὶ ἡ ἐστὶς*, here it is necessary to read *ἐκεῖ καὶ ἡ ἐστὶς*, and for *λακωνικῶν, λακωνικῶν*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *κομῶδες* in this place, it is requisite to read *κομῶδῳ*.

wise, refer the polity, by making it common to all things, to the whole union of things ; but it must be said, that war is to be assimilated to the mundane division, and<sup>1</sup> to the empire of victory. Whether, therefore, you give a twofold division to the universe, by separating it into the incorporeal and the corporeal ; and again divide the incorporeal into the more intellectual and the more material natures, and the corporeal into heaven and generation ; and heaven, into contrary periods, but generation into opposite powers ; or in whatever way you assume this opposite life, whether in the mundane Gods, or in demons, in souls, or in bodies,—you may every where transfer the analogies from men to things. For of the Gods themselves, the divine Homer makes oppositions ; representing Apollo as hostilely opposed to Neptune, Mars to Minerva, the river Xanthus to Vulcan, Hermes to Latona, and Juno to Diana. For it is requisite to survey generation in incorporeal natures, in bodies, and in both. *It is likewise necessary to consider Neptune and Apollo as the fabricators of the whole of generation, the one totally, but the other partially. But Juno and Diana, as the suppliers of vivification, the former rationally, but the latter physically. Minerva and Mars, as the causes of the contrariety which pervades through both existence and life ; the former, of that which is defined according to intellect ; but the latter, of that which is more material and passive. Hermes and Latona, as presiding over the twofold perfection of souls ; the former, indeed, over the perfection which is obtained through the gnostic powers,<sup>2</sup> and the evolution into light of productive principles ; but the latter, over the smooth, spontaneous, and voluntary elevation which is acquired through the vital powers. Vulcan and Xanthus, as the primary leaders of the whole of a corporeal constitution, and of the powers it contains ; the former, of those that are more efficacious ; but the latter of those that are more passive, and as it were more material. But he leaves Venus by herself, in order that she may illuminate all things with union and harmony, and represents her as fighting on the worse side, because THE ONE in those that belong to this side, is less excellent than multitude.* For all contrariety is surveyed in a becoming manner in conjunction with a unity, which is either prior to it, or consubstant with, or is in a certain respect an adjunct posterior to it. And Plato, as well as theologists, rightly perceiving that this is the case, have delivered a multitudinous contrariety prior to the one fabrication of the world, and parts

<sup>1</sup> καὶ is omitted in the original, and the omission of it, renders the latter part of the sentence very ambiguous.

<sup>2</sup> For θεωρητικῶν here, it is requisite to read θεωρητικῶν.

prior to wholes. Finding, likewise, these things in images prior to paradigms, he surveys this contrariety in men, which also has an analogous subsistence in wholes, neither being in want of Titanic or Gigantic wars. For how could he narrate such wars to Socrates, who on the preceding day had blamed the poets for devising things of this kind? Receiving, therefore, transactions from history, in order that he might not assert of the Gods that they fight with each other, he ascribes these battles to men, but through a cautious and pious analogy, transfers them also to the Gods. For such like wars are delivered by divinely-inspired poets, prior to the one order of things. Their mode, however, of narrating them, is adapted to them, but the present mode to Plato; the latter, in conjunction with the political science, being more moderate, but the former, in conjunction with the telestic art, being more replete with divine inspiration. And thus much concerning the whole of the text.

In what is said by Critias, however, the word "*hear*" is proverbial, and is employed in those things to which we wish to call the attention of the hearer. The word *hear*, therefore, is equivalent to *receive what is worthy of attention*. But the word "*surprising*" (αἰσίων) manifests that which happens contrary to expectation, as in the Gorgias, "*It is surprising, O Socrates,*" (αἰσίοπα γε ὦ Σωκράτης); or that which is paradoxical, as in the Crito, "*What a surprising dream, Socrates;*" (ὡς αἰσίων ἐνέπρινον ὦ Σωκράτης); or the wonderful, as in the Theætetus, "*And it is not at all surprising, but it would be much more wonderful, if it were not a thing of this kind.*" (καὶ οὐδὲν γε αἰσίων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ.) But here it is assumed as that which deserves admiration. This, however, is evident from what follows, in which it is said, "*that the deeds of this city were great and admirable.*" Moreover, the word "*narration*" (λόγος), manifests the truth of what is going to be related. For thus it is said in the Gorgias, that a fable differs from λόγος; [because the latter is true, but the former is not.] It is also very properly said, that "*Solon was the wisest of the seven wise men;*" as being asserted of one who was related to Plato; as being said to another Athenian, and in the Panathenæic; and as indicating that the ensuing narration extends to all wisdom. Nor is it requisite to wonder how Solon is said to be the wisest of all the seven wise men, nor to be anxious to know, how he can be said to be the wisest of other men, but one of the wise men, when all of them were most wise. For what absurdity is there, in calling a man the wisest of those that are of the same order with himself? But his legislation, his pretended insanity at Salamis, his armed attack of Pisistratus the tyrant, who said he was more prudent than those that

were absent, and more brave than those that were present, his conference also with Cræsus, and his answer to one who said, that he had established most beautiful laws; for he replied, that he had not established the most beautiful, but powerful laws, and that he knew laws that were more excellent than these;—all these particulars bear testimony to his wisdom. There is, likewise, a story told of a tripod that was dragged up in a net by certain young men, though it is not related by all historians, and that the oracle [of Apollo] being consulted on the occasion, the God answered, that it should be given to the wisest man. That in consequence of this, it was offered to Thales, but he sent it to another of the seven wise men, this again to another, and so on, till at last it came to Solon, all of them yielding it to him. Solon, however, sent it to the God, saying, that he was the wisest of beings.\* Solon, also, is said to have found, that the lunar month does not consist of thirty days, and on this account he was the first that called it *εὐ νέσθ*† a new one, and *νέας* new. And, in short, the discovery, that the numbers of the days revert from the twentieth day, is ascribed to him. Some, also, assert, that prior to Anaxagoras, Solon showed that intellect presided over the whole of things. From all which it is evident, that he was a participant of a certain wisdom.

“Solon, then, was the familiar and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropides, as he himself frequently† relates in his poems. But he once declared to our grandfather Critias (as the old man himself informed us) that great and admirable actions had once been achieved by this city, which nevertheless were buried in oblivion through length of time, and the destruction of mankind.”

The history of the race of Solon, and of the alliance of Plato to him, is as follows: The children of Exceestesides were, Solon and Dropides, and of Dropides Critias was the son, who is mentioned by Solon in his poems, where he sings,

Bid Critias with the yellow locks,  
Attention to his father pay,

\* The same story is also told of Solon, by Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Thales.

† In the original *οὐν*, which I conceive to be erroneously transcribed for *εὐ νέσθ*.

‡ *πῶλλας* is omitted in the text of Proclus.



For by revering what he says,  
No faulty leader he'll obey.

But Callascerus and Glauco were the sons of Critias : and again the Critias of the present dialogue was the son of Callascerus. This, however, is evident from Critias in the Charmides, calling the father of Charmides, his uncle. But Charmides and Perictione were the offspring of Glauco : and Perictione was the mother of Plato. So that Glauco was the uncle of Critias, but the father of Charmides. And Charmides was the uncle of Plato, but Solon was the brother of the great-grandfather of Critias. Such, therefore, is the truth [respecting the race of Solon.]

The divine Iamblichus, however, gives a different account of the succession of his race. For he immediately makes Glauco to be the son of Dropides. But others, as the Platonic Theon, assert, that Critias and Glauco were the sons of Callascerus ; though in the Charmides, Critias says, that "*Charmides is the son of Glauco our uncle, but is my cousin.*" Hence Glauco is not the son of Dropides, nor the brother of the younger Critias. To a man, however, who pays attention to things, it is of no consequence in whatever manner these particulars may subsist. Passing on, therefore, to things, you may assume from these particulars as images, that all the discord of the world, and the twofold co-ordinations that are in it, are suspended from proximate demiurgic causes, and are referred to other more intellectual and ancient causes ; that the causes of this motion are continuous and united, and suspended from one cause ; that the superior causes are more ancient in intellection ; and that secondary receive the production of primary natures, differ from and yet have a consascent communion with them. In addition to these things also, you may assume, that *a twofold oblivion is produced in souls of the theory of great and admirable wholes, arising either from having abandoned for a long time a life of that kind, or through having fallen immoderately into generation. For this is for the real man to be truly corrupted.* But souls that have been recently perfected, and retain the memory of things in the intelligible world, in consequence of not falling into matter, easily acquire a reminiscence of the truth. And thus much for these particulars. We must not, however, wonder, if Critias calls Solon simply a *familiar*. For we not only call those with whom we associate, but also our kindred, *familiars*. But by likewise adding, "*and an intimate friend,*" he indicates, that there was not merely a communion of race, but a sameness and similitude of life, in the ancestors of Plato. The prior Critias, also, is called an *old man*, which signifies his possession of prudence and intellect, and his being adapted to many disciplines.

"In particular, he informed me of one undertaking surpassing in magnitude all the rest, which I now think proper to relate to you, both that I may repay my obligations, and that by such a relation I may offer my tribute of praise to the Goddess in the present solemnity, by celebrating her divinity, as it were, with hymns, justly, and in a manner agreeable to truth."

Longinus doubts what was the intention of Plato in the insertion of this narration. For he does not introduce it either for the purpose of giving respite to the auditors, or as being in want of it. And he dissolves the doubt, as he thinks, by saying, that it is assumed by Plato prior to physiology, in order to allure the reader, and soften the severity of that kind of writing. But Origen says, that the narration is indeed a fiction, and so far he agrees with Numenius and his followers, but he does not admit with Longinus, that it was devised for the sake of pleasure. He does not, however, add the cause of the fiction. We, therefore, have frequently said, that it contributes to the whole theory of nature; and we likewise say, that in these words, Plato calls the one and common productive principle of the twofold co-ordinations in the world, and the one contrariety which pervades through wholes, the greatest and most admirable of works, as containing the other fabrication of things in infrangible bonds, this fabrication consisting of participations of the contraries, bound and infinity, as Philolaus says, and as Plato also asserts in the *Philebus*. For he there says, "*that there is much bound and much infinity in the world, which are things most contrary to each other, and give completion to this universe.*" Since, however, all things that contribute to the production of the world, are said to recompense the benefits bestowed by total causes, Critias says very properly, that it becomes him to repay his obligations to Socrates, who excited both the second and third powers. These things, therefore, may be immediately assumed [from the words before us.]

But will you not say, that the Minerval solemnity has an indication of demiurgic works? For the Goddess herself indeed, connectedly contains all the mundane fabrication, and possesses intellectual lives in herself, according to which she weaves together the universe, and unifying powers, according to which she governs all the mundane oppositions. The Minerval solemnity, however, indicates the gift of the Goddess which pervades through all things, and fills all things with herself, and likewise the union which extends through all variety.

For in solemnities, we especially embrace a common and concordant life. If, however, we have asserted these things rightly, we may from these transfer ourselves to the various and one life of the world, and survey the difference between the Parmenides and this dialogue. For both have their hypothesis in the Panathenæa; but the former in the greater, and the latter in the lesser of these solemnities. For they were celebrated about the same time with the Bendidian festival; and this very properly. For since the productions of Minerva are twofold, total and partial, supermundane and mundane, intelligible and sensible; the former of these solemnities, indeed, pertains to the exempt productions of the Goddess, unfolding into light the intelligible series of the Gods, but the latter to her subordinate productions, interpreting the powers of the Gods about the world. And the Bendidian festival, indeed, appears to manifest the suppression of the contrariety externally acceding to the universe from a Barbaric tempest, by the Gods who are the inspective guardians of the festival. Hence it is said to have been celebrated in the Piræus, as being most adapted to the extremities, and material parts of the universe. But the Panathenæan festival, exhibits the established order which proceeds into the world from intellect, and the unconfused separation of mundane contrarieties. For this Goddess is at one and the same time, a lover of wisdom, and a lover of war. Another veil, therefore, was referred to the Goddess [in the Bendidian festival,] representing the war in which the pupils of Minerva were victorious; just as the veil in the Panathenæan solemnity, represented the Gants vanquished by the Olympian Gods. The Goddess, however, is celebrated with hymns, justly and with truth; *justly*, indeed, because it is necessary that every thing which has proceeded, should be converted to its proper principle; but with *truth*, because the hymn is assumed through things and through beings. And because of hymns, some celebrate the essence, but others the providence of the Gods, and others praise the works that proceed from them, and a hymn of this kind is the last form of celebration; (for the praise of the divine essence precedes all other panegyrics, as Socrates asserts in the Banquet) —this being the case, the words "*celebrating as it were*," are very properly added. For he wishes to celebrate the Goddess from the deeds performed by the Athenians. But that the Panathenæan followed the Bendidian festivals, is asserted both by the commentators, and by Aristotle the Rhodian. For they say, that the Bendidia were celebrated in the Piræus on the

<sup>1</sup> For  $\alpha\pi'$  αυρω here, it is necessary to read  $\alpha\pi'$  αυρω.

twentieth day of April; but that the festival sacred to Minerva followed these.

“Soc. You speak well. But what is this ancient achievement, which Critias once heard from Solon, and which is not narrated in history, but was once actually accomplished by this city.”

Socrates exciting Critias to narration, requests that he would relate the mighty undertaking which the ancient Critias said he had heard from Solon, and which though not much celebrated, yet was really performed. In which, this in the first place deserves to be considered, that many things happen in the universe of which the multitude are ignorant. And in this, worthy men differ from others, that they see things of this kind, and understand the events that take place. But it is worth while secondly to observe, that the more perfect causes, rejoice in simplicity, and proceed from things of a composite nature, to such as are first. But subordinate beings on the contrary, descend from things simple to things composite. For thus also here Socrates recurs from that which is downward as far as to Solon, in an ascending progression; but Critias on the contrary, descends from Solon to the mention of himself.

“CRI. I will acquaint you with that ancient history, which I did not indeed receive from a youth, but from a man very much advanced in years.”

Longinus here again observes, that Plato pays attention to elegance of diction, by narrating the same things differently. For he calls the *undertaking* ἀρχαίον, but the *narration* παλαιός, and *the man*, not a youth; though as he signifies the same thing through all these, he might have denominated all of them after the same manner. Longinus, therefore, as Plotinus said of him, was a philologist, but not a philosopher. Origen, however, does not admit that Plato is studious of artificial delight and certain ornaments of diction, but that he pays attention to spontaneous and unadorned credibility, and accuracy in imitations. This mode also of expression has spontaneity, as being adapted to erudition. For it was rightly said by Aristoxenus, the lyric poet, that the dispositions of philosophers extend as far as to sounds, and exhibit in all things the arrangement which they possess; *just I think, as this mighty heaven, exhibits in its transfigurations clear*

*images of the splendor of intellectual perceptions ; being moved in conjunction with the unapparent periods of intellectual natures.\** The great Iamblichus, however, thinks that we should rather refer the variety of the words to things, and see how in nature contraries are vanquished by *the one* ; how *the one* is varied, and how great a mutation the same productive principles exhibit ; subsisting in one way in the intellect of the universe, in another, in soul, in another, in nature, and in the last place, subsisting in matter. And again, unfolding about matter a most abundant difference in conjunction with similitude. For these observations are worthy the conceptions of Plato, and not a solicitous attention to diction.

“ For at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety years old, and I was about ten.”

These three persons are assumed, as having preserved this history, or mythology, Solon, the ancient Critias, and this junior Critias ; because perfect causes precede the fabrication of the world, and perfective causes are antecedent to the subjects of their government. The elder Critias, however, heard this narration from Solon, one from one ; from the elder Critias it was heard by the junior Critias and Amynder ; and from the junior Critias three persons received it. For the monad proceeds through the duad to the perfective providence of wholes. The numbers also of the ages, have much alliance to the things themselves. *For the decad manifests the conversion of all mundane natures to the one ; and ninety the restitution again to the monad, in conjunction with progression. But both numbers are symbolical of the world.* You may say, therefore, that Solon is analogous to the cause of permanency ; but the former Critias, to the cause which supplies progression ; and the present Critias to the cause which converts and conjoins things which have proceeded, to their causes. And the first of these, indeed, preserves the relation of a ruling and leading cause ; the second, of the cause which comes into contact with mundane fabrication in a liberated manner ; and the third, of that which now pays attention to the universe, and governs the mundane war.

“ When, therefore, that solemnity was celebrated among us, which is known by the name of *Cureotis Apaturiorum*, nothing was omitted which

\* Instead of *συγκινουμεναι ταῖς αἰωνῶν ἀφαντοῦ περιόδοις*, it is necessary to read, *συγκινουμεναι ταῖς ἐκείνων, κ. λ.*

boys during that festivity are accustomed to perform. For when our parents had set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing verses, both a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time entirely new."

The Apaturia was a festival sacred to Bacchus, on account of the duel between Melanthus and Xanthus the Boeotian, and the victory of Melanthus through deception; the Boeotians and Athenians waging war with each other for CEnore. But this festival was celebrated for three days; of which the first day was called *avayyoyis*, because many sacrifices were performed in it; and the victims were called *avayyoyata*, because they were drawn upward, and sacrificed. The second day was called *δορυπια*; for on this day there were splendid banquets and much feasting. But the third day was called *χορρευσις*; for on this day boys, three or four years old, were enrolled in their tribes. On this day also, such boys as were more sagacious than the rest, sung certain poems, and those were victorious who retained the greater number of them in their memory. They sang, however, the poems of the ancients. But with respect to the tribes, it must be observed, that after Ion there were four families, but from Clisthenes ten, and that after these, each twelve of the families was divided into three: the tribes were arranged into the same family and company, as being allied to each other: the enrolment of the boys was into these tribes; and this day, as we have before observed, was called Cureotis, from the boys that were enrolled. And such is the information derived from history.

Again, however, let us direct our attention to things, and behold these in the particulars that have been narrated, as in images. The festival, therefore, of the Apaturia, which had for its pretext the victory of the Athenians, pertains to the hypothesis according to which the Athenians conquered [the Atlantics], and all intellectual subdue material natures. Deception, likewise, is adapted to mundane forms, which separate themselves from impartible and immaterial principles, and become apparent, instead of truly-existing beings. But the enrolment of the boys, imitates the arrangements of *partial souls* into their proper allotments, and their descents into different generations. The festival is an imitation of the eternal hilarity in the world: for if it is filled with Gods, it celebrates a perpetual festival. But the contests of *rhapsody*, are analogous to the contests which souls sustain, weaving their own life together with the universe. And the *rhapsody*

*itself*, resembles the above-mentioned woven life of the universe. For this has an imitation of intellectual forms, in the same manner as the contests of rhapsody have of heroic actions and manners, possessing together with an harmonious conjunction, a connected series. The *many poems of many poets*, adumbrate the many natures, and many circum-mundane productive powers,<sup>1</sup> and, in short, the division of physical imitations. But *the new poems*, are images of forms which are perpetually flourishing, always perfect and prolific, and able to operate efficaciously on other things. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Mention, however, is made of the poems of Solon, not as of a poet in the popular sense of the word, but as of one who mingled philosophy with poetry. For of mundane works likewise, and whole productions, a royal intellect is the leader. And the praise is related as being mentioned to another person, i. e. to Amynander, because, as we learn in the Phædrus, that which judges differs from that which makes and generates. Referring, however, all that has been said, to the universe, we may infer as from images, that partial souls, partial natures, and partible forms, and of these, those especially that are always new and efficacious, contribute to the mundane war. But all these are connected together by the Gods, who are the inspective guardians of fabrication, and are co-arranged with one world, one harmony, and one kindred life.

“ But then one of our tribe, whether he was willing to gratify Critias, or whether it was his real opinion, affirmed that Solon appeared to him to be most wise in other concerns, and in things respecting poetry, the most ingenuous and free of all poets. Upon hearing this, the old man (for I very well remember) was vehemently delighted; and said, laughing—If Solon, O Amynander, had not engaged in poetry as a casual affair, but had made it as others do a serious employment; and if through seditions and other fluctuations of the state in which he found his country involved, he had not been compelled to neglect the completion of the history which he brought from Egypt, I do not think that either Hesiod or Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired greater glory and renown.”

Here again, the lovers of diction may indicate to their admirers, that Plato

<sup>1</sup> The word *ἁγῶν* is, I conceive, omitted in the original in this place.

cautiously praises the poetry of Solon, since he represents the praise as bestowed by a private individual, and for the sake of others, and not as given by one who spoke conformably to intellect and reason. For Plato, if any one, was a most excellent judge of poets, as Longinus also admits. Heraclides Ponticus therefore says, that Chærilus and Antimachus being at that time most renowned, Plato preferred the poems of the latter to those of the former, and that he persuaded Heraclides at Colophon, to collect the poems of Antimachus. In vain, therefore, is it futilely observed by Callimachus and Duris, that Plato was not a sufficient judge of poets. Hence, what is here said manifests the judgment of the philosopher, and it may be considered in a more historical point of view. The investigator, however, of things, will think it requisite to show how all the causes of the orderly distribution of the universe, and also the causes that are connective of contrariety, are extended to one principle, and how the last adhere through media to the first of things. For thus those who receive the narration of the ancient Critias, are extended to him, but he looks to Solon. And he, indeed, admires the poetic power of Solon; but they, through Critias as a medium, are referred to the poetry of Solon. For gratifying the former [i. e. Critias], they praise the poetry of the latter. But what is it that Critias says respecting Solon? That he was subordinate to divinely-inspired poets, from these two causes; because he engaged in poetry as a casual affair; and because when he came from Egypt, he found the city of the Athenians in a state of sedition, and that he was not able, his country being involved in difficulties, to complete the history, which he brought from thence hither. What the history therefore was, he informs us as he proceeds.

From these things, however, as images, Plato manifests, that what is primarily demiurgic, and every thing effective, have other primary energies; but that their secondary energy is the production of secondary things. Likewise, that the confused, disorderly, and unstable nature of matter, frequently does not receive ornament from more divine causes, but subsists without symmetry<sup>1</sup> to the gift which proceeds from them. Hence, second and third powers are unfolded into light, which proximately adorn its formless nature. Solon, therefore, being most ingenious, and imitating exempt causes, did not deliver through poetry the Atlantic war. But Critias, and those posterior to him, transmit the account of this war to others, imitating second and third causes, who produce the variety of

<sup>1</sup> For *ἀλλὰ συμμετρως* in this place, it is necessary to read, *ἀλλ' ἀσυνμετρως*.



effective principles, and the orderly distribution of things, which is harmonized from contraries into a visible subsistence. Moreover, the assertion that Solon was the *wisest* of the seven wise men, exhibits his analogy to the first principles. And his being *most free*, adumbrates the power which is exempt, and established in itself, and which fills all things in a liberated manner. A thing of this kind likewise concurs with the wise man, as being immaterial, without a master, and of itself. The ancient Critias, also, being said to be *old*, indicates a cause which is intellectual, and remote from generation. For "*wisdom*," says Plato, "*and true opinions are most desirable things to him who has arrived at old age.*" Again, the assertion of Critias, that *he very well remembers*, exhibits to our view the salvation of eternal productive powers, and the stable energy of secondary causes, about such as are first. But *Solon engaging in poetry as a casual affair*, represents to us that productions into secondary natures, have only a secondary rank among first causes. For their first energies are intellectual, according to which they are united to the beings prior to themselves.

If, however, some one omitting the survey of things, should consider through what cause Plato introduced these particulars, according to their apparent meaning, he will very properly find that they contributed to the thing proposed. For the design of Plato was to narrate the Atlantic war. But it was requisite that the messenger of this history should neither deceive nor be deceived. Hence also, Solon is said to have been most wise, and intimately acquainted with those about Critias. For as a wise man, he was not deceived, and as being an intimate acquaintance, he would not deceive. It was likewise requisite, that the receiver of this history should neither have been aged, in order that the narration may appear to be ancient, nor yet so young, as to be forgetful. Hence, Critias is supposed to have been a youth, but sufficiently able to remember, and in consequence of this, to have contended with others in rhapsody, in which much memory is necessary.

Farther still, it was requisite, that the ancient Critias should not commit such-like narrations to very young men, lest they should appear to them to be contemptible. Hence, it is very properly said, that some one of the tribes, by enquiry of Solon, heard the history. But it was requisite that he also should, in a certain respect, have been familiar with Solon, in order that the old man might opportunely relate all the history to him. Hence, likewise, the praises of the poetry of

<sup>1</sup> For *παρεσκελεχεν* read *παρεσκελησεν*.

Solon precede the history ; the praise being given by Amynander in order to gratify Critias. And thus much concerning the disposition of what is said in the text.

That Solon, however, went to Egypt, not only for the purpose of obtaining the Atlantic history, but likewise that the Athenians, during his absence, obeyed his laws, which he had bound them by an oath not to violate, is evident. For during this time, also, he associated with Cræsus, and sailed to Egypt ; but on his return, he became master of the city, which was in a tumultuous condition through the Pisistratidae. And thus much we have derived from history. Origen, however, doubts how Plato calls Solon *most free* : for this is not an encomium adapted to a poet. And he dissolves the doubt by saying, that he is so called, either because he spent his money *liberally*, or because he used the greatest freedom of speech ; and that on this account he was free, without any timidity in his poetical compositions. Or he was so denominated, as being in his poetry remiss and un-compelled. But Iamblichus says, that no one of these solutions is true, but that through this appellation, the *liberated* condition of the intellect of Solon, the *un-servile* nature of his virtue, and that which was venerable in his character, and which transcended all other things, are signified. The same interpreter also says, that the *laughter* of Critias manifests a generative progression from causes, perfect, and rejoicing in its progeny. But the *remembering well*, indicates the salvation of effective principles in the world. Why, therefore, was Solon anxious to deliver the Atlantic war in verse ? Because, says he, all natural works and the mundane contrariety subsist through imitation. For this is analogous to its effective and primary causes ; just as Critias is analogous to proximate and secondary causes. But why was he prevented by sedition ? Because material motions and material tumult become an impediment, as we have before observed, to the productive powers of mundane causes.

“ In consequence of this, Amynander enquired of Critias what that history was. To which he answered, that it was concerning an affair, which ought most justly to be the greatest and most renowned which this city ever accomplished ; though through length of time, and the destruction of those by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has not reached the present age.”

Longinus says, that something is wanting here to render the sense complete

For the word *considered* is wanting to the words *most justly to be*, because these are required in what follows, but not the word *οπισθεν*, *being*. Porphyry, however, says, that Longinus did not perceive, that, in consequence of the undertaking being the greatest, but not yet celebrated, Plato adds, "*ought most justly to be most renowned*." But we, directing our attention to things, say, that Plato calls it *the greatest undertaking*, as bringing with it an image of all contrariety, extending itself every where. And that he denominates it *most renowned*, as contributing to the visible fabrication of things. For thus, also, the works of nature are called by Orpheus *renowned*.

Bondless eternity, and nature's works  
Renown'd, remain.

"Relate this affair, O Critias, says Amynander, from the beginning, and inform us what that transaction was, how it was accomplished, and from whom Solon having heard it, narrated it as a fact."

I. e. Relate what this admirable deed was, how, or after what manner it was performed, how it became known to, and by whom being preserved, it reached the hearing of Solon. Plato appears, through this, to investigate the whole form of contrariety, how it was effected, or may be known, and from what causes, to us invisible, it is suspended. Before, therefore, he recurred through relatives to the narration of Solon; but now he investigates the superior histories of it, or, that I may speak clearer, the principles of the fabrication of this contrariety. And by directing your attention to this narration, you may survey, as in images, through certain symbols, all the principles of this fabrication, as far as to the first causes of it.

"There is, then, says he, a certain region of Egypt, called Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, and in which there is a province called Saitical."

In the first place, it is worth while to observe how the narration always delivers things comprehended, proceeding from such as are more comprehensive; from Egypt, indeed, the river, from this Delta, from this the Saitic province, and from this Sais, sacred to Minerva. In the next place, having observed this, it will be

proper to ascend through the analogy of these things, to the first and most comprehensive causes of fabrication. For you may perceive this supernally comprehended by more total causes, and proceeding as far as to the last of things; comprehending causes every where preceding such as are comprehended; the more total, such as are more partial; and the impartible fabrication, that which is partible, and is denominated recent; to which also the present words refer the father of the narration. And this fabrication, indeed, is filled from these causes, and particularly participates of the undefiled power of Minerva. For, in short, since we refer this war, for the sake of which the whole narration is excited, to the mundane contrariety, it will be well, proceeding in the same way, to assimilate all the knowledge of the Egyptian priests to the former [or impartible] fabrication, which stably comprehends the productive powers contained in the universe; but the history of Solon, which is always recent, and placed in mutations, to the more novel fabrication, and which administers the all-various circulations of mundane natures. We shall also be benefited by perceiving how, in images, the difference between human and divine fabrications becomes apparent; and how, in these, Solon, indeed, calls on the priest to the development of ancient transactions, but the priest knows both such events as are reckoned ancient by the Greeks, and prior to these, such as are truly ancient. For thus also, in divine fabrications, that which is *recent* or *junior*, is converted to that which is more ancient, and is perfected by it; but the latter antecedently comprehends the causes of the former, and is established above it, by still greater and more perfect intellectual perceptions and powers. And thus much concerning the whole of the text.

It is necessary, however, to discuss every particular. With respect to Egypt, therefore, some call it an image of matter; others of the whole earth, as being divided analogously to it; and others of the intelligible, and the intelligible essence. But we say, that in what is here asserted, it is assimilated to the whole invisible order, which is the principle of visible natures. With respect to Delta also, it is produced from the Nile, being divided about the Saitic province, so as to make its egress from one right line to the right and left, and to the sea, the sea forming the hypotenuse of the triangle, which Plato calls the Saitic province; indicating, in what he here says, that it is that about which the stream of the Nile is divided. It is, however, analogous to the one vivific fountain of all divine life, and, in visible natures, to the *celestial triangle which is connective of all generation*, being proximate to the ram, which the Egyptians particularly honor, on account

of Ammon having the face of a ram, and also because *the ram is the principle of generation, and is moved with the greatest celerity*, as being among the constellations established about the equinoctial. The mention, therefore, of Delta is here very appropriate : since the triangle, as we shall learn in what follows, is the principle of the hypostasis of the mundane elements. But the Nile is to be arranged analogous to the zodiac, as being situated under it, having an inclination similar to it, and imitating, through its divisions, the obliquity of it, and its division about the equinoctial points. *The Nile also is a symbol of the life which is poured on the whole world.* Moreover, the two sides of the Nile, which run into the sea from the summit [of Delta], may be, in a certain respect, assimilated to the two co-ordinations, which proceed from one root as far as to generation, and of which generation is the recipient. So that a triangle is produced from them and their common receptacle, into which they conjointly flow. But the Saitic province, which forms a great part of Delta, participates also of a great portion of the celestial regions. Saïs, therefore, must be sacerdotally referred to the constellation called the Bear, not because it is situated under it, nor on account of its coldness, but as participating of a certain peculiar efflux of the God [who presides over that constellation]. Hence likewise Saïs is not shaken by earthquakes, in consequence of receiving a firm establishment on account of the place about the pole.

“ Of this province, the greatest city is Saïs, from which also king Amasis derived his origin. The city has a presiding divinity, whose name is, in the Egyptian tongue, Neith, but in the Greek Athena, or Minerva. The inhabitants of this city were very friendly to the Athenians, to whom also they said they were after a certain manner allied.”

The word *νομος*, or *province*, derived its appellation from the distribution of land. For thus the Egyptians called divisions of the great parts of Egypt. But from the city the whole province was denominated Saitic, just as Sebennytic is denominated from Sebennetus, and Canobic from Canobus. Amasis, however, is now assumed analogous to Solon. For he paid attention to wisdom and justice beyond all the [other Egyptian] kings. He is therefore conjoined with Solon, and has the same relation to him, which the city has to Athens ; in order that we may survey the cities and the men adorned by the Goddess [Minerva] as from one monad, and secondary natures always perfected from such as are more per-

fect. Callisthenes, however, and Phanodemus relate, that the Athenians were the fathers of the Saitæ. But Theopompus, on the contrary, says, that they were a colony of them. The Platonic Atticus says, that Theopompus altered the history through envy. For, according to him, some of the inhabitants of Sais came to renew their alliance with the Athenians. But Plato only says thus much concerning them, "*that the Saitæ were very friendly to the Athenians, and after a certain manner allied to them.*" It is possible, however, that he might say this on account of the tutelar Goddess of the city being the same with the Minerva of the Athenians.

With respect, however, to this Goddess the guardian of the two cities, it is requisite to know, that proceeding from intelligible and intellectual causes through the supercelestial orders, to certain parts of the celestial regions and terrene distributions, she is allotted places adapted to herself; not imparting an adventitious government of herself, but antecedently comprehending the essence and form of it, and thus possessing this allotment in a manner adapted to herself. That the government, however, of this Goddess extends supernally as far as to the last of things, the Greeks manifest by asserting that she was generated from the head of Jupiter. But the Egyptians relate, that in the adytum of the Goddess there was this inscription, *I am the things that are, that will be, and that have been. No one has ever laid open the garment by which I am concealed. The fruit which I brought forth was the sun.*<sup>1</sup> The Goddess, therefore, being demiurgic, and at the same time apparent and unapparent, has an allotment in the heavens, and illuminates generation with forms. For of the signs of the zodiac, the ram is ascribed to the Goddess, and the equinoctial circle itself, where especially a power motive of the universe is established. She is very properly, therefore, called by Plato a lover of wisdom, and a lover of war, and he now denominates her the leader of these allotments in the earth. In the first place, likewise, he honours the Goddess in the language of his country. For the Athenians denominate the tutelar Goddess of the city *Archegetes*, or the leader, celebrating her surname, and her presiding power. In the next place, he indicates the uniform pre-established comprehension in herself, of the allotments which are governed by her. And besides this he clearly represents to us, that it is possible for the same

<sup>1</sup> The former part of this inscription is to be found in Plutarch's treatise on Isis and Osiris; but the latter part of it, viz. *the fruit which I brought forth was the sun*, is only to be found in these Commentaries of Proclus. The original of this part is, *ὃν ἐγὼ καρπὸν ἔτεκεν ἡλίου ἐγενετο*.

things to be signified through many words, since words are images of the things signified by them. For many statues may be formed of one thing from different materials; so that the Egyptians preserve the analogous,<sup>1</sup> because they call the Goddess by a name which has the same signification with that of the Greeks. Nor is it at all wonderful that both should denominate her rightly, in consequence of establishing the name according to one science. If, therefore, there is one tutelar Goddess of the two cities Saïs and Athens, the inhabitants of Saïs are very properly said to be lovers of the Athenians, as being in a certain respect allied to them: for the affinity is not wholly perfect. For some may participate more and others less of the same providence. And some may participate of one, but others of another power contained in the Goddess. *For again, it is likewise necessary to know this, that a variation is produced in different nations from the places which they severally inhabit, from the temperature of the air, from habitude to the heavens, and still more partially from spermatie productive powers. But you may say, that they especially differ according to the gregal government of the Gods, and the diversities of the tutelar powers, from which you will find a difference in colour, figure, voice, and motion, in different places. So that those who migrate into other countries frequently change, by dwelling in those countries, their colour and voice; just as plants are changed together with the quality of the region, when they are transplanted in a foreign land.*

“ In this country Solon, on his arrival thither, was, as he himself relates, very honourably received. And on his inquiring about ancient affairs of those priests who possessed a knowledge of such particulars superior to others, he perceived that neither himself, nor any one of the Greeks (as he himself declared), had any knowledge of things of this kind.”

Solon, on account of his political wisdom, and on account of the dignity and worth of his city, justly appeared to be deserving of honor to the priests of Saïs. But he found, with respect to memory and history, among the Greeks, that neither himself, nor any other Grecian, had any knowledge of very ancient transactions. The remembrance, however, of such transactions, contributes indeed to political virtue, and also contributes to the theory of the mundane

<sup>1</sup> For *δωσασιν ἀπολογον* in this place, I read *ὁρῶσιν ἀναλογον*.

periods, which Solon being desirous to know, and interrogating for this purpose the priests, found that he was perfectly deficient in knowledge of this kind. These things, likewise, are symbols of divine concerns. For a certain fabrication or workmanship, is called by theologists *recent*. But this is particularly honoured [as being suspended]<sup>\*</sup> from the father of wholes, and from the intelligible Gods, with whom there are intellectual perceptions exempt from other things, and which have more eternal natures for their objects. But those intellectual perceptions are more partial and less excellent, which are in secondary natures. And farther still, there is such a difference in demiurgic principles, that some of them are comprehensive of more total, but others of more partial forms. And some of them precede in dignity and power, but others are recent as with reference to them, and possess a subordinate power.

“ Hence, when he once desired to excite them to the relation of pristine transactions, he for this purpose began to discourse about those most ancient events which formerly happened among us. I mean the traditions concerning the first Phoroneus and Niobe; and after the deluge, of Deucalion and Pyrrha (as described by the mythologists), together with their posterity; at the same time paying a proper attention to the different ages in which these events are said to have taken place.”

Of such a nature as this are all divine causes: for they call forth more divine powers, and through this evocation, are filled from them with more divine and total intellections; such as is now also effected by Solon. For extending to the Egyptian priests the most ancient transactions of the Greeks, he in a certain respect leads them to the narration of their antiquities; *of which the Egyptians participate in a remarkable degree, as they survey without impediment the celestial bodies, through the purity of the air, and preserve ancient memorials, in consequence of not being destroyed either by water or fire. But the Assyrians, says Iamblichus, have not only preserved the memorials of seven and twenty myriads of years, as Hipparchus says they have, but likewise of the whole apocatastases and periods of the seven rulers of the world.* So that this being admitted, there is still less reason to compare with these memorials the much-celebrated archæology of the Greeks: from which

<sup>\*</sup> The words *ως ἐκπρεμνῆς* appear to me to be wanting in this place in the original.



likewise it is evident, that the present narration does not look to that which is small, but to the whole and the universe.

Farther still, the archaeology of the Greeks is different with different [Grecian cities]. For with the Athenians it proceeds as far as to Erichthonius, who was a native of Athens : but with the Argives, as far as to Phoroneus and Niobe. For these two are with the Greeks the most ancient. For Argos descended from Niobe ; but from him Iasos and Pelasgos, from whom Argos was denominated Pelasgic. The particulars, however, respecting Deucalion and Pyrrha, that a deluge taking place, they were preserved in Parnassus, and how migrating from thence, they restored the human race, are manifest, and also that antiquity with the Thessalians is as far as to these. But according to some, the Argolic race begins from Inachus, but that of the Athenians from Cecrops, each of whom was prior to Deucalion. Solon, therefore, relating these and such-like particulars, causes the Egyptian priests to narrate their antiquities. We shall however see, what one of the ancient priests said respecting the narration of Solon. And these things, indeed, will be evident through what follows. Solon, however, met at Saïs with a priest called Pateneit ; but at Heliopolis, with a priest called Ochlapi ; and at Sebennytus, with one whose name was Ethimon, as we learn from the histories of the Egyptians. And perhaps it was the priest of Saïs, who says as follows to Solon :

“ But upon this, one of those more ancient priests exclaimed, O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, nor is there an aged Greek among you.”

The Egyptian priest is ancient, in order that while he reproves he may not be intolerable, and may have a probable reason for teaching about archaeology. But he employs a repetition of the name of Solon, not only as striving beyond measure in what he is about to say, but also for the purpose of indicating the circulation of things from the same to the same, which the more total causes of things generated in the universe, comprehend stably and intellectually, through indelible knowledge ; to which causes the priest is analogous. He accuses, however, the Greeks as being always children, because they have not acquired the all-various wisdom of the Egyptians, but bear servile hairs in their soul. *Juvenility*, therefore, indicates their want of wisdom. Or this privation of wisdom arises from the frequent destructions of them, so that before they become truly ancient, they

become again juvenile through destruction. Or it is because ancient deeds are not preserved by them ; but their knowledge is always confined to present events, and such as sense apprehends. But with the Egyptians, past transactions are always present through memory, as if they were recent. And the remembrance is through history. But the history is from pillars, in which things paradoxical and worthy of admiration, whether in actions or inventions, are inscribed. Why, however, it may be said, does this priest accuse the Greeks with such severity ? For what is there admirable in his narration, since, as the noble Heraclitus says, *a very learned knowledge of past transactions does not produce intellect* ? But if that which Eudoxus says is true, that the Egyptians call a month a year, the enumeration of many of these years, will not be attended with any thing wonderful. It was idle, therefore, in the Egyptian priest to think highly of himself for the knowledge of transactions in these. Or, *though, as Aristotle says, it is impossible that memory and sense should be effective of science, yet at the same time it must be admitted, that they contribute to the reminiscence of wholes*. For by relating in many things many similar circumstances, we produce one form of them, and finding frequently from history concordant apocatastases of many things, we recur to the one cause of them. For thus the observations of the affections of the air were framed by Calippus, and the knowledge from astrology of the celestial motions. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

Again, however, let us recur to the theory of wholes, and there survey *the junior fabrication*, held together by Minerva, and filled from more ancient and primordial causes. For from thence this fabrication possessing stability proceeds,\* on account of an exempt cause, and contributes to the mundane contrariety. For every thing in the demiurgic progression which is distributed into parts and multiplied, proceeds on account of that principle. As, therefore, there are causes in the world, some of which are effective of the regeneration of things, but others are guardians of the coherence of productive powers, the priest, indeed, must be assumed as analogous to these latter causes, but Solon to the former. Hence, the one exhibits a transcendent remembrance of antiquity, but the other is said to have related various mutations, generations, and corruptions. It likewise appears to me, that the arrangement of the elder prior to the younger person, is assumed in a way adapted to the orderly distribution of the universe. For in the fabrication of Jupiter, they have this order with reference to each other ; just as the

\* Instead of *προς το εζηγημενον* here, I read, *και προεισι δια το εζηγημενον αιτιος*.

Elean guest [in Plato] says, that those who live in the Saturnian period, proceed from being older to being younger; but those that live in the period of Jupiter, proceed in a contrary direction. And in this dialogue, Timæus says, respecting the soul, that the Demiurgus produced it more ancient than the body, and on this account constituted it of a more principal nature. Now, therefore, the priest, who is the guardian of divine institutions, excels through antiquity, though that which is junior proceeds from a higher order; just as Solon comes from a city, which pertains in a greater degree to Minerva. In mundane works, however, that which is more ancient possesses a great dignity.

“To whom the priest:—Because all your souls are juvenile; neither containing any ancient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any discipline hoary from its existence in former periods of time.”

*Juvenility of soul*, in what is here said, is analogous to renovation of life, and to more partial causes; but *remote tradition*, to stable intelligence, and to more ancient principles. And *hoary discipline* is analogous to the comprehension, which is united and always the same, of the nature and composition of all that the world contains; through which, indeed, the first and most divine of mundane natures comprehend totally and exemptly the causes of all generated beings, and eternally and antecedently contain in themselves temporal natures; but comprehend things more proximate to the universe partially and subordinately, as falling short of the unical intelligence of wholes. Hence to some of the Gods *hoariness* is adapted, but to others *juvenility*. For hoariness is a symbol of intelligence and an undefiled life, and which is remote from generation; but juvenility of more partial knowledge, and which now comes into contact with generated natures.

“But the reason of this is the multitude and variety of destructions of the human race, which formerly have been, and again will be: the greatest of these, indeed, arising from fire and water; but the lesser from ten thousand other contingencies.”

In what is here said, an inquiry is made, why the Greeks are always children, but there is no discipline with them hoary from its existence in former periods of time? Or, if you wish to survey the paradigms of these things, the enquiry is,

through what cause the junior fabrication presides over variety, generated natures always rising into existence, and such as are ancient becoming renovated? Before, however, he discovers the cause of such-like doubts, he first discusses the periods in the universe, and points out the variety of them; of which the first principles of the Gods, indeed, have an antecedent knowledge, stably and unitedly; but the second principles partially, and in such a way as to come into contact with the nature of the things which they govern; for this it is always to know what is present. But to retain in the memory things that are absent, is analogous to the perception of wholes separately and stably. There are, therefore, certain various periods of things in the world; but it must be admitted, that there is always generation and always corruption in the universe. For that which is sensible is rising into existence, and tending to corruption, but never *truly* is. This generation, however, and destruction, must be surveyed in one way in the heavens, and in another in material natures. For, in the former, a mutation of figures, and the motion of perpetually generated bodies, pre-exist. But generation, being governed through the mutations of these bodies, evolves its own circle. In this circle, however, different elements have dominion at different times. And wholes, indeed, always preserve the same and a similar order according to nature; but the different parts of these wholes subsist at different times, either conformably to nature, or preternaturally, in a becoming manner. For<sup>1</sup> either the wholes and the parts always subsist according to nature; or both, on a certain time, have a preternatural subsistence; or the one has a preternatural, but the other a natural subsistence, and this in a twofold respect. If, therefore, all things [perpetually] existed according to nature, the variety of generation would be dissipated, perpetual natures would be the extremities of beings, and the first essences would be the last of all things. But if all things were disposed preternaturally, there would be nothing stable; from which an invariable sameness of subsistence might be present with mutable natures; nor would the circle of generation be preserved. And it is impossible that wholes should have a preternatural, but parts a natural, subsistence; for parts follow wholes, and wholes are comprehensive of parts. Hence it is impossible that the former should, at a certain time, exist preternaturally, but the latter remain in a condition conformable to nature. For neither is it possible, when the whole of our animal nature is moved, and its order destroyed, that any one of its parts should still exist according to nature.

<sup>1</sup> Tap is omitted here in the original.

It remains, therefore, that wholes being established in a natural subsistence, the parts at one time following the wholes, are disposed conformably to nature, but at another time have a preternatural tendency. But as of partial animals, each is indeed always generated and corrupted, on account of the efflux of them in the universe; but one is more generated, and another is more corrupted than another, and one is more adapted to existence, but another to corruption; thus also the several parts of the earth, receiving both a natural and preternatural subsistence, some of the parts are more able to subsist conformably to nature, but others are more adapted to sustain deviations into a preternatural condition of being; this, indeed, on account of a different temperament, but afterwards on account of the position being different of different parts, and in the next place, on account of habitude to the heavens. For different parts of the earth are adapted to different parts of the heavens, though they are preserved by other figures [or configurations]. And in addition to all that has been said, on account of the power of the inspective Gods, and of the divinities who preside over climates, and who are allotted different peculiarities; some rejoicing more in motion, but others in permanency, some in sameness, but others in difference; abundant corruptions likewise of partial natures being produced in different places; the forms or species of the universe have a never-failing subsistence. For man is always, the earth is always, and each of the elements always is. For since corruption and generation proceed from the celestial figures; but these are imitations of divine intellections, and the intellections are suspended from intellectual forms, but from these stability is derived;—this being the case, continuity is produced in mundane forms, and the visible figures are preservative of species, but corruptive of parts, so as to cause things which are generated in time, to be also dissolved in time, according to a circular progression. For the universe does not envy salvation to such things as are able to exist in conjunction with it; but that which is incapable of being administered together with the universe, is not able to abide in it. The law of Jupiter, however, expels<sup>a</sup> from essence every thing of this kind as disgraceful. For it is perfectly impossible that what is disgraceful should remain in the universe. But that which is deprived of order in the universe is disgraceful. We have shown therefore why<sup>b</sup> abundant and partial corruptions are produced in different places of the earth.

<sup>a</sup> For *εμβαλλει* here, it is necessary to read *εμβαλλει*.

<sup>b</sup> For *ετι* in this place, read *ετι τα*.

In the next place it must be shown why the greatest of destructions are through the predominance of fire and water, and not through that of the other elements. Fire, therefore, has an efficacious and productive order in the elements, is sufficiently able to proceed through all other things, and is naturally adapted to divide them. But water, is indeed moved with greater facility than earth, yet is more difficultly passive than air. And by its facility of motion, indeed, it is able to operate; but through being passive with difficulty, it is not affected by violence, nor becomes imbecile when dissipated, like air; so that it reasonably follows, that violent, and the greatest destructions are effected by deluges and conflagrations. You may also say, that the remaining two elements are more adapted to us. For we are pedestrious, and allied to earth; and as we are on all sides comprehended by air, in which we live, and which we respire, it is evident that our bodies are of a kindred nature with it. Hence these elements, as being more allied to, are less destructive of us; but the others, which are contrary to these, bring with them more violent destructions. Farther still, according to another mode of survey also, these elements earth and air, together with suffering themselves, and suffering prior to us, appear to operate on us. For air when it becomes putrid, produces pestilence; and earth when divulsed, abundant absorptions. But pestilence is a passion of air, and chasms and earthquakes are passions of earth. Fire, however, and water are able to operate on us, without being previously affected themselves; the former by permeating, but the latter by external impulsion. Hence they are capable of producing more extended destructions, as being more vigorous and powerful than the other elements, in consequence of not corrupting through being themselves distempered. Deluges, therefore, and conflagrations are the greatest destructions. But famine and pestilence, earthquakes and wars, and other such-like partial calamities, may be produced from other causes. And of all these, the effective cause indeed is the order of the universe, and prior to this, the junior fabrication, which always makes new effects, and at different times produces the generation of different things. *For this is asserted by the fables of the Greeks, and is indicated by the tradition of the Egyptians, which mystically says of the sun, that he assumes different forms in the signs of the zodiac.\** It is not, therefore, at all wonderful, if though there are many destructions, and in many places, yet man and every form always exist, through the immutable progression of divine forms. For through these, the productive principles in the universe possess an invariable

\* See this explained further on, in one of the notes on the 4th book;

sameness of subsistence, because every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, is always suspended from its cause.

“ For the relation subsisting among you, that Phaeton the offspring of the Sun, on a certain time attempting to drive the chariot of his father, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the natures belonging to the earth, and perished himself blasted by thunder, is indeed said to have the form of a fable.”

That the first principles of beings comprehend<sup>a</sup> indeed things which are moved, stably, things multiplied, unitedly, partial natures, totally, and such as are divided according to time, eternally, is evident. And it is likewise well known, that theologists refer the causes of periods, and of the psychical ascents and descents, and of all multiplied and divided life, to the principles that are proximately established above the world. Hence it appears to me, that what is now said, refers the mythology about Phaeton to the Greeks, and the knowledge of Solon. For all such-like corruptions and generations derive their completion from the junior fabrication, [for the fabrication of the junior, or mundane Gods,] from which also the circulation of forms, and the variety of corporeal and psychical periods, is perfected. As, however, in divine natures, things secondary remaining, perfection is imparted to them from such as are first; thus also, the Egyptian preserving what is related by the Greeks, teaches Solon from this concerning things of which he had a knowledge prior to Solon. What therefore does this narration obscurely signify? That psychical lives, and the nature of bodies, have still multifarious mutations. And over these, indeed, the supermundane powers preside; but they are connectedly comprehended by the intelligible orders of the Gods. And of the former, indeed, the apparent meaning of the narration being historically delivered by the Greeks, is a symbol; but of the latter, the priest investigating the real meaning of the history, and unfolding it into light, to Solon. And thus much has been said by us for the sake of the whole theory, and in order to show that the narration is not discordant with the things proposed to be discussed.

The fable respecting Phaeton, however, requires a manifold discussion. For in the first place, it is necessary to consider it historically; in the second place, physically; and in the third place, philosophically. History therefore says, that

<sup>a</sup> For *παρεχόμεναι* here, it is necessary to read *περιεχόμεναι*.

Phaeton was the offspring of the Sun, and of Clymene the daughter of Ocean, and that driving the chariot of his father, he deviated from the proper track. That Jupiter also fearing for the safety of the universe, destroyed him by thunder; but he being blasted by thunder, fell about Eridanus. The fire likewise proceeding from him burnt every thing that was nourished by the earth: and his sisters, the Heliades, lamented his fall. And such is the historical account of the fable. It is, however, necessary to admit that a conflagration took place; for the whole narration is introduced for the sake of this; and, also, that the cause of it is neither an impossibility, nor a certain thing which may easily happen. But it will be impossible if some one fancies that the Sun at one time drives his own chariot, and at another time being changed ceases to drive it, and commits his proper employment to another. And it will be among the number of things which may be easily accomplished, if it is supposed that this Phaeton was a comet, which being dissolved produced an intolerable dryness from vehement heat. For this supposition is generally adopted. *Porphry therefore says, that certain signs may be assumed from the motion of comets. For when this motion is towards the southern parts, it is indicative of tempests, towards the north, of dryness from excessive heat, towards the east, of pestilence, and towards the west, of fertility.* The disappearance likewise of the comet, is said to be the destruction by thunder.

If, however, it be requisite to dissolve the fable in a more physical way, it is better to adopt the explanation of our associate Dominicus, that sometimes so great a quantity of dry exhalation is collected together, as to be easily enkindled by the solar heat. But this being enkindled, it is not at all wonderful, that it should burn all that part of the earth which is situated under it, and produce such a conflagration as that of which the fable speaks. In consequence, therefore, of the inflammation being produced by the Sun, the authors of fables were induced to call Phaeton the offspring of the Sun; denominating this offspring a male, on account of the efficacy of the power of fire, and because likewise it is usual to call fire a male, in the same manner as earth a female; and to denominate the one matter, but the other form. But because this exhalation did not proceed in a path parallel to that of the Sun, Mythologists assert, that Phaeton did not drive the chariot conformably to the track of his father. The dissolution of the cloud about the earth, was called by them, the fall of Phaeton; and the extinction of this cloud, the thundering of Jupiter. But the abundance of rain after the extinction of the cloud, (for this takes place after great conflagrations) is the lamentation of the sisters, or the wet exhalations, in as much as



those that weep, pour forth moisture. And the exhalations, both the dry and the wet, have one cause, the Sun. But to the latter the female pertains, and to the former the male. These explanations, therefore, are more physical.

It is however possible, that the fable may indicate something more sublime; that partial souls proceed indeed from the father of wholes, but are disseminated about the mundane Gods, in order that they may not only be intellectual, come into contact with intelligibles, and recede from bodies, but also that they may have a mundane hypostasis. As, therefore, divine and dæmoniacal souls are arranged under secondary leaders; some indeed under the divinity of the Earth, others under the Moon, and others under the Sun; some, under the government of Jupiter, but others under that of Mars; that which is disseminated being of divine origin, every where receives something from the nature of that in which it is sown: just as things sown in the earth, receive something from the earth; but those sown in an animal, receive something from the nature of the animal: so that of offspring, some express the peculiarity of places, but others the similitude of the mother. Hence also, souls that are disseminated about their kindred stars, receive a certain peculiarity of life, from their leaders; so that each is not only soul, but a soul of a certain kind, such for instance as Martial, or Jovian, or Lunar. For whether the God is of an immutable characteristic, or is demiurgic, or vivific, a certain representation of the peculiarity of the allotted deity accedes to the souls that are arranged under it. And why is this wonderful, since the peculiarity of presiding Gods extends as far as to herbs and stones? And there is a stone, and also a herb suspended from the solar power, whether you are willing to call them heliotropes, or by any other name. A similar reasoning likewise must be extended to the other Gods.

Of these souls therefore, those indeed that are undefiled, remain always suspended from the Gods to whom they are allied, and govern the universe in conjunction with them. But others descend, yet are not filled with genesiurgic vice [or the depravity which is offspring of the realms of generation]. And others receive a certain defilement from the subjects of their government. For this is the last form of life. The first of these souls, therefore, are truly sons of the Gods, as not proceeding out of their fathers, being, as it were, fashioned by and remaining within them, running before the Gods, and having the order of guards or attendants. The souls that have the middle rank, are indeed called sons of the

<sup>1</sup> For *υπο ταυς υποταγμενας αυταις ψυχαις*, it is requisite to read *εν ταυς υποταγμεναις*, κ. λ.

Gods, but receive also a secondary life, and become the sons of Gods and men. And souls of the third rank, are also sons of the Gods, but are not called genuine sons, as not preserving the form of their proper God, but verge to matter, and become oblivious of their genuine fathers. Whether, therefore, the authors of fables call Tityus the son of Earth, or Phaeton the offspring of the Sun, or Musaeus the son of the Moon, they thus denominate them after this manner, and others differently conformably to the before-mentioned causes. With respect to other sons of the Gods, however, we shall elsewhere speak.

But again, Phaeton is indeed the offspring of the Sun, as being of the solar series. Hence also he has a solar name. Since however, abiding on high, he revolved and governed the universe in conjunction with his father, he is said to have driven the chariot of his father. For the vehicle of Phaeton belongs to the solar chariots; since that also is entirely solar form. But when he fell into generation, for he did not rank among the first of souls, he is said to have been destroyed by the thunder of Jupiter. For thunder (i. e. lightning) is a symbol of fabrication, proceeding through all things without contact,<sup>1</sup> and vivifying all things; but is not the cause of the dissolution of the spirit in which the soul is carried. But there are many transpositions of souls into different politics, and from one element into another; some being transferred from earth to the sphere of fire; but others from the sphere of fire to earth; and some in order; but others heaped together, and accompanied with much tumult and disorderly motion, such as Phaeton is said to have suffered. For being borne along on high collectively, and attracting empyrean vestments, he was moved through these in a disorderly manner, when he proceeded to earth, and produced in certain parts of it a conflagration. For souls in descending become invested with many garments aerial or aquatic; and some have empyrean vestments. Of these also, some have the vigorous,<sup>2</sup> but others the vehement and the percussive, from fire. And some indeed, when they become situated in air, lay aside these garments, and assume others that are more gross, but others preserve them even as far as to the earth. I know, therefore, that the Charonean Plutarch relates, that in one of the islands of Britain, which appears to be sacred, and on this account is considered by the rulers of it as an asylum, the inhabitants frequently assert, when prodigious rains or thunder and lightning take place, that some one of the more excellent natures

<sup>1</sup> For *αραποι* here, it is necessary to read *αραφης*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *αμυδρως* in this place, I read *αμυδρως*.

fails, they being accustomed to passions of this kind. But they denominate souls that are transferred into bodies, and that relinquish a certain generation, more excellent natures.\* It must not, however, be denied that such-like circumstances befall souls descending into bodies, and especially those that are magnificent, and are allotted a more demoniacal essence, such as the fable obscurely signifies the soul of Phaeton to have been. But it is not at all wonderful, that descending souls should be in a greater degree co-passive with those elements which are analogous to their presiding Gods, and should attract and become invested with a greater number of such-like elementary garments; so that Saturnian souls should in a greater degree rejoice in humid and aqueous vestments, and solar souls in such as are empyrean, each being desirous of obtaining a material and ponderous body, instead of immaterial garments; the Gods also employing these as organs, in the same manner as they use material demons, in their productions about the earth. Through these souls likewise the Gods produce conflagrations, or pestilence, or inflict certain other calamities on those who deserve to suffer them, and employing souls that are allied to them as ministrant to the causes of the effects that take place in the heavens, they accomplish that which they effect. For it is nothing wonderful, that there should be many causes of the same things, some producing in one, and others in another way. Phaeton therefore, being borne along about the earth, and after a certain demoniacal manner, burning those places to which he approached, through the stream of fire (for partial souls effect many things out of the body, being then the instruments of avenging or purifying demons); he was lamented by the *Heliades*, who were certain solar souls, whence also they were said to be the sisters of Phaeton. But they lamented him, not as alone commiserating him on account of his descent into generation, but providentially inspecting him, in order that they might in an undefiled manner pay attention to things which are generated and corrupted. For the river Eridanos, and the falling into it, indicate the lapse of the soul into the river of generation; in which being situated, she requires the providential care of the genera allied to herself, and the aid of souls that are in a permanent condition. Theologists also signify the extension of the solar providence to mortal natures through tears.

The much-enduring race of men thy tears  
Excite.

\* Plutarch relates this, in his treatise *On the Failure of the Oracles*.

So that the fable very properly manifests through tears, in a symbolical manner, the providential attention to Phaeton of souls that are of the solar order. Again, therefore, this corollary may be assumed from the fable, that the descents of souls are effected through impotency. And that not only souls, but likewise their vehicles participate of the peculiarity of their leading Gods; so that from these divinities, some of them are denominated Solar, others Martial, and others receive an appellation from some other God. It may also be inferred that destructions are effected by the providence of the Gods. For Jupiter was the cause of the conflagration, by hurling the thunder at Phaeton. And likewise, that the descents of souls are suspended from the one fabrication of things. Hence Timæus teaches us not only about the essence, but also about the ascents and descents, the lives and all-various elections of souls.

“ But the truth is, that it indicates the mutation of the bodies revolving in the heavens about the earth; and signifies that through long periods of time, a destruction of terrestrial natures ensues from the devastations of fire.”

The Egyptian priest only unfolds thus much of the fable that contributes to the proposed discussion, that abundant destructions of terrestrial natures are produced through fire, in consequence of the mutation of the bodies that revolve in the heavens about the earth. But through mutation he signifies either the incommensuration of things in the earth to celestial natures; for all things while they subsist commensurately to the celestial effluxions, are able to remain, but when they are incommensurate to them, are corrupted. For things which are able to sustain the dividing power of Mars, are preserved; but such as are too imbecile to endure his effective energy, are easily dissolved; just as if your eye not being able to endure the solar light, should be blinded by its effulgence, though some other eye may be capable of looking directly to it without pain. And a similar reasoning must be adopted with respect to the other Gods and their configurations. For the universe is one animal, and its parts sympathizing with each other, it preserves different things by different parts; nor is any thing which is generated in it preternatural to the whole. For the natures which are generated in it, are generated through it; and it is the world itself which operates, and operates on itself. Or it may be said that this mutation is just as if a good father, who is always benevolently disposed towards his son, should on a time

chastise him for the sake of his good; for in so doing he will appear to have changed his accustomed mode of treatment. Or this mutation may be the various configuration of the celestial bodies. For these are the bodies that revolve in the heavens about the earth, and at different times exhibit different figures, through the various intellectual perceptions of their informing souls. *For the configurations are the letters of these souls, and certain efficacious impressions produced through them.* Again, however, both these are true. For the mutation of these bodies, and the incommensuration of earthly natures, are the leading causes of such-like destructions. But if it is necessary to call the fall of Phaeton from the heavens to the earth, a certain mutation of some one of the bodies that revolve in the heavens, it is not at all wonderful. For the mutation of the celestial Gods is one thing, since this is an impassive transfiguration; but another, that of the souls that revolve together with them, this being a habitude to terrestrial natures, from a life without habitude; and that of places about the earth, is different from either of the former, since it is a certain corruptive mutation; according to which neither souls are changed, nor much less the Gods, the leaders of souls. Such-like corruptions, therefore, of terrestrial natures are effected through partial souls; but are also effected through daemons alone. And as through these, destructions adapted to their series are produced, the like also takes place through souls. For the souls that when on high are delighted to illuminate immaterially, betake themselves to sublunary conflagrations.

Why, however, do copious destructions of the human race happen through long periods of time; is it because a concurrence of many things is necessary in order that such a destruction may take place? For it is requisite that there should be both the peculiar and common habit of the things that suffer, and a conspiracy of the agents. For what if that which is corruptive of one thing, should be preservative of another? It is also necessary that there should be an aptitude of matter, and a preparation of instruments and times. For these also take place in partial destructions, but more rarely in such as are common; and this reasonably. For it is necessary that the progression from an incorruptible nature to one that is easily corruptible, should be through things which are corrupted with difficulty. If, therefore, wholes are always incorruptible, but more partial natures are easily corrupted, the media between these may be very properly arranged among things which are corrupted with difficulty, and which become destroyed in long periods of time. For wholes which remain during the

mundane period, are incorruptible and indestructible. For no configuration of the stars is destructive of them, since all things are evolved in the whole period of the universe. But partial natures and individuals receive an easy dissolution. Copious destructions, however, of partial natures are effected through long periods of time; but such natures are nevertheless dissolved. For there is a life of a certain genus, as there is of one man, and of a city, and a nation. And as Aristotle says, there are periods of these, of some, more, but of others, less extended.

“Hence those who either dwell on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, perish more abundantly than those who dwell near rivers or the sea.”

This is likely to happen in the visible destructions through fire: for those who dwell near water, are defended from the devastation of fire. The philosopher Porphyry, however, transfers what is here said, from the phenomena to souls; and says, that in these the irascible part is at one time effervescent, and this inflammation is the destruction of the man within us. Thus Homer represents the eyes of Agamemnon when he was enraged with Achilles, as “shining like fire.” But at another time, the epithymetic part, being deluged by genesiurgic moisture, is enervated, and merged in the streams of matter. For, as Heraclitus says, “another death of intellectual souls is occasioned by moisture.” But if these things are rightly asserted, those will be inexperienced in the perturbations arising from anger, who have the irascible part in a relaxed condition, and commensurate to a proper attention to secondary concerns. For this is signified by *hollow places, and such as are near to water*. But those are inexperienced in the perturbations of desire, who have the epithymetic part in a more strenuous condition, and excited from the somnolency of matter. For this is indicated by *lofty places*. For in a certain respect, the irascible part is adapted to be easily moved, and to be efficacious; but desire is languid and imbecile. A musician, therefore, will be requisite, in order to relax the strenuous nature of anger, and give intention to the inertness of desire. The philosopher Iamblichus, however, thinks fit to survey these things physically, and not ethically. He says, therefore, that when a conflagration takes place, those perish more abundantly that dwell on lofty mountains, as being more remote from the exhalations arising from water; for these exhalations are not much elevated on account of the weight of the moist substance.

Hence the air that surrounds them is not wet but dry, and becomes fuel to fire, which naturally tends upward. But the contrary takes place in deluges. For those that dwell in hollow situations, are more abundantly destroyed, since all heavy substances naturally tend downward.

“To us, indeed, the Nile is a saviour in other respects, and also because it liberates us from this destruction.”

According to the apparent signification of what is here said, the Nile is the cause to the Egyptians of many and all-various goods, viz. of geometry, of the generation of fruits, and likewise of avoiding conflagrations. Its water also preserves their bodies, and the divinity that connectedly contains this body, elevates their souls. But from these things you may assume, that first causes, being full of life and prolific power, connect themselves, and remain eternally, and also think fit to impart connexion from themselves to other things, which are in a flowing and dissipated condition; so that the name of *saviour*, adumbrates divine and exempt providence; from which also the light that is in the intelligible<sup>1</sup> Gods, illuminates all the intellectual and demiurgic causes.

“But when the Gods, purifying the earth by water, deluge its surface, then the herdsmen and shepherds inhabiting the mountains are preserved, while those that dwell in your cities are hurried away to the sea, by the impetuous inundation of the rivers.”

In what is here said, the efficient cause is clearly ascribed to the Gods. And this also may be asserted of conflagrations. For purification is at one time effected through water, and at another through fire. But every where purification to secondary is from primary natures. Hence likewise in Orpheus, Jupiter is exhorted to bring purifications from Crete. *For it is usual with theologists to arrange Crete for the intelligible.* But the material cause of purification is here ascribed to the incursion of water. For each of these [i. e. fire and water] produces without deliberation and involuntarily, being borne along according to its own natural tendency. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be a pre-existent cause which employs them to beneficial purposes, and operates for

<sup>1</sup> The words *νοητός φως* are wanting in the original.

the sake of good ; which cause is beautifully ascribed to the Gods. But if there are certain purifications in wholes, there are also powers that preside over these purifications, operating as purifiers on wholes prior to partial natures. There are likewise divine mysteries, some powers initiating, and others being initiated ; nor will these ever desert the universe. The Egyptian priest likewise knowing this to be the case, calls the destructions through water and fire by a sacerdotal name, purifications, but not corruptions, as he would have done if he alone physiologized.

“On the contrary, in our region, neither then, nor at any other time, did the water descending from on high pour with desolation on the plains ; but, the whole of it is capable of returning from the bosom of the earth. And hence, and through these causes, the traditions which are preserved here, are said to be most ancient.”

Though rain may sometimes happen in Egypt, yet it does not happen in the whole of it, but usually takes place about the lower parts. This, however, says Aristotle, is evidently the work of the river. But the upper parts do not receive an afflux of this kind. Whence, therefore, does the Nile return ? Porphyry indeed says, it was an ancient opinion of the Egyptians, that the water issued upward from beneath, by the ascent of the Nile ; on which account also they called the Nile, the waterer of the earth ; and that it returned from beneath ; manifesting by this, that what is dissolved in Egypt preserves the Nile. Not that the snow being dissolved produces the quantity of its water ; but that it is loosened from its own fountains, and proceeds so as to become visible, being prior to this impeded and detained. We however understand the term *dissolved*, with reference to doubt : for speaking Attically, the Nile is dissolved, because it liberates us from doubt. For it is not true that from snow being dissolved the Nile is increased. For where in southern places, such as those through which the Nile flows, is there a collection of snow ? Nor does this river emerge from rarefied earth. For the rarity of the earth, does not give to the water a motion upward. But it is entirely necessary that there should be something else, which impels it from cavities to lofty places. And thus much with respect to the Egyptian opinion.

Others, however, say, that the Nile is increased from certain rains that are poured into it, as is clearly asserted by Eratosthenes. Hence to *return* does not now signify to spring from beneath, but for the water, being elsewhere increased, to



proceed above the earth; streams of water being poured into the Nile from other places. But Iamblichus says, it is not requisite to investigate a thing of this kind, but to understand in a more simple way the return of the water from beneath, as equivalent to what is usually called the *ascent* of water; and he assigns a two-fold cause, through which the Egyptians avoid dryness, from excessive heat, and deluges. And this is manifest from what he says when examining the increase from rains. For he says, that the first cause of the salvation of the Egyptians, is the will of their presiding Gods, and the boundary from the first of fabrication. But the second cause is the temperature of the air. For the seasons there are contrary to those in the antarctic<sup>1</sup> regions, from which the Nile flows to these places; and in them the generation of dryness from violent heat, and of great rains, reciprocates. If, however, some one should blame this explanation, because the rains being increased the increase is not regular, it must be said, that rain frequently happens when there is no descent [or disappearance] of the Nile. At the same time, the uninterrupted succession of rain, and the magnitude of the mountains in which the fountains of the Nile are contained, are the causes of the unceasing increase of the water. For these mountains, receiving in all their sides the rain impelled against them from the annual clouds, pour it incessantly into the fountains of the Nile. But these fountains becoming exuberant increase the river. For this, says Theophrastus, is one cause of rain, viz. the pressure of clouds against a mountain. Moreover, it is not at all wonderful, if clouds are not seen about the cataracts. For the stream of the Nile is not first poured from these, but from the Lunar mountains, which are thus denominated from their altitude. And the clouds when present being collected about the mountains, impede the cataracts by their superior magnitude. And thus much against the Egyptian oration of Aristides.

Eratosthenes, however, says, it is no longer requisite to investigate the cause of the increase of the Nile, when we direct our attention to certain waters and rains that run into it, so as to corroborate what is said by Aristotle. These things, therefore, we have concisely indicated on this subject. But from these particulars the Egyptians infer, that their land will never experience either a deluge or a conflagration. That it should however fail from other causes, is not at all wonderful; since, as Aristotle rightly observes, every part of the earth becomes sea in the infinity of time, and the same place is at one time continent, and at another, sea.

<sup>1</sup> For *antarcticus* here, it is necessary to read *antarcticus*.

And looking to the infinity of time, it must not be denied that the water of the Nile may fail. For what if the annual winds, blowing less vehemently, should not impel the clouds against the mountains? What also, if the mountains should fall, in which there is a collection of clouds; the wind from subterranean places bursting them, *through which, likewise, the oracles say, that succeeding cities shall be destroyed?* And the clouds not being collected, the stream always becoming less and less, will be absorbed by the earth which is dry.

"But the truth is, that in all places, where neither intense cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of men is always preserved, though it is sometimes more, and at other times less numerous."

The priest has spoken concerning the mundane periods, and the different mutations [in them], and has observed that the safety of the Egyptians is derived from the position of the region, and the providence of the Nile. Now, therefore, he infers in common respecting places of the earth, that every place which is free from deluges and conflagrations, has always the race of men remaining, more or less numerous. For the greatest destructions are through fire and water, as was before asserted. Some one, however, may say, that the race of men fail in a different way. *For at present there are none who inhabit these very places of the Attic land [which were formerly so populous], though neither a deluge nor a conflagration has happened, but a certain dire impiety, which has entirely obliterated the race of men.*<sup>1</sup> Or it may be said that Plato now calls *climates, places*. He says, therefore, that every climate has men, though there should not have been a deluge or a conflagration, at one time more, and at another less numerous. Some however will also be saved in a deluge, as Deucalion, who was preserved, when the climate of Greece was deluged. After this manner, therefore, some unfold the meaning of the passage.

But according to our associate [Dominius], Plato means, that every place has always a greater or less number of men, which is not excessively cold, or immoderately dry through heat. For mathematicians say, that there are certain places which are uninhabitable through excess of heat or cold. Every place, therefore, which is adapted to the habitation of men, and every climate, has a greater or less number of men. And this interpretation is reasonable, and conformable to

<sup>1</sup> In my copy of the original of these Commentaries, a certain annotator observes in the margin, that "Proclus alludes, in what he here says, to the Christian religion."

the words of the text. For the words, "where neither intense cold, nor immoderate heat prevails," appear to signify, *where neither of the contraries being excessive, impedes habitation.* And, in short, since Plato had before observed, that the transactions of the Egyptians were said to be most ancient, he very properly adds, that in reality, every climate which is commensurate to the habitation of men, has always men more or less numerous. For not only mathematicians assert that not every climate of the earth has men, but Orpheus also, who says :

The Demiurgus for th' abode of men,  
A seat apart from the immortals gave,  
Where turns the Sun's mid axis stretching wide ;  
Between excessive cold and heat a mean.

And this likewise Plato now asserts, when he says, "*where neither intense cold, nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of men is always preserved, though it is sometimes more, and at other times less numerous.*" With other nations, however, there is an oblivion of ancient transactions, not through the failure of men, but in consequence of frequent destructions taking place, certain illiterate and rustic persons alone remain. But with us [says the priest] many most ancient transactions are said to be preserved, in consequence of every thing being committed to writing in our temples.

"But whatever has been transacted either by us, or by you, or in any other place, beautiful or great, or containing any thing uncommon, of which we have heard the report,—every thing of this kind is to be found described in our temples, and preserved to the present day."

As the situation of the country and its guardian Goddess impart safety to the Egyptians, thus also the preservation of past transactions is effected by their own care and attention, through which they apply a remedy to the oblivion produced by time. But they are assisted in this by their temples, in which all great and wonderful actions are recorded, both of their own people and of others, and also paradoxical events of things. For this is the meaning of the words, "*or containing any thing uncommon.*" The history, however, of these things contributes to their knowledge of similar events; from which the reminiscence of wholes is produced, and also to the knowledge of futurity. *For through observations of this kind, they discover the effective powers of the celestial configurations.* For assuming that certain

things happen from certain things existing, they are able syllogistically to collect, from the same signs, the causes of future events. It appears also to me, that the doctrine of the Pythagoreans which prepares souls to remember their former lives, imitates such a history as this of the Egyptians. For as it is fit to assume different lives of one man, or rather of one soul, thus also different periods must be assumed of one nation. Hence, as in the one, the recollections of the transactions of a former life are perfective of souls, so in the other, the histories of former periods afford the greatest assistance to the acquisition of wisdom. Farther still, such observations are assimilated to the orderly distribution of the universe. For they imitate the stable productive powers of nature, through which remaining immoveable, order is ingenerated in things that are mutable. If, therefore, the world is a most sacred temple, in which the productive powers that connect the universe eternally remain, the recording of ancient deeds in temples will be an image of the subsistence of these powers. And what is asserted by the Egyptians may signify, that whatever in sensibles is stable, of a firm consistence, and always subsisting after the same manner, proceeds from the intelligible Gods; but that whatever is moved, and at different times is generated and corrupted in a different manner, is derived from the junior fabrication. For the sacerdotal genus by which mention is made of ancient transactions, conveys an image of the divine order, which is connective of wholes and of stability, and which guards all things by divine memory, and from which the junior fabrication being filled, imparts by illumination to things of a very mutable nature, sameness, connexion, and permanency.

“While on the contrary, you and other nations, commit only recent transactions to writing, and to other contrivances which cities have employed for transmitting information to posterity.”

*Contrivance* is a symbol of the cause which always fabricates new things, produces things which are not yet in existence, and co-adapts all things to the one perfection of the world. For in our domestic concerns, we call the preparation of every thing necessary, *contrivance*. And such also in cities, are literature and arts, forums and baths, and the like. But in the universe, *contrivances* are such things as receive a temporal and partial composition. As, therefore, temples signify the receptacles of perpetual productive powers, and also of such as are of a connective and guardian nature; thus likewise cities manifest hypostases consist-

ing of many, dissimilar, and mortal powers. But *recent transactions* only being committed to writing, evinces that the existence of such writings and arts, is of a more recent nature.

“And so again in accustomed years, a celestial effluxion rushes on them like a disease.”

This also is evident in men. For deluges destroy their race, being excited indeed from the celestial periods, but having water for their matter. Hence the whole of this is called a celestial effluxion, and, as it were, a disease, because it is corruptive of other things. That, however, which is corruptive, is indeed to a partial nature evil, but to the whole of things good. But Plato says, “*in accustomed years*,” because such like destructions are accomplished conformably to certain circulations, which also have themselves a certain consecutive order with reference to the whole period of a divinely generated [or perpetually circulating] nature. This also seems to be manifested through these particulars, that such things as are alone generated from wholes are necessarily consummated according to mundane periods, which are defined by the same number; but that such things as happen from certain partial causes, will not entirely happen to be the same, though the configurations of the period are the same. In the universe, however, you may survey the same thing, by understanding that all generated natures are corrupted, and yield to the mundane periods, and to the circulations of the whole life [of the world; and that the periods are conjoined to each other, and accomplish one continued life.

“Hence those among you who survive, are illiterate and unacquainted with the Muses. And thus it happens that you become juvenile again, and ignorant of the transactions of ancient times, as well of those among us, as of those in the regions which you inhabit.”

For from a deluge, Plato says, that herdsmen and shepherds are left, but that the inhabitants of cities are destroyed. Hence those that remain are illiterate and without the Muses. And on account of the former, indeed, they are unable through writing to transmit memorials of the pre-existent period; but on account of the latter, they are not sufficiently capable of preserving in verse or melody the events that happened prior to the deluge. Hence they become oblivious of all

things. But through oblivion they return to the life of children. For an ignorant old man, says Aristotle, does not at all differ from a child in understanding. A thing of this kind, however, happens to souls that have recently descended into generation. For having exchanged for the former period, which was intellectual,<sup>1</sup> a certain, secondary and genesiurgic condition of being, they become oblivious of intelligibles, through the deluge arising from matter. Such representations also of intelligibles, as they once had from the vision of them they lose in the progressions of time. Thus, therefore, every thing in the world returns to juvenility from juvenility through regeneration being borne along differently at different times, in consequence of the form of it naturally subsisting in motion. Moreover, the assertion that mutations taking place, those that remain, are illiterate and unacquainted with the Muses, indicates to those who consider it physically, that the analysis of bodies takes place as far as to that which is formless and without morphe; and also that in this mutation, the destruction of the elements happens, which is manifested through the word *illiterate*, and the dissolution of harmony, which again the Gods who are the inspective guardians of renovation, easily remedy, and restore to a condition according to nature.

"The transactions therefore, O Solon, which you relate from your antiquities, differ very little from puerile fables."

The Egyptian priest compares the venerable and very ancient narrations of Solon to the fables of children. For the fables of the wise are about things of an eternal nature; but those of children about temporal things and which are of small consequence. And the former, indeed, contain intellectual concealed truth; but the latter, truth of a grovelling nature, and which indicates nothing elevated. To the latter fables therefore, the histories of Solon are analogous; but to the former, the histories of the Egyptians. For the one look to that which is small, but the other have a most extended survey. And the one are only histories, but the other contribute to science. From these things, therefore, the paradigms also of them are to be surveyed. The effects, indeed, of the junior fabrication, are called the sports of the Gods, and resemble fables. For they are the images of beings, and participate of forms in an ultimate degree. But the things which primarily derive their subsistence from intelligibles, are intellectual, eternal, and stable, and have the essence of themselves concealed.

<sup>1</sup> For *κατα* here, it is necessary to read *κατα*.

“For, in the first place, you only mention one deluge of the earth, though in former times there have been many.”

For the deluge of Deucalion is much celebrated by the Greeks, though as the Egyptian says, there were many others prior to it. Thus also in wholes, the junior fabrication gives completion to wholes partially, and multitudinously, and renders that which is present in a good condition through regeneration. But in intelligibles, the causes of the first subsistence and of the circulation of forms, are antecedently comprehended unically [or according to the nature of *the one*].

“And, in the next place, you are ignorant of a most beautiful and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country; from whence you and the whole of your city descended, though a small seed only of this admirable people once remained. But your ignorance in this affair is owing to the posterity of this people, who for many ages were destitute of literature, and became as it were dumb.”

The Egyptian wishes to conjoin the second to the former period, and to show that there is one connexion and life of the first Athenians, and of those that now exist, through a small seed, as he says, remaining. For thus also in the world the seeds of a former period conjoin that which succeeds it to its principles, through the essence of causes, the unceasing motion of the universe, and as some one says, its immutable mutation. We must not, however, wonder if the priest now indeed says, that Solon is the offspring of those excellent men. For we must again direct our attention to the cause of all mundane contrariety. For Solon, so far as he is an animal, possesses from them the genus; but so far as he is a partial intellect, receiving the narration of a war, he is analogous to the divinity, who transports the productive principle of mundane contrariety, supernally from intelligibles to the sensible region. Nor is it proper to be disturbed by such like objections, but to know the nature of analogies; and that the same things through analogy, become first, middle, and last.

“For prior to that greatest destruction by water, there was a most excellent city of Athenians, which surpassed all others in war, and was in every respect governed by the most equitable laws, and whose deeds and politics are said to have been the most beautiful of all that we have received the knowledge of by the hearing, under the heavens.”

Plato does not perhaps mean by *the greatest destruction*, the deluge of Deucalion, but some one of the deluges prior to it. But he calls the city of the Athenians most warlike, and governed by the most equitable laws, as being an imitation of its guardian Goddess, whom he afterwards says, is both philosophic and philopolemic. For the Athenians partake of the warlike from the philopolemic, and of equitable legislation from the philosophic. By *the most beautiful deeds* he means the victory over the Atlantics. But by *the most beautiful politics* he does not intend to signify that they changed many of them, but he thus speaks, because one polity may be called the number of many polities; just as one world is connective of many worlds. For if the life of each individual is a certain polity, but the common life is the communion of many partial lives, the one polity will consist of many polities, the beauty of it depending on its union. He also adds, *the most beautiful of all that we know under the heavens*, because it is the first imitation of the polity of the world; so that you may say, it is the best of those under the heavens; for the paradigm of it is in the heavens. And thus much for particulars.

Again, however, we should remind ourselves respecting the whole deed of the Athenians, that it is neither called a fable, nor a mere history; some indeed receiving what is narrated as a history, but others, as a fable. And some asserting, that, in the first place, the developement of these, and such like narrations, appeared to Plato himself to be the province of a certain laborious and not very fortunate man;<sup>1</sup> and in the second place, that what is delivered by Plato is not a thing of such an enigmatical nature, as the doctrine of Pherecydes, but that he teaches with perspicuity concerning most of his dogmas. Neither, therefore, say they, should we force him to analyse, since the man proposes to instruct us without ambiguity. They also add, in the third place, that neither is a developement in the present instance necessary. For the cause of the insertion of this narration is known to be the delight and allurements of the reader. And in the fourth place, that if we analyse all things, we shall suffer the same as those who in a slippery manner are conversant with Homer. Others again think that the developement of this history should be referred to physical harmony, from what Plato says of the narration about Phaeton, that it has indeed the form of a fable, but that it manifests a certain natural event; *since the Egyptians also, who, as Plato says, were the fathers of this relation, obscurely signified the arcana of nature through fable*. So that the developement of this narration

<sup>1</sup> Plato says this in the Phaedrus of the man who does not adapt the explications of fables to divine concerns, but interprets them physically.



will be adapted to him, who speaks in the person of the Egyptians. For as Timæus himself, conformably to the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, makes his discussion from numbers and figures, as interpreting nature through images; thus, also, the Egyptian priest will teach the truth of things through symbols adapted to himself. To which may be added, that Plato himself elsewhere accuses those who speak every thing from what is at hand, in order, says he, that they may render their wisdom manifest, even to shoemakers. So that he who delivers true assertions through enigmas, is not foreign from the mind of Plato. And such are the arguments of each.

We however, say, that all these particulars are a history, and also an indication of the mundane contrariety, and the whole order of things; the history, indeed, narrating the past transactions of men, but symbolically comprehending in itself those things which are comprehended in the universe, and the mundane contrariety. For the progression according to opposition, commencing from the first intelligibles, divides the world by powers that are oppositely arranged. And if you are willing, we will divide the universe according to the divine orders, which are in uninterrupted succession, and survey, conformably to the Pythagoreans, the co-ordinations that it contains. From the two principles, therefore, it is divided into bound and infinity, or rather into things allied to bound and the infinite. For of things that are mixed, some pertain to the former, but others to the latter principle. But from that which is unfolded into light as the third after these principles, the universe is divided into the united and the multiplied.<sup>1</sup> For there multitude first subsists unitedly. From the triad that is next to this, it is divided into things perpetual, and things corruptible.<sup>2</sup> For the measure of existence to all things is derived from thence. From the third triad it is divided into the male and female:<sup>3</sup> for in this each of these primarily subsists. But from the first triad of the next order, it is divided according to the even and the odd; for number characterized by unity there.<sup>4</sup> From the second triad, it is divided into the partial and the total.<sup>5</sup> And from the third,<sup>6</sup> into the straight and the circular. Again, of the intellectual triads, it is divided, according to the first, into things that are

<sup>1</sup> This third thing, after the two principles bound and infinity, is *being itself*.

<sup>2</sup> This triad constitutes *intelligible life*, or *eternity itself*.

<sup>3</sup> This triad forms *intelligible intellect*, or [*avro2wor*] *animal itself*.

<sup>4</sup> This triad is the summit of the order which is called *intelligible*, and at the same time *intellectual*.

<sup>5</sup> The second triad of the above order is denominated *Heaven*, by Plato in the *Phædrus*.

<sup>6</sup> And the third triad of this order, is called by Plato in the *Phædrus*, *the sub-celestial arch*.

in themselves, and things that are in others. According to the second, into things animated and things inanimate, into things stable and things which are moved. But according to the third, into things that are the same and things that are different.<sup>1</sup> And from the order of Rulers,<sup>2</sup> indeed, it is divided into things which rejoice in similitude, and things allied to dissimilitude. But from the liberated<sup>3</sup> order, it receives a division into the separate and the inseparable. These things, therefore, which have an arrangement elsewhere, have now also been as it were explored by us. For according to each division, the goodness of better natures, desiring to fill things subordinate, and to take away depravity, produces war. But the desire of less excellent natures, to divulse a certain portion of beings, of a more excellent condition, excites the apparent opposition of things; since in war, also, those that contend against each other, wish to reduce into their own power the property of their opponents, and entirely destroy them. These things, therefore, are evident.

We may, however, understand the opposition of powers in the universe, by making a division after the following manner, into the adorning and adorned. And, in the first place, indeed, into things super-essential and essences. For the genus of the Gods is super-essential. In the next place, by dividing essences into eternal lives, and those which energize according to time. Likewise, those which energize according to time, into souls and bodies. And bodies, into such as are celestial, and such as subsist in generation. These, likewise, we must divide into wholes and parts. For the division extends as far as to these extremes. And, again, we must divide super-essential natures into the divine peculiarities, such as the male and the female, the odd and the even, that which unites, and that which separates, the stable and the motive. But eternal natures must be divided into total and partial essences. And such as are total, into the divine and angelic. Souls are to be divided into the divine, and the attendants on the divine. And divine souls, into the celestial, and those that pay a providential attention to generation. Souls, likewise, that follow the Gods, must be divided into those that follow them perpetually, and those that are frequently separated from them. And the division of those that are separated from them, is into those that preside over generation with undefiled purity, and those that become defiled with vice. For

<sup>1</sup> The intellectual triad consists of Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter.

<sup>2</sup> The order of Rulers, is the *supermundane order* of Gods.

<sup>3</sup> The liberated which immediately follows the *supermundane order*, is itself immediately followed by the *mundane order* of Gods. See my translation of Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*.

the descent is far as to these. Moreover, the celestial bodies must be divided into the inerratic and erratic. And these, into such as are moved with a simple, and such as are moved with a various motion. The latter, also, must be divided into the peculiarities of powers. And universally the division in all the above mentioned orders, is into that which adorns, and that which is adorned, that which fills, and that which is filled.

If, however, it be requisite, not to look to a part, but to adhere to the intellectual conception of wholes, it must be admitted that this opposition subsists every where. For it is in Gods, and in intellects, in souls, and in bodies. For in the first of these, there is bound and infinity; in intellects, sameness and difference; in souls, the circle of the same, and the circle of the different; and in bodies, heaven and generation. But secondary natures are always arranged with reference to <sup>1</sup> such as are more excellent. Hence, also, we say that this narration is useful to the whole theory of nature, as indicating to us the mundane contrariety from energies and motions. For all the teachers of physiology begin from contraries, and make these to be principles; which Plato also knowing, delivers to us, through symbols and enigmas, what the contrariety is of the genera in the universe, and how less are subjugated to more excellent natures, through the intellectual energy of Minerva. Farther still, Plato very properly calls the polity the work of the Athenians, because it is requisite that such an analogy as this which the junior fabrication connects, should proceed through all things; but that total powers should by a much greater priority effect this, from which also the junior fabrication being filled, gives subsistence to mundane intellects, to souls and bodies, conformably to the peculiarity of itself.

“Solon, therefore, on hearing this, said that he was astonished, and burning with the most ardent desire, entreated the priests to narrate every thing pertaining to his ancient fellow citizens.”

This, likewise, is the peculiarity of divine natures, viz. for such as are secondary, genuinely to adhere to such as are first, and to be established in their undefined intellectual perceptions; but for such as are first, to impart by illumination their own plenitude to such as are secondary, through <sup>2</sup> unenvying exuberant

<sup>1</sup> For *προ των αμεινων*, it is necessary to read *προς των αμεινων*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *τα δε πρωτα, δυναμενι αφθωνι, και αγαθοτητι, τοις δευτεροις επιλαμπει την αφ' αυτων*,

power and goodness. *Wonder*, therefore, precedes, because in us, also, this is the beginning of the knowledge of wholes. But in divine natures, it conjoins that which wonders with the object of wonder. Hence, likewise, those who are wise in divine concerns celebrate *Thaumas*, [whose name is derived from *thauma*, wonder,] as one of the greatest of the Gods, who through wonder inclines secondary to primary natures. But *ardent request* follows, rendering that which ought to partake of more perfect goods, adapted to the participation of them.

"That afterwards, one of the priests said:—Nothing of envy, O Solon, prevents us from complying with your request. But for your sake and that of your city, I will relate the whole; and especially on account of the Goddess."

Solon being an Athenian, has a resemblance to the Tutelar Goddess Minerva, so far as he adheres to more perfect intellectual perceptions. And the priest resembles one speaking, as it were, from a certain adytum. For he teaches what was committed to writing in the temples; and presents to us an imitation of the middle orders of the junior fabrication, and of the whole paternal cause; which orders transmitting the gifts of a more elevated to a subordinate cause, fill from that as from a certain fountain the divine order. All things, likewise, are elegantly effected by the speaker. For Solon is perfected, the city is praised, and the Goddess is celebrated. The ascent also is from Solon to the Goddess through the city as a medium; imitating the convertive power of the Goddess. And this, likewise, is indeed beneficent; viz. to energize for the sake of the perfection of secondary natures: for it imitates providence, and the super-plenary power of divine beings. But it is in a still greater degree beneficent, to energize for the sake of the city: for the energy is more ample, and embraces a greater power. Besides this, it is still more divine to extend all the narration to the Goddess, and to terminate the whole energy in her; all which, the unenvying communication of the priest genuinely represents to us, not only indicating the privation of envy, but the divine and prompt generation of good.

Again, however, we must not be ignorantly disturbed, if now indeed the priest as being the dispensator of the narration, is said to adumbrate a greater and more divine cause; but at another time, the Athenians being the ancestors of Solon,

πληρωσει in this place, it is necessary to read τα δε πρωτα δια δυνάμεων αεθλων, και αγαθοηγου, c. λ.

' For ποιειται here, it is necessary to read μιμνεται.

are more ancient than the inhabitants of Sais ; the Athenians being arranged according to the mundane causes of the whole contrariety of things. For so far as pertains to the narration, they have this order ; but so far as pertains to physical progression, they bring with them an image of certain more elevated and divine orders. And if you are willing so to speak, since all fabrication, and the mundane contrariety, are antecedently comprehended in the father of wholes, together with adorning causes, and things which are adorned, you may there also assume according to analogy, the paradigmatic cause of the Athenians in intellectual lives. For again, the veil [of Minerva] is the last image of the whole contrariety of things. But in the universe, the true works of the Gods have a precedence, and likewise in the productive and primary causes of them ; where also it is said, Minerva became apparent, invested with armour. Or rather, the veil is the last work of the weaving art, containing in itself an image of the mundane war, and of the demurgic order proceeding from the Goddess into the universe ; which veil she wove in conjunction with her father. A better image however of this, is that which in the narration of Plato, and in enigmas, represents to us the whole contrariety of things, and of the works of Minerva ; which narration contributes to the whole [descriptive] fabrication of the world, in the same manner as the veil to the splendid procession of the Goddess, and the whole of the solemnity. *For the Panathenæa is an image of the Minervæ fabrication in the universe.* The veil, however, is superior to both these, which is woven in the universe, in the intellectual light of Minerva. For contrariety is spread under the one life of the world, and the war is a part of the fabrication of things, which the ruling art of Minerva arranges in a becoming manner. And prior to all these, is the veil, which is pre-established in paradigmatic causes and the intelligible, and is comprehended in the one intellectual perception of Minerva. For,

In weaving, all th' immortals she excels,

says Orpheus. Hence, the weaving art is there primarily, and the veil of the essence of this Goddess, which essence is all things intellectually, that the universe is according to a mundane characteristic. For in ruling over the war of the universe, she does not look any where else than into herself.

That we may however recur to the thing proposed to be considered, the Egyptian priest directly imitates the unenvying providence of the Demiurgus, about which Plato a little farther on says, "*He was good, but envy never subsists in him who is good, about any thing.*" For the orders which exist proximately with him,

*Tim. Plat.*

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have from him, and on account of him, an unenvying participation of good. And through this privation of envy, the priest fills indeed the mind of Solon, but praises the city, and celebrates the tutelar Goddess; conjoining partial and total<sup>1</sup> natures, uniting things contained to the things that contain them, and suspending all things from the Goddess, according to one bond and one series.

“Who is allotted the guardianship both of your city and ours, and by whom they have been nourished and educated.”

The Egyptian, after a certain admirable manner, converts all things to the Goddess, and produces them from, and again converts them to her. For recurring from a citizen through the city to the power who presides over it, he makes this conversion. But again proceeding from the Goddess to the natures that primarily, and also to those that secondarily participate of her, he imitates the progression of things from her divinity. Again also asserting that the participants are nourished and disciplined by the Goddess, he likewise converts these to her. How is it possible, therefore, that these particulars should not in an admirable manner imitate demiurgic powers, which are established in natures prior to themselves, and generate those posterior to, and convert them to the causes of themselves? And thus much concerning these particulars.

What, however, is the meaning of this *allotment*? And how are the Gods said to be distributed into the universe? Of allotments therefore, some are those of partial souls, and others, of the undefiled genera. Some are demoniacal, others angelic, and others, of the Gods themselves. For if the father of the universe was one alone, and there was only one providence and one law, there would be no need of allotments, nor of divine distribution. Since, however, after the one father there is a triad, after the uniform a multiform providence, and after one law a multitude of fatal laws, it is also necessary that there should be a division of the subjects of government, and another providence and order about other things. *Through this cause therefore the universe is divided by demiurgic numbers, viz. by the duad, triad, tetrad, pentad, hebdomad, and dodecad.* For after the one fabrication, the section of the universe into two, heaven and generation, constitutes two-fold allotments, the celestial and genesiurgic. After this, the triad divides the universe, about which Neptune in Homer<sup>2</sup> says,

To me by lot belongs the hoary deep,  
The spacious heaven to Jove, to Pluto, Hades dark.

<sup>1</sup> For *άλλα* here, it is necessary to read *άλλα*.

<sup>2</sup> *Iliad* xv. vs. 190, &c.

The tetradic distribution follows the triple order; giving a four-fold arrangement to the elements in the universe, as the Pythagoreans say, celestially and ethereally, above the earth, and under the earth. Next to this is the five-fold division. For the world is one, consists of five parts, and is appropriately divided by celestial, empyreal, aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial figures, and presiding Gods. After this allotment, the division into seven parts follows. For the heptad beginning supernally from the inerratic sphere, proceeds through all the elements. And after all these, is the allotment of the universe defined in the dodecad. From the divine allotments, however, the allotments of angels and daemons are suspended and have more various distributions. For one divine allotment is comprehensive of many angelical, and of a still greater number of daemoniactal allotments. For every angel rules over a multitude of daemons, and every angelical allotment has about itself many daemoniactal allotments. For what a monad is in the Gods, that a tribe is to each allotment in daemons. Instead of a triad, therefore, we must assume three companies, and instead of the tetrad or dodecad, four numbers and twelve choirs, following their respective leaders. And thus we shall always preserve the higher allotments. For as in essences, as in powers, as in energies, progressions generate multitude, thus also in allotments, those that rank as the first, have a precedency in power, but are diminished in quantity; as being more proximate to the one father, and to the total and one providence. But those that are the second in rank, are allotted a diminished power, and an increased multitude. These things therefore are to be considered in common about allotments.

Since, however, we have divided allotments according to a section into two, into the celestial and sublunary, concerning the former indeed there can be no doubt respecting the nature of them, and whether they always remain invariably the same. But the sublunary allotments are deservedly subjects of admiration, whether they are said to be perpetual, or not. For if they are perpetual, how is this possible? For how, since every thing in generation is mutable and flowing, can the energies of the powers that providentially inspect it, be perpetual? For the things that are in generation, are not perpetual. And if these energies are not perpetual, how is it that divine inspection subsists differently at different times? For an allotment is neither a certain separate energy of the Gods, in order that things in generation being changed into another condition, this energy may remain exempt and immutable; nor is it alone that which is governed, in order that no absurdity may follow from the allotment flowing, and sustaining all-various mutations; but it is an assigned state, providence, and unrestrained government of divinity, about these sublunary concerns. And on account indeed of the subject

of government, the definition of perpetuity cannot be applied to it; but on account of its being [always] present, it is destitute of corruption, in order that we may not ascribe to the Gods the passion of partial souls, by assigning them different allotments at different times. Hence it remains for us to show, how allotment is to be explained, so as to preserve the immutable in the Gods, and mutability to things in generation.

Perhaps therefore the discussion of this affair will be easy, by having recourse to that theory, which we have frequently elsewhere employed, viz. that every thing in generation, and generation itself, must not be considered as alone consisting of mutable and flowing things, but there is also in these something immutable, and naturally adapted to remain always the same. For the interval, which receives all the parts of the world, comprehends them in itself, and is extended through all bodies, is immoveable, lest, if it belonged to things which are moved, it should also itself require another receptacle, and this should be the case ad infinitum. The ethereal vehicles likewise of divine souls, with which these souls are circularly invested, and which imitate the lives in the heavens, have a perpetual essence, and are eternally suspended from divine souls, being full of prolific power, and performing a circular motion,<sup>1</sup> according to a certain secondary circle of the celestial orbs. And in the third place, the wholeness of the elements remains always the same, though the parts sustain an all-various corruption. For it is necessary that each form of the universe should be never-failing, in order that the universe may be perfect, and that being generated from an immoveable cause it may be immoveable according to essence. *But every wholeness is a form, or rather it is that which it is said to be, through the participation of one entire form.*

And here you may see, how the nature of bodies proceeds in [a becoming] order. For one thing [i. e. the interval of the universe] is immoveable according to every motion; but another thing, [i. e. the vehicles of divine souls] receives motion only according to place. For this is most remote from essential mutation. And another thing, [i. e. the wholeness of the elements] admits of other mutations in its parts, but the whole remains entirely immutable. And the celestial allotments indeed, proximately dividing the interval, divide also together with it the heavens. But with respect to the sublunary allotments, in the first place indeed they are allotted portions in the interval of the universe. In the next place, they make a distribution according to the definite vehicles of souls. And in the third<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *οὕτω πληρῇ, καὶ γοιτμον ἐναρμῶς κοησιν ἐγκυκλίῳ ποταμῶμα*, it is necessary to read *οὕτω πληρῇ γοιτμον ἐναρμῶς, καὶ κοησιν, κ. λ.*

<sup>2</sup> For *ἄρειτον*, read *τρίτον*.



place, they remain always invariably the same, according to the *whole* parts of generation. The allotments of the Gods therefore do not change, nor subsist differently at different times. For they have not proximately their hypostasis in that which is changed. How, therefore, do the illuminations of the Gods take place in these? How are the dissolutions of sacred rites effected? And how is the same place, at different times occupied by different spirits? May we not say, that the Gods possessing perpetual allotments, and dividing the earth according to divine numbers, similarly to the sections of the heavens, these divisions of the earth also are illuminated, so far as they possess aptitude? But the circulation of the celestial orbs produces indeed this aptitude, through certain configurations; divine illumination,<sup>1</sup> at the same time, imparting a power more excellent than the then existing nature. Total nature likewise [or nature considered as a whole] produces this aptitude, inserting divine impressions in each of the things illuminated, through which these spontaneously participate of the Gods. For she inserts different images of the divinities in different illuminated parts, in consequence of these parts being suspended from the Gods. Times also effect something, according to which the conditions of other things are governed. The good temperament of the air too co-operates. And, in short, every thing about us contributes to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. When, therefore, according to a concurrence of these many causes, aptitude to the participation of the Gods is ingenerated in some one of the things naturally disposed to be changed, then divinity is unfolded into light, even in these mutable natures, he being before concealed through the inaptitude of the recipients; possessing indeed eternally his proper allotment, and always extending the participation of himself, but not being always received by these terrestrial places, on account of their inaptitude. But in the same manner as of partial souls, which choose different lives at different times, some choose such as are adapted to their proper Gods, but others such as are foreign, through an oblivion of the divinities to whom they are allied; thus, also, of sacred places, some are adapted to the power that has there his allotment, but others are suspended from another order. And on this account, says the Athenian guest, some are accustomed to be more prosperous, but others more unfortunate. Whether, therefore, the *teletic* or legislative art dedicates this particular city to the divinity who, according to an eternal allotment from the beginning, received this portion [of the earth], the life [of the inhabitants] is through this in a greater degree assimilated to the tutelar deity, and the works of him [who

<sup>1</sup> It appears to me that the words *θεϊας ελλαμπέως* are wanting in this place.

looks to this divinity in effecting them] are rendered more correctly great and admirable than those of the man who is not impelled to action from a principle of this kind. And he who chooses a life conformable to that of the allotted deity, acts with greater rectitude than he does who transfers himself to another order.

Conformably to this mode therefore, the Egyptian says, that Minerva is allotted the city which is named after her, and also his own city Saïs; inferring this perhaps from the great similitude of the life of the citizens to the Goddess; and perhaps also perceiving that there was an allotment of this kind, from the telestic art, and sacerdotal works. For as of the other Gods, so likewise of Minerva, there is an allotment proceeding supernally from intellectual causes to the place of the earth. Her allotment therefore is first in her father; but in the ruling Gods according to a second order. In the twelve liberated Gods, it makes a third progression; but after this, it unfolds itself into light in the heavens, with unrestrained authority. In one way indeed, in the inerratic sphere. For there a certain allotment of this Goddess is expanded, whether it be the place about the Ram, or that about the Virgin, or whether it be some one of the northern stars, as some say it is the Electra, which is there. But in another way, it is unfolded into light in the Sun. For there, according to theologists, an admirable power, and a Minervial order, govern wholes in conjunction with the Sun. And again, in another way in the Moon: for Minerva is the monad of the triad<sup>1</sup> which is there. But in another way in the earth, according to the similitude of the allotments of the earth to the celestial distributions. And lastly, about the earth differently in different places, according to the peculiarities of providence. It is not therefore at all wonderful, if one divinity should be said to be allotted both Athens and Saïs. For the same thing must not be supposed to take place about the Gods, as about partial souls, which are not adapted to dwell in two bodies at the same time, because they exert a providential energy in conjunction with habitude; but there is indeed a participation of the same power in different places; and in the one power there is also multitude. This power likewise is differently participated by different places. And in some, sameness is more abundantly participated; but in others, difference.

These things therefore are truly asserted, and the allotments of the Gods are perpetually established in the universe. These likewise existing, there are different

<sup>1</sup> This triad consists of Minerva, Proserpine, and Diana.

temporal evolutions of them into light, according to different places. Ancient theology also manifests the perpetual essence of the allotments; as when it is said in Homer,

To me in ocean's hoary deeps to dwell,  
*Always*, by lot belongs.\*

For the word *always* is significant of perpetuity. And in short, since it is necessary that prior to things which *sometimes*, there should be natures which *always*, participate of the Gods, it is likewise necessary that perpetual allotments should exist prior to such as are temporal. For as dæmons prior to partial souls follow the Gods, thus also there are perpetual allotments suspended from the Gods, prior to partial illuminations. And the mundane Gods comprehend these allotments; the terrestrial Gods, such as are terrestrial; the aquatic, such as are aquatic; and the aerial, such as pertain to the air. These Gods likewise, prior to visible bodies, ride in ethereal vehicles, conformably to the Gods in the heavens. But whether it must be admitted, that there are other sublunary allotments, proceeding from on high in conjunction with divine light, must be elsewhere considered: for what has been said, is sufficient for the present.

“Yours indeed, by a priority to ours of a thousand years, receiving the seed of your race from Vulcan and the Earth.”

With respect to the fabrication of Vulcan, how may some one decide, so as not perfectly to fail in his conceptions of the power of the God? For the assertions of the multitude concerning him, belong to things which must be entirely rejected. But that which is said by those whose notions are more intellectual<sup>†</sup> is indeed true, but requires no small degree of confirmation. We shall therefore introduce to our discussion from theologists, credibility concerning this divinity. That Vulcan then is of the demiurgic, but not of the vivific, or connective, or any other series, is manifested by theologists, when they represent him as fashioning things from brass, employing the bellows, and, in short, when they call him the artificer. But that he is the fabricator of sensible, and not of psychical, or intellectual works, is also manifested by them. For the formation of a mirror,

\* Iliad xv. vs. 190.

† Instead of *οι νεωτεροι* in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read *οι σοφιστεροι*.

the exercise of the brazier's art, lameness, and every thing of this kind, are symbols of his productive energy about a sensible nature. Moreover, that he is the maker of all sensibles, is evident from the same theologists, who say that he was hurled from Olympus as far as to the earth, and who make all the receptacles of the mundane Gods, to have been elaborated by Vulcan. If, therefore, we admit that these things are true, *this God will be the fabricator totally of every corporeal-formed substance; preparing for the Gods their visible seats, rendering all things subservient to the one harmony of the world; filling all fabrications with corporeal life; and adorning and connecting with forms the resisting and gross nature of matter.* On this account also he is said by theologists to fashion things from brass, as being the artificer of *resisting solids*. And because the heavens are [said to be] brazen, as being an imitation of the intelligible, the maker of the heavens is likewise [fabled to be] a brazier. But he is lame in both his feet,<sup>1</sup> as being the fabricator of things that are last in the progressions of being; for such are bodies; and also as being no longer able to proceed into another order. Likewise, because he is the maker of the universe, which, as Timæus says, is without legs. And he was hurled from on high to earth, as extending his fabrication through the whole of a sensible essence. Whether, therefore, there are said to be certain physical productive principles in the universe, or whether there are spermiatic principles, the cause of all these must be referred to this God. For that which nature effects by verging to bodies, this God fashions divinely and exemptly, exciting nature, and using her as an instrument to her own fabrication. For innate heat is Vulcanian, being generated by Vulcan as subservient to corporeal production. The productive cause therefore of generated natures is referred, in what Plato says, to this God.

Since however matter is necessary to things that are generated; for the Gods in the heavens borrow parts from the universe, as things which will be again returned, for the generation of mortal animals; this also Plato delivers to us, in a very admirable manner, through *earth*. For in seed itself, there are productive powers, and a subject. And the former are derived from the art of Vulcan; but the latter from earth. For by earth, we must now understand every material cause; not that the Athenians sprung from the earth; but because it is usual to

<sup>1</sup> It must be carefully observed, that *defects* when ascribed to divine natures, adumbrate *transcendence*: just as those whose eyes are filled with the solar light, are said to be *incapable* of perceiving mundane objects; for this *incapacity* is nothing more than transcendency of vision. In like manner, the lameness of Vulcan, symbolically indicates his exemption from any defective progression.

call all generation earth, and every thing material, earthly. Fire, therefore, is a Vulcanian instrument; but earth is matter, which is excited and vivified through fire, since it is of itself lifeless. Hence also, in consequence of this being filled, the material order is now assumed in conjunction with Vulcan. And on this account it is said that the seed of Vulcan, together with earth, gave subsistence to the generation of the Athenians. For according to the fable also, Vulcan being in love with Minerva, emitted his seed on the earth, and from thence the race of the Athenians blossomed forth. In short, therefore, Vulcan is always in love with Minerva, imitating her intellectual nature, in the fabrication<sup>1</sup> of sensibles. But Minerval souls, according to this energy of Vulcan, especially receive vehicles from him, and are introduced into bodies from the productive powers of Vulcan, and the hypostasis<sup>2</sup> of earth; the productive powers receiving Minerval impressions. For this God, prior to nature, is the perfecter of bodies, inserting in different bodies, different symbols of the divinities.

What however are the thousand years, according to which the Athenians are prior to the inhabitants of Sais? This, therefore, may be said historically. But it seems also to signify the temporal priority of the life of the Athenians, and in short, that it is necessary their life should be more elevated than that of the Saitans. For as in the invisible orders of things, many genera are suspended from the same leader, some indeed more proximately, but others more subordinately; after the same manner also, of Minerval souls descending into generation, some are assimilated to Minerva, according to the highest degree of excellence; but others subsist proximately after these. A thousand years, therefore, signify this excellence. *For they are the measure of a perfect genesiurgic period, on account of a thousand being a cubic number.* Hence this number is very properly adapted to a life superior according to generation, and which is in a greater degree assimilated to the tutelary Goddess. If also you wish to transfer these things to the universe, you may there behold all the visible fabrication which is Vulcanian, and adorning causes and adorned effects; some of which are more total, but others more partial. And some being analogous to the Athenians, but others to the Saitans. For

<sup>1</sup> Instead of το νοερον αυτης των αισθητων μιμουμενος in this place, which is evidently defective, I read το νοερον αυτης εν τη δημιουργια των αισθητων μιμουμενος.

<sup>2</sup> For της γης υποστασις των λογων, αθηναϊκα συνθηματα λαβοντων, it seems necessary to read της γης υποστασεις, των λογων αθηναϊκα, κ. λ.

nothing hinders, but that the same things may be surveyed analogously, in demurgic causes, in the universe, and in an historical narration.

The divine Iamblichus however doubts, how the gods are said to be allotted certain places, according to definite times; as for instance, Minerva was first allotted Athens, and afterwards Saïs. For if, their allotment commences from a certain time, it will also at a certain time cease. For whatever is measured by time, is a thing of this kind. Farther still, with respect to the place which they are allotted at a certain time, was it without a ruler, when it fell to their lot, or was it under the dominion of other Gods? For if, indeed, it was without a ruler, how is it possible that any thing belonging to the universe can be perfectly destitute of divinity? How, in short, can any place remain without the guardian protection of more excellent natures? Or how, if it is sufficient to the preservation of itself, can it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods? But if it is under the dominion of another leader, it will also fall to the allotment of another God, and thus an absurdity will ensue. For the second God does not divulse the prefecture and allotment of the former divinity. Nor do the Gods alternately receive the places of each other; nor do daemons change their allotments. Iamblichus having thus doubted, dissolves the doubts by saying, that the allotments of the Gods are perpetually established, but that the participants of them, at one time derive advantage from the guardianship of the rulers, and at another time reap no benefit from it. He adds, *that these are the participations which are measured by time, and which sacred institutions frequently call the birth-days of the Gods.* It has however been observed by us, that this resembles that which happens about souls. For every soul has entirely a tutelar God. And certain souls choose lives adapted to other Gods. Thus, therefore, every place is the allotment of a certain God, and there is a time when it becomes the allotment of some other divinity, who renders it adapted through a certain period, or through certain mystic rites established by men. For allotment is twofold, the one being essential, but the other subsisting according to habitude. But let us direct our attention to what follows.

“ But an account of the transactions of this our city, during the space of eight thousand years, is preserved in our sacred writings.”

The priest assigns to the Athenians the number nine thousand, receiving this

also from history; but to the Saitans the number eight thousand; measuring the lives of the citizens by the chiliad, conformably to the writings in the temples. *For by this number*, as the philosopher Porphyry says, *damons also measure time*. Farther still, the priest makes this narration from the sacred writings; which manifests, as Iamblichus would say, the stable guard of the mundane divine guardians. These numbers, however, happen to lives according to a probable reason. For eight thousand is a cube on a cube; <sup>1</sup> but nine thousand is a tetragonic superficies on a cube. <sup>2</sup> Hence the one <sup>3</sup> gives depth to a superficies, and this through the indefinite duad; but the other preserves the superficies itself in itself, in similitude and perfection from the triad. <sup>4</sup> But it is the symbol of a better life, to remain in itself, and to adorn secondary natures. And it is an indication of a more imperfect life, to descend to secondary natures, to be assimilated to them, and to be filled with a certain indefiniteness. Since however even a secondary nature is not entirely deprived of similitude to divinity, the descent is through a cube, in which there is a tetradic similitude. <sup>5</sup> But it is better to imitate more excellent nature through a more simple life, than through a life which is more compounded. And a square is more simple than a cube. If however you should say, that the number nine thousand is adapted to those that have their hypostasis from Earth and Vulcan; for a thousand is terrestrial, as being a cube, but nine pertains to Vulcan,

With them I many artificial forms  
For nine years fashion'd——

says Vulcan [in Homer, <sup>6</sup>]——in thus speaking, you will not wander from the truth. But, in short, a cube is adapted to the terrestrial allotments of Minerva; since the decad is attributed to the heavens, and the last progression of the decad gives subsistence to the solid number one thousand. For the Gods make their progression from the celestial allotments to the terrestrial, as the last. This therefore must be said by us.

The philosopher Porphyry however, in interpreting these things, supposes

<sup>1</sup> For 1000 is a cube, and so likewise is 8.

<sup>2</sup> For 9 is a square, and 1000 is a cube.

<sup>3</sup> 8000 gives depth to the superficies 20. For  $20 \times 20 \times 20 = 8000$ . and this is through the duad, because  $20 = 2 \times 10$ .

<sup>4</sup> For 9000 is the cube of 30.

<sup>5</sup> i. e. The descent is through 9000, in which there is a tetradic similitude, because as Proclus had before observed, it is a square superficies on a cube.

<sup>6</sup> Iliad. l. 18. vs. 400.

Vulcan to be the intellect that presides over art, but earth to be the lunar sphere. *For this is called by the Egyptians ethereal earth.* He says therefore that souls which derive their subsistence from divinity, but participate of the artificial [or Vulcanic] intellect, are disseminated in the body of the moon; souls that give themselves to the arts, dwelling there; and that they have bodies which are effluxions of the ethereal bodies. That nine thousand years, also, are adapted to these souls, after the following manner. A myriad of years is, says he, the period of the soul, which ascends and descends through the five stars, in order that each may have two chiliads, yet not successive. Time indeed is successive according to conception; for it is not without continuity. Hence all the stars have nine lives; which is obscurely signified through nine thousand years. Ninths also are performed to the dead. And in a similar manner, some give names to those that are born, in the ninth year; employing as symbols the periods of generation and production. The priest, however, does not now assume a myriad of years, but the number of nine thousand, in order that those of whom he is speaking may still be terrene, but approximating to the period of a myriad of years. All this interpretation, however, the divine Iamblichus rejects, and says that the discussion here is not about lives, but about the different measures of Minerval participation. It is absurd, therefore, to make mention of the periods spoken of in the *Phædrus*. But if it be requisite to narrate what follows from the conception of Porphyry, it must be said, that the soul lives indeed intellectually and Saturnally on high, but descends first to the conception of a political life, which is Jovian. Afterwards, she excites anger, and lives ambitiously. But anger is Martial. In the next place, she proceeds in her descent to desire, and venereal lives; and at last, exerts physical reasons [or productive powers]. But all reasons are Hermaic. And Hermes is the inspective guardian of physical reasons. Through these, however, she is bound to body. And again, receiving a body, she first lives physically, being the supplier of nutriment and increase to the body. Afterwards, she lives epithymetically, exciting genesiurgic powers. In the next place, she lives under the influence of anger, rising against her former habits, but entering into an ambitious life. Afterwards, she lives politically, moderating the passions. And in the last place, she lives intellectually. If therefore she is restored to her pristine state, her life is intellectual, and the myriad is terminated. But in generation, though she is conversant with it in the best manner, she lives according to a deficiency by the chiliad. And of this the number nine thousand is a symbol, being adapted to the best polity of the Athenians.



"I will therefore briefly unfold to you the laws, and the most beautiful of the deeds of those citizens that existed nine thousand years ago. For when we are more at leisure, we shall accurately discuss every particular, receiving for this purpose the sacred writings themselves."

If you wish to refer what is here said to the whole order of things, the number nine thousand will manifest the total progression as far as to a cube, and terrestrial works, and likewise the life which pervades through all things. But through the word *briefly*, the union of many productive powers, and the comprehension of them according to intellect, are indicated. For the synoptical is an image of intellectual impartibility; but that which departs into multitude, of prolific power; multiplying, producing, and dividing forms into minute parts, through diversity. *The laws* are images of the divided fabrication, which is united according to intellect. But *the most beautiful work* is an adumbration of the orderly distribution of things which is extended to one beautiful end. For beauty subsisting according to the united, proceeds from intelligibles to the visible fabrication. And *the resumption of the sacred writings*, indicates the recurrence to the paradigms of them, from which also the priest being filled, delivers these things to Solon. The narration, therefore, will be concerning the divided and multiplied fabrication, which is connected by intellect, and extends as far as to terrestrial works, as may be inferred from all that has been said.

"In the first place then, consider the laws of these people, and compare them with ours. For you will now find here many paradigms of things which then subsisted in your city."

As Socrates summarily discussed his own polity, thus also the priest briefly discusses the laws of the ancient Athenians, in order that the latter may have diminution with reference<sup>\*</sup> to the former, and also a similitude to it. And this very properly. For the one is more universal, but the other more partial. And the one is the work of *dianoia*, but the other of the phantasy. This diminution indeed may be surveyed, so far as Socrates has described a *polity*, but the priest *laws*. A *polity*, however, is the union and common bond of the life of citizens; but legislation is order proceeding into multitude and division. And the former is more analogous to the providential cause, but the latter to fate. But there is a similitude between Socrates and the

\* Instead of *ὑπερὶ ἧν τὰτα καὶ ἐκείνα*, it seems necessary to read *ὑπερὶ ἧν τὰτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνα*.

priest, so far as both assert that they deliver the multitude of their words contractedly.

Again, therefore, these things embrace wholes and divine causes. For the middle is suspended from the first fabrication, and is assimilated to it. And each indeed pertains to the universe; but the latter according to union, and one sameness; and the former according to progression and the difference of the things fabricated. Just as the third<sup>1</sup> fabrication subsists according to conversion.<sup>2</sup> And the first fabrication connects the war in generation celestially; but the second subordinately and according to diminution; just as the third<sup>1</sup> connects the extremities of the universe. Very properly therefore does Socrates summarily deliver the laws, and the whole life of the Athenians, in the same manner as the priest. And these things may be assumed from what the priest now says. But he calls images paradigms, because the Saïtans participate secondarily of those things, of which the Athenians participate primarily. For though archetypes rank among the first of beings, yet images have the first order with reference to our knowledge. As therefore things secondary by nature are said to be first, thus also they are said to be paradigms to the things that are elevated from them, and which know through them the natures prior to them. Here also, what pertains to the Athenians, indicates a more total, but what pertains to the Saïtans, a more partial order. These things likewise are analogous, both in partial natures and in wholes. So that the polity which is about to be delivered, pertains to the city of the Athenians, or rather to the whole orderly distribution of things; and the laws extend to the whole world from Minerva. For every law is said to be the distribution of intellect, and is rightly said to be so. But the laws of the Athenians, being established conformably to the tutelar Goddess, exhibit the distribution of the Minerval intellect. But of this kind are the laws in the universe which are defined conformably to one demiurgic intellect, and the one providence of Minerva.

“For the race of the priests was separated from the rest of the inhabitants.”

That in a certain respect all this order of the polity of the priest is more partial and more divided than that of Socrates, imitating the middle fabrication, may be

<sup>1</sup> For *πρωτη* here, it is necessary to read *τρητη*.

<sup>2</sup> The nature of these three fabrications is unfolded farther on.

<sup>3</sup> Here also for *πρωτη*, it is necessary to read *τρητη*.

learnt from the multitude and quality of the genera in the city. For in the polity of Socrates, there were three genera, the guardian, the auxiliary, and the mercenary. For the triad is allied to the demiurgic monad. But here there are the double of these, the sacerdotal, and the military; the demiurgic, [for pertaining to artificers] and the pastoral; the venatic and the agricultural. For the middle fabrication has at one and the same time the duadic, and the triadic; and both these numbers are adapted to Minerva. But one of these indeed, viz. the triad, is immediately adapted to the Goddess; but the other according to generation. For the hexad is a triangle from the triad.<sup>1</sup> By the trigonic therefore, and by the hexad from the triad, the diminution and at the same time alliance to the Goddess are manifested. For though every fabrication participates of Minerva, yet the first and supreme parts of the universe, and the first fabrication, and the first father, are filled from her in a more abundant degree. Thus therefore, if you alone select these genera, you will find the number adapted to the Goddess. But if you add, the presiding over wisdom, you will entirely find the heptad, which is of a Minerval characteristic. And this is one of the things that are of great notoriety. The feminine nature likewise of the heptad is celebrated, and that it is produced from the monad alone. *The monad also, the triad, and the heptad, are said to be especially images of Minerva; the first, indeed, as being intellectual; the second, as converting the monad to itself; and the third, as proceeding from the father alone.* After this manner, therefore, you may infer from numbers.

It is necessary however, from the quality of the genera, to survey the diminution and transcendency of these. For the sacerdotal is subordinate to the guardian genus, which ascends as far as to the first cause.<sup>2</sup> For Plato himself in the Politicus arranges the priests under the politician, and does not impart to them political power. The military also is subordinate to the auxiliary genus. For the latter arranges in a becoming manner, and sufficiently disciplines the inhabitants of the city. But the former pursues war alone, and things pertaining to it, and participates of this study alone. And the mercenary tribe is divided into the remaining genera. The polity of Socrates therefore surpasses that of the priest, as being more comprehensive, and after a manner co-adapted to the genera prior to it. So that both from number and quality, it becomes evident to us that the polity

<sup>1</sup> For 6 is a triangular number, and is the double of 3.

<sup>2</sup> Plato asserts this of the guardians, in his Republic.

second after it. We establish, however, the analogies of the polity of Socrates to the universe, to be as follows. The genus of guardians we arrange as analogous to the celestial Gods. The auxiliary genus to those more excellent natures, the attendants on the celestial Gods, and the defenders of the universe. And the mercenary genus, to those powers that connect a material nature with partial souls. The first of these also, is analogous to the fixed stars, the second to the planets, and the third to material natures. We may likewise assume in the celestial Gods themselves, all these according to analogy.

Here, however, it is worth while to survey how, and after what manner, these genera [enumerated by the priest] are to be assumed in the universe. For the philosopher Porphyry arranges them as follows: That the priests are analogous to the archangels in the heavens, who are converted to the Gods, of whom they are the messengers. But the soldiers are analogous to souls descending into bodies. Again, *the shepherds are analogous to the powers that are arranged over the herds of animals; which in arcane narrations are said to be souls that are frustrated of the human intellect, but have a propensity towards animals.* For there is also a certain curator of the herd of men. And there are likewise certain partial curators; some being the inspectors of nations; others of cities; and others of individuals. But the hunters are analogous to those powers that hunt after souls, and inclose them in bodies. There are likewise powers who delight in the hunting of animals, such as Diana is said to be, and another multitude together with her of venatic demons. And the husbandmen are analogous to those powers that preside over fruits. All this administration therefore of sublimary demons is said by Plato to receive many demiurgic distributions, in consequence of looking to the effect which now is, or is becoming to be. The divine Iamblichus, however, reprehends these assertions, as neither Platonic nor true. For archangels are not any where mentioned by Plato, nor does the military genus pertain to souls verging to bodies. For it is not proper to oppose these to gods or demons. For we should act absurdly, in arranging these in the middle genus, but Gods and demons among the last artificers. Nor must it be admitted, that those are shepherds, who are frustrated of human intellect, but have a certain sympathy to animals. For the existence of demons who govern the mortal nature, is not derived from men; nor are those powers hunters, who inclose the soul in body, as in a net; since the soul is not thus conjoined to which is now delivered, is subordinate to that of Socrates, and will rank as the

to the body. *Nor is this mode of theory philosophic, but full of Barbaric arrogance.*<sup>1</sup> Nor are husbandmen to be referred to Ceres: for the Gods are exempt from the proximate causes of nature. Reprehending, therefore, these assertions, he considers the priests as analogous through similitude to all such secondary essences and powers, as honour and worship the causes prior to themselves. But the shepherds, as analogous to all those mundane powers, that are allotted the government of the life which verges to body, and of the most irrational powers, and who distribute these in an orderly manner. The hunters he places as analogous to those universal powers who adorn secondary natures through the investigation of [real] being. But the husbandmen, as corresponding to the powers that give efficacy to the seeds that descend from the heavens to the earth. And the soldiers, to the powers that subvert every thing atheistical, and corroborate that which is divine. After this manner, therefore, the divine Iamblichus [interprets what is said by the priest.] But it is common to both these philosophers, that they divide the fabricative genus into the pastoral, the venatic, and the agricultural; but they do not produce the four genera from one. For no one, who rightly considers the affair, can place either the pastoral or the venatic under the fabricative genus.

Will it not therefore be better to interpret the passage conformably to our preceptor, by admitting that the sacerdotal and military tribes form one duad, but the fabricative and agricultural another, and the pastoral and venatic a third duad; and assuming an order of this kind, to investigate the paradigms of them. For the sacerdotal genus subsists in the anagogic Gods, the military in the guardian, and the fabricative in the Gods who separate all the forms, and the productive principles of mundane natures. But the agricultural genus subsists in those Gods that supernally excite nature, and disseminate souls about generation. For Plato, likewise, denominates the lapse of the soul into generation, a dissemination. But to sow is most adapted to husbandmen, as is, also, to collect productions of nature. The pastoral genus subsists in the Gods that govern distinctly all the forms of life that revolve in generation. For Plato, in the *Politics*, delivers to us certain divine shepherds. *And the venatic subsists in the divinities that give an orderly distribution to all material spirits. For it is usual with theologists to call these Gods hunters.* All these genera likewise pertain to the middle fabrication, viz. the convertive genus, the guardian, that which ad-

<sup>1</sup> It is somewhat singular, that Porphyry, who called the Christian religion *Βαρβάρων τολμήμα*, a barbarously bold wickedness, should have adopted this theory.

ministers the psychical allotments, that which governs the genesiurgic forms of life, every thing which fabricates and gives form to material natures, and that which arranges the last order of spirits. That, however, which pays attention to wisdom, and that which is contemplative, must be considered as different from all these genera, and which the Egyptian also celebrates above all the rest, making mention in the first place, as being a priest, of the sacerdotal genus. All the genera, therefore, are seven, and the monad is exempt from the hexad. And the monad, indeed, is analogous to the one intellect which connects all the fabrication of generated natures; but the hexad is analogous to the more partial orders under this intellect, viz. to the anagogic, guardian, formalizing, and vivifying orders, and also to those that are the leaders of the herds of a tame life, and to those that rule over the brutal nature, which orders in the universe likewise are separated from the fixed stars. Moreover, he says, that these orders may be seen among men, in the first place, among the Athenians, but in the second place, among the Saitans, according to the division of genera, each accomplishing its proper work in a definite manner. For he manifests this by saying, *separate from others*, in order that we may understand the unmingled purity of the genera, proceeding supernally through diminution, as far as to the last of things.

“The artificers, also, exercised their arts in such a manner, that each was engaged in his own employment without mingling with that of other artists. The same method was likewise adopted by shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen.”

The whole of this tetractys has, indeed, the third order, according to a section of the genera into three, but is now enumerated by Plato as the second; in order that through this, what is said may imitate the universe, in which the last is the middle, comprehended on all sides by more divine natures. For that which is most material and gross, is enclosed by fabrication in the middle. For thus alone<sup>1</sup> can it be preserved, being adorned and guarded according to the whole of itself by all the comprehending natures (in the universe). But again, it is here added, that the fabricative art was not mingled with the other arts, nor in a similar manner any one of the others with the rest, but that each remained by itself, and in its own purity. For this not only produces accuracy and rectitude in

<sup>1</sup> For *μολα* here, it is necessary to read *μολω*.

appropriate works, but likewise effects the sympathy of the citizens. For all will thus be in want of all, in consequence of each not exercising many arts. For the builder will be in want of the husbandman, the husbandman of the shepherd, the shepherd of the hunter, and the hunter of the builder; and thus each being in want of the rest, will not be unmingled with them; hence, there is sameness in conjunction with difference, and separation accompanied with union.

“The warlike genus too, you will find was separated from all the other genera, and was ordered by law to engage in nothing but what pertained to war.”

Every where indeed, but especially in the warlike genus, the unmingled and the separate are appropriate. For they have an alliance to the highest order, which cuts off every thing material, and obliterates that which is disorderly and confused. Very properly therefore does this genus pay attention to the concerns of war. For on account of this, the city remains free from external and injurious incursions; and this invests it with a guard from itself, imitating the guardian order. For as a guardian deity is present with the first, so likewise with the middle of the demiurgi. This, therefore, may be assumed from theology. But by law in the universe, we must understand the divine institutions proceeding from the one demiurgic intellection. For prior to mundane natures is the demiurgic law, which is seated by Jupiter, and distributes together with him in an orderly manner all the providential inspection which exists in the universe.

“A similar armour too, such as that of shields and darts was employed by each. These we first used in Asia; the Goddess in those places, as likewise happened to you, first pointing them out to our use.”

The narration extends the energy of Minerva supernally from paradigms, as far as to the last genera. For there are things connascent with this energy, participating of undefiled powers, more total and more partial, and which arrange the mundane genera from the middle fabrication. Analogously also to this, they comprehend and are comprehended, are vanquished by the Minerval energies, and remain perpetually undefiled with invariable sameness through it, in the universe. It is requisite, therefore, to know these things in common about all these

particulars. We must however show what the armour, the shields, and the spears, are, and how these are antecedently comprehended in the Goddess. Porphyry, indeed, calling the body the shield, assumes anger for the spear. But these pertain to souls falling into generation and to material things, and are not the instruments of immutable safety, but of a genesiurgic life, corrupting the purity of intellect, and destroying the life which subsists according to reason. The divine Iamblichus, however, explains these in a divinely inspired manner. For since it is requisite that every thing divine should operate and not suffer, in order that by operating it may not have the inefficacious, which is assimilated to matter, and that by not suffering it may not have an efficacious power resembling that of material natures, which act in conjunction with passion;—in order that both these may be accomplished, he says, that shields are powers through which a divine nature remains impassive and undefiled, surrounding itself with an infrangible guard. But spears are the powers according to which it proceeds through all things without contact,\* and operates on all things, cutting off that which is material, and giving aid to every genesiurgic form. These powers, however, are first seen about Minerva. Hence in the statues of her she is represented with a spear and shield. For she vanquishes all things, and according to theologists, remains without declination, and with undefiled purity, in her father. But these have a secondary subsistence, in both the total and partial Minerval powers. For as the Jovian and demiurgic multitude, imitates its monad, and as the prophetic and Apolloniæal multitude participates of the Apolloniæal peculiarity; thus, also, the Minerval number, adumbrates the undefiled and unmingled nature of Minerva. This, also, takes place in an ultimate degree in Minerval souls. For in these, likewise, the shield is the untamed and uninclining power of reason; but the spear is that power which amputates matter and liberates the soul from demoniæal or fatal passions; of which powers the Athenians participate in a purer manner, but the Saitans in a secondary degree, receiving these through the measure of alliance to the Goddess.

“You may perceive, too, what great attention was paid immediately from the beginning by the laws to prudence and modesty, and besides these, to divination and medicine, as subservient to the preservation of health. And from these, which are divine goods, the laws, proceeding

\* For *απαφωσ* here, it is necessary to read *απαφην*.



to the invention of such as are merely human, procured all such other disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated."

A little farther on, he calls the Goddess both a lover of wisdom and a lover of war, in order that the arrangement of the polity of the Athenians and Saitans might be produced conformably to her as a paradigm. And what indeed pertains to the exercise of war, is sufficiently indicated from what has been said; but that which pertains to wisdom, he exhibits to us in the present words; in order that by the one, the philopolemic, and by the other, the philosophic nature of Minerva might be adumbrated. What then is this prudence? The theory of wholes and of supermundane natures, from which, after the first of goods which are perfective of souls, a certain facility is obtained in the concerns of human life, proceeding in conjunction with divination and medicine. And in one way, indeed, this prudence is the source of disciplines in invisible causes, in another way, about the world, and in the last place, about human affairs. For since the Goddess herself is immaterial and separate wisdom, on this account, to the natures that are allied to her, she unfolds into light all the parts of divine and human prudence. For with respect to divination, also, one kind must be admitted to exist in the intellectual, and another in the mundane Gods. And of the latter, one kind proceeds from the Gods, another from demons, and another from the discursive energy of the human soul, existing rather as something artificial and conjectural. In a similar manner also with respect to medicine, one kind indeed exists in the Gods themselves, and this is of a Paonian nature; but another kind, in demons, being ministrant and subservient to the Gods, from whom likewise matter and instruments are procured for the advents of the Gods. For as there are many demons about Love, thus also about Esculapius, some are allotted the order of attendants, but others that of forerunners of the God. And another kind exists in human lives, being that which is imparted from theorems and experience, according to which some are adapted in a greater, and others in a less degree to divine medicine. But there is also a mixture of these two kinds of prudence, viz. the prophetic and the medicinal, with the Egyptians; because the causes of these are antecedently comprehended in one divinity, and from one fountain many streams are distributed about the world. And thus much has been said in common about the *prudence* which is now mentioned.

In order, however, to unfold each particular more fully, we must say, that *laxe*, indeed, is the order proceeding from the one intellect of Minerva; but *attention*,

the providence pervading from wholes as far as to material natures; *and immediately from the beginning*, the natural aptitude of Minerval souls to prudence. For that which is neither adventitious nor foreign, appears to be signified by these words. But if some one should refer what is said to the mundane order, because the distribution of things does not proceed from the imperfect to the perfect, but is always arranged and accompanied in its progression with that which is excellent, it appears to me that this is manifested by the words *immediately from the beginning*. The words, however, must be referred to the order of the whole world, because there are invisible causes of the natures that are arranged in the world, which perfect prudence [i. e. wisdom] primarily contemplates. For the form of prudence is not, as Porphyry says it is, artificial, or adapted to the arts. For this, as Iamblichus observes, is the gift of Vulcan, but not of Minerva. But *attention was also paid to divination and medicine*, because it is fit, in the first place, to contemplate the other powers of the mundane Gods, and thus afterwards, their prophetic and sanative production; since we are allotted the government of a generated body, and to us who are enclosed in body, futurity is immanent. For a material life exhibits much of the contingent, and of an hyparxis differently moved at different times. But *by such other disciplines as follow from these*, he doubtless means geometry, astronomy, logistic, arithmetic, and the sciences allied to these; all which the law having established, led the Athenians and Saitans to the possession of an admirable prudence. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Porphyry, however, says, that medicine very properly proceeds from Minerva, because Esculapius is the lunar intellect, in the same manner as Apollo is the solar intellect. But the divine Iamblichus blames this assertion, as confounding the essences of the Gods, and as not always rightly distributing according to present circumstances the intellects and souls of the mundane Gods. For it must be admitted that Esculapius exists in the sun, and that he proceeds from that luminary about the generated place; in order that as the heavens, so likewise generation may be connected by this divinity, according to a second participation, and may be filled from it with symmetry, and good temperament.

“According to all this orderly distribution therefore, and co-arrangement, the Goddess first established and adorned your city.”

The word *all* manifests the united comprehension in the Goddess of all the natures that are adorned by her, and that neither is any thing pretermitted by

her, nor the multitude in her suffered to exist in a divided state. But the word *διακοσμησις*, indicates the orderly distribution of the Minerval providence. And the word *co-arrangement* signifies the union of these, and their alliance to one world. Farther still, the word *διακοσμησις* signifies the progression of wholes from the Goddess; but *co arrangement*, the conversion of them to herself. Since, however, of the natures in the universe, some are total, but others are partial, and some are analogous to monads, but others to numbers, and both participate of the Minerval providence, but primarily such as are total and monadic,—on this account what is at present said, attributes the more ancient and leading order to the Athenians, but that which is secondary and diminished to the Saitans.

“Choosing for this purpose the place in which you were born; as she foresaw, that from the excellent temperature of the seasons it would produce the most sagacious men.”

Prior to this, the Goddess was said to have been *allotted* the Attic region; but it is now said that she *chose* it. Both, however, concur, and neither is the being allotted contrary to her will, nor is her choice disorderly, as is the case with a partial soul. For divine necessity concurs with divine will, choice with allotment, and *to choose* with *to be allotted*. What this place, however, is, has been before shown by us, viz. that it is interval, and that which is truly place. For the divisions of divine allotments, are divisions of these, in order that they may be established with invariable sameness prior to things which subsist according to time. But it must now be added, that the soul of the universe possessing the productive principles of all divine [mundane] natures, and being suspended from the essences prior to herself, inserts in different parts of the interval an alliance to different powers, and certain symbols of the divine orders in the Gods. For this interval is proximately suspended from her, and is an instrument connascent with her. As she is, therefore, a rational and psychical world, she also renders this [sensible] world endued with interval, and vital through divine impressions. Hence the interval itself, though it is said to be continued and immoveable, yet is not entirely without difference with reference to itself; since neither is the soul of the universe perfectly without difference in itself towards itself, but one part [as it were] of it, is the circle of *the same*, and another, the circle of *the different*. And why do I assert this of the soul? for neither is much celebrated intellect without difference in itself, though all things in it are, as it were, of the same colour. For

all things do not possess an equal power in intellect, but some are more total, and others more partial. Nor is this wonderful. For the Demiurgus himself contains in himself, first, middle, and last orders. Whence, also, I think Orphens, indicating the order of his powers, says, "that his head is the refulgent heaven, but his eyes are the sun, and the opposing moon." Though, therefore, this interval should have one essence, unattended with difference, yet the power of soul, and the allotted orders of daemons, and prior to these, the Gods, dividing it, according to the demiurgic order, and the allotments of justice, demonstrate that there is much difference in the parts of it. Hence it must be admitted, that the choice becomes internal, and from the essence of the Gods, and that it is not such as we see in partial souls. For the former is essential; but the latter is alone defined according to the present life. And the former is eternal, but the latter temporal.

By *place*, therefore, we must not understand the earth or this air, but prior to these, the immoveable interval, which is always illuminated after the same manner by the Gods, and divided by the allotments of justice. For these material natures are at one time adapted, and at another unadapted, to the participation of the Gods. And it is necessary that prior to things which sometimes participate, there should be those which are always suspended after the same manner from the Gods. And thus much may suffice respecting these particulars.

With respect, however, to the excellent temperature of the seasons, which is productive of sagacious men, Panectius, and certain other Platonists, understand the words according to their apparent meaning, viz. that the Attic region, on account of the excellent temperature of the seasons of the year, is adapted to the production of sagacious men. But Longinus doubts the truth of their assertion. For the contrary is seen to be the case, since about this place, there is a great want of symmetry in dryness from excessive heat, and cold tempestuous weather. Nor if the place was of this kind, would they yet be able to preserve the immortality of souls, if sagacity was implanted in them through the excellent temperature of the seasons. But he says, that this excellent temperature is not to be referred to the condition of the air, but that it is a certain nameless peculiarity of the region contributing to sagacity. For as certain waters are prophetic, and certain places are productive of disease, and are pestilential, thus, also, it is not at all wonderful that a certain peculiarity of country should contribute to prudence and sagacity. Origen, however, refers this excellent temperature to the circulation of the heavens; for from thence the fertility and sterility of souls are derived, as Socrates says, in the Republic. He, however, apprehends the truth in a more

partial manner. But Longinus is ignorant that he makes the peculiarity to be corporeal, and that he is entangled in the doubts which Porphyry proposes to him. For how can one peculiarity of air render men adapted to different pursuits? And in the next place, a similar peculiarity still remaining, how comes it to pass that there is now no longer the same natural excellence in the genius of the inhabitants? But if the peculiarity is corruptible, it must be shown what it is that is corruptive of it. It is however better to say, that the Gods having divided the whole of space conformably to the demiurgic order, each portion of place receives souls adapted to it; that portion indeed which is Martial, receiving souls of a more animated and irascible nature; that which is Apolloniacal, prophetic souls; that which is Esculapian, medical; and that which is Minerval, prudent and sagacious souls. But this is effected through a certain quality, or rather each portion of place possesses a power of this kind from its allotted divinity; and Plato calls this adaptation, excellence of temperature; since there are many physical, psychical, daemoniacal, and angelical powers in each portion of place, but each unity of the allotted divinity unites and mingles all these in an unmingled manner. Since however the Seasons are allotted from the Father, the guardianship of these portions of place and allotments, to whose care, as Homer<sup>1</sup> says, "the mighty Heaven and Olympus are committed," and according to which, the co-adaptations of souls similar to places is effected; hence Plato suspends this excellent temperature from the Seasons, the whole of it deriving from thence its subsistence.

The Goddess therefore perceiving that the [Attic] portion of interval which is always guarded by the Seasons, is adapted to the reception of sagacious souls, selected it for this purpose; not that this place was once deprived of Minerva, but at another time was under her allotted guardianship; for the text demonstrates the contrary; but because there are also in the interval itself, different aptitudes to the reception of divine illuminations, according to different parts; which aptitudes were inserted by the whole Demiurgus, who uniformly comprehends the powers of all the Gods posterior to himself. These powers, however, are corroborated and perfected by, or rather proceed from, the presiding Gods. As, therefore, with respect to the elections of lives, the soul that chooses its proper life, acts with rectitude; after the same manner, also, the soul which is arranged in a

<sup>1</sup> *Iliad*. V. v. 750.

place conformable to the choice of its life, energizes in a greater degree than the soul which is disseminated in a foreign place. But to this arrangement, the one circulation of the heavens contributes, which introduces a fertility and sterility of souls. In fertile periods, therefore, there is a greater, but in barren periods, a less number of sagacious men. Hence, as when a husbandman chooses good land for the efficacious growth of the seeds, knowing that when the season is fertile, he shall reap greater benefit, but when it is barren less, on account of the power of the earth; thus also the text says, that the Goddess chose this place, as productive of sagacious men, in order that when the period is fertile it may have more; and when the period is barren, may have less<sup>1</sup> of prudent and sagacious men, in consequence of falling off from a life adapted to the place. We must not however wonder, if Plato praises the excellent temperature of the visible Seasons. For there is one excellent temperature with reference to the health of bodies, and another contributing to the reception of sagacious souls, such as is that of the Attic region. For though there is not always the same sagacity in those that inhabit this region, yet there is always a certain greater abundance of it through the peculiarity of the place, and the aptitude of the Seasons. Such, therefore, is our opinion respecting these particulars.

The divine Iamblichus, however, does not understand by place, one corporeal-formed condition, but an incorporeal cause pervading through the earth, sustaining bodies by life, and comprehending all interval. For in a place of this kind, he says the Goddess fashions truly good men, and causes them to inhabit. But whether he accords with the words of Plato, may be surveyed from what has been said. If, however, it be requisite, desisting from these things, to contemplate wholes according to the analogous, it must be said that this Goddess fabricating and weaving the universe in conjunction with her father, every where distributes to wholes, and to things of the better co-ordination, a more perfect allotment. But these are more replete with wisdom than their opposites, and are more adapted to the Goddess. We shall show, therefore, from the following words of Plato, how that which excels in prudence is of a more Minerval characteristic.

“The Goddess, therefore, being a lover both of war and wisdom, first selected this place for the habitation of men most similar to herself.”

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *καὶ ἀφούρις πλεος, τῷ ἐλαττωσὶ ἀποπικτεῖν τῆς κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἐπιτηδείας ζωῆς*, in this place, it is necessary to read, *καὶ ἀφούρις ἥτοι, τῷ ἀποπικτεῖν, &c. λ.*

In what is here said, Plato delivers to us the most accurate conception respecting this greatest divinity, unfolding to those who are sufficiently able to perceive his meaning, the indications of theologists. Different interpreters however betake themselves to different arrangements of the Goddess; some indeed narrating their opinion more enigmatically, but others more clearly, yet not confirming what they assert. For Porphyry, placing Minerva in the Moon, says that souls descend from thence, which possess at one and the same time irascibility and mildness; and that on this account, the *mystagogues* in Eleusis are lovers of wisdom and lovers of war; since it is said that the race of those who are leaders of the mysteries in Eleusis, is derived from Musæus, the offspring of the Moon; and also that the *Hermes* there subsists about the Moon, from which also the race of the *Cryers* is derived. The divine Iamblichus, however, blames these assertions, as not well preserving the analogy. For he interprets war as that which entirely subverts the whole of a disorderly, confused, and material nature; but wisdom as immaterial and separate intelligence. He also says, that this Goddess<sup>1</sup> is the cause of both these; which likewise the Athenians imitate through a prudent and warlike life. He adds, that the Athenian region is well adapted to the reception of such-like souls.

If, however, it be requisite that the conceptions of these men should become manifest, and prior to these, that what is delivered by Plato should be shown to accord in the highest degree with theologists, we must assert as follows: deriving what we say from a supernal origin. In the Demiurgus and father of the whole world, many orders of Gods that have the form of *the one*, present themselves to the view. And these are of a guardian, or demiurgic, or elevating, or connective, or perfective characteristic. But the undefiled and untamed deity Minerva, is one of the first intellectual unities subsisting in the Demiurgus, according to which he himself remains firm and immutable, and all things proceeding from him participate of inflexible power; and through which, he intellectually perceives every thing, and is separate in an exempt manner from all beings. All theologists, therefore, call this divinity Minerva, as being brought forth indeed from the summit of her father, and abiding in him; being a demiurgic, separate, and immaterial intelligence.

Hence Socrates, in the *Cratylus*, celebrates her as *theonoe* [θεονοη] or *deific intellect*ion. But theologists, also, consider her as in conjunction with other divinities

<sup>1</sup> Instead of τῆς θεῶν here, it is necessary to read τῆς θεῶν.

sustaining all things in the one Demiurgus, and arranging wholes together with her father. Hence through the first of these, they denominate her philosophic, but through the second philopolemic. For she, who according to the form of the one, connectedly contains all the paternal wisdom, is a *philosopher*. And she, who invariably rules over all contrariety, may be properly called a *lover of war*. Hence Orpheus speaking of her birth says, that Jupiter generated her from his head,

With armour shining like a brazen flower.

Since, however, it was necessary that she should proceed into second and third orders, she appears in the order to which Proserpine belongs, according to the undefiled heptad; but she generates every virtue from herself, and elevating powers; and illuminates secondary natures with intellect, and an undefiled life. Hence she is called *Core Tritogenes*. She likewise appears among the liberated Gods, uniting the lunar order with intellectual and demiurgic light, causing the productions of those divinities to be undefiled, and demonstrating the one unity of them to be unmingled with their depending powers. She also appears in the heavens and the sublunary region; and according to the united gift of herself imparts the cause both of the philosophic and the philopolemic power. For her inflexibility is intellectual, and her separate wisdom is pure and unmingled with secondary natures; and the one characteristic peculiarity of Minerval providence, extends as far as to the last orders. For since wherever there are partial souls that resemble her divinity, they exert an admirable prudence, and exhibit an unconquerable strength, what ought we to say of her attendant choirs of daemons, or divine, mundane, liberated, and ruling orders? For all these receive as from a fountain the twofold peculiarity of this Goddess. Hence also, the divine poet [Homer] indicating both these powers of Minerva, in conjunction with fabulous devices says,

The radiant veil her sacred fingers wove  
Floats in rich waves, and spreads the court of Jove.  
Her father's warlike robe her limbs invest.

\* For *χαρυσίων* in this place, it is necessary to read *χαρῶν τῶν*.

\* *Iliad*, viii.



In which verses by the veil which she wove, and to which she gave subsistence by her intellections, her intellectual wisdom is signified. But by the warlike robe of Jupiter, we must understand her demiurgic providence, which immutably takes care of mundane natures, and prepares more divine beings always to have dominion in the world. Hence, also, I think Homer represents her as an associate in battle with the Greeks against the Barbarians; just as Plato here relates that she was an associate with the Greeks against the inhabitants of the Atlantic island; in order that every where more intellectual and divine natures may rule over such as are more irrational and vile. For Mars, also, is a friend to war and contrarieties, but with a separation and division more adapted to the things themselves. Minerva, however, connects contrariety, and illuminates the subjects of her government with union. Hence, likewise, she is said to be philopolemic. For,

Strife, fighting, war, she always loves.

And she is a friend to *war*, indeed, because she is allotted the summit of separation; but she is a lover of contrarieties, because these are in a certain respect congregated through this goddess, in consequence of better natures having dominion. On this account, likewise, the ancients co-arranged Victory with Minerva.

If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, she is *philosophic* indeed, as being demiurgic intelligence, and as separate and immaterial wisdom. Hence, also, she is called *Metis* by the Gods. But she is *philopolemic*, as connecting the contrarieties in wholes, and as an untamed and inflexible deity. On this account, likewise, she preserves Bacchus undetiled, but vanquishes the giants in conjunction with her father. She too alone shakes the ægis, without waiting for the mandate of Jupiter. She also hurls the javelin;—

Shook by her arm, the massy javelin bends;  
Huge, ponderous, strong! that when her fury burns,  
Whole ranks of heroes tames and overturns. \*

Again, she is *Phosphoros*, as every way extending intellectual light; the *Saviour*, as establishing every partial intellect in the total intellections of her father;

\* *Iliad*. viii.

*Ergane*, or the artificer, as presiding over demiurgic works. Hence the theologist Orpheus says, that the father produced her,

That she the queen might be of mighty works.

But she is *Calliergos*, or the beautiful fabricator, as connecting by beauty all the works of the father; a *Virgin*, as exerting an undefiled and unmingled purity; and *Agiochos*, or agis-bearing, as moving the whole of fate, and being the leader of its productions. We should, also, discuss the remaining appellations of the Goddess, if, what we have already said might not appear to be prolix through my sympathy with the discussion. Again, therefore, recurring to the thing proposed we must say, that Plato calls both these divinities, Love and Minerva, philosophers, not for the same reason; but he thus denominates the former, as being the middle of wholes, and as leading to intelligible wisdom; and the latter as the summit of wholes, and as the union of demiurgic wisdom. For the Demiurgus is "Metis the first generator and much-pleasing Love." And as Metis, indeed, he brings forth Minerva; but as Love, he generates the amatory series.

"The ancient Athenians, therefore, using these laws, and being formed by good institutions in a still greater degree than I have mentioned, inhabited this region; surpassing all men in every virtue, as it becomes those to do, who are the progeny and pupils of the Gods."

We learn from history that the affairs of the Athenians are more ancient than those of the Saitans; that the establishment of their city is prior; and that their laws are more proximate to Minerva. But in the mundane paradigms, also, wholes are prior to parts; and there is an order in them which is more divine, a power which is greater, and a form of virtue which is truly Minerval. For the genus of virtue is adapted to this greatest divinity, as being virtue herself. For abiding in the Demiurgus, she is wisdom and immutable intelligence, and in the ruling [or supermundane] Gods, she unfolds the power of virtue.

By virtue's worthy name she's called,

says Orpheus. It is evident, however, that things which are more divine in the universe, may be called the progeny and pupils of the Gods. For they derive

their subsistence and are perfected, or rather they are always perfect, through the fabrication of the Gods, and the undefiled production of Minerva. Every thing, therefore, which is suspended and originates from the Gods, and is converted to them, exhibits transcendent virtue. But this, also, is in wholes; since it must be admitted that there is divine virtue in the universe. And it is likewise in human lives, according to a similitude to wholes. Hence what is now said is applied to the Athenians. But making the life of the Athenians to be one and continued, it conjoins Solon to the ancient inhabitants of Athens. For it says, they "inhabited this region." For the paradigm of them is one, and in continuity with itself; since the whole of the Minerval series being one, extends as far as to the last of things, and originates supernally from the supermundane orders.

"Many and mighty deeds, therefore, of your city are recorded in our temples, and are the subject of admiration; yet there is one which surpasses all of them in magnitude and virtue."

The priest having promised summarily to relate the laws and deeds of the Athenians, he delivered, indeed, their laws according to a division of genera; and it, therefore, remained for him to celebrate their deeds, through which an encomium is passed on the city, and the tutelar Goddess is praised. Since, however, of deeds there is a number, and there is also one unity comprehensive of them, according to which the whole form of the polity is exhibited, he announces that he shall narrate the greatest deed, and which surpasses all the rest in virtue; this deed not being one of the many, but one prior to the many. For such a method of narration subsists appropriately with reference to the universe, in which wholes accomplish, and connectedly contain one life, and collect many contrarieties into one union with the Goddess. Hence, as there were many and great deeds of the city, the priest very properly relates one deed which was recorded in the temples. For there is, also, an intellectual paradigm of it, so far as it is surveyed in the world, and which transcends in magnitude and virtue; transcendency according to *magnitude* presenting to our view that which is *total*, but according to *virtue* that which is *intellectual*. For wholes and the more divine of mundane natures have many energies of the greatest magnitude,<sup>1</sup> and accomplish one life and polity, conformably to which fighting under Minerva, they vanquish all subordinate beings. After this

<sup>1</sup> For *μεγας* here, it is necessary to read *μεγιστος*.

manner, therefore, we must explain what is said. Porphyry, however, by great and admirable deeds, understands such as are accomplished by souls against matter, and material modes. But he calls demons *material modes*. For, according to him, there are two species of demons, of which the one consists of souls, but the other of *modes*: and these are material powers, which are noxious to the soul. For these dogmas, however, he is corrected by the interpreter that came after him.<sup>1</sup>

“For these writings relate, what a mighty power your city once tamed, which rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury over all Europe and Asia.”

Plato in what is here said, neither omits any thing of encomiastic augment, if the war of the Athenians against the Atlantics is considered as a mere history; nor fails in theological accuracy in conjunction with caution, if any one is willing to pass from partial natures to wholes, and to proceed from images to paradigms. As it is usual, therefore, in Panathenæic orations to celebrate most amply the Persian expedition, and the victories of the Athenians both by land and sea, with which more recent orators fill their orations; Plato in praising the Athenians, neither delivers the Persian invasion nor any other similar deed, but introducing the Atlantic war against the parts inhabited by us, and which rushed from the external sea with a force capable of entirely destroying these parts, he informs us that the Athenians were victorious, and that they subdued this mighty power. Since, however, the Persian expedition came from the east against the Greeks, and particularly against the Athenians, Plato introduces the Atlantic war from the west, in order that you may survey the city of the Athenians as from a centre, castigating a Barbaric multitude pouring against it on each side in a disorderly manner. To which may be added, that in the institutes delivered by the ancestors of the Athenians, and also in the mysteries, the Gigantic war is celebrated, and the victory of Minerva over the Giants, because in conjunction with her father she vanquished these and the Titans. Plato, however, does not think it safe immediately to introduce war against the Gods; for this is the very thing which he blames in the ancient poets; and it would be absurd that Critias or Timeus, who were auditors of what Socrates said against the poets on the preceding day, should

<sup>1</sup> i. e. By the divine Iamblichus.

again ascribe wars and seditions to the Gods. But through the analogy of human to divine concerns, he delivers this Atlantic war prior to the fabrication of the world, assuming the Athenians instead of Minerva and the Olympian Gods, and the Atlantics instead of the Titans and Giants. For it is possible to survey the same things in images as in wholes. And that I may remind you of the analogy, through the name of the Athenians, he refers his readers to the Olympian co-ordination which fought under the command of Minerva; but through that of the Atlantics, to the Titanic Gods. For the mighty Atlas was one of the Titans. *Theologists also after the laceration of Bacchus, which manifests the divisible progression into the universe under Jupiter from the impartible fabrication, say that the other Titans had different allotments, but that Atlas was established in the western parts, sustaining the heavens.*

By strong necessity the wide-spread heav'n  
In earth's extremes, by Atlas was sustain'd.

Farther still, the victories of Minerva are celebrated by the Athenians, and there is a festival sacred to the Goddess, in consequence of her having vanquished Neptune, and from the genesiurgie being subdued by the intellectual order, and those that inhabit this region betaking themselves to a life according to intellect, after the procurement of necessities. *For Neptune presides over generation; but Minerva is the inspective guardian of an intellectual life.* The things proposed therefore will contribute in the greatest degree to these analogies. For the Athenians bearing the name of the Goddess, are analogous to her; and the Atlantics through inhabiting an island, and through being called the progeny of Neptune, preserve an analogy to this God; so that it is evident from these things that *the Atlantic war indicates the middle fabrication*, according to which the second father [Neptune] being filled by Minerva, and the other invisible causes, governs diviner natures in a more powerful manner, and subjects all such things as have a multiplied, divisible, and more material hypostasis, to intellectual natures. For the Gods themselves, indeed, are eternally united; but the beings which are governed by them, are filled with this kind of division. After this manner, therefore, these things must be separately understood.

In order however that we may pre-assume certain definite forms<sup>1</sup> of the proposed analysis, it must be admitted, that the habitations within the pillars of Her-

<sup>1</sup> For *vousous* here, it is necessary to read *vousous*.

cules, are analogous to the whole of the more excellent, but those external to them, to the whole of the inferior co-ordination, and that of this, there is one continued, and variously proceeding life. Whether, therefore, beginning from the Gods, you speak of the Olympian and Titanic divinities; or beginning from intellect, of permanency and motion, or sameness and difference; or from souls, you speak of the rational and irrational; or from bodies, of heaven and generation; or in whatever other way you may divide essences, according to all divisions, all the genus of those within the pillars of Hercules will be analogous to the better, but of those without to the less excellent co-ordination of things. For the true sea of dissimilitude, and the whole of a material life which proceeds into interval and multitude from *the one*, are there. Hence, whether you are willing Orphically to arrange the Olympian and Titanic genera in opposition to each other, and to celebrate the former as subduing the latter; or Pythagorically, to perceive the two co-ordinations proceeding from on high, as far as to the last of things, and the better adorning the subordinate rank; or Platonically, to survey much of infinity and much of bound in the universe, as we learn in the *Philebus*, and the whole of infinity in conjunction with the measures of bound, producing generation, which extends through all mundane natures,—from all these, you may assume one thing, that the whole composition of the world is co-harmonized from this contrariety. And if the illustrious Heraclitus looking to this said, *that war is the father of all things*, he did not speak absurdly.

Porphry, therefore, here refers the theory to daemons and souls, and makes mention of the fabulous Titanic war, adducing some things to what is proposed to be considered, with probability, but others, without it. The divine Iamblichus however, against those who adopt a more partial assignation of the cause of the analysis, is of opinion after a certain wonderful manner, that what is said is only to be understood according to the apparent meaning, though in the preface he himself delivers to us auxiliaries for the solution of such-like narrations. May that divine man however, who has instructed us in many other particulars, and also in these, be propitious to us. Betaking ourselves, therefore, to the interpretation of the words of Plato, we think it fit to remind ourselves, of the before-mentioned forms of analysis; and that we must arrange the Atlantics according to all the total natures of the inferior co-ordination. For in these, also, some things are wholes, but others parts. But we must arrange their *insolent injustice*, according to progression, a division through diminution, and a proximity to matter. For matter is truly infinity and baseness. Hence through nearness

to, and being in a certain respect in it, they are said to have acted injuriously from insolence. For the paradigm of them is manifested by the theologist, through these names, when he says of them, "that their mind is replete with evil counsels, and their heart is insolent." And we must arrange *the rushing from external parts* according to a defection and separation remote from the Gods, and things of a diviner nature in the universe. For the external does not indicate comprehension of powers, but an hypostasis departing from every thing stable, immaterial, pure, and united. But the Atlantic sea must be arranged according to matter itself, whether you call it the abyss, or the sea of dissimilitude, or in whatever other way you may be willing to denominate it. For matter receives the appellations of the inferior co-ordination, being called infinity and darkness, irrationality and immoderation, the principle of diversity and the duad; just as from the Atlantic sea, the Atlantic island is denominated. For thus receiving the analogies in order, we shall understand that the whole of the inferior co-ordination, and the more total and partial genera in it, are characterised by progression and division, and a conversion to matter, and that thus it proceeds through all things, presenting itself to the view appropriately in each, and appearing analogously in each nature, viz. the divine and intellectual, the psychical and corporeal. Being however such, it is adorned and arranged by the better order, which you may properly say is Minerval, as being undefiled, and subduing through its power things of a subordinate nature. But the inferior co-ordination becoming adorned, ceases from its abundant division and infinity; the genus of the Titans being connected by the Olympian Gods; but difference being united by sameness, motion by permanency, irrational by rational souls, generation by the heavens, and in a similar manner in all things. It must not however be supposed from this, that two-fold divided principles of things are to be admitted. For we say that these two co-ordinations are of a kindred nature. But *the one* precedes all contrariety, as the Pythagoreans also say. Since, however, after the one cause of all, a duad of principles is unfolded into light, and in these the monad is more excellent than the duad, or, if you wish to speak Orphically, æther than chaos, the divisions are accomplished after this manner in the Gods prior to the world, and also in the mundane Gods, as far as to the extremity of things. For among the supermundane Gods the demiurgic and connective orders are under the monad, but the vivific and the generative orders are under the duad. But among the mundane Gods the Olympian genus is under the monad, but the Titanic under the duad. And sameness, permanency, reason and form, are under the more

ancient, but difference, motion, irrationality, and matter, are under the other of these principles. For as far as to these the diminution of the two principles proceeds. Since however *the one* is beyond the first duad, things which appear to be contraries are collected together, and are co-arranged with a view to one orderly distribution of things. For in the universe there are these two-fold genera of Gods, the oppositely divided genera of being, the various genera of souls, and the contrary genera of bodies. But the subordinate are vanquished by the more divine, and the world is rendered one, being harmonised from contraries, since it subsists according to Philolaus from things that bound, and from things that are infinite. And according to the infinite, indeed, which it contains, it derives its subsistence from the indefinite duad, or the nature of the infinite; but according to the things that bound, from the intelligible monad, or the nature of bound. And according to a subsistence from all these, it becomes one whole and all-perfect form from *the one*. For it is God, as Socrates says in the *Philebus*, who gives subsistence to that which is mixed.

“ For at that time the Atlantic sea was navigable, and had an island before that mouth which is called by you the Pillars of Hercules. But this island was greater than both Libya and Asia together, and afforded an easy passage to other neighbouring islands; as it was likewise easy to pass from those islands to all the opposite continent which surrounded that true sea.”

That such and so great an island once existed, is evident from what is said by certain historians respecting what pertains to the external sea. For according to them, there were seven islands in that sea, in their times, sacred to Proserpine, and also three others of an immense extent, one of which was sacred to Pluto, another to Ammon, and the middle [or second] of these to Neptune, the magnitude of which was a thousand stadia. They also add, that the inhabitants of it preserved the remembrance from their ancestors, of the Atlantic island which existed there, and was truly prodigiously great; which for many periods had dominion over all the islands in the Atlantic sea, and was itself likewise sacred to Neptune. *These things, therefore, Marcellus writes in his Ethiopic History.* If however this be the case, and such an island once existed, it is possible to receive what is said about it as a history, and also as an image of a certain nature among



wholes. Unfolding likewise the similitude of this, we may gradually accustom those who survey things of this kind, to the whole theory of mundane natures. For it is possible to behold the same analogies in a more partial, and in a more comprehensive way. But it is necessary that doctrine proceeding from universals to the subtle elaboration of particulars, should thus give respite to theory. You must not therefore wonder, if before we assumed this analogy more generally, but now after another manner, and that we explore the same thing with an accuracy adapted to the things themselves. For since, as we have said, there is a two-fold co-ordination in the universe, which originates from the Gods, and is terminated in matter and material form; and since each possesses things more total, and things more partial, [for this we have before said]; but other things are the middles of both these co-ordinations; for the divine genera are comprehensive of all things, and the last elements are the vilest of all things; and the intellectual and psychical genera subsist between these;—this being the case, we think fit in the first place to divide in a three-fold manner the inferior co-ordination, and to assume in it some things as most total genera, others as middle, and others as last genera. And to some things, we shall arrange the Atlantics as analogous, to others the other islands, and to others all the opposite continent. But we shall consider the deep, and the Atlantic sea, as analogous to matter. For all the inferior co-ordination is material, and proceeds into multitude and division. But it also has, with respect to itself, transcendency and deficiency. Hence Plato says that the Atlantics spread themselves externally, as being more remote from *the one* and nearer to matter; but that they inhabited an island larger than both Libya and Asia, as proceeding into bulk and interval. For all things that are more remote from *the one*, are diminished according to power, but transcend according to quantity; just as such as are nearer to *the one*, are contracted<sup>1</sup> in quantity, but possess an admirable power. Here, therefore, magnitude is significant of diminution, and of progression and extension to every thing. But the sea was then navigable, since more total natures proceed as far as to the last of things, and adorn matter, but having arrived at the end of the order, they stop, and that which remains beyond it is infinite. For that which in no respect has a subsistence is successive to the boundaries of being. But the addition of *those*, has an indication that total causes proceed without impediment through matter, and adorn it, but that we do not always subdue it, but are merged in an infinite

<sup>1</sup> For *συνεσταλμένα* here, it is necessary to read *συνεσταλμένα*.

and indefinite nature. Since however the progression of things is continued, and no vacuum<sup>1</sup> any where intervenes, but a well-ordered diminution is surveyed from more total to middle natures, which comprehend and are comprehended; and from middles to the last and vilest natures,—on this account he says, there was a passage from the Atlantic island to the other islands, and from these to the opposite continent. And that the Atlantic was one, but the other islands many, and the continent was the greatest. For the monad is adapted to the first genus in every thing; but number and multitude to the second. For multitude subsists together with the duad. And magnitude is adapted to the third genus, on account of the progression of magnitude to the triad. Since, however, the extremities of the worse co-ordination are most material, he manifests through the term *opposite*, that they are at the greatest possible distance from more excellent natures. And he does not alone use the term *external*, as he does of the Atlantics, and which evinces that they belong to the other part, but he also adds the word *opposite*, that he may indicate the most extreme diminution. But he signifies by the words *about that true sea*, the hypostasis of them about matter, and the last of mundane natures. For the true sea is analogous to that which is truly false, and truly matter, which in the Politicus he calls the sea of dissimilitude. Moreover, because it is necessary that these two-fold co-ordinations should be separated from each other without confusion, and guarded by demiurgic boundaries, on this account he says, that the Pillars of Hercules separated the internal from the external habitable part. *For he denominates flourishing demiurgic production, and the divine separation of genera in the universe, the latter of which always remains stably and strenuously the same, the Pillars of Hercules.* This Hercules therefore is Jovian; but the one prior to this, and who is divine, is allotted the guardian order of the generative series. Hence from both the demiurgic division, which guards these two separate parts of the universe, must be assumed.

“For the waters which are beheld within the mouth we have just now mentioned, have the form of a port with a narrow entrance; but the mouth itself is a true sea. And the land which surrounds it may be in every respect truly denominated the continent.”

The waters within the mouth indicate the genera of the better co-ordination,

<sup>1</sup> For *μερον* in this place, the sense requires we should read *κερον*.

as being converted to themselves, and rejoicing in a stable and uniting power. For the *mouth* symbolically manifests the cause which defines and separates the two portions of mundane natures. But the port with a narrow entrance, signifies the convolved, self-converging, arranged, and immaterial hyparxis of these mundane portions. For through *the narrow entrance* it is signified that interval and extension proceed from the worse co-ordination. But through *the port* an hyparxis is indicated, exempt from the confused and disorderly motion of material natures. For such are ports affording a protection from the tumults in the sea. If, however, some one should say, that an elevation to the more intellectual and divine natures in the universe becomes a port to souls, he will not be far from the truth.

“ In this Atlantic island there was a combination of kings, who with great and admirable power subdued the whole island, together with many other islands and parts of the continent; and besides this subjected to their dominion all Libya as far as to Egypt, and Europe as far as to the Tyrrhene sea.”

In what is here said it is requisite to recollect the Platonic hypotheses about the earth, that Plato does not measure the magnitude of it conformably to mathematicians; but apprehends the interval of it to be greater than they admit it to be, as Socrates says in the *Phædo*; and that he supposes there are many habitable parts similar to the part which we inhabit. Hence he relates that there is an island and a continent of so great a magnitude in the external sea. For in short, if the earth is naturally spherical, it is necessary that it should be so according to the greater part of it. That portion of it, however, which is inhabited by us, exhibits great inequality by its cavities and prominencies. Hence there is elsewhere an expanded plane of the earth, and an interval extended on high. For, according to Heracitus, he who passes through a region very difficult of access, will arrive at the Atlantic mountain, the magnitude of which is said to be so great by the Ethiopic historians, that it reaches to the æther, and sends forth a shadow as far as to five thousand stadia. For the sun is concealed by it from the ninth hour of the day till it entirely sets. Nor is this at all wonderful. For Athos, a Macedonian mountain, emits a shadow as far as to Lemnos, which is distant from it seven hundred stadia. And Marcellus, who wrote the Ethiopic history, not only relates that the Atlantic mountain was of such a great height,

but Ptolemy also says that the Lunar mountains are immensely high, and Aristotle informs us that Caucasus is illuminated by the solar rays during the third part of the night after the setting, and also for the third part before the rising, of the sun. And he who looks to the whole magnitude of the earth, bounded by its elevated parts, will infer that it is truly immense, according to the assertion of Plato. So that we are not now in want of certain mathematical methods to the development of what is said about the earth, nor do we attempt to recur to them. *For these methods measure the earth according to the surface which is inhabited by us ; but Plato says that we dwell in a cavity, and that the whole earth is elevated, which also the sacred rumor of the Egyptians asserts.* And thus much concerning what is related of the magnitude of the Atlantic island, in order to show that it is not proper to disbelieve what is said by Plato, though it should be received as a mere history. But with respect to the power of this island, that there were ten kings in it who begat five male twins, and that it ruled over the other islands, certain parts of the continent, and some parts within the Pillars of Hercules,—all these particulars are clearly related in the Critias.

Now however, for it is proposed to make an analysis of the particulars, the power is said to be great and admirable, according to a reference to the universe, because it proceeds to every thing, and comprehends totally the whole of the second co-ordination. For it is held together by ten kings, because the decad comprehends the rulers of the two co-ordinations ; since the Pythagoreans also say, that all opposites are comprehended in the decad. But they were twins, so that there are five duads, twins being five times begotten from Neptune and Clites ; because according to the measures of justice, there is likewise an orderly distribution of this co-ordination, of which the pentad is an image. The progression of it however is through the duad, just as that of the better co-ordination is through the monad. Moreover, all of them are the descendants of Neptune, because all the connexion of contraries, and the mundane war, belong to the middle fabrication. For as this God presides over the contrariety which every where exists, he likewise rules over generation and corruption, and all-various motion. But these kings subdued the Atlantic island as comprehending all the first and most total genera of the worse co-ordination. And they subdued the other islands, as likewise comprehending middles through the wholeness of them. But they also vanquished parts of the continent, as adorning as much as possible the last of things. And they had dominion over certain parts of the internal habitable region, *because the last parts of the better are subservient to the first parts*

of the worse co-ordination. Nor is this at all wonderful; since certain demons are in subjection to certain heroes, and partial souls which belong to the intelligible portion of things are frequently slaves to fate. Such also is the Titanic order with the Gods to which Atlas belongs. And the first of these ten kings was called Atlas, and as it is said in the *Atlantides* gave the name to the island. The summits, therefore, of the second co-ordination, are adorned indeed by the Olympian Gods, of whom Minerva is the leader; but they subdue the whole of the essence which is subordinate to the Gods, but terminates in the worse co-ordination; such as the essence of irrational souls, of material masses, and of matter itself. Plato also appears to have called the power of the Atlantics great and admirable, because Thaumas and Bias are said by ancient theologists to have belonged to this order. Perhaps too, he so denominated it, because the whole of the second co-ordination is the progeny of infinity, which we say is the first [power], just as the better co-ordination is the offspring of bound. On this account he celebrates the *power* of the Atlantics, just as he does the *virtue* of the Athenians, which belongs to 'bound': for it is the measure of those that possess it. After this manner therefore, I think we may be able to make the analysis according to the Pythagorean principles.

The words of Plato likewise, have a great augment, in order to exhibit the work of the victors in a greater and more splendid point of view. For he says *δυναμιν τε*, through the union of the particle *τε* augmenting *δυναμιν* power. And he also adds, *great*, and *admirable*. But each of these is different from the other. For power may be great though it is nothing else, but it is said to be admirable from other things. And by how much the more admirable that is which is vanquished, by so much 'greater is the victor demonstrated to be. Besides this also, indicating through divisions the multitude subdued by this power, he evinces that it is multitudinous and transcendent.

"But then all this power being collected into one, endeavoured to enslave our region and yours, and likewise every place situated within the mouth of the Atlantic sea."

<sup>1</sup> *Δυναμιν* is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *πρὸ τοῦ πελάγους* in this place, it is necessary to read *πρὸς τοῦ πελάγους*.

<sup>3</sup> For *τοῦ τοῦ* here, read *τοῦτοῦ*.

Plato does not say that there was once sedition among divine natures, or that subordinate subdued more excellent beings. But let these things indeed be true in human affairs : the present narration however, indicates, that the most total of the genera in the second co-ordination of things in the universe proceed through all things. For there are both in the heavens and every where, a separating and uniting power, and nothing is destitute of these. In more excellent natures however, these powers do not subsist with division, nor multitudinously, but collected into one, and with one impulse ; but this is, unitedly, and according to one and a continued life. For as in the worse co-ordination *the one* is multiplied, thus also in the better, multitude is united. Hence multitude is every where, and is vanquished through union. Of these things the Atlantics wishing to subdue every place within the mouth of the Atlantic sea, all their powers being collected into one, but at the same time being vanquished by the Athenians, are an image. For multitude and separation, though they may be surveyed in the better co-ordination, yet they will be seen to subsist there unitedly ; multitude not being there victorious, but sameness, and in short, the better genera.

“Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous to all men for its virtue and strength.”

Plato opposes to the power of the Atlantics, the power of the Athenians ; preferring this appellation, as being adapted to the middle fabrication. And he celebrates the more excellent power for its virtue and strength ; in order that through *virtue*, he may indicate its alliance to the philosophic nature of Minerva ; (for another theology, \* and not the Orphic only, calls her virtue,) but through *strength* its alliance to her philopolemic nature. But he calls the power *conspicuous*, because it is mundane, and contributes to the fabrication of sensibles ; and to the Atlantics indeed, he alone attributes power, and this continually, because they are arranged under infinity. But he says that the Athenians vanquished this power, through virtue. For as they belong to the co-ordination of bound ; they are characterized by virtue, which measures the passions, and uses powers in a becoming manner.

\* i. e. The Chaldean theology.

"For as its armies surpassed all others, both in magnanimity and military arts, so with respect to its contests, whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometimes presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, and thus was in extreme danger, yet still it remained triumphant. In the mean time, those who were not yet enslaved, it liberated from danger; and procured the most ample liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules."

As we have triply divided the inferior co-ordination, into first, middle, and last boundaries, thus also we must divide the superior, into the most total, and the most partial genera, and those that subsist between these. And having made this division, we shall arrange the Athenians as analogous to the first genera; but the other Greeks who were not yet enslaved, to the middle; and those who were now slaves, to the last genera. For according to this arrangement, those that belong to the Minerval series, vanquish those that belong to the series of Neptune; those that rank as first, subduing those that rank as second,<sup>1</sup> the monadic, the dyadic, and in short, the better vanquishing the worse. But the middle genera eternally preserve their own order, and are not vanquished by the worse co-ordination, on account of the union of themselves, and the stable genus of power. They likewise liberate from slavery those that are enslaved, recalling them to union and permanency. For some things indeed, are always in matter, others are always separated from it, and others, sometimes become situated under the material genera, and sometimes have an arrangement in a separate life. Just as in the drama pertaining to us; at one time we are arranged under the Titanic, and at another, under the Olympian order; and at one time our course terminates in generation, but at another, in the heavens. This however happens to partial souls, through the invariably permanent providence of the Gods, which leads back souls to their pristine felicity. For as in consequence of there being genesiurgic Gods, souls descend, in subserviency to their will, thus also, through the prior subsistence of anagogic causes, the ascent of our souls from the realms of generation is effected. And thus much

<sup>1</sup> For *πρῶτων* here, it seems necessary to read *δευτέρων*.

concerning the whole meaning of the words before us. Let us however, concisely discuss each particular.

The words therefore, *surpassed all others*, manifest the total comprehension of the first genera of the more divine part. But the words in *magnanimity*, and *military arts*, have the same meaning as Minervally. For through *magnanimity*, they imitate the philosophic characteristic of the Goddess, but through *warlike arts*, her philopolemic characteristic. And the words, *whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometimes presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies*, signify that first and total causes, produce some things in conjunction with second and middle causes, but others by themselves, beyond the production of these, and being alone in their energy. For the genus of the Gods, and that which is posterior to the Gods, do not produce equally, but the effective power of the Gods proceeds to a greater extent; since every where more divine causes energize prior to, together with, and posterior to their effects. Credibility therefore of this may be multifariously produced. But *the extreme danger* manifests the last production of the first genera. And the *trophies* signify that the second co-ordination is perfected under the first, being adorned by it; that it is in a certain respect *converted* by the power of it; and that there are in the last of things invariably permanent indications of the conversion of less excellent natures, proceeding from the first of things. For whatever is arranged in the worse co-ordination, and invested with form, material causes receding, affords a sufficient indication of the inspective care<sup>1</sup> of the better order, which is especially the peculiarity of trophies. But *the most ample liberty*, is an indication of the divine and *liberated* order, proceeding from on high to all things; which liberty the Athenians imparted to the Greeks, by vanquishing the Atlantics; or rather the Olympic, by subduing the Titanic genera. For thus the demiurgic will is accomplished, and the worse is vanquished by the better co-ordination; in partial natures indeed the Atlantics by the Athenians, but in wholes, the Titans by the Olympian Gods. "Though they are robust, and oppose the better order, through pernicious pride, and insolent improbity," says the theologist; whom Plato emulating, asserts that the Atlantics *insolently* proceeded against the Athenians.

"But in succeeding times prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking

<sup>1</sup> For *ἐπιστορίας* here, it is necessary to read *ἐπιστορίας*.



place, and bringing with them desolation, in the space of one dreadful day and night, all that warlike race of Athenians was at once merged under the earth; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea, entirely disappeared. *And hence that sea is at present innavigable, from the impeding mud which the subsiding island produced.*"

That what is here said has a physical deduction, is evident to those who are not entirely ignorant of the physical theory. For it is not wonderful that there should have been an earthquake so great, as to have destroyed such a large island; since an earthquake that happened a little before our time, shook both Egypt and Bithynia, and it is not at all paradoxical, that a deluge should follow an earthquake. For this usually happens in great earthquakes, as Aristotle relates, who at the same time adds the cause. For where a deluge takes place together with earthquakes, the waves are the cause of this passion. For when the spirit which produces the earthquake, does not yet flow towards the earth, and is not able to drive backward the sea which is impelled by a certain contrary spirit, urging it in a contrary direction, through the wind which propels it, but nevertheless stops the sea by hindering its progression, it is the cause of much sea which is impelled by the spirit contrary to this, becoming collected together. Then however, the sea thus collected flowing most abundantly, the spirit impelling it in a contrary direction, enters under the earth and produces an earthquake. But the sea deluges the place. For after this manner also about Achaia, there was an earthquake accompanied with an ingress of the waves of the sea, which deluged the maritime cities, Bouras and Helice; so that neither will any physiologist reject this narration, who considers the affair rightly. Moreover, that the same place may become pervious and impervious, continent and sea, is among the things admitted by physiologists, according to Aristotle, and which history demonstrates. Aristotle also relates, [in his *Meteors*,] that there was mud in the external sea, after the mouth of it, and that the place there was marshy; so that if *το πηλόν κατὰ βραχέος* signifies *marshy*, it is not wonderful. For even now rocks concealed under the sea, and having water on their surface, are called *breakers*. Why therefore should any one contending for the truth of these things be disturbed?

That these particulars however, have reference to the admirable and orderly distribution of the universe, we shall be convinced by recollecting what is said by

\* The text of Plato in this place is in the Commentaries of Proclus very erroneous, as the learned reader will immediately perceive by comparing it with any of the editions of the *Timæus*.

Orpheus about the hurling into Tartarus, near the end of the fabrication of things.— For he delivering the demiurgic opposition between the Olympian and Titanic Gods,<sup>1</sup> terminates the whole orderly distribution in the extremities of the universe, and imparts to these also the undefiled providence of the Gods. Plato, therefore, knowing this, and delivering to us wholes in images, extends and leads into the invisible, these twofold genera, and through this *disappearing*, imitates the Orphic precipitation into Tartarus. For in order that the last of things may be adorned, and partake of divine providence, it is requisite that both the superior and inferior co-ordination, should extend their production from on high as far as to the mundane extremity. Each however, effects this in a manner adapted to itself; the one being shaken, and entering under the earth, which is the same as proceeding stably and solidly; but the other disappearing, which is the same as becoming material, disorderly, and formless; *under the earth*, being a symbol of the firm and the stable; but *in the sea*, of that which is very mutable, disorderly and flowing. For in the last of things, permanency and generation are from the better; but corruption, mutation, and disorderly motion are from the worse co-ordination. Since however these things are adorned, both the invisible and visible fabrication receiving their completion, on this account Plato says, they happened in one dreadful day and night, *night* indicating the invisible causes, but *day* the visible, and the *dreadfulness*, signifying opposing power, the inflexible, and that which proceeds through all things. But because all these are accomplished according to demiurgic powers, earthquakes and deluges took place, which are adapted to the middle fabrication. For if he wished to signify Jovian powers or energies, he would have said, thunders and lightnings happened. But since he delivers Neptunian demiurgic energies, he assimilates them to earthquakes or deluges. For it is usual to call this God *earth-shaker*, and *the source of marine water* (κρηνοχέτην). And because time signifies a progression in order, and a well-arranged diminution, he says that all these events took place *in succeeding time*. It is not therefore proper to say, that he who destroys an argument, takes away also the subjects, as Homer says of the Phaeaceans, and of the wall which the Greeks raised; since the things which are now asserted are not fictitious, but true. For many parts of the earth are deluged by the sea; and what he says happened is not at all impossible. Nor again, does he relate it as a mere history; but he introduces it for the purpose of indicating the providence which proceeds through all things, and extends even to the last of things.

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *την των Ολυμπιων θεων, και την Τιτανικην παραδου δημιουργικην αιτιθεσιν* in this place, I read *την των Ολυμπιων θεωι, και την των Τιτανικωι, κ. λ.*

In short, it is necessary to assert, since the whole orderly distribution of things receives its completion from the visible and invisible fabrication, that for the purpose of giving perfection to the demiurgic productions of the second father, the gifts both of the better and the worse co-ordination, proceed as far as to the last of beings; the former vanquishing the subjects [of its power] through the *warlike genus*, and illuminating a stable<sup>1</sup> power, through *entering under the earth*, [i. e. through proceeding firmly and solidly:] but the latter producing ultimate division, and connecting the most material and indefinite motion of Tartarus. But these things being adorned, it reasonably follows that what remains is an impervious<sup>2</sup> and uninvestigable place of the sea. For there is no other passage and progression of the adorning genera of the universe, but this is that which is truly mud; and which is mentioned by Socrates in the *Phædo*, when he is teaching us concerning the subterranean places. For the place under the earth obscurely retains the forms of corporeity, which it possesses through the inferior co-ordination subsiding, and proceeding to the end of the orderly distribution of things. For the Titanic order being driven by Jupiter as far as to Tartarus, fills what is there contained with deiform guards.

“And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon. But when yesterday you were speaking about a polity and its citizens, I was surprised on recollecting the present history. For I perceived how divinely from a certain fortune, and not wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the narration of Solon.”

That the war of the Atlantics and Athenians contributes to [the theory of] the whole fabrication of the world, and that the mundane contrariety is connected by the middle fabrication proceeding from on high, from the first to the last of things, the Minerval series adorning all things stably, and in a ruling and victorious manner, expanding indeed the natures which are detained in matter, but preserving those undefiled that are separated<sup>3</sup> from matter; and also, that the other fabrication imparts appropriately,<sup>4</sup> motion, division, and difference, to the things fabricated, and proceeds supernally to the end;—all this has been sufficiently

<sup>1</sup> For γαῖαν here, it is necessary to read ποταμῶν.

<sup>2</sup> For ἀπείροτα here, it is necessary to read ἀπείροι.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of καὶ χωρισμένα read κεχωρισμένα.

<sup>4</sup> For προσφύωντι, read προσφορῶσι.

shown and recalled to the memory by us, in what we have before said. Since however, he by whom this narration is made, is analogous to the God who connects this contrariety, he, in a certain respect imitates him. And through a recurrence to the fathers of the narration, through what was heard by Critias and Solon, he ascends to the Egyptians; conformably to what pre-exists in the paradigm, which is filled from first causes, and fills things posterior to itself, with demiurgic power. Farther still, since he brings with him an image of the second, which proceeds from another fabrication, hence he says, that he recollected the history through the discourse of Socrates. For the recollection itself, is not a transition from images to paradigms, but from universal conceptions to more partial actions. Hence, also it is adapted to the progression of the whole fabrication of things. For since all things are in intelligibles, every demiurgic cause distributes total productions according to its proper order.

Again, if you consider what is said after another manner, you will find that the Athenians are praised in an admirable manner, and that the polity of Socrates is fitly celebrated. *For that it is possible for this polity to exist, is demonstrated through the life of the [ancient] Athenians, and also that it is productive of the greatest good to those who belong to it;* which also Socrates thinks fit to demonstrate in his Republic. But he is likewise of opinion that those who live according to the best form of a polity, should be shown to deserve the greatest admiration. For those who are fashioned according to the first paradigm are truly admirable; since of mundane natures also, the more divine which transcendently receive the whole form of their paradigms, are said to be, and are monadic; but material natures which have the same form in many subjects, possess the last order. This therefore, which in the fabrication of things, belongs to the Gods, viz. to partake transcendently of their proper paradigm, the city of the Athenians also exhibits, by applying itself in the most excellent manner to the best measure of life.

Moreover, the circle of benefits, imitates the mundane<sup>1</sup> circle. For the Egyptians are benefited by the Athenians, through warlike works; and the Athenians are benefited by the Egyptians through sacerdotal narrations. For the communication of an unwritten action, was a return of favour. But in addition to this, the doctrinal narration of the deeds of their ancestors, exhibits a multiplied retribution. The mention also of fortune and divinity, and the excitation of our reasoning powers, are worthy of the theory of Plato. *For fortune and her*

<sup>1</sup> For το εγκύκλιον here, it is necessary to read τον εγκύκλιον.

gifts are not without a scope, or indefinite ; but she is a power collective of many dispersed causes, adorning things that are without arrangement, and giving completion to what is allotted to each individual from the universe. Why then did Socrates collect many things which agree with the narration of Solon? I answer, on account of the cause which collects many dispersed causes, and on account of the one divinity<sup>1</sup> who connects the common intellect of Socrates and Solon. For, being of a Minerval characteristic, they are excited as it were from one fountain, their tutelar Goddess, to similar conceptions.

“ Yet I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as, from the great interval of time since I first received them, my remembrance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose of repetition. I consider it therefore necessary, that I should first diligently revolve the whole in my mind.”

These things may also be surveyed in the universe ; viz. that the demiurgic cause of beings which are generated according to time, gives subsistence to his own progeny prior to that of partial natures.<sup>2</sup> And that the hypostatic cause of things generated, first<sup>3</sup> intellectually perceiving himself, and seeing in himself the causes of his productions, thus gives also to other things a progression from himself ; in order that he, being sufficient and perfect, may impart his own power to secondary natures. *Conception* therefore and *resumption*, and every thing of this kind, manifest the comprehension of demiurgic productive principles in one.

“ And on this account, I yesterday immediately complied with your demands ; for I perceived that we should not want the ability of presenting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Hermocrates has informed you, as soon as we departed from hence, by communicating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose

<sup>1</sup> For *μὴν θεῶν* in this place, read *μὴν θεῶν*.

<sup>2</sup> The erroneousness of the punctuation here, perverts the meaning of Proclus. For the original is, *ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τῇ παρτί θεῶν, πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν, το δημιουργικὸν αἶτιον τῶν γιγνομένων κατὰ χρόνον υφίσταται τα αὐτῶν γέννηματα.* But the punctuation ought to be as follows : *ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τῇ παρτί θεῶν, πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν, το δημιουργικὸν αἶτιον, &c. λ.*

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *πρὸ τῶν* in this place, it is necessary to read *πρῶτον*.

of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of the affair."

Why did Critias *nearly* remember? For he promised to accomplish what was enjoined him. Because he did not *accurately* remember. But he first revolved the affair in his mind, conceiving that in mandates of this kind, such as that in which Socrates wished to see his polity in motion, the greatest undertaking is to find an hypothesis from which it is possible to give what is adapted to the mandates. And this Critias accomplishes, by receiving from history the war of the Atlantics and Athenians, as a thing capable of exhibiting a life productive of the best polity. He also revolved this narration by night, in order that he might impart it to his associates without error.

Again therefore, from these things, let us betake ourselves to wholes. For there the demiurgic cause being filled from an invisible cause (since all intellectual causes are there primarily, to which he is united<sup>1</sup> according to the highest transcendency), produces the power of himself into the visible world, conformably to their will and judgment. Farther still, not to give the narration immediately, but afterwards, is a symbol of the preparatory apparatus of nature, from which perfection is produced in physical effects. You may also consider the caution of Critias ethically. For it is not proper to attempt things of such a magnitude rashly, without first revolving the whole undertaking by ourselves, in order that we may bring them forth as from a treasury through speech, which is truly the messenger of internal reasons. Moreover, the repeating the narration to himself, imitates the conversion of demiurgic reasons to themselves, according to which [the soul] surveys in herself [by participation] the productive principles of beings. And *to present a discourse accommodated to the wishes of those who enjoined it*, indicates in the fabrication of things the suspension of visible effects from their causes.

"And, indeed, according to the proverb, what we learn in childhood, abides in the memory with a wonderful stability. For with respect to myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recollect the whole of yesterday's discourse; yet I should be very much astonished if any thing should escape my remembrance, which I had heard in some past time very

<sup>1</sup> For *ωπρὸς* here, it is necessary to read *ἐν*.

distant from the present. Thus, as to the history which I have just now related, I received it from the old man with great pleasure and delight ; who on his part very readily complied with my request, and frequently gratified me with a repetition of it. And hence, as the marks of letters deeply burnt in, remain indelible, so all these particulars became firmly established in my memory."

That children remember better than men is seen in works, and has many probable causes. One indeed, as Porphyry says, because the souls of children have not an experience of human evils. Hence, as they are neither distracted nor disturbed by externals, their imagination is void of impressions ; but their reasoning power is more sluggish. For experience renders this power more acute. But another cause is this, that the rational life in children is in a greater degree mingled with the phantasy. As therefore, in consequence of the soul being co-passive, and co-mingled with the body, the body becomes stronger and more vital ; after the same manner also, the phantasy is strengthened through the habitude of reason. And being strengthened, it has more stable impressions, from receiving through its own power reason in a greater degree ; just as the body is more powerful, in consequence of being more vital, through a more abundant communion with the soul. A third cause in addition to these is, that the same things appear to be greater to the imaginations of children. Hence they are in a greater degree admired by them, so that they are more co-passive with them, and on this account especially remember them. For we deposit in the memory things which vehemently pain, or vehemently delight us. They therefore operate on us in a greater degree. Hence as that which suffers in a greater degree from fire, preserves for a longer time the heat imparted to it ; after the same manner, that which suffers more from the external object of the phantasy, retains the impression in a greater degree. Moreover the imagination of children suffers more, on account of the same things appearing to us to be greater during our childhood. Hence children in a greater degree retain the impression, as suffering in a greater degree from the same things. And it appears to me that Critias indicates this when he says, that he heard this history from the old man with great delight, and that on this account it became firmly established in his memory, like the marks of letters deeply burnt in. But as Socrates in the recapitulation of his polity asserts, that the cause of memory to us is the unusualness ' of the things which

' For ἀλθηταρ here, it is necessary to read ἀγθηταρ.

we hear, thus Critias, in what is here said, ascribes this cause to the age of children. For every thing that occurs to children at first, appears to be unusual. And perhaps this brings with it an indication, that the prolific fabrication of Gods of the second rank is suspended from the stable sameness of those of the first order; just as the memory of a boy is the cause of memory to the associates of Critias. If some one however, in addition to these solutions, should adhere to the whole theory of things, let him hear Iamblichus asserting, that the memory of children indicates the ever new, flourishing, and stable production of reasons; the indelibility of the letters, the perpetually-flowing and never-failing fabrication; and the alacrity of the teacher, the unenvying and abundant supply afforded by more ancient causes to secondary natures. For these things also have a place in conjunction with the before-mentioned solutions.

“ In consequence of this, as soon as it was day, I repeated the narration to my friends, that together with myself they might be better prepared for the purposes of the present association. But now with respect to that for which this narration was undertaken, I am prepared, O Socrates, to speak not only summarily, but so as to descend to the particulars of every thing which I heard. We shall transfer, however, to reality the citizens and city which you fashioned yesterday as in a fable; considering that city which you established as no other than this Athenian city, and the citizens which you conceived, as no other than those ancestors of ours described by the Egyptian priest. And indeed the affair will harmonize in every respect; nor will it be foreign from the purpose to assert, that your citizens are those very people who existed at that time. Hence, distributing the affair in common among us, we will endeavour, to the utmost of our ability, to accomplish in a becoming manner the employment which you have assigned us. It is requisite therefore to consider, O Socrates, whether this discourse is reasonable, or whether we should lay it aside, and seek after another.”

Before, Critias made his associates partakers of his narration; but now, he calls on them to accomplish in conjunction with him, the employment assigned them. Because in the paradigms all things indeed are united on high, and fill each other with intellectual powers; but in the demiurgic world [or in the world in the intellect of the Demiurgus,] they subsist with each other, according to a certain divine and total conspiracy; conformably to which, and through



which, all things are every where appropriately in each. Hence in the heavens the paradigms of generated natures pre-exist, and in generation there are images of celestial natures. Since, however, wholeness every where precedes parts, this also may be seen in the second fabrication. On this account Critias first summarily discusses the war; but afterwards he endeavours to explain more copiously every particular, narrating all the polity of the Atlantics, and the principle of their generation; how they turned to injustice, how the Athenians proceeded to war; from what apparatus, from what legations, through what ways, with whom they were co-arranged, and such things as are consequent to these. The genuine polity, therefore, [of Socrates] is an imitation of the first fabrication. Hence indicating the mystic nature of it, and its pre-existence in pure reason, he says, *that it was fashioned as it were in a fable*. But the hypothesis of the Athenians has an indication, as in images, of the second fabrication; in which that which is more partial presents itself to the view; and what remains consists of contrariety and motion, and that which is circumscribed in place. Since, however, the second is suspended from the first fabrication, and is in continuity with it, hence he says, *“that the affair will harmonize in every respect, and that it will not be foreign to the purpose to assert, that the citizens in the Republic of Socrates are the very people who existed at that time.”*

“SOCRATES. But what other, O Critias, should we receive in preference to this? For your discourse, through a certain affinity, is particularly adapted to the present sacrifice to the Goddess. And besides this, we should consider, as a thing of the greatest moment, *that your relation is not a mere fable, but a true history of transcendent magnitude*. It is impossible, therefore, to say how and from whence, neglecting your narration, we should find another more convenient.”

Socrates approves the narration of Critias, in the first place as adapted to the festival of the Athenians; for the [Atlantic] war is an image of mundane wars; and as a hymn accommodated to the sacrifice to Minerva. *For if speech is of any advantage to men, it should be employed in hymns*. And besides this, since the Goddess is the cause of both theory and action; through

<sup>1</sup> For *ὡς ἐκείνων οὐτως* in this place, it is necessary to read *ὡς ἐκείνων οὐτως*.

sacrifice, indeed, we imitate her practical energy, but through the hymn her theoretic energy. But, in the second place, Socrates approves the narration as bearing witness to the possibility of his polity. For this, in his discourse about it, he thought worthy of demonstration. For it was sufficient for him that this scheme of a polity existed in the heavens, and in one man; since all things that have an external, have an internal subsistence, and that which is truly law, begins from the internal life itself. If also he shows, that this polity once prevailed among the Athenians, he certainly demonstrates the possibility of it. This, therefore, has such-like causes as these. Again however it may be assumed from these things, that the narration about the Atlantics is not a fiction, as some have supposed it to be; but a history indeed, yet having an affinity to the whole fabrication of the world. So that such things as Plato discusses about the magnitude of the Atlantic island, must not be rejected as fabulous and fictitious on account of those who enclose the earth in a very narrow space.

“Hence it is requisite that you should speak with good Fortune, but that I on account of my discourse yesterday, should now rest from speaking, and be attentive to what you have to say.”

Plato does not, like the Stoics, assert, that the worthy man has no need of Fortune; but he is of opinion that our dianoetic energies, since they are complicated with corporeal energies, according to external progression, should be inspired by good Fortune, in order that they may proceed fortunately, and that their effect upon others may be friendly to divinity. And as Nemesis is the inspector of light words, thus also good Fortune directs the words both of those that receive and of him that utters them, to a good purpose, in order that the former may receive benevolently and sympathetically, but the latter may impart in a divinely inspired manner, that which is adapted to every one. Thus, therefore, in partial natures. But in wholes, good Fortune signifies a divine allotment, according to which each thing is allotted an order adapted to it, from the one father, and the whole fabrication. Moreover, for Socrates to rest from speaking, and to be attentive to what may be said, has indeed an appropriate retribution. For the other persons of the dialogue did this, when he narrated his polity. But this shows from analogy, how all deniurgic causes being united to each other, have at the same time separate

productions. For to hear is indicative of receiving through each other. And for the others to rest, when one speaks, signifies the unmingled purity according to which each demiurgic cause produces and generates secondary natures from its own peculiarity.

“CRIT. But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet of discussion. For it seems proper to us that Timæus, who is the most astronomical of us all, and is eminently knowing in the nature of the universe, should speak the first; commencing his discourse from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But that I after him, receiving the men which he has mentally produced, but which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to you according to the narration and law of Solon, as to proper judges, should render them members of this city; as being in reality no other than those Athenians which were described as unknown to us, in the report of the sacred writings. And that in future we shall discourse concerning them, as about citizens and Athenians.”

The intention of this arrangement is to make Timæus a summit, and at the same time a middle. For he speaks after Socrates and Critias, and prior to Critias and Hermocrates. And thus, indeed, he is a middle; but in another respect, he is a summit, according to science, and because he generates the men, whom Socrates indeed educates, but Critias arms. This, however, is also a manifest symbol of total fabrication, which is at one and the same time a summit and a middle. For it is exempt from all mundane natures, and is equally present to all. The summits likewise, and the middle of the universe, belong to the Demiurgus, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. For the tower of Jupiter is, as they say, situated there. But Critias, who spoke as the middle after Socrates, now again summarily speaks prior to Hermocrates. *For the duadic pertains to the middle fabrication, and also the whole in conjunction with parts; just as the whole [prior to parts] belongs to the first, but parts to the last fabrication.* Hence Socrates summarily delivered his polity, and Hermocrates contributed to the parts of the history which was about to be narrated by Critias. And thus much concerning the whole arrangement.

Some one, however, may doubt, what will be left for Hermocrates to accomplish after Timæus has delivered the generation of the men, Socrates their education,

and Critias their actions. For to these things there is nothing successive. May it not be said that Hermocrates is the adjutor of Critias in his narration; for the relation of the history was a mixture of deeds and words. And Critias himself promised to make a discussion of the actions, but calls on Hermocrates to assist him in the words. For the imitation of these is difficult, as was before observed. Hence in the *Atlanticius*, Critias having assembled the Gods, as consulting about the punishment of the Atlantics, he says "*Jupiter thus addressed them.*" And he thus terminates the dialogue, as delivering to Hermocrates the imitation of the words. But there is no absurdity in his not discussing [in the *Atlanticius*] the remainder of the deeds. For, in short, having assembled the Gods, for the purpose of chastising the insolence of the Atlantics, he has every thing consequent to this comprehended in the Gods being thus collected, viz. the preparation of the Athenians, their egress, and their victory. Timæus, therefore, generates the men, Socrates educates them, Critias leads them forth to actions, and Hermocrates to words; the first of these, imitating the paternal cause; the second, the supplier of stable intelligence; the third, the supplier of motion and progression to secondary natures; and the fourth, imitating the cause which converts the last of things to their principles through the imitation of reasons [i. e. of productive powers]. Thus, therefore, these particulars may be symbolically understood, and, perhaps, in no very superfluous manner.

Some one, also, may doubt why the Timæus had not an arrangement prior to the Republic, since in the former dialogue the generation of the world, and also of the human race, is delivered. For it is necessary, as Timæus says, that men should be generated; and also, that they should be educated, which Socrates effects in the Republic; and that they should energize in a manner worthy of their education, which in a certain respect the *Atlanticius* exhibits. And if, indeed, Plato beginning from the end proceeded to the Timæus, which is first by nature, it will be asserting, what is usual to say, that for the sake of doctrine, things that are first to us, though posterior by nature, are first delivered; but that now he appears to have arranged the middle as the first, and the first as the middle. And if, indeed, this arrangement had been adopted by those who are studious of ornament, it would have been less wonderful; but now Plato himself appears to have acted in this manner. Here, therefore, there is a recapitulation of the polity, as having been already summarily narrated in the shortest manner. In answer to this doubt it must be said, that if all hypotheses were assumed from the nature of things now in existence, or which were formerly, it would be necessary that the

doubt should be valid, and that the Timæus is not rightly ranked in the second place. If also, all the narrations were devised from hypothesis, it thus would be requisite that such things as are first according to nature, should be first assumed. But since the hypothesis of Socrates subsists in words alone, and surveying the universal, applies itself to the nurture and education of men, but the hypothesis consequent to this discusses beings and things in generation, these are very properly conjoined to each other; while the hypothesis of Socrates, as only subsisting in words, and being on this account accurate, has an arrangement prior to the rest. Perhaps, likewise, Plato wished to indicate this to us, that such things as divine [human] souls, and which are ascending to the intelligible, produce, these are some time or other effected on the earth, according to certain prosperous vicissitudes of circulations. As Critias therefore asserts this, bearing testimony to Socrates, we must say that those true ancestors of ours of which the priest spoke, perfectly accord with those citizens which Socrates mentally conceived, and our opinion is not to be rejected that they were those who existed at that time. If however the Republic is inferior to the Timæus, because it is conversant with that which is partial, and to discuss mortal affairs is to dwell on an image, yet the universal prevails in it. *For the same form of life exhibits indeed in the soul justice, but in a city a polity, and in the world, fabrication.*

Farther still, the deliberate choice of virtue is free, but the energy which is directed to externals, requires the mundane order, and hence the Atlantis is posterior to the Timæus. But the habit of the citizens shows that virtue is without a master. Plato also manifests through these things, *that the soul when she is of herself [and does not depend on another] is superior to every physical hypostasis, and runs above Fate; but when she verges to actions, is vanquished by physical laws, and is in subjection to Fate.* In addition also to what has been said, it is requisite to know this, that from the order of human life delivered in the Republic, the connexion of these dialogues, may be obtained. For in that dialogue the men are first educated and instructed through disciplines. Afterwards, they ascend to the contemplation of [true] beings; and in the third place, descend from thence to a providential attention to the city. Conformably to this congruity, the Republic has an arrangement prior to the Timæus; and the Timæus to the Atlantis. For the men being instructed by the Republic, and elevated according to theory by the Timæus, will, living happily, wisely' perform such actions, as the

<sup>1</sup> For *εσπορος* here, I read *εμφορος*.

**Atlanticus narrates.** After this manner therefore, we dissolve the doubt. The philosopher Porphyry however, not directly for the sake of this doubt, but discussing something else, affords us the following aid in its solution; that those who wish<sup>1</sup> to apprehend the whole theory genuinely, ought first to be instructed in the form of it, in order that being similar to the object of intellection, they may be in a becoming manner co-adapted to the knowledge of the truth. This therefore, the order itself of the dialogues demonstrates. For the auditors of the *Timæus* ought first to have been benefited by the *Republic*, and having been adorned through it, to attend afterwards to the dogmas concerning the world, evincing themselves to be most similar through erudition to the excellent order of the universe. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

Each particular however of the text must be considered. *Timæus* therefore, is now said to be most astronomical, not as directing his attention to the rapidity of the celestial motions, nor as collecting the measures of the courses of the sun,<sup>2</sup> nor as being conversant with the works of Fate, but as astronomizing above the heavens, conformably to the coryphaeus in the *Theætetus*, and contemplating the invisible causes which are properly stars. Hence Socrates does not exhibit the visible man, but the man that is purely essentialized in reason; and he does this as imitating the whole demiurgus, in whom the heavens and all the stars sub-sist, as the theologist says, intellectually. *Timæus* begins however, from the generation of the world, and ends in man; because man is a microcosm, possessing all things partially, which the universe does totally, as Socrates demonstrates in the *Philebus*. But there are certain persons educated by Socrates in the most excellent manner, who also educate the whole city, and these are the guardians and auxiliaries. For in the universe, that which transcendently participates of intellect is heaven, which also imitates intellect through its motion. The men however, are introduced by Critias, conformably to the law and conceptions of Solon, because Solon narrates, that the Athenians were once thus governed, and established laws how children ought to be introduced into the polity, and into the tribes, and how they ought to be registered;

<sup>1</sup> For *μεμνηστας* in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read *ἐκδοκούς*.

<sup>2</sup> Proclus here alludes to the following Chaldaean oracle: "Direct not your attention to the immense measures of the earth; for the plant of truth is not in the earth. Nor measure the dimensions of the sun by means of collected courses; for it revolves by the eternal will of the father, and not for your sake. Dismiss the sounding course of the moon; for it perpetually runs through the exertions of necessity. The advancing procession of the [fixed] stars, was not generated for your sake," &c. See my collection of these Oracles, in No. XXVII, of the *Classical Journal*.

and likewise, by what kind of judges, they should be tried, in one place from the tribes, but in another, from other appropriate persons. As Critias therefore admits, that the men educated by Socrates were Athenians, he follows the conceptions and the law of Solon, conformably to which certain persons are introduced into the polity.

Soc. "I seem to behold a perfect and splendid banquet of discussion set before me. It belongs therefore, now to you, O Timæus, to begin the discourse; having first of all, as is fit, invoked the Gods according to law." 72

The *perfection* and the *splendor* of the narration indicate the supernatural production of things on account of their paradigms, and which takes place universally. And to these the words of Socrates refer. The *banquet of discussion* indicates the perfect plenitude of demiurgic forms; but the *calling on Timæus*, the conversion of partial causes to the whole, and an evocation of the goods thence derived; and the *invocation of the Gods*, the fabrication supernally suspended from intelligibles. For the expression *according to law*, is not such as many of the Italic or Attic interpreters suppose it to be, but it has the same meaning as the words usually employed by the Pythagoreans, "Honor in the first place, the immortal Gods, as they are disposed by law." For law manifests the divine order, according to which secondary are always suspended from prior causes, and are filled from them. But law thus beginning from intelligibles, extends to the demiurgic cause, and from this proceeds, and is divided about the universe. At the same time, however, Socrates indicates through these things, that the Pythagoric doctrine requires that physiology should commence from a divine cause, and that it should not be such as that which he reprobates in the Phædo, which blinds the eye of the soul, by assigning airs and æthers as causes, conformably to Anaxagoras. For it is necessary that true physiology should be suspended from theology, in the same manner as nature is suspended from the Gods, and is divided according to the total orders of them; so that words may be imitators of the things of which they are significant. For mythologists also narrate that Vulcan who presides over nature was in love with Minerva, who weaves the order of intellectual forms, and is the supplier of intelligence to all mundane essences. As far as to this therefore, the preface of the Timæus receives its completion; of which Severus, indeed, did not think fit to give any interpretation; but Longinus does not say that the whole is superfluous, but only such particulars as are introduced

about the Atlantics, and the narration of the Egyptian ; so that he is accustomed to conjoin with the request of Socrates, the promise of Critias. I mean, he connects with the words, "*I now therefore stand prepared to receive the promised feast,*" the words, "*But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet of discussion.*" But Porphyry and Iamblichus show that this preface accords with the whole design of the dialogue, the one indeed more partially, but the other with more profound intuition ; so that we also shall here finish the book in conformity to Plato, having adopted their order.



## BOOK II.

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THE preface of the Timæus consists of two heads ; a recapitulation of the polity of Socrates, and a concise narration of the war of the Athenians against the Atlantics, and the victory which they obtained over them. Each of these, however, contributes in the greatest degree to the consummation of the whole theory of the world. For the form of the [Socratic] polity, considered by itself, is primarily adapted to the orderly distribution of the heavens. But the narration of the war and the victory, becomes a symbol to us of the mundane contrariety. And the former describes in images the first fabrication, but the latter the second. Or, if you are willing, the former describes the formal, but the latter the material cause. For all physiologists make principles to be contraries, and constitute the world from the harmonious conjunction of contraries. And harmony indeed, and order are derived from form, which in the recapitulation is shown to proceed from the polity in common, and to extend in an orderly progression to every multitude. For it is one thing to deliver the polity which is in the soul, another, that which is in men, and another, that which is mundane. But the recapitulation of Socrates, describing the form itself of every polity separately, exhibits to us primarily the polity in the universe, to which also it entirely hastens to refer [the polities that rank as] parts.

Farther still, if also you are willing to consider the affair after another manner, the polity may be arranged as analogous to the heavens, but the war to generation. For the polity extends as far as to the last of things ; since all things are arranged conformably to the series which proceeds from the demiurgus as far as to mundane natures. Contrariety also pre-exists after a manner in the heavens ;

either according to the two-fold circulations of the celestial bodies, viz. to the right hand, and to the left; or according to the two-fold circles of souls, the circle of sameness, and the circle of difference; or according to the genera of being, permanency<sup>1</sup> and motion; or according to the divine peculiarities, the male and the female; or according to any other such-like division. The polity therefore, is more allied to the heavens, but the war to generation. Hence the former is Jovian, but the latter pertains to the allotment of Neptune. After however the theory of parts, it is necessary through images to be extended to the knowledge of the whole. And after the survey of images themselves, it is requisite to adhere to their paradigms, from small being initiated in greater [objects of contemplation]. For the former have the relation of things preparatory to initiation, and of small mysteries, exciting the eye of the soul to the comprehension of the whole and the universe, and to the contemplation of the one cause, and the one progression of all mundane natures. For every thing is from *the one*, and the universe with having in different parts of it, more partial presiding powers, proceeds vice versa to the one cause of its subsistence.

Timæus however, prior to entering on the whole discussion, converts himself to the invocations of, and prayers to the Gods, imitating in this the maker of the universe, who prior to the whole fabrication of things, is said to have approached to the oracle of night, to have been there filled with divine intellectual conceptions, to have received the principles of fabrication, and there to dissolve, if it be lawful so to speak, all his doubts. To night also, who calls on the father, [Jupiter] to engage in the fabrication of the universe, Jupiter is represented by the theologist as saying,

Maia, supreme of all the powers divine,  
Immortal Night! how with unconquer'd mind  
Must I the source of the immortals fix?

And he receives this answer from her,

All things receive inclos'd on ev'ry side,  
In æther's wide ineffable embrace;  
Then in the midst of æther place the heav'n.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For *ευστασις* here, it is necessary to read *στασις*.

<sup>2</sup> For *εὐρανῷ* here, it is necessary to read *εὐρανόν*.

And he is instructed by her in all the consequent fabrication of the world. But again to Saturn, after the bonds, Jupiter al but praying says,

Damon, most fan'd, our progeny direct.

And in all that follows, he calls forth the benevolence of his father. For how could he otherwise fill all things with Gods and assimilate the sensible world to *animal itself*, [or the intelligible paradigm] than by extending himself to the invisible causes of wholes, from which being himself filled,

He from his [sacred] heart may godlike works  
Again produce.

It is necessary therefore, prior to all other things, that we should know something manifest concerning prayer, what its essence is, and what its perfection, and whence it is imparted to souls. For the philosopher Porphyry indeed, describing those among the ancients that admitted prayer, and those that did not, leads us from one opinion to another, and says in short, that neither those who are diseased according to the first kind of impiety, derive any benefit from prayer, since they do not admit that there are Gods, nor those who labour under the second kind, and entirely subvert providence, granting indeed that there are Gods, but denying their providential energies. Nor are they benefited by it, who admit indeed the providence of the Gods, but assert that all things are produced by them from necessity. For there is no longer any advantage to be derived from prayer, if things of a contingent nature have not<sup>1</sup> any existence. But such as assert that the Gods providentially attend to all things, and that many things that are generated are contingent and may subsist otherwise, these very properly admit the necessity of prayers, and acknowledge that they correct our life. Porphyry also adds, that prayer especially pertains to worthy men, because it is a contact with divinity. But the similar loves to be conjoined to the similar: and the worthy man is most similar to the Gods. Because likewise those who embrace virtue are in custody, and are inclosed in the body as in a prison, they ought to request the Gods that they may migrate from hence. Besides, since we are as children torn from our parents, it is fit we should pray

<sup>1</sup> For ἀλλως γινεσθαι οὐτων here, it is necessary to read, ἀλλως γινεσθαι μὴ οὐτων.

that we may return to our true parents the Gods. Those also resemble such as are deprived of their fathers and mothers, who do not think it requisite to pray and be converted to the Gods. All nations likewise, that have excelled in wisdom, have diligently applied themselves to prayer; among the Indians the Brachmans, among the Persians the Magi, and of the Greeks the most theological, who instituted initiatory rites and mysteries. But the Chaldeans venerate every other divinity, and likewise the virtue itself of the Gods, which they denominate a Goddess;<sup>1</sup> so far are they from despising sacred worship, on account of the possession of virtue. And in addition to all this, as we are parts of the universe it is fit that we should be in want of the universe. For a conversion to the whole imparts salvation to every thing. If therefore you possess virtue, you should invoke that which antecedently comprehends all virtue. For that which is all-good, will also be the cause to you of appropriate good. Or if you explore a certain corporeal good, there is a power in the world which comprehends all body. It is necessary therefore that perfection should from thence be derived to the parts. And this is the sum of what is said by Porphyry on this subject.

The divine Iamblichus however, does not think that a history of this kind pertains to what is here proposed to be considered. For Plato is not now speaking about atheistical men, but about such as are wise, and able to converse with the Gods. Nor does he speak of such as are dubious about the works of piety; *but to such as wish to be saved by those who are the saviours of woles, he delivers the power of prayer, and its admirable and supernatural perfection which transcends all expectation.*

It is fit however, that transferring what he says to what is more usual and more known to the reader, we should render his meaning clear, and assign arguments concerning prayer which accord with the doctrine of Plato. From hence therefore we must begin: All beings are the progeny of the Gods, by whom they are produced without a medium, and in whom they are firmly established. For the progression of things which perpetually subsist, and cohere from permanent causes, is not alone perfected by a certain continuation, but immediately subsists from the Gods, from whence all things are generated, however distant they may be from the divinities. And this is no less true, even though asserted of matter itself. For a divine nature is not absent from any thing, but is equally present to all

<sup>1</sup> For *θεωα* in this place, it is requisite to read *θεωα*.

things. Hence though you should assume the last of beings, in these also you will find divinity. For *the one* is every where; and in consequence of its absolute dominion, every thing receives its nature and coherence from the Gods. As all things however proceed, so likewise, they are not separated from the Gods, but radically abide in them, as the causes and sustainers of their existence. For where can they recede, since the Gods primarily comprehend all things in their embrace? For whatever is placed as separate from the Gods has not any kind of subsistence. But all beings are contained by the Gods and reside in their natures, after the manner of a circular comprehension. Hence, by a wonderful mode of subsistence, all things proceed, and yet are not, nor indeed can be separated from the Gods; because all offspring when torn from their parents, immediately recur to the immense vastness of non-entity. But in a certain respect they are established in them; and in short, proceed in themselves, but abide in the Gods. Since however, having proceeded, it is requisite that they should be converted and return, imitating the evolution into light, and conversion of the Gods to their cause, in order that these being arranged conformably to the perfective triad, may again be contained by the Gods and the first unities,—hence they receive from them a certain secondary perfection, by which they may be able to convert themselves to the goodness of the divinities, in order that being at first rooted in, they may again through conversion be established in them, forming a certain circle, which originates from and terminates in the Gods.

All things therefore, both abide in, and convert themselves to the Gods, receiving this power from the divinities, together with two-fold impressions according to essence; the one, that they may abide there, but the other that, having proceeded, they may convert themselves [to their causes]. And these things we may survey not only in souls, but also in inanimate natures. For what else ingenerates in these a sympathy with other powers, but the symbols which they are allotted by nature, some of which are allied to *this*, but others to *that* series of Gods? For nature being supernally suspended from the Gods, and distributed from their orders, inserts also in bodies impressions of their alliance to the divinities. In some indeed, inserting solar, but in others lunar impressions, and in others again, the symbol of some other God. And these indeed, convert themselves to the Gods; some, as to the Gods simply, but others as to particular Gods; nature thus perfecting her progeny according to different peculiarities of

\* For *κατὰ* *cori* here, read *καπερι*.

the divinities. The Demiurgus of the universe therefore, by a much greater priority, impressed these symbols in souls, by which they might be able to abide in themselves, and again convert themselves to the sources of their being. And through the symbol of unity indeed he conferred on them stability; but through intellect, he imparted to them the power of conversion.

But to this conversion prayer is of the greatest utility. For it attracts to itself the beneficence of the Gods, through those ineffable symbols which the father of souls has disseminated in them. It likewise unites those who pray with those to whom prayer is addressed; conjoins the intellect of the Gods with the words of those who pray; excites the will of those who perfectly comprehend good to the abundant communication of it; is the fabricator of divine persuasion; and establishes in the Gods all that we possess.

To a perfect and true prayer however, there is required in the first place, a knowledge of all the divine orders to which he who prays approaches. For no one will accede to the Gods in a proper manner, unless he has a knowledge of their peculiarities. Hence also the oracle admonishes, *that a fire-heated conception has the first order in sacred worship*. But in the second place, there is required a conformation of our life with that which is divine; and this accompanied with all purity, chastity, discipline, and order, through which our concerns being introduced to the Gods, we shall attract their beneficence, and our souls will become subject to them. (In the third place, contact is necessary, according to which we touch the divine essence with the summit of our soul, and verge to a union with it.) But there is yet farther required, an approximating adhesion: for thus the oracle calls it, when it says, *the mortal approximating to fire will possess a light from the Gods*. For this imparts to us a greater communion with, and a more manifest participation of the light of the Gods. In the last place, union succeeds establishing *the one* of the soul in *the one* of the Gods, and causing our energy to become one with divine energy; according to which we are no longer ourselves, but are absorbed as it were in the Gods, abiding in divine light, and circularly comprehended by it. And this is the best end of true prayer, in order that the conversion of the soul may be conjoined with its permanency, and that every thing which proceeds from *the one* of the Gods, may again be established in *the one*, and the light which is in us may be comprehended in the light of the Gods.

Prayer therefore, is no small part of the whole ascent of souls. Nor is he who possesses virtue superior to the want of the good which proceeds from prayer; but on the contrary the ascent of the soul is effected through it, and together with this, piety to the Gods, which is the summit of virtue. *Nor in short, ought any*

other to pray than he who is transcendently good, as the Athenian guest [in Plato] says. For to such a one, converse with the Gods becomes most efficacious to the attainment of a happy life. But the contrary is naturally adapted to befall the vicious. For it is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure. Hence, it is necessary that he who generously enters on the exercise of prayer, should render the Gods propitious to him, and should excite in himself conceptions full of intellectual light. For the favor and benignity of more exalted beings, is the most effectual incentive to their communication with our natures. And it is requisite to continue without intermission in the worship of divinity. For [according to the oracle] the rapid <sup>1</sup> Gods perfect the mortal constantly employed in prayer. It is also necessary to observe a stable order in the performance of divine works; to exert those virtues which purify and elevate the soul from generation, together with faith, truth, and love; to preserve this triad and hope of good, this immutable reception of divine light, and segregation from every other pursuit, that thus becoming *alone*, we may associate with *solitary deity*, and not <sup>2</sup> endeavour to conjoin ourselves with multitude to *the one*. For he who attempts this, effects the very contrary, and separates himself from the Gods. For as it is not lawful in conjunction with non-entity to associate with being; so neither is it possible with multitude to be conjoined with *the one*. Such therefore are the particulars which ought first to be known concerning prayer; viz. that the essence of it congregates and binds souls to the Gods, or rather, that it unites all secondary to primary natures. For as the great Theodorus says, all things pray except the first.

The perfection however of prayer, beginning from more common <sup>3</sup> goods, ends in divine union, and gradually accustoms the soul to divine light. But its efficacious energy both replenishes us with good, and causes our concerns to be common with those of the Gods. With respect to the causes of prayer too, we may infer, that so far as they are *effective*, they are the efficacious powers of the Gods, converting and calling upwards the soul to the Gods themselves. But that so far as they are *final* or *perfective*, they are the immaculate goods of the soul, which they derive as the fruits of being established in the Gods. That so far also as they are *paradigmatical*, they are the primordial causes of beings, which proceed from *the good*, and are united to it, according to one ineffable union. But that so far as they are *formal*, they assimilate souls to the Gods, and give perfection to the whole of their life. And that so far as they are *material*, they are the impres-

<sup>1</sup> i. e. The intelligible Gods.

<sup>2</sup> For *καὶ μετὰ πολλοῦς* here, it is necessary to read *καὶ μὴ μετὰ πολλοῦς*.

<sup>3</sup> For *κοινοτέρων* in this place, it is requisite to read *κοινωτέρων*.

sions or symbols inserted by the Demiurgus in the essences of souls, in order that they may be excited to a reminiscence of the Gods who produced them, and whatever else exists.

Moreover, we may likewise define the modes of prayer which are various, according to the genera and species of the Gods. For prayer is either demiurgic, or cathartic, or vivific. And the *demiurgic* is such as that which is offered for the sake of showers and winds. For the *demiurgi* are the causes of the generation of these. And the prayers of the Athenians for winds procuring serenity of weather are addressed to these Gods. But the *cathartic* prayer is that which is offered for the purpose of averting diseases originating from pestilence, and other contagious distempers; such as we have written in our temples. And the *vivific* prayer is that with which we worship the Gods, who are the causes of vivification, on account of the origin and maturity of fruits. Hence prayers are of a perfective nature, because they elevate us to these orders of the Gods. And he who considers such prayers in a different manner, fails in properly apprehending the nature and efficacy of prayer. But again, with reference to the things for which we pray; those prayers, which regard the salvation of the soul, obtain the first place; those which pertain to the good temperament of the body, the second; and those rank in the third place, which are offered for the sake of external concerns. And lastly, with respect to the division of the times in which we offer up prayers, it is either according to the seasons of the year, or the centers of the solar revolution; or we establish multiform prayers according to other such-like conceptions.

210 TIM. "But, O Socrates, all such as participate but in the least degree of temperance, [i. e. wisdom] in the impulse to every undertaking, whether small or great, always invoke divinity."

Do you see what kind of an hypothesis Plato refers to the *Timæus*; what kind of an auditor of it he introduces, viz. Socrates; and what a beginning of the discussion he has described? For the hypothesis indeed, refers to the whole fabrication of things; but the auditor is prepared to be led to it conformably to the one intellect and one theory of wholes. Hence also he excites *Timæus* to prayer. But the beginning of the discussion, being impelled from the invocation of the Gods, thus imitates the progression of beings, which first abiding in the Gods, are thus allotted a generation from them. Since however, it is said, that "all who in the least degree participate of



*temperance always invoke divinity in the impulse to every undertaking, whether it be small or great,*" let us see from what kind of conception they make this invocation of the Gods in every thing in which they engage. For it is not probable that those who are temperate will not make real being the scope to which they tend. And those who establish a pure intellect as the leader of their theory; who deposit the beautiful and the good in the prerogatives of the soul, and not in human affairs, nor in external fortunes; and who perceive ' the power of providence extending through all beings, and harmonizing all things to the universe, so that both the whole and the parts may subsist most beautifully, and that nothing may be destitute of the providence which proceeds from deity to all things; these will genuinely apprehend the science concerning the Gods. But again, perceiving this to be the case, they will very properly in each action, and according to each energy, call on divinity as the co-adjutor of their impulse, introducing their productions to the universe in conjunction with wholes, and establishing themselves in the goodness of the Gods. For things which appear to be small, enjoy the providence of the Gods, and are great so far as they are suspended from them; just again, as things which are great in their own nature, when they separate themselves from divinity, are seen to be perfectly small, and of no worth.

These things therefore, temperance imparts to souls, not being a certain human habit, nor approaching to what is called continence, but a divinely inspired energy of the soul, converting herself to herself and to divinity, perceiving the causes of all things in the Gods, and from thence surveying both other things, and such as proceed [into a visible subsistence], through which as auxiliaries, <sup>a</sup> we also may be able to recur to the Gods, by means of the gifts which they insert in us. The soul also, when thus converted to herself, finds symbols of the Gods in each even of the smallest things, and through these renders every thing familiar and allied to the Gods. Since however, the Gods produced the whole of our essence and gave us a self-motive nature in order to the choice of good, their producing power is particularly manifested in our external energies; though when we consult, we require their providential attention; (which the Athenians manifest by honoring Jupiter the Counsellor) and when we choose, we are in want of their assistance; in order that by consulting, we may discover what is advantageous; and that in choosing, we may not through passion verge to that which is worse; but rather, that both when acting, and when

<sup>a</sup> For καθάρων here, read καθάρων.

<sup>b</sup> For ἀπορρην in this place, it is necessary to read ἀπορρην.

impelled, we may perceive that the self-motive nature possesses the smallest power, and that the whole of it is suspended from the providence of the Gods. Hence Timæus also says, that those who are temperate always invoke the Gods, in the *impulse* to every undertaking. For in our elections indeed, we are more able to separate providence from that which is in our power; but we are incapable of doing this in our impulses: <sup>1</sup> because in these we have less of the self-motive energy. For that which is in our power is not so extended as the providence of the Gods; but as we have frequently said, superior energize prior to secondary natures, and together with and posterior to them, and on all sides comprehend the energies of subordinate beings. But, says the Epicurean Euri-machus, how can we avoid proceeding to infinity, <sup>2</sup> if in the impulse to every small thing, we require prayer: for though we should pray, we shall be in want of another prayer, and we shall no where stop? And Porphyry dissolves the doubt as follows: that it is not said it is necessary to pray on account of every thing, but in the impulse to every thing. We are impelled therefore to things, but we are not impelled to impulses, so that there is not a progression to infinity. Or does not the doubt still remain? For we are impelled to prayer, so that in this we shall again require prayer, and an impulse to this again to infinity. Hence it is better to say, that he who prays respecting any thing, prior to this, acknowledges to the Gods, that he is allotted a power from them of conversion to them, and that to other things indeed good is imparted through prayer, but to prayer through itself. It does not therefore require another prayer, since it comprehends good in itself, and procures communion with a divine nature.

“It is necessary therefore, that we should do this, who are about to speak in a certain respect concerning the universe, whether it was generated, or is without generation, unless we are perfectly unwise.”

Timæus evinces how very admirable the hypothesis is, but elegantly preserves himself in the order of a prudent man, pursuing the medium between irony and arrogance. For having before said, that those who in the smallest degree participate of temperance, invoke divinity in the impulse to every great or small under-

<sup>1</sup> Instead of διακρίναι γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀρεσίων, τὴν προνοίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀδυνατοῦμεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὁρμῶν, μάλλον δευτερευοῦμεν in this place, it is necessary to read, διακρίναι γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀρεσίων, τὴν προνοίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν μάλλον δευτερευοῦμεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὁρμῶν, ἀδυνατοῦμεν.

<sup>2</sup> For ἀπὸρον here, read ἀπειρον.

taking, he very much exalts his proposed subject of discussion, by opposing a discourse about the *universe* to a *small thing*. But he cautiously says, not that he has himself arrived at the summit of temperance [i. e. of wisdom]; for this is the contrary, to the participation of temperance in the smallest degree; but that he is not perfectly unwise. And this he says from the hypothesis, in order that he may have to show, that the power and science which he possesses, are from the work itself, but not from his own discussions. His theory therefore, will be concerning the universe, so far as it is produced by the Gods. For the world may be multifariously surveyed; either according to its corporeal-formed nature, or so far as it is full of partial and total souls;<sup>1</sup> or so far as it participates of intellect. Timæus however, considers the nature of the universe, not according to these modes only, but particularly according to its progression from the Demiurgus; where also physiology appears to be a certain theology; because things which have a natural subsistence, have in a certain respect a divine hyparxis, so far as they are generated from the Gods. And thus this must be determined.

It is usual however to doubt, why Plato here adds *in a certain respect*: for he says, “*Those who are about to speak in a certain respect concerning the universe.*” And the more superficial indeed of the interpreters say, that the universe is *in a certain respect* unbegotten, and *in a certain respect* generated. Hence the discussion of it is very properly in a certain respect, as of that which is unbegotten, and in a certain respect as of that which is generated. Though Plato does not co-arrange \* το πρ in a certain respect, with the words *unbegotten* and *generated*, but with the words *about to speak*. But the divine Iamblichus says that the discussion is *in a certain respect* about the universe, and *in a certain respect* not; for matter, as being indefinite in the world, may be variously considered. To this interpretation however, it may be said, that πρ is co-arranged with something else, and not with the universe. Will it not therefore, be better to say with our preceptor, that words are multifariously enunciated. For the demiurgic words proceeding from intellect are of one kind, such as the Demiurgus utters to the junior Gods: for Plato says, “*that the soul speaks, being moved to itself.*” Those words which are surveyed in science, are of another kind. And those are of another kind which are allotted the third hypostasis from intellect, and which proceed externally for the sake of discipline and communication with others. Hence Timæus knowing that those

<sup>1</sup> Instead of καθ' ὅσον πληρεῖς ἐστὶ ψυχικῶν τε καὶ οὐλικῶν in this place, it is necessary to read, καθ' ὅσον πληρεῖς ἐστὶ ψυχῶν μερικῶν τε καὶ οὐλικῶν.

<sup>2</sup> For καὶ τε γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ here, it is requisite to read καὶ τοὶ γὰρ οἱ Πλάτων μὴ ἐν, κ. λ.

are demiurgic words which the Demiurgus employs, but that those are scientific which he is now about to generate, but which he pre-assumes in himself, and that he makes use of external words for the sake of Socrates alone, on this account he says that he shall employ words *in a certain respect* about the universe. For it is one thing to use them intellectually, another scientifically, and another, for the sake of discipline; and  $\pi\epsilon\gamma$  indicates these differences of words.

Again therefore, with respect to the words, "*whether it was generated, or is without generation,*" those interpreters read the former with an aspirate, but the latter with a soft breathing, who say that Plato speaks about the universe, so far as it was generated from a cause, or is unbegotten, in order that surveying it as generated, we may perceive the nature which it contains. And the Platonic Albinus thinks, that according to Plato the world being perpetual,<sup>1</sup> has a beginning of generation, by which also it is more redundant than being; since this indeed always is, but the world in addition to existing always, has a beginning of generation, in order that it may exist always, and be generated. Not that it is generated after such a manner as to be so according to time; for in this case it would not always exist; but in short, it has the relation of generation, on account of its composition from things many and dissimilar. And it is necessary to refer its hypostasis to another cause more ancient than itself, through which always existing primarily, the world is *in a certain respect*, and always is, and is not only generated, but is also unbegotten. [This therefore is asserted by Albinus, though Plato no where in what follows says, that the universe is in a certain respect generated, and in a certain respect unbegotten. Others again, read both the parts with an aspirate, in order that Timæus may say, *he is about to speak concerning the universe so far as it is generated, and so far as it is unbegotten*; erring in the same way as those prior to them; unless indeed they assert that the universe was generated according to form, but unbegotten according to its nurse [matter]. For thus also Timæus says, that its nurse is unbegotten, but that the world was generated, as receiving form from divinity. But Porphyry and Iamblichus read both the parts with a soft breathing, in order that what is said may be *whether the universe was generated or is unbegotten*. For this is to be considered, prior to all other things; since it contributes in the highest degree to the consummation of the whole of physiology, rightly to admit that the world was generated or is unbegotten. For from this hypothesis we shall be able to see what the nature is of

<sup>1</sup> For  $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\gamma\eta\gamma\alpha\upsilon$  here, I read  $\alpha\delta\iota\epsilon\gamma$ .

its essence and powers, as will be manifest to us shortly after. The discussion therefore, concerning the universe, will be for the sake of discipline, and will proceed from this principle, whether the world was generated, or is without generation; and from this, other things must be woven together in a consequent order.

“It is necessary, therefore, that invoking all the Gods and Goddesses, we should pray that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves.”

The division of male and female comprehends in itself all the plenitudes of the divine orders. For the cause of stable power and sameness, the supplier of being, and that which is the first principle of conversion to all things, are comprehended in the male. But that which emits from itself all-various progressions and separations, measures of life and prolific powers, is contained in the female. Hence, Timæus, elevating himself to all the Gods, very properly comprehends the whole orders of them, in a division into these genera. Such a division, likewise, is most adapted to the proposed theory. For this universe is full of these twofold divine genera. For heaven has to earth (that we may assume the extremes) the order of the male to the female; because the motion of heaven imparts productive principles and powers to every thing [sublunary]; and earth receiving the effluxions thence proceeding, is parturient with and generates all-various animals and plants. Of the Gods also in the heavens, some are distinguished according to the male, but others according to the female. And of those powers that govern generation in an unbegotten manner, some are of the former, but others of the latter co-ordination. In short, the demiurgic choir is abundant in the universe, and there are many rivers of life, some of which exhibit the form of the male, but others of the female characteristic. And what occasion is there to say much on this subject? For from the liberated unities,<sup>1</sup> both masculine and feminine, various orders proceed into the universe. Hence, he who is entering on the discussion of the universe, very properly invokes the Gods and Goddesses, from both which the universe receives its completion, and beseeches them that what he asserts may be consistent, and particularly that it may be agreeable to their divinities. For this is the sublimest end of theory, to run upward to a divine intellect; and as all

<sup>1</sup> For εἰδέναι here, it is necessary to read ἐπαίδειν.

things are uniformly comprehended in it, to arrange the discussion of things agreeably to this causal comprehension. But that which is the second end, and is consequent to this is, for the whole theory to receive its completion conformably to human intellect and the light of science. For the whole, the perfect, and the uniform, pre-exist in a divine intellect; but that which is partial and falls short of divine simplicity, subsists about a mortal intellect.

Why however, does Timæus say, that it is necessary to pray, and magnificently proclaim that the Gods and Goddesses should be invoked, yet does not pray, though an opportunity for so doing presents itself, but immediately converts himself to the proposed discussion? We reply, it is because some things have their end comprehended in the very will itself; but others, distribute<sup>a</sup> another energy after the will, and through action accomplish that which was the object of the will. And a life indeed, conformable to philosophy, depends on our will, and a deficiency in it, is contrary to the will. [But the consequences resulting from a life conversant with external actions, are not dependent on our will;] for the end of them is not placed in us. We may justly, therefore, rank prayer among the number of things which have all their perfection in the will. For the wish to pray, is a desire of conversion to the Gods. And this desire itself conducts the desiring soul, and conjoins it to divinity, which is the first work of prayer.<sup>b</sup> Hence it is not proper first to wish, and afterwards to pray, but he that wishes to pray, will at the same time have prayer as the measure of his wish, one person indeed in a greater, but another in a less degree. Farther still, this also is the work of a true prayer, for those things for which we pray to be common to the Gods, both according to powers and energies, and for us to effect them in conjunction with the Gods.—Thus if some one should pray to the powers that amputate matter, and obliterate the stains arising from generation, but should himself particularly endeavour to effect this, through the cathartic virtues; such a one in conjunction with the Gods, would entirely accomplish a dissolution of his material bonds. Thus therefore Timæus here effects. For those things which he prays to the Gods to accomplish, he himself completes, disposing the whole discourse according to human intellect, but so as to be in conformity to the intellect of the Gods.

“And such is my prayer to the Gods with reference to myself; but as

<sup>a</sup> For ἀποτετα in this place, we must read ἀνεκτετα.

<sup>b</sup> For εὐχῆ here, it is obviously necessary to read εὐχῆς.

to what respects you, it is requisite to pray that you may easily learn, and that I may be able to exhibit what I scientifically conceive, in the clearest manner about the proposed subjects of discussion. [According to my opinion therefore, the following division must first be made.]”

The exhortation of the auditors, is a thing consequent to the prayers\* [of Timæus]. For it is necessary that the replenishing source being suspended from its proper causes, should previously excite its recipients, and convert them to itself, prior<sup>†</sup> to the plenitude which it confers; in order that becoming more adapted, they may happily receive the intellectual conceptions which it imparts. For thus the participation will become more perfect to them,<sup>‡</sup> and the gift will be rendered more easy to the giver. Moreover, this very circumstance of facility, is adapted to those that imitate the whole fabrication; from which abiding and rejoicing in itself, all things proceed to the effects which it excites. Farther still, to produce one series, through the contact of secondary with prior natures, adumbrates the demiurgic series, which proceeds as far as to the last of things. For if the auditors receive what is said conformably to the intellect of Timæus, but Timæus disposes the whole discussion conformably to the intellect of the Gods, it will happen that the whole conference will in reality be referred to one intellect, and one intellectual conception. Besides this also, the self-motive nature of souls is sufficiently indicated, that being moved by the Gods, they also move themselves, and produce from themselves sciences. For the words, “*what I scientifically conceive,*” exhibit the energy which is impelled from a life whose power is free.

According to my opinion therefore, these things are first to be considered; that Timæus being a Pythagorean, and preserving the form of Pythagoric discussions, is immediately exhibited to us as such, from the very beginning. For Socrates does not enunciatively declare his opinions to others, but having dialectically purified their conceptions, unfolds truth into light; who also said to them, that he knew nothing except to make an assertion [or give a reason] and receive one. But Timæus, as also addressing his discourse to men, says that he shall enunciate his own dogmas, not at all busying himself with foreign opi-

\* The original of the words within the brackets belongs to the text, but is not to be found in the commentaries of Proclus, though as the reader may see, he comments on these words.

† For ψυχαι here also, it is necessary to read ευχαι.

‡ Instead of προς της πληρωσεως in this place, we must read προ της πληρωσεως.

• For το γαρ αυτοις, read τοις ; ηρ αυτοις.

nions, but pursuing one path of science. Moreover, the word  $\alpha\delta\omicron\zeta\alpha$ ,<sup>1</sup> i. e. *I am of opinion*, is assumed here very aptly, and appropriately to what has been before said. *For of the whole rational soul, one part is intellect, another is dianoia, and a third is opinion. And the first of these indeed, is conjoined to the Gods, the second produces the sciences, and the third imparts them to others.* This man therefore, knowing these things, through prayer adapts his own intellect to the intellect of the Gods. For this is manifested by the words, "*that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves.*" But through exhortations, he excites the dianoetic part of the souls of his auditors. For the words, *what I scientifically conceive*, have an indication of this kind. The doxastic part therefore remains, which receiving a scientific division from dianoia, delivers the streams of it to others. This however is not ambiguous, nor divided about sensibles, nor does the formal distinction of it consist in hypolepsis<sup>2</sup> alone; but it is filled from intellect and dianoia, surveys the demiurgic reason, and distinguishes the nature of things. These particulars also, are sufficiently assimilated to the paradigm<sup>3</sup> of the speaker. For there, a royal intellect precedes, according to which the paradigm is united to intelligibles; a dianoia, containing in itself the plenitudes of forms; and the first and uniform cause of opinion. Hence, *the paradigm contains intelligibles in intellect, but introduces sense to the worlds*, as the Oracle says; or as Plato, "*such ideas therefore, as intellect perceived to be inherent in animal itself, so many he dianoetically saw this universe ought to possess.*"

Moreover, the distinction between beings and things generated, is consentaneous to what has been before said. For after the Gods and Goddesses, and the ineffable peculiarity which is in them, the separation of these two genera, i. e. of being and generation, takes place. For being is allied to the more excellent order of divine natures, which is always established in invariable sameness, and is intelligible. But generation is allied to the inferior order, from which, infinite progression, and all-various mutation, derive their subsistence. What then is this division, and after what manner was it produced? Was it made as if it were the section of a certain whole into parts, or as genus is divided into species, or as the division of one word into many significations, or as that of essence into accidents, or vice versa,

<sup>1</sup> This word is not to be found in any edition of the *Timæus* of Plato; but from this comment of Proclus, it appears that it originally belonged to it.

<sup>2</sup> viz. In the apprehension of each of the terms of which a syllogism consists.

<sup>3</sup> i. e. To Jupiter the Demiurgus of the world.



that of accident into essences; for these are the species of division which some persons are accustomed to applaud. It is ridiculous therefore, to divide being and generation, either as accident into essences, or as essence into accidents. For accident by no means pertains to perpetual being. Nor again must they be divided as a word into its significations. For what word is there which Plato assuming as common, divides into perpetual being, and that which is generated; unless some one should say that  $\tau\iota$ , i. e. *a certain thing*, is thus divided by him? This division however, is not Platonic, but is derived from the Stoic custom. Is the division therefore, as that of a whole into parts? But what is that whole which consists of perpetual being, and that which is generated? Or how can paradigm and image give completion to one composition? How likewise can perpetual being be a part of a certain thing, since it is impartible, united, and simple? For the impartible is not a part of any thing which does not consist of all impartibles. But that which is generated is not impartible. Hence there is not a common genus of perpetual being, and that which is generated. For perpetual being precedes according to cause that which is generated; and the former is when the latter is not. But perpetual being not existing, which it is not lawful to suppose, generation also would vanish. How likewise, is there one genus of the first, and the last of things? For the division of genera into species, takes place in the middle psychical reasons [i. e. productive powers]. But things prior to soul, subsist in more excellent genera; and things posterior to soul, have their essence in co-ordinate natures. How therefore, can being itself and that which is generated, be arranged under one genus? What also will this genus be? For it is not being, lest that which is generated, and which never [truly] is, should be arranged in being. Nor will being itself be *the one*. Because every genus is divided by its proper differences, and antecedently assumes the differences, either in capacity, or in energy. But it is not lawful that *the one* should have differences either in capacity, lest it should be more imperfect than secondary natures; or in energy, lest it should have multitude. But as it is in short demonstrated to be superior both to power and energy, it cannot in any way whatever have differences; so that neither will there in short, be a division of *the one*.

What then shall we say? Must it not be this, that Plato does not now make any division whatever, but that he proposes to define separately what each of these two, perpetual being, and that which is generated, is? For it appears to me that the word  $\delta\iota\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\tau\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma$  has the same signification with  $\delta\iota\alpha\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\tau\iota\sigma$ . For since he discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, he

wishes separately to define perpetual being, and separately that which is generated, in order that through the given definitions we may know where the world, where the Demiurgus, and where the paradigm are to be arranged; and that we may not confound the orders of things, but may separate them from each other, so far as they are severally adapted to be separated. He likewise does the very same thing in the *Philebus*. For inquiring concerning intellect, pleasure and the mixed life, which is the best of these, he assumes the genera of them, viz. bound, infinity, and that which is mingled from bound and the infinite. For thus the order of each will become apparent, and he will manifest the peculiarity of them from their genera. There however, bound and infinity beginning from the Gods, proceed through all beings of whatever kind they may be. For these also were in intelligibles according to the stable and generative cause of intelligibles. They were likewise in the intellectual order according to the paternal and material principle of the intellectual Gods. And they were in the supermundane order, according to the demiurgic monad and vivific duad, and in the last place, according to effective and prolific powers. Here however, being and that which is generated, do not begin from the Gods; for the unities of the Gods are superior to being, and prior to these *the one itself* is exempt from all beings, because the first God is *one*,<sup>1</sup> but the other Gods are *unities*. Nor are being and that which is generated things which are participated by the Gods, in the same manner as the unities which are posterior to the Gods, are said to be and are participated by being. Nor do they extend as far as to the last of things. For neither is it possible to say that matter is perpetual being, since we are accustomed to call it non-being; nor that which is generated, which is not able even to suffer being, lest perishing by so doing, it should entirely vanish. This therefore, will again be asserted by us. It is however, [evident]<sup>2</sup> that the division is not of one certain thing, and that the proposed theory has necessarily, prior to other things, the definition of these two-fold genera, in order that the discussion proceeding as if from geometrical hypotheses to the investigation of things consequent, may discover the nature of the universe, and the paternal and paradigmatic cause of it. For if the universe was generated, it was generated by a cause. There is therefore a demiurgic cause of the universe. If there is a Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to which he who constituted the universe fabricated. And thus in a consequent

<sup>1</sup> For as here, it is obviously necessary to read *αὐτῷ*.

<sup>2</sup> *φανερὸν* is omitted in the original.

order the discussion about these things is introduced, and the physical theory beautifully terminates for us in theology.

“What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated indeed, [or consists in becoming to be] but is never [real] being.”

According to some, all beings whatever, whether they subsist paradigmatically or iconically, are comprehended in this distinction; but not all beings according to others. And the interpreters contradict each other respecting this, not a little. We however, cannot know which of these assertions it is fit to adopt, unless we examine each of them by itself. Let us then consider from the beginning, what power each of the words [of Plato] possesses in itself.

In the first place, therefore,  $\tau\omicron$   $\tau\iota$ , or the *what* is definitive. For we are accustomed to give  $\tau\iota$  an antecedent arrangement in definitions. But it is not a genus, as the Platonic Severus thought it was, who says that  $\tau\omicron$   $\tau\iota$  is the genus of being and that which is generated; and that *the all* is signified by it. For thus that which is generated, and likewise perpetual being, will be all. It was also doubted by some that preceded us, why Plato did not demonstrate *that* there is such a thing as perpetual being, prior to the inquiry *what* it is. For whence is the subsistence of perpetual being evident? And it is the law in demonstrative discussions, to consider *if* a thing is previous to the investigation, *what* it is. In answer to this doubt it may be said, that perhaps Timæus did not think this was requisite to his purpose; as the day before, it was shown by Socrates in what he said about the soul, that the soul is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that it philosophises through its alliance to real beings, with which it comes into contact.

And likewise, as it was shown by him, that what is perfectly being, and truly the object of science, is one thing; that what is partly being, and partly non-being, is another, and on this account is of a doxastic nature; and that what in no respect is being, and is entirely unknown, is another. This was also granted to Timæus by Socrates, when he divides a line into four parts, the intelligible, the dianoetic, the sensible, and the conjectural; where likewise speaking about *the good* he says, that it reigns in the intelligible place, in the same manner as the sun in the visible region.<sup>1</sup> And farther still, the introduction of prayer previous to the discussion, is a demonstration of the existence of being which always is. For if

<sup>1</sup> See the latter end of the 6th book of the Republic, where all this is asserted.

there are Gods, it is necessary that there should be truly existing being : for this is united to the Gods ; but not that which is generated and which perishes, but is never *truly* being. Or rather prior to these things it may be said, that the existence of something which always is, is deposited in our common conceptions. For whence was that which is generated produced except from perpetual being ? For if this also was generated, it must have been generated from some other being. And this must either be perpetual being, or must likewise have been itself generated. So that we must either proceed to infinity, or generation is in a circle, or perpetual being has a subsistence. But it is not lawful to proceed to infinity. For from one principle which is *the one*, all things originate. Nor is generation in a circle, lest the same things should be both better and worse, causes and effects. Hence it remains that [true] being always is. Why then, it may be said, is not generation from *the one* ? Because, we reply, it is absurd that multitude should be entirely produced without being. It is necessary therefore, that there should be truly existing being, which primarily proceeds from *the one*, in order that the first principle may not be alone the cause of the last of things, but prior to these may be the cause of being, from which also generation proceeds. After all that has been said, however, the most true solution of the doubt is, that Plato now assuming as an hypothesis that there is perpetual being, defines it. But after the discussion about the fabrication of the world, resuming this very thing, he demonstrates that perpetual being has a subsistence. Preserving however, what pertains to physiology, he proceeds from this hypothesis, and demonstrates such things as are consequent to it. For science itself also is from hypothesis, and requires that hypotheses should be assumed prior to its demonstrations. In what he says therefore about matter, he demonstrates not only that matter is, but also that being is. But a little after, from one of the hypotheses, i. e. from the third, demonstrating that there is a Demiurgus of the world, he obtains also from this that perpetual being subsists prior to that which is generated. And again from the fourth hypothesis he evinces, that the Demiurgus fabricated the universe, looking to an eternal paradigm. But in the place we have mentioned, he demonstrates that perpetual being is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much for this particular.

With respect however, to perpetual being itself, whether does it signify the whole intelligible world, or the Demiurgus, or the paradigm of the universe ? for it is differently assumed by different interpreters. And if indeed, it is the whole intelligible world, whence does the intelligible breadth begin, and where does it

proceed? But if it is the paradigm, how comes it to pass that the Demiurgus is not perpetual being, if the paradigm is one thing, and the Demiurgus another? And if it is the Demiurgus, whence is it that the paradigm is not a thing of this kind? That the paradigmatic cause, therefore, is to be arranged in perpetual being, is clearly evident from Plato when he says, "*According to which of the paradigms did the artificer fabricate the world? Was it according to that which subsists with invariable sameness, or according to that which was generated?*" And he immediately decides by saying, "*If the world indeed is beautiful, and the Demiurgus is good, it is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm. But if the world is not beautiful, and the Demiurgus is not good, which it is not lawful to assert, then he looked to a generated paradigm.*" If therefore it is not lawful to assert this, the paradigm of the universe is perpetual being. But that this is also true of the Demiurgus, is evident from this; that Plato calls the soul, which the Demiurgus constitutes, the first of generated natures, and delivers the generation of it. The Demiurgus, however, is prior to soul, so that he belongs to eternal beings. Hence also Plato says concerning him, "*After this manner therefore was there truly an eternal reasoning of the God.*" And how is it possible that being a divine intellect he should not rank among eternal beings? Is therefore every intelligible world perpetual being? The divine Iamblichus, however, strenuously contends on this subject, evincing that eternal being is superior both to the genera and the species of being; and establishes it at the summit of the intelligible essence, as that which primarily participates of *the one*. But what is written in the Parmenides concerning the one being (or being characterized by *the one*), and also in the Sophista, bears testimony to these things. For there Plato arranges the one being prior to whole, and prior to the intelligible all; though the whole and the all are intelligible. Here, however, Plato clearly calls the paradigm perpetual being, and a whole, and all-perfect. For he denominates it all-perfect animal; and a whole, when he says, "*of which other animals are parts according to one, and according to genera.*" So that if the paradigm is a whole and all-perfect, but that which is primarily being is above whole and all, the paradigm and that being will not be the same.

Will it not, therefore, be better to say, that there is indeed such an order of being, as that divine man [Iamblichus] has delivered, and such as Plato elsewhere surveys; but that now Plato thus denominates every eternal world? Nor is this at all wonderful. For, *at one time, the intelligible is asserted of every perpetual and invisible nature*, as when it is said that the soul also is intelligible, as by Socrates in the Phædo. But at another time it is asserted of the natures that

are more excellent than every psychical essence, as the division in the Republic manifests. And at another time, it is asserted of the first triads of being, as is evident from what Timæus a little after says of them. After the same manner, therefore, being in the Sophista, indeed, manifests the order of the one being; but here it signifies the whole eternal world. For it is evident that being which is primarily being, is the summit of the intelligible breadth, and the monad of all beings. For every where, that which is primarily being in its own series, has the highest order; since if it ranked as the second, it would not have the same form; for it would no longer be primarily that which it is. As therefore, virtue itself possesses the highest place in the series of the virtues, as the equal itself in equals, and animal itself in animals, thus also being itself which is primarily being, is the summit of all beings, and from it all beings proceed.<sup>1</sup> But every intelligible and intellectual being, and whatever appears to exist, has<sup>2</sup> the appellation of being, yet being and perpetual being are not the same. For the one being is beyond eternity. For eternity participates of being. Hence all such things as participate of eternity, have also a certain portion of being, but not all such things as participate of being, participate likewise of eternity. The natures therefore that exist in time, participate also of being, so that what is primarily being is beyond the order of eternity. But perpetual being is eternal. Hence the reasoning demonstrates the very contrary, that every thing is rather to be assumed from perpetual being, than the one being. For this latter is better than *the ever*, as subsisting between *the one* and eternity, and prior to eternity being denominated one being.

If, therefore, it be requisite that I should say what appears to me to be the truth, *Plato now precedaneously assumes every thing which is eternally being; beginning, indeed, from the nature of animal itself. For this is primarily eternal; but ending in partial intellects.* But the one being, he perhaps omits, in consequence of its existing as the<sup>3</sup> monad of these, and as being ineffable, and conjoined to *the one*. Hence Plato will now speak in reality of every intelligible, if that intelligible is not assumed which is occult, is the highest, and does not depart from *the one*. He says, therefore, shortly after this, that animal itself is the most beautiful of intelligibles, in consequence of the natures prior to this, being

<sup>1</sup> In the original *οὐτὼ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτὸν αὐτῶν, ὁ πρῶτος ἐστίν, ὁ κεφαλῆς οὖτος ἐστὶ πάντων, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ προέσται.* After *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* therefore, the words *πάντα τα ὅσα* must be supplied.

<sup>2</sup> *ἐχει* is wanting here in the original.

<sup>3</sup> For *μονα* here, read *μονα*.

through excess of union, superior to a subsistence as objects of intellect. Unless he says that animal itself is the most beautiful of all the objects of intellect, both animal itself and the one being existing as objects of intellect also, the latter as being *causally* ever, eternity as being so according to *hyperxis*, and animal itself or the eternal, as existing *always*, according to *participation*. Hence, if these things are admitted, in that which always exists, eternity, animal itself, and the Demiurgus will be comprehended, and likewise the one being itself, which possesses the occult cause of eternity. So that it is evident from this, that perpetual being comprehends every nature prior to souls, whether it be intelligible, or intellectual; beginning indeed from being itself, but ending in a partial intellect, and that it does not alone comprehend, as Iamblichus says it does, the summit of all beings, such as the being is which is characterized by *the one*, or the one being, through which all beings are said to be beings, and to which *the one itself* alone, and the principles of being [bound and infinity] are superior. *The one*, therefore, is better than that which is self-subsistent. For it is necessary that it should be exempt from all multitude. Perpetual being, however, is self-subsistent indeed, but possesses the power of being so through *the one*. But that which is posterior to it, such as is our nature, is self-subsistent, and at the same time derives its subsistence from another producing cause. And the last of things proceed<sup>1</sup> indeed into existence from a more excellent cause, but are not self-subsistent. It is not however yet time for these observations.

But with respect to perpetual being, it must not be supposed, that it is partly being, and partly non-being; for if it were, it would be a composite, and consisting of things of this kind, it would be dissimilarly a composite. Nor is it at one time being, and at another non-being; for it is said to be *always* being. But it is simply and eternally being, and is unmingled with every thing whatever it may be, that is of a contrary nature. For it appears to me that the addition of the words, "*but not having generation*," indicates the unmingled and undefiled purity of perpetual being, according to which it is exempt from every hypostasis which is borne along in the images of being, and is changed by time. Not as some assert, that perpetual being is said, for the sake of perspicuity, to be without generation; nor according to others, that Plato was willing to speak of it both affirmatively and negatively; but that it is necessary perpetual being should be intellectually perceived subsisting by itself, remote from all temporal mutation. For soul

<sup>1</sup> For *παρῆται* in this place, it is requisite to read *πρῆται*.

participates of time, and the heavens are allotted a life which is evolved according to time; but the intelligible nature alone is, according to the whole of itself, eternal. Hence, some of the ancients call the intelligible breadth truly existing being; the psychical *truly existing and at the same time not truly existing being*; <sup>4</sup> the sensible *not truly existing being*; and matter, *truly non-being*. After what manner, however, they made this arrangement, we shall elsewhere investigate. But that the addition of "*not having generation*," is for the sake of indicating the separate essence of perpetual being, is I think evident from what has been said.

➤ In the next place, with respect to *that which is generated*, whether does it signify the whole world, or a material and perfectly mutable composition? For some of the ancients explain this in one way, and others in another. But we understand by it *every corporeal formed nature*, and not the soul of the universe; so far as this nature is of itself indeed unadorned, but is always or at a certain time, arranged by another. For the soul of the universe is, in a certain respect, perpetual being. Much less is intellect *that which is generated*: for this is immediately perpetual being. But body alone is that which is generated, and is truly never real being. For body is always in want of the world-producing cause, and is always deriving from it the representation of existence. Why then it may be said, did not Plato add, *always*, and *that which is generated*, in the same manner as *being*, or *at a certain time*, in order that he might have *what is generated* entirely opposed to *perpetual being*? May we not say that Plato devised this mode of expression, looking to the various nature of that which is generated, and taking away from eternal being the existence at a certain time, and the perpetuity of a generated nature? *For the wholes of such a nature are generated always, but the parts at a certain time*. And after another manner [of considering the affair] with respect to forms, some are inseparable from matter, and are always generated from that which is truly always; but others are in time, and depart from matter. *For corporicity, indeed, is always generated and is always about matter; but the form of fire, or of air, enters into and departs from matter, becoming separated from it and perishing, through the domination of a contrary nature*. But if the perpetuity which detains matter is always *generated*, it never therefore is; and if the existence at a certain time is *generated*, it is never *being*. Every thing

<sup>4</sup> After *οὐτως περ ἐκ καὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ ὑποφανεῖτος*, instead of *ἐκ αὐτῶν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς*, it is necessary to read *οὐτως καὶ αὐτὰ ἐκ αὐτῶν ἐστίν*.



however, which is generated, is either *always* generated, or *at a certain time*. Hence, every thing which is generated, is never [real] being.

These things, therefore, having been said, let us, recurring to the discussion from the beginning, show whether *perpetual being* in this place is asserted of all beings, or not of all. For if, indeed, we admit that perpetual being indicates an eternal nature alone, having the eternal according to the whole of itself, it is not asserted of all beings. For neither the being prior to eternity, nor the order of eternity, nor again, such things as have indeed an eternal essence, but produce energies according to time, can be arranged under this being. But if we assume every thing whatever that is eternal, and which always is, either according to the whole of itself, or partially, then soul also ranks among eternal natures, and also that which contains in itself the causes of all things, unically, as it is said, and universally. For the case is as follows: one thing (i. e. being itself) is super-eternal; [another thing is eternity;'] another is simply eternal, and another is in a certain respect eternal. With respect, however, to each of these perpetual beings, the first is as the power and fountain of *the ever*; the second, as that which is primarily always being, and *the ever itself*, and not according to participation; but the third is always, as participating of *the ever*, and as primarily wholly eternal; and the fourth, is as that which in a certain respect participates of a peculiarity of this kind. For each thing subsists triply, either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation. And the one being, indeed, is *being alone* according to hyparxis, but is *perpetual being* according to cause. Eternity is *perpetual being* according to hyparxis, but *being* according to participation. And the eternal is *perpetual being* according to participation, but according to hyparxis is a certain other intelligible, or intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual [only]. And if the last of these, it is either total or partial; and if this, it is either supermundane or mundane; and if this, it is either divine, or is posterior to the Gods, and is each of these either according to existence alone, or according to power and energy, and as far as to the perpetual being of things which are in a certain respect eternal.

Again therefore, with respect to that which is generated, if we assume the universal, we must assume generation all-variously changed; but if every thing generated, in whatever way it may be, we shall find that the heavens also are generated, so far as they partake of motion and mutation, and that soul is the first of generated natures, so far as it lives in time, and time is consenscent with its ener-

\* The words *το δε αὖτις*, are wanting in the original, but must necessarily be supplied.

gies. And thus ascending from beneath, we shall end in soul as the first of things that are generated; and descending from above, we shall again terminate our progression in soul, as the last of eternal natures. For though a certain person<sup>1</sup> rightly says that the heavens always exist, yet their being is always generated by something else; but soul possesses its own essence from itself. Hence also, Socrates in the *Phædrus* says, that it is unbegotten, and at the same time self-moved, as being indeed the principle of all generation, but generating and vivifying itself. If therefore we say, that it is both unbegotten and generated, eternal and not eternal, we shall speak rightly. Hence too the Athenian guest<sup>2</sup> thinks fit to call the soul indestructible, but not eternal, because it is in a certain respect only eternal, and not according to the whole of itself, in the same manner as truly existing being. For it is one thing to *be* always, and another to be *generated* always. And the heavens, indeed, are generated always; for they do not possess being from themselves. But soul *is* always; for it possesses being from itself. And every thing prior to soul is not *generated* from a cause, but *is* from a cause. For generation is alone in things which derive their subsistence from others. Through these things therefore it will be manifest after what manner there is a comprehension of all beings in the before-mentioned portions of division, and after what manner all beings are not comprehended in them. There is not a comprehension of all beings, because that which is eternal only, and that which is generated only, are assumed; one of which is prior to, but the other is posterior to soul. And there is a comprehension of all beings, because the extremes being assumed, it is possible from these to find the middle, which is at one and the same time both being and that which is generated.

That these distinctions, however, of that which always is, and of that which is generated, are necessarily made prior to all other axioms, it is easy to learn; by observing that this is the first of the problems which it is requisite to consider about the universe in the beginning, i. e. *whether it always was, having no beginning of generation, or whether it was generated*. For if this is the first of the things to be investigated, then what that is which is generated, and what that is which is eternal, have very properly the first order in the axioms. For the other axioms follow these, just as the remaining problems follow the problem respecting the generation of the world. And if it be requisite that resuming the discussion about the hypotheses, I should more fully explain what appears to me on the subject,

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Aristotle.

<sup>2</sup> In the 10th book of the *Laws*.

Plato in the same manner as geometricians, employs definitions and hypotheses prior to demonstrations, through which he frames his demonstrations, and antecedently assumes the principles of the whole of physiology. For as the principles of music are different from the principles of medicine, and in a similar manner there are different principles of arithmetic and mechanics; thus also there are certain principles of the whole of physiology, which Plato now delivers to us; [and these are as follow :] *Truly existing being is that which may be comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which is generated is to be apprehended by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. Every thing generated, is generated by a cause. That which does not derive its subsistence from a cause, is not generated. That of which the paradigm is eternal being, is necessarily beautiful. That, of which the paradigm is generated, is not beautiful. Let the universe be called heaven or the world.* For from these principles he produces all that follows. And it appears to me, that on this account he shows *what* perpetual being is, and also *what* that is which is generated, but does not show us *that* each of them is. For the geometrician informs us *what* a point is, and *what* a line is, prior to his demonstrations, but he by no means teaches us *that* each of these is. For how can he be a geometrician, if he discusses his own principles? After the same manner also, the physiologist says *what* perpetual being is, for the sake of the demonstrations he is about to make, but he by no means shows *that* it is; for in so doing, he would go beyond physiology. But since, as we have before observed, Timæus does not resemble other physiologists, being a Pythagorean physiologist, and Plato exhibits in this dialogue the highest science, hence he afterwards very divinely proves *that* truly existing being is. For his present purpose, however, it is sufficient for him to admit *that* it is, preserving the boundaries of physiology. He appears also to investigate the definition of perpetual being and of that which is generated, in order that he may discover the causes which give completion to the universe, viz. form and matter: for that which is generated is in want of these. He assumes, however, the third hypothesis, in order that he may discover the producing cause; but the fourth, that he may be able to infer that the universe was generated according to a paradigmatic<sup>1</sup> cause; and the fifth, which is concerning the name of the universe, in order that he may investigate the participation of *the good* and the ineffable by the world, as will be shown in what follows.

It appears also to me, that Aristotle in his *Physics*, imitating Plato, assumes one

<sup>1</sup> For παράδειγμα αἰτίον here, read παραδειγματικόν αἰτίον.

hypothesis, when he says, *it is supposed by us with respect to things which have a natural subsistence, that either all or some of them are moved*. For it is entirely necessary that there should be motion, if the discussion of the physical theory is to proceed with success; since nature is a principle of motion. But in his treatise *On the Heavens*, prior to every thing else, he assumes those hypotheses concerning which Plotinus says, that Aristotle will find no difficulty in his discussion if his hypotheses about the fifth body are admitted, meaning these five; *that the motion is simple of a simple body; that a simple body has a certain simple motion according to nature; that there are two simple motions; that one motion is contrary to one; and that the thing which has not a contrary, has not that which can corrupt it*. From which hypotheses, he frames his demonstrations concerning the fifth body. Aristotle, however, shows that the universe is unbegotten, from the hypotheses; but Plato that it is generated. Whether therefore, they are discordant or not, will shortly after be manifest to us. And this, indeed, will again be considered.

Why, however, does Plato, who is accustomed to employ, when speaking of intelligibles, the terms *αυτο itself*, and *οτις that which*, now assume neither of these, but rather prefers the term *αι always*, as connascent with being. For this also is attended with a doubt, through what cause he employs the third of these terms, i. e. *always*, as better adapted to signify the nature of truly existing being. In answer to this it may be said, that *the term itself manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, a subsistence according to hyparxis, and an existence which is primary, which is asserted conformably to the peculiarity, according to which intelligibles are primarily that which they are, and fill secondary natures with the participation of themselves*. But the term *that which is*, indicates purity, the unmingled, and the not being filled with a contrary nature. And *the ever* manifests the eternal, the immutable, and the invariable, according to hypostasis. Thus for instance, when we say the beautiful *itself*, and the just *itself*, we survey beauty which is not so by the participation of the beautiful, and justice which is not so by the participation of the just; but that which is primarily beautiful, and that which is primarily just. But when we say *that which is beautiful* we mean that which is not mingled with deformity, nor contaminated by its contrary, such as is material beauty, which is situated in deformity, and is itself replete with its subject nature. And when we use the term *ever* or *always* we indicate beauty which is not at one time beautiful, and at another not, but which is eternally beautiful. So that the first of these terms manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, and the supplying all other things from themselves. For such is the beautiful *itself*, by which

all beautiful things are beautiful, and the equal *itself*, by which all equal things are equal, and in a similar manner in other things of this kind. But the <sup>(2)</sup>second of these terms, indicates onlyness and purity, the unmingled and the undefiled. For the *that which* is this, i. e. it is something which is not various, and which does not attract to itself any thing of a foreign nature. And the *ever* manifests immutability, for the *ever* is this. Yet it does not simply indicate immutability, but a permanency in eternity. For a *temporal ever* is one thing, and an *eternal ever*, another; the latter being every thing collectively and at once; but the former being co-extended with the whole continuity of time, and being infinite. And the latter subsisting in the *now*, but the former, in interval, the interval being unceasing, and always in generation, or becoming to be. The term therefore *itself*, is derived to beings from the paradigm. For that is the cause of simplicity to beings, and of imparting to other things that which it primarily possesses. But the term *that which is*, is derived from the one being. For that is primarily exempt from non-being, and privation; because it is primarily being, and all things subsists in it occultly and indivisibly. And the term *ever*, is derived from eternity. For as the one being is the supplier of existence,<sup>1</sup> so eternity imparts perpetuity to intelligibles. Hence, if Plato had been speaking about participants and things participated, and for this purpose had required being, he would have inquired *what being itself is*. And if he had been discussing things unmingled, and things that are mingled, he would have used the term *that which is*. But since he discourses about generation and the unbegotten, and for this purpose requires these definitions, he very properly inquires *what that is which is always being*. For this distinguishes the eternal from that which is temporal, in the same manner as the unbegotten distinguishes eternity. Hence also the nature of animal itself, which is comprehensive of all intelligible animals, is eternal; but time was generated together with heaven, as Plato says in the course of the dialogue.

Moreover, though perpetual being is said to proceed from a cause, yet it must not be asserted that it is generated according to all causes, but that it is according to them. For it is  $\delta\iota\ \sigma$ , *that on account of which*, and  $\pi\rho\sigma\ \sigma$ , *that with relation to which*, and  $\upsilon\phi'\ \sigma$ , *that by which*. For perpetual being is self-subsistent, and is not generated by *itself*, lest not existing at a certain time, it should be generated. For that which is generated, when it is *becoming to be* is not. Nor is it generated *with relation to itself*, lest it should be a composite. Nor *on ac-*

<sup>1</sup> Instead of  $\sigma\varsigma\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\ \sigma$ , it is necessary to read  $\sigma\varsigma\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\iota\ \epsilon\ \lambda$ .

*count of itself*, lest it should be imperfect. But that which is generated is suspended from another thing, and has its progression from other causes; and such is every corporeal-formed nature. After what manner however, is that which is generated *never being*, concerning which Plato speaks clearly in the *Sophista*? Not that it is non-being,<sup>1</sup> but that it is never *truly* being. Now, however, it is said to be *never at any time being*, because being has a prior arrangement in an eternal nature; but *that which is generated*, is never *that which always is*. If, therefore, existence, so far as it is being, is unreceptive of non-existence, it is evident that what is generated, since it has the being which is in it, of whatever kind it may be, mingled with non-being, is never at any time being, so as to be genuinely being; and being which subsists by itself, since this pertains to real existence alone, which has not in a certain respect non-existence in conjunction with existence, at one and the same time being and not being.

“The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness. But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.”

\*\*\*\* To these it happens, that they err in many other respects, and that they comprehend in the definitions the things defined. For what perpetual being is, which the first definition assumes is explained, and is said to be that which always subsists with invariable sameness; and this the second definition assumes, saying it is that which is generated and corrupted, but never truly is. This, however, is to accuse both themselves and Plato of unskilfulness in dialectic. But others dividing the sentence, show that in each of the colons there are definition, and the thing defined. For in the former colon, the words, “*that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason*,” are a definition; but the words, “*since it always subsists with invariable sameness*,” are the thing defined. And in the second colon, the words “*is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense*,” are given as a definition; but the remaining part of the sentence, is the thing defined. To these men it will be found our preceptor has well replied. For by a little transposition of the words, the whole will be immediately apparent as follows: *That which always subsists with invariable sameness, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason; but that which is generated and cor-*

<sup>1</sup> For  $\epsilon\kappa\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \tau\omicron\ \pi\epsilon\tau\ \eta\ \epsilon\alpha\tau\omicron$ , in this place, it is requisite to read  $\epsilon\kappa\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \tau\omicron\ \mu\eta\ \eta\ \epsilon\alpha\tau\omicron$ .

The beginning of this commentary, is unfortunately wanting.

*rupted, and never truly is, is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense.* For these things are consequent to what was before said, "*what is that which is always being but is without generation ;*" and "*what is that which is generated, but is never [real] being ;*" *that which always subsists with invariable sameness,* signifying the same thing as, *that which is without generation ;* and *that which is generated, but is never [real], being,* having the same signification as, *that which never truly is,* though they are more obscurely announced. And through the addition of *truly* Plato indicates that so far indeed as it is generated, it is not ; but that so far as it brings with it an image of being, so far it is not generated. For in the definitions, he renders the things defined more clear through the additions. Thus, one of the definitions says, "*which is always being,*" in order that by the term *always* we may not understand temporal perpetuity, but *the eternal.* For this is all at once, and subsists with invariable sameness. But temporal perpetuity, is co-extended with the infinity of time. Thus, too, the other definition has, "*that which is generated,*" and together with it also says, "*and is corrupted,*" in order that we may not understand by generations *simply* progressions, which are also ascribed to the Gods who are beyond being, but progressions which are co-ordinate with destruction. The assigned definitions, therefore, are such as follow : *Perpetual being, is that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which is generated is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense.*

For these definitions, however, it is usual to accuse Plato, in the first place, indeed, that he does not assume genus, as the rules of definitions require. In the next place, that he does not manifest what the nature is of the things defined, but distinguishes them by our knowledge. It is necessary, however, prior to this habitude, to consider things themselves by themselves. But [in defence of Plato] we shall demonstrate the very contrary, viz. that those who are accustomed thus to doubt perfectly err. For what kind of genus has a place in being, which comprehends every intelligible essence ? For if essence has no genus prior to itself, nor definition, since it is most generic, what can you say respecting being which is comprehensive of every essence, and of all powers and energies ? Neither, therefore, is being the genus of eternal being : for if it was, it would not be simply being, but a certain being. Nor is non-being the genus of eternal being lest we should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera are predicated of species. Hence, there is not a genus of being. Besides, is not a definition derived from knowledge adapted to theory, and to the proposed definitions ? For if,

as we said before, Plato wished to use these axioms and hypotheses in the demonstrations which he intended to make, it was necessary that they should be known and manifest to us. If, indeed, he had exhorted us to investigate the nature of things, itself in itself, he would have ignorantly filled the whole of his doctrine definitions with obscurity. But as he wished to make known through definitions being and that which is generated, he produced the demonstrations through things that are known, and clearly represents to us the peculiarity of them, in order that being excited and perfected, we may more manifestly survey what each of them is. For since *every thing gnostic, is either the thing known itself, or perceives, or possesses the thing known; for intellect, indeed, is the intelligible, but sense perceives what is sensible, and dianoia possesses in itself the dianoetic object*; and as we are not naturally adapted to become the intelligible, but know it through the power in us which is conjoined with it; this being the case, we require this power, and through this the nature of being is known to us. After this manner, therefore, we answer the doubts.

It is requisite, however, to observe how Plato proposing to himself the problems, renders each of them manifest, both affirmatively and negatively. But giving an answer to each, in perpetual being, indeed, he assumes the affirmative alone, but in that which is generated, the negative, adding to it also, "*and which is destroyed*." He, also, explains the words, "*but which is never being*," through the assumption of, "*never truly is*." For since being is characterized by existence alone, but that which is generated by non-existence, he assumes the one, alone defining it, and says, subsisting invariably the same; but he assumes the other together with negation, yet not with negation alone, because definitions respect affirmations, and signify that which in each thing is inherent. It is not, however, wonderful, if he not only says "*which is generated*," but also, "*and corrupted*." For as he adds to *being*, the words, "*subsisting with invariable sameness*," and not only says, *it is always*; so likewise to *that which is generated* he adds, "*and corrupted*." For this so far as it is generated, is different from perpetual being; but so far as it is corrupted, it differs from that which is invariably the same. For that which is generated, so far as it is generated and corrupted, is incapable of connecting itself; since if it were, it would also be able to produce itself. Assuming therefore each by itself, i. e. being and that which is generated, he assumes the former as that which is above generation, but the latter, as that which is not indestructible. So that when the representation of being accedes to that which is generated, it is able after a certain manner to abide in a condition of always becoming to be.



Let us however, consider each of the words by itself, through which he composes the propositions; and in the first place, let us see in how many ways *intelligence* subsists, and collect by a reasoning process the other progressions of it. The first intelligence therefore, is the <sup>①</sup>intelligible, which passes into the same with the intelligible, and is not any thing different from it. This also is essential intelligence, and essence itself, because every thing in the intelligible subsists after this manner, viz. essentially and intelligibly. The second intelligence is that which <sup>②</sup>conjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing a peculiarity which is connective and collective of the extremes, and existing as life and power, filling indeed intellect from the intelligible, but establishing it in the intelligible. The third is the <sup>③</sup>conjoined intelligence in a divine intellect<sup>1</sup> itself, being the energy of intellect, through which it comprehends the intelligible it contains, and according to which it intellectually perceives, and is what it is. For this intelligence is energy, and intelligence itself, but is not intelligible intelligence. Nor does it exist as power, but (as we have said), as energy, and intellectual intelligence. The <sup>④</sup>intelligence of partial intellects has the fourth order. For each of these possesses this<sup>2</sup> and entirely contains in itself a certain conjoined intelligible and intelligence. Or rather each has all these partially, viz. intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible, through which also it is conjoined to total intellects, intellectually perceives each of these, and likewise the whole intelligible world. The fifth intelligence is that of the rational soul. For *as the rational soul is called intellect, thus also the knowledge of it is intelligence, and transitive intelligence, and has time connascent with itself.* But the sixth intelligence, if you are willing also to connumerate this, is <sup>⑤</sup>phantastic knowledge, or the knowledge of the imagination, which by some is denominated intelligence; and the phantasy is called by them passive intellect,<sup>3</sup> because it knows such things as it does know, inwardly, and accompanied with resemblances and figures. For *it is common to all intelligence to have the objects of its knowledge inward.* For in this also intelligence differs from sense. In one order however, intelligence is the thing known itself. In another it ranks as the second, but sees that which is first totally. In another it is partially the thing known, but sees wholes also through that which is partial. In another it sees indeed wholes, but at the same time partially and not at once. And in

<sup>1</sup> In the original, *την δὲ ἣ ἐν αὐτῇ θεῷ συζυγῆ νοησι*. But it is necessary after *θεῷ* to supply *τῇ*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ταύτων* here, it is requisite to read *ταύτης*.

<sup>3</sup> The phantasy is thus called by Aristotle.

another, the vision is accompanied with passion. So many therefore, are the differences of intelligence.

Now, however, phantastic intelligence must not be assumed; since this is not naturally adapted to know truly existing being. For it is indefinite, because it knows the object of its perception accompanied with figure and morphe. But perpetual being is unfigured. And in short, no irrational knowledge is able to survey being itself, since neither is adapted to perceive that which is universal. Nor must the intelligence in the rational soul be assumed. For it does not possess the at-once-collected, and that which is co-ordinate with eternal natures; but it proceeds according to time. Nor must we assume total intellections; for these are exempt from our knowledge. But Timæus co-arranges intelligence with reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect, must now be assumed. For it is in conjunction with this, that we some time or other perceive real being. For as sense is in the second duad below the rational soul, so intelligence is in the duad above it. *For a partial intellect is proximately established above our essence, elevating and perfecting it, to which we are converted when purified through philosophy, and when we conjoin our own intellectual power with the intelligence of this intellect. But what this partial intellect is, and that it is not as one to one rational soul, but is participated through souls which always energize according to it, through which also partial souls sometimes participate of intellectual light, we have elsewhere distinctly and copiously discussed. Now, however, thus much must be assumed, that it is participated indeed by all other proximate daemoniacal souls, but illuminates ours, when we convert ourselves to it, and render the reason which is in us intellectual. And as in the Phædrus Plato calls this the governor of the soul, and says that it alone intellectually perceives real being, but that the soul perceives it together with this intellect, when she is nourished by intellect and science; thus also it must be said that this intelligence is prior to soul, and is truly that intelligence [mentioned by Plato] but that it is participated by soul when reason energizes intellectually. Hence Plato says in the following part of this dialogue, that intellect is indeed in the Gods, but that a certain small genus [of men] participates of it. And it seems that in what he says unfolding the knowledge of perpetual being, he first calls it intelligence; but that we may not apprehend it to be that alone, he adds to intelligence reason, distinguishing by a transitive energy the latter from the former. So that when reason intellectually perceives perpetual being, as reason indeed, it energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually, with simplicity; understanding each thing as simple at once, yet not all things at once, but passing from some to*

others. *It transitively however perceives intellectually every thing which it perceives as one thing, and as simple.*

After the definition of intelligence however, let us see what reason is, and how it is connascent with intelligence. In the Theætetus therefore, λογος, reason, is said to have a three-fold subsistence; for it is either enunciative, or a discursive procession through the elements [of speech]; or that which exhibits the differences of each thing with respect to others. All these significations however, are conversant with compositions and divisions, and are unadapted to the comprehension of eternal being. For the similar is naturally adapted to be apprehended by the similar. But eternal being is simple and indivisible, and is exempt from every thing which is contrary to these. Again, after another manner, one kind of reason is said to be doxastic, another scientific, and another intellectual. For since there are in us opinion, dianoia, and intellect; *but I call intellect here, the summit of dianoia*; and since the whole of our essence is reason, in each of these reason must be differently surveyed. Opinion however, is not naturally adapted to be united to the intelligence of intellect in energy: for on the contrary it is conjoined to irrational knowledge. Nor is dianoia, so far as it proceeds into multitude and division, able to recur to intellect; but on the contrary through the variety of its discursive energies, it is separated from intellectual impartibility. It remains, therefore, that the summit of the soul, and that in it which has most the form of *the one*, is established in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being through alliance united to it. Hence this is the *reason* which intellectually perceives the intelligibles co-ordinate to our nature, and the energy of which<sup>1</sup> Socrates in the Republic says is intelligence; just as *dianoia is the knowledge of things which subsist between intelligibles and the objects of opinion*. If, however, intelligence is the energy of this reason, it will be a certain intellect. Plato in the following part of this dialogue says, that *this reason in the same manner as science, is ingenerated in the soul, when it is moved about the intelligible*. But that science has a more various energy, apprehending some things through others, and intellect a more simple energy, intuitively surveying beings themselves. *This highest therefore, and most impartible portion of our nature, Plato now denominates reason, as unfolding to us intellect, and an intelligible nature*. For when the soul abandons phantasy and opinion, and various and indefinite knowledge, but recurs to its own impartibility, according to which it is rooted in a partial intellect, and having run back to this, conjoins the energy of itself with the intelligence of that intellect, then

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *καὶ οὐκ ἐν πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης, ἰσχυρὸν εἶπε τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν* in this place, it is necessary to read *καὶ οὐκ ἐν πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης τοῦτον εἶπε τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν*.

it intellectually perceives eternal being together with it, its energy being both one, and twofold, and both sameness and separation being inherent in its intellections. For then the intelligence of the soul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal things, in order that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and that the reason which is in us may like a less light, energize in conjunction with one that is greater. For our reason in conjunction with intelligence, sees the intelligible; but the intelligence of intellect always sees it, and always is; and conjoins reason to it, when reason acquires the form of intellect.

After what manner however, is truly existing being comprehended by a partial intellect, or by reason? For this is still more admirable. May we not say, that though the intelligible itself cannot be comprehended by intellect and reason, because it is superior to all comprehension, and comprehends all things exemptly, yet intellect possessing its own intelligible, is also on this account said to comprehend the whole [of an intelligible nature]. But reason through the intellect which is co-ordinate to itself, receiving the conceptions of real beings, is thus through these said to comprehend being. Perhaps also it signifies, that reason running round the intelligible, and energizing and being moved as about a centre, thus surveys it; intelligence indeed knowing it intransitively and impartibly, but reason dancing as it were round the essence of it in a circle, and evolving the united hypostasis in it of all things.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to opinion, and consider what it is. That it is therefore the boundary of the whole rational life, and that it is conjoined to the summit of the irrational life, is frequently acknowledged. But we shall now unfold such things as are the peculiarities of the Platonic doctrine; and which are as follow: That the doxastic part comprehends the reasons<sup>1</sup> [or productive principles] of sensibles; that it this is also which knows the essences of them; and that it knows the *οὐσία*, or *that a thing is*, but is ignorant of the cause of it. For since dianoia knows at one and the same time both the essences and the causes of sensibles, but sense knows neither of these; for it is clearly shown in the Theatetus that sense does not know the essence of a thing, and that it is perfectly ignorant of the cause of the objects of its knowledge; it is necessary that opinion being arranged between sense and dianoia, should know the essences

<sup>1</sup> These reasons in a divine soul, subsist both gnostically and fabricatively, and in the human soul also, they thus subsist, when it revolves on high in conjunction with the Gods: but during the union of the soul with this outward body, they subsist in it gnostically only.

of sensibles, through the reasons which it contains, but should be ignorant of the causes of them. For thus right opinion will differ from science in this, that it alone knows *that* a thing is, science being able to survey likewise the cause of it. But sense adheres to opinion, being also itself a medium between the instrument of sense and opinion. For the instrument of sense apprehends sensibles accompanied with passion. Hence also it is corrupted through the excess of sensibles. But opinion possesses knowledge undefiled with passion. Sense however participates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something gnostic, so far as it is established in the doxastic part, is illuminated by it, and partakes of the form of reason, since it is in itself irrational. In this, therefore, the series of gnostic powers is terminated, of which indeed intelligence is the leader, which is above reason, and is without transition. But reason has the second order which is the intelligence of our soul, transitively coming into contact with real beings. Opinion has the third order, being a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason. And sense has the fourth order, being an irrational knowledge of sensibles. For dianoia, being a medium between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic of middle forms, which require a more obscure apprehension than that of intelligence, but a clearer perception than that of opinion; as Socrates said on the preceding day, when he defined the different kinds of knowledge by the objects of knowledge.

It must be said, therefore, that opinion is according to reason, because it possesses gnostic reasons of the essences of things, but that it is otherwise irrational, as being ignorant of causes. For Socrates in the Banquet, speaking of it says, "*since it is an irrational thing, how can it be science?*" But it must be admitted that sense is entirely irrational. For in short, since each of the senses knows the passion produced about the animal by the object of sense, hence intelligence is an intransitive, but dianoia and reason a transitive knowledge; opinion a knowledge in conjunction with reason but without the assignation of cause; sense an irrational knowledge of passions; and the instrument of sense passion only. Thus, for instance, when an apple is presented to us, the sight indeed knows that it is red from the passion about the eye, the smell that it is fragrant from the passion about the nostrils, the taste that it is sweet, and the touch that it is smooth. What then is it which says that the thing presented to us is an apple? For it is not any one of the partial senses; since each of these knows one certain thing only about the apple, and not the whole of it; nor does even the common sense know this. For this alone distinguishes the differences of the passions; but it does not know that the thing which possesses an essence of such a kind is the

whole thing. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain power superior to the senses, which knowing the whole prior to the things which are as it were parts, and surveying the form of it, is impartibly connective of these many powers. This power, therefore, Plato calls opinion, and on this account, he denominates that which is sensible doxastic.

Farther still, since the senses frequently announce various passions, and not such as things of this kind are in themselves, what is it in us which judges and says, that the sight is deceived when it asserts that the sun is but a foot in diameter, and that the taste which pronounces honey to be bitter, is the taste of those that are diseased? For it is entirely evident that in these, and all such-like particulars, the senses announce indeed their own passions, and are not perfectly deceived. For they say what the passion is about the instruments of sense, and it is a thing of such a kind as they assert it to be; but that which says what the cause is of the passion, and forms a judgment of it, is something different from sense. Hence, there is a certain power of the soul superior to sense, which no longer knows sensibles through an instrument but through itself, and corrects the grossness of sensible information. And this power indeed which is reason as with reference to sense, is irrational as with reference to the knowledge of truly existing beings. But sense is simply irrational. On this account, Plato in the Republic calling this power opinion, shows that it is a medium between knowledge and ignorance: for it is indeed a rational knowledge, but it is mingled with irrationality, knowing sensibles in conjunction with sense. But sense is alone irrational, as Timæus also denominates it; in the first place, because it is also inherent in irrational animals, and is characteristic of every irrational life; for by these things, what is said in the Theætetus distinguishes it from science. In the second place, because in contradistinction to all the parts of the irrational soul, it is disobedient to reason. For the irascible and epithymetic parts, are obedient to reason and its mandates, and receive from it education. But sense though it should hear reason ten thousand times asserting that the sun is greater than the earth, yet would still see it to be a foot in diameter, and would not otherwise announce it to us. In the third place, because neither does it [accurately] know that which it knows. For it is not naturally adapted to see the essence of it. For it does not know *what* a white thing is, but it knows through passion *that* it is white. It likewise is not separated from the instrument of sense,<sup>4</sup> and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the Georgias,

<sup>4</sup> Instead of διακρίνεται δε το αισθητηριον in this place, it is necessary to read ου διακρίνεται δε τον αισθητηριον.

irrational knowledge is defined to be not scientific, but conjectural. In the fourth place, sense is alone irrational, because it is the boundary of the whole series of knowledge, possesses an essence most remote from reason and intellect, pertains to externals, and effects its apprehension of things through body. For all these particulars demonstrate its irrationality.

Every thing generated therefore is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense; the latter announcing passions, but the former producing from itself the reasons of them, and knowing the essences of sensibles. And as reason when in contact with intelligence sees the intelligible, thus also opinion co-arranged with sense, knows that which is generated. For since the soul is of a middle essence it gives completion to a subsistence between intellect and irrationality. For by its summit it is present with intellect, but by its ultimate part it verges to sense. Hence also Timæus in the former conjunction, arranges intelligence prior to reason, as being more excellent; but in the second he places opinion before sense. For there indeed, reason is posterior to intelligence, as being a less intellect; but here opinion is prior to sense, as being rational sense. Opinion however, and reason circumscribe the whole breadth of the rational essence. But intellect is our king, and sense our messenger, says the great Plotinus. Reason indeed, together with intellect, sees the intelligible; but by itself it surveys reasons or forms that have a middle subsistence. And opinion in conjunction with sense, sees that which is generated; but by itself it contemplates all the forms it contains, concerning which we have elsewhere spoken, have shown how these forms subsist, how the place of them is the doxastic part of the soul, and that the intelligible is apprehended by reason, but by opinion, the intelligible is seen as a doxastic object. For the object of its knowledge is external to, and not within it, as the intelligible is within reason. Hence the object is not comprehended by it, but is called opinable and not sensible; because opinion knows indeed the essences of things, but sense does not. Hence too, it receives the appellation of a clearer knowledge, which knows *what* a thing is, but not alone *that* it is, which latter we say is the employment of sense; and in consequence of this Timæus very properly calls that which is generated the object of opinion. For this is Pythagoric; since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, <sup>1</sup> as a discussion according to opinion; sensibles being in their own nature perceptible by this

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *επει και ο εν Παρμενίδει, την περι των αισθητων πραγματειων* in this place, it is necessary to read *επει και ο Παρμενίδης, την περι των αισθητων πραγματειαν*.

power of the soul. Hence it is not proper to call that which is generated sensible alone, because sense is not gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion, without the addition of sense.

Here however, Aristotle particularly blames the second assertion of Timæus. For where is it [universally] true that what is perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense is generated and corrupted? For heaven is unbegotten and indestructible, though it is perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense. And Timæus in the course of this dialogue, inquires whether the whole heaven was generated. At present, therefore, it must be said by us, that generation and corruption subsist according to analogy in the heavens, not only according to the motions and mutations of figures, but also because a celestial body is not produced by itself, but alone subsists from another cause. Hence it is generated as having the cause of its subsistence suspended from another thing [different from itself. Since, however, it not only subsists from, but is connected by another, not being able to connect itself, and is corrupted according to its own proper reason, on this account it assumes generation co-ordinately with corruption. For truly existing and eternal beings generate themselves, and are connected by themselves, whence also they are said to be in their own nature unbegotten and indestructible. If, however, truly existing being is unbegotten, and therefore subsists from itself, that which does not subsist from itself will not be truly unbegotten. And if that which is truly indestructible is naturally adapted to connect itself, that which is not naturally adapted to connect itself will not be truly indestructible. Heaven, however, but I mean by heaven the corporeal-formed nature of it alone, is neither adapted to produce nor to connect itself. For every thing of this kind which produces and connects itself, is impartible. Hence it is neither truly unbegotten<sup>1</sup> nor truly indestructible, but so far as pertains to its corporeal nature, it is generated and made. Farther still, as Aristotle himself says, and clearly and generously demonstrates, no finite body possesses an infinite power. But the celestial body is finite, and therefore does not possess an infinite power. The indestructible, however, so far as indestructible, possesses an infinite power. Hence body, so far as body, is not indestructible. So that from the reasoning of Aristotle it is demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. But after what manner the heaven is unbegotten and perpetual, will be manifest to us

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *οὐκ ἀπαύρτως γεννητός ἐστιν* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *οὐκ ἀπαύρτως ἀγεννητός ἐστιν*.



shortly after. Now, however, this alone is evident from what has been said, that every thing corporeal, is of itself, or in its own nature generated and corrupted, but never truly is, as Plato also says in the *Politicus*. For he there observes “*that to subsist always invariably the same, alone pertains to the most divine of all things. But the nature of body is not of this order. That, however, which we denominate heaven or the world, possesses indeed many and blessed prerogatives from its generator; but, as it partakes of body, it is impossible that it should be entirely free from mutation.*” We have shown, therefore, how the heaven falls under the above-mentioned distinctions.

If however, the daemoniacal Aristotle, should again doubt respecting what is said of eternal being, not enduring to say that every thing which always is, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason; since the most divine of visible objects always<sup>1</sup> exist; we think it fit, that he should not confound the eternal, and that which subsists through the whole of time. For he also distinguishes eternity from time; and attributes the former indeed to intellect, but the latter to heaven, and the motion of heaven. That always-existing being, therefore, the eternal, is a thing of such a kind as Timæus defines it to be. The most divine, however, of visible objects, are after another manner perpetual, and not according to an eternal permanency. But they are produced in the whole of time from their causes, and the whole of their existence is *in becoming to be*. This also is said by Aristotle, that eternity is connascent with intelligibles, possessing and comprehending in itself infinite time; and therefore the eternal is truly intelligible.<sup>2</sup> If, however, that which *always is*, signifies *the eternal*, why is it necessary to refer the nature of heaven to this *perpetual being*, and why should we not say that it is always generated, or becoming to be, as being co-extended with the perpetuity of time? So that we shall thus dissolve the objections from his arguments, which he urges against these definitions. Since, however, we have replied to this inquiry, we shall dismiss it; for it will be spoken of hereafter.

But, in short, the opinion of Plato concerning criteria, may from these things be assumed. For different persons admitting a different criterion, some asserting that it is sense, as the Protagoreans, others opinion, as he who said,

Opinion is in all things fram'd;

<sup>1</sup> It is necessary here, to supply the word *æti*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *το αἰώνιον νοητὸν οὐτως ἐστὶν* in this place, it appears to me that we should read *καὶ το αἰώνιον ἀπὸ νοητὸν οὐτως ἐστὶν*.

others that it is reason, and others that it is intellect; Plato divides the essence of the criteria conformably to things themselves, attributing intellect to intelligibles, *dianoia* to *dianoetic* objects, opinion to *doxastic* objects, and sense to sensibles. You must not however fancy that the criteria are on this account divulsed according to him from each other. For the soul is both one and a multitude. If, therefore, the soul which judges is both one<sup>1</sup> and a multitude, the judicial power will also be both uniform and multiform. Some one therefore may say, what is this one power? We reply, reason. For this, when it proceeds to the survey of intelligibles, uses both itself and intelligence; not that intelligence indeed is the instrument, and reason that which uses it, as the Platonic Severus thought, considering intelligence as inferior to reason, but that *intelligence is the light of reason, perfecting and elevating it, and illuminating its gnostic power.*

But when it forms a judgment of middle reasons, it alone uses *dianoia* and itself, and through this is converted to itself. When also it decides on objects of opinion, it moves opinion; but in judging of objects of imagination, it excites the phantasy, and in judging of sensibles, sense. For when it considers the sensible essence of forms, such as is every sensible object, it uses opinion as the co-adjutor of its speculation. For in this the reasons of sensibles subsist. But when it directs its attention to the position or figure of a certain thing, as for instance, to the manner in which the earth is posited, which has in its summit a habitude to the heavens, it then excites the phantasy, in order that it may survey the object of its inquiry accompanied with interval and morphe, as it is. And when it considers an eclipse, it employs sense as an adjutor in its observations. At one time also, it admits the judgments of the second powers; but at another, it blames the errors which they frequently happen to commit on account of the instruments. Concerning the criteria therefore, thus much may suffice for the present; for we have discussed these things more copiously in our Commentaries on the Theætetus. From what has been said, however, the great accuracy of the before-mentioned definitions is evident.

But if you are willing, we will also survey the same thing according to another method. I say, therefore, that the nature which is primarily perpetual being, is that which is eternal according to all things, viz. according to essence, power, and energy. And that the nature which is simply generated, is that which receives all<sup>2</sup> its essence, power and energy in time. For it is necessary that the

<sup>1</sup> It is requisite here to supply the word *αὐτή*.

<sup>2</sup> For *πάντων* here, read *παντός*.

former should be wholly eternal, but the latter wholly temporal. And that the former should be at once every thing in a self-subsistent manner, but that the latter should have its hypostasis suspended elsewhere than from itself, and consisting in an extension<sup>1</sup> of existence. Since these, however, are the extremes, the media are, things which in a certain respect participate of a portion of *being*, and in a certain respect communicate with *generation*. But again, there are two natures which participate of neither of these, one in consequence of being superior, but the other through being inferior to them. For matter is neither being, nor that which is generated. For it is neither comprehended by intelligence, nor is sensible. And this also is true of *the one*, as Parmenides demonstrates of both these, of the latter in the first, and of the former in the fifth hypothesis. Perpetual being, therefore, is the whole of the intelligible, and the whole of the intellectual genus, every supermundane intellect, every intellect participated by divine souls, and every intellect which is called partial, and is participated by angels, and daemons; and by partial souls, through angels and daemons as media. And as far as to this, perpetual being extends. For every intellect energizes eternally, and is measured in the whole of itself by eternity. But that which is generated, is every thing which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, and which in conception is surveyed prior to the production of the world; likewise every thing which is properly generated and corrupted, heaven, and all these sensible and visible natures. Timæus also defines that which is simply generated, and that which is simply perpetual being, to be these. But the intermediate natures are those which communicate with both these; and on each side of them are the natures which participate of neither of these. Hence Timæus proposes both of them affirmatively and negatively, as for instance, *perpetual being, and without generation, and again, that which is generated, and is never real being*, in order that through the affirmations he may separate them from things which are the recipients of neither, but that through the negations they may be distinguished from things which in a certain respect participate of both.

As these, therefore, are the extremes, viz. every intelligible and intellectual essence, and every sensible essence, let us direct our attention to the intermediate nature. For Timæus calls both time and the soul generated. And it is evident that these, as not being sensible, are in a certain respect beings, and in a certain respect generated, but perfectly neither of these. Porphyry, therefore, rightly observes, that Plato now defines the extremes, viz. that which is primarily being,

<sup>1</sup> For *παρὰστασι* here, read *παράστασι*.

and that which is alone generated, and that he omits the media ; such for instance as, that which is at one and the same time *being* and a *generated nature*, or that which is both *generated* and *being* ; of which *being* and *generated* are adapted to the nature of souls, but vice versa that *which is generated* and *being*, are allied to the summit of generated natures. Such as this, however, is the nature of the universe which vivifies the universe. For this nature so far as it is divisible about bodies, is generated, but so far as it is entirely incorporeal, is unbegotten. But it is absurd to say that matter is both *generated* and *being*. For thus it would be superior to generated sensible natures, since these are generated alone, but matter would also partipate of being. And if you are willing separately to assume that which is alone perpetual being, and that which is alone generated, by taking away from one of the definitions intellect, and from the other sense ; you will produce the definition of the medium. For this is known by reason and opinion. For reason knows both itself and opinion, and opinion knows itself and reason ; the former indeed both in conjunction with cause ; but the latter both, without cause. For in this reason and opinion differ from each other. Opinion also is known by reason, and reason by opinion. And the whole [rational] soul subsists through both these which are media. Thus too, by assuming the worse of the two upward terms, viz. reason, and making it to be spurious reason, and of the two downward terms sense, and making it to be insensible sense, you will then have the manner in which Plato thought matter may be known, viz. by spurious reason, and insensible sense. Assuming likewise analogously in each, that which is the better of the two, and making it to be spurious according to that which is more excellent, you will have the manner in which *the one* is known, viz. by a spurious intellect, and spurious opinion. Hence it is not properly simple, and is not known from cause. It is known therefore by a spurious knowledge, because it is known in a superior manner according to each. For opinion does not know from cause, and *the one* is not known from cause, but from not having a cause. And intellect knows that which is simple ; but a *spurious* intellect knows *the one*, because it is superior to *intellectual* perception. The superior therefore, here, is spurious as with reference to intellect, as *the one*<sup>1</sup> also is more excellent than that which is simple, such as that is which is intelligible to truly existing intellect, and to which intellect is allied and is not spurious. It perceives therefore, *the one*, by that in itself which is not intellect. But this is *the one* in it, according to which also it is a God.

<sup>1</sup> For *αὐτὸς* here, it is necessary to read *αὐτῶν*. For Proclus is speaking of the *τὰ αὐτὰ*.

“Every thing however, which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. For it is perfectly impossible that it should have generation without a cause.”

Timæus, in a manner truly conformable to the geometric method, after the definitions assumes these axioms. For having said what *being* and *what that which is generated* are, he adds these other common conceptions; that the thing which is generated, is entirely generated by a cause; but that the thing which is not generated by a cause, cannot have generation. From these axioms also it is evident that το διαίρετον, does not signify the dividing method, but that the hypotheses are to be defined. For the assertion that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, and that it is impossible for it to have generation without a cause, and also the following axiom, that what is generated according to an eternal paradigm is rendered beautiful, all these being axioms, are to be considered as belonging to the term διαιρετέον, and not to be parts of division. Since however one of the present axioms is more clear, but the other is less known and clear, hence Timæus places the one as the middle term, but the other as the conclusion. For the axiom, every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, is the conclusion. But the axiom, it is entirely impossible that it should have generation without a cause, is the middle, in order that the syllogism may be categoric, and may be in the first figure, as follows: It is impossible for that which is generated to be generated without a cause. But this is necessarily generated by a certain cause. Every thing therefore which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. For it is better to collect what is said after this manner, as the divine Iamblichus also thinks we ought, than to make, as some other persons do, the syllogism to be hypothetical. But how is the middle more known than the conclusion? For it is evident that a thing must necessarily be, which it is impossible should not be, and that it is impossible a thing should not be, which necessarily is. Or in a certain respect each of these is the same. But frequently it is not known that a thing necessarily is, but that it is impossible for it not to be, is known. Thus for instance, the physician says [to his patient] it is necessary you should be nourished, and he will in a less degree persuade the sick man. But if he says, it is impossible to live without being nourished, this will now compel the patient [to take nutriment]. And again, death is necessary through a certain cause: for it is impossible not to die [i. e. to avoid death]. And, it is necessary to give money

that is owing to a tyrant: for it is impossible not to give it. And in a great variety of other instances, you may in a similar manner see, that one of these is more obscure, but the other more known, though both may appear to signify the same thing.

How, therefore, in the words before us, is the one clearer than the other? For what if in some things this should be true, but in others not? May we not say, that here also it is easy to learn how that which is generated, when it is separated from its cause, is powerless and imbecile? For not being able to preserve itself, neither is it connected by itself. But as it derives from its cause alone its preservation and connexion, if it is separated from its cause, it is evident that it becomes of itself powerless, and being dissipated, departs into non-entity, which also demonstrates that what is generated, cannot be generated without a cause. For if it is generated, it is generated by a certain maker. Hence it is rightly said in the *Philebus*, that what is generated is made, but that which makes is the cause to that which is made<sup>1</sup> [of its being made]. If, however, this be the case, it is either generated by itself, or by another. But if by itself, it passes into the same with perpetual being; and thus that which is generated, and that which always is, will be the same, and a generated nature will rank among things that have an eternal subsistence. But if it is not generated by itself, it is *entirely* generated by another. For it is necessary that what is generated, should be generated by something, if it is that which is generated, and not [real] being. For not connecting itself, nor making itself in energy, it will suffer this from something else. And being itself by itself imbecile, it will derive power from another. Farther still, though the same thing should both act and suffer, so far indeed as it is that which suffers, it suffers from another, and so far as it is effective it operates on another. That also which is generated, so far as it is generated suffers. But if it suffers, it suffers from something else: for it is not naturally adapted to generate itself. For it would be before it is generated, and would be in energy prior to subsisting in capacity. For it is necessary that what operates should operate in energy on that which is in capacity. Plato, therefore, conjoining that which is generated to cause, which he does in the conclusion, very properly uses the term *from necessity*. For firmness and stability accompanied by persuasion accede to that which is generated, from its cause: just as he says in the *Politicus*, that a renovated immortality is imparted to the world from its father. But separating that which is

<sup>1</sup> For τῷ γενόμενῳ here, it is requisite to read τῷ ποιημένῳ.

generated from its cause, which he does in the middle, he uses the term *impossible*. For that which is generated, surveyed by itself, is inefficacious and imperfect.

Moreover, in employing the word cause, he indicates the uniform power of the demiurgic principle; calling the demiurgic cause, not simply that which gives subsistence to another thing; for Socrates says that *the good* is the cause of intelligibles, but it is not the demiurgic cause of them. For the demiurgic is attributed to generation as Plato says in the *Philebus*, "*that the demiurgic refers to that which is generated.*" Hence, prior to the world, there are different causes of different things, but there are not demiurgic causes of generated natures. If, therefore, there are many demiurgic causes, there is also one such cause [prior to the many]. For in short, if that which is generated is one, union must accede to it from its cause, and therefore it is much more necessary that its cause should be uniform and connective of multitude, in order that what is generated may become one conformably to the union pre-existing in its cause. And thus much concerning these particulars.

It is here, however, usual to enumerate all the causes, and the differences of causes according to Aristotle; nor is this done immethodically. For it is requisite to say that every cause is either essential or accidental, [and this proximately or remotely,] and that these subsist in a two-fold respect, either simple or complex. All these, likewise, have a two-fold subsistence; as they are either in capacity, or in energy. For thus the multitude of them may be surveyed. For on account of the essential and accidental, there are two modes of the explication of causes. But on account of these being attributed in a two-fold respect, either proximately or remotely, there are four modes. And again, on account of all these subsisting in a two-fold respect, either as simple or complicated with each other, there are eight modes. Through these also being two-fold, either in energy, or in capacity, there are sixteen modes. But on account of causes being predicated in a four-fold respect according to Aristotle, but according to Plato, causes subsisting in a three-fold,<sup>1</sup> and con-causes also, though in a different way, in a three-fold respect,—hence according to the former, there will be sixty-four modes of causes; [but according to the latter there will be forty-eight modes of causes,] and the same number of con-causes. For thus the assumption will become perfectly methodical; though that of Plato is usually omitted by the interpreters, who having enumerated causes

<sup>1</sup> These causes are, the *producing*, the *paradigmatic*, and the *final*; and the con-causes are, *matter*, *material causes*, and *form*.

according to Aristotle, enquire how it is said that every thing which is generated, is generated by a certain cause. We, however, omitting all this superfluous discussion, say that Timæus is here speaking about the effective cause. Hence he uses the words, *by a certain cause*. For the term *by which*, is adapted to that which is effective. But he adds *a certain cause*. For the intellect of the universe, soul and nature, are said to be producing causes, and prior to these, other causes have this dignity, yet as many things are generated, and there are many causes, though not of each particular, the word *certain* is very properly added. For each particular is generated by a *certain* cause, and not by all cause. These things therefore are manifest.

This axiom, however, is entirely derided by the Epicureans, who make the whole world, and the most divine of visible natures to be the work of chance. But by the Aristotelians, for the name alone it is thought worthy of reverence. For they say indeed, that what is generated, is entirely generated by a certain cause, but they undesignedly make the cause to be causeless, when they enumerate chance with causes. For chance is this very thing, *the causeless*. But Plato alone, following the Pythagoreans, rightly says that every thing which is generated, is generated by a cause, and places over generated natures, Fate and God. For though generated natures are many, and separated from each other, and which also on this account are generated from many causes, producing in a different manner, yet there is one cause collective and connective of the makers, in order that there may be nothing in vain, or adventitious in the universe. For it is not proper that beings should be governed badly.\* Let there, however, be one ruler, one cause of all things, one providence, and one chain of beings; let there be also together with the monad an appropriate multitude, many kings, various causes, a multiform providence, and a different order; yet every where multitude has a co-arrangement about the monad, things various about that which is simple, things multiform about that which is uniform, and things different about that which is common, in order that a truly golden chain may have dominion over all things, and that all things may be constituted in a becoming manner. For if, as Aristotle says, all things are co-arranged with a view to form, it is necessary that there should be a cause of the co-ordination, and that nothing which is in vain should have a place in the universe, but that what appears to be in vain to a part, should be advantageous to the whole. These observations, however, have been made elsewhere.

\* These are the words of Aristotle, in the 12th book of his Metaphysics.



But what is said in the *Philebus* appears to be more universal than this axiom, viz. that every thing which is mixed, subsists from a certain cause of the mixture. For if things which are mingled, are not to be mingled casually, it is necessary there should be one cause collective of the separated natures, and imparting union to the mingled form. This cause, however, is in one mixture God, in another intellect, in another soul, in another nature, and in another a certain art, imitating nature. Indeed, every thing which is generated, is mingled, but not every thing which is mingled is generated. For the first of beings, bound and infinity, subsist mingled with each other. From these, therefore, Plato says other things, and also bodies derive their subsistence. All that is said here therefore, is analogous to all that is said in the *Philebus*, viz. the Demiurgus to *the one*, form to bound, matter to the infinite, and that which is generated to that which is mixed. But the latter are more universal than the former; because the latter [viz. *the one*, bound, the infinite, and that which is mixed,] are beheld in all things, but the former [viz. the Demiurgus, form, matter, and that which is generated] are seen in mundane natures only. For intellect is mixed, as being knowledge, and as possessing infinite power, and also soul, as being at one and the same time impartible and partible. Hence, a *certain* cause, is the cause of that which is generated, just as that which is generated is a *certain* mixture, and not *every* mixture; by which also it is evident that the Demiurgus is subordinate to *the one*, since he produces indeed a mixture, but a mixture which is generated. For since the causes of the world are these, the final, the paradigmatic, the effective, the organic,\* the formal, and the material, Timæus indeed points out to us afterwards, from reason and demonstration, the final cause, but delivers the organic, the formal, and the material cause, from the former before-mentioned axioms. For if the universe is not [real] being, but that which is generated, it is a form participated by matter, and by the organic, formal, and material causes is proximately moved. But Timæus unfolds to us the effective cause from what is now said. For if the universe is generated, there is an effective cause of it. And he unfolds the paradigmatic cause in what will be said afterwards. For if the world is beautiful it was generated according to an eternal paradigm. So that through these axioms investigating for us the causes of the universe, he delivers all things in order. And the hypotheses afford him this utility.

“When therefore, an artificer looking to that which possesses an inviolable sameness of subsistence, and always employing<sup>a</sup> a certain paradigm

\* There is an omission here, in the original, of το οργανικον.

<sup>a</sup> For προσημερος in this place, it is necessary to read προσημεριος.

of this kind, expresses in his work the idea and power of it, then it is necessary that the whole should be a beautiful effect; but when he looks to that which is generated, employing a generated paradigm, then his work will not be beautiful."

This also is in continuity with what has been said. For the paradigmatic is investigated after the effective cause; except that the before-mentioned axioms contribute to our discovering that there is a demiurgic cause of the universe, but the present axioms do not contribute to the discovery that there is a paradigmatic cause of the world, but to the knowledge of what kind of a paradigm it is, whether eternal or generated. For from there being an effective cause, it follows that there is also a paradigm, either pre-existing in the maker himself, or external to him, and either superior, or inferior to, or of the same rank with him. For universally, that which makes, being extended to a certain form, makes that which it wishes to insert in the thing made. This therefore follows. It is necessary however to find that which is next in order, viz. whether the mundane paradigm is eternal, or generated. But to this the proposed axioms contribute: and the whole of what is said, will be truly consentaneous to itself. If the universe is generated, there is a Demiurgus of it; if there is a Demiurgus of the universe, there is also a paradigm. And if indeed that which is generated is beautiful, it was generated on account of an eternal paradigm. But if it was not, that which is generated is not beautiful. So that a continued syllogism such as the following is produced. The world was generated. Every thing generated, has a demiurgic cause. Every thing having a demiurgic, has also a paradigmatic cause. The world, therefore, has both a demiurgic and paradigmatic cause. And as in the first axioms there were two hypotheses, what perpetual being is, and what that is which is generated, and two other in the second axioms, viz. every thing which is generated has a cause, that which has not a cause, is not generated; thus also in these, there are two common conceptions, that which is generated on account of an intelligible paradigm is beautiful, that which is generated on account of a generated paradigm is not beautiful.

Each also of these is perfectly true. For he who makes on account of the intelligible, either similarly, or dissimilarly, imitates it. And if indeed similarly, he makes the imitation beautiful: for there, that which is primarily beautiful, subsists. But if dissimilarly, he does not make on account of the intelligible: for on the contrary, he falls off from the similitude. And he who makes any thing on account

of that which is generated, if he truly directs his attention to it, evidently does not make that which is beautiful. For this very thing is full of dissimilitude, and is not that which is primarily beautiful; whence that which is generated on account of it, is much more separated from beauty. Hence Phidias also, who made the [celebrated] statue of Jupiter, would not have arrived at the conception of the Jupiter in Homer, if he had looked at a generated resemblance of the God. And if he had been able to extend himself to the intellectual Jupiter, it is evident that he would have rendered his work still more beautiful. For from the paradigm indeed, beauty or the want of beauty accedes to the image; but from the maker, similitude or dissimilitude to the archetype is derived. With reference to both however, the image is said to be the image of the paradigm, but the work an effect of the maker. On this account also Timæus, when he speaks of the paradigm, conjoins with it its image: for he says, "*Thus therefore we must speak concerning the paradigm and its image.*" But when he speaks of the Demiurgus, he conjoins with him his work: for he then says, "*Of whom I am the Demiurgus and father of works.*"

Since however paradigms are triple; for there is either an eternal paradigm of an eternal thing, or an eternal paradigm of a generated thing, or a generated paradigm of a generated thing;—hence when there is an eternal paradigm of an eternal thing, that which is entirely eternal is the paradigm of that which is so in a certain respect, as intellect of soul. But when there is an eternal paradigm of a generated nature, this paradigm also is in a certain respect eternal, i.e. according to infinite time. And when there is an entirely generated paradigm of a generated nature, this falls off from eternity. For it is not possible that what is essentially generated, should be productive of eternal natures. 'The former, therefore, participate from their paradigms of beauty and order, as being imitations of a stable nature; but the latter, as deriving their subsistence from things mutable and in motion, are not beautiful, and yet are not entirely deformed, but are alone manifested through the negation of beauty. Such things, therefore, as are the beautiful progeny of art, are not beautiful when compared with the beauty which accedes from an eternal paradigm to sensible paradigms.' And perhaps on this account also, Timæus does not say that what derives its subsistence according to a generated paradigm, is entirely deformed, but only that it is not beautiful. For that which is constituted according to artificial reason, does not subsist conform-

\* For *ορμασι* here, it seems necessary to read, *παρεσκευασι*.

ably to an eternal form, since there are not in intellect paradigms of things artificial. Hence, they are not simply beautiful, nor yet are they deformed, because in short, they derive their subsistence according to reason, [or that productive principle which is in the mind, of the artist.] That these axioms therefore are true, we may through these observations be reminded.

Some however doubt, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged, that there is a Demiurgus of the universe who looks to a paradigm: for there is not a Demiurgus of it say they who directs his attention to that which is invariably the same. And many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion; among whom are the Epicureans, who entirely deny the existence of that which is perfectly eternal. The Stoics admit that there is a Demiurgus, but assert that he is inseparable from matter. And the Peripatetics grant indeed, that there is something which is separate from matter, yet do not allow that it is a producing, but that it is a final cause. Hence they also take away paradigms, and place over the whole of things an intellect void of multitude. Plato however and the Pythagoreans celebrate a separate and exempt Demiurgus of the universe, a producing cause of all things, and a providence that is attentive to the welfare of wholes; and this with the greatest propriety; for if the world, as Aristotle says, aspires after intellect, and is moved towards it, whence does it derive this desire? For since the world is not the first of things, it is necessary that it should possess this tendency, from a cause which excites it to desire. For he also says that the appetible is motive of that which is appetitive. But if this is true, and the world by its very being and according to nature is appetitive of intellect, it is evident that the whole of its existence is from thence, whence also its being appetitive is derived. Whence likewise is the world, since it is finite, moved ad infinitum? For every body possesses, as he says, a finite power. Whence therefore does the universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epicurus says it is? In short, if intellect is the cause of a motion which is infinite, uninterrupted, and one, there is something which is productive of the eternal. But if this be the case, what should hinder the world from being perpetual, and deriving its subsistence from a paternal cause; for as it receives an infinite power of being moved, from the appetible, through which it is moved ad infinitum, thus also it will entirely receive from thence an infinitive power of existing, through the proposition which says, that in a finite body there is not at any time an infinite power. Either therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, and

how is this possible? For every thing partible, has something impartible which connects it, as Aristotle himself somewhere says, and the universe also is an animal. He therefore says that God is an eternal animal, but every animal is connected by the life which is in it. Or the universe has, indeed, a power which connects it, but this power is finite. This, however, is impossible: for if it is finite, it will fail. Or it possesses an infinite power. And again, it will not have this from itself. Something else, therefore, imparts to it the power of existing, and imparts not the whole at once. For it is not receptive of the whole at one time. Hence it imparts this power by influx, and the influx is perpetual, and always as much as the world is able to receive. So that the world is always *becoming to be*, and never *is*.

But if intellect is the Demiurgus of the world, whether does it make that which it makes, by a reasoning process, or by its very being? If indeed by consulting, an absurdity follows. For there will be a mutation about it, and the passions of a partial soul. It will not therefore consult. And if it should consult, it must entirely antecedently assume in itself the work about which it consults; just as every one does who consults before he energizes. But if it makes by its very being, it makes that which is similar to itself. And if it does this, it will contain the paradigms of the things that are generated. And again, we must investigate, whether these paradigms subsist primarily in it, or not, and whence it derives this paradigmatic cause of wholes. Farther still, after what manner do we see artificers that are here produce? Is it not by possessing the reasons or productive principles of their effects? This, therefore, the daemonic Aristotle will also grant. But if art imitates nature, it is necessary that nature, much prior to art, should contain the reasons of the things which she generates. And if nature does this, we must inquire whence she is moved, and whence she is perfected? For she is irrational; and thus ascending, we must say that the causes of all things are in intellect. In opposition to Aristotle, indeed, much has been said by many; but our business, at present, is to explore what Plato says.

In the first place, therefore, let us investigate from what cause he introduces to generated natures the beautiful and the not beautiful, from the paradigm, and not from the producing cause. It might then have been said, that there are two-fold demiurgic causes, viz. the generated and the intelligible, the latter being effective of beautiful things, but the former of things that are not beautiful. But Plato does not speak after this manner, but says that intelligible paradigms are the paradigms of beautiful effects, but generated paradigms, of such as are not beau-

tiful. It may however be said, that what is here asserted contributes to erudition, exhorting us not to reject beautiful actions. For if he had said that what is generated, is not effective of beauty, perhaps he might have rendered us more sluggish with respect to beautiful actions. But it will be better and more physical, if we say that it is possible for the same effective cause to look to two-fold paradigms, and to make a certain thing beautiful, and a certain thing not beautiful. For soul looking to intellect, generates truth and science, but looking to generation, she procreates imaginations, and passive appetites. But it is impossible for the same paradigm to be the cause of beautiful and not beautiful effects. Very properly therefore is it asserted, that from this cause beauty and deformity accede to generated natures. As the paradigm however of this universe is beautiful, it is evident that it is intelligible, and always subsists invariably the same; to which also the Demiurgus looking, adorns the universe. If, therefore, it is the supplier of beauty, it has the highest order among eternal beings, and belongs to the first intelligibles. Hence the cause effective of beauty is there, through which all things are beautiful, intellect, soul, and the nature of body. Again, therefore, the Demiurgus, indeed, is the cause of form, but the paradigm of beauty, and *the good* of union. And the last of these, supplies all things at once, but the paradigm is the supplier of beauty and form, and the demiurgic cause, so far as it is intellectual, of form and essence.

Moreover, the demiurgic cause looking to the intelligible is multiform. For the *whole* Demiurgus fabricates in one way<sup>1</sup> looking to it. He, therefore, is united to it according to supreme transcendency. But the demiurgic triad fabricates in another way. And of this triad indeed, the first [i. e. Jupiter] fabricates uniformly; the second [i. e. Neptune] generatively, and the last [i. e. Pluto] convertively. And in one way in the ruling, in another in the liberated and in another, in the mundane order. But after this triad, we must survey fabrication proceeding after a different manner to the many demiurgic Gods, who from these receive and are allotted paternal powers. After these, also, it proceeds in one way to demiurgic angels, but in another to demiurgic daemons, the attendants of this order. Farther still, we must likewise survey the undefiled forms of life, which contribute to the demiurgic series, and the genera of partial souls, which follow the demiurgic choir. For the peculiarity and the mode of production, and of looking to the intelligible, extend differently to different natures, as far as to these. It is also necessary to admire this in Plato, that he does not say that what is generated on

<sup>1</sup> For αὐτῷ here, it is necessary to read αὐτῶν.

account of<sup>1</sup> an eternal paradigm is beautiful, but that what is generated by the Demiurgus who looks to it, is most beautiful; since that which is confused and disordered is generated, for it is visible and sensible. But every thing of this kind is and was generated, as he says further on, receiving from the intelligible certain vestiges of forms prior to fabrication, and is not most beautiful, though it is in a certain respect beautiful, as with reference to the formless nature of matter. Hence that which is generated on account of an eternal paradigm, such for instance as that disorderly and confused nature, is not simply beautiful, but that which was generated by the Demiurgus looking to it. For from that confused nature the Demiurgus was absent; but the intelligible prior to the Demiurgus, illuminated that disorderly essence. So far, however, as it was generated by the Demiurgus, it was also generated by the eternal paradigm, energizing on it through the Demiurgus as a medium. And so far indeed as it was generated by the paradigm, it was invested with form, but so far as by the Demiurgus, it was arranged. *For the Demiurgus is the cause of order; but the paradigm is simply the cause of form to its participants.*

Farther still, from the paradigm itself the difference of demiurgic powers may be assumed. For some of these powers, indeed, looking to the whole of intelligibles, produce according to the whole of them; but others produce partially. And some, indeed, survey the whole of intelligibles through union; but others through intelligence. Some, again, do not produce according to the whole of the intelligible; but some are divided according to the four primary causes; others proceed into a greater number; and others make the last forms the paradigms of their productions. Hence through these, there is one shepherd of men, but another of horses, as Plato says in the Politicus, and in a similar manner in other forms. As the demiurgic series therefore is various, and there are different paradigms of different things, some of which are more total, but others more partial, Timæus very properly does not say, that he who uses this intelligible paradigm, makes that which is generated to be beautiful, but he who uses a paradigm of *this kind*. In the intelligible paradigms therefore, the part is in a certain respect the whole, on account of the union of intelligibles; and the multitude is most similar to the monad, through the domination of sameness. Since also the whole Demiurgus looks indeed to the intelligible and all-perfect animal, but employs the paradigm which is in himself, possessing intellectually the intelligible; which paradigm also

<sup>1</sup> For *ἡρώδης* in this place, we must read *ἡρώδης*.

is such as the intelligible through similitude to it, but is of a more partial nature; hence Timæus adds the words *a certain to a thing of this kind*. For these intelligibles participate of the eternal paradigm, and are more partial than all-perfect animal. Hence, too, he calls idea,  $\tau\iota$ , *a certain thing*, assimilating that which is generated to the paradigm. But fabrication imparts essences and powers to the things that are generated. Why, however, of eternal being does he say "*employing a paradigm of this kind*," but of that which is generated, he no longer adds the expression "*of this kind*," but instead of this, adduces the term *generated*? Is it not because the intelligible has something similar to itself, as having the highest rank, but that which is generated being the last of things, has nothing else similar to itself? For that which is produced on account of it, is generated, and to this the dissimilar is appropriate; but to the intelligible, the similar, the same, and every thing of this kind, is allied. And thus much concerning these particulars. But the term *always* must be conjoined to a subsistence according to sameness, in order that there may be that which looks to a nature always possessing a sameness of subsistence. For thus the philosopher Porphyry properly decides. For Timæus does not say that the Demiurgus in fabricating all things, *always beholds*, as Atticus thought, but that the intelligible *always subsists after the same manner*. Unless it should be said, that on this account he assumes the beholding always, lest by seeing at one time, but at another not, he should latently introduce into his production, that which is not beautiful. The Demiurgus, therefore, looks to that which is eternal, in order that he may produce that which is similar to it, and beautiful.

"Let therefore this universe be denominated by us, *all heaven*, or *the world*, or whatever other appellation it may be especially adapted to receive."

This is the last of the axioms, giving a name to the subject [of discussion] conformably to geometricians, when they speak about the gnomon in parallelograms. For they say any one thing consisting of two complements is to be called a gnomon. For since Plato intends to call the same thing both heaven and the world, in order that you may not think he disturbs the doctrine, by employing at different times different names, he previously determines something about the

\* For  $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$   $\gamma\alpha\rho$  here, read  $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$   $\gamma\alpha\rho$ .



names. For it must be observed that these names had great ambiguity with the ancients; some of them calling the sublunary region alone the world, but the region above it, heaven; but others denominating heaven a part of the world. And some defined it to extend as far as to the moon; but others called the summits of generation heaven:

The wide-spread heav'n in æther and the clouds  
Fell to the lot of Jove.\*

Hence Plato very properly determines concerning these names, prior to the whole theory, calling the universe heaven and the world, and saying *all heaven*, that you may not fancy he says, *a divine body alone is denominated by us the world, or by whatever other name it may rejoice to be called*. And it seems, indeed, that he calls the universe *heaven*, conformably to the opinion of all men, but *the world*, according to his own opinion. For he says, let it be called by us heaven and the world. For the name of *world* is adapted to it as a certain fabrication; though it is also possible to call it both heaven and the world: *heaven*, indeed, as beholding the things above,<sup>1</sup> as surveying the intelligible, and as participating of an intellectual essence; but *the world*, as being always filled and adorned by truly existing beings. It may also be called *heaven*, as being converted [to its principle], but *the world* as proceeding from it. For it is generated by, and is converted to real being. But as of statues established by the telestic art, some things pertaining to them are manifest,<sup>2</sup> but others are inwardly concealed, being symbolical <sup>3</sup> of the presence of the Gods, and which are only known to the mystic artists themselves; after the same manner, the world being a statue of the intelligible, and perfected by the father, has indeed some things which are visible indications of its divinity; but others, which are the invisible impressions of the participation of being <sup>4</sup> received by it from the father who gave it perfection, in order that <sup>5</sup> through these it may be eternally rooted in real being. Heaven, indeed,

<sup>1</sup> Iliad. xv. vs. 192.

<sup>2</sup> This is asserted in the Cratylus.

<sup>3</sup> For *αφανη* here, it is necessary to read *εμφαιη*.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of *συμβολικη των θεων παρουσιας* in this place, it is necessary to read, *συμβολικα της των θεων παρουσιας*.

<sup>5</sup> Instead of *της του οντος μετοχης* in this place, it is necessary to read *της του οντος μετοχης*.

<sup>6</sup> In the words *ινα μη δε αυτων ερριζωμενος η δαιωνιως εν τη οντι*, it is obvious that *μη* ought to be expunged.

and *the world*, are names significant of the powers in the universe; the latter so far as it proceeds from the intelligible, but the former so far as it is converted to it.

It is however necessary to know that the divine name of its abiding power, and which is a symbol of the impression of the Demiurgus, according to which it does not proceed out of being, is ineffable and arcane, and known only to the Gods themselves. For there are names adapted to every order of things; those indeed that are adapted to divine natures being divine, to the objects of dianoia, being dianoetic, and to the objects of opinion, doxastic. This also Plato says in the *Cratylus*, where he embraces what is asserted by Homer on this subject, who admits that names of the same things with the Gods, are different from those that subsist in the opinions of men,

Xanthus by Gods, by men Scamander call'd.<sup>1</sup>

And,

Which the Gods Chaleis, men Cymmdis call.<sup>2</sup>

And in a similar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of the Gods is different from that of partial souls, thus also the names of the one are different from those of the other; since divine names unfold the whole essence of the things named, but those of men only partially come into contact with them. Plato therefore knowing that this pre-exists in the world, omits the divine and ineffable name itself, which is different from the apparent name, and with the greatest caution introduces it as a symbol of the divine impression which the world contains. For the words, "*or whatever other appellation*," and "*it may receive*," are a latent hymn of the mundane name, as ineffable, and allotted a divine essence; in order that it may be co-ordinate to what is signified by it. Hence, also, divine mundane names are delivered by Theurgists; some of which are called by them ineffable, but others effable; and some being significant of the invisible powers in the world, but others of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Through these things, therefore, as hypotheses, the mundane form, the demiurgic cause and paradigm, and the apparent and unapparent name of the world, are delivered. And the former name indeed is duadic, but the latter monadic. For the words "*whatever other*" are significant of oneness. You may also consider *the ineffable* name of the universe, [as significant<sup>3</sup>] of its abiding in

<sup>1</sup> *Iliad* xx. vs. 74

<sup>2</sup> *Iliad* xiv. vs. 291.

<sup>3</sup> In the original in this place, *σημαίνον* is omitted.

the father ; but the name *world*, as indicative of its progression ; and *heaven*, of its conversion. But through the three, you have the final cause, on account of which it is full of good ; abiding ineffably, proceeding perfectly, and converting itself to *the good* as the antecedent object of desire. It is fit, however, to engage in the discussion of the rest of the theory, terminating what follows by the principles.

“ In the first place, therefore, that as an hypothesis, must be considered respecting it, which ought in the beginning to be surveyed about every thing.”

After the prayer, the exhortation to the auditors, and the delivery of the hypotheses, nothing else remains than to dispose the whole discussion conformably to the hypotheses themselves. Of this, however, that head is the leader, whether the world was generated, or is unbegotten, having no beginning of generation. For in what was asserted prior to the hypotheses, Timæus said, “ *It is necessary that we who are about to speak concerning the universe, whether it was generated or is unbegotten, should invoke the Gods and Goddesses,*” as from hence commencing the theory. And in the hypotheses, “ *What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated, but is never [real] being,*” were the things which were first assumed. This therefore must first be considered, as it was the first thing supposed in the principles. It is necessary, however, as Socrates says in the Phædrus, respecting every thing, to consider in the first place *what* it is. But this is the form of the object of investigation. And the generated and the unbegotten give distinction to the mundane form. So that this is very properly thought to be the first thing that deserves an appropriate consideration, to which also Timæus immediately after this directs his attention. But since most of the Platonists understand by the words *περὶ πάντος*, that Plato means *about every thing*, conformably to what is said in the Phædrus, but Porphyry understands the words as signifying *about the universe*, it being fit to speak first concerning the universe, and to show whether it is naturally unbegotten or generated,—it is requisite to know that the former interpretation has in a greater degree the spontaneous. For to assume *τὸ πάντος* for *τὸ περὶ τὸν πάντος*, is a forced assumption.

That, however, these things are simply to be investigated concerning every thing, we may previously assume from common conceptions, and the first hypotheses. The addition also of “ *whether the universe always was, having no beginning of generation, or whether it was generated,*” shows that what is said is asserted more generally of the universe. For with reference to the world, it is demonstrated that it has a

beginning of generation, and that it is visible and tangible, but not with reference to the universe. This, therefore, is manifest. But since it is also necessary to discover in the first place the mundane form, whether it is to be arranged among eternal, or among generated natures, let us see what arguments the philosopher employs, and follow him in his demonstrations whether it always was, having no beginning of generation, or was generated from a certain principle; for we shall find that he uses all the dialectic methods in the hypotheses. Thus he *divides* being from that which is generated, and *definitively* and also *analytically* assigns what each of them is. For he recurs from generated natures to the demiurgic and paradigmatic causes of them. Moreover, having indicated to us the truth concerning ineffable and effable names, in perfect conformity to the doctrine of Pythagoras, who said that number was the wisest of things, but that he was the next in wisdom who gave names to things,—he afterwards converts himself to the demonstrations of the problems concerning the world. And in the first place, he endeavours to find the form of it, and whether it must be admitted to be a portion of perpetual being, or of a generated nature. And on this account he inquires whether it has a certain principle of generation, or has none, not asking whether it belongs to eternal beings, or to generated natures; for he might have said that it was a medium between both these, in the same manner as soul. But he asks whether it always was, having no principle whatever of generation, or whether it was in some way or other generated, in order that he might apprehend the medium between both these to be that which has a certain principle of generation, and yet always is. Afterwards having shown that the world is alone generated according to its body, he grants it according to a certain other thing to be unbegotten, according to which also it is a God, as will be evident as we proceed.

Such therefore being the inquiry, Plutarch, Atticus, and many other of the Platonists, conceiving the generation here mentioned to be temporal, say that the inquiry is, whether the world is unbegotten or generated according to time. For they assert that prior to the fabrication of the world, there was a disorderly motion. But time entirely subsists together with motion; so that there was time prior to the universe. Time, however, was also generated together with the

\* As the dialectic of Plato is perfectly scientific, as we have shown in the notes on the Parmenides, and employs the dividing, defining, analysing, and demonstrative methods, it is evident that instead of *διαλογικαὶ μέθοδοι* in this place, we should read *διαλεκτικαὶ μέθοδοι*. This is also evident from what follows.

universe, being the number of the motion of the universe; so that the former time was prior to the fabrication of the world, being the number of a disorderly motion. But the interpreters of Plato that follow Crantor, say that the world is said to be generated, as being produced by another cause, and not being self-begotten, nor self-subsistent. And Plotinus, and the philosophers after Plotinus, viz. Porphyry and Iamblichus, say that the composite nature is here called that which is generated, and that with this, generation from another cause is co-subsistent.

We however say, that all these assertions are most true; and that *the world is generated, both as a composite, and as being indigent of other causes to its existence.* For every thing which has interval is a thing of this kind, and that which is sensible, is allotted such a nature as this. We think it fit however, that these philosophers should look to other generated natures, I mean time and soul, survey what is common in them, and extend it to these significations, and say, that [real] being indeed is that, which eternally possesses a stable essence, power and energy. But that which is simply, or absolutely generated, is that which receives all these according to time. And that which is in a certain respect generated, possesses its energy in motion and extension. For it has been before observed by us, that Plato defined the extremes to be, that which is simply perpetual being, and that which is simply generated. But in what is here said, he comprehends the media. Hence, *that which does not possess at once, the whole of its essence, or energy established in unity, is denominated generated.* A thing of this kind also, entirely subsists through generation, and its existence is generated, or becoming to be, but is not [real] being. This sensible world likewise, time among things that are moved, and the transitive intelligence of souls, are things of this kind. But it is manifest that all motion subsists according to a part, and that the whole of it is not at once.

If, however, the essence of the world has generation, and the perpetuity of it subsists according to temporal infinity, some one by considering this may syllogize as follows: First, that it is necessary between things that are eternally perpetual, and things which are generated in a part of time, the medium should be an hypostasis which is generated infinitely. And that this should be two-fold, either having the whole perpetual, through the whole of time, but the parts in the parts of time, as is the case with these elements, or having both the whole and the parts co-extended with the perpetuity of the whole of time, as is the case with the celestial

! For *τοῦτο* here, it is necessary to read *τοῦτο*.

bodies. For there is not the same perpetuity according to eternity and the whole of time; since neither is there the same infinity of time and eternity, because eternity and time are not the same. In the second place, that what is measured by eternity, and exists in eternity, is necessarily impartible. For how can that which is partible be fixed, and have its essence established in the impartible? In the third place, that soul energizes according to time, and that body subsists entirely in time. For the energy of soul is nearer to eternal natures, than the essence of body. What is it then, by which we may infer that the essence of the celestial bodies is thus perpetual according to time? It is this, that it cannot be separated from the cause that adorns it. For this makes it evident that it is allotted a renovated perpetuity, and is always generated from a source external to itself. For if it received the whole of its proper essence from itself, it would be sufficient to itself, separate from that which makes it, and imparts to it essence. The intention indeed of Plato is to show, that the world is simply generated, as having its essence, power, and energy, and also its perpetuity co-extended with the whole of time. But he inquires from the first, whether it is eternal being, or belongs to things which are perfected by time. For the expression *always was*, signifies with Plato the intelligible, as we have before observed. If, however, he says further on, that the term *was* is not adapted to eternal natures, but the term *is*, we must not be disturbed. For prior to a distinct evolution, he follows the accustomed mode of speaking. Hence also, when celebrating the Demiurgus he says, "*he was good*," though the Demiurgus ranks among eternal natures. And speaking of the paradigm, he collects both these together at once: for he says, "*The nature of animal itself therefore was being eternal*;" together with *αιωνιος οουσα* being eternal, assuming *το ετογγαν* was. And in addition to all that has been said, because the power of every finite body is not infinite, as Aristotle has demonstrated, but eternity is an infinite power, hence every finite body is incapable of receiving eternity. It is necessary therefore that it should not always *be*, but should always *be generated*, or *becoming to be*, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence.

Being, therefore, as I have said, and perpetual being, manifest the eternal. But "*that which was generated*," signifies the being allotted an hypostasis, measured by time, such as is a sensible nature, which also is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. It has however been already said by us, that the intelligible is self-subsistent and eternal; but that the sensible nature is produced by something different from itself, and is con-subsistent with time. For the eternal in number is one thing, and the temporal another. And the former *is* in number,

but the latter *is generated* in number. For to the former eternity is conjoined, but to the latter time. That which is generated likewise, though it is said to be perpetual, has an hypostasis co-extended with all time, and which is always generated, and always adorned by its producing cause. If therefore, perpetual being manifests the eternal, but that which has a principle of generation signifies that which is produced by another cause; for such is that which is always generated; but Plato always inquires, whether the world always was, or has the principle of a certain generation;—this being the case, an inquiry of this kind will be the same as an investigation, whether the world belongs to eternal natures, or to things which are generated according to the whole of time; and whether it belongs to self-subsistent natures, or to things which are adorned by another cause.

Farther still, that which is generated belongs to things which are multifariously predicated. For this very thing which has a temporal beginning, and is so much spoken of, is called generated, whether it arrives at being through generation, or without generation, as Aristotle says. Every thing likewise which proceeds from a cause, is called generated, that also which is essentially a composite, and that which has a generable nature [or which is naturally capable of being generated] though it should not have been generated; such as is that which has a visible nature, though it should not be seen. That which is generated therefore, being predicated multifariously, that which is generated according to time, has all the generations. For it proceeds from a cause, is a composite, and has a generable nature. It does not, however, entirely follow that what is generated after another manner, has all the generations. [If therefore Plato had inquired whether the universe has all the generations,] or not all,\* we should say that he investigated whether it is generated according to time, or has not a temporal principle of generation. Since, however, this is not the case, but he asks whether it has no principle whatever of generation, or has a certain principle of it, he renders it manifest to those who have the smallest degree of intelligence, that he does not doubt about its temporal beginning, but whether the universe, since there are many generations, has a certain principle of generation. For if it has no principle whatever of generation, it belongs to eternal and self-subsistent natures, in which there is not generation, because neither is there time. For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the

\* It seems that the following words are wanting in this place in the original: *εἰ τοῦτον εἴηται οὐ πλατὺν ποτερον το παν πασαι εχει τας γενεσεις.*

Gods, yet we say this indicating their ineffable progression, and the difference of secondary natures with reference to the causes of them. Theologists, however, previously subverting all such doubts, in order that the generations of the Gods may be rationally devised by them, call the first principle of things Time, because it is fit that where there is generation, time should precede, according to which and on account of which generation subsists. With these, therefore, cause and time are the same; since also with them progression is the same as generation. That however which is truly generated, is that which does not generate itself, but is generated by another, becomes the image of another thing, is composed of many dissimilar things, and always receives a renovated hypostasis; with which also time is conjoined. It likewise has a never-failing generation, co-extended with the infinity of time, and is always becoming to be one and the same in number, but is not one according to an eternal subsistence. But that which is thus generated you may say proceeds from non-being. For that which is self-subsistent, being generated by itself, does not proceed from non-being. For though you may divide it by conception into cause and effect, yet it proceeds from being. For the maker and that which is made are one, so that it proceeds from the being of itself. Hence also it is eternal, never at any time deserting itself. But that which is alone from another thing, subsists from non-being, because it no longer is when separated from its cause; and the cause is different from the effect.

Thus, therefore, the physical axiom <sup>1</sup> may be adapted according to analogy to this generated nature: and that which is always generated and illuminated by being, to that which is always in time. But this is evident; for if you take away the maker, the universe is immediately imperfect; which is likewise the case with every thing that is still generated. At one and the same time, however, the universe is generated and perfect, and is always generated. Hence also its perpetuity and its perfection, are according to the whole of time. For time was generated together with the heaven [or the universe], not a part of time, but all time: so that the heaven is generated in an infinite time, and is never-failing both with respect to beginning and end, in the same manner as time. Thus, therefore, it is also said to have a principle of generation, and to originate from a certain other principle. And in the first place, indeed, it originates as he says from the most proper principle, the final. For from this, the generating cause commences the generation of the world. In the next place, the generation of the

<sup>1</sup> i. e. That the cause is different from the effect.



world subsists with reference to the final principle, and as the world is always becoming to be, it is beginning to be generated, and possesses the end of it, through generation in the whole of time. For with respect to the world, *it was generated*, is not one thing, and *it is generated* another; as neither is the beginning of it one thing, and the end another. That, therefore, which is generated in a part of time, begins at one time, and is perfected at another; *but that which is generated in the whole of time is always beginning, and is always perfect*. And it has indeed, a certain principle of generation, which is perfected by something different from itself, but it has not a certain principle, as not having the beginning of a certain partial time. For since generation is multifarious, the principle also of it is multifarious. So that the generation which subsists through the whole of time <sup>1</sup> is *a certain* generation, and this principle is the principle of *a certain*, and not of *all* generation. What therefore is this generation? That which has both the beginning <sup>2</sup> and the end contracted together [so as to be simultaneous]. Because therefore the world is a body, it is generated, and has a principle or beginning of generation. But because intellect is the maker of it, it was generated, and has an end of generation. Through both, however, it is rising into existence, and is perfect according to generation, was generated, is always becoming to be, and is generated. For these do not <sup>3</sup> subsist at one and the same time, in things which are generated in a part of time. Thus for instance the motion of the heavens, not being generated in a part of time, is always, as Aristotle says, in the end; but this is not the case with motions on the earth.

“It was generated. For it is visible and tangible, and has a body. But all such things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense, and appear to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated.”

As the Demiurgus of wholes looking to himself, and always abiding in his own accustomed manner, produces the whole world, totally and at once collectively, and with eternally invariable sameness; for he does not make at one time, and at another not, lest he should depart from eternity; after the same manner also

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<sup>1</sup> *χρονος* is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> *αρχη* also is omitted in this place in the original.

<sup>3</sup> It is necessary to supply *οτι* here.

Timæus, being converted to himself, delivers the whole theory, recurring to intellect from dianoia, and proceeding into a reasoning process from intellect; doubting, therefore, and interrogating himself, he energizes according to the self-motive nature of soul; but in answering he imitates the projecting energy of intellect. For he first comprehends the dogma in one word γενεα, *it was generated*, and proclaims the conclusion prior to the demonstration, directly after the manner of those who energize enthusiastically. For these see the whole collectively, and contract in intellect the end prior to the egress, perceiving all things at once. But syllogizing, he descends from intellect to logical progressions, and the investigation through demonstration of the nature of the world. Hence, in a manner perfectly divine, he shows from the hypotheses the whole form of the universe. For if the world is visible and tangible, and has a body, but that which is visible and tangible, and has a body, is sensible, and that which is sensible is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense, and is generated, the world therefore is generated. Hence he shows this demonstratively from the definition, according to a conversion<sup>1</sup> of the definition; since geometers also use demonstrations of this kind.<sup>2</sup> And thus much concerning the form of the words. [Since, however, as we have said, he asks whether the universe is eternal, or has a certain principle of generation, he answers, *it was generated*.<sup>3</sup> From this, therefore, it is evident that he gives a *certain* generation to the world: for this was the other part of the before-mentioned opposition. If, however, this be the case, he establishes the universe remote from temporal generation; for if the world has a *certain*, and not *every* principle of generation, but that which is generated in time has the principle of every generation, the world was not generated in time. Farther still, let us also consider the wonderful hypotheses of Atticus, who says that what was moved in a confused and disorderly manner is unbegotten, but that the world was generated in time, and let us speak concerning this assertion, "*it was generated*."] Since, therefore, Atticus admits that there is a cause of generation, let us see what the nature of this cause is according to him; for the world is visible and tangible. Whether, therefore, was every thing sensible generated in time, or not every thing? If indeed every thing, then that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner will be generated in time: for he says that this also

<sup>1</sup> For ἐπιστροφήν here, it is necessary to read ἐκστρόφην.

<sup>2</sup> See this explained farther on.

<sup>3</sup> Γενεα is omitted here in the original.

was visible. But if not every thing, then the reasoning of Atticus is unsyllogistic and conclusive of nothing. Unless he should say, indeed, that the world is visible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is not now visible, but was so prior to the fabrication of the world; since Plato also speaks in this manner when he says, "*every such thing as was visible, and was moved in a confused and disorderly manner.*" But in the words before us he says, "*for it is visible and tangible, and has a body.*" He shows therefore that every thing which *is* visible and tangible, was generated, but not that which *was* visible and tangible. Though, therefore, these things should be asserted by Atticus; for the man is skilful in defending what he advances; it must be said in answer to him, that there is nothing of this kind in the definition of that which is generated, but it is simply said, that every thing generated is the object of opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. So that if there is any thing which is entirely sensible, such thing will be generated. But every thing visible is sensible; and therefore that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is generated. In addition to which we may also say<sup>1</sup> that Plato calls this very disorderly thing itself generated. For he says that prior to the generation of the world, there were three things, being, place and generation, subsisting in the vestiges of forms. Hence that disorderly nature was generated, as well as that which is visible. It is not proper therefore to say that it was unbegotten according to time, and that the universe was generated; but either both were generated according to Plato, or both were unbegotten. For both are similarly said by him to be visible and generated. If however both were generated, the world prior to being generated such as it now is was changed into the confused: for to a contrary, the generation is entirely from a contrary. And if he who made the world is good, how is it possible he should not adapt it in a beautiful manner, or that having beautifully adapted it, he should corrupt it? But if he is not good, how not being good, did he make it to be arranged and adorned? For it is the province of a good being to adorn and arrange other things. If, however, being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not necessary immediately to make the universe to be generated in time, because it is visible and generated. And thus much against Atticus.

But let us recur to our principles, and discuss the affair as follows: Whether is the world perpetual being, in the same manner as the eternal, or is it not

<sup>1</sup> For  $\phi\omega\varsigma$  here, it is necessary to read  $\phi\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$ .

eternal, but consubsistent with time? And whether is it self-subsistent, or produced by another? Such then is the inquiry. But the answer is, that it is produced by another, and is consubsistent with time. A thing of this kind however, is generated. For if it has a composite form, it has a generation according to the composition. And if it alone subsists from another cause, it is generated, as not being itself productive of itself. If likewise it is not eternal, it has the whole of its hypostasis according to time. For it is fabricated on account of another, and is generated as a flowing image of being. Hence, as that which is composite is to that which is simple, and as time is to eternity, so is generation to essence. If, therefore, a simple and uniform essence is eternal, the essence which is composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation. For it is divinely said by Plato, that the world originated from a certain principle. For that which is generated in a portion of time began from a temporal, from a producing, from a final, from a material, and from a formal cause. For since principle is multifariously predicated that which was once generated has a beginning of generation according to all these causes. The world however originated from a *certain*, and not from *every* principle. What therefore is this principle? You must not say it is a temporal principle. For that which originates from this is also allotted the principle of generation from all the rest. But it originated from that principle, in which he afterwards instructs us, I mean the most proper, or the final principle. For it was generated on account of *the good*; and this is the principle from which its generation originated. He says therefore that this is the most proper principle, so that this may be called the principle of the generation of the world. Hence in the first place he shows that the world is generated from its composition; for it is visible and tangible. These, therefore, are the extremes of the universe. For heaven is visible, but earth is tangible. And visibility is in earth so far as it participates of light; and tangibility in heaven, so far as a terrestrial nature is antecedently comprehended in it according to cause. But the world is simply [visible and tangible],<sup>1</sup> and has a body in order that you may also assume the middle plenitudes which it contains. And this again is asserted by Plato conformably to the oracle, which says: *It is an imitation of intellect, but that which is fabricated has something of body.* So far, therefore, as the universe

<sup>1</sup> For *παρομερον* here, read *παπαγομερον*.

<sup>2</sup> For *μεν* here, it is requisite to read *μη*.

<sup>3</sup> The words *οπαρον και ανρον* appear to me to be omitted in this place.

has something corporeal, it is generated ; for according to this it is visible and tangible. But every thing visible and tangible, is sensible ; *for sense is touching and seeing*. That however which is sensible is the object of opinion, as being mingled from sensibles, and not able to preserve the purity of intelligible forms. But every thing of this kind is generated, as having a composite essence.

Plato, therefore, does not subvert the perpetuity of the universe, as some who follow the Aristotelian hypotheses fancy he does. And that this is true we may easily learn from hence. [He says that time was generated together with the heaven or universe. If therefore time is perpetual, the universe also is perpetual. But if the universe had a temporal beginning, then time also had a temporal beginning, which is of all things the most impossible.<sup>1</sup> They say, however, that time is twofold, the one disorderly, but the other proceeding according to number. For motion is twofold, the one kind disorderly and confused, but the other orderly and elegant. But there is a time<sup>2</sup> co-ordinate to each of these motions. That a body, however, may be moved equably or anomalously is possible ; but it is impossible to conceive an equable and anomalous time. For thus the essence of time will be a composite. And why do I say this ? For when the motion is anomalous, time is equable. There are now, therefore, many motions ; and some are swifter, but others slower, and one is more equable than another ; but there is one continued time of all these, and which proceeds according to number. Hence it is not right, thus to make a twofold time. If, however, time is one and continued ; if indeed it is unbegotten, the universe also is unbegotten, which is consubsistent with time. But if it was generated, an absurdity will follow ; since time, in order that it may be generated, will be in want of time, and this, though it does not yet exist. For when time was generated, time was not yet.

Farther still, Plato conjoins the soul of the universe immediately on its being generated, with body, and does not give to it life prior to the corporeal-formed nature, but as soon as it is constituted incloses it in body. Moreover, he says that soul ranks among beings that always exist. If, therefore, he makes body and soul to be consubsistent, but soul always exists, according to him body also is perpetual. For that which is at once consubsistent with the perpetual, is un-

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *εἰ δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει χρόνικη, καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς ἀρχὴν ἔχει χρόνικη*, in this place it seems to be necessary to read, *εἰ δὲ οὐρανὸς ἀρχὴν ἔχει χρόνικη, καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἀρχὴν ἔχει χρόνικη*.

<sup>2</sup> For *χρόνος* here, it is requisite to read *χρονος*.

gotten. Again, Timæus here says, that the soul was generated; but Socrates in the Phædrus says, it is unbegotten. Hence, he after another manner calls that generated, which is clearly unbegotten according to time. Farther still, he says that the world is incorruptible, which is also granted by those who oppose him. But in the Republic he clearly asserts, or rather the Muses, that every thing generated is necessarily corrupted, assuming in this place generation according to time. From these things, therefore, you may understand what I say: for the world is thus demonstrated to be unbegotten. For if the world is incorruptible, but nothing which is generated according to time is incorruptible, the world is not generated according to time. What occasion is there, however, for these syllogisms! For Plato in the Laws clearly says, that time is infinite according to the past, and that in this infinity there have been myriads on myriads of barren and fertile periods of men. For investigating the beginning of a polity, from which cities change into virtue and vice, he adds: "*But you will say, from whence? I indeed think from the length and infinity of time, and the mutations which take place in a thing of this kind.*" Or rather that we may argue from what is in our hands, a little prior to this, we may hear him saying, that "*where there is neither extreme heat or cold, there the race of men always exists more or less numerous.*" But if the race of men always exists, the universe also is necessarily perpetual.

Again, therefore, if the Demiurgus ranks among eternal beings, he does not at one time fabricate, and at another not. For if he did, he would not have an invariable sameness of subsistence, and immutability. But if he always fabricates, that which is fabricated by him always exists. For why, being willingly at rest for an infinite time, did he at length convert himself to fabrication! Was it because he apprehended it to be better! But was he, prior to this, ignorant that it was better or not! For it is absurd, being intellect, that he should be ignorant; since there will be about him both ignorance and knowledge. But if he knew this, why did he not before begin to generate and produce the world! And if it was better, why did he not persevere in this energy, if it be lawful so to speak! For it is not holy to conceive that, being intellect and a God, he would pursue that which is less instead of that which is more beautiful. It is necessary, however, to admit these things, if the world is generated according to time, and is not consubistent with the infinity of time. Those also appear to me to sin against

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ τοῦ κόσμου συνεγένετο*, in this place, it is necessary to read *ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ τοῦ χρόνου συνεγένετο*.

the Demiurgus of the world, in another way, who say that the world once was not. For if it once was not, there was a time in which the Demiurgus did not make it. For that which is made, and that which makes, subsist together. But if there was a time in which he did not make, he was then a maker in capacity. And if he was in capacity, he was imperfect, and afterwards perfect when he made. If, however, there is prior and posterior about him, it is evident that he does not belong to natures which energize eternally; but that he passes from not making according to time, to making. Moreover, he produces time. How therefore having an energy which is in want of time, does he produce it through this energy? For he once produced time, of which he is indigent, in order that by his effective energy he may produce time. This, therefore, cannot be otherwise.

After this opinion, however, let us direct our attention to Severus, who says that the world simply considered is indeed perpetual, but that this which now exists, and is thus moved, was generated. For there are twofold circulations, as the Elean guest has shown; one of which is that which the universe now circumsolves, but the other the contrary to it. The world therefore is generated, and originated from a certain principle, which is the cause of this circulation. But simply considered it is not generated. This interpretation, however, we shall oppose, by observing, that it is not proper to transfer fabulous enigmas to physiology. For how is it possible that the soul which moves the universe, should be weary, and change the ancient circulation? How also is the universe perfect, and sufficient to itself, if it desires mutation? How can there be an alternate change of circulations, when both that which is moved, and that which moves, preserve their proper habit? And how does Timeus say, that the circulation of the nature which is characterized by sameness, is moved to the right hand, according to the demiurgic will, but that which is characterized by difference, to the left hand? For if it is necessary that the works of the Demiurgus should remain invariably the same, and be perpetual, it is likewise necessary that the circulations should be always the same; and that the period characterized by sameness should be moved to the right hand, but that which is characterized by difference, to the left.\* For they proceeded at one and the same time from the Demiurgus, and were allotted this circulation. Farther still, is it not necessary, that inequality must thus be introduced to the

\* The words *την δὲ ὁμοειρήνην ἐκ' ἀπαιρέσει*, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted in this place.

motion of the universe! For every thing which is about to cease from its former motion, and to pass on to another, hastens to the contrary, i. e. to rest, and causes the precedaneous motion to waste away. For if it continued fixed in the same energy, what is the cause of the second circulation? By no means, therefore, are these interpretations which are not physical to be admitted. Nor again, must such explanations be adopted, though they are more rational, as those which ascribe generation to the world, in conception only. For thus we may also infer according to conception, and not according to truth, that there is a Demiurgus of the universe. For from admitting that the world was generated, it is demonstrated that there is a producing and demiurgic cause of it. Or it may be said, that the universe is admitted to be generated 'for the sake of perspicuity, and the doctrinal method, in order that we may learn what the numerous goods are, of which it participates, from the demiurgic providence. For this is indeed in a certain respect true, yet is not sufficient to the theory of Plato. For the perspicuous, says Iamblichus, is venerable, when it is adapted to science. For admitting also that the universe is perpetual, it is possible to point out the goods imparted to it by the Gods. And thus much in opposition to these interpretations.

Again, however, let us show from the beginning, after what manner the universe is said to be generated. For it is neither so according to time, through the before mentioned arguments, nor simply because it proceeds from a cause; since it is not sufficient to say this. For intellect also is from the first cause, and all things after *the one* are from a cause, yet all things are not generated. For where does the eternal subsist, if all things are generated? For *the one* is prior to eternity. After what manner therefore, it may be said, is the universe generated? As that which now is always becoming to be, and at the same time always was becoming to be, or rising into existence. For it is not that which is partial. Body therefore, [i. e. partial body] is not only generated, but there is also a time when it was generated. But the whole world alone subsists in *becoming to be*, and is not at the same time that which *was* generated. It is also according to Aristotle always in the end, *the always* being temporal, according to temporal infinity. For as the solar-form light proceeds from its proper fountain, thus also the world is always generated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the

<sup>1</sup> *For* is omitted in this place; and the sentence ought to be interrogative. Hence instead of *ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ἐκέρχεται, τὸ αὐτὸν τῆς δυνάμεως ἀνασκηνοῦσθαι*, we must read *ἐκ γὰρ τῆς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ἐκέρχεται* &c. with a note of interrogation at the end.

<sup>2</sup> After *πρότερον τοῦ παρ* here, the word *γενεῖσθαι* must be supplied.



time time always was so. As a composite likewise it is generated. For all composition is generation. But if it is always composed, it was always becoming to be, with which to be generated concurs. And it appears to me that Plato knowing this, says *it was generated* instead of it is generated, just as of [real] being, he says it was, instead of it is; for his words are "*whether it always was.*" For as in the intelligible, the was and is are the same; for all things are there according to sameness, since all things are in *the now*, which is more impartible than the now which is according to time; thus also *it is generated* and *it was generated* proceed to the same thing in every sensible nature. For it was generated, as that which always was becoming to be, and as generated, it is. But that a thing generated, when it is assumed according to a certain time, does not indicate that which is simply a composite, is evident from its opposite. For to this Plato opposes perpetual being. If, therefore, perpetual being manifests that which is simple, we must say that what is alone a composite is generated. But if eternal being signified that which is always according to time, that which is originating from a certain thing, would be said to be becoming to be. For that which is generated is not opposed to the eternal, so far as it is generated, but so far as it participates of time; on which account also it is generated. That perpetual being, however, [or that which always is,] manifests the eternal, is evident; since the Demiurgus also who produces time, is called perpetual being, and the paradigm likewise is thus denominated. Hence, it signifies an eternal hypostasis, and not that which participates of temporal perpetuity.

Some one, however, who acknowledges this may nevertheless doubt, why we have before said that the world is generated, from having a body? For as there are in it a body, which is alone generated, a divine soul, which always is, and a divine intellect prior to this, why do we say that it is generated on account of its body, and not denominate it unbegotten, on account of its soul, or its intellect? It is said, therefore, that the whole world is every where characterized from form, and not from the subject nature. For do we not call Socrates mortal, though he has an immortal soul, because the animal which is in him is mortal? If, however, you say that we now consider the corporeal-formed nature of the universe, not yet co-arranged with soul, you will speak rightly. But when you see it animated and endued with intellect, you may call it a God. For thus Plato in the Republic calls it *a divine generated thing*. But in this dialogue, he thinks fit to denominate the world, a blessed God. In the very words also before us, he in a greater degree celebrates the universe. For as he is about to call that which is

unbegotten [viz. soul] generated, though he attributes an unbegotten subsistence to eternal natures, thus also he calls the world generated. For it is not when denominated generated, diminished by a juxtaposition with the eternal. He likewise conjoins *the becoming to be* of it, with *it was generated*; in order that as *all* or the universe, he may evince that it is perfect and being, but as having its essence in time, that it is generated. He likewise assigns to it the principle of a certain and not of all generation. And according to its corporeal-formed nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the divine powers in it, through which it is happy, and is called a God.

Moreover, the demonstration is worthy of admiration, viz. how scientifically it proceeds from the definition. Hence also, he inverts the order. For in the hypotheses indeed, he defined that which is generated to be the object of opinion; but to the demonstration of that which is generated, he assumes the converse, in order that he may make the definition to be the middle term, as in demonstration is perfectly requisite. For this will cause what is said to be truly a demonstration. For opinion through<sup>1</sup> possessing the reasons of generated natures, introduces the order of causes with reference to them. Hence it appears to me that Plato is not satisfied with the term sensible in order to demonstrate that the world is generated, but adds also that what is sensible is the object of opinion; since sense indeed knows the energy of sensibles, in consequence of suffering by them, but opinion knows also their essences. For it antecedently comprehends the reasons of them. In order, therefore, that he might evince the essence of sensibles to be generated, he forms his demonstration from that which is the object of opinion. Farther still, his not adding *that which is destructible* to *that which is generated*, shows his reverential conceptions of the world; though it is in a certain respect true that the world is destructible, as we have before said. At the same time, this exhibits to us the caution and reverence of Plato; for having that which is consequent [to the being generated], yet he does not add it; which he ought to admire who thinks that the world was generated according to Plato in time. For this generated nature which he calls the object of opinion, is at the same time destructible; but the world is not destructible at the same time that it is generated. Hence the world is both destructible and incorruptible, yet the philosopher does not call it both these according to the same; for this would be ridiculous; but he calls it incorruptible, in the same manner as unbegotten, according to time. For if that which is generated according to time,

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *η γαρ δεξαται τους λογους εχειν των γενητων* in this place, it is necessary to read *η γαρ δεξαται τους λογους κ. λ.*

is corruptible, as it is said to be in the Republic, that which is incorruptible is unbegetten. But *the world is destructible, as not being able to connect itself.* For as that which is corporeal so far as pertains to itself is either motive, or moved by another, thus also so far as pertains to itself it is destructible, in consequence of being connected by something else. For no body is either generative or connective of itself; since every thing which generates, makes; but every thing which makes is incorporeal. *For though it should be a body, yet it makes by incorporeal powers.* Every thing, therefore, which generates is incorporeal; and every thing which connects, is effective of a certain thing, viz. it is effective of union, and the undissipated. But every thing which is effective is impartible. Every thing therefore connective is impartible. Hence it is impossible for that which connects itself to be a body. For it is not the province of body to connect; since so far as it is body, it is partible, as it is said in the Sophista against those who assert that all things are bodies. But that which connects is impartible. If, however, that which is connected is body, but that which connects is incorporeal, body is not itself connective of itself. Hence that which is connected by itself is necessarily impartible. As therefore body has in its own nature a finite power, so likewise it is in its own nature destructible, not as being adapted to corruption, but as not naturally capable of preserving itself, nor as corruptible in capacity, that you may also investigate the corruptible in energy, but as incapable of imparting incorruptibility to itself.

Whence, therefore, has it the perpetual, and whence does it receive infinite power? We reply, from its producing cause. For as it is moved from thence, so likewise it is generated from thence, and is always generated. For every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, is allotted a never-failing nature, as also the demoniacal Aristotle says; so that according to this reasoning likewise, the world will have the perpetual proceeding from the immoveable [i. e. from the intellectual] fabrication. Since, however, according to its own proper nature it is generated, it is always generated from the father. But since the world being all and a whole, is not imperfect, in addition to being generated, or becoming to be, it always was generated, since, likewise, the motion of it is always in the end, as Aristotle says. Much more, therefore, is the essential generation of it always in the end, imitating the perfection of its maker. *So that it is always generated, and always was generated; not receiving<sup>1</sup> at once the whole infinity of the generative*

<sup>1</sup> It is necessary here to supply *μη δεχομενος*.

*power of its Maker, but always according to the now possessing the ability of existing from this power, and receiving something from it, according to the instantaneous participation of infinity.* And it receives the same infinity, indeed, on account of that which is imparted, but on its own account is not able to receive the same at once. After this manner, therefore, the perpetuity of the world remains, and the generation of it takes place; and in this respect the before mentioned men [i. e. Plato and Aristotle] are not at variance. At the same time, however, they differ, because Plato says, that the essence of the universe is co-extended with all time, but Aristotle supposes that it simply always exists, infers this to be necessary through many arguments, and ascribes to it temporal infinity, asserting at the same time that eternity is stable infinite power. He likewise demonstrates that no infinite power whatever can be present with a finite body. Hence it follows, that the world being corporeal always receives infinite power, but never has the whole of it, because it is finite. It is therefore alone true to say, that from infinite power it is *generated*, but *is not*, infinitely. But if it is generated, it receives infinity on account of infinite time. For *to be* infinite pertains alone to that which is eternal; but a *generated* infinite belongs to that which is temporal; for generation is conjoined with time. Hence Aristotle himself is compelled to acknowledge that the world is in a certain respect generated.

Both likewise assert that it is the same in number, but Plato conformably to principles, says that it is generated. For he established prior to the universe a producing cause, from which he gives subsistence to the universe. But Aristotle does not admit that any eternal nature is an effective cause. And the former, indeed, generates time together with the essence of the universe, but the latter together with motion: for time according to him is that which is numbered. Aristotle, however, is accustomed to do this in his other Treatises. For such things as Plato asserts of *the one*, Aristotle ascribes to intellect,\* viz. the non-possession of multitude, the desirable, the having no intellectual perception of secondary natures. But such things as Plato attributes to the demiurgic intellect, Aristotle ascribes to the heavens, and the celestial Gods: for according to him, fabrication and providence are from these. Such things also as Plato ascribes to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motion; departing indeed from theological principles, but dwelling more than is fit on physical

\* Aristotle in his metaphysical discussions ascends no higher than intelligible intellect, which is with him the first cause. And perhaps this was in consequence of knowing that all beyond this intellect is truly ineffable.

productive powers.\* Since, however, the daemoniacal Aristotle is very copious in discussing the reciprocations of the generated with reference to the corruptible, and of the unbegotten with reference to the incorruptible, he must be reminded, that Plato much prior to him assents to these axioms; in the Republic indeed asserting that corruption follows every thing which is generated; but in the Phædrus, that the unbegotten is also incorruptible. How is it possible, therefore, since Plato gives generation to the universe, that he should not also introduce corruption to it; or that corrupting that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he should not give generation to it prior to corruption? The generation of the universe, therefore, was devised by him after a manner different [from its apparent meaning].

“ But we say that whatever is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause.”

The discussion accords with the hypotheses, or rather with the order of the things from which the hypotheses are assumed. For as every where form is suspended from the effective cause, so likewise, the first hypotheses are in continuity with the second, and afford a principle to the demonstrations which are consequent to them. For since it was demonstrated according to the first hypothesis, that the world was generated, through the object of opinion as a medium, afterwards that which is consequent to this is demonstrated according to the second hypothesis, viz. that it was generated by a cause. For if the world is a thing generated, or becoming to be, but every thing generated is generated by a certain cause, hence the world was necessarily generated by a certain cause. What therefore is the producing cause of the universe? That from which the being generated is present to the world. For it is necessary to investigate this immediately after the present demonstration. And we shall see as we proceed, what kind of arguments Plato uses on this subject.

Now, however, let us briefly recall to our memory, [the reasoning by which it is shown] that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause. Every thing generated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any other imperfect thing. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that

\* This is because he discussed metaphysics physically, just as Plato discussed physics metaphysically.

which is in energy. But that which is in energy is perfect; so that every thing which perfects another is always when it perfects in energy<sup>1</sup> according to that form to which it gives perfection). That however, which is generated, so far as it is generated, is imperfect. Hence that which is generated, so far as it is generated is not naturally adapted to perfect another thing. But if it cannot perfect another thing, much more is it incapable of perfecting itself. The latter, therefore, is a greater undertaking than the former. For that which perfects itself, is also perfective of another thing.<sup>2</sup> But if it is not perfected by itself, it is evident that it is perfected by another. For how will it be generated, unless it is perfected?

Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated. But every thing which is generated being imperfect, is either perfected by another thing, or by itself. Hence every thing which is generated, is either perfected by another, or by itself. But it is not perfected by itself. It is therefore perfected by another, so that it is generated by a certain cause. Farther still, the world is a composite, and has its hypostasis from dissimilars. But if it is a composite, it is either composed by itself, or by another. For it is necessary that composition should be from a cause, unless we intend to make it an accidental thing, and from chance. If therefore it is composed by itself, again it will perfect itself, and give subsistence to itself, and we shall ignorantly transfer it to an incorporeal essence. For how will it compose itself? Will it be from the parts arranging themselves? But thus we shall make bodies to be self-motive. Or will it be from impelling each other? And what in this case is that which primarily moves them. And how is it holy to commit the whole world to such like impulsions and contrivances? How likewise will there be order from things deprived of order, and ornament from things unadorned? For every where that which makes is better than its effect, and that which generates, than the thing generated. And if indeed the parts are the material causes of the composition of the world, what is it which made them? For this is what we investigate. But if they are the efficient causes, how is it possible that things unadorned can be effective of things that are adorned, and disorderly natures, of such as have order and arrangement? If however the world is not composed by itself, it is evident that it has this composition from another. Hence if the world is a composite,<sup>3</sup> but that which is a composite is

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *αὐτὸς ἐν ἐνέργειᾳ* in this place, we should doubtless read *αὐτὸς ἐν ἐνέργειᾳ ἑστὸς*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸς τελεωτικὸς ἐστὶν*, which is evidently defective, it seems requisite to read *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸς τελεῖται, καὶ ἄλλος τελεωτικὸς ἐστὶν*.

<sup>3</sup> *Σύνθετος* is omitted in the original.

composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause. Hence too, from these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause.

It is not however wonderful, if Plato calls the cause of every thing generated, *a certain cause*. For the cause of all things, is *simply* cause, and not *a certain* cause; concerning which he also says, that it is the cause of all beautiful things. For it is simply God. But every divinity posterior to it is *a certain* God, as for instance, demiurgic or vivific. The cause therefore of generated natures is a certain cause, as differing from the cause of all. Hence, he says, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause. It is also well that Plato says one cause precedes the whole of generation. For multitude is co-arranged about one principle, and the many unities about *the one*. But with respect to other physiologists, some rank cause with con-causes; others recur to physical powers; others to dispersed infinite principles; others to nature; and others to soul. Plato, however, dismisses indeed these causes, but supposes that there is one cause which is the first of all causes. For with this cause, the psychical order indeed co-operates, but nature is ministrant to it, and all con-causes are subservient to it, and are moved conformably to its will. Because, therefore, the demiurgic monad precedes multitude, he denominates this monad a cause: for this is significant of unity. Because, however, it has not the first order among causes, nor is imparticipable,<sup>1</sup> he adds the word *certain*. So that the words "*by a certain cause,*" have the same signification as, *by one cause indeed, yet not the first cause*. Hence, neither is it reasonable immediately to produce that which is generated, but that which is eternal, from *the one*; in order that from *the one*, which is prior to eternity, every eternal nature may proceed; but from an eternal nature, that which is generated and temporal. And that self-subsistent natures likewise may proceed from that which is superior to beings that produce themselves; but from these, those that are generated by others. For the series and order of things which proceed from *the one*, is continued; and things nearer to the principle, give subsistence to such as are more remote from it.

"It is difficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men."

<sup>1</sup> For *as* here, it is requisite to read *et*.

<sup>2</sup> The demiurgic monad, (i. e. Jupiter or the Demiurgus,) is not imparticipable because it immediately illuminates, or is con-subsistent with, intellectual intellect. See the 6th Book of my Translation of Proclus on the theology of Plato.

It has been rightly observed by some prior to us, that Plato having shown that the world was generated by a cause, immediately after ascends to the God who is the Demiurgus of it, in a manner worthy of his intellectual conceptions. For it seems that the artificial nature of the progeny, introduces a rational and divine cause, and not accident or chance, which are neither causes, nor have an hypostatic power, nor in short, sustain the well-ordered progression of beings. It is requisite, however, that we should first examine the words themselves, and afterwards thus recur to the whole theory.

Father and maker therefore, differ from each other, so far as the former is the cause of matter,<sup>1</sup> but the latter of the world and order, and in short, of the formal cause; and so far indeed as the former is the supplier of being and union, but the latter of powers and a multiform essence; and so far as the one stably contains all things in himself, but the other is the cause of progression and generation; and so far as the former signifies ineffable and divine providence, but the latter an abundant communication of productive principles. Porphyry however says, that father is he who generates the universe from himself, but maker he who receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo indeed, is said to be the *father* of Plato, but the builder of a house is the *maker* or fabricator of it, as not himself generating the matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, there was no occasion to call the Demiurgus father, because, according to Timæus, he does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus therefore, rather the maker as producing form? For we call all those makers who produce any thing from a non-existent state into existence. But so far as the Demiurgus produces that which he produces, in conjunction with life, he is father. For fathers are the causes of animals, and of certain living beings, and impart seed together with life. And thus much concerning this particular.

But "*this universe*" signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and the whole spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudes of each. It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers, which ride as it were in the corporeal masses. It also comprehends all the mundane causes<sup>2</sup> and the whole divinity of the world, about which the number of the mundane Gods proceeds; likewise, the one divinity, the divine soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the divine,

<sup>1</sup> For *αλης* here, it is necessary to read *αλης*, because matter according to Plato proceeds from the father Phæus, or animal itself, and not from the Demiurgus.

<sup>2</sup> For *αυρουι*, it is necessary to read *αυρουι*.



intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is conjoined with the world. For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate to itself. All these therefore must be assumed for the *universe*; since it signifies all these. Perhaps likewise the addition of the pronoun *this*, is significant of the universe being in a certain respect sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not *this*, because it is comprehensive of *all intellectual forms*. But the term *this* is adapted to the visible universe which is allotted a sensible and material nature. It is difficult therefore, as Plato says, to discover the Demiurgus of this universe. For since with respect to discovery one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are first,<sup>1</sup> but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature, according to reminiscence; the discovery from such things as are first may be said to be difficult, because the invention of the intermediate powers, pertains to the highest theory. But the discovery from such things as are secondary, is nearly more difficult than the former. For if we intend from these to survey the essence of the Demiurgus, and his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld all the nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the world, and the unapparent natural powers which it contains, according to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist. Prior to these also, we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons, and natures themselves, both the more total and the more partial,<sup>2</sup> and again, the immaterial and material, the divine and daemoniacal, and the natures of mortal animals. And farther still, the genera which are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefiled and the material, such as are wholes, and such as are parts, the rational and the irrational, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours, through which every thing between the Gods and the mortal nature are bound together. We must likewise have beheld the all-various souls, the different numbers of Gods according to the different parts of the universe, and the ineffable and effable impressions of the world through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without having seen these is impelled to the survey of the Demiurgus, is more imperfect than is requisite to the intellectual perception of the father. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be conjoined with that which is all-perfect.

Moreover, it is necessary, <sup>3</sup> that the soul becoming an intellectual world, and being assimilated as much as possible to the whole intelligible world, should in-

<sup>1</sup> viz. From axioms and definitions.

<sup>2</sup> *Μετὰ τὰς* is omitted in the original.

<sup>3</sup> For ἐν here, it is requisite to read ἐκ.

introduce herself to the maker of the universe; and from this introduction, should in a certain respect become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For uninterrupted energy about any thing, calls forth and resuscitates our [dormant] ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at the door of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to him. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, to associate alone with the alone, and to see him himself, the soul hastily withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For being present with her father, she then considers scientific discussions to be but words,<sup>1</sup> banquets together with him on the truth of real being, and in pure splendor is purely initiated in entire and stable visions. Such therefore is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Neither is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence of the intellectual Demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and a union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be denominated difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after every evolution of life; or as the true labour of souls. For after the wandering about generation, after purification, and the light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect which is in us shine forth, placing the soul in the father as in a port, purely establishing her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the nature of *the one* than this. For this is the paternal port,<sup>2</sup> and the discovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him.

<sup>1</sup> This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus being so much superior to scientific perception.

<sup>2</sup> Proclus here alludes to the fabulous wanderings of Ulysses in the Odyssey. For Homer by these *occultly* indicates the life of a man who passes in a regular manner from a sensible to an intellectual life, and who being thoroughly purified by the exercise of the cathartic virtues, is at length able to energize according to the intuitive perception of intellect, and thus after becoming re-united to Penelope or Philosophy, meets with and embraces his father. This appears also to have been the opinion of the Pythagorean Numenius, as we are informed by Porphyry in his treatise *De Antro Nympharum*. "For he thought that the person of Ulysses in the Odyssey represented to us a man who passes in a regular manner over the dark and stormy sea of generation; and thus at length arrives at that region (i. e. the intellectual region) where tempests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation

"Who ne'er knew salt, or heard the billows roar."

See more on this subject in my *Restoration of the Platonic Theology*, p. 294.

But to say "*that when found it is impossible to speak of him to all men,*"<sup>1</sup> perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who had arcane assertions about divine natures, and did not divulge them to all men. For as the Elean guest says, the eyes of the multitude are not strong enough to look to truth. Perhaps also this may be said which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to certain persons such as he has seen him. For the discovery was not made by the soul speaking, but closing her eyes, and being converted,<sup>2</sup> to the divine light. Nor was it made by her being moved with her own proper motion, but through being silent with a silence which leads the way [to union]. For since the essence of other things is not naturally adapted to be spoken of, either through a name, or through definition, or through science, but is seen through intellection alone, as Plato says in his Epistles, in what other way can it be possible to discover the essence of the Demiurgus, than by intellectual energy? And how when having thus found it, is it possible to tell what is seen, and explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolution which is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple nature. What then, some one may say, do we not assert many things about the Demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of *the one itself*? To this we reply, we speak indeed *about* them, but we do not speak *of each of them itself*. And we are able indeed to speak *scientifically* of them, but not *intellectually*. For this, as we have before observed, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a silence of the soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth, be sufficient to lead that which is discovered into light.

After these things, therefore, let us, following the light of science, survey who the Demiurgus is, and to what order of beings he belongs. For different philosophers among the ancients were led to different opinions on this subject. For Numenius, indeed, celebrating three Gods, calls the first father, but the second maker, and the third that which is made. For the world according to him is the third God. So that with him the Demiurgus is two-fold, viz. the first and the second God, and that which is fabricated is the third God. For it is better to say this, than<sup>3</sup> to say as he does speaking tragically, grandfather, offspring, nephew. He how-

<sup>1</sup> For *μὴδε ευροντα δυατα δυατον ειναι λεγειν* it is necessary to read, *μὴδε ευροντα εις απαιτας δυατον, κ. λ.*

<sup>2</sup> For *απειστραμμενης*, it is requisite to read *επιστραμμενης*.

<sup>3</sup> It is necessary here to supply *η*.

ever, who asserts these things, in the first place does not rightly con-numerate *the good* with these other causes. For it is not naturally adapted to be conjoined with certain things, nor has it an order secondary to another. But *father* with Plato [in the text] is arranged as the second to *maker*. Farther still, Numenius co-arranges that which is exempt, <sup>1</sup> from all habitude, with the natures that are under and posterior to it. It is necessary, however, to refer these indeed to the first, but to take away from it all habitude. Neither therefore, is the paternal nature of the maker <sup>2</sup> adapted to the first. For these things <sup>3</sup> are apparent in the orders of Gods posterior to it. In the third place; it is not right to divide father and maker, since Plato celebrates one and the same God by both these names. For one divine fabrication, and one maker and father, are every where delivered by Plato. And by following names, to divulse the one cause [of the world,] is just as if some one, because Plato calls the universe both heaven and the world, should say there are two fabrications, the one heaven, and the other the world; just as here, Numenius says there is a two-fold demiurgic God, the one father, but the other maker.

With respect to Harpocraton, it would be wonderful, if he were consistent with himself, in determining things of this kind about the Demiurgus. For this man is inconsistent in what he says according to the doctrine of three Gods and so far as he makes the Demiurgus to be two-fold. For he calls the first God, Heaven and Saturn, the second, Dia and Zena, and the third, Heaven and the World. But again changing the order he calls the first God Dia, and the king of the intelligible; but he denominates the second God, the ruler, and the same divinity, is with him Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The first God therefore, is all these; from whom Parmenides takes away all things, every name, all language, and all habitude. And we, indeed, cannot endure to call the first God even father; but he denominates him father, and offspring, and the offspring of an offspring.

But Atticus, the preceptor of Harpocraton, immediately makes the Demiurgus to be the same with *the good*, though the Demiurgus is called *good* by Plato, but not *the good*. He is also denominates by him *intellect*, but he says that *the good*

<sup>1</sup> For ἐξηρημευον in this place, it is requisite to read ἐξηρημενον.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of παντος here, the sense evidently requires that we should read παντων.

<sup>3</sup> Father and maker are first apparent in the intelligible and intellectual, and afterwards in the other orders of Gods.

is the cause of all essence, and is beyond being, as we may learn in the Republic. What then will Atticus say concerning the paradigm? For it is either prior to the Demiurgus, and in this case, there will be something more ancient and honorable than *the good*; or it is in the Demiurgus, and the first God will be many things; or it is posterior to the Demiurgus, and thus *the good*, which it is not lawful to assert, will be converted to things posterior to itself, and will intellectually perceive them.

After these men, Plotinus the philosopher, asserts that there is a twofold Demiurgus, one in the intelligible world, but the other the leader and ruler of the universe. And he says rightly. For the mundane intellect is in a certain respect the Demiurgus of the universe. And Aristotle shows that this is the first God, denominates it Fate, and calls it by the name of Jupiter. But again, there is an exempt father and maker, which Plotinus places in the intelligible, calling every thing between *the one* and the world, the intelligible. For there, according to him, the true heaven, the king of Saturn, and the Jovian intellect subsist. Just as if some one should say, that the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, are in the heavens. For the whole intelligible is one many, and is one intellect comprehensive of many intelligibles. Plotinus therefore philosophizing asserts these things.

Amelius, however, makes a threefold Demiurgus, three intellects, and three kings, one being him that exists, another him that possesses, and the third him that sees. But these differ, because the first intellect, indeed, is *truly* that which it is. The second, is the intelligible which is in it, but has the intelligible prior to itself, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the second intellect. But the third, is also the intelligible which it contains; for every intellect is the same with its conjoined intelligible; but it possesses the intelligible which is in the second, and sees the first intellect. For by how much greater the interval is, by so much the more obscure is that which is possessed. He supposes, therefore, that there are these three intellects and Demiurgi, and says that with Plato there are three kings, and with Orpheus also three, Phanes, Heaven, and Saturn. And he who, according to him, is especially the Demiurgus, is Phanes. It is worth while, therefore, to observe to him, that every where Plato is accustomed to recur from multitude to the unities, from which the order in the many proceeds. Or rather, prior to Plato, unity always precedes multitude according to the arrangement itself of things. And every divine order originates from a monad. For it is necessary, indeed, that divine number should proceed from the triad;

but the monad is prior to the triad. Where, therefore, is the demiurgic monad, in order that the triad may proceed from it? How likewise is the world one, unless it was fabricated by one cause? For it is by a much greater priority necessary that the cause itself should be united, and be monadic, in order that the world may become only begotten. Let there then be three Demiurgi; but who is the one Demiurgus prior to the three? For no one of the divine orders originates from multitude. Farther still, if the paradigm is one, and the world is one, how is it possible that there should not also be one Demiurgus prior to the many, who looks indeed to the one paradigm, but makes the world to be only begotten? Hence, it is not proper that the demiurgic number should originate from a triad, but from a monad.

After Amelius, Porphyry thinking to accord with Plotinus, calls the supermundane soul the Demiurgus, but the intellect of it to which it is converted, animal itself, so as to be according to him the paradigm of the Demiurgus; whom it is worth while to ask, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the Demiurgus. How, likewise, is this conformable to Plato, who continually denominates the Demiurgus a God and intellect, but never calls him soul? How also does he call the world a God? How does the Demiurgus proceed through all mundane natures? For all things do not participate of soul, but all things partake of the demiurgic providence. And divine production, indeed, is able to generate intellect and Gods, but soul is not naturally adapted to produce any thing above the psychical order. I omit to say that this very thing itself requires much confirmation, whether Plato knew that there is a certain *imparticipable*<sup>1</sup> soul.

In the next place, therefore, the divine Iamblichus has written much against the opinion of Porphyry, and has subverted it as being Plotinian; but delivering his own theology, he calls the whole intelligible world the Demiurgus; so that from what has been said, it is evident that he asserts the same thing as Plotinus. He says, therefore, in his Commentaries, "Thus we call that which is truly cause, and the principle of generated natures, and the intelligible paradigms of the world, the intelligible world. Such causes, likewise, as we admit to have an existence prior to all things in nature, these, the demiurgic God, whom we now investigate, comprehending in one, possesses in himself." If, therefore, in what is here said, he intends to signify that in the Demiurgus all things subsist demiur-

<sup>1</sup> i. e. A soul which is not consubstient with body.

gically, and being itself, and the intelligible world, he speaks conformably both to himself, and to Orpheus who says :

For in Jove's ample dwelling all things lie,  
And in Jove's belly they together flow.

And all such like assertions. Nor is it at all wonderful, that each of the Gods should be the universe, but after a different manner, one demiurgically, another connectively, another immutably, another convertively,<sup>1</sup> and another in some other way according to a divine peculiarity. But if he says that the whole extent between the world and *the one*, is the Demiurgus, this deserves to become the subject of doubt; and we may urge against this assertion the arguments which we derive from him. For where are the kings that are prior to Jupiter, and are the fathers of Jupiter? Where are the kings, according to Plato, whom he thinks fit to arrange above the world next to *the one*? How likewise can we say that perpetual being itself is the first being, if we also say that the Demiurgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himself perpetual being, as is likewise animal itself? For shall we not thus be compelled to say, that the Demiurgus is not an eternal being? Unless the Demiurgus likewise is comprehended together with other eternal beings. That Iamblichus himself, however, though he here celebrates the demiurgic order in a more confused manner, yet speaks of it more accurately elsewhere, may be from thence assumed. For writing concerning the fabrication of Jupiter in the Timæus, after the intelligible triads, and the three triads of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual<sup>2</sup> Gods, he attributes the third order in the intellectual hebdomad to the Demiurgus. For he says that these three Gods are celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who assert that the first of them is an intellect comprehending in itself whole monads, the simple, the indivisible, the boniform, that which abides and is united in itself, and who deliver such like indications of its transcendency. But they say that the second is collective of the perfection of things of this kind, and that the most beautiful indications of it are divine fecundity, that which is collective of the three Gods, that which gives completion to energy, that which is generative of divine life, that which proceeds

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *τὴν δε τρεῖς*, it is necessary to read *τὸν δε ἐπιστρεπτικὸν*.

<sup>2</sup> It is here necessary to supply *καὶ νοερῶν*. For the three triads of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, immediately follow the intelligible triads, and the intellectual hebdomad follows as the third in order.

every where, and that which is beneficent. And they teach us that of the third who fabricates wholes, the most beautiful signatures are, prolific progressions, the productions and connections of total causes, together with total causes defined by forms, all proceeding fabrications, and other things similar to these. It is worth while, therefore, to form a judgment of the Iamblichean theology from these things, and to determine what the nature of it is respecting the Demiurgus of wholes. For how can the Demiurgus be the whole<sup>1</sup> of perpetual being, if indeed perpetual being has been already defined by Plato; but he now says that it is difficult to find the Demiurgus, and when found, impossible to speak of him to all men? And how can these things be verified of that which is definitively delivered, and unfolded into light to all those that were present?

After Iamblichus, therefore, Theodorus, following Amelius, says that there are three Demiurgi. He arranges them, however, not immediately after *the one*, but at the extremity<sup>2</sup> of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. He also calls the first an essential intellect, the second, an intellectual essence, and the third, the fountain of souls. He likewise says, that the first is indivisible, but the second, divided into wholes, and the third receives a division into particulars. Again, therefore, the same things must be said to him as were said to the illustrious Amelius; viz. that we indeed acknowledge that there are three Gods, or Gods analogous to these, yet we do not admit that there are three Demiurgi, but that the first is the intelligible of the Demiurgus, the second, his generative power, and that the third is truly the demiurgic intellect. It is likewise requisite to consider whether the fountain of souls is to be arranged as the third: for power pertains to the middle, as he somewhere says; and thus it must be denominated partially, and not called the universal fountain of life. For the fountain of souls, is one of the fountains contained in this middle [or generative power of the Demiurgus.] For life is not in souls only, nor in animated natures alone, but there is also a divine, and an intellectual, prior to the psychological life, which is said to proceed diversely from thence, from divided rivers. And such, in short, are the dogmas<sup>3</sup> of the ancient interpreters concerning the Demiurgus.

Let us, however, concisely relate the opinion of our preceptor [Syrianus] on this subject, as we think that it especially accords with the conceptions of Plato.

<sup>1</sup> For όλων here, it is necessary to read όλον.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν νοητῶν τε καὶ νοητῶν θεῶν, I read ἐπὶ ἐσχάτων τῶν νοητῶν κ. λ.

<sup>3</sup> For δογματῶν here, it is necessary to read δόγματα.



The one Demiurgus, therefore, according to him,<sup>1</sup> subsists at the extremity of the intellectual divine monads, and the fountains of life. But he emits from himself the total fabrication, and presides over the more partial fathers of wholes. Being, however, himself immoveable, he is eternally established on the summit of Olympus,<sup>2</sup> and rules over the twofold worlds, the supercelestial and the celestial, comprehending also the beginning, middles, and ends of wholes. For of the<sup>3</sup> whole demiurgic order, one part is a distribution of wholes totally, another of wholes partially, another of parts totally,<sup>4</sup> and another of parts partially. Fabrication, therefore, being fourfold, the demiurgic monad binds to itself the total providence of wholes; but a demiurgic triad, is suspended from it, which rules over parts totally, and over the divided power of the monad.<sup>5</sup> Just again, as in the other, or the partial fabrication, a monad is the leader of a triad, which orderly distributes wholes partially, and parts partially. But all the multitude of the triad dances [as it were] round the monad, and being divided about it, distributes its productions, and is filled from it. Of the many Demiurgi, therefore, there is one Demiurgus [who is the monad of the rest], in order that all things may be consequent to each other, viz. *the one*, the paradigm in intelligibles, the one intelligible Demiurgus, the one only-begotten world. If, however, these things are rightly asserted, the Demiurgus of wholes is the boundary of intellectuals, established indeed in the intelligible, but being full of power, according to which he produces wholes, and converting all things to himself. On this account also Timæus calls him intellect, and the best of causes, and says that he looks to the intelligible paradigm; in order that by this he may separate him from the first intelligible Gods. But by calling him intellect, he distinguishes him from the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. And by denominating him the best of causes, he establishes him above all the other supermundane Demiurgi. For he denominates the causes demiurgic, as also he had before said, "*Every thing generated is generated by a cause,*" and adds, "*When therefore an artificer, &c.*" Hence the Demiurgus is an intellectual God, exempt from all the Demiurgi. If,

<sup>1</sup> For *αὐτὸν* in this place, it is obviously requisite to read *αὐτόν*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. He dwells eternally in the highest intellectual splendor.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *πῶς γὰρ δημιουργεῖται κ. λ.*, here, it is requisite to read *τῆς γὰρ κ. λ.*

<sup>4</sup> After *το δὲ τῶν ὅλων μερικῶς*, it is necessary to supply the words, *το δὲ τῶν μερῶν ὁλως*, in order to render the division complete.

<sup>5</sup> For *τριάδος* here, we must read *μονάδος*.

however, he was the first among the intellectual Gods, he would alone abide in his own accustomed manner: for this is the illustrious property of the first. If he was the second, he would be particularly the cause of life. But now, when he generates soul, he energizes with the Crater [i. e. with Juno], but when he generates intellect, he energizes by himself. Hence he is no other than the third of the intellectual fathers. For his illustrious and principal work is to produce intellect, and not to fabricate body. For he produces body not alone, but together with necessity; but he produces intellect through himself. Nor does his principal work consist in producing soul: for he generates soul together with the Crater. But he alone by himself gives subsistence to intellect, and causes it to preside over the universe.

Existing, therefore, as the producer of intellect, he very properly has an intellectual order. Hence also he is said by Plato to be both maker and father, and neither father alone, nor maker alone, nor again father and maker. For the extremes indeed, are father and maker; the former possessing the summit of intelligibles, and being prior to the royal series [i. e. to Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, and Bacchus]; but the latter possessing the end of the [intellectual] order. And the former being the monad of paternal deity; but the latter being allotted a producing power in the universe. Between both these, however, are father and at the same time maker, and maker and at the same time father. For each of these is not the same; but in one order the paternal, and in another the effective has dominion. The paternal, however, is more excellent than the effective. Hence in the media, though both are in each, yet the former<sup>1</sup> is more father than maker. For it is the boundary of the paternal depth,<sup>2</sup> and the fountain of intellectuals. But the second is more maker than father. For it is the monad, of total fabrication. Hence I think the former is called *Metis*, but the latter *Metietes*. And the former indeed is seen, but the latter sees. The former also is absorbed, but the latter is replete with the power of the former. And what the former is in intelligibles, that the latter is in intellectuals. For the former is the boundary of the intelligible, but the latter of the intellectual Gods. Concerning the former likewise, Orpheus says,

In a dark cavern these the father made.

<sup>1</sup> Viz. father and at the same time maker. This God also is Phanes or animal itself, and subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order.

<sup>2</sup> For *βορρον* in this place, we must read *βυθον*.

But concerning the latter Plato says, "*Of whom I am the Demiurgus and father of works.*" In the Politicus likewise, he makes mention of the doctrine of the Demiurgus and father; because with the former [i. e. with Phanes] the paternal is more predominant, but with the latter [i. e. with Jupiter] the demiurgic. Each of the Gods however is denominated from his peculiarity, though each is comprehensive of all things. And he indeed who is alone maker,<sup>1</sup> is the cause of mundane natures. He who is maker and father, is the cause of supermundane and mundane natures. He who is father and maker, is the cause of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures. But he who is alone father, is the cause of intelligibles, of intellectuals, of supermundane and mundane natures.

Plato, therefore, admitting a Demiurgus of this kind, suffers him to be ineffable and without a name, as having an arrangement prior to wholes in the portion of *the good*.<sup>2</sup> For in every order of the Gods, there is that which is analogous to *the one*. Such therefore is the monad in each world. But Orpheus gives a name to the Demiurgus, in consequence of being moved [i. e. inspired] from thence; whom Plato himself likewise elsewhere follows. For the Jupiter with him, who is prior to the three sons of Saturn, is the Demiurgus of wholes. After the absorption therefore of Phanes, the ideas of all things shone forth in him, as the theologist says :

Hence with the universe great Jove contains,  
 Extended æther, heav'n's exalted plains;  
 The barren restless deep, and earth renown'd,  
 Ocean immense, and Tartarus profound;  
 Fountains and rivers, and the boundless main,  
 With all that nature's ample realms contain;  
 And Gods and Goddesses of each degree;  
 All that is past, and all that e'er shall be,  
 Occultly, and in fair connection lies,  
 In Jove's wide belly,<sup>3</sup> ruler of the skies.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Vulcan.

<sup>2</sup> viz. The Demiurgus has an arrangement analogous to *the good*. For as *the good* is the exempt monad of the intelligible order, so the Demiurgus is the exempt monad of the supermundane order.

<sup>3</sup> Celestial and sublunary causes and effects, are very properly said by Orpheus to subsist in the belly of Jupiter, because these have a middle subsistence between supermundane and Tartarean natures, just as the belly is in the middle of the body.

<sup>4</sup> These verses are very defective in the original; but the learned reader will find them in a correct state in the Orpheus of Herman.

Jupiter however, being full of ideas, through these comprehends in himself wholes: which the theologist also indicating adds:

Jove is the first, and last, high-thundering king,  
 Middle and head, from Jove all beings spring.  
 Jove the foundation of the earth contains,  
 And the deep splendor of the starry plains.  
 Jove is a king by no restraint confin'd,  
 And all things flow from Jove's prolific mind.  
 One mighty principle which never fails,  
 One power, one daemon, over all prevails.  
 For in Jove's royal body all things lie,  
 Fire, night and day, earth, water, and the sky.

Jupiter therefore, comprehending in himself wholes, produces in conjunction with Night all things monadically and intellectually, according to her oracles, and likewise all mundane natures, Gods,<sup>1</sup> and the parts of the universe. Night therefore says to him asking, how all things will be a certain one, and yet each be separate and apart from the rest:

All things receive inclosed on ev'ry side,  
 In æther's wide ineffable embrace:  
 Then in the midst of æther place the heav'n;  
 In which let earth of infinite extent,  
 The sea, and stars, the crown of heav'n, be fixt.

But after she has laid down rules respecting all other productions, she adds:

And when your power around the whole has spread  
 A strong coercive bond, a golden chain  
 Suspend from æther.

This bond which is derived from nature, soul and intellect, being perfectly strong and indissoluble. For Plato also says, that animals were generated, bound with animated bonds. Orpheus, likewise, Homerically calls the divine orders

<sup>1</sup> For *θεων* here, it is necessary to read *θεων*.

which are above the world,<sup>1</sup> a golden chain; which Plato emulating says, "*That the Demiurgus placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, fabricated the universe;*" and that he gave subsistence to the junior Gods, through whom also he adorns the parts of the universe. If therefore, it is Jupiter who possesses the one power, who absorbs Phanes, in whom the intelligible causes of wholes first subsist, who produces all things, according to the counsels of Night, and who gives authority both to the other Gods, and to the three sons of Saturn,—he is the one and whole Demiurgus of all the world, and has the fifth order among the kings, [i. e. among the Gods of the royal series,] as it is divinely demonstrated by our preceptor in his Orphic Conferences. Jupiter likewise, is co-ordinate with Heaven and Phanes, and on this account he is both maker and father, and each of these totally.

That Plato, however, had these conceptions respecting the mighty Jupiter, is manifested by him in the Cratylus from names: for he there shows that he is the cause and supplier of life to all things. For he says, "*That we denominate him Dia and Zena, through whom life is present to all things.*" But in the Gorgias he co-arranges, and at the same time exempts him from the sons of Saturn, in order that he may be prior to the three, and participated by them. He also makes Law to be his assessor, in the same manner as Orpheus. For with him also Law is placed by the side of Jupiter, according to the counsels of Night. Farther still, Plato in the Laws represents total Justice to be the attendant of Jupiter, in the same manner as the theologist. But in the Philebus he shows, that a royal soul and a royal intellect pre-exist in Jupiter according to the reason of cause. And conformably to this he now represents him as giving subsistence to intellect and soul, unfolding the laws of Fate, and producing all the orders of the mundane Gods, and constituting all animals as far as to the last of things; some things being generated by him alone, but others through the celestial Gods as media. To which we may also add, that in the Politicus he calls Jupiter the Demiurgus and father of the universe, just as in the present dialogue he says concerning him, "*Of whom I am the Demiurgus, and father of works.*" He likewise says in the Politicus, that the present order of the world is Jovian, and that the world is moved according to Fate. The world therefore living a Jovian life, has Jupiter for the Demiurgus and father of its life. If, likewise, he represents the Demiurgus delivering a speech,<sup>2</sup> this too is in reality Jovian. For in the Meno, he on this

<sup>1</sup> Instead of τῶν θεῶν πρῶτων ὑπο τῶν ἐσθμιῶν in this place, it is necessary to read τῶν θεῶν ταύτων ὑπερ τῶν ἐσθμιῶν.

<sup>2</sup> For δημιουργοῦντα here, it is necessary to read δημιουργοῦντα.

account calls him a sophist, as filling the Gods posterior to him with all-various reasons. This also the divine poet [Homer] manifests, who represents him thus speaking<sup>1</sup> from the summit of Olympus.

Hear, all ye Gods and Goddesses, my words.

And converting the two-fold co-ordinations to himself. Through the whole of his poetry, likewise, he praises him as the supreme of rulers, and the father of men and Gods, and celebrates him with all demiurgic conceptions. As, therefore, we have shown that all the Grecian theology attributes the total fabrication of things to Jupiter, what ought we to conceive of these words of Plato? Is it not, that the same God king Jupiter, is with him maker and father, and is neither father alone, nor father and maker. For father is the monad, as the Pythagoreans say, but the decad is the demiurgic<sup>2</sup> order of divine natures, "to which divine number arrives from the secret recesses of the monad, which decad is the venerable universal recipient, surrounding all things with bound, is immutable and unwearied, and is called the sacred decad." Hence, after the paternal monad, and the paternal and at the same time effective tetrad, the demiurgic decad proceeds. And it is indeed immutable, because an immutable deity subsists together with it. But it surrounds all things with bound, as supplying with order things that are disorderly, and with ornament things that are unadorned. It likewise illuminates souls with intellect, as being intellect totally, and body with soul, as possessing and comprehending the cause of soul, and generates things which are truly generated, both such as are middles, and such as are last, in consequence of comprehending in itself demiurgic being. From what is written also in the Protagoras, we may collect what the demiurgic order is. For Jupiter there becomes the cause of the whole political science, and of the reasons essentially disseminated in souls. This, however, is to bind the whole fabrication of things, and to connect all things by his own immutable powers. For as the theologist establishes about him the Curetic order, thus also Plato says, that he is surrounded with terrible guards. And as the former establishes him on the summit of Olympus, so the latter assigns to him a tower, in which being eternally seated, he adorns all things through the middle orders. Who the Demiurgus therefore is, and that he is a divine intellect, the cause of total fabrication, is evident from what has been said; and likewise that Jupiter himself is celebrated as the Demiurgus both by Orpheus and Plato.

<sup>1</sup> Here also it is requisite to make the same emendation as above.

<sup>2</sup> Δημιουργική is omitted in the original.

Whether, however, we must say that he is a fontal or a ruling God, or belongs to some other order of the demiurgic series, deserves not to be passed over in silence. It appears, therefore, that such things as the theurgist [Julian] ascribes to the third divinity of the rulers, these Plato assigns to the Demiurgus; \* such as to fabricate the heavens, inclosing them in a convex figure; to establish the numerous multitude of inerratic stars; to give subsistence to the heptad of planetary animals; and to place earth in the middle, but water in the bosoms of the earth, and air above these. If, however, we accurately consider the affair, we shall find that the third of the mundane rulers divides the universe into parts; that the second divides it into wholes, and is celebrated as the demiurgic cause of motion; and that the first by his will alone disposes all things, and constitutes the whole world according to union. But the God who is said by Timæus to be the Demiurgus, produces all things by his will, imparts to the universe a division into wholes, and also into parts, which give completion to all the wholenesses [*τας ολοτητας πασας*]. For he not only makes the universe to be a whole of wholes, but he also produces the multitude of each wholeness. On all these accounts therefore, we think it proper to assert that the Demiurgus is beyond the triad of ruling fathers; that he is one fontal cause, and that the Oracles represent him eradicating the multitude of ideas in the fontal soul, and constituting the world from intellect, soul and body, and producing our souls, and sending them into generation. The Oracles likewise assert the same things of him as Timæus. For they say, "The father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul in sluggish body."† But this is the admirable thing celebrated by the Greeks, concerning him who is according to them † the Demiurgus. If however these things are asserted conformably \* both to Timæus and the Oracles, those who are incited by the divinely delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] will say that this Demiurgus is fontal; that he fabricates the whole world conformably to ideas, considered as

\* It appears to be necessary here to read *τη δημιουργῶ* instead of *τη κοσμῶ*.

† The Greek in this place is very faulty. For it is *κατεβητο γαρ νουν μεν εν ψυχῃ σωματι δε ημενς εγκατεθηκε πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε*. Instead of which it ought to be,

————— *κατεβητο γαρ*  
*Νουν μεν ενι ψυχῃ, ψυχῃ δ' ενι σωματι οργῶ*  
*Ἡμεων εγκατεθηκε πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε.*

† For *παρ' αὐτῆς* here, it is necessary to read *παρ' αὐτοῖς*.

\* For *ομοφυλως* in this place read *ομοφυως*.

one, and as many, and as divided both into wholes and parts, and that he is celebrated as the maker and father of the universe, and as the father of Gods and men by Plato, Orpheus, and the Oracles; generating indeed, the multitude of Gods, but sending souls to the generations of men, as Timæus himself also says. For if he is the best of causes, as he says, by what contrivance can he be arranged in the second orders of Demiurgi? For the most excellent among the Demiurgi is significant of the highest transcendency in the demiurgic series. But the highest summit of every series is fontal, so that this Demiurgus is necessarily fontal, and not ruling; the rulers being every where secondary to their proper fountain. Hence also he renders the mundane Gods Demiurgi, or fabricators, as being a certain demiurgic fountain. Since, however, there are many fontal Demiurgi, in what place this Demiurgus is to be arranged, requires greater consideration. But from what has been said, it is evident in what order of Gods it is necessary to investigate him; from which likewise, it is manifest after what manner it is difficult to find him, and when found to speak of him to all men. It is also evident how he is father and maker, and what his effective power is; and that he is not as some say, the *maker* of inanimate natures, but the *father* of such as are animated. For he is both the maker<sup>1</sup> and father of all things. For he is called the father of works, as he himself says in his speech (to the junior Gods). But he is maker and father, as the cause of union, essence, and hypostasis, and the supplier of providential inspection in all things.

“Again, however, this must be considered respecting him, viz. according to which of the paradigms the artificer fabricated the world, whether according to that which subsists with invariable sameness, or that which was generated.”

Timæus having shown what the form is of the mundane system, that it is generated, and the manner in which it is generated, viz. as sensible; for he makes no mention whatever of time, because he has not yet constituted time; and having also shown what the demiurgic cause is, viz. that it is effective and at the same time paternal, but this is intellectual, imparticipable and total:—he now passes to the third object of inquiry, what the nature is of the paradigm of the universe, whether generated, or eternal? For he perceived that every artificer

<sup>1</sup> Ποιητής is omitted here in the original.



either assumes the paradigm of the things which he fabricates, externally, or himself produces them from the paradigm in himself. Just as of human artificers, some are able to imitate other things accurately; but others possess themselves a power capable of fashioning admirable and useful works. Thus he who first made a ship formed in his imagination the paradigm of it. Farther still, this also must be observed, that every thing which makes in an orderly manner, has the scope and measure of that which is made. For if it has not, it will err in making, and will not know whether it has arrived at the end when it has. For whence will it know that this is the end, since something may be deficient or redundant, and it may be necessary to take something away, or to add something? For on this account bodies make irrationally and stupidly, because they have no measure, nor cause of the thing that is made. For it is necessary that the medicine should be heated to a certain degree; but if art and the medical intellect are not present, defining the measure of energy to the fire, it will operate too abundantly and destroy the whole, though it was intended to contribute to the production of the remedy. For it has not the form of the thing produced. Every thing, therefore, which makes ought to have the reason of the thing that is made, if it intends to make in an orderly manner. Hence Plato perceiving this, at the same time that he admits the effective cause, introduces the paradigm of the universe; just as Aristotle also by subverting the paradigm, co-subverts likewise the maker. Plato therefore, taking it for granted that there is a paradigm, investigates through these things what the nature of it is, and employing the before-mentioned definitions, discovers the object of his inquiry, through the three former hypotheses. But in what manner he makes the discovery, and through what kind of demonstration, we shall shortly after survey.

In the first place, however, this very thing must be shown by us, that the world was generated according to a certain paradigm. And in the next place, we must investigate what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings it subsists. If indeed the fabrication of wholes is indefinite and without design, there is not a paradigmatic cause of the universe; but if it is not lawful to conceive this to be the case, and the Demiurgus knows what he produces, and knowing thus produces the fabrication of the world, the causes of the things generated are contained in him, and it is necessary either that he should primarily possess these causes, or that they should be imparted to him by more ancient principles. But whichever of these we admit, there is a paradigmatic cause prior to the world. Farther still, since the Demiurgus is intellect, if he produces by his very being,

he produces that which is most similar to himself. But this is to produce an image of himself. If, however, he produces from deliberation, this is entirely and in every respect unworthy of the demiurgic cause. And if some one should admit this to be the case, yet it will follow that the form of the demiurgic work pre-exists in him. For every one who deliberates and consults, antecedently assumes in himself the paradigm of that about which he deliberates. This therefore, may be demonstrated through many other arguments, that it is necessary the paradigm of the world should have an existence prior to the world, and especially when the demiurgic cause is pre-supposed. For it is necessary that the Demiurgus being intellectual, should either be ignorant of the order of what is fabricated, or that he should know it. But if he is ignorant of this, how can he providentially attend to it? And how can he give arrangement to the universe? If, therefore, he knows it, how is it possible he should not comprehend that which is generated by the intellection of it, according to one cause?

In the next place, it must be considered what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings it ranks. For there is a difference of opinion respecting this among the more ancient interpreters. Thus according to the divine Iamblichus, that which is being itself, and which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, is the paradigm of the universe. For he admits that *the one* is beyond the paradigm, but shows that what is being itself concurs with it, and denominates each that which is comprehended by intelligence. But the philosopher Porphyry supposes, as we have before observed, that imparticipable soul is the Demiurgus, but that intellect is the paradigm, thus beholding in subordinate, natures which exist in more ancient and venerable orders. For Plato having said that the Demiurgus is intellect, denominates the paradigm intelligible. But this interpreter assuming soul for the Demiurgus, calls the paradigm intellect. In the third place, the admirable Theodorus dividing the demiurgic triad, and perceiving that in each monad of it there is a first, middle and last, calls the last<sup>\*</sup> in each animal itself, and thus says that intellect looks to animal itself; for according to him, intellect is proximately suspended from *essential* animal. Hence, either the *essential* Demiurgus does not fabricate looking to animal itself, or the paradigmatic causes are not many, or not every Demiurgus effects his proper production according to a certain paradigm, lest the maker should make looking to things posterior to himself, and thus should ignorantly sustain the passion of a partial soul.

\* For *εαυτον* here, it is necessary to read *εαυτων*.

Our preceptor, however, according to his divine intellectual conceptions, has thought fit to give this subject an appropriate examination. For of the ancients, some have made the Demiurgus himself to possess the paradigms of wholes, as Plotinus; others, not the Demiurgus, but have asserted that the paradigm is prior to him, as Porphyry; and others, as Longinus, that it is posterior to him, whom our preceptor asks, whether the Demiurgus is immediately posterior to *the one*, or there are also other intelligible orders, between the Demiurgus and *the one*. For if the Demiurgus subsists immediately after *the one*, it is absurd that all the multitude of intelligibles should be immediately posterior to that which is without multitude. For through numbers proximate to *the one*, the progression is to the whole of number, and the whole of multitude. But if there are other orders between *the one* and the Demiurgus, it must be investigated whether the paradigm of the universe is in the Demiurgus primarily, or posterior to, or prior to him. For if it is primarily in him, we must admit that he contains every intelligible multitude. For the paradigm is the most beautiful of intelligibles, so that again he will be intelligible, and not what we a little before demonstrated him to be, intellectual, though the paradigm has four ideas alone, but the Demiurgus has those which are more partial than these, viz. the ideas of the sun and moon, and each of the natures that have a perpetual subsistence. But if the paradigm is posterior to him, he will be converted to that which is less excellent, and less honorable, which it is not lawful to admit of any divine nature. So that the paradigm is prior to the Demiurgus. If, however, it is prior to the Demiurgus, whether is it seen by him, or not seen by him? To say, therefore, that it is not seen by him, does not accord with Plato and the nature of things. For it is absurd that our soul should see it, and speak about it, but that it should not be seen by intellect, and by a total intellect. But if the Demiurgus sees the intelligible, whether being converted to himself does he see it, or does he alone perceive it external to himself? If, however, he alone sees it external to himself, he sees the image of being, and possesses sense instead of intelligence. But if converted to himself, the object of his intellectual perception will be in himself. So that the paradigm is prior to, and in the Demiurgus; intelligibly indeed prior to him, but intellectually in him.

The words of Plato also appear at one time to make the paradigm different from, and at another the same with the Demiurgus. For when he says, "*Such and so many ideas therefore, as intellect saw in that which is animal itself, so many he conceived by a dianoetic energy this universe also should possess,*" he asserts that

the Demiurgus, as being different from the paradigm, is extended to animal itself. And again, when he says, "*Let us consider after the similitude of what animal the composing artificer constituted the world. Indeed, we must by no means think that he fashioned it similar to such animals as subsist in the form of a part; but we must admit that it is the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals, both considered individually, and according to their genera, are nothing more than parts;*"—in these words also he separates him who constituted the universe from the paradigm. But when again he clearly says, "*He was good; but in that which is good, envy can never be inherent about any thing whatever: being therefore void of this, he was willing that all things should be as much as possible similar to himself;*" here, the sameness of the Demiurgus with the paradigm, appears to be manifest. So that in some places Plato says that the Demiurgus is the same, and in others, that he is different from the paradigm, and very properly makes each of these assertions. For the ideas, or four monads of ideas, prior to the fabrication of things subsist intelligibly; but the order of forms proceeds into the Demiurgus; *and the whole number of ideas is one of the monads which he contains.* Orpheus also indicating these things says, that the intelligible God [Phanes] was absorbed by the Demiurgus of wholes. And Plato asserts that the Demiurgus looks to the paradigm, indicating through sight intellectual perception. According to the theologist, however, the Demiurgus leaps as it were to the intelligible God, and as the fable says, absorbs him. For if it be requisite clearly to unfold the doctrine of our preceptor, the God who is called Protogonus by Orpheus, and who is established at the end of intelligibles, is animal itself,<sup>1</sup> with Plato. Hence it is eternal, and the most beautiful of intelligibles, and is in intelligibles that which Jupiter is in intellectuals. Each however is the boundary of these orders.<sup>2</sup> And the former indeed, is the first of paradigmatic causes; but the latter is the most monadic of demiurgic causes. Hence Jupiter is united to the paradigm through Night as the medium, and being filled from thence, becomes an intelligible world, as in intellectuals.

Then of Protogonus the mighty strength  
Was seen; for in his belly he contain'd

<sup>1</sup> For  $\tau\eta\ \alpha\iota\sigma\theta\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\eta$  here, read  $\tau\eta\ \nu\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\zeta\omega\omicron\upsilon$ .

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Protogonus is the boundary of the intelligible, and Jupiter of the intellectual order.

The whole ' of things, and mingled where 'twas fit,  
 The force and powerful vigour of the God.  
 Hence, with the universe great Jove contains, &c.

Very properly, therefore, does Plato now say that the Demiurgus looked to the paradigm, in order that becoming all things through the intellectual perception of it, he may give subsistence to the sensible world. For the paradigm was the universe intelligibly, but the Demiurgus intellectually, and the world sensibly. Hence also the theologist says:

For in his sacred heart he these conceal'd,  
 And into joyful light again reveal'd.

That the world therefore, was generated according to a paradigm, what this paradigm is, after what manner it is above, and how it is in, the demiurgic intellect, is manifest through what has been said.

Some however doubt why Plato inquires whether the world was fabricated according to that which is generated, or according to that which is intelligible; for there is not any other generated nature in order that the universe might be fabricated with relation to it. If therefore the inquiry had been concerning Socrates, or any other partial nature, the question, say they, would have been reasonable. But as the inquiry is concerning the universe, is it not impossible it should have been constituted with relation to that which is generated? For what other generated nature is there besides the universe? We may dissolve this doubt however, by recollecting what has been frequently said, that Plato calls soul generated, so far as it participates of time. But the inquiry here is, what is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is soul, or intellect, or the intelligible? For these are the only things that are eternal. And on this account he asks, whether the world was generated with relation to a generated or to an eternal nature. After this manner, as it has appeared to some, the doubt may be solved. May it not, however be possible to solve it, by another more perfect method, through which it will also be evident that the confused and disorderly nature prior to the

<sup>1</sup> In the original τῶν παντῶν ἐκ δέματος, the word δέμας or *body* obviously signifying *whole*. In this sense also, the word σῶμα, which is likewise *body*, is used by Aristotle in Lib. 2. Cap. 2. of his *Meteors*. For he there says, *that the sea is the principle and body of all water*, ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ σῶμα τοῦ παντός ὕδατος ἧδ' ἐπὶ. This principle too, he afterwards calls *ἡθροισμενὸς οἶκος*, a collected bulk or mass. So that δέμας with Orpheus, and σῶμα with Aristotle, have in these places the same meaning as *olome* or *wholeness* with the Platonists.

world, must not be said, as Atticus and Plutarch thought it must, to be unbegotten? For if nothing was generated prior to the universe, it was ridiculous to inquire whether the world was generated with relation to perpetual being, or to that which is generated. This however, is now investigated. Prior to the world therefore, there was a certain generated nature. And since it was neither perpetual being, nor place; for three things [as Plato says] were prior to the generation of the universe, viz. being, place, and generation; it is evident that the so-much celebrated confused and disorderly nature was a thing of this kind. Hence not the universe only, but that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner, was generated, as we have said, and had a prior subsistence. The world therefore, possessing this confused nature as matter, but the intelligible pre-existing as more excellent, whether was the universe assimilated to the material nature which it contains, or to that which is essentially more divine? For being a medium between the two, it is necessarily assimilated to one of the extremes. For it is supposed that the Demiurgus assumed that disorderly nature, and perceives animal itself; so that Plato very properly inquires to which of these the Demiurgus assimilates the universe, whether to that which he assumes, or to that which he sees. To these things therefore, that which follows is conformable; viz. that the world being beautiful, it was assimilated to the intelligible, and not to that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For that which is assimilated to this is deformed.

Some of the interpreters however say, that Plato does not inquire concerning the Demiurgus, according to which of the paradigms he made the world, but that he asks as with reference to us who know that there are twofold paradigms, with relation to which of these the universe was generated. And this assertion is after a certain manner reasonable. For we are those who look to both these paradigms, and not the Demiurgus. For it is not lawful for him to look to that which is less excellent; but we perceiving the natures which are prior, and also those which are posterior to him, interrogate ourselves, in which of them it is fit to place the paradigm. But others say that Plato adduces that which is generated, for the sake of a perfect division, in order that he may not appear to prevent the object of investigation, whether the mundane paradigm is eternal. For supposing the paradigm to be generated, he shows that a certain absurdity will follow. Others again say, that since of sensibles, some are preternatural, but others according to nature; and of these, some have the images of certain generated natures, but others are the similitudes of them;—hence Plato wishing

to demonstrate that the world was generated with relation to an eternal paradigm, makes a subversion of the others, on account of the universe being most beautiful. For that which is most beautiful, is neither preternatural, nor is derived from a generated paradigmatic essence; since that which is derived from this is not most beautiful. But because, in short, the universe is beautiful, it is not preternatural. Such therefore, is the solution of the doubt.

It is worth while however concisely to survey the accuracy of the words. For the words "*again*," and "*must be considered*," indicate the order of the problem; viz. that it is in continuity with the things which precede it, and that this immediately follows those speculations. But the words, "*respecting him*," collect all the investigations, and refer them to the one theory about the world. For what is said about the Demiurgus and the paradigm, is assumed for the sake of the theory of the universe. The words, "*according to which of the paradigms*," separate as extremes, and as different from each other, the intelligible, and that which is generated; the former existing among the first, but the latter among the last of beings. But the word *artificer* exhibits the production of form by its cause, and demiurgic art proceeding into the world. For as the theologist says, the first manual artificers gave to Jupiter the demiurgic powers of all the mundane production. And,

Who thunder, and the lightning formed for Jove.  
Vulcan and Pallas the first artists, taught  
Jove all the dadal arts, the world contains.

Plato therefore following what the theologist here asserts, continually uses the words *τεκτονικὴ* and *παιδαγωγία*, which signify fabricative energy, when speaking of the demiurgic production. But the words, "*according to that which subsists with invariable sameness*," indicate the eternal paradigm of the universe, which is the first of eternal natures, and is established at the end of the first intelligibles. And again, "*that which was generated*" signifies, that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For this is a composite, is much mingled, and alter-motive, or moved by another; all which are the elements of a generated nature. He does not therefore say that this disorderly nature is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that the world is generated and corruptible; but that the former of these was generated, as being alter-motive and co-mingled. For Plato clearly says, that prior to the generation of the universe there were these three

things, place, generation, and being. And it is evident that by generation he means the confused and disorderly nature. Generation therefore is this; and the world is unbegotten according to temporal generation. Hence these things are more concordant with Plato, and with our unperverted opinions about the universe.

“Indeed, if this world is beautiful, and the Demiurgus of it is good, it is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm; but if he is not good, which it is not lawful for any one to assert, he looked to that which was generated.”

In the first place, it is requisite that we should understand the logical method of Plato, in order that we may see how demonstratively it proceeds. For from the hypotheses he had these twofold axioms, that what is generated according to an eternal paradigm is beautiful; but that what is generated according to a generated paradigm is not beautiful. The converse however to these are, that what is beautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, but what is not beautiful was not generated according to an eternal paradigm. For if to the opposite of that which precedes, the opposite of that which is consequent follows, then these reciprocate with each other, and that which was proposed from the beginning is demonstrated, through a deduction to an impossibility. For if that which is beautiful was generated according to a generated paradigm, but that which is so generated is not beautiful, through one of the axioms, then it will follow that what is not beautiful is beautiful. Why therefore, did not Plato immediately in the hypotheses assume these axioms, viz. that what is beautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, what is not beautiful was not so generated; but those to which these are the converse, though he intended to use the former, and not the latter in his demonstration? In answer to this, it must be said, that the latter which commence from causes, are more adapted to hypotheses, but the former which are derived from things caused, are more allied to things posterior to hypotheses. For when he says, “*That which was generated according to an eternal paradigm is beautiful,*” he begins from causes, but ends in that which is caused. But when vice versa, he says, “*That is beautiful which was generated according to an eternal paradigm,*” he makes the beautiful to be precedaneous, but the cause consequent. He employs therefore, the former of these, in order that



he may assume things adapted to principles and causes in the hypotheses, but he employs the latter, which is the converse of the former, in the demonstrations, selecting that which is appropriate to the things demonstrated. Hence laying down these four axioms, he very properly enquires concerning the universe, whether it is beautiful, or is not beautiful. But if indeed the world is beautiful, it was generated according to an eternal paradigm; but if it is not beautiful, according to a generated paradigm. That the world however is beautiful, is evident from sense. It was therefore generated according to an eternal paradigm.

Since however beauty is imparted to the world from the paradigm, through the demiurgic cause as a medium, in the proposition which precedes, for the purpose of showing that the world is beautiful, he assumes that the Demiurgus is good. For every artificer, who is a good artist, has dominion over his proper matter, and superinduces the form which he wishes, on the subjects of his art. And this is accomplished in a much greater degree by the whole Demiurgus, who also gives subsistence to nature, the [universal] subject of things, as other assertions evince; and who produced it, that it might co-operate<sup>1</sup> with him, in receiving the world and fabrication from him. Since however, he had added this in the second proposition, he passes over the opposite in silence. For the defamation of the world is atrocious, since it is most beautiful, and a blessed God, but the defamation of the Demiurgus is still more so. Hence Plato employs Themis<sup>2</sup> as a guard to what he says, who collects the Gods themselves to the Demiurgus, and does not suffer them to be divulsed from the goodness of the father. And he does this, in order that through Themis, he may not ascribe any thing disorderly or defamatory to the Demiurgus. The propositions therefore, being such, and receiving their beginning from the dividing art, let us see what Plato afterwards adds.

“ It is however, manifest to every one, that he looked to an eternal paradigm; for the world indeed is the most beautiful of generated natures, and the Demiurgus is the best of causes. But being thus generated, it is fabricated according to that which may be apprehended by reason and intelligence, and which subsists invariably the same.”

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *συνεργος* here, it is requisite to read *συνεργος*.

<sup>2</sup> For Plato uses the word *θεμις*, or *lawful*, in this place.

Through what is here said, in the first place, he antecedently assumes the conclusion, as he is accustomed to do, deriving the principles of his demonstrations from intellect. In the next place, he introduces the recollection of the assumption, and afterwards adds the rest.<sup>1</sup> For the words, "*It is however manifest to every one, that he looked to an eternal paradigm,*" are the conclusion. But the words, "*For the world indeed is the most beautiful of generated natures, and the Demiurgus is the best of causes,*" are a narration of the assumption, as the causal conjunction *μεν* indeed manifests. And the rest is the conclusion of all that is said. Such therefore is the logical arrangement of the words. But again, betaking ourselves to the theory of the things, let us in the first place see through what cause he transfers the word *beautiful* to the word *most beautiful*, and *good* to the *best*. In the next place, let us survey how these things are true, and what kind of order they have with reference to each other.

That a beautiful fabrication therefore, was fabricated according to an eternal paradigm is evident, and was before asserted. For whence could it obtain the beautiful, except from the imitation of this paradigm? If however, this is most beautiful, the fabrication was not simply made according to an eternal paradigm, but if it be requisite to say so, it was assimilated to the most eternal of eternal natures. For every image which more clearly participates of form, is the image of a purer paradigm. And *as of the statues produced by the telestic art, some partaking of the presence of a divine nature more obscurely, enjoy the second and third powers of the divinity, but others participating of it more clearly, partake also of the first and highest powers of the God*;—after the same manner likewise, the God who gives perfection to the world, has rendered it most beautiful, as an image of the first of eternal natures. For that which is most beautiful is derived to the world from thence, and is extended to a similitude towards it, through its own beauty. Again therefore, if the demiurgic cause is good, he looked to that which is eternal, and not to that which is generated; lest by looking to what is less excellent, which it is not lawful to assert, he should fall off from goodness. If, however, this be the case, not only a good cause, but the best among causes, looked to the most eternal of paradigms. For by how much the perceiver is more divine, by so much the more elevated is the object of perception. For the same thing will not be surveyed by the better and the less excellent nature. Plato therefore, indicating these things, and through these latently assisting the position that the para-

<sup>1</sup> Instead of το λεγον here, it is necessary to read το λοιπον.

digm of the universe does not rank among the multitude of eternal natures, but is the most eternal of all of them, and primarily eternal, calls the world indeed most beautiful, but the Demiurgus most excellent. For that which is most beautiful was generated according to the most divine paradigm, and that which is most excellent necessarily looks to that which is supreme. For if that which is most beautiful was not derived from the first paradigm, this first paradigm will either be the paradigm of nothing, or of something less excellent. But it is not lawful for superior natures to make that which is less excellent in secondary natures. And unless that which is best looked to that which is first [either it will not make that which is most beautiful] or not looking to that which is first it will make it. How likewise, will that which is the first paradigm, rank as a paradigm, unless<sup>1</sup> that which is best intellectually perceives it? And how can that which is intelligible to a less excellent nature, be incomprehensible through transcendency by that which is more excellent? Hence it is necessary that what is most beautiful should have been generated according to that which is most divine, and that what is most excellent should look to that which is most eternal. Farther still, it is necessary that what is most beautiful should be fabricated by that which is best. For of what is that which is best the cause, unless of that which is the most beautiful of generated natures? For if it is not the cause of the most beautiful effect, it is the cause of something less excellent. If, therefore, that which is best is the cause of that which is less excellent, that which is not best will be entirely the cause of that which is most beautiful, and thus the order of things will be radically subverted. It must be admitted therefore, that these three things are, as it is said, demonstrated by geometrical necessities; and through these we are reminded after what manner names are assumed by Plato. Porphyry however adds, that if the Demiurgus is most excellent, it follows that he looks to an eternal nature, or<sup>2</sup> that he will not fabricate what is beautiful. And in the next place,<sup>3</sup> it is necessary that he who fabricates what is [truly] beautiful, should look to that which is eternal, or<sup>4</sup> he will not make what is beautiful as the best of fabricators, but he will make it casually. Hence also, Plato asserts that the fabricators of mortal natures are demons. And if indeed, they are simply most excellent, nothing will prevent the artificers and framers of mortal natures from being likewise most excellent, and on this

<sup>1</sup> The words  $\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ , are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of  $\eta$  in this place, it is requisite to read  $\epsilon\iota\ \mu\eta$ .

<sup>3</sup> Instead of  $\epsilon\iota$  here, read  $\eta$ . <sup>4</sup> For  $\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon$  read  $\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha$ .

<sup>5</sup> The same emendation is also requisite here as above.

account the fabricators of beautiful images. Such therefore are the observations of Porphyry.

We may easily however learn, that it is rightly said the world is most beautiful, and the Demiurgus the best of causes. In the first place, indeed, the beauty of the heavens, the order of the periods, the measures of the seasons, the harmony of the elements, and the analogy which pervades through all things, demonstrate to those who are not entirely blind, that the universe is most beautiful. In the next place, does not the order of the invisible powers it contains, according to which the parts of the world are connected, and the gift of the intellectual essence, evince that it is the most beautiful of generated natures? For there are in it the harmonious choir of souls, the participation of intellect, the supply of a divine life, the progression<sup>\*</sup> of ineffable deity, and the number of henads or unities, from which the whole becomes full of beauty. Since also, the [partial] soul which is assimilated to the universe, becoming elegantly adorned, exhibits in herself an admirable beauty, how is it possible that the universe should not possess beauty in a still greater degree? hence theologists conjoining Venus with Vulcan, say that he thus fabricated the universe. And again, from Vulcan and Aglaia, they generate Eucleia and Eusthenia, Eupheme and Philophrosune, who render the corporeal-formed nature decorated with beauty. Neither therefore, do those who revile the Demiurgus, dare to say that the world is not most beautiful, but on the contrary they say that through the beauty of it souls are allured and ensnared.

But how are we to admit that the Demiurgus is the best of eternal natures? For some think that we must understand by this word *best*, the best of the causes of generated natures, in order that he may not be absolutely the best of causes. For this would be false, but that he may be the best of the causes of things that are generated; since the natures that are above him are not the causes of these. I however, should be ashamed of myself, if I were in want of such an artifice as this, forgetting what was a little before said, in which the Demiurgus now delivered to us by Plato, was shown to be the fountain and monad of every demiurgic order. On account of this therefore, he is the best of causes, because he is allotted the first order among the demiurgi of the universe; Plato here, directly emulating Homer, who calls the Demiurgus the father of wholes, and the supreme of rulers; and he thus denominates him though he mentions the Gods

<sup>\*</sup> It appears to me that the word *προόδος* must be supplied in this place.

prior to him, as far as to the Goddess Night. Because therefore Jupiter is the most ancient and venerable of demiurgi, he is celebrated by Homer as the supreme of rulers, but by Plato as the best<sup>1</sup> of causes. Others however by no means dare to accuse the Demiurgus, but blame this universe, and pervert the assertions of the ancients, who call it a cavern and a den. And others, as Heraclitus, say, that the Demiurgus sported in fabricating the world.

To these objections however it is easy to reply. For though the world is, as Plato says, most beautiful, and a blessed God, yet when compared with the intelligible, and the place which is there, it is deservedly called a cavern and a den. And it is especially so to partial souls who verge to bodies and matter. But with respect to the Demiurgus, though he is the best of causes, yet the whole of his providential energies about the recent fabrications, may be called *sport*, when compared with the energies which are exempt from sensibles. For these reasons therefore, the Demiurgus is thus celebrated in the present words by Plato. It is requisite also to understand how the co-ordination of the most beautiful with the most excellent, is suspended from the first principles. For as in them beauty is suspended from *the good*, and the beautifying cause, from the fountain of all good, thus also here, the world is said to be most beautiful, but the Demiurgus most excellent, and the most beautiful is suspended from that which is best. In the next place it is requisite to understand how what is said about the fabrication itself [of things] imitates this fabrication. For as the world itself was led from confusion to order, and a similitude to the intelligible, by fabrication, thus also the discussion of it first employed abhorrent appellations, calling it generated and destructible, but now the most venerable names, denominating it the best of generated natures, the offspring of the most excellent father, and the image of the most divine paradigm. And shortly after, he reminds us of it by the most sacred of names.

“ But again, these things [thus] subsisting, there is every necessity that the world should be the image of a certain thing.”

To those who are more simple, what is here said may appear to be the same with what was before asserted. For some one who does not survey things accurately may ask what difference there is between saying, that the world was fabricat-

<sup>1</sup> For *αριστος* here, it is necessary to read *αριστος*.

ed according to a paradigm, and that it is the image of a certain thing. In reality however, each of these is separated from the other. For since it is possible for an artificer to make conformably to a paradigm, but the thing fabricated may not become the image of the paradigm in consequence of not being vanquished by the fabricating cause; in order that you may not fancy that this is also the case with the world, Plato has shown that the Demiurgos indeed looked to a paradigm, and that being most excellent he looked to the most divine paradigm, from what he said respecting the universe being fabricated conformably to the intelligible. But that the universe also is vanquished by form, and truly<sup>1</sup> imitates its paradigm, he manifests from what is now said. For if the world is an image, the universe is assimilated to the intelligible. For that which is not dissimilar but similar and consentaneous, is an image. You have therefore, the sensible universe, the most beautiful of images, the intellectual universe, the best of causes, and the intelligible universe, the most divine of paradigms. Each of these also is every where. For the sensible universe participates of intellect and being; the intellectual universe possesses sensibles uniformly, but intelligibles<sup>2</sup> secondarily; and the intelligible universe antecedently comprehends, primordially and unitedly, intellectuals and sensibles. The universe however, subsists appropriately in each order. And the sensible universe indeed, is placed before us as a fabrication; but the eternal is two-fold, the one being as demiurgic, but the other as paradigmatic; though the paradigmatic is also in the demiurgic. For the Demiurgos makes looking to himself; since every intellect sees itself, and is the same with the intelligible it contains. And again the demiurgic is in the paradigmatic; since it makes that which is generated. For it is not a paradigm like a form impressed in wax, nor as the image of Socrates is the image of another image; but the paradigmatic cause by its very being makes secondary natures similar to itself. At the same time however, to fabricate paradigmatically, and to be a paradigm demiurgically (i. e. fabricatively) differ. *For the former is to energize essentially; but the latter is to impart essence energetically.* And the former is to perceive intellectually, intelligibly; but the latter is to be intelligible intellectually. *For the peculiarity of the paradigm is to make by its very being; but of the Demiurgos, to make by energizing.* For it is not the same thing to make by existing, and to know and energize through knowledge; *since soul also produces life by existing, but makes artificially through knowledge.* And it

<sup>1</sup> For *ομοιος* here, read *ομοιος*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τα ασθητα* here, it is necessary to read *τα νοητα*.

possesses indeed, the former essentially, but the latter according to energy. And why is it requisite to lengthen these observations philosophically? For the theologist long before, celebrates the demiurgic cause in Phæneus. *For there, as he says, the great Breeding, or all-seeing Jupiter, was, and antecedently existed*; in order that he might have as it were the fountains of the twofold fabrication of things. He also celebrates the paradigmatic cause in Jupiter. For again, he likewise is, as he says, Metis the first generator, and much-pleasing Love. He is also continually denominated by him, Dionysius, and Phæneus, and Ericapæus. All the causes therefore participate of each other, and are in each other; so that he who says as the divine Iamblichus, that the Demiurgus comprehends in himself the paradigm, and he who evinces, as the illustrious Amelius, that the paradigm is the Demiurgus, in a certain respect speak rightly. For the latter saw the demiurgic peculiarity pre-existing in the paradigm; for there the first Jupiter exists, and on this account he makes Phæneus to be the Demiurgus; but the former saw the paradigm in the Demiurgus. For Metis also was in the Demiurgus, being absorbed by him. And on this account he considered the paradigmatic to be the same with the demiurgic cause. And thus much concerning these particulars.

We ought not however, to wonder if Plato calls the world an image. For though it is most beautiful, yet it is the image of intelligible beauty. Through this similitude also, it exhibits such things as adorn<sup>1</sup> and beautify generation, and receives as a whole the form of the paradigm. Thus the philosopher calls the world the image of the intelligible, as being assimilated to its paradigm. The addition likewise of *necessity*, shows that the similitude of the former to the latter is admirable and ineffable. Afterwards also, he testifies this by a demonstration indubitable and firm. For it proceeds from the hypotheses themselves.

“But in every thing, to begin from a principle according to nature, is the greatest of undertakings.”

Some read what is here said by stopping at the word *παντος*, *every thing*, according to whom the words indicate, that it is the greatest of all things, to make that beginning of the discussion which is according to nature. But others, stopping at the word *μεγιστον*, *greatest*, conjoin the word *παντος* with what follows; so that with them the colon signifies that it is the greatest undertaking, to begin

<sup>1</sup> For *επιπροβενοντα* here, I read *επιπροκοστα*.

the discussion of the universe, from a principle which is according to nature. Others again say that these words are introduced for the sake of the things previously assumed, these being rightly concluded through the hypotheses which were necessary. But according to others, they are introduced for the sake of what is directly after asserted, it being requisite, if we intend to make a proper beginning, to define previously what kind of discourses ought to be adopted concerning sensibles. And others say, they are introduced for the sake of what will afterwards be delivered concerning the final cause. For this is the greatest principle, and according to nature, which it is requisite especially to survey, and from which commencing it is fit to discuss what follows. But that previous to the disquisition of this, he informs us what the mode will be of physical discussions.

To me however, this axiom appears to be rightly asserted of all things. For it is universal, and is adapted to what has been before said, to what immediately follows, and to what will be again said. Or rather, it is not adapted to these alone, but to all fabrication. For beginning from a principle according to nature as from a root, Plato delivers afterwards explanations of cause homologous to this principle. And science itself, from proper hypotheses, collects appropriate conclusions. Science therefore follows the order of things; but doctrinal disquisition follows science. And this is the greatest undertaking. In the first place, because it imitates wholes, and the progression of beings. In the next place, because if the smallest particular is overlooked in the principle, it becomes multiplied as we proceed. And in the third place, the principle or beginning, is said to be the half of the whole. If however, this be the case, it possesses the greatest power. If, too, as some say, the principle is something more than the whole, it is in an admirable manner said to be the greatest thing. The truth of this is also testified by poets who say, "that every thing which receives a good beginning usually ends well." And moreover, on this account the Athenian guest calls the principle a God, if it obtains that which is fit. For he says, "*Principle being established in men as a God, produces all things rightly if it obtains a congruous portion [or the part which is adapted to it].*"

But what is the meaning of the words "*according to nature*?" Is it the receiving every thing which ought to be received, or is it that which first proceeds from things which subsist essentially? For that which is last is a principle as with reference to us, but not with reference to nature. The principle therefore



according to nature, of the universe indeed, is the final cause, but of demonstrations the hypotheses, and of discussions the definition respecting the form of the doctrine, whether it is to be received as firm, immutable and accurate, or as that which is merely probable, and is not indeed truth, but credible, and assimilated to truth.

“After this manner therefore, we must decide about the image, and the paradigm of it.”

These three particulars are connascently consequent to each other, the things, the conceptions, and the words. According to the things and the conceptions therefore, Plato assumes the first hypothesis; but according to the words he makes this definition. For when he separates that which is generated from being, he adheres to the theory of the things. But when he defines our knowledge according to the objects of it, he adheres to the theory of the conceptions.<sup>1</sup> And now distributing the words according to the diversity in the knowledge of them, he demonstrates to us their definite nature. Hence, these are consentaneous to each other; viz. twofold things, being and that which is generated; twofold knowledges, intelligence and opinion; and twofold words, the stable and the probable. For whence are knowledges derived, except from the objects of knowledge? And whence is the difference of words derived, except from knowledges? Some therefore say, that it is the logographic art to define previously what the mode is of the diction, and what kind of person the auditor of it ought to be; and that Aristotle emulated this, and also many others more recent.

I however should say that the discussion imitates the fabrication itself of things. For as that unfolds into light the invisible lives of the world, but gives subsistence to that which is apparent, and imparts a boundary to it prior to the whole world, thus also Timæus adheres indeed to the theory of the things; but also makes the form of the words to be adapted to the things; and antecedently assumes, and previously defines the mode of the whole theory of the discussion, in order that he may dispose the whole of the doctrine conformably to this definition. Why therefore does he do this now and not before? Because, after the demonstra-

<sup>1</sup> In the original, *οτε δε τας ημετερας γνωσεις διαριζει, επι τοις πραγμασιν τοις των νοηματων*, which is evidently defective, but may be restored to its genuine meaning by reading, *οτε δε τας ημετερας γνωσεις διαριζει επι τοις πραγμασιν, της ατευχου θεωριας των νοηματων*.

tion, that it is requisite the world should be generated, he necessarily defines what the nature of the discussion about sensible things ought to be, but not prior to this, the nature of the universe being unknown. But when he calls the world an image, an image of such a kind is not <sup>1</sup> to be assumed, as we conceive that of inanimate <sup>2</sup> natures to be, as neither is the paradigm unprolific and inefficacious, but an assimilation must be given to this world to the intelligible. In the first place indeed, according to the prolific power of the paradigm; for by its very being it produces the image from itself. In the second place, according to the demiurgic cause, which renders the universe most similar to the intelligible, by the energies extended to it. And in the third place, according to the conversion of the world itself to the forming power and participation of intelligibles. For "it assimilates itself, as the Oracle says, hastening to be invested with the impression of the images which the intelligible Gods extend to it."

"As words therefore are allied to the things themselves of which they are the interpreters."

As the progression of beings is from *the one* which is prior<sup>3</sup> to the many, and mundane natures proceed from a monad to their proper number, thus also the discourse of Timæus, being assimilated, as he says, to beings, commences from one axiom, and the universal, and thus afterwards introduces division to his words. What therefore is the one common axiom, in the words before us? That it is necessary language should be allied to the things, of which it is the interpreter. And it seems that the Platonists Albinus and Gaius, and their followers, took occasion from hence to define in how many ways Plato dogmatizes; and that he does this in a twofold respect, either scientifically, or from probability, and not according to one mode, nor as if all discussions had one accuracy, whether they are concerning beings, or things which subsist through generation; but such as is the nature of things, such also is that of the words which are divided in conjunction with things. Hence they subsist in such a way with respect to accuracy and clearness about the things which are their subjects, that some words assert the accuracy of the dogmas, but others their probability. For it is necessary that

<sup>1</sup> *Ov* is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For *ἀνεχον* here, it is necessary to read *ἀδυνατον*.

<sup>3</sup> *Πρῶ* is omitted in the original.

language should be similar to things ; since it could not otherwise interpret their nature, than by being allied to them. For it is requisite that what the thing is contractedly, that language should be evolvedly ; in order that it may unfold the thing into light, and may be subordinate to the nature of it. Hence, the divine causes of language unfold after this manner the essences of the natures prior to them, and are consascent with them. *In the Gods therefore, the angel or messenger of Jupiter [i. e. Hermes], who has the relation of logos to the intellect of his father, announces the will of Jupiter to secondary natures. But in essences, soul which is the logos of intelligibles, unfolds the united cause of wholes which is in them, she receiving from them her hypostasis.<sup>1</sup> And in the genera superior to us, the angelic order has the relation of logos to the Gods.* Very properly therefore, is it here said, that language is allied to the things of which it is the interpreter. This therefore, must be said to be the one<sup>2</sup> common axiom, prior to the divided particulars. And Timæus in what follows, distributes different modes of words in conjunction with the quality of the things.

“ Hence, respecting that which is permanent and stable, and intellectually apparent, it is requisite that the words should be as much as possible permanent, without lapse, irreprehensible and immutable. But in this [stability] the paradigm is in no respect deficient.”

Prior to this, Timæus called the paradigm perpetual being, subsisting invariably the same, and apprehended by intelligence ; but now he calls it permanent and stable ; the former indeed, instead of perpetual being, and which is apparent in conjunction with intellect, but the latter, instead of that which is apprehended by intelligence. He also denominates the words respecting it *permanent*, indeed, in order that through the sameness of the name, he may indicate the similitude of them to things ; but *without lapse*, in order that they might adumbrate the firmness of the thing. And *irreprehensible*, in order that they may imitate that which is comprehended by intelligence, and may scientifically accede. For it is necessary that words, in order that they may be adapted to intelligibles, should have accuracy and firmness, as being employed about things of this kind. For as the knowledge of eternal natures is without lapse, so likewise is the discourse

<sup>1</sup> For τὴν υποθέσιν here, it is necessary to read τὴν ὑποστάσιν.

<sup>2</sup> Ἐν is omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

about them. For it is an evolved knowledge. Since, however, it proceeds into multitude, and is allotted a composite nature, and on this account falls short of the union and impartibility of the thing, he designates the thing itself in the singular number permanent and stable, and intellectually apparent; but the discourse about it in the plural number, calling it *stable words, which are without a lapse, and are irreprehensible*. And since in language there is a certain similitude to the paradigm, but there is also a certain dissimilitude, and this abundant, he assumes one word in common *the permanent*, but the others different. Since also a scientific discourse is irreprehensible, as with reference to our knowledge; for there is not any thing in us better than science; but is confuted by the thing itself, as not being able to comprehend the nature of it, such as it really is, and as falling off<sup>1</sup> from its impartibility,—on this account he adds, “*as much as possible*.” For science itself, as subsisting in souls, is indeed irreprehensible, but is reprehended by intellect, for evolving that which is impartible, and apprehending that which is simple in a composite manner. For the phantasy also reprehends sense, because its knowledge is in conjunction with passion, according to a commixture, from which the phantasy is purified. But opinion reprehends the phantasy because its knowledge is attended with type and morphe, from which opinion is free. Science reprehends opinion, because its knowledge is without the explanation of cause, by which science is especially bound. And intellect as we have said, reprehends science, because it transitively divides the object of knowledge, but intellect knows at once the whole in conjunction with essence. Hence intellect is alone unconquerable, but science, and scientific discourse, are vanquished by intellect, according to the knowledge of being.

“It is necessary however, that words respecting that which is assimilated to the permanent and stable, but which is the image of being should possess probability [alone].”

That the discussion of generated<sup>2</sup> natures, is a discussion about an image, and that on this account it is to be called *probable*, is evident. Perhaps however, some one may inquire what words remain to be assigned to things which are not assimilated to the intelligible, but yet at the same time exist in the universe, such

<sup>1</sup> For ἀπομενος here, I read ἀποσημαμενος.

<sup>2</sup> For πρὸ τῶν γεινητῶν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read περὶ τῶν γεινητῶν.

as we assert conjectural and artificial things to be. May we not say, that words of a conjectural nature are adapted to these, which words are different from those that are assimilative? For to conjecture is one thing; since this is more obscure than sense; and to assimilate another. For assimilation pertains to the interpreters of the images of being. Artificial, therefore, and conjectural things, are unfolded through conjectural words. Unless other such like words are adapted to things which are truly conjectural; but with respect to artificial things, assimilative or probable words, are adapted to those that are the first from forms, but to those which have a secondary hypostasis, and are the third from truth, such words are adapted as pertain to things conjectural by nature. For conjectural things are the images of sensibles, in the same manner as sensibles are the images of intelligibles. Thus the painted bed is the image of that which is made by the carpenter.

Farther still, this also must be considered, that Plato is now speaking about physical images, and that on this account he gives a twofold division to words. For things which are assimilated to the intelligible, subsist by nature or naturally; but this is not the case with things artificial. For the artist does not make that which he makes, according to certain ideas, though Socrates appears to say this in the Republic. There, however, what is said, is asserted for the sake of the paradigm, and is not concerning ideas themselves. For he says that God is the maker and Demiurgus of things artificial,<sup>1</sup> but he is not the Demiurgus of ideas. But in the Protagoras, it is clearly shown by Plato that we do not contain the reasons or productive principles of the arts,<sup>2</sup> and much less of things artificial,

<sup>1</sup> See the 10th book of the Republic, where he speaks of the ideas of a bed and a table. Plato, however, did not intend to signify in what he there says, that there is an idea of each of these in the intellect of the Demiurgus of the universe; or, in short, that there are ideas of things artificial; but he calls by the name of idea, the reason or productive and forming principle which subsists in the dianoetic power of the artificer. This reason also he says, is the offspring of deity, because he conceived, that this very artificial principle itself, is imparted to souls from divinity. Proclus, in the Parmenides, well observes, that an argument of the truth of this may be derived from hence, that Plato calls a poet the third from, or with respect to, the truth, placing him analogous to a painter, who does not make a bed, but the image of it. The form of bed, therefore, in the dianoetic part of the artificer, ranks as first with respect to truth; the bed which he makes as second; and that which is painted as the third. But if there was an idea of bed in the intellect of divinity, the painter would be the fourth, and not the third from truth.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. The soul does not *essentially* contain the reasons of those arts which are solely ministrant to the purposes of the moral life.

and that neither are the paradigms of them established in the Gods. These therefore were not generated according to the intelligible. Plato, however, now divides words into those which pertain to the discussion of the intelligible, and those which are concerning the image of the intelligible. Hence indicating this he says, *that words respecting that which is assimilated to the permanent and stable, but which is the image of being, should possess probability [alone].* But the works of nature are assimilated to the intelligible, and not the works of art; so that neither have particulars this assimilation definitely, but the universals which are in them. We have, however, spoken concerning these things elsewhere.

“The latter words having the same relation to the former [as that of an image to its paradigm]. For what essence is to generation, that truth is to faith.”

Prior to this, Timæus made two things antecedent, the intelligible and the generated, or the paradigm and the image, and assumed two things as analogous to these, science and probability, or truth and faith: so that as truth is to the intelligible paradigm, so is faith to the generated image. But now alternately he says, as truth is to faith, so is the intelligible to that which is generated. And this perfectly well. For he makes the intelligible and truth to be antecedent, but at the same time begins from that which is generated and faith, that he may mingle that which has a reference to us with the order which is according to nature, and that he may preserve the proper worth of the things, and may argue from what is known to us. Plato, therefore, clearly divides language and knowledge conformably to the objects of knowledge; and Parmenides though obscure on account of his writings being poetical, yet at the same time indicating these things, he says, “that truth is full of splendor and immutable, but that the opinions of mortals have no real credibility.” And again, “that there are two paths, one of which has a real existence, so that it is not possible for it not to exist. But this is the path of Persuasion, and is attended by Truth. The other, necessarily has no true existence. The former of these paths, however, though replete with the most perfect persuasion, is unpleasant.” And again, “Neither can you have any knowledge of non-being; for it is not attainable; nor can you make it the subject of discourse.” The philosopher therefore says, that there are two-

\* Owing to the obscurity of the original, I have only given the substance of the verses of Parmenides

fold knowledges, of twofold things; *truth* which he calls [full of splendor, as shining with intellectual light; and *faith*, from which he takes away stable knowledge. The faith, however, which Plato now mentions appears to be different from that spoken of him in the Republic, in the section of a line. For there the faith is an irrational knowledge; whence also it is divided from conjecture, but is arranged according to sense. The faith however of which he now speaks is rational, but is mingled with irrational knowledge, as it employs sense and conjecture. Hence it is filled with much of the unstable. For receiving from sense or conjecture the *οτι*, or *that a thing is*, it thus explains causes. But these kinds of knowledge, have much of the confused and unstable. Hence Socrates in the Phædo reprehends sense in many respects, because we neither hear nor see any thing accurately.

How, therefore, can the knowledge which originates from sense possess the accurate and the irreprehensible? For the powers which use science alone, comprehend the whole of the thing known with accuracy; but those that energize with sense, are deceived, and deviate from accuracy, on account of sense, and because the object of knowledge is unstable. For with respect to that which is material, what can any one say of it, since it is always changing and flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide for a moment. But that which is celestial, in consequence of being remote from us, is not easily known, nor to be apprehended by science, but we must be satisfied in the theory of it, with an approximation to the truth, and with probability [instead of certainty]. For every thing which is in place, requires the being situated there, in order to a perfect knowledge of its nature. The intelligible, however, is not a thing of this kind; since it is not apprehended by us in place. For wherever any one establishes his dianoetic energy, there, truth being every where present, he comes into contact with it. But if it is possible to assert any thing firm and stable about that which is celestial, this also is possible so far as it participates of being, and so far as it can be apprehended by intelligence. For if any thing necessary can be collected concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstrations which are universal. But so far as it is sensible, it is difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to be surveyed. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Some one, however, may doubt, how it can be any longer said to be difficult to discover the Demiurgus, and impossible when found to speak of him to all men, since we are able to employ stable, immutable, and irreprehensible language about the paradigm? Or is not that which is said about the Demiurgus, in a much

greater degree adapted to the paradigm itself? For it is much more difficult to discover the latter than the former, and when found to speak of it to all men. Neither, however, does Plato deny that scientific language may be employed about the Demiurgus, nor about any other of the natures that subsist always invariably the same. For in what does Plato differ from other physiologists, except in exhibiting the science pertaining to divine natures? But if he particularly reminds us of this in the Demiurgic cause, that it is difficult to find it, we ought not to wonder. For he knew, as it appears to me, that other physiologists transfer the effective cause to physical powers. Hence that we may not be affected in the same way as they were, he shows that the Demiurgic principle is difficult to be found, and difficult to be known. And this much in answer to the doubt.

Plato however in many places admits the truth of beings, conformably to theologists. For uniform truth [or truth characterized by unity] is of one kind, and is the light proceeding from *the good*, which, as he says in the *Philebus*, imparts purity, and as he says in the *Republic*, union to intelligibles. The truth proceeding from intelligibles, is of another kind, and illuminates the intellectual orders, which the essence that is without figure, without colour, and without contact primarily receives, where, also, as it is written in the *Phaedrus*, the plain of truth is situated. Another kind of truth is that which is connate with souls, which comes into contact with being through intelligence, and is conjoined through science with the objects of science. For the psychical light, may be said to be as in the extension of breadth the third from the intelligible; the intellectual breadth being filled from the intelligible, but the psychical from the intellectual. This truth, therefore, which is in souls, is that, which must now be assumed, since we likewise assume this faith, and not that which is irrational, and separated from all rational animadversion. The one also must be conjoined to intelligibles, but the other to sensibles.

“ You must not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, if asserting many things about many concerning the Gods, and the generation of the universe, I should not be able to employ language in every respect accurate and consistent with itself.”

Timæus first exhibits the hypotheses of the whole of physiology, and collects the lemmas pertaining to the theory of it; the latter being three, but the former five. In the second place, he defines the mode of the discussion. And in the



third place, he prepares the auditor to receive in a proper manner the discourse which he is about to make. For it is necessary that he should not expect to hear perfectly accurate arguments in physical discussions, nor such as are truly scientific, but such as are assimilated to them. It is besides this requisite he should know, that as the world is mingled from physical powers and an intellectual and divine essence; for "physical works, as the Oracle says, co-subsist with the intellectual light of the father;" thus also the discussion of it, makes a commixture of faith and truth. For things which are assumed from sense participate largely of conjectural discussion; but things which commence from intelligibles possess that which is irreprehensible, and cannot be confuted. For when we say of the Demiurgus himself, that he consults, that he energizes dianoetically, and that he makes these things prior to those, we relinquish the truth of things. So that if when speaking of eternal beings, and showing how they provide for the universe, we are compelled to divide that which is impartible, and to make that which is eternal temporal, much more will the assertions respecting sensibles themselves be deficient in accuracy [and truth]. What then, someone may say, do we not speak accurately concerning the heavens when we say, that the circles in them bisect each other? But do we not fall off from accuracy, when we are satisfied, not with the accurate, but with an approximation to it, in consequence of our imbecility, and not on account of the nature of the thing? Or, also, when we receive indeed, principles from sense, yet is it not from universal reasons? The assertions therefore, respecting the heavens, as in intelligibles, exhibit the irreprehensible; but as in objects of belief, they also are reprehended through immaterial forms. Consider then this very thing which is now asserted, that the greatest circles in the heavens bisect each other. Is it not necessary that the section should be according to points? But a point is impartible. What, therefore, is there of this kind in a partible nature? What is there without interval in a nature distended with interval? For every thing which subsists in a physical body, is co-divided with its subject. What, then, is there not likewise a physical point? This however relinquishes that which is truly impartible, and is a point indeed, in physical substances, but is not simply a point. So that what is said of a point, is not accurately adapted to a thing of this kind. In short, as the assertions concerning intelligibles, are not adapted to dianoetic objects, so neither is what is said of scientific objects adapted to sensibles. For intelligibles are the paradigms of dianoetic natures, and dianoetic natures of sensibles. For

it is soul which adorns the mighty heaven, and adorns it in conjunction with the father. So that when we speak of circles in the heavens, of contacts, bisections, and equalities, we speak accurately, as not speaking about sensibles. Since therefore things of this kind may be asserted of all material natures, the objection is trifling.

If, however, some one should ask us, is not that which is truly equal impartible, and that which is truly a circle, without interval? For each is a universal; but universal is an impartible reason and form. But the natures in the heavens are partible, and not indivisible, and are in a subject. Here again, we do not say that either circles, or equalities, or any thing else of this kind are in sensibles; and thus we are consistent with ourselves. We summarily, say, therefore, that *Plato at one time defines science, by an explanation of causes alone; at another time, by the subjects of it, possessing an essence perfectly stable, together with an explanation of cause; and at another, by the principles not being hypotheses.* And according to this last form, indeed, he asserts that there is one science [i. e. dialectic] which ascends as far as to the principle of being. For this science pre-establishes the principle which is truly principle, to be unhypothetical. It also has for its subject truly existing being, and produces its reasonings from cause. But according to the second form, he also calls dianoetic knowledge science. And according to the first alone, he allows the appellation of science to be given to physiology. Now therefore looking to the 'first' form he thinks fit to call it conjunctural knowledge. And thus much in answer to the doubt, the whole of what is here said being attended with difficulty on account of the construction of the words, which may thus be corrected with a small addition. "*If, O Socrates, asserting many things about many,*" afterwards showing what these many things are, he adds, "*concerning the Gods, and the generation of the universe.*" And these are the many he alludes to. "*If therefore, he says, many things being asserted about many, concerning the generation of the universe, and the Gods it contains, each of these being many, we should not be able to employ accurate language, you must not wonder.*" He says this, however, because it is not wonderful, to be occupied in things of a necessary nature. But it is necessary that a discussion should not be accurate in a twofold respect, viz. on account of the thing known, not being stable and clear, and on account of our nature being human. So great therefore is the caution

<sup>1</sup> It is evidently necessary instead of *διετηρον ειδος* in this place, to read *πρωτον ειδος*. For dianoetic knowledge is by no means conjunctural.

which Plato employs in what he says. This however is not the case with others. But Heraclitus, by asserting of himself that he knew all things, makes all other men to be destitute of science. And Empedocles announces that he imparts truth herself, and that, in what he writes.

To Wisdom's summit rapidly he leaps.

For these assertions are not conformable to philosophic caution. But the Stoics say that there is the same virtue of Gods and men, being very far from emulating the piety of Plato, and the modesty of Socrates.

“ If therefore we shall afford arguments no less probable than others, it is proper to be satisfied, calling to mind that I who speak, and that you who are my judges, have the human nature [in common]. So that if you receive a probable narration concerning these things, it is fit to seek for nothing farther than this.”

Timæus reminds us in a twofold respect of the privation of stability and accuracy in physical discussions ; first, from the essence of the things. For from immaterial natures becoming material, from impartible partible, from separate natures, such as are situated in a foreign seat, and from universal, becoming individual and partial natures, they do not receive the definition of things scientific and irreprehensible, which is adapted to immaterial and impartible forms. But in the second respect, from the imbecility of that by which physical objects are surveyed. For if it be requisite to know any thing concerning them, it is also requisite to embrace a knowledge co-ordinate to them. But this is sense. And if indeed we were in the heavens, we should perhaps be less deceived ; but here dwelling in the last part of the universe, and being most remote from them, we employ sense in a gross and erroneous manner. For we are allotted the human nature. But the human nature brings with it a life which is material and darkened by the body, and which is partible, and in want of irrational knowledge. The Gods, however, know that which is generated, in a way perfectly remote from generation, that which is temporal, eternally, and that which is contingent, necessarily. For by intellectually perceiving they generate all things, so that they

\* The word *γεννησασθαι* is wanting in the original.

intellectually perceive them after the above-mentioned manner. For we must not fancy that knowledge is characterized by the natures of the things known, or that what is not stable is also not stable with the Gods, as the philosopher Porphyry says; for this is asserted by him which it would have been better not to have said; but we must admit that the mode of knowledge varies with the diversities of gnostic natures. For the same thing is known by divinity indeed unitedly, by intellect totally, by reason universally, by the phantasy morphotically,<sup>1</sup> and by sense passively. Nor does it follow, that because the thing known is one, the knowledge also is one. Farther still, if knowledges are essential in the Gods, and their intelligence is not adventitious, such as they are, such also is their knowledge. But they are immaterial, eternal, united, and undefiled; and, therefore, they know immaterially, eternally, unitedly, and with uncontaminated purity. Hence they antecedently comprehend that which is material, immaterially; dispersed multitude, uniformly; that which is changed according to time, stably and eternally; and every thing preternatural, dark and impure, in a manner [transcendently luminous and] pure. Would it not therefore be superfluous to add any further confirmation of this truth?

Again however this may be assumed from what has been said, that the want of accuracy in the theory of the images of being, arises from our imbecility. For to the knowledge of them we require phantasy, sense, and many other organs. But the Gods contractedly comprehend these in their unity, and divine intellection. For in sublunary natures, we are satisfied in apprehending that which for the most part takes place, on account of the instability of their subject matter. But again, in celestial natures, we are filled with much of the conjectural, through employing sense, and material instruments. On this account, we must be satisfied with proximity in the apprehension of them, since we dwell remotely, at the bottom, as it is said, of the universe. This also is evident from those that are conversant with them, who collect the same things respecting them from different hypotheses; some things, indeed, through eccentrics, others through epicycles, and others through evolvents, [in all these] preserving the phenomena. What then, some one may say, are we to be satisfied with Plato in physiologizing, and in affording us arguments no less probable than others? May we not reply, that it especially becomes prudent men thus to speak about things of this kind, and to pursue the

<sup>1</sup> The word *morphe*, as we have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies. Hence, the phantasy perceives *morphotically*, because its sight is a *figured* perception.

<sup>2</sup> For *τοσα* here, it seems necessary to read *τοσο*.

medium between dissimulation and arrogance; for the latter is to say more, but the former less, than all others, and the medium is to say what is in no respect less. In the next place, the words *no less*, may not only be said of men in former times, and speculators of nature, but also of the conjectural things themselves. As if he had said, "*If therefore, we shall afford arguments no less probable than the things themselves, and shall not desert the nature of the objects of knowledge, we must be satisfied.*" The Gods indeed know these things in a more excellent manner, but we must be satisfied with an approximating knowledge of them. For we are men, are placed in body, and exert a partial form of life, and are filled with much of a conjectural nature. Hence, our discourses may be very properly said to resemble fables. For our language, which the word *μῦθος* a *fable* [used here by Plato] indicates, is replete with crassitude and irrationality, and it is necessary to pardon human nature.

"You speak most excellently, O Timæus, and we shall receive what you say, in every respect as you advise. Your preface indeed we wonderfully approve. Proceed therefore, and bring to a conclusion the subsequent melody."

In the Republic, where Socrates disposes the discourse, Timæus was silently present, not exhibiting his own judgment about what was said. But here Socrates, after a certain admirable manner, receives what Timæus says. For in the things also, of which the persons are images, while secondary natures energize, those that are first are established in themselves, and do not depart from themselves, nor verge to inferior natures. But when more divine beings energize, then more subordinate natures are elevated to the participation of them, through the love of all-various wonder. Hence Socrates, in what is here said, very properly surrounds Timæus with all possible praise. For through wonder itself, he is in a greater degree united to him. Moreover, the word "*most excellent*" indicates indeed, the perfect, intellectual, and scientific nature of the doctrine of Timæus. And it also indicates his analogy to the Demiurgus. For as he is the best of causes in works, thus also Timæus is the best in discourses. The words likewise, "*we shall receive what you say in every respect*

\* For *πῶλον* here, it is necessary to read *καλον*.

\* In the text of Proclus, *λογον* is erroneously printed for *ερον*.

*as you advise*," indicate what kind of person he ought to be, who rightly receives discussions concerning divine natures. That he ought assiduously to adhere to the teacher; to perform with all his might that which is ordered by him; and to persuade himself, that it is right to be persuaded by what the teacher says.

Farther still the word "*preface*" indicates the comprehension of total conceptions in the hypotheses. All things therefore, are in the preface itself.<sup>1</sup> For in this preface, it is shown what the form<sup>2</sup> is of the object of inquiry, on what hypotheses,<sup>3</sup> and things previously demonstrated from them it depends, and also what the nature is of the discussion, and what are the requisite qualifications of the auditor. But the word *νομος melody*, is assumed from modulations adapted to the harp. These therefore, are certain melodies, some of which are Minerval, but others Martial. And some indeed, are entheastic, but others are defamatory of manners. Prior, however, to these melodies, it is usual to arrange the preludes, which also on this account are called *precontractations*. From thence therefore, they are assumed. But the word *melody* contributes to the thing proposed to be considered, because all the visible partible<sup>4</sup> order of things, being harmonious, eternally remains, on account of the goodness of its producing causes. And because likewise, it proceeds from, and subsists according to intellect, and possesses total powers separated from each other, and arranged in a manner adapted to each. For melodies are called *νομους laws*, because they remain immutable, and because such things as are fit are distributed from each.

"Let us narrate then on account of what certain cause, the composing artificer constituted generation, and this universe."

All that has been before said delivers to us preparatives for the whole of physiology. And of these, some through images and symbols, exhibit the theory of the world. A preface also of the whole discussion is prefixed, and of the demonstration through images or symbols; one part of which unfolds the union, but another the separation of mundane natures. Of the prefatory parts also, some are hypotheses, but others are as it were lemmas demonstrated through the hypo-

<sup>1</sup> For *κατα τι* *re* here, it seems requisite to read *κατα τοῦτο*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *τι τοῦ εἶδους* in this place, it is necessary to read *τι τοῦ εἶδαι*.

<sup>3</sup> For *καὶ ποῶν ὑποθέσεων* read *καὶ ἐκ ποῶν ὑποθέσεων*.

<sup>4</sup> The word *μερίστη* is omitted in the original.

theses. For the particulars respecting the mode of discussion, may be placed among the things demonstrated. For to the demonstration that the world is generated, the assertion that the discussion of it is eikotology [or speaking from probability], is consequent. But again, these things having received an appropriate end. Timæus commencing the fabrication of the universe, begins from *the good*, conceiving that the discovery of the final cause will be to him the most beautiful incitation. For as *the good* is the cause of all beings, so likewise it is fit that the generation of the world should proceed from this as the first principle. For all things are from *the good*. And of such things indeed, as the demiurgic intellect is not<sup>a</sup> the cause, as for instance of matter, of these *the good* is the cause. And of such things as the paradigm is not hypostatic, these also derive their subsistence from *the good*. For all things are for the sake of it, and it is the cause of all beautiful things, as it is said in the Epistles. Hence Timæus refers the other causes to this one cause. For having found the form of the world through the hypotheses, and also the paradigmatic, and effective cause, he now wishes to assign the most principal, most venerable, and most ancient of causes, the final, which he particularly desires in the fabrication of things. For since the man who lives according to intellect performs every thing for the sake of good, will not intellect itself, and a divine intellect, in a much greater degree fabricate all things for the sake of the final cause? For though the worthy man frequently appears to perform something for the sake of the body, yet this is not the end to him of the thing, nor does he principally regard the good of the subordinate nature; but he does this also for the sake of a similitude to divinity, and makes that to be his most intentional end. How much more therefore, must the Demiurgus of the universe fabricate for the sake of good, and the final cause? For he does not energize without design, nor indefinitely. Hence also, as it appears to me, Plato does not investigate in the beginning, if there is a final cause of the composition of the world, but as if this was acknowledged by all men, he inquires what the final cause is. For the Demiurgus is supposed to be intellect and a God, and not chance, as some say. But if intellect is the maker, there is certainly *that for the sake of which* in the fabrication of things. For as the soul when it is in an upright condition, performs all things according to intellect, so intellect in fabricating, gives subsistence to all things conformably to divinity. But this is the same as conformably to *the good*.

<sup>a</sup> For οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτίας here, it is necessary to read οὐκ ἢ ἔστιν αἰτίας.

Whether therefore, it be requisite to follow the Aristotelian problems, after *what* the universe is, and *what kind of a thing* it is, it is necessary to investigate *on what account* it is. For it has been said that it is generated indeed, but is the image of being. And it is also requisite besides this to consider, for the sake of what it was generated. Or if it be necessary to adopt the Platonic causes, it is fit after the demiurgic cause and the paradigm, to discover the final cause of the fabrication of the world. For again, all other causes are suspended from this, and likewise the divinity of the paradigm, the goodness of the maker, and the perfection of that which is generated. And as far as to this is the ascent to those who love to contemplate truth. It is usual however, to call the final cause  $\delta\alpha\sigma$ , *on account of which*; the paradigmatic cause  $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\sigma$ , *with relation to which*, the demiurgic cause  $\pi\alpha\tau'$ , *by which*; the instrumental cause  $\delta\iota'$ , *through which*; form  $\kappa\alpha\tau'$ , *according to which*; and matter  $\epsilon\kappa$ , *or ex quo, from which, or in which*. These causes also received the same appellations from Plato himself. For now investigating the final cause he says, *on account of what cause*. Inquiring concerning the paradigmatic cause, he says, *with relation to which* of the paradigms. But concerning the demiurgic cause, he says, that which is generated, is from necessity generated *by* a certain cause. And as we proceed, we shall point out the rest from the words themselves of Plato; except that at present also it must be said, that these appellations are adapted to the discriminating science of the philosopher.

What however is generation, and what is the universe? Some indeed by generation understanding the sublunary place, call the universe the whole world. But these entirely wander from the meaning of Plato. For the Demiurgus is not represented as separately fashioning material natures, and separately the whole world. And in the next place, generation itself is a part of the universe. If however, it should be said that Plato calls the heaven the universe, because it is the greatest part of the world, for the rest is small; or because it is the most divine and principal part, and as it were the summit of the universe; for the head also is called the whole, as,

Teucer, dear head;<sup>1</sup>

and Plato also says, that the world was surrounded with the remaining bulk of body for the sake of this;—yet at the same time, the philosopher is accustomed to call this likewise generation. Others again call matter generation, but that

<sup>1</sup> Iliad, viii. 281.



which is adorned from matter [as the subject], they denominate the universe, by whom many things written by Plato, must necessarily be rejected. For he says, that every thing generated, and all generation, is sensible, or tangible, and visible. Farther still, he gives a division to generation opposite to that of matter, as when he says, there were these things subsisting separately, being, place, and generation, from which the universe was constituted.

Our preceptor however says, that the fabrication of the world is to be understood in a twofold respect. For one part of it consists in the formation of bodies, but the other, in adapting bodies to the completion of one world. For it is one thing to fashion bodies themselves, through figures, but another to harmonize them when fashioned, to the universe. *Generation therefore, must be said to be the formation of bodies, being a motion [or tendency] to the wholeness and perfection of the universe. For that which is composed from parts has a pre-conceived production of the parts. Hence the formation,<sup>1</sup> which takes place between matter, the whole orderly distribution of things, and the one completion of the universe, must be called generation, in order that it may be a path to the whole in which the parts are comprehended.* For this is the universe, being constituted perfect from perfect parts, according to the one harmony of wholes. Since however, this whole is sensible, and not the intelligible all, or universe; for this was the paradigm; nor the intellectual all; for this was demiurgic; on this account Plato adds the particle *this*, manifesting by it that which is sensible and partial. For every thing corporeal, though it should be a whole, is partial. But the most principal whole is that which is immaterial and without interval, and that is truly all whether it be intellectual or intelligible. And thus much concerning this particular.

But what shall we say is meant by composition? Perhaps it indicates that the world is composed from many things, and that the generation of it is from dissimilars. Perhaps also, it signifies that union and stability accede to it from the total fabrication. For the collocation of *συν*, *with*, [in the word *συνιστας*] is significant of union, and of the conspiracy of all things to one. But *στασις*, *permanency*, manifests the firmness and stability of the fabrication of the world. Farther still, with respect to the words *συνιστας* and *συνιστητατο* [i. e. *he who composed and he constituted*] employed here by Plato, the former copulates the present and past times, and the latter indicates the perfection and the perpetuity of the fabrication. For the former of these words manifests continual pro-

<sup>1</sup> For *πασαν* here, it is necessary to read *πασιν*.

duction, and which is always consummately effected with invariable sameness; but the latter a wholeness which is allotted an existence in fulness. The signifying likewise, both the past and the present time through the same names, indicates that the divine fabrication proceeds through sameness and similitude. For such as is the nature of that which is effective, such also is the energy which it possesses. And as it is, so it fabricates; because it produces by its very being, and from its own proper essence.

“He was good, but in him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated about any thing.”

Those who call the Demiurgus *the good*, are entirely ridiculous. For *the good* and one who is good are not the same. For the former is imparticipable itself by itself, and is exempt from all things; but the latter is good through participation of the former. And the one rules over all intelligibles; but the other, if indeed it is the same with the paradigm, is intelligibles themselves, but is not the sovereign ruler of intelligibles; and if it is subordinate to the paradigm is in a much greater degree inferior to the king of all intelligibles. And in short, every certain God is a certain good, one being a demiurgic, another a vivific, and another a perfective good. But *the good* is not a certain good, but is simply good. And if you say that it is demiurgic, you diminish its subsistence as simply good.

These distinctions therefore being made, let us next consider the beginning of what is here said. In the first place, therefore, as Plato when investigating the mundane form, and inquiring whether the world was generated, or is unbegotten, adds prior to the whole demonstration, “*it was generated*,” and as when exploring the paradigmatic cause, he previously adds, “*it is manifest to every one, that it was generated with relation to an eternal paradigm*,” adducing the conclusion prior to the whole of the reasoning;—thus also proposing to discover the final cause after all the others, he adds, “*he was good*,” imitating intellect through this enunciation, and the at once collected comprehension of the assertion. For in this colon, the whole of what is investigated is comprehended, because goodness is the final cause, whether it is simply so and one, or whether<sup>1</sup> it is the demiurgic goodness. For as the paradigm is two-fold, the one being intelligible, but the other intellectual; and as the one is prior to the Demiurgus,

<sup>1</sup> For *αυτο* here, read *απο*.

<sup>2</sup> *Eare* is omitted in the original.

being primarily eternal and united, and comprehensive of all intelligible animals, but the other which is in the Demiurgus of wholes, unically comprehends the demiurgic number of forms;—thus also with respect to goodness, one kind is simply so, but another is in the demiurgic intellect. And the former indeed, is the fountain of all intelligible, intellectual, and supermundane good; but the latter being a certain goodness, is the cause and fountain of some things, but is allotted an order subordinate to others. For if we wish to explore what it is which makes a God, whether he be intelligible or intellectual, supermundane or mundane, we shall find that it is nothing else than goodness. For what is it that makes each of the bodies that are animated to be so, except the resemblance of soul? What is it which makes intellectual souls to be such, except the intellect that is in them, and which is an illumination of total intellect? What therefore can deity intellect, and an intelligible essence, except the participation of the first God, and the forerunning illumination that proceeds from him? What therefore is the first? If indeed, he were intelligible beauty we should say that intellect was a God through beauty. But since the first God is *the good*, intellect also through participating of goodness is a God. Hence this is the hyparxis of the Gods; and the very essence of the Gods, if it be lawful so to speak, is goodness. According to this likewise, every God exists as a God. And on account of this he has a providential, or a demiurgic, or a vivific, or a connective characteristic. For intellect indeed, so far as intellect, is naturally adapted to have an intellectual perception and knowledge of beings; but to energize providentially is divine. So that the demiurgic intellect likewise, possesses its subsistence as demiurgic, on account of the goodness which it contains. For on account of this, the intellect which is in the Demiurgus, is the maker, and is not only gnostic of being. The being also which is in him, is an efficacious paradigm, and produces by its very existence, and is not alone perfective of intellect. And intellect indeed in making is corroborated by both these; by the paradigm, because it produces with *relation to it*; and by goodness, because it produces *on account of it*. But the paradigm is corroborated by unity.

You have therefore, these successive, viz. goodness, the paradigm, intellect. And these subsist in one way indeed, in the Demiurgus, and in another prior to the Demiurgus. And if you are willing so to speak, the first goodness is *the one*,

\* For *ἡνὲν* in this place, it is necessary to read *ἡνὲν*.

which is beyond even intelligibles themselves : for it is imparticipable <sup>1</sup> goodness. But the paradigm is that intelligible which unitedly comprehends all the number of forms. And the maker is the intellectual intellect which gives subsistence to wholes. So that if Amelius said that there are three demiurgi after this manner, perceiving this triad in the one Demiurgus, he said rightly. For one of them, says he, makes [as it were] by concretion, another by mandate, and another by his will alone. And the first indeed, is arranged analogously to the manual artificer; the second pre-exists conformably to the architect; but the third is established prior to both, analogously to a king. *So far therefore, as the Demiurgus is intellect, he produces all things by the intellectual perceptions of himself; but so far as he is intelligible, he makes by his very being; and so far as he is a God, by his will alone.* If however Amelius divulges the three Demiurgi from the one Demiurgus, we must not admit it, while we follow Plato. For the same Demiurgus is good, so far as he is a God, and on account of goodness he produces all things by his will, and is intelligible <sup>2</sup> intellectually; for such is the demiurgic being. He is also intellect, the artificer of the world. The words therefore, "*he was good,*" have an explanation of this kind; *in the term WAS, the super-plenary, the consummately perfect, and the super-eternal nature of his divine hyparxis, being indicated. For the term IS, is significant of eternal things; the term WAS, of the super-eternal unities; and the term WILL BE, of things which subsist in time. For if the term IS pertains to eternal natures, the term WAS will be adapted to the natures prior to these, and the term WILL BE, to the natures posterior to these.* But such are the beings which are indigent of time.

Since however the Demiurgus is good, envy is never ingenerated in him about any thing. But some one may say, what is there [remarkable] in intellect not being envious? For this <sup>3</sup> does not happen even to men that are moderately good. The term therefore *never*, is significant of eternal perfection; since souls are at one time passively effected, but at another, recur to impassivity. But the term *about any thing*, is significant of self-sufficiency; since we indeed, for the sake of other things, are frequently purified from envy, but in those things in which we have less [than we think we ought to have in these] we are filled with envy. What however, is

<sup>1</sup> For ἀμετέστος here, read ἀμετέστως.

<sup>2</sup> For σῶντας εἶναι σοφῶς, it is necessary to read in this place σῶντας εἶναι σοφῶς.

<sup>3</sup> For τοῦ γὰρ here, it is requisite to read τοῦτο γὰρ.

the meaning of the term *οἷδης*, none.<sup>1</sup> Is it because there are many kinds of envy that he adds *none*? Or is it said through transcendency, in consequence of making a perfect negation of envy? But what kind of transcendency is it possible to find in assertions concerning the Gods? For all the appellations and words which are employed about them, are beneath their dignity. Is not envy therefore, a pain arising from the goods belonging to others, this passion in us being mingled from pleasure and pain, as Socrates has shown in the *Philebus*? Envy likewise, is for a man to be able to benefit, and yet not benefiting, but keeping the good confined to himself. And *envy is also the want itself of good*; which the philosopher appears to me especially to assume at present, exterminating it from a divine essence. For it is naturally adapted to be perfectly exempt from this alone, since it is essentialized in goodness itself. *For to be pained from the goods pertaining to others, is inherent in all good which subsists according to participation, and which is not primarily good. For adventitious good is one thing, good according to habit another, and primary good another. For the first is mingled with its contrary, in the same manner as adventitious beauty is mingled with deformity. But the second is wholly boniform, yet is such by participation. And the third, which is primarily good, is good itself.* For as intellect itself is the first intellect, and as the beautiful itself is primarily beautiful, so good itself is primarily good. What therefore is this? It is *the deity* of each thing, according to which every truly-existing being is a God. For it differs in no respect from goodness. But if any one of secondary natures should be said to be a God, or good, it is among the number of things deified, and rendered good, and is a God through participation, and not on account of its own proper essence, nor from itself.

This participation therefore, Plato is accustomed to call *indigence*;<sup>2</sup> just as in the *Banquet*, he calls Love *the want* of things beautiful and good. Hence, a divine nature, so far as it is divine, is primarily good, and not according to participation; so that neither is it indigent of good. Hence too, it is superior to all envy. For as to the sun, which is generative of light, it is impossible for darkness to approach, but it is excluded from it at a great distance, about the cavities of the earth; after the same manner, it is impossible for envy to approach to a divine nature. For what kind of indigence can there be in such transcendent abundance? What imbecility is there in almighty deity? What participation in the

<sup>1</sup> i. e. *Οὐδὲν ὀφειλὸν, no envy.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ἐξέστις* is omitted in the original.

fountain of good? The Demiurgus therefore, being good by his very being, transcends all indigence, and all participation which accedes from another thing. For he is united to *the one itself*, and does not proceed out of it. For intellectual union is of one kind, but the union prior to intellect of another, according to which the generative deity of the Demiurgus, and the goodness which connects all things, are united to *the one itself*. For this goodness is not a certain power, as some say, but the measure of all power. Nor is it will, but will proceeds from it. Nor is it a habit; for habit pertains to another<sup>1</sup> thing different from habit; but goodness is itself of itself [i. e. pertains to itself alone]. Nor, in short, is it an essential hypostasis; but it is that which unites essence, and is ineffable, connects powers, and is prolific of demiurgic energies. As therefore, every intellect is essentialized in existing as intellect, but that which is above intellect is participated by it; and as every soul is essentialized in existing as soul, but intellect is participated by it; thus also every God is essentialized in being a God, or rather is superessentialized, but there is not any thing which is participated by him; because the Gods are the most ancient and venerable of all things. The demiurgic intellect therefore, so far as it is a God, in existing as a God is primarily so, and not according to participation. This however is the same with good. As therefore, if some one should say that envy is the want of intellect, and a partial intellect is superior to envy, but soul is not superior to it, for it is indigent of intellect, because it is adapted to become intellectual by the participation of intellect;—thus also in goodness, envy is the indigence of good; but every thing indigent is not primarily good. Soul indeed and intellect are indigent of good, because they are not primarily good. But a God, so far as a God, being good, is exempt from all envy, and transcends all indigence of whatever kind it may be, whether it subsists according to diminution, or according to deviation. For indigence is twofold, one kind as we have said being evil, but the other not.

“Being therefore entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself.”

This is consequent to the before-mentioned axioms. For the first colon [or

<sup>1</sup> For αὐτῷ here, it is necessary to read αὐτῷ.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Every God, so far as he is a God, is a participant of nothing superior to himself. For the procession of the Gods from the principle of all things, is not a participation, but an ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου αὐτοῦ, an ineffable unfolding into light.

<sup>3</sup> For ἀποδοῖ here, read ἐδοῖτο.

part of the sentence] manifested the order, and the hyparxis of the Demiurgus, that he is a God. And since with respect to deity, one God is imparticipable, but another participable, <sup>1</sup> he manifests that the Demiurgus is participable. For he does not say that he was goodness, but that he was good. But he who is good participates of goodness. And goodness itself indeed, is primarily good. But intellect and being are good by participation. Again, the second colon shows that the Demiurgus does not rank among deified natures. For one thing is entirely imparticipable, such, for instance, as *the good*; but another is good by <sup>2</sup> the participation of some other nature, as every thing which is deified.<sup>3</sup> But that which is primarily good, is good itself. And that which is participated, and is the medium of both the before-mentioned natures is of such a kind as all the intelligible and intellectual orders of the Gods are said to be. But this third colon comprehends the demiurgic peculiarity. For not only to be good, but on account of the super-plenary, and the extended, to proceed to all things, is indicative of the demiurgic and effective cause, desiring to fill all things with itself, and to benefit all things; in order that all things may become as much as possible similar to itself, by participating of a certain divine nature, and of arcane and ineffable impressions, which accede to them from the whole fabrication of things. If therefore, the maker of the universe is superior to all indigence, he is exempt from all imbecility, and this eternally. For *being* signifies the eternal; and because he especially benefits all things, he imparts to all things by illumination, the measure of good, a greater thing than which each of the participants is by no means adapted to receive. And this indicates the extension of providence. If likewise, he wished to supply all things with the participation of good, there is nothing in the universe solely evil, so that neither is there any thing disorderly, nor without the inspection of providence, nor indefinite; but all things participate of beauty and order, so far as they are naturally adapted to receive them. Hence he made all things similar to himself, so far as he is a God, benefiting generated natures; but he caused them to become other things besides this, according to other paradigmatic reasons. For as Atticus says, as the carpenter makes all that he makes to be artificial, but differ-

<sup>1</sup> The Demiurgus is a participable deity, because his intellect participates of his goodness, which constitutes his hyparxis.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *το μετὰ* in this place, it is necessary to read *τῷ μετὰ*.

<sup>3</sup> Thus soul is deified by the participation of intellect as a medium; because deity accedes to soul through the intervention of intellect; and body is deified by the participation of soul as a medium.

ent things according to a different reason [or productive principle], causing one thing to be a ladder, but another a bed; thus also the Demiurgus, so far as he is good, assimilates all things to himself, rendering them good; but according to forms which distribute their essences, he makes them with relation to paradigmatic causes. Porphyry however, admitting these things, thinks fit to ask what it is by the reception of which genera are good. And he says it is by the reception of harmony, symmetry, and order. For these are beautiful. But every thing [truly] beautiful is good. Plato therefore manifests that good is in these, when he says, "*That God led that which was disorderly into order, through his wish to communicate good.*"

From all that has been said, therefore, it is easy to infer, that the Demiurgus produces eternally; that the world is perpetual, according to a perpetuity which is extended through the whole of time; that it is always generated with arrangement; and that it is not always incorruptible, but is always *generated or becoming to be so*, in consequence of always receiving good. But it is not immediately good like its generating father. For in him all things are contained unitedly, [but in the world distributedly],<sup>1</sup> and not with perfect reality, as in eternal natures. For if the universe was generated in time, was it from the Demiurgus that it did not exist before, or from its subject nature being without order? For if from the Demiurgus, was it because he also did not subsist eternally? Or is it not unlawful to assert this, and in other respects in vain? For concerning him, there is the same mode of interrogation, and whether shall we make all things generated, or will there be something primarily unbegotten, and the Demiurgus still more so? Let it therefore be admitted, that it was in consequence of the Demiurgus not energizing. Whether then, did he not fabricate, because he was not willing, or because he was not able? If indeed we say it was because he was not willing, we forget that we thus deprive him of goodness. But if he was not able, it is absurd that he should at one time have power, and at another imbecility. For we shall take away the eternal. But if it was from its subject nature that the universe did not exist before, whether was it from this nature being unadapted or adapted? If therefore it was adapted, it was not this nature which prevented the universe from existing. But if it was unadapted, how being unadapted for an infinite time, came it to be now changed [into an adapted condition]? Whether did it move itself? But it is not

\* The words *εν δε τῷ κόσμῳ διηρημένως*, are omitted in the original.



self-motive. Was it therefore moved by the Demiurgus? And why was it not moved by him before, if he also was then good, and was willing that all things should become similar to himself? The extension therefore of providence is suspended from the goodness of the father; but from this the eternal production of the Demiurgus; and from this, the perpetuity of the universe, which subsists for an infinite time in becoming to be, and is not a stable perpetuity. And the same assertion subverts the perpetuity of the world, and the goodness of him who made it. For if the Demiurgus was good, he always wished to impart good to all things. For as the sun, as long as it exists, illuminates<sup>1</sup> all things, and fire heats as long as it is fire; for the one is essentially illuminative, but the other calefactive; thus likewise, that which is always good, always wishes to impart good, lest being willing indeed, but unable, it should sustain the passion of the vilest natures. For neither does the worthy man wish to effect other things than such as he is able to effect. But if the Demiurgus was always able to impart good, he always imparts it in energy, lest he should have an imperfect power. If however, he always imparts good in energy, he always makes that which is good. But if he always makes it, the world is always generated. Hence the world is perpetual; for the Demiurgus is always good. The world therefore is perpetual, not *being* but *becoming to be* perpetually. Hence, as we have said, the perpetuity of the universe is suspended from the goodness of its maker. For the orderly distribution of the universe sufficiently manifests the demiurgic power. For matter, on account of its privation of form and morphe, has appeared to some to be without God, and the confused and disorderly nature, to be remote from divine providence. Since the universe however, is well-ordered and decorated with beauty, it clearly demonstrates divine production. The visible order of things therefore, being the progeny of the demiurgic cause, is consubistent with the goodness of the father.

“He therefore, who especially receives this most principal or proper and powerful principle from prudent men, will receive it with the greatest rectitude.”

Timæus assigns the final cause which extends itself to the goodness of the Demiurgus, according to which uniting himself to the first, and imitating him,

<sup>1</sup> For *καταλαμβάνει*, it is necessary to read *καταλαμβάνει*.

he generates all things. For the first principle is that which primarily produces all things, and this Timæus denominates the most proper and powerful principle, because it is motive of causes themselves. For the demiurgic principle moves indeed that which is generated, but is moved from thence (i. e. from the first principle). And the paradigmatic principle moves the total fabrication, but is moved by goodness; because *the good* indeed, is prior to intelligibles, but the paradigm is intelligible, and the Demiurgus intellectual. About *the good* also, all intelligible and intellectual natures subsist: but about the intelligible, the order of intellectuals subsists. The effective cause therefore, is a principal cause, but the paradigmatic is more principal, and the final is most principal. For it is that for the sake of which all things subsist, from which other things are suspended, and which is truly the end of fabrication. Hence the world is perfected indeed, on becoming animated and inspired with life; but it is most perfect, so far as it participates of good, and of the union which extends through wholes. For as *the good* is the leader of all things, so the goodness which is in each thing has the first dignity in each. On these accounts therefore, he calls the final cause the most principal, or the most proper and powerful principle. For the name of principle comprehends also concauses. But by the addition of *most principal*, he indicates that which is truly \* cause. For the most principal principles are the causes of generated natures; but concauses are subservient to other things, and are in the effects themselves. It must be said however, that *generation and the world, as we have before observed, are the path between matter and the whole arrangement of things, and the perfection itself of the universe.* Since also in dogmas concerning the highest causes it is necessary that the speaker should have the intellectual habit, and the auditor a prudent judgment, this is especially requisite in discussions concerning *the good*. For intellect subsists on account of *the good*, and the intellect which is in us, on account of the good which is in us. Hence Plato thinks it is necessary, that those who assert something concerning the most proper and powerful principle, should be prudent men, and that their auditors should receive what they say with the greatest rectitude. What then, may not any casual person say something concerning God and the final cause? And do we not every day hear the multitude asserting that God is good? But God spoken of without true virtue is but a name, as Plotinus says; and

\* Instead of *περι δε το νοητος, η των νοητων διακοσμησις* in this place, it is necessary to read *περι δε το νοητον, η των νοητων διακοσμησις*. For the intelligible is superior to the intellectual order.

† For *ην οστος αιτιαν* here, it is requisite to read *την οστω αιτιαν*.

*he is spoken of by the multitude, not according to wisdom, but according to chance.* Do not daemons also know the goodness of the father, who dance [as it were] round him; and demiurgic angels, who precede as in a solemn procession the paternal production of things; and Gods who receive demiurgic powers from the one fabricative cause? Gods however, possess this knowledge uniformly, angels intellectually, daemons with undefiled purity, eternally, and in a way allied to the natures prior to them, but we must be satisfied with having this knowledge prudently and wisely, since we are in a certain respect media between more divine natures and the multitude, between intellectual beings, and those that are deprived of intellect. For such is human prudence, proceeding indeed from intellect and intelligence, but ruling over a life destitute of intellect. Hence, when we speak concerning the most proper principle, what we assert must be received as uttered by prudent men. *For prudence is a medium between intellect and opinion*; so that a right judgment will be concordant with it. Hence too, Plato adds, "*he who especially.*" For the assertion concerning this principle must be *especially* received from prudent men. But from the natures above man, something better than this assertion must be sought; and from the multitude, a casual assertion.

"For the divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be evil."

The divine fabrication, and intellectual production proceeds from impartibles to partibles, from things united to such as are multiplied, and from things without interval, to every way extended masses. This also the discourse concerning it adumbrating, in the first place, celebrates the final cause apophthegmatically; in the next place, discursively; and in the third place, it delivers in an evolved manner, the whole orderly distribution and progression from it. For the assertion, "*he was good,*" uniformly comprehends every final and the most divine of causes. But the words, "*In him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated about any thing; and being entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself,*" comprehend this cause discursively; because, after the one will of intellect, he adds the divided theory of it. And what he now says represents to us intelligence proceeding into all multitude, and interval, and evolving all the demiurgic providence, and all the parts of fabrication. The third

<sup>1</sup> The word *ἐκείνους* is omitted in the original.

assertion, likewise, is in continuity with the second, and the second with the first. For since the first division was, "*he was good*," on this account the second begins from *good*, but proceeds as far as to the *will* of the father. And the third beginning from his *will*, delivers the whole of his *providential energy*. For if he was good, he wished to make all things good. But if he wished, he made them to be so, and the universe obtained an elegant arrangement. For providence indeed, is suspended from will, but will from goodness. And thus much concerning the order and connexion of the assertions.

Let us however survey what will is, in order that we may understand how it is conjoined with goodness. The super-essential union itself, therefore, which is of itself exempt from beings, is one, ineffable, and uncircumscribed, from *the one itself* possessing its undefined and incomprehensible nature. Hence, if it be requisite to survey in this, from what has been said, the triad which is characterized by unity, or which has the form of *the one*,—goodness indeed precedes, but the second is will, and the third is providence; *goodness producing the perfect, the sufficient, and the desirable; but will exhibiting the super-plenary, the extended, and the generative; and providence imparting the efficacious, the perfective of works, and the undefiled*. According however, to this ineffable and united hyparxis of the triad, the intelligible also is triply divided, into essence, power, and energy; essence indeed, being firmly established in this triad, and existing self-perfect; but power possessing a never-failing and infinite progression; and energy being allotted perfection and essential production. And again, intellect analogously receives a triple division, into being, life, and the intellectual. For the first of these is the supplier of existence, the second of vitality, and the third of knowledge. After these, soul likewise is divided into the object of science, into science, and the scientific. For the first of these indeed, is that which is known, the second is knowledge, and the third is that which receives its completion from both. These triads therefore, being four in number, as goodness is to will, so is essence to power, being to life, and the object of science to science. And as will is to providence, so is power to energy, life to intellect, and science to that which is scientific. For essence, being, and the object of science, have an order analogous to goodness. For the connective, the stable, the uniform, and the perfective, pertain to goodness. But power, life, and science, are analogous to will. For the self-begotten, and that which comprehends and measures all things, belong to will. And energy, intellect, and that which is scientific, pertain to providence. For the efficacious, and that which proceeds

through and antecedently comprehends all things, are the resemblances of divine providence. Since therefore, the Demiurgus also is a God, and an imparticipable intellect, so far as he is a God indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and providence; but as intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy; and as intellect, he is, and has life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will.

Consequent to this, it remains to inquire how the Demiurgus wished all things to be good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it may be said, if he was willing that this should be the case, it would be requisite that the progression of things should stop at the Gods and undefiled essences. If, however, he not only fabricated these, but also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thing material, he was not willing that all things should be good. For he was not willing that better natures should alone exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. If he had been willing, therefore, that all things should be good, he would have stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply, however, that if the progression of things was only as far as to the Gods, all things would not be good. For first natures being allotted the last order, the good would be destroyed; since being able and willing to generate through their goodness, yet in consequence of an arrangement as the last of things, they would become unprolific and not good. Our opponents therefore say, if all things are good, the progression is as far as to the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends only as far as to the Gods, all things are not good. For if a divine nature is unprolific how is it good? But it will be unprolific, if it is the last of things. For every thing which generates is better than that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing, that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there be the Gods, therefore, and let them have the first order. But after the Gods, let there be a progression<sup>1</sup> as far as to matter itself; and let us give a transition to all beings, from the first to the last of things. And neither let there be any thing wanting even of the last of beings, nor any vacuum. For what vacuum can there be when things characterized by *itself*<sup>2</sup> have the first subsistence; those that rank as the second proceed from these; those of the third order proceed from these and

<sup>1</sup> Προῶν is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> viz. Self-subsistent super-essential natures; for to these the *αυτο*, or *itself*, primarily belongs. The next to these are intellects. Those in the third rank, are souls. Those in the fourth, the natures that are divided about bodies. And those in the fifth and last rank are bodies.

others; those in the fourth rank are generated from things characterized by the term *another*; and those in the fifth rank being *others* only; and on each side of these those natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar! Such, therefore, being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable natures being first established, self-motive natures having the second, and alter-motive natures, the third rank, all of which are the last of things. For all beings derive their completion from the above-mentioned orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the well-ordered progression of all beings from *the one*.

Let, therefore, all these things be acknowledged, and let the generation of beings be extended as far as to nothing; but whether is there nothing evil in these, or shall we admit that there is in a certain respect, and that there is what is called depravity in bodies, and in souls? For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil entirely; but others have been induced to deny a providence, in consequence of believing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are good. For if, indeed, divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he be good? For it is the province of that which is essentially good to benefit every thing, just as it is of that which is essentially hot, to give heat. But it is not lawful for *the good* to effect any thing else than what is good. And if divinity was not willing there should be evil, how can it have a subsistence? For something will exist contrary to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the doubt.

We must say, however, conformably to the doctrine of Plato, according to our preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respect to things subsists in a different manner from that of ours. And again that the habitude of things with reference to deity is different from their habitude with reference to us. For wholes have a relation to parts different from that of parts to each other. To divinity therefore nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. For he uses these also to a good purpose. But again, to partial natures there is a certain evil, these being naturally adapted to suffer by it. And the same thing is to a part indeed evil, but to the universe and to wholes is not evil but good. For so far as it is a being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, it is good. For this thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute of all good, you will

<sup>1</sup> viz. *The one*, and matter.

<sup>2</sup> *M<sub>7</sub>* is wanting in the original.

make it to be beyond even that which in no respect whatever is. For as *the good itself* is prior to being, so evil itself is posterior to the nothingness of non-entity. For that which is most distant from the good is evil, and not that which has no kind of subsistence.<sup>1</sup> If, therefore, that which in no respect whatever is, has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is much more impossible that there should be such a thing as evil itself.

If, however, that which is entirely evil has no subsistence, but evil is complicated with good, you give it a place among beings, and you make it good to other things. And, indeed, how is it possible it should not, if it ranks among beings? For that which participates of being, participates also of unity, and that which participates of unity, participates likewise of good. Hence evil, if it is, participates of good; because evil has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not entirely deprived of order, and indefinite. Who therefore made it to be such? Who imparted to it measure, and order, and bound? It is evident that it is the Demiurgus who rendered all things similar to himself. For he filled both wholes and parts with good. But if he benefits all things, and colours evil itself with good, there is nothing evil according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For power is twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that is so abundantly seen;<sup>2</sup> but the other being that of recipients, which participate of the goodness of the Demiurgus according to the measure of their order [in the scale of beings]. In consequence therefore of the Demiurgus being willing that there should be nothing evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as the cause of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away the fabrication of the world, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and confound the nature of things first and last.

That we assert these things, however, conformably to the opinion of Plato, may be easily seen from his writings. For in the *Politicus*, he clearly says, "that the world obtained from its maker all beautiful things, but from its former habit, all such injustice, and evil, as are produced within the heavens." For because there is generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a subsistence.

<sup>1</sup> *The good itself* is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not that which is most distant from the good: for it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from the good is evil itself. Hence evil itself is posterior to nonentity.

<sup>2</sup> For πολυπαρον, it is necessary to read πολυοπαρον.

<sup>3</sup> For περι here, it is requisite to read παρα.

And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls with inelegance, through an association with it, on this account that which is not conformable to reason is allotted a certain resemblance of subsistence. At the same time, however, all these particulars become beautiful through the goodness of the maker of the universe. But in the Republic, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God, and says that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated; through which he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from divinity. For it is not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of snow to heat, nor of that which is all-good to produce evil. And he asserts that certain partial causes of these are to be admitted, and such as are indefinite. For it is not in evils as in things that are good, viz. that *the one* and what is primarily good, precede multitude; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil. The words *others*, therefore, and *certain*, evince that the causes of evil are partial and indefinite. But in the Theætetus he says, "that it is neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor for them to be in the Gods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal nature, and this place of our abode." If, therefore, evil revolves necessarily in the mortal place, it will not be according to Plato, that which in no respect whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all beings. So that according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, and is benefited through the boniform providence of the Demiurgus, because there is nothing which is entirely evil, but every thing is in a certain respect accomplished conformably to justice and divinity.

For we may make the following division: Of all that the world contains, some things are wholes, but others parts. And of parts, some eternally preserve their own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial daemons, but others are not always able to preserve their proper good. And of these, some are alter-motive, but others self-motive. And of self-motive natures, some have evil established in their choice; but in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes, therefore, they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts with good. Such things, however, as are parts, and yet preserve their own good, possess good secondarily and partially. But such as are parts, and alter-motive, deriving their subsistence from other things, are suspended from the providence of them, and are transmuted in a becoming manner, as is the case with such bodies as are generated and corrupted. For if it is necessary that there should be generation, it is also necessary that there should be corruption. For generation subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation. But if there is



corruption, it is necessary that the preternatural should be secretly introduced. As, therefore, that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted with reference to itself, but is not destroyed with reference to the universe; for it is either air or water, or something else into which it is changed; thus also that which is preternatural, is indeed with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the universe has an orderly arrangement. For if though it should be destroyed and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of the universe, how is it possible that when having a preternatural subsistence which is of itself nothing when deprived of all order, it can destroy the whole arrangement of things? But again, partial natures which are self-motive indeed, and whose energy is directed to externals, cause that which is effected by their energy to be evil to themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is good, and conformable to divinity. For since impulses and actions are from choice, actions follow elections, according to justice, when he who chooses not only deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that also which follows from his conduct. And simply, indeed, the action is not good, but to him who chooses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain way, it is introduced according to justice; and is good to this individual and this particular life. For of goods, some are good to all things, others to such as differ according to species, and others to individuals, so far as they are individuals. For hellebore is not good to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies, but it is good to one who is diseased in a particular manner, and is salutary from a certain principle. Whether, therefore, the action is intemperate or unjust, to those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is conformable to justice, but simply it is not good, nor to those by whom it is done, but is to them the greatest evil. And so far as it proceeds from them and is directed to them, it is evil; but so far as it proceeds from the universe to them, it is not evil. And so far as their energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming actually depraved; but so far as they suffer from the universe, they undergo the punishment of their choice (just as it is said, that those who deliberate about betraying a suppliant, subvert divinity); or they suffer the punishment of their will.

Let us, however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such partial natures as energize self-motively, and who stop their depravity as far as to their choice. For they suffer the punishment of their cogitation alone. For, as it is said, there is a certain punishment of mere imagination, impulse and will; since the Gods govern us inwardly, and as they reward beneficent choice, so likewise

they punish the contrary. But it may be said, how can choice itself have that which is conformable to justice and divinity? May we not reply, because it is necessary there should be an essence of this kind and a power of an ambiguous nature, and which verges to different lives? If therefore that which has dominion over choice is from divinity, choice also is from divinity, and if this be the case, it is good. For the electing soul alone is transferred to another and another order. For all choice either elevates the soul, or draws it downward [to an inferior condition of being]. And if indeed the choice is from a depraved soul, it is evil; but if it transfers that which chooses to its proper order, it is according to justice and good. For the choice itself introduces punishment to the electing soul. Or rather, the choice becomes punishment in him who chooses, causing the soul to apostatize from good. For as a beneficent choice becomes truly the reward of itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is the peculiarity of self-motive powers. Hence there is no evil, which is not also in a certain respect good; but all things participate of providence.

If, however, certain persons should ask on what account an evil-producing cause had at first a subsistence, though it should not rank among wholes, but is of a partial nature, to these it must be said, that the progression of beings is continued, and that no vacuum is left among them. Whether, therefore, is it necessary that there should not be every self-motive life? But we shall thus take away many natures that are divine. Or shall we say it is necessary there should be wholes that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should be self-motive parts? But how is it possible they should be wholes, if deprived of their proper parts? And how will the continuity of beings be preserved, if wholes and self-motive natures have a prior existence, and also partial and alter-motive natures, but we entirely destroy the intermediate natures, viz. such as are self-motive indeed, but at the same time partial? And which through the partial form become connected with habitude, but through the self-motive power, are at a certain time liberated from habitude. It is necessary therefore, that there should be this life also, which is a medium in beings, and the bond of things which have as it were an arrangement contrary to each other. Evil, however, is not on this account natural to the soul; since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated body has an essential tendency to disease; for it is essentially corruptible; and yet disease

<sup>1</sup> *Μεχθρηται* is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For the proper parts of a self-motive whole, are also self-motive.

<sup>3</sup> For *απ' αττης* here, it is necessary to read *απ' αττης*.

is not according to nature. Hence, disease is indeed evil to the partial nature which is allotted to connect this particular body, but is good to the wholeness of bodies. For it is necessary that what is generated from other things, should be changed into another thing. As, therefore, to the nature which is in us, it is good for the nutriment to be changed, in order to the preservation of the animal; thus also to every nature it is good for a part to be corrupted, in order that the wholes may be preserved, which are always prior to parts. For if parts were generated from wholes, and the things generated should remain, all things would be rapidly consumed, in consequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For a continued ablation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must necessarily fail. But wholes not existing, either generation will be stopped, or mutation to partial natures will be derived from other things. Hence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the whole life of the world.

Farther still, therefore, resuming the inquiry after another manner from the beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there should be evil, or was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he was willing, indeed, considered as imparting being to all things. For every thing in the universe which has any kind of being proceeds from the demiurgic cause. But he was not willing, considered as producing all things good. For he concealed evil in the use of good. And if you are willing to argue physically, evil is produced *essentially* indeed from a partial soul, but *accidentally* from divinity, so far as it is evil, if it is admitted that divinity gave subsistence to the soul. Evil also, so far as it is essentially good, originates from a divine cause, but accidentally from the soul. For so far as it subsists according to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in the Laws defines what punishment is, viz. that it appears to consume him who suffers it, and resembles the opening of ulcers. And he who is incapable<sup>1</sup> of being healed without a certain action, is incited to the performance of it, in order that the soul being liberated from her parturiency and stupid astonishment about that which is base, and repenting of her own evils, may begin to be purified. For base and unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely to those that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, till those that perform them with repentance. And when, indeed, they are the subjects of meditation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased; but when they have proceeded into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, but liberate the soul from the

<sup>1</sup> For το μὲν ἔντα μὲν in this place, it is necessary to read, το μὴ ἔντα μὲν.

most disgraceful parturition. And some, indeed, exhibit this punishment according to the whole of their life ; but others according to partial energies. For he who does any thing irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in his imagination.

In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures ; for the whole intellectual genus is free from all evil ; nor in whole souls, or whole bodies ; for all wholes are exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and always subsisting according to nature. It remains, therefore, that it must be in partial souls, or in partial bodies. But neither is it in the essences of these ; for all their essences are derived from divinity ; nor in their powers ; for these subsist according to nature. Hence it remains, that it must be in their energies. But with respect to souls, it is neither in such as are rational ; for all these aspire after good ; nor in such as are irrational ; for these energize according to nature. But it subsists in the privation of symmetry<sup>1</sup> of these with reference to each other. And in bodies, it is neither in form ; for it wishes to rule over matter ; nor in matter, for it aspires after the supervening ornaments of form. But it consists in the privation of symmetry between form and matter. From which also it is evident, that every thing evil exists according to a *parypostasis*, or *resemblance of subsistence*, and that at the same time it is coloured by good ; so that all things are good through the will of divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it was not possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have a shadowy subsistence, since it is necessary to the perfection of the whole of things. And from what has been said, it is evident, that the will of divinity is not vain. For all things are good with reference to him, and there is not any being which is not vanquished by a portion of good. Nor are the words, "*as much as possible*," written superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an abundance of good.

"Thus receiving every thing that was visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he led it from disorder into order, conceiving that the latter was in every respect better than the former."

<sup>1</sup> For *συμμετρικῶς* here, it is necessary to read, *ἀσυμμετρικῶς*.

Plutarch of Chersona and his followers, and also Atticus, understand what is here said literally, as testifying for them the generation of the world from a certain time. They also say that unadorned matter existed prior to the generation of the universe, and likewise a malevolent soul, which moved this matter. For, [they add,] whence was the motion except from soul; and if the motion was disorderly it was from a disorderly soul? It is said therefore, in the *Laws*, that a beneficent soul instructs in an upright and prudent manner, but that a malevolent soul is moved disorderly, and that what is governed by it is conducted confusedly and inelegantly. They farther add, that when the fabrication of the world by the Demiurgus commenced, matter was brought into a state adapted to the composition of the world, and that the malevolent soul participating of intellect, was rendered prudent, and produced an orderly motion. For the participation of form, and the presence of intellect, brought it into order. Porphyry however, and Iamblichus, and their followers, reprobate this opinion, as admitting in wholes, that which is without, prior to that which has arrangement, the imperfect prior to the perfect, and that which is without intelligence, prior to that which is intellectual. And [they add], that Plutarch and Atticus are not only guilty of impiety towards the Demiurgus, but likewise, either entirely subvert his beneficent will, or his prolific power. For both these concurring, it is also necessary that the world should be perpetually fabricated by him. They likewise say, that Plato wishing to indicate the providence proceeding from the Demiurgus into the universe, and also the supply of intellect, and the presence of soul, and the numerous and mighty goods of which they are the causes to the world, previously surveys how the whole corporeal-formed composition is when considered itself by itself, disorderly and confused. And that he does this, in order that by perceiving by itself the arrangement derived from soul, and the demiurgic orderly distribution of things, we may be able to determine what the nature is of the corporeal-formed essence by itself, and what order it is allotted from fabrication; the world indeed, always existing, but language dividing that which is generated from its maker, and producing according to time things which are con-subsistent at once, because every thing which is generated is a composite.

We may also observe, in addition to what is here rightly asserted, that since the demiurgic production is twofold, the one being corporeal,<sup>1</sup> but the other decorative, Plato beginning from the latter, supposes with the greatest propriety, that

<sup>1</sup> For Σωματικῇ here, it is necessary to read οὐρανοῦ.

every thing corporeal is moved in a way perfectly confused and disorderly. For its motion is such, so far as pertains to itself, when it is surveyed as not yet participating of intellect, and animated by an intellectual soul. For when the universe becomes a thing of this kind, then it participates of supernatural powers. But if it is moved, as he says, neither by intellect, nor by a prudent soul, from which order is derived, its motion will be disorderly. A little after this however, Plato delivers to us the demiurgic providence about the fabrication of bodies. For then the Demiurgus is represented as fashioning the whole of a corporeal nature, which Plato now says he assumed; the Demiurgus being the maker, the adorning, the artist, and the manual artificer. If therefore, he produces the first bodies, it is evident that the generation of body is a part of his fabrication, the visible nature receiving certain vestiges of forms, which are the forerunners of their distinct subsistence; each thing when this distinction takes place, being perfectly adorned, and obtaining an appropriate position and order in the universe. And there is no occasion indeed, to say much about that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For Plato clearly says, that the Demiurgus fashioned the whole of the corporeal nature within soul. With respect to soul however, it is evident that one thing pertaining to it was not a subject [unproduced by the Demiurgus], and that he alone produced its orderly distribution. For he first constitutes its essence, and the same and the different; of which as elements it consists. Hence, if he produced the elements of soul, and the mixture of these, he produced the whole of it. So that he did not assume one part of it as already existing, and add another. And of soul indeed, which is incorporeal, this is true. But with respect to body, we have shown how divinity is the cause of the first forms.

Concerning matter itself, however, some one may enquire whether it is unbegotten, not being generated by a cause, as Plutarch and Atticus say, or whether it was generated, and if so from what cause. For Aristotle indeed, in another way demonstrates that it is unbegotten, as not being a composite, nor consisting of another matter, nor again, being analyzed into another. The present discussion however, says that it is perpetual, but investigates whether it is unbegotten and not generated by a cause, and whether according to Plato, two principles of wholes are to be admitted, matter and God, neither God producing matter, nor matter God; in order that the one may be entirely perpetual, and without God, but the other entirely immaterial and simple. This thing therefore, is among the number of those which are very much investigated, and has been considered by us elsewhere. Now, however, it is requisite to exhibit to these men, what the

conception of Plato is on this subject. For that the Demiurgus is not the first who gave subsistence to matter, is evident from what Plato says further on, viz. that these three things preceded the generation of the world, *being, place, and generation*; and that generation is an offspring, but place a mother. He appears therefore through these things to divide matter oppositely as it were to the Demiurgus, according to the maternal and paternal peculiarity, but to produce generation from the Demiurgus and matter. Does he not therefore give subsistence to matter from another order, which has an arrangement prior to the Demiurgus? In the *Philebus* therefore, he clearly writes, "*He say that God<sup>1</sup> exhibited the bound, and also the infinity of beings, from which bodies and all beings derive their composition.*" Hence, if bodies are from bound and infinity, what is the bound in them, and what the infinity? It is evident indeed, that we say matter is infinity, but form bound. If therefore, as we have said, God gives subsistence to all infinity, he likewise gives subsistence to matter, which is the last infinity. And this indeed, is the first and ineffable cause of matter. But since every where sensibles are analogous to intelligible causes, and Plato constitutes the former from the latter; as for instance, the equal which is here, from the equal itself, the similar, from similitude itself, and after the same manner all sublunary animals and plants,—it is evident, that he likewise produces the infinity which is here, from the first infinity, just as he produces the bound which is here from the bound which is there. It has however, been demonstrated by us elsewhere, that he establishes the first infinity which is prior to things that are mingled in the summit of intelligibles, and from thence extends its illumination as far as to the last of things; so that according to him, matter proceeds from *the one* and being, or if you are willing, from the *one* being also, [or being characterized by *the one*] so far as it is being in power. Hence likewise, it is in a certain respect good and infinite, and the most obscure and formless being. On this account also these are prior to forms, and the evolution of them into light.

Orpheus likewise delivers the very same things. For as Plato produces two-fold causes from *the one*, viz. bound and infinity, thus too the theologist gives subsistence to ether and chaos from time; ether being the cause of bound every where, but chaos of infinity. And from these two principles he generates both the divine and the visible orders of things; from the more excellent principle indeed, producing every thing stable, effective of sameness, and the source of measure and connexion; but from the less excellent, every thing motive, effective

<sup>1</sup> viz. The highest God, or *the one*.

of difference, never failing progression, the nature which is defined, and connected by other things, and the last infinity by which matter also is comprehended. Hence also matter is dissimilarly assimilated to the first infinity.<sup>1</sup> *And it is indeed a separation (χωρισμα), as being the receptacle (χωρα) and place of forms; but there is neither bound, nor a bottom, nor a seat about it, as being infinite, unstable, and indefinite. But again, the last infinity may be denominated a perpetual darkness, as being allotted a formless nature.* Hence conformably to this assertion, Orpheus produces matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles. *For there perpetual darkness<sup>2</sup> and the infinite subsist.* And these indeed, subsist there in a way more excellent than the successive orders of being. In matter however, the unilluminated, and the infinite are inherent, through indigence, and not according to a transcendency, but a deficiency of power. Moreover, the tradition of the Egyptians asserts the same things concerning it. For the divine Iamblichus relates that according to Hermes materiality (υλοτητα) is produced from essentiality<sup>3</sup> (εκ της ουσιοτητας). It is probable therefore, that Plato derived from Hermes an opinion of this kind concerning matter. And matter indeed primarily subsists from these principles [bound and infinity]. But Plato also produces it according to second and third principles, viz. intelligible and intellectual, super-celestial and mundane causes. And why do I say this of the Gods themselves? For the nature of the universe likewise, produces matter so far as she is [a Goddess]<sup>4</sup> and according to the hyparxis of herself. For according to this she participates of the first cause. The Demiurgus therefore, according to the unity which he contains, according to which likewise he is a God, is<sup>5</sup> also the cause of the last matter; but according to his demiurgic being, he is not the cause of matter, but of bodies so far as they are bodies,

<sup>1</sup> For προς εαυτην here, it is necessary to read προς αυτην, [i. e. προς αυτην απεφικαν.]

<sup>2</sup> The first hypostasis of intelligibles is being itself, which is mingled from bound and infinity. Perpetual darkness therefore, may be said to reside here, because this hypostasis through proximity to the ineffable cause of all becomes darkened. "For being very near, as Damascius admirably observes, to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it dwells as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence." This darkness, however, is not any deficiency, but a transcendency of all that is luminous. For as there is one kind of ignorance which is below knowledge as being the defect of it, and another which is above knowledge, being that in which our ascent to the ineffable terminates; thus also, there are two kinds of darkness, the one being below, and the other above light.

<sup>3</sup> See Iamblic. De Mysterns, p. 159.

<sup>4</sup> The word θεα is omitted in the original, but ought evidently to be inserted, because Proclus in the Introduction to this work observes that Nature is a Goddess through being deified.

<sup>5</sup> For εστι here, it is requisite to read εστιν.



and of corporeal qualities. *Hence generation is the offspring of being.* According to the life which he contains, he is the cause of the animation which pervades through all things; but according to his intellect, he is the cause of the intellectual supply imparted to the universe. And all such things indeed, as he produces according to his secondary powers, he produces in conjunction with those that are primary. For every thing which participates of intellect, participates also of life, of being, and of union. That also which lives is, and is one; and being is connected through its own proper unity. The converse, however, is not true. For such things as he produces according to *the one*,<sup>1</sup> so many he does not produce according to *being*. Nor does he give subsistence to as many things according to the fountain of life, as he does according to being. Nor as many things according to a royal intellect, as he does according to life; but he gives the greatest extent to his providence from his more elevated powers. These things, however, we have elsewhere more fully discussed.<sup>2</sup>

Let us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey the meaning of each. The word *thus* then, suspends the whole orderly distribution of things from the goodness of the Demiurgus, viz. from his divinity. But the words, "*every thing that was visible*," in the first place, leave nothing solitary; and in the next place, they show that this visible nature is corporeal. For it would not be visible if it was incorporeal and without quality. So that they neither signify matter, nor the second subject [i. e. body void of quality]. But the visible nature is that which now participates of forms, and possesses certain vestiges, and representations, being moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For the idolic and indistinct presence of forms produces different motions in it, as Timæus says farther on. These, however, all the orders of Gods prior to the Demiurgus illuminate; but the paradigm transcendently illuminates them by his very being, and prior to fabrication. For superior energize prior to secondary causes, and the Demiurgus makes in conjunction with the paradigm, but the paradigm, prior to the Demiurgus, and permeates to those things to which the energy of demiurgic providence does not extend. If therefore, you wish to disjoin primordial causes, and the things which proceed from them,<sup>3</sup> you will find that *the good* which is the cause of all things, is also the cause of matter. On this account it is likewise the cause of

Tellus as  
matters  
motion  
!!  
what?

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *εἰς τὸ ἓν* here, it is necessary to read *κατὰ τὸ εἶναι*.

<sup>2</sup> For *εἰσηγαται* here, it is necessary to read *εἰσάγεται*.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *ἀφιστηναι* in this place, it is requisite to read *ἀφίησιν*.

<sup>4</sup> For *τα ἀπ' αὐτῶν* here, read *τα ἀπ' αὐτῶν*.

its being invested with forms; for every form is a measure; and of its participation of order. For order is the reason of things that are arranged. The paradigm, however, is not the cause of matter, but of the production of form, and of the order in forms. But the Demiurgus is the cause of order. Hence also Plato says, that the Demiurgus received matter now advancing to the participation of forms. Since all causes therefore, subsist always and at once, but of their effects, some proceeding as far as to things that are last [i. e. to bodies], but others as far as to things which are beyond both, through the extension of superior causes;—this being the case, the paradigm indeed, receives matter from *the good*, and invests it with form; for forms, so far as they are forms, are the progeny of the paradigm; but the Demiurgus receiving forms from the paradigm adorns them with numbers, and inserts in them order. After this manner therefore, you must conceive, if you disjoin causes. If also you say, that the Demiurgus is the one cause of all things, he produces indeed in one way according to his goodness [or *the good* which he derives from the ineffable], but in another way according to his own paradigmatic, and as we may say, artificial peculiarity. As he produces likewise collectively, at once, and eternally, different things proceed from a different peculiarity contained in him. For according to *the good*, he produces matter, form and order; but according to the paradigm in him, form; and according to his artificial peculiarity, order. Hence this thing which is invested with form prior to order, has these representations of forms from the paradigm which is in its own nature intelligible. From this order likewise, the Oracles produce abundantly-various matter. For they say, “From thence entirely leaps forth the generation of abundantly-various matter.” *For the first matter does not possess a great variety; nor is there a generation of this, but of that matter which has vestiges the forerunners of forms*; from which it is evident that the paradigm and the Demiurgus differ from each other, since matter indeed participates of the former prior to the fabrication of the world, when according to the hypothesis, the Demiurgus was absent; but it especially receives something from the latter when it is arranged and adorned, and then the Demiurgus is present with it. The word therefore *receiving*, may be said to indicate the paradigmatic cause which is exempt from the demiurgic providence, from which the Demiurgus receives the subject of things, now variegated with certain vestiges of forms. It may also be said, that a different work participates of a different power, though we may survey all powers in the Demiurgus. For he will be the same divinity who receives and who delivers, essentializing, or adorning things by different powers.

But the words, "*which was not in a state of rest but moved,*" show that the hypothesis alone imparts to the subject a nature from which motion is derived. For the nature of it being irrational and not governed by divinity, what kind of order can it be able to preserve? This however is evident, from the *Politicus*, where, separating the Demiurgus from the world, Plato says, that it was moved by a certain fate, and an essentially connascent desire. Hence supposing here in conjunction with fabrication, what he there supposed after it, he introduces the privation of order to the motion of the visible nature, this motion being produced without intellect. And thus much for this particular. Again, the words, "*he led it from disorder into order,*" signify the participation of intellect, and an intellectual life. But the word *conceiving* indicates the demiurgic intelligence, which is analogous to his will and power. Previously assuming therefore, will in the expression "*being willing,*" and power in the expression "*as much as possible,*" in the third place, he adds intellectual knowledge in the term, "*conceiving.*" For in the *Laws*, he characterizes divine providence by these three things, viz. by goodness, power, and knowledge. And goodness indeed is paternal, and pertains to the first natures; but power is maternal, and ranks in the second place; and intellect, which is gnostic, is the third. Goodness therefore is the first, but power is with him, viz. with the first of the triad, and intellect, which is from him, is the third. Again, the words, "*that was in every respect better than this,*" signify that order is better than disorder. For it was thus said, viz. "*that he led it from disorder into order.*" The word *this* also has an indication of the disorder then present which the Demiurgus received; but the word *that* represents to us the order pre-existent in the Demiurgus, according to which also he is about to arrange disorderly natures. Aristotle therefore, did not know the order which is in the Demiurgus, but that which is in effects. He places however, the excellent in both; in order that according to him, intellect may abide in itself, but may in no respect be effective of secondary natures. But Plato following Orpheus, says, that order is first in the Demiurgus, and the whole prior to parts. For the Demiurgus being all things intellectually, made all things to exist sensibly. For if he produces by his very being or existence; and it is necessary that he should, in order that we may not ascribe to him deliberate choice, which is an ambiguous tendency; he either produces by a separation of parts from himself, and by a diminution of his own powers, in the same manner as fire, or abiding such as he is [without any

<sup>1</sup> For ἡκεῖ here, it is requisite to read ἡκεῖ.

alteration], he produces successive natures by his very being. It is however, absurd to say, that he produces by a separation of parts from himself: for neither is nature diminished in producing the hair or teeth, or any other of the parts of the body. Much more therefore, is it fit to preserve an exempt essence, and which gives subsistence to itself, undiminished. But if remaining that which he is, he produces by his very being, through *this* indeed, he produces that which is similar to himself; but through a separation of parts, he does not ' make that which he produces wholly similar to himself. For that which is diminished, does not make according to the whole of itself. All things therefore, subsist in him primarily. But external natures are the images of his allness, (παντοτιτος) and order exists in one way in effects, and in another in paradigms. For the former is complicated with disorderly natures, but the latter is order itself, subsisting in, and being of itself; that it may be able to arrange things disorderly, and may be exempt from them, and preserve its own essence in undefiled purity. And thus much concerning the meaning of the words.

It deserves however not to be omitted, that Plato here imitates the theologists, in supposing the existence of a confused and disorderly nature prior to the fabrication of the world. For as they introduce the wars and seditions of the Titans against the Olympian Gods. So likewise Plato presupposes these two things, the unadorned and that which is effective of ornament, that the former of these may be adorned, and participate of order. They however speak *theologically*. For they arrange in opposition to the Olympian Gods, the patrons of bodies. But Plato *philosophically* transfers order from the Gods to the subjects of their government.

In the next place, therefore, let us concisely narrate the sacred conceptions which the philosopher Porphyry here delivers. In the first place, then, he opposes Atticus and his followers, who admit that there are many principles, conjoining to each other the Demiurgus and ideas. These also say, that matter is moved by an unbegotten, but irrational and malevolent soul, and is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner. That according to time likewise, matter exists prior to that which is sensible, irrationality to reason, and disorder to order.

① Let there however be, as they say, matter and God, both being without generation from a cause. Hence, the unbegotten is common to them. At the same time, they differ from each other. They differ therefore, by something else, and not by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other, will

form conclusion,

that confuses

equality. etc. balance

\* Instead of καθολος here, it is necessary to read ου καθ ολο.

not be unbegotten. It will therefore be generated. It is impossible, however, that things without generation, should differ by the generated. In the next place, what is the cause to them of their difference, and which makes the one to be preservative, but the other corruptive? For it is absurd to say, that it is the unbegotten; (for either every thing unbegotten is preservative, or every thing unbegotten is corruptive;) if the unbegotten nature of God makes God to be preservative, or the unbegotten nature of matter makes matter to be corruptive. But if something else is the cause of their difference, whether is that something else unbegotten or generated? For if it is generated, it is absurd that it should be the cause of things unbegotten; or if unbegotten, that it should be the cause of unbegotten natures. So that again, we must investigate something else prior to these, as the cause of their difference, and the ascent will be ad infinitum. For if there will be no cause of difference to things that differ, so as to render the one preservative, but the other corruptive, the casual will have dominion over the principles; for cause being subverted, the concurrence of such-like principles will be irrational, and without a cause.

Farther still, it is absurd to make evil eternal, in the same manner as *the good*. For that which is without God, is not similarly honorable with that which is divine; nor is it equally unbegotten, nor, in short, is it to be contrarily divided. For why is the one more sufficient to itself, or more immutable, or indestructible, than the other, if each of them is from eternity, and neither is in want of the other? Again, if one of them is adapted to be adorned, but the other to adorn, whence is their aptitude derived? For it is necessary there should be something which connects both, and makes them commensurate to each other. For these principles being divulsed from, and subsisting contrary to each other, cannot render themselves adapted to coalition. Unless they say, that this also arises from chance. Nor in thus speaking do they attend to the Athenian guest, who says, that this is the fountain of stupid opinion, to assert that the irrational is prior to reason, and that chance has dominion prior to intellectual art. Nor to Socrates in the Republic, who says, that it is not proper to remain in multitude, but to recur from the many to their common monads. Farther still, it is necessary to characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another principle; for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity: (2) [but that it is the prin-

: It is necessary here to supply *αγενητον των*; and therefore instead of reading, as in the original, *επει αγενητων οντων*, we must read, *επει αγενητον των αγενητων οντων*.

<sup>1</sup> For *ααζιαν* here, it is necessary to read *αζιαν*.

ciple of all principles]. But if this be the case, there will not be more [independent] principles than one. For if there were, God will not be the cause of all things, but only of certain things. But if he also rules over matter, there is one principle, and not many principles. Farther still, if the existence of principle consists in this, that it is the principle of certain things, and that it adorns that which is disorderly, it will be simultaneous with the things that proceed from it, and the principle will be no less subverted from things posterior to it not existing, than things posterior to it when the principle is subverted.<sup>1</sup> But this will be the case, since they frequently say, that the principle has its existence in fabricating. If however this be true, it is not possible for the principle to exist, the world not existing. But again, asserting differently from what they did before, they say, that God exists without fabricating. They assert this however, not<sup>2</sup> knowing that true powers energize by their very being, and that the augmentative and nutritive powers, by their very being, increase and nourish the body. Thus also the soul by its very existence animates, vivifies, and moves its instrument [the body]. For the body does not perceive or palpitate in consequence of our pre-deliberation; but the presence of soul alone accomplishes these energies. Again, every thing which is always naturally adapted to a certain thing, essentially possesses the power of effecting it; but that which is changed differently at different times, is adscititious. If therefore God always fabricates, he will have a connascent demiurgic power; but if he does not, his power will be adscititious. How therefore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from not being artificial, an artificer?

The second head therefore after this, is that which shows that Plato refers all things to one principle. And this is evident from the Republic, where he asserts that the sun is the cause of visible, but the good of intelligible natures. Again also, he calls the sun the offspring of the good. This is likewise evident from his Epistles, in which he says that all things are about the king of all, and that all things are for his sake. For if all things are converted to him, and subsist about him, he is the principle of all, and not only of certain things; since whatever you may assume will be derived from thence. This too is manifest from the Philebus, in which dialogue he clearly says, that all things are from bound and

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀσηχημένη τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐκ ποῶν τὰ μετ' αὐτῇ, ἐκ τούτων μὴ οὕτω, ἀσφαρῆται ἡ ἀρχή*, I read, *καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀσηχημένη τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐκ ποῶν τὰ μετ' αὐτῇ ἢ ἐκ τούτων, κ. λ.*

<sup>2</sup> Οὐκ is omitted here in the original.

two  
pages  
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infinity, but that of these principles themselves there is one pre-existent cause, which is God. Hence, there is one principle and many principles: but these are perfected by the one principle. From what is said also in the *Philebus* this is evident, in which dialogue he confutes those who assert that beings are [alone] many, and likewise those who admit the principle to be being itself. For he demonstrates, that it is neither proper to begin from the multitude of beings, nor from the one being, but from the one itself.

In the third place, therefore, neither do the principles which they assume pertain any thing to Plato. For ideas are not separated from intellect, subsisting by themselves apart from it; but intellect being converted to itself, sees all forms. Hence the Athenian guest assimilates the energy of intellect to the circulation of an accurately-fashioned sphere. But they introduce ideas as things inefficacious, resembling in themselves forms impressed in wax, and situated external to intellect. Nor is the Demiurgus the first God. For the first God is superior to every intellectual essence. Nor does a certain irrational soul move that which is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner. For every soul is the offspring of the Gods. Nor, in short, did the universe, from being without order, become arranged. For if God was willing to bring all things into order, how was he willing? Was he always willing, or at a certain time? For if he was willing at a certain time, this was either from himself, or from matter. But if from himself, an absurdity follows. For he is always good. Every thing good, however, which always exists, is always effective.\* And if this arose from the resistance of matter, how came it to be now adorned? Because, say they, it became adapted to receive the demiurgic productive power. For God observed this, viz. the aptitude of it. It is necessary therefore, that it should have been brought into order, not being itself disorderly. For if it had been disorderly, it would not have been adapted; since the disorderly motion of it is inaptitude. Hence matter is not the cause of the privation of order and ornament. Moreover, neither is the will of God the cause of this. For he is always good, and therefore the world is always adorned; and the Demiurgus always arranges the confused and disorderly nature. On what account, therefore, did Plato hypothetically introduce this privation of order? It was that we might survey how the generation of bodies is one thing, and the order of them when generated, another; bodies indeed existing, but being moved in a disorderly manner. For they are inca-

\* Instead of το δὲ ἀγαθὸν παν, αἰεὶ ὁρῶντων, it seems necessary to read το δὲ ἀγαθὸν παν αἰεὶ ὁρῶντων.

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(3)  
This may  
be a good  
reason

pable of arranging themselves. *Hence Plato, wishing to indicate the order which accedes to bodies from something different from themselves, shows that disorder is consubistent with their motions, without a divine cause.* Aristotle, however, blames him who asserts that disorder is assumed prior to order, merely according to hypothesis, and says that those things will not follow for which the hypotheses are assumed, as is the case in geometry. For the hypotheses of geometry are of themselves able to effect geometrical conclusions. To this we reply, that it is not said after this manner according to hypothesis, that the unadorned ought to be admitted prior to the adorned, but that Plato saw that which is formless prior to forms, though it is never separate from them. Thus too, that which is invested with form, though yet without distinction, is assumed prior to order, though it never was prior to it, but is consubistent with order.

The fourth head, in addition to those that have been already considered, is that in which Plato demonstrates the mode of fabrication; a divine intellect effecting this by its very being, which he infers through many arguments. For artists are in want of instruments to their energy, because they have not dominion over every kind of matter. But this is evident from the instruments which they use, in order to render matter pliant, boring, or polishing, or elaborating it with a wheel; all which operations do not insert form, but take away the inaptitude of the recipient of form. *The reason itself however, or form, becomes present with the subject from art instantaneously, all the impediments being removed.* Hence if there was no impediment, form would immediately accede to matter, and would not in short be in want of any instruments. Moreover, the phantasy produces many passions about the body by its very energy alone. For a man blushes through the imagination of what is base, and becomes red; and through the conception of something dreadful is terrified, and his body is rendered pale. And these, indeed, are the passions about the body. But the cause of these is a phantasm, which does not employ impulsions and mechanical contrivances, but energizes by being present alone. Farther still, theologists assert that there are certain powers superior to us, who employ efficacious imaginations, and which by their very existence are effective of what they wish to accomplish, and who are also able to produce illuminations, and to exhibit certain divine forms by their motions, to such as are able to behold the visions which they externally present to the view. If therefore human arts, the imaginations of partial souls, and the energies of demons, effect things of this kind, why is it wonderful that the Demiurgus, by the intellectual intuition of the universe, should give subsistence to the sensible nature; generating, indeed, that which is material immaterially, that



which is tangible, without contact ; and extending impartibly that which possesses interval ? And, indeed, it ought not to be considered as an admirable circumstance, if something which is incorporeal, and without interval, is the fabricator of this universe. For human seed produces man, who is so much larger than the seed, and in each part of it contains all the differences of the solids ; as for instance of the bones, those that are compact, and those that are hollow ; of the soft parts, such as the lungs and the liver ; of the dry parts, such as the nails and the hair ; of the moist parts, such as the blood and phlegm ; of the adipous parts, as the marrow and fat ; of the bitter parts, as the bile ; of the parts without quality, as the saliva ; of the thick-set parts, as the nerves ; and of the expanded parts, as the membranes. For all these, the substances of similar parts, and those that in a certain respect are composed of them, derive their subsistence from a small bulk ; or rather from that which is without bulk. For reasons [or productive powers] generate these, and they are every where void of bulk. For whatever part you may take of the seed, you will find in it all things. Much more, therefore, is the demiurgic reason able to produce all things, being not at all in want of matter to their existence. But the fabricator of all things is eternally established in himself, and abiding in himself produces the universe.

“ But it neither was, nor is lawful, for that which is best, to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful.”

Themis<sup>1</sup> is very properly assumed in the beginning of the fabrication of the universe. For she is the cause of the demiurgic sacred laws, and from her the order of the universe is indissolubly connected. Hence also she remains a virgin prior to the progression of the Demiurgus, according to the Oracles of Night. But she produces, in conjunction with Jupiter, the triad of the Seasons, to whom

Olympus and great Heav'n are giv'n in charge,  
And a dense cloud to open, or to close.

She is therefore the monad of all the mundane order ; on which account also Socrates in the Republic calls her Necessity, as is demonstrated in that dialogue. He likewise convolves the world on her knees, she preserving the order of it perpetually immutable and unshaken. Conformably therefore to this divine cause of order, the Demiurgus also, leading that which is disordered into order, imparts beauty to all things, and renders the world similar to, and connects it

<sup>1</sup> This word which is used here by Plato, signifies both the Goddess of justice, and lawful.

with himself. For being himself most excellent, he very properly causes the world to be most beautiful; because the first and intelligible beauty itself is suspended from, and is in goodness. Hence the world likewise, being most beautiful, is suspended from the Demiurgus, who is the best [of fabricative causes]. And because *the good* is the cause of beauty, on this account also the best of fathers gives subsistence to the most beautiful offspring. Farther still, as Themis is the guardian of the divine laws, but they make the generations of secondary from first natures to proceed in an orderly series, and preserve the connexion of divine beings, and the similitudes of things second to such as are first;—on this account also, the Demiurgus, energizing with Themis, renders the universe most beautiful, being himself most excellent. For if Socrates, being a man, says that it is not lawful for him to concede any thing that is false, or to obliterate the truth, how is it possible we should say that the demiurgic intellect effects any thing else than what is beautiful, and that he does not exterminate deformity, being united to Themis, who is likewise always present with him? And thus much concerning this particular.

But the words, "*it neither was nor is,*" are very appropriately assumed with *that which is best*: for before this, he had called the Demiurgus *good*, and then also the term *was*, was added. For Timæus says; he *was* good. For the simplicity which is above intellect, and the peculiarity itself of deity, are more adapted to the term *was*, as being super-eternal, and better than all intellectual perception. Now<sup>1</sup> however he calls him the most excellent, as being a deified intellect. For that which participates [of deity] is most excellent. The terms also *was* and *is*, are adapted to the Demiurgus; as to a God indeed, the term *was*; but as to an intellect, the term *is*, in order that at one and the same time his divine union and eternal hypostasis may be rendered manifest.

By a reasoning process, therefore, he found that among the things which are naturally visible, no whole work destitute of intellect would ever be more beautiful than a whole work which possesses intellect."

Amelins in a wonderful manner endeavours to prove that Plato knew the different demiurgic causes, and continually passes in a silent way from one of these causes to another; exhibiting, on account of their connexion, no one of the

<sup>1</sup> Now is erroneously printed here for *is*.

divine causes themselves, but discoursing about them as if they were one and the same, through the union of the demiurgi with each other. For all of them are one, and one is all. Since now also he who *wills* is one Demiurgus, he who *reasons* is another, and he who *assumes* or *receives* is another. And the first, indeed, makes by his will alone, the second by intelligence and intellectual perception, but the third by [as it were] manual operation. For they placed intellect in soul, but soul in body, and thus together fabricated ' the universe. The divine Iamblichus however reprobates all such interpretations, as very superfluously devised. But he defines λογισμός, or a reasoning process, to be that which causally precedes beings, which is fabricative of essence itself, and which is according to energy invariably the same; from which all reasonings are connected, and have their existence.

We indeed have already observed, that Timæus discourses about one and the same Demiurgus, and shall now remind the reader that this must be admitted. For if there is a multitude in the demiurgi, [i. e. if there are many demiurgi,] it is necessary to arrange a monad prior to the multitude. Moreover, we think it fit that the divine Iamblichus should consider, whether the one and whole Demiurgus, being an intellectual world, is not multipotent, and does not by different powers fabricate different things, in addition to his being the father of all things? For let the same Demiurgus, so far as he is good, and so far as he is a God, be the producing cause of all things; yet since he comprehends in himself the cause of all fabrications, and produces in one way the whole, but in another the parts; the former indeed collectively and totally, but the latter in a distributed manner, giving subsistence to each thing, according to its proper cause; hence by one intellectual perception, he adorns the whole, and generates it, collectively; according to which also, the world is one animal. But by a reasoning process, he produces the parts in the world, and these as wholes; *because he is the Demiurgus of total natures*, fabricating total intellect, and total soul, and all the bulk of body. Hence, as composing parts, he is said to make them by a reasoning process. For λογισμός is a distributed or divided evolution of parts, and a distinctive cause of things. For it does not pertain to one who doubts; since neither does art, nor science doubt; but artists and scientific men then doubt when they are indigent of the habits by which the former become artists, and the latter men of science. If however these do not doubt, no reason can be assigned why intellect should

' For συνεκτείνειν in this place, it is necessary to read συνεκταίνειν.

doubt. Hence this λογισμος is not through the want of that which is fit taking place. But the Demiurgus produces the whole world by intelligence. For intelligence is collective of multitude into one; just as λογισμος is distributive of the one into multitude. Such therefore is the meaning of "*by a reasoning process.*"

With respect however to the things which are naturally visible, to say that they are sensibles is perfectly absurd. For these are not yet arranged in the discourse of Timæus, and it is among the number of things impossible, that the Demiurgus should be converted to them. For how can he verge to that which is less excellent, or what kind of representation can he receive of material things, to which it is not fortunate even for a partial soul to incline? It is better therefore, as the divine Iamblichus interprets the words, to think that things of this kind are intelligibles. For that these are visible is evident from the things which Timæus shortly after says the Demiurgus perceives. For his words are, "*As many therefore, and such ideas, as intellect perceived to be inherent in that which is animal, &c.*" That they are also naturally visible, will be evident if we consider, that some things are visible with relation to us, but others according to nature. And the things indeed which are visible with relation to us, are in their own nature dark and immanifest; but those which are naturally visible are truly known, and are resplendent with divine light. But intelligibles are things of this kind. Perhaps too, as he had called that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner visible, and which subsists preternaturally as with reference to fabrication, he now calls the intelligible paradigms of the Demiurgus, naturally visible. Hence, in the introduction he inquires, whether an eternal or a generated paradigm of the universe must be admitted; these two things existing prior to the generation of the universe, being and generation. And where else can the Demiurgus find the causes of generated natures, than in intelligibles? For invention with him is not a fortuitous thing, nor a syllogistic process; since this pertains to partial souls; but a union with the intelligible causes of the parts of the universe, and a survey and plenitude from thence derived. For all things exist paradigmatically in the natures prior to him, both such as are the objects of intellection, and such as are deprived of intelligence; since truly existing being comprehends uniformly the cause of intellectual natures, and of those that do not partipate of intellect. And the intellectual beings which are there, are

For νοητων here, it is necessary to read αἰσθητων.

of a superior<sup>1</sup> but the rest, of an inferior order. For though all things there are objects of intellectual perception, and intellects, yet in some of them, the cause possesses the intellectual nature of the things caused, but in others, the privation of intellect and the irrational: the causes themselves being intellectual, but the things which proceed from them, deprived of intellect. Hence the Demiurgus looking thither, very properly admits that what possesses intellect is more venerable than that which is without it, the genus of the one, than the genus of the other, and the individuals of the one, than the individuals of the other. For man is better than horse, and a certain man than all horses, according to the possession itself of intellect. If however, you assume a certain part of man and a certain part of horse, it does not entirely follow that the one is better than the other. Nor if you assume man fashioned by nature, and the man made by the art of the statuary, is the former in every respect more venerable according to figure than the latter. For art is in many respects more accurate [in this instance than nature]. One whole therefore, is every where better than another, when the one possesses intellect, but the other is deprived of it. For through what other thing can body be able to participate of intelligible beauty [than intellect]? Let no one therefore fancy that Plato makes the division of forms to be into those that possess and those that are deprived of intellect. For all things there [i. e. in the intelligible world] are, as we have said, intellects, where also Plato calls all things in every respect Gods. But extending himself to the natures which are there, he likewise perceived the separation which is here between the beings which possess, and those that are deprived of intellect. Hence he thus says, that nothing destitute of intellect, will be better than that which possesses it, the difference of these existing as in works, but there pre-existing according to cause.

Again however, let us survey how Plato says, that secondary energize on account of more principal causes, the latter being more perfect than the former, but the former being suspended from the latter. Because indeed, the Demiurgus is good, on this account, he made the world to be most beautiful. For goodness is the cause of beauty. But because he made the universe to be most beautiful, he rendered it endued with intellect. And beauty fills the first intellect with its own power. Because also he made the universe to be endued with intellect, he imparted to it soul. For soul proceeds from intellect. Because likewise he rendered the world animated, he inserted life in that which was before moved in

<sup>1</sup> For *υπερερον* read *υπερερον*.

a confused and disorderly manner. For this being well arranged, is able to participate of soul, soul of intellect, and intellect of beauty. The whole world however, becomes most beautiful from *the good*, and after this manner may be said to be a blessed God. The Demiurgus likewise, seems, in what is here said, to behold all the paradigms, which Plato calls naturally visible, not those only which are in animal itself, but also such as are more partial than the four ideas which are there. Or how does he see some things which are the paradigms of intellective, but others which are the paradigms of unintellective natures, which are not separated in animal itself? But he mentions the forms of this animal itself, when he causes the universe to be an animal. For so far as it is an animal, it is the image of animal itself, and so far also as it consists of four parts [i. e. of the four elements]. So far however, as it is now divided into intellectual, and non-intellectual beings, so far it entirely derives its subsistence from other paradigms more partial than those which exist according to the four ideas in animal itself. So that animal itself indeed, is a paradigm,<sup>1</sup> but every <sup>2</sup> paradigm is not <sup>3</sup> animal itself. Having discussed these particulars however, let us proceed to what follows.

305 “It is impossible however, for intellect to accede without soul.”

The intellectual essence indeed, is impartible, uniform and eternal, but the essence of bodies is partible and multiplied, and is consubsistent with temporal representation. These therefore, exist contrarily with reference to each other, and are in want of a medium which may be able to collect them together; a medium, which is at one and the same time partible and impartible, composite and simple, eternal and generated. But according to Plato, the psychical order is a thing of this kind, intelligible, and at the same time the first of generated natures, eternal and temporal, impartible and partible. If therefore, it is necessary that the universe should be endued with intellect, it is also necessary that it should have a soul. For soul is the receptacle of intellect, and through it intellect exhibits itself to the masses of the universe. Not that intellect is in want of soul: for thus it would be less honorable <sup>4</sup> than soul; but that bodies

<sup>1</sup> Instead of το δε παραδειγμα in this place, it seems necessary to read παν δε παραδειγμα.

<sup>2</sup> For ο το αυτοζωον here, it is necessary to read ου το αυτοζωον.

<sup>3</sup> For ευσημωτερος here, it is necessary to read ασημωτερος.

require soul, in order to their participation of intellect. For the last, and not the first of things, are in want of secondary<sup>1</sup> natures. For the first of things are every where present without a medium.<sup>2</sup> Hence it is necessary to understand, that the soul which connects intellect with a sensible nature, ought to be intellectual, and not deprived of intellect. For how can that which is destitute of intellect be suspended from intellect? But to these another medium will be requisite. The medium however, being a thing of this kind, will wisely and orderly govern every corporeal-formed nature. But it will imitate intellect, dancing as it were round it. If therefore, wholes are better than parts, things eternal, than such as subsist in time, and efficient than effects, it is necessary that the whole universe should be more divine than all the parts it contains. If therefore, certain animals in the world, which are partial, material and mortal, are naturally adapted to participate of intellect, what ought we to say of the whole world? Is it not, that the whole of it exhibits through the whole, the presence of intellect? For its figure, its order, and the measure of its powers, may be said to afford clear indications of intellectual inspection. If however, intellect presides over wholes, and governs the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellectual soul in the middle of it, adorning and ruling over bodies, and at the same time separate from the subjects of its government, and filling all things with life, in order that the world may through it, be firmly established in intellect, and that intellect may illuminate the world.

If you are willing, we will also recall to your recollection<sup>3</sup> what is written in the *Philebus*, where Socrates shows that the world possesses intellect and is animated, because that which is terrestrial in us is from the universe, and the fire which is in us is from the mundane fire, and in a similar manner the air and the water which we contain; and that it would be absurd that things less excellent in us should pre-exist in the whole, but that things more divine should not analogously pre-subsist in it, and that total intellect and total soul should not be contained in the universe. For either it must be said that no animal possesses intellect, or if there is a certain animal of this kind, it is absurd that it should

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *συνάρτων* in this place, it is requisite to read *δεύτερων*.

<sup>2</sup> viz. They are not in want of a medium in order to be present every where: but the last of things require secondary natures as media, by which alone they can receive the illuminations of the first of things.

<sup>3</sup> For *ἀναμνησθμεν* here, it is necessary to read *ἀναμνησθμεν*.

participate of intellect prior to the universe.<sup>1</sup> For the universe is always arranged, and through the sameness of its subsistence, is nearer to an intellectual essence. But much of the disorderly and confused is inherent in partial animals. Much more therefore, must it be said, that soul is in the universe.<sup>2</sup> Hence Plato very divinely admits that there is a twofold intellect, the one being imparticipable and demingic, but the other participable, and inseparable<sup>3</sup> [from its subject]. For from things which are in themselves, those which are in others, and are co-arranged with inferior natures, are derived. He also gives to the universe a twofold life, the one connascent, but the other separate; in order that the world may be an animal through the life which is in it, animated through an intellectual soul, and endued with intellect through much-honored intellect itself. But Aristotle only admits the half [of this doctrine of Plato], since he takes away<sup>4</sup> imparticipable intellect from his philosophy.<sup>5</sup> For the first intellect with him, is the intellect of the inerratic sphere; but he cuts off the intellectual soul, which is the medium between intellect and the animated body of the universe; and immediately conjoins intellect with the living body. In addition to these things also he appears to me to err in another particular. For having placed intellect over the spheres, he does not establish the whole world in any intellect; but this is the most absurd of all things; for how is the world one, unless one intellect has dominion in it? What co-arrangement likewise is there of intellectual multitude, unless it is suspended from a proper monad? And how are all things co-ordinated to an excellent condition of being, unless there is a certain common intellect of all mundane natures? For the intellect of the inerratic sphere is the intellect of that sphere [alone]; and this is also the case with the intellect of the solar, and of the lunar sphere, and in a similar manner of the other spheres. Against Aristotle however, we have written a peculiar treatise about these particulars.

With respect to Plato however, is not his method admirable? For receiving the world, dividing it into parts, and surveying by itself that which is moved in

<sup>1</sup> In the original *ἡ ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον τοιοῦτον, ἀσώτων. ἀλλ' ὅτι πρὸ τοῦ παντός σου μετέχειν*. But it is necessary to expunge *ἀλλ'*, and by altering the punctuation, to read as follows: *ἡ ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον τοιοῦτον, ἀσώτων ὅτι πρὸ τοῦ παντός, κ. λ.*

<sup>2</sup> The words *ἐν τῇ παρτι αὐτῇ*, are omitted in the original.

<sup>3</sup> For *ἀχώρητος* here, it is necessary to read *ἀχώριστος*.

<sup>4</sup> For *ἀφαιρεῖ* here, read *ἀφαιρεῖ*.

<sup>5</sup> For an explanation of the intellect to which Aristotle ascended, also why he says nothing about that which is beyond intellect, and why he appears to dissent in many things from Plato, but does not in reality, see my Dissertation On the Philosophy of Aristotle.



a confused and disorderly manner, he stops it in his discussion. Just as in the *Laws*, wishing to show that the self-motive nature is the cause of all motion, he stops the whole heaven, and having stopped it, introduces soul into the universe, in order that by pouring forth an abundance of life, she may animate the world. He likewise introduces intellect to soul, which governs the world, being converted to itself; through which the universe is moved in a circle, the whole is arranged, and the whole world is immovable. Since however, all these particulars give completion to one animal, and one nature, it is requisite that a collective and uniting cause of them should have a prior existence, and that this should be intellectual. For to comprehend wholes collectively and at once, and to bring them together, to the completion of one thing, is the work of an intellectual cause. Hence, Plato establishing imparticipable prior to participable intellect, and placing the causes of all things in it, he produces from thence, intellects, souls and bodies, from which he gives completion to the sensible world. That it is necessary therefore, that the universe should participate of an intellectual soul, if it participates of intellect, is evident from what has been said. For this soul is the bond of the extremes which are contrary to each other.

But it must also be demonstrated that the converse is true; viz. that an intellectual soul existing in the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellect of the universe. For since it is said that this soul is intellectual, it is likewise necessary that it should participate of intellect. Whether therefore, does it alone participate of the whole of intellect, or does it participate of it through a certain thing in itself derived from it? But if indeed, that which is corporeal immediately participates of the fountain of souls, and not through that which is in itself, it will be also requisite to admit, that the same thing takes place in the whole soul [of the universe]. If however, there is in the Demiurgus the fountain of souls, and there is also the fountain of the soul of the universe, and the universe participates through the latter of the former, it is likewise necessary that the soul itself of the universe, should be entirely suspended from imparticipable intellect through participable intellects. For as the body of the universe is to its soul, so is the soul of it to intellect. And if indeed, so far as it is soul it becomes intellectual,\* it would be necessary that every soul should be the same [i. e. should be

\* Instead of *καὶ εἰ μὲν καθὼς νοερά, ψυχὴ γίνεται*, in this place, it is necessary to read, *καὶ εἰ μὲν καθὼς ψυχὴ, νοερά γίνεται*.

intellectual]. But if it becomes intellectual through the participation of intellect, it is necessary that it should participate of an intellect commensurate to it. A thing of this kind however, is not intellect itself, but that which is a medium between intellect itself and soul, which has intellectual perception adscititious. This intellect also is a certain intellect, and is *essentially* intellect, and not *becoming to be so*, like soul; for it is better than soul. But by being<sup>1</sup> a *certain* intellect, it is co-ordinate with soul. For intellect itself is intellect by *existing*, and not by *becoming to be*, and intellect which is simply so by its very being, is superior to a co-ordination with soul. If also you consider, that every monad constitutes a multitude similar to itself, a divine monad, a divine multitude, a psychical monad, a psychical multitude, just as an intellectual monad produces an intellectual multitude, and that secondary orders always participate of the natures prior to themselves, it is necessary these things being admitted, that there should be a certain intellect of the whole world. For it is necessary that an intellectual soul should participate of intellect. But if some one should say, it participates of the intellect which ranks as a whole, it is absurd. For this intellect will not be the Demiurgus of all things.<sup>2</sup> And if it participates of a certain other intellect, this is the intellect of the universe, and that which is properly participated, as giving completion to the universe in conjunction with soul. *But the intellect which ranks as a whole, is so participated by, as illuminating the soul of the universe.* If therefore intellect presides over wholes, the universe is animated; but if the universe is animated, it is also endued with intellect.

4-6 "Through this reasoning process therefore, placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, he fabricated the universe."

In the first place, it is requisite to see what this intellect is, and whether it is essential, established above soul, or a certain intellectual habit of soul. From analogy however, it may be inferred that it is essential. For as intellect is to soul, so is soul to body. But soul does not so subsist with reference to body, as to be a habit of it; and therefore neither is intellect a habit of soul. This like-

<sup>1</sup> For το δε τῆς εἰσας, read τῷ δε τῆς εἰσας.

<sup>2</sup> viz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic is an imparticipable intellect, or in other words, is not consubstantial with soul.

wise, may be inferred from the final cause. For Plato says that soul was constituted on account of intellect.<sup>1</sup> But the converse is not true. If however, soul is for the sake of intellect, but intellect is that for the sake of which soul subsists, intellect is not a habit; for no where<sup>2</sup> does essence subsist on account of habit. And in the third place, the Demiurgus constitutes this intellect; but the soul as Plato says, gives subsistence to the intellect which is according to habit, through the motion of the circle of sameness about the intelligible. For [as he adds] through this motion, intellect and science are necessarily produced. How therefore does the Demiurgus constitute prior to soul, that to which soul herself gives subsistence? To which we may add, that it is right to assume, that in the Demiurgus there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, as Socrates says in the *Philebus*, subsisting according to the reason of cause [or causally]; and that according to these fountains of these two-fold genera, the Demiurgus now places intellect in soul, and soul in body, not because better are in less excellent natures, nor that intellect is in want of a certain seat, or that the soul of the universe is in a certain thing. For these things are unworthy of wholes and divine essences; through which the world is called by Plato, a blessed God. Because however, we conceive of the nature of things in a two-fold respect, either according to their progression, or according to their conversion; hence, when we survey their progression, we begin from first natures, and say that causes are in their effects. But we assert the converse of this, when we survey their conversion. For then we say that the things caused<sup>3</sup> exist in their causes. This second mode therefore, Plato delivers to us shortly after, when he places body in soul, and analogously soul in body. Now, however, treating of the mode of progression, he places intellect in soul, because the whole of it has the form of intellect, and nothing pertaining to it can be assumed, which is not under the dominion of an intellectual nature. But soul in body, because this according to the whole of itself participates of soul, and no part of it can be assumed which is inanimate; but even that which is deprived of its proper life, so far as it is a part of the universe, is animated. For as we say that providence proceeds every where, and is every where because it is present with all things, and leaves nothing destitute of itself; after the same manner likewise, we say that intellect is in

<sup>1</sup> For *διὰ τὸν νοῦν* here, it is necessary to read *διὰ τὸν νοῦν*.

<sup>2</sup> After *οὐδαμῶς* in this place, it requisite to supply *γὰρ*.

<sup>3</sup> For *τὰ αἰτια* here, it is necessary to read *τὰ αἰτιατά*.

soul, as circularly illuminating the whole of it, and soul in body, because it is present with the whole of it.

Nor does Plato speak after this manner, and Orpheus after another; but if it be requisite to give my opinion, the conceptions of the theologist become manifest through what is here said. For Ippa who is the soul of the universe, and is thus called by the theologist, perhaps because her intellectual conceptions are essentialized in the most vigorous motions, or perhaps on account of the most rapid lation of the universe, of which she is the cause,—placing a testaceous vessel<sup>1</sup> on her head, and encircling the fig leaves that bind her temples, with a dragon, receives Dionysius [or Bacchus]. For with the most divine part of herself, she becomes the receptacle of an intellectual essence, and receives the mundane intellect, which proceeds into her from the thigh of Jupiter. For there it was united with Jupiter, but proceeding from thence and becoming participable by her, it elevates her to the intelligible, and to the fountain of her nature. For she hastens to the mother of the Gods, and to mount Ida,<sup>2</sup> from which all the series of souls is derived. Hence also, Ippa is said to have received Dionysius when he was brought forth from Jupiter. For as Plato before observed, it is impossible for intellect to accede to any thing without soul. But this is similar to what is asserted by Orpheus; by whom also Dionysius is called the sweet offspring of Jupiter. This however, is the mundane intellect, which proceeds into light conformably to the intellect that abides in Jupiter. Thus too, the divinely-delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] says, that the world derives its completion from these three things [viz. from intellect, soul and body]. Soul therefore says [in the Chaldean Oracles,] concerning Jupiter fabricating the universe: "I soul reside after the paternal conceptions, hot, and animating all things."<sup>3</sup> For the father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul he deposited in sluggish body." Plato likewise, bears testimony to the Oracles, when he calls the Demiurgus father, and represents him generating souls, and sending them into the generation of men according to the first life. And thus much concerning these particulars. Since however, as we have said, both soul and intellect give completion to one animal, Plato appears to me to use very appropriately the words to *constitute* and *co-fabricate*, through the common preposition *συν* in both,

<sup>1</sup> For *λαύον* in this place, I read *λαύρον*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. To the region of ideas, and an intelligible nature.

<sup>3</sup> For *θεοειρηχονσα* here, read *θεομη λυχονσα*.

exhibiting the union of the universe. For by always making diviner to be more comprehensive than less excellent natures, he causes the world to become one; but through the forms in each he manifests in the one composition, but in the other demiurgic art.

“In order that it might become most beautiful according to nature, and the most excellent work.”

In what is here said, Timæus recurs to the principle from which all the before-mentioned particulars were deduced. For the world has arrangement on account of soul, soul subsists on account of intellect, but intellect proceeds into the universe on account of intelligible beauty, and the world participates of this in order that it may also participate of *the one*; and this is the end to it of its composition, that it may be rendered most beautiful and the best. But it becomes most beautiful indeed, on account of the beautifying cause which subsists in the intelligible, but the best, or most excellent, on account of the fountain of good. For *the good* is the most excellent of all things. And through all these, the world becomes most similar to the Demiurgus. For he was called by Timæus most excellent. He however, is the best of demiurgic causes, just as *the good* is simply most excellent, existing beyond all the divine causes. But the world is the most excellent *work*; for it is a *fabrication*. For here also the world participates of deity; since the goodness which is above intellect is deity; and on this account the world is denominated most excellent. In an admirable manner Plato likewise, does not speak of the deity of the world in the same way as concerning intellect and soul, viz. as acceding after intellect. For the union of intellect with its proper deity is ineffable, and intellect itself being divine proceeds from the father, which also is the peculiarity of total production. For as intellect indeed, it derives its subsistence from the total fabrication, but as a divine intellect, from deity.<sup>1</sup> Plato therefore, does not make a division into deity and intellect, in consequence of constituting the intellect of the world from the father. What however, is the meaning here of *according to nature*? Perhaps this is significant of order, according to which the universe is likewise enabled to participate of divine beauty; and therefore will be the same with *according to order*. Perhaps also it manifests to us, that

<sup>1</sup> Instead of ἀπο τῆς αἰῆς here, I read ἀπο τῆς θεουργίας.

the Demiurgus makes by his very being, and produces both intellect and soul from his essence. And it is not improbable that it is used, because this fabrication, the universe, is complicated with nature, and the most beautiful here is not of such a kind as that which is better than nature; but that which is above nature, is as it were mingled with nature, and intellectual with physical entities.

“Thus therefore, it is necessary to say, according to assimilative reasoning, that this world was generated an animal, possessing in truth [or reality] soul and intellect through the providence of God.”

As the world itself is mingled, being composed of images and divine essences, of physical and supernatural things, thus also Plato calls the discussion of it *assimilative*, and again *truth*. For according to that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, it requires assimilative reasoning, but according to the intellectual essence which is in it, it requires truth, and also according to the divine cause from which it proceeds. Hence Plato, when about to speak concerning the world adds the word *assimilative*, or probable, but the word *truth*, when about to speak concerning the providence of divinity. Farther still, you may perceive both assimilation and truth in the speaker himself; not only dividing these conformably to the nature of things. For he frequently apprehends the fabrication of things in a partible manner, assuming reasonings, divisions and compositions, though all things subsist at once in divine production. And frequently, he recurs to the whole intelligence of the father, as in the axioms, “*he was good*,” and “*it neither was nor will be lawful for that which is most excellent to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful*.” For in the former of these his apprehension is assimilative [but in the latter, comes into contact with truth]. For from the multiform knowledges that are in us, he indicates what pertains to divine and demiurgic intelligence. But how, say they, does he define the universe to be an animal animated, or possessing soul, and endued with intellect; for it seems indeed, that *animal* is a certain part, but *animated* a genus? In answer to this, it is necessary to recall to our memory those Platonists who say, that animal extends as far as to plants themselves, and to see how, according to this doctrine, every thing animated is an animal, but not every animal is animated. For intelligible animal is beyond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the rational soul an animal<sup>1</sup> but also arranges life after the rational soul, he very pro-

<sup>1</sup> Ζωον is omitted here in the original.

perly denominates every thing animated an animal, but not vice versa. If however, this be the case, having said that the world is an animal, since there is an intelligible animal, and also a sensible animal participating of a rational soul, he properly adds, that it is animated. And since of souls, one kind is endued with intellect, but another is deprived of it, in addition to the universe being animated, he likewise asserts that it possesses intellect. For it seems, that *animal* indeed, accedes from the first intelligible,<sup>1</sup> and thus also from the intelligible father,<sup>2</sup> who is prior to the intellectual Gods. But the *animated* accedes from the middle cause, both the triadic and the hebdomadic.<sup>3</sup> And the possession of intellect accedes from the intellectual father [Jupiter]. For if you survey these as with reference to the Demiurgus alone, according to the paradigm which is in him, the universe is rendered an animal; but according to his royal soul, animated; and according to his royal intellect, endued with intellect. All these however, Plato comprehends unitedly in the words, "*through the providence of God.*" For from thence the universe is rendered an animal, and a blessed God,<sup>4</sup> becoming perfect through the providence of divinity. You may also see how the discourse proceeds from goodness through will, and ends in providence. For will indeed, is suspended from goodness, and providence from will. And the universe is generated, on account of the providence, the will, and the goodness of the father; the last of these being essence prior to essence [i. e. being superessential essence], the second, being as it were power prior to powers, and the first, energy prior to energies. *For these pertain to the Gods so far as they are Gods. For goodness indeed is unific of essence, and is the flower of it; but will is the measure of power; and providence is an energy prior to intellect.* For this I think, the very name itself manifests.<sup>5</sup> We therefore thus distinguish animal and animated.

Iamblichus however, arranges *animal*, with every thing that has life, but *animated*, with the peculiar participation of souls. And perhaps he also, through the

<sup>1</sup> i. e. From *το εν ον*, or from being characterized by *the one*, and which is the summit of the intelligible order.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. From animal itself or Phanes, the extremity of the intelligible order.

<sup>3</sup> i. e. *The animated* accedes from the life, which is in the order called intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, and also from the life which is in the intellectual order, which life is the middle cause in both these orders.

<sup>4</sup> For *εαίμων* in this place, read *εὐδαίμων*.

<sup>5</sup> i. e. *Ἡπορία* providence, is an energy *προ του* prior to intellect.

possession of life indeed, comprehends intelligible animals, but through the animated sensible animals alone. But it may be inferred, that the world is an animal from its sympathy; that it is animated, from its perpetual motion; and that it is endued with intellect, from its excellent order. For if according to this, mortal<sup>1</sup> are co-passive with celestial natures, and the latter impart an effluxion to the former, the universe is one animal connected and contained by one life. For if this life were not common there would not be a sympathy of the parts in it. *For sympathy is effected through a participation of the same nature.* And if the world is perpetually moved, it is governed by soul. For every body which is itself moved inwardly by itself, is animated; but the body which is moved externally, is inanimate. If therefore, the universe is always moved, what is it which moves it? For this is either immovable, or self-motive. But it is not lawful for the immovable cause of motion to approach without a medium to things which are moved by something different from themselves. Hence, it remains, that the self-motive nature is that which always moves the world. But this is soul. The world therefore is animated.

Moreover, in the third place, if<sup>2</sup> the universe is always arranged, and if all things are co-ordinated to well-being, and there is nothing adventitious in the polity of the world, intellect governs the world. For the connexion, the order, and the sacred laws of the natures contained in it, bring with them manifest symbols of intellectual government. Aristotle also, in another way shows this, when he says that of animated natures, animals have the left hand and the right, but plants have the upwards and downwards, and also the right hand and the left, so that the world is animated and an animal. But it is likewise endued with intellect. For that which moves it is intellect. According to both philosophers therefore, the world is an animal animated and endued with intellect; except indeed, that according to Aristotle, it is animated, as having an inseparable life; for he does not admit that it has an intellectual soul, but that it has an intellect above soul, and which is essentially suspended from another intelligible animal. For what Plato calls animal itself, he calls eternal animal, as in his *Metaphysics*, when he says, "*We say that God is an eternal animal.*" And in short, since there are in the world things that are moved, and things that are immovable, things which are always one or the other of these, and things which are sometimes in motion, and sometimes are immovable, it is necessary that the

<sup>1</sup> It is necessary here, to supply τα θνητα.

<sup>2</sup> Ea is omitted here in the original.



causes of both these should preside over the world. Soul therefore is the cause of motion; on which account also Plato in the *Laws* admitting [for the sake of argument] the universe to be immoveable, gives motion to it by the introduction of soul. And in the *Phædrus* taking away soul, he makes all things to stand still. But it is evident that intellect belongs to immoveable natures. And beings that are always moved, are moved about those that are immoveable, and on account of the permanency of the latter, the former are perpetually moved. Hence it entirely follows, that there is a mundane intellect above soul. By no means therefore, must that which Chrysippus devised, be ascribed to the world. For he confounded imparticipable with participable<sup>\*</sup> causes, by supposing them to be the same with each other, and also the divine, and the intellectual, the immaterial and the material. For the same God, and who according to him is the first God, pervades through the world, and through matter, and is both soul and nature inseparable from the subjects of his government. Plato however, establishing prior to the whole world three causes, goodness, intelligible animal, and the demiurgic intellect, imparts from these to the world in the first place, a perfect intellect always fixed in energy, exempt from matter, and full of undefiled intellections. In the second place, a divine intellectual soul, evolving the essence of this one intellect, dancing round it, and convolving the universe. In the third place, a union of the total essences in the world, and one deity and goodness, connecting all the mundane multitude, and causing it to be one. And in the fourth place, a providence extending to all things its inspective care, subsisting likewise from itself, and causing itself to be exempt from all the subjects of its government.

Since however, as we have before observed, it is necessary to survey the progressions and the conversions of wholes, both these are accomplished by Plato. For he delivers the progressions of them when he says that the Demiurgus placed intellect in soul, and soul in body; but their conversions, when beginning from the world, he calls it an animal animated, and endued with intellect, and connects it through soul with intellect, which is the peculiar work of conversion. And in the last place, he refers the composition of the world to the demiurgic providence, through which conversion is imparted to all things. For goodness indeed, unites the Demiurgus to *the one*. But will supplies wholes with good. And providence converts all things to *the good*. For, as we have said, goodness is

<sup>\*</sup> It is necessary here to supply *καὶ μετέσθαι*.

analogous to essence, will to power, and providence to energy; because the first indeed, establishes all things; the second moves them to progression; and the third recalls them according to the retrogression of all things to that which is prior to intellect. If however, the Demiurgus adorns the universe on account of goodness, but through adorning it causes it to possess intellect, and to be animated, and doing these things, effects them on account of providence, (for these were generated through the providence of God)—if this be the case, it is necessary that it should be the same thing to produce on account of goodness as on account of providence. And this very properly, because providence is the energy of goodness. So that according to Plato, providence is nothing else than an energy conformable to good. For in our concerns also, we say that to provide for some one, is to be the cause of good to the object of our providential care. Not only, therefore, must providence be defined to be that which converts all things to the first, but also to be that the energy of which extends to all things, and which adorns all things according to one union. And this is in reality providence, the communication of good to all things, the conversion of all things to and the participation of the giver [of every good], who imparts to every thing that which it is able to receive. It is requisite likewise to remember what the Cheronean [Plutarch] says about the name of providence, as that which Plato exhorts us to conceive of as something divine. If also the Demiurgus is intellect, and providence so far as he has something which is better than intellect, he has deservedly this name, on account of an energy which is above intellect. For all things aspire after good, but all things do not aspire after intellect. For such things as are perfectly destitute of intellect do not desire it, lest their desire should be in vain, or they should be deprived of the end [which is their proper good]. And because he is providence indeed, he is suspended from *the good* itself; but because he is intellect he is suspended from the first intellect. For the first intellect [i. e. Saturn] is not that which intellectually sees and fabricates, but that which alone intellectually perceives; and on this account, it is a pure intellect, as we learn from the Cratylus. Hence also, according to Plato, the latter may be said to be *once*,<sup>1</sup> as having one energy directed to himself; but the former *twice*, together with this energy receiving also a power fabricative of the universe, and not only legislatively regulating things, posterior to himself, but also abiding in his own accustomed manner, as Plato says shortly after.

<sup>1</sup> Proclus says this, alluding to the Chaldean oracles, in which Saturn is called *once beyond*, and Jupiter *twice beyond*.

"This being determined, let us consider what is consequent to these things; viz. according to the similitude of what animal, the constituting artificer constituted the world."

Plato clearly exhibits to us through what is here said the connexion of the problems, and the suspension of secondary from primary natures. For the words, "*this being determined*," and "*let us consider what is consequent to these things*," indicate the connexion of what has been with what will be said; and that through the truth of the former, the latter receive the principle of investigation. For since it has been shown that the universe was rendered an animal conformably to the providence of God, it is necessary that it should be assimilated to intelligible animal. For where did the Demiurgus look when he made the world to be an animal, except to the intelligible? For it was one of the things pre-demonstrated, that the world being most beautiful, was generated according to an eternal paradigm. If therefore, the Demiurgus making it to be an image of the intelligible, constituted it an animal, the paradigm itself will be an intelligible animal. For if that was not an animal, how could that which was generated an image of it be rendered an animal? For so far as it is similar to that, it was generated an animal. For it is sensible indeed, not as similar and separate [but as visible and tangible]<sup>1</sup>. These however, [i. e. visibility, and tangibility,] it obtains through a corporeal nature. But it is an animal, as being similar to intelligible animal. And if it is similar, it is from thence allotted the *morphe* of animal. For images also, have not only their forms, but their appellations, so far as they are formalized, from their paradigms. So that if life is imparted to the world through the paradigm, it is also similarly called an animal and animated from it, because the cause of its whole animation pre-exists in intelligibles. For the same reason likewise, it is endued with intellect. It may however, in a greater degree be called an animal, on account of the most principal cause, because the paradigm is the cause of animation, of the supply of intellect, and as I may say, of all life. *For every thing endued with intellect, is also animated, and every thing animated is also an animal; but the converse is not true. For every animal is not animated. For that*

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *πῶς τὸ τοῦ ἐκείνου γένους εἶναι* in this place, it is necessary to read *πῶς τὸ ἐκείνου γένους εἶναι*.

<sup>2</sup> The words *ἀλλ' ὡς ὁρατὸν καὶ ἀπτόν* are omitted in the original, but, as it appears to me, ought to be inserted.

*which participates of a rational soul is animated. Nor is every thing which is animated endued with intellect. For the genus of men that participate of intellect, is small; so that animal is more comprehensive than all the rest. And with those things indeed, with which the rest are present, animal also is present; but it is not necessary that the rest should be inherent in those things with which this is present. That however, which is more comprehensive, is nearer to the first principle. But that which is nearer to it, is of a more causal nature, since the first principle is the cause of all beings. That Plato also, not only knew intelligible animal, but also the intelligible animated, is manifest from what he says in the Sophista. For placing life and soul in being, and wishing likewise to give to it motion, he adds, "But that which has intellect and soul, if it is not animated, must remain entirely immoveable." Hence there are, intelligible life, and intelligible animal; the cause of soul, and the animated; the cause of intellect, and that which is endued with intellect. And animal itself is beyond all the intelligible paradigms. Hence, Plato says, that the discussion of the similitude of the world to intelligible animal, is consequent to the problem concerning the composition of it. For because the universe being assimilated according to the form itself of similitude, was rendered an animal by the Demiurgus, that may more properly be called an animal, with reference to which the universe was generated an animal. For it exists as an animal on account of the intelligible, and not on account of that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner. It is necessary however, that animal should be present with the universe, either from matter or from form; so that if the world is not an animal from its subject matter, it is so from form. If however from form, that which is primarily animal is the cause to it of form.*

It remains therefore, to survey in the next place after this problem, to what animal the universe is assimilated. For that it is assimilated, is evident from what has been already said, but to what it is assimilated, must next be considered. For there is a multitude of intelligible animals, which Plato also indicating, inquires to what animal the Demiurgus constituted the world similar. For beginning supernally from intelligibles, animal proceeds through all the middle orders; in one of these orders, subsisting intelligibly alone; in another intelligibly

\* For ἀνθρωπῶν γὰρ γένος, βλάχῃ ἐστὶν οὐ μετέχον, it is necessary to read, ἀνθρωπῶν γὰρ γένος, βλάχῃ ἐστὶν τοῦ μετέχον. For Plato says this in the latter part of this Dialogue.

\* For ἄλλον here, it is obviously requisite to read ἐγγυτέρως.

indeed, but as in intelligibles and intellectuals; and in another intellectually alone. And in one of these orders indeed, animal subsists intelligibly alone, but as in intellectuals; but in another vitally. And thus in each of the intellects there is intelligible animal, subsisting appropriately in each. For every intellect has a conjoined intelligible. Very properly therefore, does Plato investigate what kind of animal is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is super-mundane, or intellectual only, or intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, or intelligible only. For the nature of animal<sup>1</sup> proceeds according to all the orders of intellect. But Plato admits that the differences always subsist in the first animal itself according to union, and gives a progression to them according to appropriate numbers. For as the first animal is tetradic, thus a different animal is defined according to a different number. And in those things in which there is the same number, in these there is a variety of subsistence according to the peculiarities of animals. For it is necessary that in animal also, there should be the monadic prior to the multiplied; because this<sup>2</sup> is more allied to *the one*. And universally, every divine multitude begins from a monad. As therefore, the Demiurgus is the monad of all effective causes, though the effective peculiarity is in many Gods, thus also animal itself is the monad of all animals; in which likewise the most total paradigms of mundane natures, and the one cause of the whole world pre-exist.

Why, however, some one may say, does Plato call the intelligible paradigm animal? Because it is the supplier of life, as I have before observed; and because it generates the causes of the whole vivific series, and the fountains themselves of life. Because likewise, it is replete with the first and intelligible life. For the one being, or being characterized by *the one*, is beyond life. But the middle order of intelligibles is the first life, and is one and infinite. Animal itself, however, being full of intelligible life, is very properly called animal. For as it is eternal, on account of being filled from eternity, thus also it is an animal, on account of its reception of life. For it is intelligible, as being arranged [immediately] after intelligible life. It is therefore called an animal, not as sensitive, nor as having impulse, but as being vital. For every thing which lives, is according to Plato, an animal. “*For because it has life, says Timæus, it may be justly called an animal.*” Hence also, Plato calls plants and seeds animals, characterizing the

<sup>1</sup> For *ἡ τοῦ ζῶν φύσις* here, it is necessary to read *ἡ τοῦ ζῶον φύσις*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τοῦτο* here, read *τοῦτο*.

animal by vitality. If therefore, the intelligible paradigm lives, as being eternal; for eternity, as Plotinus says, is the life of all things, so that the eternal lives; and if every thing that lives is an animal, hence the intelligible paradigm is an animal. And you may from hence assume that this paradigm is in the third triad of intelligibles. For it is not in the first triad; for this is prior to life. Nor is it in the second; for this is life. Hence it is in the third. For it does not exist out of intelligibles; since Plato on this<sup>1</sup> account alone calls the paradigm intelligible, though he knew the super-mundane demiurgic intellect. But neither does he call the latter intelligible, nor the former intellectual. Before therefore, he assumed every thing which perpetually exists as the paradigm of all generation; among which eternally existing beings, animal itself and the Demiurgus are included; for each of these always is. Eternity likewise, which is the first thing that always is, and the one being itself, which is eternal being according to cause, are in the number of eternally existing beings. Now, however, he calls animal itself the paradigm of the world considered as living. *For perpetual being was the paradigm of disorderly generation; since from thence, forms without distinction, were present with the disorderly nature, prior to the generation of the universe.* But though we should assume animal itself, which has the forms of the elements, this also is the paradigm of the vestiges of the elements. So far, however, as it is animal, it is the paradigm of this universe now possessing life. So that simply considered, animal itself, and the intelligible paradigm are not the same. For eternity likewise, which always exists, is the paradigm of time, but is not an intelligible animal; since not every paradigm is an animal belonging to the intelligible order. But if animal itself is eternal, eternity is prior to it, which is not an animal. For prior to animal itself, there is no other animal; since neither prior to any other of those things to which we apply the term *itself*, is there a certain form prior to it. As therefore, eternity is prior to animal itself, not being yet an animal, so likewise, being itself is prior to eternity. Hence also eternity is that which is being, and is a certain being. Animal itself therefore, is the third intelligible triad, concerning which the [Chaldean] Oracles say, "It is the operator, and the giver of life-bearing fire. It fills the vivific bosom of Hecate,<sup>2</sup> and pours on the Synoches the fertile strength of a fire endued with mighty power." For all these assertions in no respect differ from saying that all-perfect intelligible animal is the fountain of all intellectual

<sup>1</sup> For *δια τε* here, it is necessary to read *δια τούτο*.

<sup>2</sup> For *εκαστης* here, read *Εκατης*.

life, and the cause of every paradigmatic hyparxis. And thus much concerning this particular.

With respect to the words of the text, "*to constitute in the similitude*," manifests that the universe is in the highest degree assimilated to its paradigm. For not every image is constituted in similitude, but that alone which is perfectly similar; since this is not the case, where dissimilitude predominates. For then similitude is not the end. But the words, "*the constituting artificer constituted*," clearly demonstrate to us, that the Demiurgus of the universe makes by his very being, and possesses energy essentially. For Plato does not call him in one way, and the effective energy proceeding from him in another, but he calls both by one name. Farther still, the words likewise appear to signify, that the Demiurgus always produces, and that he always produces perfectly. For the word *constituting*, manifests an ever-present making; but the word *constituted*, an all-perfect making, and which is suspended from its cause. But by the conjunction of both these expressions, it is very manifest that the maker of the universe generates eternally all things, his productive energy neither commencing, nor ending at a certain time.

"We must not therefore assert, that he thought it would be adequate to its dignity, to assimilate it to any one of the animals which naturally exist in the form of a part. For that which is similar to an imperfect thing, can never at any time become beautiful."

As there are many intelligible animals, some of which are more total, but others more partial,<sup>1</sup> some of which are united, but others divided, and some are defined according to bound, but others according to infinity; Plato inquiring what the all-perfect paradigm of the universe is, and from what intelligible animal the world is suspended, thinks that no partial animal ought to be placed in this order. For each of these is imperfect as with reference to the whole. For it is possible for the imperfect to be so called in a twofold respect, either with reference to its own nature, or with reference to that which is better and more causal. And the former indeed, it is not even lawful to conceive of divine natures. For each has the measure of itself eternally, and its own proper good always exerted. For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own

<sup>1</sup> It is obviously necessary in this place, to supply the words, *τῶν δὲ μερικωτέρων*.

order. But the latter ranks, as it is said, among the things that are usual. For as in the Banquet, Plato calls that which is not primarily beautiful, but participates of beauty, indigent of beauty, thus also he calls that an imperfect animal which is not the first animal, nor animal itself, but is such by participation, and subsists according to a progression from that which is first. If therefore, every partial animal is imperfect, but the paradigm of the world is all-perfect, the paradigm of the world will not be a partial animal. For whether does the Demiurgus intellectually perceive this all-perfect and first animal, or not? It is impossible indeed, that he should not intellectually perceive those things which we perceive when our soul energizes intellectually. But if he thus sees it, and all intellectual perception of the Demiurgus is production or making, it is necessary that he should make by intellectual perception itself. What therefore can he make more divine than the universe? For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, when looking to that which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato when investigating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect animal.

What then, some one may say, are not the sun and moon and each of the stars beautiful? But how is this possible? For each of these is assimilated to a partial animal. To this we reply, that each of these is beautiful, when surveyed in conjunction with the whole, and co-arranged with the whole: just as the eye and the chin are beautiful, in conjunction with the whole face, and while in the whole; but surveyed by themselves apart from the face, do not exhibit the beauty which is adapted to them. For in subsisting as a part and not as a whole, each when essentially divulsed from the whole, suffers a diminution of its own proper beauty. The perfect therefore, and the beautiful are present with these which are parts, on account of the whole. The cause, however, of this, says Porphyry is, that in intelligible forms the part is a whole.<sup>1</sup> For all such things are in each partially, as are in the whole all-perfectly, on account of the union of intelligible forms. And the assertion is indeed true, that each of the parts in them is in a certain respect a whole, each receiving the form of whole, and becoming essentially united on account of its communicating with all, and being all things according to participation. Nevertheless the wholeness of it subsists partially, and not like that wholeness which is simply a whole. For it is one thing to be after a solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of each

<sup>1</sup> Instead of το όλον μέρος εστιν, it is necessary to read το μέρος όλον εστιν.



intellect possessing all things in a way adapted to itself, one form having dominion, which makes the intellect to be such an intellect, and a certain intellect; and another thing to be all things, without a partial peculiarity, being all things so far as intellect, and not so far as a particular kind of intellect. What then, are not these also generated according to intelligible paradigms, viz. the sun and moon and each of the stars? How therefore, are these beautiful? To this we reply, that these are beautiful, but not most beautiful. But the world is that which is truly most beautiful. As therefore each of these is perfect, but not all-perfect, so likewise each is beautiful, but not like the universe most beautiful. For that each of these is perfect, Plato manifests farther on, when he says, "*that the world was generated perfect from things perfect, and a whole from wholes.*" Hence the perfection of the whole is one thing, and of the part another. And the wholeness of the all-perfect is different from the wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is in the most beautiful is one thing, but that which receives a more partial participation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

The words however, "*in the form of a part,*" may be easily understood, if they are considered as signifying the same as, *in the order of a part.* And this is the same with, *becoming a part.* But the divine Iamblichus thinks fit to add the conjunction *as* to the words *in the form*, and to understand the whole as implying that every partial animal in intelligibles, naturally exists as in the form of a part. For since part in them is not such as it is in sensibles; since each is there according to its own order all such things as the whole is; on this account the philosopher adds, *as in the form*, in order that surveying the appellation of part in a manner adapted to forms, we may not understand it as a thing attended with interval, and susceptible of division, and thus relinquish the union of united and impartible essences. For these according to the philosopher himself are impartible and united. But with respect to the word "*naturally,*" we must not now understand by it *according to nature*, but the being *essentialized*. For all essences are frequently called *natures*, as by Socrates in the *Philebus*, when he says, "*hence, in the nature of Jupiter you may say, that there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the reason of cause.*" But the words, "*he thought it would be adequate to its dignity,*" are said as if spoken in conjunction with the Demiurgus, and as truly apprehending the *dignity* of a divine cause. For he who mystically narrates the exempt and all-perfect intellectual conceptions of a divine nature, has an arrangement in conjunction with him. And the words, "*for that which is similar to an imperfect thing can never be beautiful,*" is indeed true, but is attended with a doubt.

For if in that which is a whole one thing is more, but another less excellent, must not the whole become inferior to its more excellent part, by the addition of that which is less excellent? But the doubt may be solved by observing, that the co-arrangement of the less with the more excellent makes the whole to be one and perfect; but when they are not conglomerated with each other, then the mixture of the less diminishes the power of the more excellent nature. If however, some one should make a syllogism from opposites, through what is here, and what has been before said, so as to infer that every thing which is generated according to an eternal, is not generated according to an eternal paradigm, we may solve the objection by observing that what is employed by the objector as the middle term, is not so. For in one place, the words "*in order that it might be beautiful*," manifest that which is beautiful, whether in a certain respect, or simply; but in another place, they manifest that which is most beautiful. For a part has indeed the beauty of a part, but simply considered, is not beautiful. But that alone is absolutely beautiful which is a whole, to which also the beauty of the parts contributes; this beauty pertaining to certain things, and being itself a *certain* [and not a *universal*] thing. For every part is for the sake of another thing, i. e. the whole, and the beauty which it possesses has the order of matter with reference to the beauty of the whole. Hence it is not so beautiful as to be most beautiful.

From what has been said, those assertions likewise may be confuted, which make *the good* to be a certain intelligible form and not prior to all intelligibles. For if it is a certain form, it is also a part of the whole intelligible profundity in which it subsists. But every part, as it is here said, is imperfect; so that *the good* likewise is imperfect. How therefore being imperfect is it the most happy of all things? In reality also that which is similar to it is not beautiful. Nor are all beings similarly with reference to it, either more good, or more beautiful. If therefore *the good* being a part, will suffer things of this kind, it will not be a part of the intelligible. Moreover, neither is it the whole of the intelligible. For being the whole of the intelligible, over what will it still reign? Since neither is the sun which has an arrangement analogous to *the good*, the whole of that which is visible. It is necessary therefore, that *the good* should be beyond the intelligible, and be neither a part nor the whole of it. Neither therefore, will either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with *the good*; since each of these is a certain whole comprehensive of all forms.

\* For *r' αγαθον* here, read *r' αγαθη*.

"But we should admit it to be the most similar of all things to that animal of which other animals, both according to one, and according to genera, are parts."

Some, as Atticus, assert that this "*according to one, and according to genera,*" gives a division to individual opposite to that of more common forms. But they call individual forms those that are proximate, and the causes of individuals; such for instance as man itself, horse itself, and each of such-like forms. And they denominate genera the more total and comprehensive paradigms of these. Others again, as Amelius, say that Plato by these words, distinguishes that which is particular from things that are more common. For some things are paradigms of parts, but others of forms. Theodorus also, following Amelius, says there are twofold intellects, one of these being divided into wholes, but the other into parts. And that these are the same with, "*according to genera, and according to one.*" But others, as Xenarchus, assert, that *according to genera* manifests the pre-existent intelligible causes of animals; such for instance as the celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial, which are shortly after mentioned by Timæus. And that by "*according to one,*" the formalizing principles in each of these many are indicated. For in celestial natures, the paradigm of the sun is different from the paradigm of the moon. In terrestrial natures, the paradigm of men is different from that of lions. And in a similar manner in the natures which have an intermediate subsistence. The divine Iamblichus however, turns into a path of interpretation contrary to all these. For they indeed make the "*according to one,*" subordinate to, and more partial than, "*according to genera ;*" but he, on the contrary, makes it to be more venerable, as it is fit that in intelligibles unity should precede multitude. He says therefore, that all other animals are the parts of animal itself, both according to one, and according to genera. For they are comprehended and perfected by animal itself, both according to the multitudes they contain, and according to their unities. Nor is there any one of them which does not proceed from the intelligible. *For intelligible animal is comprehensive of all the things posterior to it, not as deriving its completion from them. For it is a whole prior to,\* and does not derive its subsistence from parts.* Nor is it a whole, as being predicated of parts; for it is the cause of the many. But it is

\* Intelligible animal, or animal itself, is a whole prior to parts, because it comprehends parts in itself *causally*.

a whole, as a primordial principle, and as filling all things posterior to itself with itself. Hence it comprehends what are called parts impartibly, many species uniformly, and exists in an all-perfect manner prior to secondary paradigms. For this principle indeed, is the universe intelligibly; but of the natures posterior to it, one is all things celestially, another after a solar, another after a terrestrial manner, and another in some other way, according to the different causes of mundane natures. So that this principle comprehends all things all-perfectly, but all things are comprehended by each of the natures posterior to it partially, as with reference to the intelligible allness. The world therefore, is also similar to these partial animals; since it is likewise similar to the Demiurgus; but it is most similar to animal itself, so far as it is an animal. For animal itself was primarily intelligible animal. Hence, that which is most similar is so in a twofold respect; either because it is similar to other things, or because other things are similar to it. But this is especially the case with the universe, and it is especially similar to animal itself.

352 "For this indeed, has all intelligible animals comprehended in itself, just as this world contains us, and such other animals as are the objects of sight."

Plotinus supposes animal itself to exist in a twofold respect. For at one time he considers it to be more excellent than intellect, as in his treatise intitled *Different Considerations*, but at another, as inferior to it, as in his treatise *Concerning Numbers*, when he says that being is first, afterwards intellect, and afterwards animal itself. But Theodorus, who says, that each of the demiurgi has a triple hyparxis, thinks fit to call the third in each, animal itself. From both, however, the truth may be assumed. From the admirable Theodorus indeed, that it has the third order in intelligibles; but from the most divine Plotinus, that it is inferior to one intellect, but beyond another. And it must be said, that unfolding itself into light at the end of intelligibles, it generates from intelligible life all the number of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane animals, supernally as far as to the last of things. It is likewise comprehensive of all things, being exempt from, and uniformly and antecedently containing in itself the causes of them. For Orpheus also indicates things of this kind about it, when theologizing

\* For *την* here, it is necessary to read *την* *αλη*.

concerning Phanes. The first God therefore, with him, has the heads of many animals, viz. of a ram, a bull, a serpent, and a fierce lion.<sup>1</sup> He also proceeds from the primogenial egg, in which the animal exists spermatically; and Plato knowing this calls this mighty God animal itself. For what difference is there between calling an occult cause an egg, or that which is unfolded into light from it, an animal? For what can be generated from the egg of all things, but an animal? This egg however, was the offspring of ether and chaos, the former of which is established conformably to the bound, but the latter to the infinity of intelligibles. For the former is the root of all things, but the latter has not any boundary. If therefore that which first consists of bound and infinity is that which is primarily being, *the being* of Plato will be the same with the *Orphic egg*. And if Phanes is from this, who is arranged according to animal itself, it is necessary to investigate it as situated next to eternity according to Orpheus, which is a medium between animal itself, and that which is primarily being.<sup>2</sup> And thus it will be more clearly evident, that animal itself is no other than the Phanes of the theologist. For if Phanes first proceeds from the egg, which is manifestly with Orpheus the first intelligible intellect, but that which first and alone proceeds from an egg, is necessarily nothing else than an animal, it is evident that the most mighty Phanes is nothing else than the first animal; and, as Plato would say, *animal itself*. This therefore is demonstrated.

Let us however, in the next place, survey what is consequent to this. Phanes, therefore, thus unfolding himself into light from the occult Gods, antecedently comprehends in himself the causes of the secondary orders, viz. of the effective, connective, perfective, and immutable orders; and also contains in himself according to one cause, all intelligible animals. For he excites himself to the most total ideas of all things. Hence also, he is said [by Orpheus] to be the first of the Gods, and to have a form. But he produces all things, and unfolds the intelligible and united<sup>3</sup> causes of things, to the intellectual Gods. Hence too, the Demiurgus being filled from these causes, gives subsistence to this visible

<sup>1</sup> This is an Orphic line, which is not noticed either by Gesner or Hermann in their collection of Orphic fragments. It is however in the printed original in a defective state: for it is, *καὶ τὰς ταυρίους οἰίας, χαροκὸν τε λεόντος*. But from Eschenbach, who quotes it from a manuscript, it may be amended as follows: *κρίον καὶ ταύρον, οἰίαι, χαροκὸν τε λεόντος*.

<sup>2</sup> It is here necessary to supply the words *τοῦ πρώτου οντος*.

<sup>3</sup> For *ἡνωμένων* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *ἡνωμένα*, in order to agree with *αἰτία*.

world, and causes it to contain all sensible animals, both such as are more divine, and such as are mortal, which are properly *θημαατα*<sup>1</sup> *thremmata*, or *things which are nourished*, as entirely participating of the nutritive soul. All bodies likewise, may properly be called *θημαατα*, as being the progeny of nature, and as always living from, and being connected by it, even though they should be perpetual bodies; but not as requiring externally adventitious nutriment. Unless indeed, it be requisite to call all things in the world *θημαατα*, as being nourished by the king of visible natures through the communication of light. For Socrates in the Republic says, that the sun is the cause of nutriment and generation to all such things as he illuminates. For every visible thing is nourished being perfected by light. For as we learn in the Politicus, it is possible to be nourished externally, and not only internally. The Demiurgus therefore, comprehends all that the world contains, in order that this sensible world may be *all* and perfect from the parts that are in it, conformably to a similitude to him. Hence, this world is a various animal, according to a different part of itself emitting a different voice, and from all its parts one voice. For it is also one, [as well as many]. By a much greater priority however, the intelligible world is one animal and a multitude [of animals], contracting multitude in the one, just as this visible world also, exhibits the one in multitude. And the latter indeed, is a whole from parts; but the former is a whole prior to parts, exemptly, uniformly, and according to cause, comprehending intelligible animals. For from it the fountains of divine natures, and all the most total genera proceed. Hence also, the theologist represents it as *a most total animal*; surrounds it with the heads of a ram, a bull, a lion, and a dragon; and ascribes to it primarily the female and the male, as to the first animal.

Female and father, strong and mighty God,  
Ericapæus,<sup>2</sup>

says the theologist. He is likewise the first God that is represented with wings. And what occasion is there to be prolix? For if he has his progression from the primogenial egg, this fable manifests that he is the first animal, if it is fit to preserve the analogy. For as the egg<sup>3</sup> antecedently comprehends the spermatic

<sup>1</sup> The word used by Plato here for animals.

<sup>2</sup> In the original erroneously *ηρισε πριος*.

<sup>3</sup> For *το αυον* here, it is necessary to read *το αυον*.

cause of the animal, thus also the occult order,\* uniformly comprehends the whole of the intelligible. And as the animal now possesses in a distributed manner, such things as were in the egg spermatically, thus likewise this God produces into a visible subsistence that which is ineffable and incomprehensible in first causes. Concerning these things however, what has now been said may suffice for the present.

If however, as this world comprehends in itself all visible natures, so its paradigm comprehends all intelligibles, and the mode of comprehension, as we have said, is different in each, yet at the same time the visible in the former is analogous to that of the latter. For Phanes supernally illuminating intelligibles with intelligible light, causes all of them to be visible, and exhibits all things [in the intelligible] generated from invisible causes; and the world imparts visibility to bodies through the light of the stars. Farther still, this also may be considered as admirable in the doctrine of Plato, that at the same time that he preserves the union of intelligibles unshaken, he imparts to them an unmingled purity. For if all of them were so united to each other as to be confused, and so as not to permit the peculiarity of each to remain undefiled, there would have been no occasion to enquire, according to what kind of paradigm the universe was generated. For in things confused there is no distinction of quality. And if these were so divided from each other as to be without any communion, some intelligibles would not comprehend, but others be comprehended. For to comprehend and be comprehended pertain to order and communion of powers, and to the rapid conspiracy of all secondary natures to become one. Moreover, for the union of them to subsist from essence, but their separation to be rendered apparent from externally proceeding energies, will be the peculiarity of incorporeal and immaterial effects. For if they are surveyed, themselves by themselves, all will be found to be in each other, on account of their being, as it were, of the same colour, and especially if the unities of them are seen with the eye of intellect. But from secondary natures, and from their participants, we collect their unconfused union. For whence is the separation of these derived, except from the unmingled purity of their efficient causes? For things which are confused with each other, give subsistence to other such-like natures, [i. e. to natures which are similarly confused.]

\* i. e. The first triad of the intelligible order, which is called by Plato in the *Parmenides* 130 c. d., *the one being*, or *being* characterised by, and absorbed as it were in *the one*.

"For the divinity wishing to assimilate this universe, in the most exquisite degree, to that which is the most beautiful, and in every respect perfect of intelligible animals, he constituted it one visible animal, containing all such things within itself, as are allied to its nature."

Atticus, in what is here said, doubts whether the Demiurgus is comprehended by intelligible animal. For it would seem, if he were comprehended, that he is not perfect. For partial animals, he says, are imperfect, and on this account things which resemble them are not beautiful. But if he is not comprehended, animal itself will not be more comprehensive than all intelligibles. And having doubted, he easily solves the doubt, by supposing that the Demiurgus is above animal itself. On the contrary, Porphyry gives an order to the Demiurgus inferior to the intelligible. For establishing a supercelestial soul to be the maker of the world, he places in intellect the paradigm of generated natures. The divine Iamblichus, as a medium between both these, connects and unites the paradigm to the Demiurgus, through the union of intellect with the intelligible. But Amelius makes the intelligible, which is defined according to being, to be the same with the Demiurgus.<sup>1</sup> We however say, that animal itself is prior to, subsists in, and is posterior to the Demiurgus. For it proceeds to every intellectual order both total and partial. The Demiurgus himself likewise, sees himself, and the natures prior to himself; for it is not lawful for him to look to natures posterior to himself. Beholding therefore, these superior natures, he produces all things, and makes the universe, so far as it is the universe, or *the all*, to be the image of the whole intelligible world. The Demiurgus however, is comprehended by the intelligible, according to the cause of the intellectual Gods which there subsist; not as being a part, or one species of it; but as a second order in the order which is prior to it. For a divine intellect is in one way said to be comprehensive of forms, and in another way to comprehend partial intellects. For each of the latter indeed, is all things in a self-perfect manner; but each of the former is united to other forms,<sup>2</sup> but is not all things. For each is itself preserving its own peculiarity, unmingled and unconfused. According to the same reasoning also, the intelligibles which are in intelligible intellect, are comprehended by it in one way, but in another way the intellectual orders which proceed from it. For you may say, that each of these

<sup>1</sup> For τῶν μετὰ τὸν δημιουργόν in this place, it is necessary to read τῶν μετὰ τοὺς δημιουργούς.

<sup>2</sup> For τὰς ἄλλων εἰδήσεις here, read τὰς ἄλλων εἰδέσεις.



being self-perfect, is comprehended in all-perfect animal. All such things therefore, as are in the paradigm, are likewise in the Demiurgus; and in making the world with reference to the paradigm, he also makes it with reference to himself. With respect to *allness* (παντοτης) however, one is intelligible, but another intellectual. For both the tetrad and the decad contain all things in themselves; but the former unitedly, and the latter distributedly. The decad likewise, though it contains all such things as the tetrad contains, yet because it contains them in a more divided manner, it is more imperfect than the tetrad. For the tetrad being nearer to the monad is more perfect; and in proportion as quantity is diminished, the magnitude of power is increased. So that the Demiurgus possessing all such things as intelligible animal possesses, yet at the same time, he has an allness inferior to that which is intelligible. In short, as *comprehension is twofold, the one being such as that of parts in their wholeness, but the other, as that of effects in their causes*, Plato now assumes the former of these, and says, that the genera and species of animals, are comprehended as parts in their whole, i. e. in animal itself; all which likewise, he denominates imperfect, as with reference to the whole. But the Demiurgus indeed, proceeds from thence as from a cause, yet he likewise possesses all things intellectually. The Demiurgus therefore, is comprehended by intelligible animal according to the reason of cause, and is not so comprehended as a part, so as to be also imperfect. Hence likewise, Timæus in a certain respect thus speaks. For the Demiurgus has all intelligible animals comprehended in himself. For in reality, these are contained in him as parts, which remain in unproceeding union with their proper wholeness, and give completion to it, as a whole which is not prior to parts, but is from parts. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

In the next place, this also deserves to be surveyed, viz. in what an admirable manner Plato, at one time in a way known to us, passes from images to paradigms, and at another time, from paradigms to images; at one and the same time indicating the connexion of things, and their progressions and conversions. For when he says, *that as this world comprehends us, thus also animal itself comprehends intelligible animals*, he recurs from sensible animals to the causes of them. But when he says, *that divinity wishing to assimilate the world to the most beautiful of intelligibles, rendered it comprehensive of all things*, he is willing to pass from causes to their effects, imitating the progression of secondary natures. He is led however, to such a transition as this, through analogy. For as effects are to each other, so are the paradigms of them. And the more total and the more partial,

subsist in both according to the same ratio. Why however, does he call animal itself the most beautiful of intelligibles, though it is the end of intelligibles? May we not say, that though there are intelligible orders prior to it, yet the most beautiful is inferior to them? For they do not participate of beauty; but the producing cause of beauty, and the first beauty and elegance subsist in them. Hence also animal itself is according to Orpheus, intellectually unfolded into light in this order. And as beauty had a prior existence in the first intelligibles, unitedly and without intermission, hence Phanes is called by Orpheus, "the very beautiful son of ether," and "delicate Love." Because therefore, this God is the first that is filled with occult and ineffable beauty, hence also he is denominated most beautiful, being the first of participants, though all intelligibles are united to each other. For it is not proper to divide them from each other, after the same manner as the intellectual orders, but survey one and an indivisible union of them. These things therefore, are beautifully asserted [by Orpheus and Plato].

That however, which is most synoptical<sup>1</sup> in the words of Plato, is this, that he says animal itself is the most beautiful, not of all intelligibles simply, but of intelligible animals. For comparing all-perfect animal with more partial animals, he says, it is the most beautiful of all intelligible animals; so that if there is something more excellent than the nature of animal, it has nothing to do with the present assertion. It is necessary however, that there should be a thing of this kind, because being itself, and beauty itself are more simple than the nature of animal, on which account also they are participated by things which are not animals. Moreover, the interpreters say, that the word *assimilation* is appropriately assumed by Plato. For he is frequently dubious concerning the mode of participation, whether it is from forms themselves being present with sensibles, or from their communicating with them in some other way: but he is not dubious whether or not it is similitude which makes the sensible world to be the image of the intelligible. Dividing however, they say, that of physical forms indeed, the sensible world participates as of impressions in wax, but that it receives the representations of psychical, and the similitudes of intelligible forms.<sup>2</sup> So that since Plato is speaking concerning intelligible paradigms, he very properly, as they say, assumes similitude. Farther still, the world is an animal, as the image

<sup>1</sup> For *συνεπτικωτάτος* here, I read *συνεπτικώτατος*.

<sup>2</sup> Concerning the mode in which forms themselves are participated by sensibles, see the Notes to my translation of the Parmenides of Plato.

of this intelligible animal, and of intelligible allness. But it is visible as being assimilated to the splendour of its paradigm. For what colour is there, that the visible is here.

'The Gods admu'd, in ether when they saw  
A light unlook'd for, bursting on the view,  
From the immortal Phanes' glittering skin ;'

[says Orpheus]. And the world comprehends all kindred natures, because it is comprehensive of all sensibles. But Plato adds, "*as are allied to its nature,*" because intelligibles are paradigms to the world of things which are according to nature, and not as some Platonists are accustomed to say, of things preternatural. For in short, mundane things being divided into such as are according to nature, and such as are preternatural, into universals and particulars, and into essences and accidents, we always admit that there are formal causes of the more, but by no means of the less excellent. For that which is produced from ideas, proceeds through nature. But if this is the case with that which is according to nature, but not with that which is preternatural, that which is generated from ideas is a certain whole, and is perpetual. For if this is not admitted, one of two things must take place, either that things contingent will have no existence, or that of forms some will necessarily produce, but it will happen that others may either produce or not produce. And in the third place, every thing which proceeds from ideas is essence. For since they produce by their very being, each is productive of essences. For it would be ridiculous to say that a partial nature is effective of essence, but that intelligible form gives subsistence to accident.<sup>1</sup> These things however, we shall elsewhere more copiously discuss. But whatever the world contains is allied to it, because all things in it subsist according to intelligible causes. Plato likewise appears in this place to have given a definition of the world, viz. "*one visible animal, comprehending in itself all animals.*" For intelligible animal also is one, but is not visible. And the sun, and each of the monadic natures, [or those natures of which there is only one,] is one visible animal, but does not comprehend all others. So that it is evident that the above is the definition of the universe. Let us however proceed to the words of Plato.

<sup>1</sup> For το ον απεστυλζε in this place, it is necessary to read τῷ μὲν απεστυλζε.

<sup>2</sup> For συμμιζηκοτος ενός νποστατικον, read συμμιζηκοτος ειναι νποστατικον.

“Whether therefore, shall we assert that there is one world, or is it more right to say that there are many and infinite worlds?”

This problem follows indeed logographically what has just now<sup>1</sup> been said. For because he had defined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending within itself all such animals as are naturally allied to it, it is necessary that he should think this to be worthy his attention and discussion, whether the world is one certain thing, or not. For of physiologists, some make the world to be one; but others assert that there are many worlds; and others contend that there are not only many, but also infinite worlds. The consideration of this likewise, has a connection with what has been before said, derived from the things themselves. For since it has been shown that the world is the image of animal itself, and is an animated animal, endued with intellect, it was requisite to add a summit to the discussion of it, by showing that it is also one. For thus he will demonstrate that it is a God, in consequence of participating a unity which is above intellect. For it was not only possible for him to say that it is an image because other things also are images, some being fashioned by nature, but others by art. Nor an animal alone, because there is a multitude of partial animals. Nor alone animated; for man likewise is an image, and an animated animal. Nor alone endued with intellect; for both a demon and an angel are animated animals possessing intellect. But this which especially and primarily pertains to divine natures, he before suffered to be ineffable, through the cause which we have already assigned. Now, however, he adds *the one*, and *the alone*. For every thing which is monadic in the world is divine, as being an image, if it be lawful so to speak of *the one*. But I denominate divine, that which is such as the angelic, as the demoniacal, and as that which is in partial souls. For each of these is divine, so far as it is suspended from its proper deity, and each of these is monadic. Such monadic natures however, as have generation and corruption, and are expelled into the mortal abode, are opposed to every thing divine. Hence this problem is suspended from what has been before said. For since the paradigm of the universe is indeed a God, and is intelligible, is the supplier of life, and is also intellect; according to that which is divine in him, he makes the world to be one; according to *the one* and the intelligible, he causes it to be sensible; but according to *the one*, the intelligible, and life, he makes it to be

<sup>1</sup> For *ra sou* here, read *ra sou*.

animated and an animal; and according to all these and intellect, he causes it to be endued with intellect. For union accedes prior to other things, and posterior to other things. Animal energizes prior to, and in conjunction with other things. And the gift of life generates and proceeds together with, and prior to intellect.

From what however is now shown, and from what has been before demonstrated, you may assume, that at the same time, the paradigm of the universe is unical, and the whole multitude of intelligibles. And neither is the simplicity of it without multitude, nor the multitude of it divided; but it has the all-various at once consubistent with *the one*, the monadic with the all-perfect, and the uniform with the multiiform. For because it proceeds indeed from *the good* it is united. But because it pre-establishes in itself the order of intelligible ideas, it is all-perfect. And as infinite, it unfolds the multitude of intelligibles; but as contained by bound, it is only begotten. As proceeding likewise from being characterized by unity, it has the relation of a monad; but as being the third from it, it produces in itself all the intelligible Gods, and on this account is demonstrated to be all-perfect. These things, however, we shall more fully unfold as we proceed.

But there is a controversy with the interpreters about the text. For to some of them it appears that two things are now distinguished by Plato, *the one*, and *all multitude*. And the word *whether* being applied by the ancients to two things, seems to testify in favor of their opinion. But to others, it appears that there is a division into three things, *the one*, *finite multitude*, and *the infinite*. And the patrons of this interpretation are Porphyry and Iamblichus, who speak conformably both to the things themselves, and to the doctrine of Plato. For shortly after he takes away two things, but assumes one thing from division. But from three things, an ablation of two and the position of one is effected, and not from two things alone. Nevertheless the word *whether* seems to contradict what they assert. It may be remedied however by saying that either *whether* signifies the same as *shall we therefore*; (τιν' αρ' ουν το ποτερον σημειναι ταυτον) for it is frequently thus assumed by the ancients; or that the words, *or not* (ἢ ου) are wanting to the sentence; and that it will be perfect by reading, *whether do we rightly assert that there is one world, or not? And if not, whether there are many, or infinite worlds?* Plato omitting to say this through conciseness. Perhaps too: you may say, it is not without design that he omitted the words *much* and *finite*.

\* For ποτερον here, read ποτερον.

For to say how many, or so many, is to speak in a way that gives completion to what is said. And as if the paradigm is not monadic, so as to be the cause of one thing, the things generated are infinite; after this manner it is probable that there are infinite worlds, if there is not only one. For the vacuum being infinite, will be the recipient of infinite worlds.

316. "One [i. e. there will be but one world,] if it be admitted that it is fabricated according to the paradigm."

Again Plato in concord with himself, announces the whole of the conclusion prior to the demonstrations, previously to belief, dissolving the doubt. For the word *one* is uttered analogously to, *it was generated*, and to *he was good*,<sup>1</sup> and the demonstration on account of it, is conformable to the proper method. For it is himself who doubts, himself who dissolves the doubts, and himself who demonstrates. Through the doubt, indeed, converting himself to intellect; but through the concise solution of the doubt, energizing according to intellect. For to comprehend the whole of a sentence in one word, is an image of intellectual projection. And through the demonstration descending from intellect to dianoia. For every one who demonstrates, receives the principles of his demonstration from intellect. But it is intellect, says Aristotle, by which we know terms; for through this we apprehend [true] beings by simple projections. Such therefore throughout is the form of the words.

Let us, however, if you think fit, in the first place, syllogistically survey the truth of the words themselves. The whole sentence, therefore, is of the following kind. If the world was generated according to a paradigm, and the paradigm is one, then the world is one.<sup>2</sup> But the antecedent is true, and therefore the consequent also is true. That the world, however, was generated according to a paradigm, was asserted before, and was mentioned both by Plato and us. But that the paradigm is one and monadic, Plato asserts as he proceeds. The assumption therefore being true, it remains to see how that which follows from it is true. He says then that if the world imitates especially and accurately the paradigm, it ought to imitate it in all things, and ought to resemble the essence of it. For if it imitates the paradigm in some things, and not in others,

<sup>1</sup> Instead of το αγαθόν ην in this place, it is requisite to read τὸ αγαθόν ην.

<sup>2</sup> The words οὐκ ὅπως ἀπὸ ἐκ ἐπὶ τῷ, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

it will not be the image of a certain whole. For the paradigm making by its very being, it makes a certain image of the whole of itself. But this being the case that which is generated with reference or according to the whole paradigm itself, is monadic, is perpetual, and is an animal. For as he who imitates the whole of Socrates expresses the whole of his life, after the same manner, the world being fashioned in the resemblance of animal itself, imitates all things in it, so far as it is naturally adapted to such an imitation; possessing all things sensibly which animal itself possesses intelligibly.

Some however oppose what is here said, by adducing the multitude of men and of horses. For man itself is the cause of many men, horse itself of many horses, and this is the case with every other form or idea of the like kind. But if some one should say, that these because they are parts of other things, are on this account monadic, the objector will not cease adducing to us the sun and the moon, and all the parts of the world which are monadic. Hence more profound solutions of the objection are requisite. The philosopher Porphyry therefore striving to solve the difficulty, says, that forms as they proceed, always descend into multitude and division, and pass into bulk, and an all-various distribution into parts. Hence an intelligible essence, proceeding into the world, terminates in a divided, gross, and material multitude, though on high it is united, impartible, and monadic. To every thing, therefore, which is intelligible, nothing else imparts the whole, for the intelligible itself gives subsistence to it. Hence it constitutes it as great as it is able to become. But this universe supplies man itself with matter. And on this account the matter of one form receives many impressions of that form. The world, therefore, is one from one [paradigm], and a whole from a whole. But man is numerous from one form, the world supplying the matter of it. Why, therefore, says he, are there not many suns and moons? For the matter of these is from the universe. To this he replies, that to incorruptible natures in the world, though they may be parts, the monadic is appropriate; but to corruptible natures, multitude. For if there were not many participants of the same reason [or form] but only one corruptible participant, the form would perish, this being corrupted. It is necessary, however, that all [material] forms perishing, the full perfection of the world should still remain. Such therefore is the solution of Porphyry.

The divine Iamblichus however reprobates this solution, as dissolving no one of the doubts. For let, says he, the whole sensible world possess impartible natures partibly, indivisibles divisibly, and monadic natures multitudinously, yet

why do some things in it still remain monadic, but others not? For this is what was dubious from the beginning. He therefore adduces a certain solution of the doubt, which is indeed admirable yet is in want of assistance. For he says that of forms some rejoice in sameness and permanency, but others in motion and difference. And that some, indeed, are the causes of monadic and perpetual natures, but others of such as are mutable and multitudinous. And this indeed is very admirably asserted, but requires a certain admonition, which it is necessary to make, by considering that after *the one* two principles proceed, bound and infinity, as Socrates asserts in the *Philebus*. And as of numbers, some are more monadic but others are dyadic, though all numbers derive their subsistence from the monad and at the same time from the dual, thus likewise, though all forms subsist according to these two principles, yet at the same time some are the progeny of bound, but others of infinity. And what occasion is there to speak of forms; since of the Gods themselves, some belong to the co-ordination of bound, but others to that of infinity, both according to their whole orders and according to parts? According to total orders indeed, because every paternal, connective, and deniurgic series is defined according to bound; but every vivific and effective series, according to infinity. But according to parts, because of the paternal and of the vivific series, some belong to the order of bound, but others to that of infinity. If, therefore, this is the case with the Gods, why is it wonderful that of forms some are more than others allied to bound, but others to infinity? And according to this analogy some forms give subsistence to monadic things, but others to those that proceed into multitude. After this manner, therefore, it is requisite to assist this solution.

Our preceptor, however, dissolves this doubt after another manner, multifariously. He says, therefore, that every intelligible nature is uniform and eternal, but that of mundane things, some are able to be more, and others less assimilated to the essences of intelligibles. For such things as are more immaterial and pure, are capable of being assimilated in a greater, but such things as are more material and gross, in a less degree. As all paradigms therefore subsist in monadic and eternal essences, the more excellent natures in the universe especially imitating the causes of themselves, are generated in all things most similar to their paradigms, viz. according to the monadic, the essential, and the perpetual; but the less excellent, being allotted a secondary form of similitude, are in a certain respect assimilated to their causes, and in a certain respect not. Hence, as there are these three things in intelligible forms, viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal, whether do mundane natures imitate the monadic and perpetual peculi-



arity of intelligibles, but not the essential? By no means.<sup>1</sup> For it has been demonstrated that it is requisite the things which proceed from them should be essences, since they produce by their very being. Will mundane natures therefore be imitations of them according to the monadic and the essential, but not according to the eternal? This however is impossible. For each of them will perish; being monadic indeed, but not perpetual. For because not perpetual, it will vanish into non-entity; but in consequence of being monadic, there will not be that from which it may be generated. Besides, every thing which subsists from immoveable causes, is immutable in essence. But forms are immoveable, for they are intelligible. Either therefore it is possible for all things to imitate them in all things, or in certain things. But it is impossible for all things to imitate them in all things. For the natures which are more remote from their principles are in a less degree assimilated to them. Just as with respect to Pythagoras, who possesses all sciences, he who is nearer to him, receives all his knowledge secondarily, but he who is more remote from him, learns some of his sciences, but is unadapted to the reception of others. If it is impossible therefore, for all things to imitate them in every respect, it remains that this must be effected by them in certain things. And if in certain things as there are three peculiarities which are characteristic of intelligible forms,<sup>2</sup> either imitating the extremes, they become destitute of the middle, or receiving the two first, they will appear to have relinquished the third, or not partaking of the first, they will participate of the two which are posterior to it. It has however been shown, that neither the first nor second is true. *Hence it is necessary that they should not express the monadic peculiarity of forms, but only the essential and the eternal. On this account all mundane forms indeed are essences, and are always invariably the same, but all of them are not monadic.* For all mundane forms do not subsist commensurately to all the powers of their paradigms. But that every intelligible form, and whole paradigmatic cause having a primary subsistence, is monadic, eternal, and essential, is evident. For whatever is not essence, will be an accident. Every accident, however, subsists about matter, and is conversant with things which are in matter, but not with those which are in separate causes. If likewise an intelligible form is not eternal, neither will the image of it be perpetual. It is necessary however that it should, if the world always consists of all forms. But the principle perish-

<sup>1</sup> Instead of το δε ουσιώδες or, οὐδαμῶς; in this place, it is necessary to read το δε ουσιώδες ου, οὐδαμῶς;

<sup>2</sup> Viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal.

ing, that which is derived from it can by no possible contrivance be preserved. And if an intelligible form is not monadic, it will be no longer primarily a paradigm. For it is impossible for any thing to be two things primarily, as Socrates says in the Republic. For whence is allness derived to these mundane forms, except from one certain common form? These three things therefore are present with all first paradigms. And it seems that the monadic is present with them from bound, the perpetual from infinity, and the essential from the first essence.

Farther still, it is also possible for us after another manner to solve the doubt. For of the things contained in the world, some indeed subsist from the first fabrication [i. e. the fabrication of the Demiurgus] alone; but others from the first and also from the second [or the fabrication of the junior Gods-]. Those, therefore, that subsist from the first fabrication, are invariably the same, and are monadic, imitating the onliness of their producing<sup>1</sup> cause. For the supermundane fabrication is immovable, one, and eternal. But things which proceed from the second fabrication are mutable, are borne alone in multitude, and subsist differently at different times. For the second fabrication is multiform, makes that which it makes with motion, and has time but not eternity commensent with itself. Hence the things which proceed from it are very mutable, and multiplied, and entirely moved. For things which proceed from causes that are moved, are naturally of this kind. Whence also I think the Demiurgus, having constituted all the monadic and perpetual natures in the world, excites the junior Gods to the fabrication of mortal natures; in order that these, so far as they have something perpetual, may derive their subsistence from him, but so far as they are mortal, from the junior Gods. And that so far as one thing participates of one form they might be constituted by him, but so far as this one is multiplied, they might derive their subsistence from them. For the mutation and multiplication of mortal natures are from many causes, and such as are moved.

Again, therefore, this also may be said, that the only-begotten is threefold. For it either signifies the monad of its proper series; according to which signification, the form of man is monadic, and the form of horse, and every form of things of this kind. Or it signifies one thing participated by one thing, according to which signification man and horse are not monadic, but the form of the sun and the form of the moon. Or it signifies that which has no other thing co-ordinate with itself, according to which meaning the above-mentioned natures are no longer only-begotten, since they are co-ordinate with each other but whole animal [or

<sup>1</sup> For *παρὰ ματος* here, it is necessary to read *παρὰ γένεσις*.

animal itself] is only-begotten, in consequence of not being co-ordinate with any other animal. As the only-begotten, therefore, has a threefold subsistence, if you assume that which is truly only-begotten, it is the third, as the cause of all animals, having the relation of a monad to all of them, being participated by one thing, and not being co-ordinate with any animal, but being truly monadic. This, however, being assumed, that which is conjoined with it now necessarily follows. For if the paradigm is only-begotten, that also which is generated according to it is only-begotten, imitating the only-begotten nature of the paradigm, and nothing else besides the world is a thing of this kind. For no other thing besides animal itself, is according to this signification, only-begotten.

Farther still, it is requisite to solve the doubt after another manner, by considering as follows: *Every form is generative of one thing, and of a multitude. Of one thing, indeed, because it constitutes a monad similar to itself, prior to the multitude which it produces. But it produces a multitude, because every monad has a number co-ordinate with itself.* Animal itself, therefore, as a monad, constitutes the whole world. But according to each order, it generates a number<sup>1</sup> analogous to the whole, and which is able to preserve the similitude to the universe conformably to that series. Hence the solar paradigm, generates indeed the visible sun itself, but it likewise generates a number of solar animals possessing the same form, according to a similitude to their proper form. And of animals of this kind, some are celestial, but others sublunary, so that such a number as this extends as far as to the earth. Man itself, therefore, does not *immediately* produce this infinite multitude of men; for progression is no where without a medium; but through numbers proximate to the monad and appropriate. Hence, since an intelligible form is one, it is necessary that it should not immediately produce the infinite, but in the first place a monad, afterwards an appropriate number, and so on in succession. *For between the intelligible form which is one, and the sensible which is multiplied, the medium is the form which is sensible indeed, but monadic; through proceeding becoming sensible; but through preserving the similitude of its paradigm, having a monadic subsistence.* For it may be said to be truly absurd, that divine, intelligible, and immoveable causes, should not be primarily the causes of things essentially immutable, but of things material and mutable.<sup>2</sup> For how is it possible that things which are in the profundity of the universe, can be conjoined with those super-

<sup>1</sup> Ἀριθμὸν is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> In the original εἰς τῶν ἐνυλῶν, καὶ μεταβάλλων; but εἰς ought evidently to be expunged.

mundane natures ; things deprived of intelligence, with intellectals ; perfectly mutable, with eternal natures ; very composite things, with such as are simple ; and things which in their own nature are dissipated, with united essences ? It is necessary, therefore, that man itself, and each of such-like forms, should generate stable monads prior to a dispersed multitude ; from which the progression of each to its appropriate number is derived. It is likewise necessary that these monads should exist in the second fabrication. Hence they remain invariably the same, as being alone produced by an immoveable cause. You must not wonder, therefore, if some one should call man immortal, a brute rational, and a plant intellectual. For each of these is primarily a thing of this kind. But progression producing a diminution of the all-various imitation of the paradigm, exhibits some things sensibles, others irrational, and others intellectual in capacity. For as the water, which primarily proceeds from its fountain, is most similar to the fountal water, and preserves its proper purity undefiled ; thus also the natures which are first unfolded into light from intelligible forms, genuinely preserve the similitudes of their paradigms ; but as they proceed, dissolve the perfect similitude, and are filled from their subjects with composition and inelegance.

In another way, likewise, the solution of the things investigated may be attempted. For of fabrication the first is total, one, and impartible ; the second is partial and multiplied, and proceeds according to a distribution into parts ; and the third is not only partible like that which precedes it, but comes into contact with generated natures, and with the forms they contain. *You have also these three fabrications in Plato, viz. the Jovian, the Dionysiacal, and the Adonaical [or pertaining to Adonis], conformably to which he divides his three politics, as we have elsewhere shown. The third fabrication, therefore, is the cause of 'wholes' and parts, and of things which are not monadic. The second is the cause of things which are monadic indeed, but are not wholes. And the first is the cause of the whole and the monadic.* For such is the universe, which is not a part of any thing, as the sun and moon are, and each of the peculiar parts of the world. If therefore Plato had now spoken concerning every fabrication, it would have been requisite to annex the extensions of forms into multitude, and their divisions. But since the present discourse is alone concerning the whole fabrication, or the fabrication which has a total subsistence, what occasion is there to disturb ourselves, in consequence of not remaining in the first fabrications, which are effected by an

\* For εἰδων here, it is necessary to read ὁλων.

immoveable and total cause? For the whole Demiurgus is a fabricator *totally* and *monadically*; since also producing many Gods, he produces them monadically. For each of the Gods belonging to the inerratic sphere, is constituted according to one form; since the form of earth is different from that of water, and the form of water from that of fire; the parts of which have a temporal generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, do such perpetual natures as the stars, and also partial souls, differ in form from each other. For every individual and at the same time partial nature, is material. If also partial souls produce different peculiar lives, from exerting the reasons they contain, it is evident that they possess the reasons of all things universally, and subsisting in forms alone, so that the progressions of each of them are according to different forms. This number too of forms must be placed in the *fountain*<sup>1</sup> of souls unically [or having a subsistence characterized by unity], but distributedly in the *principle*<sup>2</sup> of souls. For how is it possible it should not be necessary, souls being finite, that the number of them should pre-exist in the causes from whence they are derived? Since even nature comprehends the numbers of the things which she produces according to numbers. If, however, the Gods are monadic, and souls, the genera between these, are likewise monadic; so that each thing which the Demiurgus constitutes, is entirely monadic. This likewise appears to be the cause of the perpetuity of the things which he produces, that each receives the *whole* form of the paradigmatic cause. Hence every thing which proceeds from the whole Demiurgus has a nature of this kind.

If, therefore, he gives subsistence to the world, the world is one; both on account of the demiurgic monad, and the onliness of the paradigm; which Plato, as it appears to me, knowing, says, "*if it be admitted that it is fabricated according to the paradigm.*" For by not saying if it was *generated*, but if it was *fabricated*, according to the paradigm, he indicates the *onlyness* both of the paradigmatic and the demiurgic cause. For the Demiurgus is a monad, and the paradigm also is a monad; and therefore this universe being generated by a monad, with reference to a monad, is monadic. Why, therefore, you may say, is he satisfied in what follows, with the demonstration from the paradigm? We reply, because the

<sup>1</sup> i. e. In Rhea, or the vivific Goddess, considered according to her first subsistence in the intellectual order of Gods.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. In Proserpine, who subsists in the vivific triad of the super-mundane order of Gods, which order consists of the Gods who are called *αρχαί* or *Principles*. See the 5th and 6th Books of my Translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, for an account of the deities called *fountains* and *principles*.

paradigm is more united than the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus himself is a monad, through his similitude and analogy to the paradigm. This however is evident. For among the kings, he is analogous to it; and both the Demiurgus and the paradigm are analogous to the intelligible monad.<sup>1</sup> Hence, since the monadic nature is from thence derived to the Demiurgus himself, what ought we to think concerning the universe? Is it not, that it primarily possesses its onliness from the paradigm? The paradigm, therefore, is a more principal thing, for the purpose of demonstrating the onliness of the world. And again, you may see, that these are three monads, viz. animal itself, the demiurgic cause, and the universe. But the first, is an intelligible monad, the second, an intellectual monad, and the third, a sensible monad.

“For that which comprehends all such animals as are intelligible, can never be the second, [or co-arranged] with any other thing.”

The necessity of these demonstrations is admirable, showing that all-perfect animal is one and monadic,<sup>2</sup> similar to those methods through which in the Sophista, he demonstrates that the multitude of beings is to be referred to one truly existing being. For if there are two principles of beings, either each of them is primarily being, or only one of them. But if only one of them, the other will proceed from this. And if each, it is necessary there should be another being, from which both of these are beings. For each of these is a certain being, and not simply being. After the same manner likewise, he now shows, that all-perfect animal is one. So that according to all the orders of things, that which is said to exist primarily, will be only-begotten. For being itself is primarily being, just as animal itself is here demonstrated to be primarily animal, or only-begotten. For how is it possible this should not be only-begotten? For if there is another animal co-arranged with it, either each has all things, or one of them has all things, but the other not, or neither of them has all things. For besides these, there are no other consequences. If, therefore, it should be said that neither of them is all things, each of them is imperfect. We however are speaking of that which is all-perfect, and we investigate whence it possesses all things. For it must not be

<sup>1</sup> i. e. To the summit of the intelligible order, or being itself.

<sup>2</sup> In the text of Proclus *μεθ' ετερον* erroneously instead of *μεθ' ετερον*.

<sup>3</sup> In the original *εν εν και μερον*. But for *μερον* I read *μοναδων*.

said, that the sensible universe has indeed all things according to its own order, and that the soul possesses all reasons, as is evident from the things to which it applies itself, and from assigning to every thing its appropriate reason; but that there is not a certain intelligible, which is truly comprehensive of all intelligibles, just as soul contains all things dianoetically, and the universe sensibly. For whence is allness derived to these, except from intelligibles? If, therefore, the intelligible is all-perfect, that will be the paradigm of the universe which is primarily all. But if one of them is all things, and the other not, these will neither be co-arranged with each other, nor con-numerated; but that which has not all things will be inferior to the other, and that which is all-perfect will have a more comprehensive power. Hence the one will be a part, but the other a whole; and both will not be all-perfect animals, but one of them will be more perfect than the other. For that which has a diminished perfection is not all-perfect. But if each of them is all things, whence did they obtain all things? For it is necessary that they should receive this allness from something. For as participating of one form, they subsist from one cause. And thus the natures which similarly participate of all things, possess this allness from one cause. There will therefore be a cause prior to them; since it is necessary that where there are two things there should be an antecedent cause, which conducts them together. This cause, therefore, which is prior to them, is either all things indivisibly, or divisibly. But if indivisibly, another cause will be requisite as a medium. *For the medium between that which is perfectly indivisible, and the duad which possesses all things divisibly, is the monad which has all things indivisibly;*<sup>1</sup> *this indeed being itself united by an indivisible cause, but uniting the allness which is in the duad. Hence that which primarily comprehends all things is the monad which is prior to the duad. But in that which subsists indivisibly, the seed and cause are contained of an allness which is characterized by unity.* Deservedly, therefore, is all-perfect animal said to be monadic, and incapable of being the second with another thing, not only as the words appear to say, because it is not conjoined with another, but because if it were arranged with another, it would be secondarily, and no longer primarily all things. For after all-perfect animal, there are causes which are co-arranged with other kindred natures, but which have not primarily all things. *That, however, which primarily possesses all things is monadic.* But if it is comprehensive of all things, there will

<sup>1</sup> The original is, του γὰρ ἀδιαίρετος πάντα οὗτος, καὶ τῆς δυάδος τῆς πάντα ἔχουσης, μέσον ἐστὶν ἡ μονὰς ἢ πάντα ἔχουσα διηρημένως. But it appears to me to be necessary to read, agreeably to the above translation, του γὰρ ἀδιαίρετος πάντῃ οὗτος, καὶ τῆς δυάδος τῆς πάντα ἔχουσης διηρημένως, μέσον ἐστὶν ἡ μονὰς ἢ πάντα ἔχουσα ἀδιαίρετως.

not be an intelligible animal besides it. For if there were, this would no longer be all-perfect, but a part. And that will be the whole of which this will be alone a part. For it is necessary that multitude should stop at the monad.

Why, however, does Plato say, *the second with another thing*? For it would have been sufficient to have said, *with another* by itself, or *the second*, by itself. But he conjoins both, for the purpose of indicating that the nature which is co-arranged with another, and is not monadic, cannot as we have before observed, be the first. Perhaps likewise, it signifies the contrary, and that what is said pertains to things and not to words. For the form which is in corruptible natures entirely subsists with another. For the human form is in this individual, and in that, the participants being many, and on this account each is with another. That form, however, which is perpetual, yet not a whole, though it may be monadic, and on this account not with another, yet it is more imperfect than a certain whole. But that which is neither in many things, nor a part with another thing, is not secondary, as being one and a whole, and not a part. Very properly, therefore, does the theologist produce Phanes, the only divinity bearing the seed of the illustrious Gods,<sup>1</sup> from the God who is occultly all things; and from Phanes gives subsistence to all the second orders of the Gods. For Heaven indeed proceeds together with Earth. But she,

Again th' extended heav'n and earth<sup>2</sup> brought forth.

And Saturn proceeds together with Rhea. For according to a third progeny, Earth produced [as the theologist says,] "seven pure beautiful virgins with rolling eyes, and seven sons that were kings, with fine long hair." But the Demiurgus, who is the great Jupiter, is conjoined with Juno. Hence also, she is said to be of equal rank with him, and proceeds from the same fathers. Phanes, however, proceeds by himself alone, and is celebrated as female and father. *He also produces the [three] Nights, and is present with the middle Night.* For he

Pluck'd the shorn flower of Night.<sup>3</sup>

According to this theologist therefore, all-perfect animal is not the second with another, but fills the orders of Night, and also fills the celestial orders with the

<sup>1</sup> For *θεον κλυτον* here, it is necessary to read *θεων κλυτων*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. The intellectual Earth brought forth the sensible Heaven and Earth.

<sup>3</sup> In the original *αυτος γαρ εστι παιδος αφειλετο κορυμνον ανθος*. But for *εστι παιδος*, it appears from Eschenbach to be necessary to read *εστι Νυκτες*.



allness of himself; in imitation of whom, Jupiter likewise, produces twofold orders, the super-celestial and the mundane. Phanes, however, gives subsistence to twofold triads, but Jupiter to twofold duodecads. For on this account his sceptre is said to consist of four-and-twenty measures. Hence, the demiurgic is always assimilated to the paradigmatic cause, but proceeds into multitude from intelligible union. These things, however, are also elsewhere discussed.

But that animal itself rejoices in onliness, is also manifested through the Orphic theologies. For as Phanes is the offspring of an egg, it is evident that he is an animal. At the same time also, he is called by Orpheus the happy and venerable Metis, bearing the seed of the illustrious Gods; to whom Jupiter being analogous, is likewise denominated by Orpheus Metis and a dæmon.

One power, one dæmon, the great lord of all.

Thus too, the Oracles call this mighty God [i. e. animal itself] the fountain of fountains, and say that he alone generated all things. "For from thence the generation of abundantly-various matter entirely<sup>1</sup> leaps forth. Thence a fiery whirlwind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the same time into the cavities of the worlds. For all things thence begin to extend their admirable rays downwards."

"For again, another animal would be required about these two, of which they would be parts: and it might be more rightly said, that the universe is assimilated to this comprehending third, rather than to the other two."

This which is now asserted by Plato, may be easily demonstrated from the demiurgic goodness. For if the Demiurgus is good, he fabricated the universe with reference to all-perfect animal. But he is good and the best of causes, and therefore he assimilated the world to all-perfect animal. For it is necessary that the first Demiurgus should be intellective of the first paradigm; and that being intellective of it, he should be the maker of that which is in every respect most similar to it. For if there is nothing which is intellective of it, it will no longer have the order of a paradigm, with respect to that which is fabricated by the first Demiurgus. If, however, you should say, that it is necessary there should be other secondary causes, which produce with reference to more partial paradigms, you say well

<sup>1</sup> For *εἰθεν αὐτῇ* here, read *εἰθεν ἀρῇν*. And for *ἀμύροιο*, *ἀμύροιο*.

indeed, but at the same time you should preserve the universe one. For the fabrications of these partial paradigms are parts of the universe, in the same manner as the paradigms, and vice versa. As therefore paradigms are parts of paradigms, demiurgic<sup>1</sup> are parts of demiurgic causes, and fabrications of fabrications, it is necessary that the wholeness of the universe should be the image of all-perfect animal; and that all-perfect animal should be the paradigm of the universe. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that animal itself is one, and alone, as being monadic. The world therefore is one and monadic, in order that it may perfectly imitate its paradigm. For as it primarily receives a similar idea of it, how is it possible it should not adumbrate all the nature of it, in consequence of having been generated intellectual, perpetual, and monadic?

30 t "In order, therefore, that the world from its oneliness or being alone, might be similar to all-perfect animal, on this account the artificer neither made infinite, nor two worlds."

Again, Plato reminds us of the Demiurgic cause, in order that we may understand also from this, that every thing which is generated by the whole fabrication, is monadic, perpetual, and intellectual; and that the Demiurgus is the cause of all things, in consequence of producing the monads of them; but that he delivered the multitudinous and partial fabrication to the junior Gods. Farther still, he also latently teaches us who this all-perfect intellect is, the name of which is so celebrated by the more modern philosophers; viz. that it is intelligible intellect, in which the universe primarily subsists. Before, therefore, he called it distributedly "*according to all things perfect*," because he then celebrated its allness; but now speaking of it collectively, he calls it "*all-perfect*," since his discourse is about the only-begotten.

The infinite, however, in a certain respect is, and in a certain respect is not. But a thing is said to be infinite in a three-fold manner; either according to power, or according to multitude, or according to magnitude. The infinite therefore according to power is in divine natures, and in the world. For the never-failing, and the perpetual, are the peculiarities of the infinite according to power. But the infinite according to multitude partly is, and partly is not. For it has not an at-once collected subsistence, but exists according to a part. And the infinite according to

<sup>1</sup> Instead of δημιουργήματα here, it is necessary to read δημιουργία.

*magnitude, neither exists according to a part,<sup>1</sup> nor has any existence whatever* Hence the infinite according to multitude, if it exists in the worlds, in the first place, will be without arrangement with reference to itself. For what order can there be in the infinite of things first and second, where there is no first? *In the next place, it will not have one producing cause. For if it had, that cause would produce the one prior to multitude, and the whole prior to parts. For being itself one it would first assimilate to itself the things posterior to itself.* For every cause which is effective of things according to nature, produces things similar to itself. But there is no first in those worlds, since they are infinite. And if they suppose other worlds consisting of others, either the causes of them will be unco-ordinate or co-ordinate. And if co-ordinate, it is necessary that the worlds should have one co-arrangement. But in the infinite there is no order. To which we may add, that the intervention of a vacuum in the middle, will separate the worlds. But if the causes are unco-ordinate, we must admit that there is a divided and unsympathetic multitude in the principles. This, however, will entirely abolish both all the causes themselves, and the things posterior to them. For the causes will be corruptive of each other, not being able to subsist in conjunction with, in consequence of being perfectly foreign from each other. But the things which proceed from them, collapsing, will stop, and will not have any thing from whence again they can be generated, the principles being destroyed.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps, however, some one may say that there is neither one world, nor infinite worlds, but many and finite. For we have heard of a certain Barbaric opinion, which the Cheronean Plutarch relates,<sup>3</sup> placing in one equilateral triangle the intelligible world according to the middle of it, in each of the sides sixty worlds, about the intelligible, and in each angle one world; all of them (except the intelligible) being such worlds as that in which we are comprehended.

So that there are three leaders, and thrice sixty others, under them. For the angular are of a more ruling nature than the lateral worlds. This opinion, therefore, introduces a multitude of finite worlds, and makes the intelligible to be one of them. Unless, indeed, you arrange the intelligible world in the middle, as the

<sup>1</sup> The words, *οὐκ ἐκὰς μέρους* are omitted in the original; but, as it appears to me, ought to be inserted.

<sup>2</sup> These arguments, which possess an invincible strength, fully show the futility of that very popular theory of the moderns, that there are infinite worlds. For like most other modern dogmas, it is unscientific and rambling.

<sup>3</sup> See Plutarch's *Treatise on the Silence of the Oracles*.

root of all things, but the three angular worlds as connective of all things, and causing all things to be one, according to one mundane intellect, one soul, and one nature. Or according to the empyrean, ethereal, and material world. For an angle is connective of the sides. But the three sixty worlds may be said to be the multitude according to each sphere of these. For the spheres are twelve in number; and the multitude in each is spherical, of which the pentad is a symbol, being the first spherical number. Hence there are thrice sixty worlds, because there is an intellectual, a psychical, and a physical series, according to each sphere of which the pentad is a symbol; or because there is an empyrean, ethereal, and material multitude of Gods. If, however, some one should not admit that these things are obscurely signified (in this narration of Plutarch), but should assert that the worlds are truly divided according to number, we ask him, whether it is better to make one world comprehensive of all things, or many worlds separated from each other? For the former makes multitude to be connectedly contained by the monad, and parts by the whole; but the latter dissipates production into an unco-ordinate multitude; though nature, and every cause of this kind, makes a monad prior to multitude, and a whole connective of parts. If likewise the worlds being spherical, touch each other, they will touch according to a point, but in the whole they will be separated from each other, and will be more unsympathetic than sympathetic. It is necessary however that things which proceed from one cause, should be co-passive with each other, and give completion to one life. But if they do not at all touch each other, they will be [entirely] separated. How also, Aristotle would say, will things which are upward be downward, and things which are downward be upward, interval being external to the worlds? And how will this thing pertaining to the worlds be arranged here, but another there? For that which is upward to us, will be to others downward. Will not the earth therefore of the other worlds, and every thing there which is heavy, be impelled to this world, if the motion of that which is heavy tends downward? But at one and the same time, a body which in one of those worlds tends upward, will, as proceeding to this world, tend downward. And there will not be an order of motions, or powers, or of things which are co-ordinate in the universe. Unless some one should say in answer to this, that there is a different middle in each of the worlds; for the middle is not the middle of a vacuum, but of a world. Each part therefore of a world tends either to the middle, or to the circumference of that world, but not to that which is foreign to it. All the things, however, that are in other worlds, are

foreign to each other. If therefore, some one should think that these assertions are worthy of belief, let them remain as such.

Plato however, has chosen the most principal and proper cause of their being but one world, viz. that which is derived from the paradigm of the universe; but has omitted as concauses the above, and such-like causes. A demonstration also of this kind is definite. For it does not separately confute those who say there is a multitude of worlds, and separately those who introduce an infinite number, dispersed in different places, and intercepted by a vacuum, but at one and the same time he shows that the assertions both of the former and the latter are false, directly proving that the world is one from the onliness of the paradigm. And farther still, he avoids the modes of argument which are derived from matter. For he neither demonstrates, as Aristotle does, from matter being one, nor from places being definite according to nature, nor from essence, i. e. matter which is a body, being united, according to the doctrine of the Stoics. *For Plato alone or especially employed, says Theophrastus, the cause which is derived from providential inspection; beautifully testifying this of Plato.* As we have said therefore, he ascribes the onliness of the world to the paradigm. For if the paradigm is one, and the Demiurgus is one, it is necessary that the world should be one. Or rather, if the paradigm is one, and the world adumbrates the onliness of the paradigm, the world is one. But the antecedent is true, and therefore the consequent. For the paradigm is one, as he before demonstrated, and constituted the world conformably to the onliness of itself. For as the intelligible paradigm was generated one from *the one* which is *the good*, so likewise with reference to itself being one, it constituted the world only-begotten. Hence the world is one. And neither are there many worlds; for there are not many first paradigms; nor infinite worlds; for the infinite according to multitude, does not even exist in mortal natures, so far is it from having a subsistence in perpetual beings.

But it is possible, says Porphyry, to use the demonstration of Plato in all other principles. For through this, not only intelligible animal is demonstrated to be one, but also the first Demiurgus. And in short, it may be demonstrated, that there are not many principles of intelligibles, but one principle. For again another principle of their being many would be requisite, through which the principles themselves are unbegotten. *For every thing which is naturally inherent in many things, is necessarily derived from one cause.* He therefore who says, that God and matter are principles, must be compelled to admit that there is a certain

other cause prior to them. For neither is matter sufficient to itself, nor will God be comprehensive of all things [if there is another principle independent of him]. It is necessary therefore, that there should be a cause prior to these which comprehends all things, and which is truly sufficient to itself, and is not in want of any other thing.

31 f. "But this heaven [or universe] was generated, is, and will be one and only-begotten."

The only-begotten indeed, adumbrates the monadic cause, and indicates an essence which is comprehensive of all secondary natures, and has dominion over wholes. *For the theologist is accustomed to call Proserpine only-begotten; as presiding in a leading and ruling manner over all mundane natures, and as the cause of only-begotten animals. For the Goddess who is posterior to her gives subsistence to the animals which are not only-begotten, as being irrational.* The theologist therefore, on this account calls Proserpine only-begotten, though he produces another divinity from the same causes as he produced Proserpine. Unity however, is imparted to the universe from the one unity of unities. For as the being which is every where, is derived from being itself, so the one which is in all things is from *the one itself*. But the words "*was generated, is, and will be,*" manifest the temporal perpetuity of the universe, which is extended with the infinity of time. For the term *was*, is indicative of the past, the term *is*, of the present, and the term *will be*, of the future time. Again therefore you have the term *one* conformably to the image of the one being [the summit of intelligibles]; but the terms *was, is, and will be*, conformably to the image of eternity. For the infinity of time imitates the eternal infinity. But all these are according to the image of animal itself. For this was primarily monadic, and truly an eternal one. But the world is *monadic* and perpetual through the imitation of it. Farther still, *the term "was generated," is significant of perfection; the term "is," of the participation of being; and the term "will be," of perpetual generation, through which the world has a never-failing subsistence.* So that of these, the first is from *the one*; for from thence perfection is imparted to all things. But the second is from *the one being*. And the third is from *eternity*; for from thence the never-failing is inherent in wholes.

<sup>1</sup> For το εἶς παρὸν οὐν here, it is obviously necessary to read το εἶς παρὸν εἶναι.

## BOOK III.

THE present treatise in one way surveys the world according to the wholeness which it contains, conformably to which also it is similar to all-perfect animal, and was generated an only-begotten animal, animated and endued with intellect; but in another way, according to the division which is in it; as when it divides the soul from body, and likewise things which have a more formal order. But how does the psychical breadth proceed from fabrication, and according to what kind of reasons? For since the world is an animated animal and endued with intellect, three things are exhibited in it, viz. a certain body, soul, and intellect. Intellect however, is entirely unbegotten: for it is allotted an eternal essence and energy. But body is entirely generated: for it consists according to the whole of itself, in the whole of time. And soul is of a middle essence. As therefore, it is arranged in the middle of impartible and partible natures, after the same manner also, it is the boundary<sup>1</sup> of unbegotten and generated essences. Hence it is generated indeed, as with reference to intellect, but is unbegotten, when considered with relation to a corporeal-formed nature. It exists also as the end of eternal beings, but ranks as first among things that are generated. On this account therefore, Plato delivers to us an all-various generation of body, producing it wholly from causes different from itself; but he produces soul both from itself, and from the total fabrication and vivification. He does not however, in words devise any generation of intellect. For neither is intellect produced according to idea, nor does it admit of any name of generation, being entirely unbegotten, and eternal. It is however unfolded into light from wholes, but abiding in them

<sup>1</sup> For *epous* here, it is necessary to read *opos*.

inherently, it proceeds unitedly, together with its more total causes. Hence it abides impartible and undivided, being preserved by undefiled and inflexible powers, while another life is distributed and divided about the parts of the universe. Plato therefore, delivers the first hypostasis of the universe from fabrication, viz. an hypostasis according to wholeness; according to which it becomes animated, divine, and endued with intellect, conformably to a similitude to all-perfect animal. But he adds a second hypostasis, which divides the world according to wholes, and the production of total parts; soul and the corporeal-formed nature existing according to this hypostasis. For intellect is entirely unbegotten, as we have said, because it is without generation and indivisible; except that it proceeds in an unbegotten manner, from the providence of the Demiurgus. But he calls the nature which receives intellect, the evolution<sup>1</sup> itself into light of soul. For the Demiurgus himself places the circles of soul in intellect, unfolding it without division, as being impartible, and without figure, as being perfectly unfigured. And he delivers after this, the third hypostasis of the universe, dividing it according to parts, and giving perfection to each of the parts. For he delivers to us, how fire and air, water and earth are generated. But in the last place, he surveys the energy of fabrication which is effective of body; and neither in this does he descend to particulars,<sup>2</sup> but abides in the whole elements. For the total fabrication is the fabrication of wholes, and of total parts. But he delivers the formation of individuals, and of things which are truly partial, to the junior Gods; in order that imitating the providence of their father about wholes, they also may receive a similar fabrication about particulars, and may have that analogy to him which he has to the intelligible paradigm. For being intellectual as with reference to this paradigm, and having the order of intellect, as with relation to intelligible intellect, he becomes himself intelligible to the mundane Gods.

As we have said therefore, fabrication being triple, the first, according to wholeness, the second, according to a division into wholes, and the third, according to a division into parts,<sup>3</sup> Plato now intends to deliver to us the middle or second fabrication; having indeed a transition of this kind consentaneous from things themselves; and having also an opportune progression to this from what had been

<sup>1</sup> For *εξέλιξις* here, read *εξέλιξις*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τα καθόλου*, read *τα καθ' ἑαυτά*.

<sup>3</sup> In other words fabrication is either Jovian, or Dionysiacal, or Adoniacal, as was before observed by Proclus.



before said. For since he had defined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending within it all such things as are naturally allied to it; that the world indeed is one, he demonstrated from the onliness of the paradigm; but that it is visible, and that it is comprehensive of all kindred natures, is rendered manifest to us by the division of the universe into wholes. For if we can discover from what cause the world is visible, and how all the elements are co-arranged in it, and through what analogies, we shall easily perceive that it comprehends all kindred natures, and that there is nothing sensible which is not contained in the one ambit of the world. Perceiving this however, we shall sufficiently obtain the object of investigation. For this was, how the world is visible, and how it is comprehensive of all things which are naturally allied to it. For from what has been before said, we assume that the world is alone; but from these things, that it is all-perfect.

“ Since, however, it is necessary that what is generated of a corporeal nature should be visible and tangible; but without fire nothing can become visible, neither can any thing be tangible without a certain solid, nor solid without earth;—hence divinity beginning to fabricate, constituted the body of the universe from fire and earth.” 316

Plato having a little before given the definition of that which is generated, calling it that which is becoming to be, and which is perishable, he defined it to be that which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense. But demonstrating that the world is generated, he converts the definition. For he says that sensibles are seen to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated. But now transferring that which is itself generated, to the order of a subject, he predicates of it the visible and tangible. For these are the extremes of sensibles, just as the sight and the touch are the extremes of the senses. Hence there, as I have observed in what he says respecting the world being generated, he converts the definition. But here he gives it according to nature. For that which is becoming to be was in the order of the indefinite. But as he said in the hypotheses, that which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense, is to be assumed in the definition. He says therefore, it is necessary that what is generated should be sensible, not indeed every generated nature, but that which we before called generated, viz. the composite nature, and which is always becoming to be through the whole of time. For soul also is generated, but the discourse is not about this.

If however, some one should say that according to Plato material forms and qualities themselves are apprehended by sense, and yet are incorporeal, and at the same time have generation, let him know, says the divine Iamblichus, that these likewise contribute to the hypostasis of bodies, and are surveyed in conjunction with them. Since therefore the world has a certain corporeal and likewise an incorporeal portion in it, and this latter is two-fold, one being inseparable, but the other separate from body; since also the portion of the incorporeal, which is separate from body is two-fold, viz. psychical and intellectual; and further still, since the world also has the unbegotten and the generated, but the whole of every thing which consists of the unbegotten and the generated, is generated, Plato very properly calls the whole world something generated and corporeal-formed. For if a whole consists of the mortal and the immortal, the whole is mortal; if from the unbegotten and the generated, the whole is generated; and if from the incorporeal and the corporeal, the whole has the form of a corporeal nature. For if indeed, the incorporeal itself is co-passive with body, it becomes itself corporeal-formed, and not the whole only. If, however, that which is principally and properly incorporeal, is itself exempt and impassive, being raised above body, this more excellent nature is not indeed body, since it remains in its own purity, but the whole may more justly be denominated corporeal-formed. Hence, since the world participates of many and blessed prerogatives from its generator, but partakes also of body, it is deservedly called corporeal-formed, visible and tangible, according to the whole of itself. For it is generated. But that which is generated is visible and tangible and has a body, as was rightly asserted before.

Plato beginning therefore from body, in the first place gives it to be sensible according to the extreme senses. In the next place, he imparts to it that which is more perfect than this, viz. the bond through analogy, which is connective of the bodies it contains. In the third place, he makes it to be a whole consisting of the wholes of the elements. Afterwards, in the fourth place, he gives it a spherical figure, in order that it may be most similar to itself according to form. In the fifth place, he shows that the world suffers all things in itself. In the sixth place, he distributes to it an appropriate motion. Afterwards, in the seventh place, he animates it through a divine soul. In the eighth place, he imparts to it a temporal period. Afterwards, in the ninth place, he establishes the series<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For *scilicet* here, it is necessary to read *scilicet*.

of Gods in it, who conjointly produce the perfect year. And in the tenth place, he makes it to be perfect from all animals which are assimilated to the four ideas [in animal itself]. And thus through the decad he gives completion to the whole fabrication of things. These particulars however will be unfolded as we proceed.

Now therefore, we shall observe, that since the world possesses interval, and is apprehended by sense, it is known through the sight and the touch; being visible indeed, in consequence of being wholly filled through the whole of itself with light; but existing tangible in consequence of being a solid. For it is sufficient for it to receive through these senses, all sensible natures. The visible also, and the tangible conceived as always existing in the world in the four elements, are contraries. For these as being most distant from each other and under the same genus, are contraries. For both are sensibles, and this is their common genus, and they are most distant from each other, since the one is immediately sensible, but the other is not sensible without a medium. If however, we investigated the contraries in the elements so far as they are mutable, we should not say that they are fire and earth, but fire and water. For water especially extinguishes fire. Each also of the assertions is true. For it is common to both to have their contrariety consist in being extremes. *And in this the assertions accord, as in sensibles indeed, earth being contrary to fire, but as in things of a mutable nature, water to fire.* Hence also Plato opposes the visible to the tangible. Or, [it may be said] that he assumes the sensible elements, as not yet considering the mutation of them, according to which water is more contrary to fire than earth. What Plato therefore here says, is not as Theophrastus thought, imperfect: for he doubts as follows: Why does Plato say that the peculiarity of fire is visibility, and of earth tangibility, but does not at all mention the peculiarities of the other elements? We reply, it is because we see the world, and also touch it, but we do not taste, or hear, or smell it. The world itself also is visible and tangible to itself. And as being luciform indeed, it is visible, perceiving itself through divine light, which is extended through all heaven, and is similar, as Socrates says in the Republic, to the rainbow. For this divine light is that which is primarily visible, and pervades through the whole world. For as the sphere of the sun is the sight of the soul which is in it, thus also the sight of the sphere<sup>1</sup> is that divine light, which pervades through all visible<sup>2</sup> natures, and operates on, and imparts life to things that are visible. You may likewise say, that this is

<sup>1</sup> For *ὄψεαι* here, it is necessary to read *οἰσῶμαι*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *οἰσῶμαι* in this place, I read *οἰσῶμαι*.

the first and most principal sight, but not that which subsists in conjunction with passion, and which is separated from visible natures. But again, the world as being solid and full of life, has what is called a co-sensation of itself. For we also have a co-sensation of the motions or passions which inwardly subsist in us. And through this consciousness, the world becomes tangible to itself. The most proper solution however of the doubt, is that which says, that Plato assumes the extreme elements prior to the others, because the latter subsist for the sake of the former. And he intends to show that the rest are constituted as the bond of the extremes. Or it may be said, that through the extremes he also comprehends the media. For as the universe is defined through fire and earth, and the media which are comprehended in these, thus also through the visible and the tangible he comprehends all the variety of sensible natures.

This however, he employs as an axiom. For it is usual with him prior to each of the subjects of discussion, to assume an axiom from which he demonstrates the thing investigated. Thus for instance he assumes axiomatically the sentence, "*In him who is good envy is never ingenerated about any thing*," in order that he may demonstrate that the Demiurgus imparts good to all things. And again, in this way he assumes the words, "*It neither was, nor will be lawful for the most excellent nature to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful*;" in order to show that the universe is an animal endued with intellect and animated. This too, is the case with the words, "*That which is assimilated to an imperfect thing can never become beautiful*;" in order that he may survey what the nature of the paradigm is, according to which the Demiurgus constituted the world. After the same manner therefore here, previously assuming as an axiom, *that what is generated is visible and tangible*, he demonstrates from this, how the elements contribute to the composition of the world, and how they are arranged in the universe. For if it is necessary that the world should be visible and tangible, fire and earth are necessary to it: for that which is primarily visible is fire. In the first place, indeed, because visible natures themselves are luminous substances: for *all colours are the progeny of light*. In the next place, because *the sight itself is light proceeding from an ethereal-formed essence*. And in the third place, because sight, and that which is visible, require the congregating power of light, in order to their existence in energy. For what else is it than light that collects both these together? So that the world will be in want of fire, in order to be visible. To which also may be added, that *Pythagoras in what he says to Abaris, demonstrates that the eye is analogous to fire*. For it is the most elevated of the instruments of sense, just as fire is of the elements, and employs as well as fire acute energies. The conical emission also of its rays, has no

small similitude to the pyramidal form of fire. Plato however, does not say that fire alone is visible: for this is false in a twofold respect. For fire itself by itself, unmingled with the other elements, is by no means [externally] visible, but is only visible in mental conception. And farther still, none of the other elements will be visible if fire alone is visible. It is one thing therefore, to be visible through fire, and together with fire, and another for fire itself to be the only thing visible. Hence, he does not assert the latter, which may be confuted in a twofold respect, but the former, because nothing is visible separated from fire; from which also you may assume, that all bodies partícipate of fire. But in different bodies there is a different fire. *For light, flame, and a burning coal, are not the same thing. But from on high there is a diminution as far as to the earth of fire which proceeds from a more immaterial, pure and incorporeal nature as far as to the most material and gross bodies.* For there are streams of fire under the earth, as Empedocles somewhere says;

Beneath the earth burn num'rous fiery streams.

Nor ought we to wonder how fire, though in water, is not extinguished. For all things proceed through each other, and that which predominates is different in different things. Light also is fire pervading through all things. Numenius therefore, being of opinion that all things are mingled, thought that nothing is simple. But Plato knew the mixture of things, and separately delivered the nature of each, fashioning the elements from figures.

Perhaps however, the wonderful Aristotle will object to what is said, not admitting that every thing visible is such through the participation of fire; because the choir of the stars, and the great sun itself, though they do not consist of fire, yet at the same time are visible. But if some one should say to him, that with respect to fire, one kind is material, but another immaterial, as with reference to sublunary fire which is material; that one kind is corruptible, but another incorruptible; that one is mingled with air, but another is pure; and in short, that there are many species of fire, perhaps he will assent to the assertion, and also to *the theologists' who call the sun a fire which is the channel of fire, and the dispensator of fire, and all such-like appellations.* For to what else can he ascribe visibility, than to that which is generative of light? But what except fire is a thing of this

<sup>1</sup> viz. The Chaldean Theurgists. See my collection of the Chaldean Oracles.

kind? For earth<sup>1</sup> is effective of that which is entirely contrary to light: for it is the cause of darkness. And that which is more terrestrial participates in a less degree of light; but air and water are diaphanous, and are not of themselves visible. Hence each of these is a medium between that which is primarily visible, and that which obumbrates visible natures; each being the cause of visibility to other things, but not to itself, so far as each of these is diaphanous, but other things are transparent through these. It remains therefore, that fire alone illuminates the things with which it is present, and makes them to be visible.

If however, some one should say, that the celestial element which is visible and illuminative, is not fire, we ask him, whence does the fire which is *here*, become such as it is? For if each of these is generative of sensible light, why may not each of them be fire, though the one is immaterial, but the other material? When, however, I say that the one is immaterial, I mean as was before observed, that it is so when compared with the grossest<sup>2</sup> matter, which is not able to sustain forms, so as to prevent them from gliding away, and which is distinguished from the matter that invariably remains in its own proper form. For we learn that matter pervades through the whole world, as the Gods also say. Hence Plato, as he proceeds, calls matter the receptacle of the universe. Such therefore, as are the kinds of light, such also are the kinds of fire; and analogy shows that the light which is from the celestial element is from fire. Hence, it must be said, that Plato does not characterize fire by heat, nor by being moved upward; for these things are the peculiarities of the fire which is *here*, and which is not in its proper place; but that he characterizes it by visibility. For through this he comprehends all fire, the divine, the mortal, the caustic, and the vehement.

Farther still, the same things must likewise be said concerning earth, that earth is that which is primarily solid. For it must not be said that earth derives its solidity from some other place; but in sensibles, that which is especially solid, has this peculiarity, prior to such things as are less solid; since also that which is especially hot, is hot prior to things which have less heat, and from this things which have less heat, participate of this quality. If therefore, earth is more solid than the other elements, but that which is most solid is the cause of things which are less solid being solid, and things which are less such are not the causes of solidity to those which especially and particularly have this power;—if this be

<sup>1</sup> Instead of  $\pi\eta$  in this place, it is necessary to read  $\gamma\eta$ .

<sup>2</sup> For  $\tau\alpha\chi\upsilon\tau\alpha\tau\eta$  here, it is necessary to read  $\tau\alpha\chi\upsilon\tau\alpha\tau\eta$ .

the case, it is necessary that earth should be the cause of solidity to the other elements, having itself a subsistence contrary to fire. And if indeed, we assume things which are apparent to our senses, viz. heaven as fiery, and the earth on which we walk, as especially earth, the contrariety of these will be manifest, the former being always in motion, but the latter being immoveable; the former being transcendently visible, but the latter tangible: and the one being most attenuated through light, but the other most gross through darkness. But if we wish to survey the first elements of these, viz. fire itself so far as fire, and earth itself, so far as earth, we shall shortly after unfold all the oppositions of these, when we discuss the analogy of the four elements. That visibility therefore, is the peculiarity of fire, and tangibility of earth, we may from these things assume to be most true. Hence Porphyry says, that of dæmons some, being visible, have in their composition more of a fiery, in consequence of not having any thing of a resisting nature. But others, participating also of earth, are capable of being touched. He adds, that such as these appearing near Italy about the Tuscans, not only emit seed from which worms are generated, but also strike against other things, and leave behind them ashes; from which likewise he shows that all things participate of earth. There is not, however, the same nature of earth every where, and in all parts of the world, but in some places it is more pure and immaterial, and without gravity. *For not gravity, but tangibility, is the peculiarity of earth.* But in other places, it is more material, and heavy, and is moved with difficulty. In some places likewise, it exhibits solidity alone; but in others, it receives other genesiurgic and material powers, after the same manner as fire.

If however, these things being asserted by us, Aristotle should doubt, how if fire is in the heavens it is moved circularly, and not in a right line, we must adduce in answer to him, what *Plotinus* says, that every simple body, when in its proper place, either remains immoveable, or is moved in a circle, in order that it may by no means relinquish its proper place. For if it is moved in a different manner, it will either no longer be in its own place, or will not yet be in it. A celestial body therefore, being fiery, is necessarily moved in a circle. For earth also, if it were moved without leaving the place about the middle, would be moved in a circle. For when fire is moved to the upper region it is so moved in consequence of being in a foreign place. For the same reason likewise, a clod of earth is moved downward; and in short, *the local motions of the elements in a right line, are occu-*

\* Instead of *οὐα μὴ δεῦτε* in this place, I read *οὐα μηδὲ ποτε*.

sioned by their being preternaturally disposed ; so that it is false to say that fire is naturally moved in a right line. For it then especially subsists according to nature when it possesses its proper place. But when it tends to its proper place, it is not yet in a condition conformable to nature. This however being demonstrated, it is evident that the celestial fire when it is moved, is moved in a circle ; and nothing that has been said disturbs the Platonic assertion. For if fire is moved in a right line, <sup>1</sup> it is not yet in its natural place. But if it is in its natural place, it will either be immoveable, or moved in a circle. It is impossible however, that it should be immoveable : for all fire is naturally moveable. In its natural place therefore, it is alone moved in a circle. But let us return to the thing proposed to be discussed.

If therefore the universe is generated, it is necessary that it should be sensible. But if sensible, it is visible and tangible. And if so, it consists of fire and earth. But if this be admitted, it also consists of the middle elements. For fire and earth are as much disjoined from each other as the sight and the touch, and require the other elements as connecting media. If however, the world is visible, it is necessary there should be fire ; and if tangible, it is necessary there should be earth. For that which is solid is tangible, and is also able to resist the touch ; since that which is friable, and cannot sustain the touch, is by no means tangible. Hence Pythagoras calls the earth *the sustainer*, as being solid, and resisting the touch, and as moved with difficulty, and participating of stable power. If therefore, as we have said, fire is requisite in order that the world may be visible, but earth, that it may be tangible, divinity beginning from fire and earth, made the universe. Not that he first made these ; for we have already rejected the generation which is according to time ; but since every physiology commences from contraries, on this account Plato says that the composition of the universe originated from fire and earth, in order that it might become visible through fire, and tangible through the solidity of earth, which with great accuracy he calls *a certain solid*. For a physical solid is one thing, but a mathematical solid another. And the latter is intangible, but the other, which the discussion now requires, is tangible. For that solid is tangible, which is physical. Hence those are absurd who doubt why earth alone is solid : for, say they, water and air are also solids. For it may be said, in answer to them, that resistance especially pertains to earth ; since it is the support and foundation of the other elements. For earth supports water, and

<sup>1</sup> The words *ex' eubetias*, are omitted in the original



both earth and water support air. *Earth therefore, is the first tangible, and the first resisting substance, and on this account is the first solid.* We shall omit however to notice those who say that Plato here calls the three elements after fire, earth. For if this were admitted, it would not be possible to assign what is the medium of earth and fire.

“It is impossible however, for two things alone to cohere in a beautiful manner, without the intervention of a certain third; for a certain collective bond is necessary in the middle of the two. But that is the most beautiful of bonds, which causes itself and the natures which are bound, to be one.”

In what is here said, a bond is assumed as affording an image of divine union, and the communion of powers, according to which the intellectual causes of wholes effect their generations. But beauty appears to be assumed, as having an uniting and binding essence and power. For the words, “*to cohere in a beautiful manner, and the most beautiful of bonds,*” appear to me to be significant of this. Beginning therefore from the duad, as allied to generation, progression and difference, Plato introduces union to the participants of it, and an harmonious communion through a bond, imparting to the world this as the second gift from the Demiurgus. We shall however here avoid the introduction of such doubts as are adduced by those who do not rightly understand what is said by Plato. For neither do those who say that semicircles require no bond in order to the generation of a circle, speak rightly; for a circle does not consist of semicircles, but on the contrary, the circle now existing, and not subsisting from these, the diameter being drawn makes the semicircles. And this is evident from the name affording a generation to these from the circle, but not vice versa. Nor do those speak rightly who assume the monad and the duad, which in a certain respect are opposites, and have no medium. For Plato does not absolutely say, that there is something between all things, in whatever manner they may exist, which gives perfection to the hypostasis of one composite. For he says, that two things alone cannot beautifully cohere without a third. But the monad and the duad are not contraries, since the duad consists of monads. Nor again, is there any rectitude in the assertions of those who introduce things that are corrupted together, as for instance, wine mingled with honey. For these no longer exist

when the mixture takes place. We however, do not investigate how things are corrupted; for this is not wonderful; but how remaining what they are, they are co-harmonized with each other. For this bond<sup>1</sup> is the cause of safety to the things that are bound, but not of their common corruption and abolition. Nor do those speak rightly who adduce as a witness the communion of man and woman, which requires no third thing to its subsistence. For through ignorance they do not perceive the greatest bond, that of love, which excites to communion, in one way indeed, to a communion of the psychical life, and in another to that of the physical life. For the bond through animation is the medium in these. Nor are they right who adduce things which are melted together, as gold and silver. *For of these there is the same essence; since both are water.* All these therefore, wander from the conception of Plato.

We however, again say, conformably to what has been before observed, that it is necessary these two things should be assumed, in the first place, in order to the composition of one thing, and in the next place, in order that their coalition may not be corrupted. For they would no longer be bound, but would cease to exist. In the third place, also, it is necessary that they should truly be the elements of that which consists of them. For having these conditions, they will entirely be in want of a certain third thing to their colligation. For what, since they are separate, divided, and most distant from each other, will collect them into one? For if nothing accedes to them, they will remain divided, and will subsist after the same manner as before. But if something accedes to them besides what they already are, this thing which accedes will become their bond. For it was this which collected them into the composition of one thing. A bond, however, is said to be so in a threefold respect. For one bond is that which pre-exists in the cause of the things that coalesce. But another is that which is inherent in the things themselves that are bound, and which is co-ordinate to, and connascent with them. And a third is that which exists in the middle of these, proceeding indeed from the cause, but presenting itself to the view<sup>2</sup> in the things that are mutually bound. If you are willing also, one bond of an animal, and of the parts in it, is the one reason which is pre-established in the cause itself of the animal. But the nerves and the fibres are another bond, connecting the parts of the animal. And another bond is the physical reason or productive and forming power, which

<sup>1</sup> For *οὐ γὰρ δεσμός οὗτος*, it is necessary to read *ο γὰρ δεσμός οὗτος*.

<sup>2</sup> For *εμφανόμενος* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *εμφανούμενος*.

proceeds from the cause of the animal, and employs the nerves, and all the material organic bonds for the colligation of the animal. For this bond is neither exempt from the things that are bound, nor yet ranking among things which are without effective power, is it destitute of the true cause. You must not therefore, understand the bond which is now mentioned by Plato, according to the first mode; for this is not attended with cause; but cause is entirely exempt from the things which proceed from it, so far as it is cause. But Plato says, that the bond is in the middle of the things that are bound. That, however, which is in the middle of certain things, is not separated from them. Nor does this bond subsist according to the organic and last kind of bond. For the bond which is conformable to this, is not the lord of itself nor of its own proper union. Plato however adds, that the bond of which he is speaking, makes both itself and the things which are bound to be one. For it is possible for this to be arranged in the middle. But it possesses such a power as this through analogy, which is the most beautiful bond, and which imparts to it a power that causes all things to have sameness and union. This bond therefore, is inseparable from the things that are bound, and is analogy, which is different from all the natures that are bound, but has a subsistence in them. The demiurgic will likewise, is a bond, but is exempt from the things that it binds; "*My will, says the Demiurgus, being a greater and more principal bond than those with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation.*" It remains therefore, that we must understand the bond here mentioned, according to the middle mode, and as having a middle form, so as to be neither effective nor organic.

Whence then is the conception of such a bond derived, and of what is it the symbol? It proceeds indeed from the one cause of wholes. For the power of imparting union is present to all things, from that fountain of all union, through which also intellect is conjoined to the intelligible, and which produces the light of truth, or the first of bonds, through which all things are connected with each other, and become perfectly one thing through similitude. It is through this likewise, that things which have proceeded from their proper principles are converted to them. But this bond also proceeds from the one being, which is the first of beings, and which unitedly comprehends the causes of all things, according to the bond and divine union contained in it. It likewise proceeds from all-perfect animal. For every intelligible animal is by a much greater priority united to itself, than a sensible animal; and the causes of wholes which it contains, pervade

\* For ἡ τοῦ νοῦ here, it is evidently necessary to read ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.

through each other prior<sup>1</sup> to analogy; which analogy imitating, makes all things to be in all, and imparts the same powers to different things. It also proceeds from the connectedly-containing cause.<sup>2</sup> For analogy inserts connexion, causing the natures which are bound by it, as Plato says, to be indissoluble by every thing except by him who binds them. Hence this bond proceeding from these causes, is connective, is the cause of the communion, and one union of separated natures, and is the supplier of harmony, and of the conspiracy hastening to unity of different things; in order that it may be similar to the causes from which it was derived.

These things, however, being thus divided and defined, let us return to the thing proposed to be considered. For since it is necessary that the world being generated should be visible and tangible, it will be in want of fire and earth. Of fire, indeed, because it is visible. For vision<sup>3</sup> is of an ethereal nature, on which account also it emits rays; and that which collects both sight, and that which is visible, is light. But all light is from fire; for it is not from earth, which produces darkness. As we have before observed, however, there are many kinds of fire. Because likewise, the world is tangible, it is in want of earth. For earth is that which is especially solid: for it is more stable, and more of a resisting nature than the other elements. But that which is especially solid is especially tangible. For it in a greater degree sustains resistance, than that which is not solid. Hence earth is especially tangible. Let it therefore be admitted, that there are primarily these two elements in the universe, and that they are contrary to each other; fire indeed, being analogous to form, to the masculine nature, and to things of this kind; but earth, being co-ordinate to the female nature, and to matter. Hence, of these, which are thus oppositely divided, in their essences, powers, and energies, in the senses by which they are perceived, and in the places of their abode, there will not be one order, nor one world, unless a bond accedes to them, and communion with each other. For it is impossible for two things to cohere in a beautiful manner without the intervention of a certain third. And Plato indeed adduces an universal assertion by saying, "*a certain or some third thing.*" But if you add the words, "*which are entirely contrary,*" [immediately after the words, "*for two things alone*"] you will render what is said incontrovertible, and more acknowledged.

<sup>1</sup> For *πρὸς ἀναλογίαν* in this place, read *πρὸ ἀναλογίας*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. From the middle triad of the order of Gods called intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

<sup>3</sup> For *το ὄραον* here, it is necessary to read *το ὁραον*.

For it is impossible for two things which are most contrary to concur into one composition with each other, without the intervention of a third. For either they collect themselves, or they are congregated by another thing. Being, however, contrary, and most distant from each other, and secretly flying from each other, through the fear of losing their own essence, they cannot bring themselves together. Hence they are congregated by something else. But this is a bond; so that they are in want of a certain third thing. The universe, therefore, proceeds from the duad to the triad. For it began indeed from the duad, because all generation subsists in a way adapted to this principle. For difference, the infinite, and the Empedoclean strife [as being allied to the duad] are adapted to generated things. But the universe proceeds as far as to the triad, through the bond which is now mentioned. Again, therefore, a certain medium must be assumed between earth and fire, which is collective of both. *And let this for the sake of an example be moisture, which is common to air and water. For this<sup>1</sup> is connective indeed of earth, conglutinates it, and holds it together, so that it may not be dispersed; but being as a subject to fire, it imparts to it nourishment and permanency.* From this triad, however, the tetrad will shortly after be unfolded, because the natures which are bound together are solids. Hence it is rightly said, that a bond imparts beauty, and an harmonious communion and union. But what this bond is, and how it is inherent in the things that are bound, Plato shows through the following words.

“This, however, analogy is naturally adapted to effect in the most beautiful manner.”

It must be said, therefore, that this analogy is the bond which is now investigated; but that the middle or media, are after a certain manner bonds. For analogy is in those things which have the same ratio, and is naturally adapted to bind itself in conjunction with them; them indeed, through ratios; but itself, through preserving the same form in things numerically different, and continuing to be one in multitude. For it has this from itself, and according to its own reason, and this consentaneously. For analogy proceeds from equality. But equality is of the co-ordination of unity. For as the monad is the fountain and root of quantity considered by itself; so is equality of all relative quantity, having the order of a monad, to all habitudes. For that we may omit other middles or media, which more recent philosophers have added, I mean Nicoma-

<sup>1</sup> For *rov yap*, read *rouro yap*.

chus, Moderatus, &c.,<sup>1</sup> we shall confine ourselves to the three media from which Plato constitutes the soul, arithmetically, geometrically, and harmonically.

It may be seen, however, how all these middles are generated from equality, by the following method. The arithmetic middle, indeed, after this manner: Make the first number equal to the first; the second to the first and the second; and the third to the first, second, and third. Three monads therefore being proposed, there will be produced according to this method three terms, viz. 1. 2. 3. preserving an arithmetic middle. For this middle consists in equally surpassing according to number, and being equally surpassed.<sup>2</sup> But the geometrical middle is produced as follows: Make the first equal to the first; the second, to the first and second; and the third to the first, to twice the second and the third. For again, there being three monads, there will thus be generated the three terms 1. 2. 4. forming the geometric middle. For the peculiarity of analogy consists in preserving the same ratio in greater and lesser terms. And the harmonic middle, which has the third order, is generated in the following manner: Three monads being proposed make the first equal to the first, and to twice the second; the second to twice the first, and twice the second; and the third to the first, to twice the second, and thrice the third. For by this method the three terms 3. 4. and 6. will be produced, forming the harmonic middle. For the harmonic middle, according to the Platonic definition itself, consists in surpassing and being surpassed by the same part of the extremes.<sup>3</sup> All the middles, therefore, have their generation from equality. But if this be the case, they have the uniform, and a power which collects things, and causes them to be one. For equality is analogous to sameness, to the monad, to bound and to similitude, through which communion is produced in beings. Hence Plato appropriately adds the words, "*naturally adapted*," because the analogies and all the middles have the spontaneous. For they neither introduce an artificial, nor an adscititious bond, but present themselves to the view in the essences and powers themselves of things.

"For when either in three numbers, or masses, or powers, as is the

<sup>1</sup> For an account of these media, see my *Theoretic Arithmetic*.

<sup>2</sup> In the original, by some negligence of the transcribers, after *ισω δε υπερεχομενη*, *being equally surpassed*, the words *κατα φωνην αυτου ο φελομενος*, immediately follow, which are obviously totally foreign to this place.

<sup>3</sup> Thus 3 is surpassed by 4, by 1 which is a third part of 3, and 6 surpasses 4 by 2 which is a third part of 6.

middle to the first so is the last to the middle ; and again, as is the last to the middle, so is the middle to the first ; then the middle becoming both first and last, and the last and the first becoming both of them middles, it will thus happen that all of them will necessarily be the same. But becoming the same with each other, they will be one."

In the first place, it is requisite to explain what is here said mathematically ; and in the next place, physically, as being that which is especially proposed to be effected. For it is not proper to separate the discussion from its appropriate theory. There are therefore some who think that Plato in these words defines the geometric middle, and among other things which they assert, they say that the geometric middle is properly exclusive of all the others analogy ; but that the others may be justly called middles. Nicomachus also is of this opinion, and he speaks rightly. *For geometric proportion is properly analogy ; but it is requisite to call the others middle, as Plato also says further on in the generation of the soul. But the others are improperly\* called analogies.* To others, however, these appear not to have apprehended the meaning of Plato properly. For they say that it is not definitely asserted in these words, that there ought to be the same ratio ; but thus much only is said, that it is necessary there should be such a habitude of the last to the middle as there is of the middle to the first. But this is common to all the before-mentioned middles. For as the monad is to the duad, according to the arithmetical middle, and the equal in quantity, so is the duad to the triad. For by as much as the duad is surpassed by the triad, by so much is the triad less than the tetrad. And as the monad is to the duad, according to the geometric middle, so is the duad to the tetrad. For the ratio is the same. And as the triad is to the tetrad, according to the harmonic middle, and the part of the triad by which the tetrad surpasses it, so is the tetrad to the hexad. For by that part of the triad by which the triad is exceeded by the tetrad, by the same part of the hexad is the tetrad surpassed by the hexad. Such, therefore, is their opinion, though Plato clearly assumes the geometric middle. For it is the peculiarity of this proportion, that the first has the same ratio to the middle that the middle has to the third term. As, however, there are three middles, the arithmetic, the geometric, and the harmonic, and these being such as we have shown them to be, Plato very properly assumes these

\* For *καταχρημενοι* here, I read *καταχρηστικως*.

three subjects, *numbers*, *masses*, and *powers*. For the arithmetical middle is in numbers; the geometrical is in a greater degree conversant with continued [than with discrete] quantity; and the harmonical middle is in powers. For it is conversant with sharp and flat sounds. And after this manner you may speak, distinguishing the middles according to their predominance.

All of them, however, may be assumed in numbers, in masses, and in powers. And how, indeed, they may be assumed in numbers is evident; for it has been shown by us. But they may also be assumed in masses. For three equal magnitudes being proposed, you may be able, by using the before-mentioned three methods, to devise other magnitudes, at one time producing an arithmetic, at another a geometric, and at another an harmonic middle. In powers likewise after the same manner. For let there be three equal powers, as for instance, three highest *hypatæ* (*ὑπάται*) sounds, all of them homotonous, or of the same tone. You will produce therefore from these, the arithmetical middle, if you place the first sound, that is *hypatæ*, equal to the first; but the second, to the first and second, as for instance, another sound emitting a sound the double of the first. And let it be *nete* or the last sound, which has a double ratio to *hypatæ*. But the third sound must be placed equal to the first, second, and third. For it will be a sound which will have a triple ratio to *hypatæ*, surpassing *nete* by as much as *nete* surpasses *hypatæ*. And these three sounds, *hypatæ*, *nete*, *trite-hyperbolaon*, will arithmetically differ from each other. But you will make the geometrical middle, if the *hypatæ* being posited, you make the first equal to the first, but the second equal to the first and second *hypatæ*. And let this sound be *mese*: for this is capable of emitting a sound the double of *hypatæ*. But if you make the third sound equal to the first *hypatæ*, and to twice the second, and the third, you will have a certain chord which will sound *nete-hyperbolaon*. For this will be capable of producing a sound the double of *mese*, and the triple of *hypatæ*. These three sounds likewise will form the geometric middle. All the middles, therefore, are seen to exist in numbers, in masses, and in powers. Number, however, is more adapted to the arithmetical, bulk to the geometrical, and power to the harmonic middle. And hence Plato uses these three, viz. numbers, masses, and powers.

It is well, likewise, that assigning certain common ratios, he commences from the middle. For it is this through which all analogy consists, collecting the



extremes according to ratio, from one power to the other. For analogy is that which is principally and properly a bond. But it is a bond as that *through which*, and the middle. For through the middle analogy binds the extremes. From this, therefore, he commences as most allied to the nature of analogy, and because habitude receives its completion through it. Hence, also, they are called middles, and because sameness is the end of all this analogy. For since they proceed from equality, but equality is sameness, it converts all things to sameness. Sameness, however, may be properly and principally asserted of the geometric middle, for there is the same ratio; but equality of the arithmetic; and similitude of the harmonic middle. And in the third place, the ascent is through sameness to union. For analogy indeed is suspended from equality,<sup>1</sup> being a habitude ingenerated in the boundaries of equality. But equality is suspended from sameness, and sameness from union.

It is necessary, however, after the mathematical resumption of these words, to direct our attention to the physical theory. For it is not fit that those who apply themselves to this discussion, should dwell on mathematical speculations; for the dialogue is physical; nor that they should neglect such speculations, investigating only what relates to sense; but it is requisite to conjoin both, and always connect physics with mathematics; just as the things themselves are connected, are homogeneous, and of a kindred nature, according to the progression from intellect. For, in short, if the Pythagoreans arranged the mathematical essence as a medium between intelligibles and sensibles, as being more evolved than intelligibles, but more universal than sensibles,<sup>2</sup> why is it requisite, omitting mathematics, to pay attention to physiology alone? For how is the sensible nature adorned, according to what reasons is it arranged, or from what reasons does it proceed, except from those that are mathematical? These reasons therefore [or productive powers], are primarily in souls, descending into them from intellect; and afterwards they are in bodies, proceeding into them from souls. Hence it is necessary not to remain in mathematical speculations as some do; for this produces false opinions in the auditors, and induces them to think that physical figures and numbers are mathematical. It is also in another respect absurd. For the reasons of nature do not receive the accuracy and firm-

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *ἐξηρηται γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας*, it is requisite to read in this place, *ἐξηρηται γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀναλογία ἐκ τῆς ἰσότητος*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τῶν νοητῶν* here, it is obviously necessary to read *τῶν αἰσθητῶν*.

ness of the mathematical reasons. To which may be added, that in so doing we shall not follow the demonstrative canons, in which it is said that things pertaining to one genus must not be transferred to another. Neither therefore is it possible to survey physical objects arithmetically.

Let us, therefore, if you think fit, discuss the theory of the proposed words physically. The first analogy then, according to which nature inserts harmony in her works, and according to which the Demiurgus adorns and arranges the universe, is one certain life, and one reason, proceeding through all things; which first, indeed, connects itself, but afterwards the natures in which it exists; and according to which sympathy is ingenerated in all mundane essences, as existing in one animal, and governed by one nature. This life, therefore, which is the bond of wholes, total nature [or nature which ranks as a whole] and the one soul of the world constitute. The one intellect likewise generates it; and always more excellent beings, insert in mundane natures, a greater and more perfect union. Let it be said, therefore, that the habit which predominates in material subjects, that material form, and the powers of the middle elements, are bonds. All these however, have the relation of *things without which* the primary bond is not participated, and are analogous to the middle in mathematical entities, through which habitude subsists in the extremes. But the life of which we are speaking, which collects and unites all things, and is suspended indeed from its proper causes, but binds the things in which it is inherent, is *truly* analogy, and preserves both its own union and the union of its participants. Again, therefore, a bond is threefold. For the common powers of the elements are one bond; the one cause of bodies is another; and a third is that which is the middle of both the others, which proceeds indeed from the cause of bodies, but employs the powers that are divided about body. And this is the strong bond, as the theologist says, which is extended through all things, and is connected by the golden chain. For Jupiter after this, constitutes the golden chain,<sup>1</sup> according to the admonitions of Night.

But when your pow'r around the whole has spread  
A strong coercive bond, a golden chain  
Suspend from aether.

<sup>1</sup> This golden chain may be said to be the series of unities proceeding from *the one*, or the ineffable principle of things, and extending as far as to matter itself. And of this chain, the light immediately proceeding from the sun is an image.

Physical analogy then being a thing of this kind, let us survey in what things, and through what, it is naturally adapted to be established. As Plato therefore says, it subsists in numbers, masses, and powers. Physical *numbers*, however, are material forms divided about the subject [i. e. about body]. But *masses* are the extensions of these forms, and the separations or intervals of them about matter. And *powers* are the things which connect, and give form [or specific distinction] to bodies. For form is one thing, and the power proceeding from it is another. For form indeed is impartible and essential, but becoming extended, and dilated into bulk, it emits, as if it were a blast from itself, material powers, which are certain qualities. Thus, for instance, in fire, the form and essence of it is impartible,<sup>1</sup> and is truly the image of the cause of fire. For in partible natures there is that which is impartible. But from the form in fire which is impartible, a separation and extension of it take place about matter, from which the powers of fire are exerted, such as heat, or refrigeration, or moisture, or something else of the like kind. And these qualities are indeed essential, but are by no means the essence of fire. For essences are not from qualities, nor are essence and power the same; but every where the essential precedes power; and from that being one, a multitude of powers proceeds, and that which is divided, from that which is indivisible; just as from one power many energies proceed. For by how much more each thing proceeds, by so much more is it multiplied and divided, conformably to [the characteristic of] its principle and cause, which is impartible and indivisible. As in every body, therefore, there is this triad,<sup>2</sup> I mean number, bulk, and power, analogy and the physical bond, occupy from on high the numbers, masses, and powers of bodies, and likewise congregate their partible<sup>3</sup> essences, and unite them for the purpose of producing the one completion of the world. They also insert communion in forms, symmetry in masses, and harmony in powers. And thus all things are rendered effable and consentaneous to each other. But this analogy proceeds from the middle to the first, and from the third to the middle; from the first also to the middle, and from this to the last; and again, from the last to the middle, and from this to the first. Because, likewise, a bond of this kind imparts progression and conversion to bodies, it begins indeed from the

<sup>1</sup> Instead of το μὲν εἶδος αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία, ἀμερόν ἐστι καὶ οὗτος ἀγάλμα τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ πυρός, it is requisite to read, το μὲν εἶδος αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία ἡμέρως ἐστι, καὶ οὕτως ἀγάλμα τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ πυρός.

<sup>2</sup> For τοῦ τρίτου τούτου in this place, it is requisite to read τοῦ τριάδου τούτου.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of ἀμέρους here, it is necessary to read μερίσται.

middle, in consequence of being connective, and the cause of union, and is defined according to this peculiarity. But it proceeds from the first through the middle, to the last, as extending and unfolding itself, as far as to the last of things. And it recurs from the last to the first, as converting all things through harmony to the intelligible cause, from which the division of nature, and the separation and interval of bodies were produced. For by converting them to this cause, according to one circle, one order, and one series, secondary being suspended from primary natures, it causes the world to be one, and most similar to the intelligible [paradigm]. For as there all things are truly united to each other, so here all things are adapted to each other. And as intelligibles proceeding from *the good*, are again converted to it, through the goodness which is in them,<sup>1</sup> and through the intelligible monads; thus also sensibles proceeding from the Demiurgus, are again converted to him, through this bond, which is distributed and pervades through all of them, and binds all things together. For in this respect it imitates the intelligible. But it subsists intellectually in intellect, totally in wholes, and partially in partial natures.

After the same manner, therefore, as the intelligible, the sensible world has all things, according to all its parts. For fire, so far as it is tangible, participates of earth, and earth, so far as it is visible, participates of fire, and each participates of moisture. For earth indeed is conglutinated and connected through moisture, and its dissipated nature is united through it; but fire is nourished and increased by it. So that the extremes are the middle, in order that what is said may become physically manifest in things that are known by us. The extremes, therefore, are in a certain respect the middle, as preserving through it their proper idea, and remaining such as they are. And moisture itself, so far as it is coloured, participates of fire, and so far as it is re-invigorated through heat. But again, so far as it is tangible, it participates of earth. So that each of the extremes gives perfection to moisture. These things, however, will shortly after become more known to us.

But through this harmony and analogy, in the first place, sameness presents itself to the view, and in the next place union. For bodies themselves according to their own nature are partible, and are subdued by difference and strife. These, however, at the same time through harmony, are leagued in friendship with sameness, and through sameness with union. For through analogy the universe is

<sup>1</sup> For *ex autq* read *ex autou*.

completely rendered one, this having the power of making things that are divided to be one, of congregating things that are multiplied, and connecting things that are dissipated. Hence, theologists surveying the causes of these things in the Gods, enclose Venus with Mars, and surround them with Vulcanian bonds; the difference which is in the world being connected through harmony and friendship. All this complication and connexion likewise has Vulcan for its cause, who through demiurgic bonds connects sameness with difference, harmony with discord, and communion with contrariety. And this being effected, Apollo, Hermes, and each of the Gods laugh. But their laughter gives subsistence to mundane natures, and inserts efficacious power in the bonds. Let these things, however, as it is said, be preserved in sacred silence. But now, from what has been discussed, let thus much be manifest to us, that the physical bond being Vulcanian and demiurgic, (for the one and all-perfect Demiurgus comprehends also the production which is through necessity, as being Vulcanian and Dionysiacal, and causing each of the parts of the universe to be a whole,) is collective of contraries, and connective of material things; uniting their essences, measuring their masses, and harmonizing their powers. It likewise makes all things to be in all, and exhibits the same things in each other, according to all possible modes, empirically, aerially, aquatically, and terrestrially.

“ If then it were necessary that the body of the universe should have been generated a superficies, and not have depth, one medium might have been sufficient for the purpose of binding both the natures that subsist with it, and itself. But now it is requisite that it should be a solid, and solids are never adapted to each other by one, but always by two media.”

The scope proposed to us [in the *Timæus*], is, as we have before observed, to learn how the universe is constituted, and of what it consists. But this being the design, we may see in what a well-ordered manner the discourse devises the composition of the four elements. For it is impossible that there should be one simple element alone; since there would not be generation. For all generation is a certain mutation. But all mutation is naturally adapted to be effected in two things. All generation likewise is from contraries. But a simple element itself, is by no means contrary to itself: for it would be itself corruptive of itself. If, therefore, it is necessary there should be generation, it is

necessary there should not be one element only. For as Hippocrates says, if there was one element only, it would be impossible for things to be changed. For mutation and motion are not to the similar, but to the contrary. Hence there is not one simple element only. If, however, there is not one, but two at least, it is necessary that these should be contraries: for generation is from contraries. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be two elements having in a becoming manner a nature contrary to each other. Hence, if they are contraries, they will be in want of a certain bond and medium. For it is impossible that two contraries can in a becoming manner coalesce, without a third thing; since it is necessary that a bond should intervene, which is collective of both. For being themselves contraries, they will avoid communion with each other. Hence it is necessary, there should be another third thing which conjoins them and leads them to the completion of one thing. But it is likewise necessary that this medium should be of a biformed<sup>1</sup> nature. For if the elements which were to be bound were superficies, one medium would be sufficient. But since they are solids, they are connected through two media. For the duad being the primary leader of solids, is also allotted the primordial cause of the bonds that are in them. Hence, likewise, Timæus calls a binding of this kind harmony, as inserting in the extremes a symmetry of communion with each other. The analogy also which is in solids is introduced through two media. For two media analogously come between two similar solids. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, all the elements are four; and there is neither one alone, lest we should destroy mutation; nor two contraries without a third thing, lest there should not<sup>2</sup> be a bond of things which are hostile to each other. For there will not be order and ornament from two things most foreign to each other. But if you conceive a certain thing of this kind, the solution of the doubt will be easy. Moreover, neither will there be alone two things which are not<sup>3</sup> contraries. For they will not be able to operate on each other. For whiteness suffers nothing from a line, but from blackness. Nor does heat suffer any thing from whiteness, but from cold.

Again, therefore, it must be said still more universally, reasoning from things known, that either there is one element alone, or not one. If, however, there is only one element of the world, the variety of the phenomena, the opposition of the cir-

<sup>1</sup> For *δευδές* here, read *δευοιδές*.

<sup>2</sup> *Οὐκ* is omitted in this place in the original.

<sup>3</sup> *Οὐκ* is also here omitted in the original.

culations, and the war of generation, will be subverted, and either all things will be perpetual, or all things will be corruptible. But if there is not one element only, there will either be two elements, or more than two. And if two, they will either be contraries, or not contraries. If, however, they are not contraries, there will neither be action, nor passion, nor opposition in bodies, nor will there be generation in things which have generation. But if they are contraries, these will require a medium. And if this be the case, there will either be one medium, or two media. It is impossible, however, that there should be only one medium: for the elements are not superficies. Hence there are two media. But if there are two media of two things, all are four. That so many elements therefore in number are sufficient to the world, is through these things manifest.

Let us, however, if you please, concisely survey the mathematical meaning of the words before us, and afterwards adduce the physical theory pertaining to them. For how of two similar superficies or planes there is one medium, and of two similar solids two media, we will survey in number by themselves. For the primordial and spontaneous nature of numbers, is to be embraced prior to geometrical necessity. In the first place, therefore, let there be two square numbers 9 and 16, the less of which has for its side 3, and the greater 4. By multiplying these and making 12, we shall have an analogy in the three terms 9, 12, and 16.<sup>1</sup> Let two numbers likewise be assumed, which are not squares indeed, but at the same time are similar planes, and let them be 18 and 32,<sup>2</sup> the former being generated from the triad and hexad, but the latter from the tetrad and ogdoad. If therefore, we multiply either the triad by the ogdoad, or the hexad by the tetrad, we shall have for the product 24, binding in analogy 18 to 32, according to a sesquitertian ratio. This, however, is caused by their sides having the same ratio. If, therefore, the sides of the assumed numbers are found to receive no analogous mean or medium, all the planes generated from them will have but one medium, according to the before-mentioned mode.<sup>3</sup> But if the sides themselves should be

<sup>1</sup> For as 9 is to 12, so is 12 to 16.

<sup>2</sup> The two similar plane numbers 18 and 32 here adduced by Proclus, prove that Gaston Pardies was greatly mistaken in asserting in his *Elements of Geometry*, "that if two numbers are similar planes, the greater may be divided into as many squares as there are units in the less." See the Translation of this work by Harris, p. 133. For 32 cannot be divided into as many squares as there are units in 18. And 32 and 18 are evidently similar plane numbers, because their sides are analogous. For as 3 is to 6 so is 4 to 8.

<sup>3</sup> The sides of these numbers are 3, 6, 4, and 8, and they have no analogous mean. For there is no geometrical mean between 3 and 6, nor between 4 and 8. Hence the planes generated from them, viz. 18 and 32, will have but one medium, which is 24.

found to receive a certain analogous mean, the planes also produced from them, will necessarily receive more than one mean. For let there be two squares 16 and 81, and let the side of the former be 4, but of the latter 9. Since, therefore, the analogous medium between 4 and 9 is 6, according to a sesquialter ratio, it is necessary that more than one mean should fall between them. For the tetrad multiplied by the hexad will produce 24; but the hexad multiplied by itself will produce the square of itself 36; and multiplied by 9, will produce 54. And there will be a continued analogy, in the terms 16, 24, 36, 54, 81.<sup>1</sup> Hence, when the sides have an analogous mean, the planes produced from them, will have more than one mean. Hence, too, Plato appears to me to say very cautiously, not that there is entirely one medium in similar planes, but that it is possible for one to be sufficient. For more than one plane being produced, one medium would be sufficient to conjoin them, viz. 36 alone, according to the duple sesquiquartan ratio.<sup>2</sup> And thus much concerning similar planes.

Let us, however, now pass on to similar solids, and survey the media in these. In the first place, therefore, let there be two cubes 8 and 27, the former having for its side 2, and the latter 3. Of these cubes, there will be two media, the one being produced from twice two multiplied by three, i. e. 12, and which on this account is (*ζεύξ*) a beam, but the other from thrice three multiplied by two, i. e. 18, and which is therefore (*πλινθος*) a tile. These will make a continued analogy with the before-mentioned cubes, according to a sesquialter ratio.<sup>3</sup> And here you may see how each of the media has two sides from the cube placed next to it, but the remaining side from the other cube. This however will be useful to us for the purposes of physiology. Again, if the numbers were not cubes, but similar solids, they will likewise have two analogous middles or means. For let there be two similar solids 24 and 192, the sides of the former being 2, 3, 4, but of the latter 4, 6, 8. And from the duad, the triad, and the ogdoad, 48 will be produced, but from the tetrad, the hexad, and again the tetrad, the product will be 96. Here too, each of the media will have two sides from that similar solid of the extremes which is next to it, but one side from the other cube, in the same manner

<sup>1</sup> For as 16 is to 24, so is 24 to 36, so is 36 to 54, so is 54 to 81, the ratio being sesquialter.

<sup>2</sup> For 36 is a geometrical mean between 16 and 81, according to a duple sesquiquartan ratio. For 36 contains 16 twice, and a fourth part of it, i. e. 4 also; and 81 contains 36 twice, or 72, and 9 besides, which is a fourth part of 36.

<sup>3</sup> For *πλινθος* here, read *πλινθοειδής*.

<sup>4</sup> For 12 contains 8 once, and the half of 8. And in a similar manner  $\frac{1}{2} \times 8 = 4$  and  $\frac{1}{4} \times 8 = 2$ .

<sup>5</sup> For  $12 = 2 \times 2 \times 3$ , 2 being the cube root of 8, and 3 being the cube root of 27; and  $18 = 3 \times 3 \times 2$ .



as in the media of the before-mentioned cubes. Hence between similar solids, two media are sufficient; just as Plato says, that two media adapt solids to each other, but never one medium. What then, some one may say, is there not one medium alone of the two solid numbers 64 and 729, which medium is 216? For 64 is a cube produced from 4, but 729 from 9. And 729 is the triple and superparticular ogdoan part of 216; and after the same manner 216 of 64. For each contains the other thrice, and three eighths of it besides.<sup>1</sup> And this will not only be the case in these, but also in other numbers: for these are the smallest numbers which admit of this. In answer to this however it must be said, that the above-mentioned numbers are cubes and at the same time squares; the one, i. e. 64, being the square of 8, but the other, i. e. 729, being the square of 27. Hence they have one mean, not so far as they are cubes, but so far as they have the tetragonic peculiarity. For the tetragonic side of 64, i. e. 8, being multiplied by 27, which is the tetragonic side of 729, produces the analogous mean 216, according to the method delivered [by mathematicians] of finding the mean between two squares. He who makes the objection, therefore, using solids not as solids, binds them together by one medium. But if he had surveyed them so far as they are solid numbers and cubes, he would have found that there are also two media between these, the one being 144, from four times 4 multiplied by 9, but the other 324, from nine times 9 multiplied by 4.

But Democritus<sup>2</sup> doubts, how it is said that one analogous medium falls between two planes. For by assuming four lines in continued proportion, it may be shown that the squares from them are analogous;<sup>3</sup> so that two analogous media will fall between two extreme planes. He adds, that different persons have been involved in different difficulties through this doubt, and have been led by it to the duplication of the cube, and such-like investigations. Plato, however, does not say that one medium only falls between any casual planes, nor again two media between casual solids, but between those that are similar, and in an effable ratio, and which have their sides arranged according to numbers. For

<sup>1</sup> Thus 729 contains three times 216, i. e. 648, and three eighths of it besides. For the eighth part of 216 is 27, and thrice 27 is 81, the difference between 729 and 648. And thus also 216 contains 64 thrice, i. e. 192, and 24 besides, which is three eighths of 64.

<sup>2</sup> This is most probably the junior Democritus mentioned by Porphyry in his life of Plotinus.

<sup>3</sup> For let the lines be as the numbers 2. 4. 8. 16, which are in continued proportion; then the squares of them 4. 16. 64. 256 will also be analogous. For as 4 is to 16, so is 16 to 64, and so is 64 to 256.

the things generated by the demiurgic God, are effable with reference to each other, and are variegated by demiurgic numbers, as Plato says in another part of this dialogue. And it is requisite to assume similar planes, and solid numbers, and to survey in these the truth of the Platonic assertion. We shall show therefore at the end of these Commentaries, how it is possible, two right lines being given, to find two analogous media, selecting for this purpose the demonstration of Archytas, rather than that of Menæchmus, because he uses conical lines, and in like manner rather than that of Eratosthenes, because he employs the apposition of a rule.\*

With respect however to the things investigated, it must now be said that Plato appears to have perfect confidence in arithmetical demonstrations, since it is also possible to find in geometrical figures of two solids an analogous medium. For if there are three analogous right lines,  $\bar{\alpha}$ ,  $\bar{\beta}$ ,  $\bar{\gamma}$ , in a duple ratio, the squares from them will be in a quadruple ratio, as  $\xi\delta$ ,  $\iota\sigma\tau$ , and  $\bar{\delta}$ . But the solids from them will be in an octuple ratio, as  $\zeta\bar{\iota}\beta$ ,  $\xi\delta$ , and  $\bar{\gamma}$ . Hence there will be three cubes, the extremes of which will have one analogous mean. And it is manifest that all cubes are similar to each other. For the angles are the same in each cube and are equal; and they are also comprehended by similar planes; and the multitude of them is equal. Moreover, we may thus demonstrate in the same manner as Democritus, that two analogous media fall between two similar solids. For that all squares are similar to each other is evident; since the angles are the same in each, and are equal, and the sides are analogous. Hence it seems that Plato employing numbers, shows that solids are never co-adapted by one mean, but always by two media. For in these, as you see, the extremes are cubes, and at the same time similar planes. For  $\zeta\bar{\iota}\beta$ , is from  $\iota\sigma\tau$ , and  $\lambda\bar{\epsilon}$ . But the other of the extremes  $\bar{\gamma}$ , is from  $\bar{\beta}$ , and  $\bar{\delta}$ , and there is the same ratio of the sides. There is therefore one medium of these, so far as they are similar planes, but not so far as they are solids. So that you will have the solution of what is said, by assuming numbers. For it is possible to find the same numbers which are at the same time similar solids and planes; but it is impossible to assume geometrical figures which are at one and the same time similar planes and solids; since this also may be said, that all of them being cubes, the form of them is one. But Plato

\* From the most unfortunate loss of the latter part of these commentaries of Proclus, this method likewise of his finding two analogous media between two given lines, is lost.

assuming that the means are similar to the extremes, is thus confident in the theorem. For how would the extremes be in want of other bonds, if they had entirely the *same* form? And how would the media communicate with the extremes, and differ from them according to the sides, if they were all of them cubes? Hence it is evident that he assumes the media, as being truly media, and thus says, that solids are never conjoined by one, but always by two media; every medium containing the communion and difference of the things of which it is the medium. For to say universally, that all solids are connected through two media, makes the media to be infinite. It is manifest, therefore, that he assumes things which are most distant, and in every respect contrary to each other, and which have all the sides opposite to all; these in natural bodies being corporeal powers. But he does this, in order that of the media, one of them may have a greater communion with one of the extremes, but a less with the other; and that this may be vice versa with the other medium. Unless that also is true which is asserted by our preceptor. For he says that it is necessary to assume the same ratio in the media or means, as there is in the sides of the extremes. Thus, for instance, if one of the cubes is 8, but the other 27, we shall find the media of them, if we take their sides 2 and 3, and multiply the square of 2, i. e. 4 by 3, and the square of 3, i. e. 9 by 2. For then the media will be 12, and 18, which will conjoin the extremes through the sesquialter ratio, which is the ratio of the sides of the cubes. Hence, as there is the same ratio in the sides of the cubes, and in the media, Plato says that there is necessarily two media, and this in a manner more consonant to the proposed physiology. For in the powers of the elements, and in simple forms, the Demiurgus inserted communion prior to things of a composite nature. We however conjoin the extremes through the octuple ratio, the sides of them not having an octuple ratio. For the mean being assumed in a duple ratio, the extremes will have a quadruple ratio. Thus, for instance, in the three proposed terms, if we assume a fourth analogous term, we shall find that as the side 2 is octuple of the side 16, so the first cube is conjoined to the fourth through the octuple ratio. For if you add 16, as a fourth term to 2. 4. 8, the cube from 16, is conjoined to 8, through the octuple ratio which 64 has to 8, and 512 to 64, and 4096 which is the cube of 16; to 512.\* So that the sides of the media receiving an octuple ratio, two media will fall between

\* If each of the terms 2. 4. 8. 16, is cubed, the four terms 8. 64. 512. 4096, will be produced, and 64 is octuple of 8, 512 of 64, and 4096 of 512; and the first cube 8 is conjoined to the fourth 4096, through the octuple ratio.

the extremes. But if a fifth analogous term is added, the sides will no longer be conjoined in an octuple ratio but in the ratio of 10 to 1; and on this account there will be three analogous media between the two cubes. What Plato says, therefore, is true according to the before-mentioned method. Are not the sides also co-adapted to his purpose? And it is requisite to say, that there may be one medium between two cubes, yet not according to harmonic ratios. Hence, when there is truly a colligation of the extremes through these ratios, then it is perfectly requisite that there should be two media. Through these things, therefore, it is manifest mathematically, that similar planes require one medium, and similar solids two media, and that they can never be bound by one medium alone.

Being impelled, however, by these observations, let us see how physical conceptions accord with them, and let us adapt probable to scientific assertions. And in the first place, let us survey what a physical plane is, and how in planes of this kind, there is one medium, but two in physical solids. The divine Iamblichus indeed (for this man in a remarkable degree comprehended a theory of this kind, others being as it were asleep, and conversant only with the mathematical meaning of the words) appears to me to distinguish things simple from such as are composite, parts from wholes, and in short, material powers, and material forms, from the essences to which they give completion. And some of these, he calls superficies, but others solids. For as a superficies is the ultimate boundary of a mathematical body, so likewise material form, and material power, are the *morphe* and boundary of their subjects. These things, therefore, being thus divided, in things of a simple nature, one medium is sufficient, because there is [one] difference of the reasons and forms, and according to the common bonds of the reasons and the life. For in these there is one medium. Hence quality is uniformly connected with quality, and power with power, according to the difference and sameness of forms. But in things of a composite nature, there are very properly two media. For the duad is the supplier of all composition and separation. Every composite nature however consists of many essences and powers. Hence, there are many media. And these at least are two-fold. For there is one medium according to form, and another according to subject.

We however, conformably to physical principles, speak as follows, receiving auxiliaries from what Plato says as he proceeds. Or rather, let us speak from the beginning. There are some physiologists then, who ascribe one power to each of the elements; to fire indeed heat, to air frigidity, to water moisture, and to earth dryness; in so doing entirely wandering from the truth. In the first

place, because they subvert the world and order. For it is impossible for things to be co-adapted to each other, when they possess the most contrary powers, unless they have something in common. In the next place, they make the most contrary natures allied to each other, viz. the hot to the cold, and the moist to the dry.<sup>1</sup> It is necessary however, to make things which are hostile more remote than things which are less foreign. For such is the nature of contraries. In the third place, therefore, the first two powers will have no sympathy whatever with the rest; but will be divulsed<sup>2</sup> from each other. For it is impossible to say what is common to humidity and frigidity. And in addition to all these things, as the elements are solids, they will not be conjoined to each other by any medium. It has however been shown that it is not possible for solids to be conjoined through one medium. Nor can they be conjoined without a medium. For this is alone the province of things that are perfectly without interval.

But some others, as Ocellus, who was the precursor of Timæus, attribute two powers to each of the elements, to fire indeed heat and dryness, to air, heat and moisture, to water, moisture and coldness, and to earth, coldness and dryness. And these things are written by this man in his treatise On Nature. In what therefore, do these err who thus speak? In the first place, indeed, wishing to discover the common powers in the elements, in order that they may preserve the co-arrangement of them with each other, they no more assign communion than separation to them, but equally honour their hostility and their harmony. What kind of world therefore, will subsist from these, what order will there be of things which are without arrangement and most foreign, and of things which are most allied and co-arranged? For things which in an equal degree are hostile and peaceful, will in an equal mode dissolve and constitute communion. But this communion being similarly dissolved, and similarly implanted, the universe will no more exist than not exist. In the second place, they do not assign the greatest contrariety to the extremes, but to things most remote from the extremes; though we every where see, that of homogeneous natures those which are most distant have the nature of contraries, and not those which are less distant. How likewise did nature arrange them, since they are most remote in their situation from each other? Was it not by perceiving their contrariety, and that the third was more allied than the last to the first? How also did she arrange the motions

<sup>1</sup> For το ἐναντιώτατα here, read τα ἐναντιώτατα, and for τῶ θερμῶν τῶ ψυχρῶ, το θερμῶν, κ. λ.

<sup>2</sup> For ἀπρηρημένα in this place, I read διρημένα.

of them, since fire is most light and tends upward, but earth is most heavy and tends downward? But whence were the motions of them which are most contrary derived, if not from nature? If therefore, nature distributed to them most contrary motions, it is evident that they are themselves most contrary. For as the motions of simple beings are simple, and those things are simple of which the motions are simple, thus also those things are most contrary of which the motions are most contrary. And this may occasion some one to wonder at Aristotle, who in what he says about motion, places earth as most contrary to fire; but in what he says about powers, he makes the most remote of similar natures to be more friendly than those that are proximate, when they are moved with most contrary motions. For as the elements have contrary places in their positions, as they have contrary motions in motions, as they have contrary powers, gravity and levity, through which motions subsist in their forms, thus also they have contrary passive qualities. Aristotle himself likewise manifests that earth is contrary to fire. For wishing to show that it is necessary there should be more bodies than one, he says: "Moreover, if earth exists, it is also necessary that fire should exist. For in things, one of the contraries of which naturally is, the other likewise has a natural subsistence." So that neither was he able after any other manner to show that there are more elements than one, than by asserting that fire is contrary to earth.

Farther still, as the elements are solids, how can they be bound together through one medium? For this is impossible in solids, as we have before observed. Hence those who assert these things, neither speak mathematically nor physically, but unavoidably err in both these respects. For physical are derived from mathematical entities. *Timæus therefore alone, or any other who rightly follows him, neither attributes one nor two powers alone, to the elements, but triple powers; to fire indeed, tenuity of parts, acuteness and facility of motion; to air, tenuity of parts, obtuseness, and facility of motion; to water, grossness of parts, obtuseness, and facility of motion; and to earth, grossness of parts, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion.* But this is in order that each of the elements may have two powers, each<sup>1</sup> of which is common to the element placed next to it, and one power which is different, in the same manner as it was demonstrated in mathematical numbers and figures; this different power being assumed from one of the extremes; and also in order that earth according to all the powers, may subsist oppositely to fire; and that

<sup>1</sup> For *μὴν* here, it is obviously necessary to read *καταμὴν*.

the extremes may have two media, and the continued quantities two; the latter having solids for the media, but the former, common powers. For let fire indeed be attenuated in its parts, acute, and easily moved. For it has an attenuated essence, and is acute, as having a figure of this kind [i. e. a pyramidal figure], and on this account is incisive and fugitive,<sup>1</sup> and permeates through all the other elements. It is also moved with facility,<sup>2</sup> as being most near to the celestial bodies, and existing in them. For the celestial fire itself is moved with celerity, as is likewise sublunary fire, which is perpetually moved in conjunction with it, and according to one circle, and one impulse. Since therefore, earth is contrary to fire, it has contrary powers, viz. grossness, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion, all which we see are present with it. But these being thus hostile, and being solids, are also similar solids. For their sides and their powers are analogous. For as the gross is to the attenuated, so is the obtuse to the acute, and that which is moved with difficulty, to that which is moved with facility. But those are similar solids of which the sides that constitute the bodies are analogous. *For the sides are the powers of which bodies consist.* Hence, as fire and earth are similar bodies, and similar solids, two analogous media fall between them; and each of the media will have two sides of the extreme situated next to it, and the remaining side from the other extreme. Hence, since fire has for its three physical sides the triple powers, tenuity, acuteness, and facility of motion, by taking away the middle power, acuteness, and introducing instead of it obtuseness, we shall produce air, which has two sides of fire, but one of earth, or two powers of fire, but one of earth; as it is fit that what is near should rather communicate with it, than what is separated in the third rank from it.

Again, since earth has three physical powers, contrary to the powers of fire, viz. grossness of parts, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion; by taking away difficulty of motion, and introducing facility of motion, we shall produce water, which consists of gross parts, is obtuse, and is easily moved; and which has indeed, two sides or powers common with earth, but receives one from fire. And thus these media will be spontaneously conjoined with each other; communicating indeed in twofold powers, but differing in similitude by one power; and the extremes will be bound together by two media. Each element also will thus be in a greater degree conjoined to, than separated from the element which is

<sup>1</sup> For *πυρρὸν* in this place, read *πυρρὰν*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *εὐκίνητον* here, it is necessary to read *εὐκίνητον*.

near to it; and one world will be perfectly effected through all of them, and one harmonious order, through the predominance of analogy. Thus also, of the two cubes 8 and 27, the medium 12 being placed next to 8, will have two sides of this, but one side of 27. For 12 is produced by  $2 \times 2 \times 3$ . But it is vice versa with 18. For this is produced by  $3 \times 3 \times 2$ . And the side of 27 is 3, in the same manner as 2 is the side of 8. The physical dogmas therefore of Plato about the elements of the universe, accord with mathematical speculations.

Hence these things being thus determined, let us physically adapt them to the words of Plato. We call a [physical] plane or superficies therefore, that which has two powers only, but a [physical] solid that which has three powers. And we say, that if we fashion bodies from two powers, one medium would conjoin the elements to each other. But since, as we assert, bodies possess triple powers, they are bound together by two media. For there are two common powers of the adjacent media, and one power which is different. And the extremes themselves, if they consisted of two powers, would be conjoined through one medium. For let fire, if you will, be alone attenuated and easily moved; but earth on the contrary, have alone grossness of parts and immobility. One medium therefore, will be sufficient for these. For grossness of parts and facility of motion, and tenuity of parts, and difficulty of motion, are all that is requisite to the colligation of both. Since however, each of the elements is triple, the extremes require two media, and the things themselves that are adjacent, are bound together through two powers. For solids, and these are things that have triple contrary powers, are never co-adapted by one medium.

“Thus therefore, the divinity placing water and air in the middle of fire and earth, and rendering them as much as possible analogous to each other, so that what fire is to air, that air might be to water, and what air is to water, that water might be to earth, he bound together and constituted the heaven, visible and tangible.”

Some of the Platonists, being impelled by the assertions of Aristotle, extend through the whole world one passive matter, not at all different from that of the *heavens*, and in consequence of embracing certain barbaric opinions, give to the world a fifth body, and refer the doctrine concerning it to Plato. For Aristotle, following these opinions, introduced a fifth element. And this in a certain respect he obscurely signifies, adducing the observations of the Barbarians as a



testimony of the perpetuity and sameness of the motion of æther. But others assert, that the heavens are of a different essence, as having a different form of life, a more simple motion, and a more perpetual nature; but that Plato is now speaking about the sublunary elements, and adorns these by analogies. These men indeed, speak rightly, both with respect to things, and the opinion of Plato, in asserting that the nature of the heavens is different from mutable, and in short, material things; but at the same time <sup>1</sup> they neglect the Platonic words, in which the philosopher says, that "*the Demiurgus bound together and constituted the heaven [or the universe] through the analogy of the four elements;*" and again, in another place, "*that he elaborated the idea of the stars, for the most part from fire.*"

Let us therefore, if you are willing, preserving the opinions of both these men, perspicuously show, that the whole world consists of the four elements, and that the heavens are of a different essence [from the sublunary region]. And in the first place let us discuss the latter. For it is necessary, either that the heavens, should be entirely different from the four elements, being, as some say, a fifth element; or that the heavens should consist of the four elements; or from some one of the four; or from more than one. And if <sup>2</sup> the heavens consist of the four, they either consist of elements specifically the same with the sublunary, or of others. If however, that element is different from the four, how does Plato say that the whole world consists of the four elements? But if it is constituted from one of the four, how does he say shortly after, that the stars consist for the most part of fire? And if the world is constituted from more elements than one, [but not from all the four] how will it happen that a divine body will not be imperfect, and how will it possess all things, though the earth, and in short the sublunary region, have all things? But, if the world consists of all the elements, how does it happen, that in the heavens the composition of them is indissoluble, but in these [sublunary] realms is dissoluble. For they will not be indissoluble on account of equal dominion. For whence, if there is equal dominion, is the variety in the heavens produced? And how does Plato say that fire for the most part predominates there, if there is an equal domination? But if the heavens consist of four elements specifically different from the four sublunary elements, how, since they are composites, are the heavens moved with a simple motion? Where also are the wholenesses of the things which are there mingled?

<sup>1</sup> For *ἡμῶν* in this place, it is necessary to read *οὐμῶν*.

<sup>2</sup> *Εἰς* is omitted here in the original.

Such therefore being the doubts, it is better to say *that all heaven consists of fire, which there predominates ; but that it also comprehends according to cause, the powers of the other elements*, such as the solidity and stability of earth, the conglutinating and uniting power of water, and the tenuity and transparency of air. For as earth comprehends all things terrestrially, so the heavens comprehend all things according to a fiery characteristic. So that one thing [i. e. fire] has dominion, and the other elements are comprehended in it causally. It is necessary however to think, that the fire which is there, is not the same with sublunary fire, but that it is divine fire, consubsistent with life, and an imitation of intellectual fire. And that the fire which is here is wholly material, generated, and corruptible. Genuine fire therefore, is in the heavens, and total fire [or the wholeness of fire] is there. But earth is there according to cause, being another species of earth, and as it is fit it should, commascent with divine fire, possessing solidity alone, in the same manner as fire possesses an illuminative power. And as this celestial fire is not caustic, neither is the earth which is there gross, but the summit of each is there. And as genuine and truly existing fire are in the heavens, so real earth is here, and the wholeness of earth ; but fire is here according to participation, and materially, in the same manner as earth is primarily. For that which remains is in each appropriately ; there the summit of earth [or earth according to cause] ; but here the dregs of fire. But this is evident from the moon which possesses something solid and dark, and obstructing the light. For to obstruct is alone the province of earth. The stars also obstruct the sight, as producing a shadow above themselves. And it is evident this being the case, that since fire is in the heavens, and also earth, the diaphanous media between these, are likewise necessarily there primarily ; air indeed, such as the most pure and agile air which is here ; but water, such as the most exhaleable with us, and even still purer than these ; in order that all things may be in all, but appropriately in each. For on this account we characterize fire by visibility, which is deservedly the peculiarity of all fire. For as earth is primarily tangible, so fire is primarily visible ; because it is not in want of any one of the other elements, in order that it may be visible, as the others are in want of the illuminative power of fire to their visibility. But fire becomes itself visible through itself. And this is common to all fire. The question therefore is solved.

That all the progression of the elements however, may become manifest to us, and the gradations of them, it is requisite that we should begin the theory of them from on high. These four elements therefore, fire and air, water and earth,

subsist primarily, and uniformly according to cause, in the Demiurgus of wholes. For all causes are antecedently contained in him, according to one comprehension. Hence he comprehends the intellectual, divine, undefiled, and vigorous power of fire; the connective and vivific cause of air; the prolific and regenerating hyparxis of water; and the firm,\* stable, immutable, and unvacillating idea of earth. The theologist therefore, knowing these things, says of the Demiurgus,

His body 's boundless, firm, and fiery-bright;

And,

The wide-extended all-pervading air,  
Forms his broad shoulders, back, and bosom fair,  
His middle zone 's the spreading sea profound,  
His feet, the roots deep-fix'd within the solid ground.

But from these demiurgic causes, a progression takes place of these four elements into the universe, though not immediately into the sublunary world. For how can the most immaterial natures give subsistence without a medium, to the most material; and immoveable natures, to those that are in every respect moved? For the progression of things is nowhere without a medium, but exists according to a well-ordered gradation. The generations also into these material, dissipated, and dark realms, are effected through things of a proximate nature. For these are capable of being fashioned by the junior Gods, and especially so far as they have a tangible composition. But the Demiurgus is the father of greater and more beautiful effects.

Since therefore, the elements in the Demiurgus himself are intellects, and imparticipable intellectual powers, what will be the first progression of them? Is it not evident, that they will still continue to be intellectual powers, but participated by mundane natures? For the progression from imparticipable intellect is proximately to that intellect which is participated. And in short, the progression from imparticipable causes, is to those that are participated, and from supermundane to mundane forms. These powers however, still remaining intellectual, but participable, what kind of diminution will they have? Is it not this, that they will no longer be

\* For *γενεσις* in this place, it is necessary to read *ποιησις*.

intellectual? But I call intellectual natures, the forms of intellect, and of an essence truly intellectual. Being however, participable, but no longer intellectual, it is evident that they will not be immoveable. And not being immoveable, they will be self-motive. For these are proximately suspended from immoveable natures; and the progression is from things essentially intellectual, to those that are so by participation, and from immoveable beings, to those that move themselves. These elements therefore, will subsist in life, and will be intellectual according to participation, and self-motive. But it is evident what that is which will proceed from this. For the descent from life is to animal; for this is proximate to life. And from that which is self-motive according to essence, to that which is self-motive according to the participation of life. And so far indeed, as the elements proceed from life to animal, they are changed; but so far as they proceed from that which is immaterial to immaterial natures (I mean immaterial as with reference to mutable matter,) and from a divine life, to a divine essence, they are assimilated to truly immaterial essences. Here therefore, taking away the immaterial, and the immutable, you will make the material and the mutable. And through this they will be inferior to the natures prior to them; but through the order and symmetry of their motions, and the immutability in things mutable, they will be assimilated to them. If therefore, you also take away this order, and survey the great confusion and instability of the elements, you will have the last of all things, and those which are allotted an ultimate separation, being the dregs of all the elements prior to these. Hence, of the elements, some are immoveable, intellectual, demiurgic; others are intellectual indeed essentially, and immoveable, but are participated by mundane natures; others are self-motive, and have their existence in lives; others are self-motive, but live [i. e. are animals], and are not lives only; others are alter-motive, but are moved in an orderly manner; and others, are disorderly, tumultuous and confused.

The difference of the elements therefore, being so great, what occasion is there to disturb what is here said by Pl<sup>o</sup> to, as if the elements existed only in one way? For it is necessary to survey the elements in as many ways as there are media between the Demiurgus and sublunary natures; because their progression is through media. The elements therefore, are in the heavens, but not<sup>1</sup> after the

<sup>1</sup> *Ου* is omitted here in the original.

same manner as in genesiurgic bodies ; for neither do they subsist in the heavens, after the same manner as in the Demiurgus. But prior to the sublunary elements, there are, the celestial fire (and this light manifests which is a species of fire) and celestial earth. Or why does the moon being illuminated produce a shadow, and why does not the solar light pervade through the whole of it ? It is also necessary that the middle elements should be in the heavenly bodies, but that different elements should abound in different parts of the celestial regions. *And in some places indeed, it is necessary that the fiery nature should widely scatter its splendour, on account of solidity, as in the starry bodies ; but in others, that it should be concealed from us, as in the spheres that carry the stars. Hence, the peculiarity of all fire is visibility, but neither heat, nor floating. And solidity and tangibility, are the characteristics of all earth, but not gravity, sinking, and a downward tendency. If therefore, we assume these peculiarities, we shall find that fire and earth subsist also analogously in the heavens ; fire indeed, defining the essence of them, but each of the other elements being consubsistent with it.*

For again, this also may be said, that causes and the efficient of certain things, every where antecedently comprehend the powers of the natures which are adorned and produced by them ; and especially when they produce according to nature. For this nature possesses the form of the teeth, the eyes and the hands, through which also she gives *morphe* to matter. And not every eye possesses interval, but there is something in which it has an impartible form. Again, soul is one, and contains in itself that which is divine, and that which is irrational. And in the divine part of itself, it comprehends rationally the irrational powers, by which it governs, and arranges in a becoming manner irrationality. And neither is the unity of the soul, nor its multitude destroyed through different essences. For these things subsist in one way in the superior, and in another in the inferior part. In a similar manner, the world also is one and many ; for the heavens are one thing, and generation another. And generation is adorned from the heavens ; and these elements are in the heavens, but celestially. For they are in soul, psychically, in intellect, intellectually, and in the Demiurgus, demiurgically. For how could the sublunary elements be governed by the effluxions from these natures, unless they also subsisted in them after another manner ? Thus also in the arts, we may see that the physician does not preside over the carpenter ; for the physician does not antecedently comprehend in himself the works of the carpenter. Nor does the mechanic preside over the cook ; for the former does not antecedently comprehend things pertaining to banquets. But it

is the province of that which antecedently comprehends the whole power of a thing, to govern it. Hence it is evident that the mechanist entirely presides over the carpenter, and the physician over the cook. If therefore, the heavens govern all generation, the elements will be contained in them primarily.

The Pythagoreans however say, that the elements may be surveyed in the heavens in a twofold respect, in one way indeed prior to the sun, and in another after it: for the moon is ethereal earth. This therefore, the theologist clearly asserts. For he says:

Another boundless earth besides he made,  
Which Gods *selene*, mortals *mene* call,  
With num'rous houses, cities, mounts adorn'd.

But they say that the planet Mercury is ethereal water, Venus air, and the sun fire. And again, that Mars is celestial fire, Jupiter celestial air, Saturn celestial water, and the inerratic sphere celestial earth. And thus speaking in a divided manner they make the extremes to be every where fire and earth, but conjoin the ethereal natures through media, viz. through Venus and Mercury: for both these have a collective and unifying power. But they conjoin the celestial natures, through Saturn and Jupiter: for through these that which is connective of wholes, and the commensurate, accede to all things. What we now say, however, is conformable to the history delivered by many [of the Pythagoric doctrines]. For that this mode of distribution is not Platonic, we may learn from this that Plato arranges the sun immediately above the moon, afterwards Venus, and then Mercury.

It is necessary therefore to understand, that all the elements are in each of the celestial spheres, since in the sublunary elements also, each participates of the rest. For fire participates of earth; since being moved with facility, it would most rapidly perish, if it was entirely without stability. And earth participates of fire; for being moved with difficulty, it requires heat to resuscitate and restore it. As this therefore is the case in these sublunary elements, much more must all the elements be in each of the celestial spheres, though some of the heavenly bodies participate more<sup>1</sup> of fire, others of air, others of water, and others of earth.

Again therefore, from the beginning we must say, that the elements being con-

<sup>1</sup> Μαλλον is omitted in this place in the original.

ceived in one way as unmingled, but in another as mingled, the first mixture of them produces the heavens, which contain all things according to a fiery characteristic. [But the second mixture of them produces the sublunary region],<sup>1</sup> in which all things subsist according to a middle characteristic. And the last mixture of them produces the subterranean realms, in which the dregs of all things are contained, Pyriphlegethon, as they say, and Acheron, Ocean and Cocytus. Hence it may be said, that the four unmingled elements are every where, and that there are five, all heaven being assumed as one element; but that the last elements are comprehended in the earth. The five elements however, are said to be the elements of the *world*; and on this account the world derives its completion from them. But it must be said that the four elements are the elements both of the *heavens* and of *generation*. Hence the heavens are of a fifth essence, besides the four elements; but are mingled from the simple elements. For these sublunary four are not in the heavens, but the summits of them are there, and all the four elements unmingled, and separated from each other by their proper forms. And these assertions are most concordant with Plato, who at one time says that the heavens consist of the four elements, bound together by analogy, and that the whole world is constituted from these; but shortly after fashions the five figures, and calls them five worlds. For these things give a fifth essence to the heavens, introduce a tetractys of the elements, and accord with truth. For all things are in the heaven according to a fiery mode; and on this account it is a simple body, different from that which is sublunary, and truly comprehends all things pertaining to these material masses. We must not therefore admit that all earth is heavy, nor that all fire is light; but sublunary earth and fire are perhaps things of this kind, while those in the heavens subsist after another manner. For the solidity and stability which are there are derived from earth. And hence each of the spheres is not moved according to the whole of itself [but revolves round an immoveable centre]. But the celestial light, and facility of motion, are derived from fire. The connective and transparent nature of the heavens are from air; and their equability and smoothness, from water.

That Plato however, affords us these auxiliaries, he clearly shows shortly after, when he says, "*that he who constituted the world composed it from all fire water, air and earth, leaving no part nor power of any one of them externally.*" For he does not say from

<sup>1</sup> It appears that the words *της δε δευτερας τον υποσκληνην τοπον*, are wanting in this place, in the original.

fire or water simply, but from *all* fire and *all* water, through which he indicates that there is much fire in the universe, and of a different nature, and also much water, and which is essentially different. Moreover, *the theology of the Assyrians which was unfolded into light from divinity, delivers the same things.* For in that theology, the Demiurgus is said to have made the whole world from fire, water, earth, and all-nourishing ether or air; and the artificer is said to have fashioned the world as it were with his own hands. For it says, "there was a certain other mass of fire." But he fashioned, as it were manually, all things, in order that he might conglomerate the mundane body, "that the world might become manifest, and might not appear membranous;" which is the same thing as to say, that it might not alone bear the obscure and imbecile vestiges of forms. For the word *membranous* signifies the indistinct subsistence of reasons [or forms]. As we have said therefore, the *Oracles* also bear witness to what is asserted by Plato, since they too generate the world from the four elements. And thus much concerning the concord of philosophers about this particular: for we shall see in what follows, if there is any difference respecting it in the doctrine of Plato.

It is manifest however, that the elements are every where bound to each other by analogy.<sup>1</sup> For analogy, as we have said, imitates divine union, and is a demiurgic bond. And the analogy indeed in mathematics, possesses the accurate and the scientific: for the ratios there are immaterial. But in physics this is no longer similarly the case. For the analogy which is in the heavenly bodies participates of a certain accuracy; but in sublunary natures the analogy is less accurate, because it is conversant with matter. Again therefore, the order of the elements becomes apparent, and we see that Plato very properly procures from the mathematics belief in physical reasons. For they are causes, and the demiurgic progression is effected through soul. The generation also of physical essences appropriately proceeds through media; and celestial natures are in a certain respect more allied to accurate reasons, but sublunary natures have an obscure truth. Plato therefore knowing these things, adds, "*as much as possible,*" in order that you may not entirely require in physical reasons a mathematical accuracy. *For if you are willing to examine each of the elements, you will perceive an abundant mixture in it. Thus, for instance, air is not simply a thing of attenuated parts. For it has also something gross, nebulous, and aqueous. Nor is water simply easily moved. And the part of fire itself which is mingled with air, resembles the*

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *οτι δε αναλογια δεδεσται* in this place, it is necessary to read, *οτι δε αναλογιη δεδεσται*.



*obtuseness of air ; and this necessarily.* For it is requisite to conjoin the summits of secondary with the dregs of primary natures.

Farther still, we ought also to understand the manner in which Plato constitutes the analogy. For he begins from the media, and preserves the order of the terms, just as the Demiurgus made all things to be in each other,<sup>1</sup> together with preserving the distinction of them ; and he denominates all this contexture a bond and composition. For it is a *bond* indeed, as imparting union and analogy from the demiurgic cause ; but it is a *composition*, as being thence produced according to essence itself. For some one may bind things which he did not compose. This however, is not the case with the Demiurgus, but he is the father, he is the unifying cause, and he is the guardian of all his own works. In addition to these things also, it must be observed that Plato assumes here, as we have said, the geometric mean, and indicates that this is analogy. For it is the peculiarity of this middle to have the same ratio. Hence some persons properly call it analogy. The other media therefore, appear to be the suppliers of more partial goods to the world, and not to be the sources of the order which proceeds through all things, and of uninterrupted connexion. For in the generation of the soul the other<sup>2</sup> media are assumed for the sake of binding together the geometric ratios, and are comprehended in the whole geometric middle, as in that which is alone analogy.

“ Hence from these and things of this kind, which are four in number, the body of the world was generated, being concordant through analogy, and possessing friendship through these, so as to conspire into union with itself, and to be indissoluble by any other nature than by him through whom it was bound.” 32C

That the tetrad itself of the elements, primarily proceeded from all-perfect animal, (for it was the intelligible tetrad) and that on this account all things exist tetradically, becomes I think evident through the words before us ; and also that generation proceeds to the tetrad from the monad through the duad. For the world is only-begotten and one. Afterwards we find it is necessary that there should be the visible and tangible in it ; in the next place, we find that these being much separated from each other, are in want of a certain third thing ; and in the

<sup>1</sup> For *ex αλλοις* here, it is necessary to read *ex αλληλοις*.

<sup>2</sup> There is an omission in this place of *αι αλλαι*.

third place, that the medium is biformed, and thus we arrive at the tetrad. This therefore, is what the Pythagoric hymn says about number: *That it proceeds from the secret recesses of the monad, until it arrives at the divine tetrad. And this generates the decad, which is the mother of all things.* Thus also the father of the Golden Verses, celebrates the tetractys itself, as the fountain of perennial nature. For the world being adorned by the tetrad, which proceeds from the monad and triad, is terminated by the decad, as being comprehensive of all things. That the world likewise is one through analogy, subsisting from these elements, and from such like things according to powers, and from so many according to quantity, Plato clearly manifests by saying, that not the sublunary region, but the body of the universe, was generated from the four elements. But the friendship of the world is the end of the analogy, through which also the world is saved by itself. For every thing which is friendly, wishes to be preservative of that to which it is friendly: but every thing foreign turns from, and does not even wish that to exist to which it is abhorrent; so that the nature which is friendly to, is preservative of itself. The world however, is friendly to itself through analogy and sympathy, and therefore it preserves itself. But it is also preserved by the fabrication of things, receiving from it an ineffable guard. Hence also, the theologist denominates the bond derived from the Demiurgos strong, as Night is represented saying to the Demiurgos,

But when your power around the whole has spread  
A strong coercive bond.

Analogy however, imparts this friendship to the world, by connecting and comprehending the powers of the elements that are in it. Total nature likewise imparts it, producing the sympathy and harmony of contraries. But prior to nature, soul imparts it, weaving the one life of the world, and co-adapting all the parts of it to the whole. And still much prior to these, it is imparted by intellect, which produces in all things, order, perfection, and one connexion. And even prior to an intellectual essence, the one divinity of the universe, and all the Gods that are allotted the world, are the primordial causes of the union that is in it. But much prior to this, the one Demiurgos imparts this friendship to the world. This greatest however, and most perfect of bonds, which the father on all sides throws round the world, as being effective of the friendship and harmonious communion in it, is denominated by the [Chaldean] Oracles, *the bond of love heavily-laden with fire.* For they say, "The paternal self-begotten intellect understanding his works,

disseminated in all things, the bond of love heavy with fire." And they add the cause why he did this, "That all things might remain<sup>1</sup> loving for an infinite time, woven together intellectually in all the light of the father." For on account of this love, all things are adapted to each other, "That the elements of the world might remain running in love." Hence, the mundane elements are bound together, possess friendship, and this indissoluble for an infinite time, through the will of the father. If also together with these,<sup>2</sup> you are willing to survey the supermundane cause of friendship, you will find this likewise celebrated by theologists. For the Demiurgus produced Venus, in order that she might beautifully illuminate all mundane natures, with order, harmony, and communion. And he also produced Love as her attendant, who is the unifying cause of wholes. The Demiurgus however, likewise possesses in himself the cause of Love. For he is "Metis the first generator, and much-pleasing Love." Hence he is very properly the cause of friendship and concord to his fabrications. *And perhaps looking to this Pherecydes said, that Jupiter when he was about to fabricate, was changed into Love.* Because however, he constituted the world from contraries, he led it to concord and friendship, and disseminated in all things sameness and union which pervade through wholes.

Through these things therefore, the world is indissoluble, and it is likewise so from its maker. For how can that which generates all things by its very existence, be the cause of corruption to all things? Besides, every thing which is corrupted is corrupted either from matter, or from form, or from its maker; and from each of these in a two-fold respect. For it is corrupted from the maker, either being imbecile, as a partial nature; or changing its intention, as a partial soul. It is also corrupted from form, either not being well constituted at first, or being dissolved in the course of time. And it is corrupted from matter, either being inwardly deprived of symmetry, or sustaining violence externally. As corruption therefore, is produced in a sixfold manner, Plato subverts all the modes of it. For the world is not in either way corrupted from its maker. Not from his want of power, because the Demiurgus is the best of causes, and imbecility has no place with him, since he governs the universe by inflexible powers.

<sup>1</sup> For Μη &c here, read Μηνη &c.

<sup>2</sup> In the original *πρὸ τούτων*, but as Venus is posterior to the Demiurgus, who has previously been said to be the cause of friendship to the world, it appears to me that we should read *πρὸς τούτων*, or rather *πρὸς τούτοις*, as *πρὸς* seldom signifies *with*, when it governs the genitive.

Nor from his will, because he does not at different times will different things; and because, to be willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized, and well constituted, is the province of an evil nature. But he is good, and the universe is beautifully harmonized. It is a similar thing therefore, for the Demiurgus to be willing that the universe should not exist, and for him not to be good. Nor is the world corrupted from form; for it is harmonized according to analogy, and is perfect and one. And through harmony indeed, form vanquishes; but through wholeness and onliness, the world will never be deprived of congruity. Nor is it corrupted from matter. For its inherent analogy subverts the privation of symmetry. But its onliness removes it from the reach of external violence. By no means therefore, is it possible for the universe to be corrupted. Why then does Plato add, that it cannot be corrupted, except by him by whom it was bound? It is evident indeed, that it every where belongs to him who binds, to dissolve. And you may assume from this, that the world is generated in such a way,<sup>1</sup> as alone subsisting from another cause. For as it is not dissoluble by any thing else than its generator; so it is not generated by any other than by him who bound it, which is, as we have said, through his possessing the cause of the dissolution of that which is bound. What is here said also has another indication. For the universe is indissoluble by every thing, except by him who bound it. For it is not indissoluble by him; since this is a small thing to assert. But on the contrary, it is eternally bound by him. As if therefore it should be said, that he who possesses scientific knowledge, is incapable of being deceived by all things except by intellect; for he is not incapable of being deceived by intellect; since it is not sufficient to intellect that the soul is not deceived, but that it possesses wisdom; thus also the world is not indissoluble by him who bound it, but is rather bound by him. For by other things it is indissoluble; but to him it rather belongs to bind, and not to dissolve. Just as it belongs to the sun to illuminate, and not to darken. For this is the province of certain other things.

“ But the composition of the world received one whole of each of the four elements. For it was constituted by him who composed it, from *all* fire, water, air and earth; and he did not leave externally any part or power of any one of the elements.”

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *ouros* here, it is requisite to read *ourus*.

Plato knew, as we have before observed, that there are many differences of fire, of water, and of each of the other elements; from *all* which, he says, the world derives its completion; and he confers this as the third demiurgic gift on the world. So that we must not wonder if he leaves the summits of the four elements in the heavens, but the middle progressions of them in the sublunary regions, and the last dregs of them in the subterranean realms, distributing the elements analogous to the three demiurgi Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. For each whole of them is assumed, and the universe consists of all of each; whether you speak of that which is primarily fire, and is celestial, or of that which has a middle rank, or of that which is the last, which is disorderly and confused, and is coloured over with certain fiery qualities. For such as we suppose the confused and inordinate to be, such especially appears to be each of the subterranean elements; because fabrication in proceeding, ends gradually in that which is unadorned, and which participates in the smallest degree of order. These things, therefore, are manifest.

We say, however, that part and power differ; so far as a part of each of the elements, is of a similar essence with the whole of which it is a part, but power gives completion to each of the elements. For a part of fire is fire; but power is one of the many peculiarities in fire, such as motion, acuteness, and tenuity. It is evident, therefore, that all fire, and all the powers of fire, and of the other elements, are comprehended in the world. What then, some one may say who is impelled by the divine wisdom which is beyond the confines of common philosophy; who divides all things, into the empyrean, the etherial, and the material; and who calls the visible alone the material world, what shall we assert of the firmaments that are above the world, whether it be requisite to call them Olympus, or empyrean, or ethers? May we not say, that though those firmaments should not consist of the four elements, again it is true, that no part of the four, is external to the universe, or rather, as Plato says, is *externally*. For the term *externally*, is more emphatical, because it manifests, that the violence which these elements bring with them, is not within the universe, but *externally* invades it. For those firmaments are fiery, and are comprehended in the whole world. And again it

\* Proclus means by this, the wisdom of the Chaldeans, as delivered in their Oracles.

\* According to the Chaldeans there are seven corporeal worlds, one empyrean and the first; after this, three etherial; and then three material worlds, which consist of the inerratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region.

is true, that there is no fire out of the universe, but the universe comprehends the whole of it, such as the universe is, and such as is the amplitude of its bulk. So that the assertion of Timæus is perfectly true. But why then, some one may say, does he give subsistence to the universe, beginning from the inerratic sphere? Is it not because it belongs to a natural philosopher to discourse about visible, and in short, sensible natures? Perhaps, too, he very properly alone makes mention of these, as pertaining to the fabrication of Jupiter. For of those [i. e. the empyrean, ethereal, and material worlds] the ethereal is most vivific, but the empyrean is paternal, and the material is demiurgic. *For the fire which is the first beyond, did not enclose its power in works, but in intellect: for the artificer of the fiery [i. e. the empyrean] world is an intellect of intellect, says the Oracle.* Unless it be requisite to say this, that Plato produces soul analogous to the ethereal worlds, but intellect, to the empyrean world. Hence also he says, that soul was mingled from three parts, but that intellect is impartible. For the ethereal is triple, and the *Psychocrator*, or mingler of soul, who ascends into the ethereal worlds, is a Teletarch.<sup>1</sup> We learn, also, that the empyrean world is one, and is essentially intellectual. These things therefore must hereafter be considered: for it is very dubious how they accord with the dogmas of Plato. Now, however, let us pass on to the words that follow.

“ For by a dianoetic or reasoning process he concluded, that it would thus be a whole animal in the highest degree perfect from perfect parts. And besides this, that it would be one, as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced. And further still, that it would neither be obnoxious to old age, nor disease. For he intellectually perceived, that the heat and cold which meet in body, and all such things as have strong and vigorous powers, when they surround bodies externally, and fall on them unseasonably, dissolve their union, and introducing diseases and old age, cause them to perish through decay.”

<sup>1</sup> For *εκ δυνάμιν* here, read *ἐν δυνάμιν*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *οὐ γὰρ ἡμεῖς*, it is necessary to read *οὐ γὰρ οὐμῖς*.

<sup>3</sup> The Teletarchs subsist at the extremity of that order of Gods which is called *intelligible and at the same time intellectual*. See the 4th Book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

Plato assigns three causes, that I may speak summarily, through which no element is left externally to the universe, viz. perfection, unity, and perpetuity. But all these reciprocate in the subject of them. For if the universe is perfect, there is nothing external to it. For another world might be generated from that which is external; since why should one thing be generated from these elements [which are within the world], but nothing from those [which are external to it]? And if there is nothing external to the world, the world is one. Again, if the world is perpetual, there is no body external to the universe, homogeneous to the elements which are in it. For if any thing should invade it, it would injure, and dissolve the universe. For being external, it would be foreign to the world, and being foreign it would molest the universe. And if nothing is external to the world, the world is perpetual. For it will not have that which is corruptive of it. If also the admonition respecting the onliness, perpetuity, and perfection of the universe, is true, it was before assumed from the paradigm. For that was all-perfect, uniform [or having the form of one], and eternal; the second of these, on account of the one being, from which the only-begotten is derived; but the third, through eternity, from which perpetuity is derived; and the first, through comprehending all the forms of intelligible animals. For this is the peculiarity of all-perfect animal. But the all-perfect, indeed, is the cause of perfect natures; the uniform, of monadic; and the eternal, of perpetual natures; since every producing cause, produces that which is second similar to itself, and especially when it produces according to essence, and has an essence in energy. At the same time, also, each of these is demonstrated from these as material causes. For if there is nothing external to the universe, and if it comprehends all appropriate parts, it is one, perfect, and perpetual. Some one however may doubt, how Plato arguing from perpetuity, says that nothing is left external to the universe. For there are other perpetual natures, such as the celestial bodies, and yet something is external to them. But may you not say of these, that other things are external to them, and yet not external? For as naturally separated from other things, there is something external to them; but as being co-passive with them, and comprehended together with them as most principal parts of the universe by one nature, there is not any thing external to them. But if any thing was external to the universe, it would be external alone, having no sympathy with the world. It would also be a thing of a foreign nature, would be destitute of the life which is in the world, and would be cut off from it, by the intervening vacuum.

If, likewise, some one should doubt concerning the psychical vehicles, how they

are not passively affected by these elements, since they do not vanquish them in the same manner as divine bodies, it must be said that they would suffer from them, if they consisted of things similar to the elements. But now being composed of other things, they remain according to hypostasis<sup>1</sup> indissoluble. At the same time, however, they are not entirely impassive; but material bodies being agglutinated to them, they are hindered from their natural motion, and are moved in an inordinate manner; neither being able to be moved circularly, on account of the connexion with them of the material bodies, nor to proceed in a right line, on account of their own nature. Hence also Plato calls the periods of our souls, disorderly and confused; not only on account of the psychical motions, but likewise on account of the motions of our vehicles, in consequence of such a conglutination taking place from these sublunary bodies. If therefore the universe is perpetual, and always subsists according to nature, it will be requisite that there should be nothing external to it. For this being perfectly foreign from it, and falling on it externally, would become the cause of its corruption. You may also say conversely, that the words, "*in order that the universe may be perpetual,*" are the conclusion; but that the middle term and the cause of the conclusion is this, *that there is nothing external to the universe.* For because there is nothing external to the universe, nothing can introduce corruption to it, as something foreign; so that it is perpetual. To the universe therefore this is the cause of perpetuity; but to the parts in it, not this, but other things are the cause of incorruptibility; such for instance as, the being constituted by the one Demiurgus. For he is simply the cause of immortality to all things; so that the universe is in a greater degree incorruptible. For it is incorruptible on account of the Demiurgus, and because there is nothing external to it. Thus, likewise, it is possible to convert the other parts of the text, as, that because there is nothing external to the universe, the universe is *only-begotten*; that the only-begotten may be three-fold, viz. on account of the paradigm, on account of all matter being comprehended in it, and on account of the Demiurgus being one. And, also, that the universe is *all-perfect*, because it is comprehensive of all things. Each of these assertions therefore is evident. But with respect to the things which are the converse of these, such as that, if the universe is only-begotten it has nothing external to it, this is immediately true of the universe alone; and the demonstrations will be as follow: The universe is only-begotten; but if it is only-begotten, it will have nothing external

<sup>1</sup> For *υποβολή* here, it seems necessary to read *υποστασις*.



to itself, from which another thing of the like kind may be generated. The universe is indissoluble; but if indissoluble nothing foreign to the natures of which it consists, will be external to it. The universe<sup>1</sup> is all-perfect. For the all-perfect is that which is not defective in any thing. Hence Aristotle also says, that the universe alone is perfect; but all things in it are imperfect, as being parts of the universe. These therefore, that I may speak summarily, are the particulars which are discussed by Plato.

If, however, you are willing, we will recur to the words themselves. Through the words therefore, "*by a dianoetic or reasoning process*," he evolves the intellectual perception in the Demiurgus, calling it *dianoia*; since he apprehends it dianoetically and not through simple projection. *For a various evolution of cause, is the work of dianoia; but a uniform apprehension, and the comprehension of all things in one intellectual perception, are the employment of intellect.* Plato therefore, making himself the promulgator of the causes antecedently comprehended in the Demiurgus, refers his own discursive energy to the uniform intellectual perception of the fabricator of the world. Thus also the oracles call the partible intellection of the Demiurgus, *dianoia*. For they say, "I soul being hot and animating all things dwell after the paternal *dianoias*." But the words, "*a whole animal in the highest degree perfect from perfect parts*," assimilate the world to the intellectual wholeness, and the intelligible allness. For parts subsist with a reference to whole, and are not perfect from themselves; but they have indeed the perfection of parts, yet are simply destitute of perfection. The universe, however, is properly a whole. *For a whole totally is one thing; a part totally is another; a whole partially is another; and a part partially ranks in the third place. And the universe, indeed, is a whole totally, as being a whole of wholes. But each of the spheres is a part totally, according to the second form of wholeness. And partial animals, are wholes partially. For the third wholeness is in these, but with a partial peculiarity. And the parts of these are parts partially: for they are parts alone.*

Moreover the words "*as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced*," is an explanation of the cause through which the world is one; but it is an explanation of the material cause. For if there was anything of this kind external to the world, another world greater or less might be generated from it. For the Demiurgus would not leave it unadorned; because he wishes

<sup>1</sup> In the original το παν ἀρα παντελές, but ἀρα is evidently superfluous. For that the universe is all-perfect, is now about to be proved.

all things to be good, and nothing to be bad. But if the world is one, nothing of such a nature as the things from which it is generated, is left external to it. Perhaps, too, Plato adds this, on account of the celestial bodies, and in short, on account of monadic natures. *For the celestial bodies are monadic, no other things being left external to them from which such like bodies could be generated.* For each of them consists of those things, which in magnitude, power, and multitude, are constitutive of them alone, but of no other thing.<sup>1</sup> Hence also they are called monadic, because they alone consist of these things alone. Nor is any one of the simple bodies [i. e. of the four elements], such in all respects as the element<sup>2</sup> of each of these [celestial bodies]. From the elevated conceptions therefore of Plato, it follows, that then alone a thing is corrupted by the natures that surround it, when it consists of the same things as those by which it is surrounded; so that there are as many differences of fire, and of each of the elements, as there are monadic natures from which the universe consists; and the Demiurgus constituted as many ideas of simple bodies, as of the composite natures, which he intended to produce. Hence, all of them give completion to one certain thing, and nothing else is generated from them.

But the words, *neither obnoxious to old age, nor disease*, have a manifest cause. *For disease arises from the want of symmetry in the things that enter into the body, some of the parts in us being augmented by others, and dissolving the analogy with the remaining parts of which we consist, through which a superabundance and deficiency of the humours are secretly introduced, and old age accedes, nature becoming imbecile*, as Plato says further on, through contending against many things that externally attack it, and enduring a numerous succession of labours. For the concoction and management of the food, purgation, and all such things as are the works of nature, are not without labour. And from this you may assume, that the Demiurgus who renders the world free from old age and disease, possesses the fountain of the Paeonian series. For it is necessary that the truly existing cause, and which is alone the cause of health, should subsist prior to the generated cause, or the cause of health which the world contains. For, in short, if the cause of symmetry is the health of the elements, it is necessary that this should exist in the most beautiful manner in the universe, in which there is in the most

<sup>1</sup> Instead of ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οὐδενος here, it is requisite to read ἀλλανδὲ οὐδενος.

<sup>2</sup> For οὐκ τὸ καθύστερον τούτων στοιχείων, I read οὐκ τὸ καθύστερον τούτων στοιχείων. The celestial bodies consist of, what Aristotle calls, a fifth element, and which is essentially different from each of the four elements.

eminent degree a symmetry of all the elements; so that the fountain of this is primarily with the Demiurgus. And it seems that there is one concurrence with each constitution of composite natures, and which is a certain demiurgic health; but another which renovates the existing state of being, or the state of being, which is still preserved, or is in a perishing condition; which is preserved, indeed, in the natures that are connected by indissoluble bonds, but is in a perishing condition in those whose connecting bonds are dissoluble. For indissoluble natures, as being finite, and having a finite power, are in want of renovating causes: for they are renovated from things which possess infinite power. And here indeed [i. e. in what Plato now says] the providence of divinity about the universe, in order that it may be free from disease, concurs with the composition of the universe. But the providence mentioned in the Politicus, according to which divinity coming into contact with the helm of the universe, corrects what was vitiated in a former period, is the paradigm of the second kind of health, which is of a renovating nature. *Hence also theologists refer one kind of health to Esculapius, this being all the medicine of things preternatural, whether it perpetually or sometimes only represses a preternatural subsistence. But they generate another prior to Esculapius, which is consubsistent with the fabrication of things, and which they produce from Persuasion and Love.* Hence, as Plato says, the universe is from intellect and necessity, intellect<sup>1</sup> persuading necessity; but necessity being converted to intellect, in order that it may lead all things to that which is best. For it is evident from these things, that the universe subsists according to nature, from its first composition, through the persuasion proceeding from intellect, and the conversion of necessity to intellect. Hence, it is manifest that the Demiurgus comprehends the fountain of health, both that which is Esculapian, and that which is Demiurgic. And thus much for this particular.

But the constituted body, is a composite, and alter-motive. That which is self-motive therefore, is preservative of itself; but that which is alter-motive, in a particular manner requires not to be disturbed by other things. The universe, however, so far as it is a body is alter-motive. But Plato assumes heat and cold as things of an efficacious nature, and as possessing strong and vigorous powers; the former producing corruption through section, but the latter through violent congelation. But the word *unseasonably* manifests the privation of symmetry, and the inaptitude arising from the want of symmetry, and besides these, the incursions

<sup>1</sup> For *rov rov* here, read *rov rov*.

from chance. For it appeared to those who leave something external to the universe, that it was proper to commit the accidents of bodies to fortune and chance. Plato, however, in saying that heat and cold by surrounding and falling on the world, would introduce disease and corruption, may seem to grant that the world is in short both hot and cold. For if it did not suffer something of this kind, though the natures which surround it should be hot and cold, it would suffer nothing from them. For he says that the world would suffer by the things which would surround it. And if indeed it consisted of things some of which are hot and others cold, it would suffer by these; but if of others, which have strong and vigorous powers, it would suffer from them. For whether these surrounding natures should happen to be contrary to the things of which the world consists, because contrary, they would cause the composite on which they fall, to decay; or whether they were similar, they would dissolve the proportion according to which the world was constituted, through being mingled with the similar natures that are in it. As he speaks, therefore, of every composite, he very properly makes mention of heat and cold, as of things universally known. For there is a certain composite, and it consists of these, and is known to all. Hence, because it is known, he mentions these. Since, however, every composite does not consist of these, he adds, in what he afterwards says, universally, "*and all such things as have strong and vigorous powers*," though they should not be heats and colds. For it is necessary that every physical body should have a physical power, through which it may be able to act according to nature. If, therefore, any body should surround the world, whether similar or dissimilar to certain things contained in it; if dissimilar, indeed, it would disturb the world; but it is necessary that what is impassive should not be disturbed by that which is foreign, and by something which is situated in a certain place; and if similar, in consequence of being mingled with what is similar to it, it would dissolve the ratio of the elements in the world, from which it is constituted according to the most beautiful bond. Such therefore is the explanation of the particulars of the text.

Let us, however, survey itself by itself, how there is nothing external to the universe. For why did not the Demiurgus who constituted matter, fabricate many kinds of matter, and many worlds? May we not say, that he constituted matter, and always constitutes it, according to the unity which he contains, so that on this account, he very properly produces but one matter; and that the multitude of sensible forms possess differences, which distinguish them from each other, but that matter is without difference and without quality? For though we should

grant that there are many kinds of matter in this universe, yet we must say that there is one matter which proceeds from on high through diminution, as far as to the last dregs of things, which last sediment also is truly formless, the summit of matter having a great alliance to forms. For all things according to their summit are most allied to the natures prior to them. So that there is one, and yet not one matter, which proceeds through all things, itself subsiding into itself. On account of this matter, therefore, the Demiurgus produced one world having itself a diminution with reference to itself.<sup>1</sup> Every thing likewise which makes by its very existence, being one in itself, makes one image of itself, and one whole form; and especially when it remains immoveable. For being moved, it is possible for it to make other and other images of itself. Farther still it may be said, *that to divide production into multitude, is no longer the effect of power, but of imbecility. But to comprehend multitude in unity, and to connect the whole number of things through the monad, is the province of admirable abundance.* If, therefore, total power is in the Demiurgus, if he is an immoveable cause, if he fabricates by his very being, and if he generates that which is similar to himself, he generates the world one, whole, and perfect. *What then, it may be said, is not the Demiurgus able to govern many and infinite worlds? We reply, that multitude and the infinite [in quantity] are not the prerogatives of power, but that it pertains to power to congregate things that are divided, and to give bound to infinities. For this assimilates things to the good, to which also the Demiurgus extends all his productions.* This, therefore, is demonstrated through many other arguments.

That Plato however, in an admirable manner informs us, that nothing is left external to the universe, from which any thing else of the like kind could be generated, and that each of the things that are monadic alone consists of the simple natures of which it is composed, and there are not other<sup>2</sup> things external to it of a similar kind, from which any other such nature could be produced, we may learn by observing that he says, an all-various inequality exists in the seeds of bodies. And also, that on account of this inequality, the differences of fire, and of each of the elements, are incomprehensible. Hence, all fire is not<sup>3</sup> similar to all fire, though visibility is common to all. On this account likewise, there is a certain fire which burns, and this is all-various from the smallness and magni-

<sup>1</sup> For *αὐτὰ εἰς εἰσὴν* here, it seems necessary to read *αὐτὸν εἰς εἰσὴν*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτοις ὁμοία*, it is necessary to read *καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ ἄλλα κ. λ.*

<sup>3</sup> *Οὐχ* is omitted here in the original.

tude of the elements of which it consists. And the same thing is true of all the elements. Each of the monadic natures therefore, consists of all such things, as are contained in it alone, but in no other thing whatever. Hence it is not externally mingled with them nor is connascent with them. But you may also assume this from these sublunary bodies. For not every one is nourished by every one, but different bodies by different things, because all of them are not similar to the elements of which they consist. But each body becomes greater through those things by which it is able to be nourished, the things that enter into it receiving the places of those that depart from it. On this account, therefore, corruptible natures perish, because there are external to them things of a kind similar to those of which they consist, and which are contraries some to one thing, and others to another. Each of these also, being added to their appropriate natures, introduce corruption to composites, by dissolving the symmetry which is in them. In things that are corruptible therefore, the reason or productive principle, especially effects a difference, since it is very different from that of simple natures. But in things that are indissoluble, the difference, and the reasons of the composition of them, pertain to the same things. Hence, they are indissoluble, and in short monadic, alone existing from elements alone, according to one reason, and one symmetry. These things, therefore, should be examined more fully. For we shall find that they subsist in a beautiful manner,' if we look to things, and do not rest in words alone, as is the case with many who meddle with the theory of these particulars. Let us, however, proceed to what is next said by Plato.

“Through this cause, therefore, and this reasoning, he fabricated the world one whole, perfect from containing in itself all wholes, and free from old age and disease.”

*Cause* indeed, uniformly comprehends every thing which proceeds from it, but *reasoning* comprehends its productions in a divided manner, as we have before observed. So that the universe as one whole is comprehended by its cause, and is generated according to cause; but as consisting of all wholes, it is generated by a reasoning process.<sup>1</sup> And it is generated *one* indeed, by the demiurgic deity,

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *ειρησόμεν γὰρ οὐ καλῶς ἔχοντα*, it is obviously necessary to read *εὐρησόμεν γὰρ καλῶς ἔχοντα*.

<sup>2</sup> A reasoning process in the Demiurgus signifies, as has been before observed, a distributed or divided cause of things.

and according to divine union; but a whole according to the wholeness which is connective of intellectuals.<sup>1</sup> For this producing totally renders the universe a whole. And it is a whole containing in itself all wholes, according to the divided causes of forms. For the monad possesses with itself the whole number [of which it is the cause.] The universe also is perfect, as being always converted to its principles, and imitating the demiurgic conversion. But it is free from old age and disease, as having a flourishing, vigorous, and ever vigilant life, and as participating of admirable powers. For from the causes which renovate the world a pure and unwearied life is imparted to it, and from the inflexible <sup>2</sup> Gods, undefiled power. And through the former indeed the world is free from old age, always becoming new; but through the latter, it is free from disease, being purified from every thing preternatural. The Demiurgus, however, comprehends the cause of both these.

“ But he gave to it a figure adapted and allied to its nature. For to the animal which was to comprehend all animals in itself, that figure will be adapted, which contains within its ambit all figures of every kind. Hence he fashioned it as with a wheel of a spheriform shape, every where [or from all the parts] equally distant from the middle to the bounding extremities; this being the most perfect of all figures, and the most similar to itself. For he conceived that the similar is infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar.”

After the total causes of the world, the whole composition of it, and its essence consisting of total plenitudes, Timæus speaks concerning the figure of the universe; the most similar of all figures, being essentially imparted to it by the Demiurgus. And this is the fourth demiurgic gift conferred on the universe. There are therefore, other demonstrations both physical and mathematical, that the world is spherical, which we shall afterwards discuss. Now, however, let us first direct our attention to the Platonic demonstration, which is truly a demonstration, and together with *that* it is, showing *why* it is. The demonstration therefore, is

<sup>1</sup> The wholeness which is connective of intellectuals, constitutes the middle triad of the order of Gods which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See Book iv. of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

<sup>2</sup> These are the Amelictor Curetes of the Greeks, and form the unpolluted triad of the intellectual order of Gods.

triple, the first being derived from *the one*, the second from intelligible beauty, and the third from intellectual production. Or rather each of these is manifold, and at least triple. We may say then, immediately with respect to the demonstration from *the one*, that the Demiurgus is one, and you may also say that the paradigm is one, and that *the good* is one. From these things likewise, you may assume, that in figures that which is especially one is more divine and more perfect than that which is not one. For that which *the one* is in the Gods, that which the one intelligible animal itself, is in intelligible animals, and that which the one maker and father is among the Demiurgi, that the sphere is among solid figures. For *the one* is comprehensive of many unities, animal itself, of intelligible animals, the one Demiurgus, of many causes, and the one spherical figure, of all figures. The second demonstration therefore, is from the beautiful and the becoming. For the spherical figure<sup>4</sup> is becoming to the receiver, to the giver, and to the paradigm. To the receiver indeed, because he being perfect, is friendly to the most perfect of figures, and he who is comprehensive of all things, is friendly to that which comprehends all things in itself. But it is becoming to the giver, because he being intellect, and converted to himself, generated a becoming figure, and most similar to himself. For as Plato says in the Laws, intellect possesses intelligence similar to the motion of a sphere fashioned by a wheel; being extended according to the same things, after the same manner, in the same, and about the same. And it is becoming to the paradigm, because the intelligible universe is a thing of this kind, converging on all sides to itself,

On all sides like a sphere's revolving bulk,  
Well from the middle pois'd with equal force,  
And round its stable centre glad to run :

says Parmenides. The same things also are asserted by Empedocles. For he makes a two-fold sphere, the one being sensible, in which strife predominates, but the other intelligible, which is connected by Venus. He likewise calls the one the image of the other; but it is evident which of the two he denominates the image.

The third demonstration therefore, is from the allied. For a spherical figure is allied to the universe; since it is allied to *the one*, to the Demiurgus, and to all-perfect animal. To *the one* indeed, because of the oneness of a spherical figure.

<sup>4</sup> For το πρεπον here, it is necessary to read το σφαιρικον.



For as the world is one, so likewise the figure of it is uniform. But a spherical figure is allied to the Demiurgus, because he contains all things intellectually in himself. And it is allied to the paradigm, because it first proceeds from it. Hence this figure, is primogenial to the world. It also presents itself to the view, in the occult order itself.' For [what is said in the Orphic verse]

Unwearied in a boundless orb it moves,

is asserted of that order. But it is more clearly seen in all-perfect animal. For it is said of this divinity by the theologist, *that he is excited in an ineffable circle*. And it is still more clearly visible in the [intelligible and at the same time] intellectual Gods. For there, intellectual figure, the rectilinear, and the circular subsist, as it is asserted in the Parmenides. Farther still, after these Gods, this figure is seen in the Demiurgus. For as he is intellectual intellect, the universe subsists appropriately in him, and he receives demiurgic powers from the Gods that are prior to him. Hence also he is the Demiurgus of all mundane figures. But what shall we say after the Demiurgus of much-honoured Vulcan? Does he not fashion all mundane natures, elaborating all heaven and generation, and making

Bracelets and chains, and necklaces and rings.\*

For how is it possible, since he produces the essence of the mundane body, that he should not impart a figure adapted to each of the bodies contained in the world? He however gives figure to the universe as it were with his own hands; but the Demiurgus by his will alone. For manual operation with him is will, and production is intellection. And thus much we have inferred from these particulars.

Because, however, the spherical figure is allied and adapted to the universe, it is necessary that the universe should have a figure of this kind. Perhaps, indeed, because<sup>1</sup> a sphere, as those who are skilled in mathematics say, is the most capacious of all solids that have equal perimeters, and as we shall shortly after show by collecting what they have asserted. Perhaps also because every polygonous figure of equal sides may be inscribed in a sphere;<sup>2</sup> but it is not possible to

<sup>1</sup> i. e. At the extremity of the first triad of the intelligible order.

<sup>2</sup> Iliad XVIII. v. 402.

<sup>3</sup> Or is omitted here in the original.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of *εἰς ἄλλο σχῆμα δυνατόν εὑρεσθαι*, it is necessary to read, *εἰ σφαῖραν δυνατόν εὑρεσθαι*.

inscribe every polygonous figure of equal sides in another figure. Hence a sphere is most adapted to that which is to contain all things in itself: for the five regular figures may be inscribed in it. If therefore, you look to corporeal masses, all masses of equal perimeters will be comprehended in the sphere. Not that they will be so contained in as to have their surfaces equal to the spherical superficies: for they will be less than it. But if all figures may be inscribed in the spherical superficies, which is not true in other figures, this also is more appropriate to the things proposed. For Plato likewise says that this figure is adapted to that which is to comprehend in itself all figures. For intending to fabricate the body of the universe, through the five regular figures, he very properly looks to all the figures which are about to be comprehended by the universe. So that he evidently directs his attention, not to corporeal masses, but to the inscription of figures.

Farther still, you may also say in a more perfect manner, that the nature which is to comprehend all things in itself, ought to have dominion over all that it contains: for it will not otherwise be comprehensive of them. But that which has dominion over all things, assimilates all things to itself. For nothing has dominion over things foreign and dissimilar. That, however, which assimilates all things to itself, will be by a much greater priority most similar to itself; in order that it may impart similitude to other things. But that which being a body is most similar to itself, is spherical. Hence the body which comprehends all things in itself, is spherical. This figure, therefore, is adapted to the world: for it is most perfect, and most similar. It is most perfect, indeed, as being comprehensive of all things, and as having an unceasing motion. *For a right line is imperfect, as always capable of being extended; but a circle and a sphere are most perfect, as not receiving increase, and as making the end of their motion the beginning.* Such therefore is the meaning of what is here said by Plato.

Let us, however, consider the dogma by itself, conformably to the intellectual conceptions of Iamblichus. Since, therefore, it is necessary that the world should be assimilated to the whole soul which rides as it were in it, it is also necessary that it should become similar to the vivific body of that soul. Hence, as the Demiurgus constituted the mundane soul, according to two circles, thus also he fashioned the universe of a spherical figure, assimilating it to the self-motion of soul. *Hence too, our vehicle is rendered spherical, and is moved circularly, when the soul is in a remarkable degree assimilated to intellect.* For the intellection of soul, and the circulation of bodies, imitate intellectual energy, just as rectilinear motion imitates the ascent and descent of souls. For these motions pertain to bodies, which

are not in their proper places. Farther still, the unceasing motion of the universe, is similar to infinite power; its uniform circulation, to simplicity of essence; and the circulation of wholes, after the same manner, and about the same centre, to eternal permanency. Again, as the one motion of the world comprehends all motions, one wholeness, all wholes, and corporeal parts; and as one nature, comprehends all second and third natures, thus also it is necessary that the one mundane figure, should be comprehensive of all figures. This figure, however, is spherical, at the same time being one, and capable of containing multitude; which is a circumstance truly divine, to have dominion over every thing multitudinous, without departing from unity.

In addition also to these things, as intelligible animal itself comprehends all intelligible animals, according to one union, thus also the world being assimilated to its paradigm, comprehends all mundane figures, according to the spherical figure. For a sphere alone is able to comprehend all the elements. As therefore the world by its onliness adumbrates the intelligible universe, thus also by its spherical figure, it imitates the comprehension of wholes in that universe. Farther still, the world through this figure is assimilated to intelligible beauty. For how is it possible that a thing which is perfectly equable, commensurate, and similar, should not be in a remarkable degree beautiful? If, therefore, it is necessary that the world should be the most beautiful of sensibles, it is requisite that it should have a figure of this kind, on all sides equal, definite, and accurate. Again, the spherical figure is most adapted to bound itself. For other figures through the multitude of superficies, and their angles, or fractures, are elongated from bound, and the end. But a sphere being monadic, and simple, and on all sides the same, pertains to the cause of bound. Farther still, that which is collective of many things into one, and likewise the generative, and the spermatic, rejoice in a figure of this kind. But this is manifest in seeds, and in the more principal parts of animals: for nature renders these as much as possible, spherical. Again, the immutable, the unbroken, and the perpetual, are most adapted<sup>1</sup> and allied to a spherical figure; since in consequence of every where verging to itself, it is most powerful. For the centre is unific and connective of the whole sphere. Very properly, therefore, did the Demiurgus constitute the universe, which is connective of itself, of a spherical figure. These things, therefore, may be philosophically said concerning this particular.

<sup>1</sup> For *οικειοτα* here, read *οικειοτατα*.

After another manner, however, the same thing may be syllogistically inferred, physically in the way in which Aristotle endeavoured to prove it. For since the universe is moved in a circle, and it has been demonstrated by him that there is nothing external to the extreme circumference of the world, neither vacuum, nor place, it is necessary that the figure of the universe should be spherical, and not rectilinear. For if it was rectilinear, there would be a vacuum. For as the universe revolves in a circle, it would never have the same place through the alternate mutation of the angles and superficies. For since of every other figure besides a sphere, the lines from the middle are unequal, there will be a vacuum according to the less interval, where the bulk of the body is not. Whether therefore it be according to length, or according to breadth, there will be, during the revolution, a less interval. For a vacuum is perfectly equidistant; but where there is no body nor figure, there will be a deficiency, in consequence of the magnitude being less than the vacuum.\* Farther still, from secondary natures also, you may assume physically, that the universe is spherical. For the earth is spherical, as is evident from all things every way tending to the middle of it. But water is diffused round the earth, and it is spherical. For there is a conflux of it into the concavity, till it comes into contact with the central part of the earth. The air also surrounds the water and the earth, and the fire surrounds the air. If, however, this be the case, the heavens likewise will be spherical. For there will be a vacuum within them, unless they also spherically comprehend fire.

Again, nature distributes to the first of bodies, the first of figures, and a simple figure, to a simple body. For in each genus of things, *the one* is prior to *the many*, and *the simple*, to *the composite*. As, therefore, we distribute motions in a way adapted to their works, to simple works indeed, simple notions, but to composite works, composite motions; thus also there is an allotment of appropriate figures, one kind to simple, but another to composite bodies. *Figure, however, is, as it were, the visible resemblance of form, the morphe of morphe, and as it were an affilation of the peculiar hyparxis of each particular thing.* Hence, that which is essentially simple, proceeds into a simple figure, but that which is variously mingled, has also a co-mingled idea of figure. Farther still, the celestial motion is the measure of motions; but the measure in each thing is that which is least. The least motion, however, is the swiftest. But circulation is the swiftest of motions. If, however,

\* Instead of οὐδεν το σχημα ελλειπει, δια το μεγαθος, ελαττον ον του κενου in this place, it is necessary to read, ουδε το σχημα, ελλειπει, δια το μεγαθος, ελαττον ον του κενου.

this be the case, the heavens are spherical. For the spherical is the swiftest of motions, in consequence, as the Elean guest says, of proceeding on the smallest foot. Again, of bodies, some consist of similar, but others of dissimilar parts. To bodies, therefore, of dissimilar parts, dissimilar figures are necessarily distributed by nature. For polygonous and, in short, angular figures, are of this kind, and also those that consist of many superficies. But to bodies of similar parts, similar figures are adapted conformably to their excellence. For the sphere alone among solids is a similar figure; since all the rest have dissimilar figures. For some have two superficies, as the cone, others three, as the cylinder, others four, others five, and others more than five, as pyramids on polygonous bases arranged in succession. If, therefore, ether consists of similar parts, but the figure of that which consists of similar parts is similar, and the similar is spherical, ether is spherical. After this manner, therefore, we may physically prove that the world is spherical.

If, however, it be requisite to elucidate what is said, by mathematical demonstrations, let us summarily relate what appears to be the truth to those who are skilled in these particulars. In the first place, therefore, they endeavour to prove [that the universe is spherical] from the stars being moved in parallel circles, both the fixed stars, and the planets, the sections always becoming unequal, as we approach to the north; so that some of the circles touch the horizon; but others which are less than these, do not touch it. And, at last, there is a certain immoveable point, about which all the circulation is moved. In the next place, they infer this from the nights and days becoming unequal, conformably to the solar motions to the north or south. In the third place, from shadows. For whence is it that the sun when he begins to rise,<sup>1</sup> and also when he sets, is more northern to us, and appears to pass beyond the crab, but when he is in the meridian, he sends the shadow to the north; unless from the universe being moved in a circle, which inclines to our motion? Farther still, they prove that the universe is spherical, from the stars which are not moved according to depth, always appearing to have an equal magnitude. For if the heavens were not spherical but cylindrical, or some other such like figure, it would be requisite that the sun, when he becomes more southern to us, should appear to be less, on account of the inequality of the interval.<sup>2</sup> Nothing of this kind, however, is seen to take place. From these things, therefore, astronomers, in short, endeavour to prove that the universe is spherical.

<sup>1</sup> For *επιχειν* here, it is necessary to read *αποχειν*.

<sup>2</sup> For *υποσφαιδεις* in this place, it is necessary to read *αποσφαιδεις*.

But that a sphere is the most capacious of all bodies that have equal perimeters, is also demonstrated by them. Likewise that all bodies of equal sides may be inscribed in a sphere, but not all of them in any one of the polyedra. Nor is there any occasion that we should transcribe what is demonstrated by them. For we write to him who has been sufficiently instructed in these particulars. At the same time, however, thus much must be related, that they demonstrate the superficies of the sphere to be more capacious than that of all other solid bodies of equal ambits, and they particularly demonstrate that it is more capacious than the bodies which are called by Plato, equilateral and equiangular polyedra; partly employing the propositions of Euclid, and partly those of Archimedes. As I have said, therefore, the demonstrations of this may be obtained from their writings. It is our intention, also, after we have commented on the whole of the *Timæus*, to discuss more fully in a collection of the Mathematical Theorems in the *Timæus*, such mathematical particulars as are disseminated in the Commentaries; in order that the lovers of truth, by having a collection of these things, may be assisted in the all-various comprehension of the mathematical parts of the dialogue. But enough of mathematics.

Let us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey after what manner each of them is delivered. That in intellectuals<sup>1</sup> then, *figure* is after *whole*, and that Plato having demonstrated the universe to be a whole, very properly in what follows teaches us concerning the figure of it, we have before observed. Since, however, this proceeds into the universe from the demiurgic cause, on this account he says that figure was given to it from thence. But the giver evidently possesses by a much greater priority that which he gives. The spherical figure, therefore, is in the Demiurgus, but *intellectually*; so that it is in all-perfect animal *intelligibly*, and in that which is still prior to the latter of these,<sup>2</sup> occultly. For if it be requisite to speak what appears to me to be the truth, where intellect is, there also the spherical peculiarity exists. For intellectual energy has an essence of such a kind as that to which the Athenian stranger or guest assimilates it.<sup>3</sup> But in one place, this peculiarity subsists unitedly and intelligibly, as those say who are divinely wise. In another place, it subsists intelligibly, indeed, but with a

<sup>1</sup> i. e. In first intellectuals, or in other words, in that divine order which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. In *being itself*, or the summit of the intelligible triad.

<sup>3</sup> In the 10th book of the *Laws*, he assimilates it to the revolution of a sphere fashioned by a wheel.

more abundant intelligible division. In another intellectually, but accompanied with an all-various diversity. And in another sensibly, accompanied with separation and interval. And this last, indeed, is not simply called by Plato *spherical* (σφαίρικον), but *spheriform* (σφαίροειδης), as being an imitation of the intellectual or intelligible sphere. For the universe also is moved in a circle, because it imitates intellect. *But either the intellectual or the intelligible universe, will be most principally spherical; and that which is truly astronomy, will be conversant with these. For this is to astronomize above the heavens.*<sup>1</sup> Moreover, to be from all the parts equally distant from the middle to the bounding extremities, pertains indeed, to the sensible sphere, because all the lines from the centre of the earth to the extremities of the sphere are equal. For *from all the parts* is significant of distance according to the three intervals [of length, breadth, and depth]. It also pertains to the mathematical sphere. For there there is a middle, and the intervals are from all the parts equal. After another manner likewise it pertains to intellect. *For to converge to itself, and to be as it were of the same colour according to every part of itself, and to have all the powers in it conjoined to the one of itself, is the spherical peculiarity in intellect.* Proceeding also still higher, it will no longer be possible to separate the centre from the sphere, on account of the ineffable and united nature of the intelligible<sup>2</sup> peculiarity. He says, therefore, that it is the property of the sphere to have all the right lines every way equal from the middle, in order to distinguish it from the circle. For the term every way, or from all parts, does not pertain to this, since it has only two intervals.

Plato likewise uses the expression *to fashion as with a wheel*, because bodies with us are rendered more accurately round through a wheel which cuts off the inequalities of the bodies. And that the *similar* and the *perfect* especially pertain to the spherical peculiarity, is evident. The similar, therefore, is analogous to *the one*, but the perfect to *the good*, so that through both he refers the spherical peculiarity to the first principle of things, by saying that it is most similar to itself, and most perfect; equallizing that which is most unical and most boniform. For neither the mixed perfect or similar, nor the right line, which always receives an addition and may become angular; but the spherical peculiarity alone, is most similar and most perfect. After this, he adds, which is evident, "*that the similar is better than the dissimilar.*" For similitude is of an uniting, but dissimilitude of a

<sup>1</sup> Which the Coryphean philosopher mentioned by Plato in the *Theætetus*, is said to do.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *της σφαίρας ιδιότητος* in this place, it is necessary to read *της νοητης ιδιότητος*.

dividing nature. And the former belongs to the co-ordination of sameness, but the latter to that of difference. And the former is the cause of simplicity, but the latter of variety to things. As the artificer therefore of the universe found, that among things naturally visible, the intellectual is more beautiful than that which is destitute of intellect, thus also he thought that the similar is better than the dissimilar. For in intelligibles, similitude is better than dissimilitude; in powers, in intellectual perceptions, and in productions. Whence also some one may wonder at those Platonists, who admit that difference is better than sameness, though Plato says that the similar is infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar. At the same time, also, dissimilitude is in a certain respect secretly introduced into beings from matter, but similitude accedes from forms alone, and intelligible causes. Similitude, therefore, is infinitely better than dissimilitude; so that sameness is also more excellent than difference. This is the judgment of Jupiter. Through this, also, in the universe the similar is better than the dissimilar, in essences, in motions, in figures, and in all other things. For the progression of things is very properly effected through the similitude of productions to the cause of the production; and again, conversion is the primary leader of another similitude. Very properly therefore is the world, on account of these things, under the dominion of *similitude*, being a God according to *form itself*. Hence Plato also endeavours to show what the figure of the world is, from similitude, and the Pythagoric Timæus himself, assigns this as the first cause of its figure, in conjunction with making a physical mention of it. "For a sphere alone, says he, both when it is quiescent, and when it is moved, is capable of being co-adapted in the same place; so as never to fail nor receive another place." Aristotle likewise after him, well knew, that with whatever other figure you may surround the universe, you will make a vacuum, through the alternate mutation of the angles, and the unequal distance of the extremes from the middle.

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 "He also accurately elaborated the external circumference of the universe, and rendered it smooth, for the sake of many things."

Some one may think that the same thing which was before asserted, is again here repeated. For in what does this smoothness differ from rotundity, or what mutation is there of similitude? In a certain respect, therefore, this universe comprehends what has been said about similitude; but at the same time, there is a difference between surveying what the nature is of the whole figure which per-



vades as far as to the centre of the earth, and alone considering itself by itself, the most external superficies of the universe. And what is here said about smoothness, contends as it appears to one thing, viz. to show that the universe is neither in want of gnostic, nor of partible motive organs, for the purpose of acting upon, or suffering from other things; introducing this as the fifth demiurgic gift to the world. What is said, therefore, about the smoothness, is a medium between what is asserted respecting the bulk, and the soul of the universe. For the proximate boundary of body is smoothness; but the exempt boundary is soul, and prior to soul, intellect. For this is the boundary of soul itself. And prior to intellect, the one deity which connects the whole mundane multitude, is the boundary of the body of the world. You may therefore speak after this manner.

But you may also say, according to a more perfect mode, that the universe being a luminous whole, it is most luminous according to its external superficies, and is full of divine splendour. For on this account also poets place Olympus on the summit of the world, being wholly luminous, and light itself.

Nor clouds, nor rain, nor winter there are found,<sup>1</sup>

But dazzling splendour spreads its radiance round.

Of this luminous subsistence, smoothness is a symbol. Why therefore are the summits of the universe smooth? Plato says, for the sake of many things. For they are so, in order that it may be spontaneously conjoined with soul and intellect, and may be adapted to supermundane lights, through a similitude to them. *Smoothness, therefore, is significant of the highest aptitude, through which the universe is able to receive the illuminations from intellect and soul*; in the same manner as mirrors receive the representations of things by their smoothness. Formerly also by theologists, a mirror was assumed as a symbol of aptitude, to the intellectual completion of the universe. Hence they say, Vulcan made a mirror for Dionysius, or Bacchus, into which the God looking, and beholding the image of himself, proceeded into the whole partible fabrication of things. You may say therefore, that Plato reminds us of this catoptric apparatus, in what he now says of the smoothness of the external superficies of the world. Hence the corporeal

<sup>1</sup> Hom. Odys. vi. v. 45. But in Proclus for *ἀλλὰ μάλλον αἰθήρη*, read *ἀλλὰ μάλ' αἰθήρη*.

<sup>2</sup> For *συμπατήρη* here, read *σηματήρη*.

universe is a thing of this kind, externally smooth, according to which also, it is consenscent with its own intellect, and with the Demiurgus. Hence too, poets establish the Demiurgus on the highest summit of the world; it being allotted so great an aptitude from him, to the participation of intelligible causes.

If you are willing, also, according to another mode, smoothness itself is a symbol of the divine and simple life in the world. We, therefore, since we have a partible life, have also the parts of the body multiform, and variously mixed, because different things are prepared by nature for a different life. But the universe has one and a simple life. For it is purified from those things of which terrestrial animals are in want, through a material and partible life. Hence it is the recipient of one life, but is exempt from a various life. It is also prepared for one, but is unreceptive of a divided life. On this account, it is said to be accurately elaborated externally, and rendered smooth, because it is fitly adapted by the demiurgic cause, to the reception of one life, being constructed as the organ of such a life. What follows, however, is significant of this.

“Nor was the addition of eyes requisite to the universe: for nothing visible was left external to it. Nor was hearing necessary: for there was nothing externally audible. Nor was it invested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of respiration.”

Through these things, Plato appears to do nothing else, than to take away a partible life from the universe, and the partible organs, which are suspended from us, when we descend into generation. For while we abide on high, we are not at all in want of these multiform lives, and partible organs. But the luciform vehicle is sufficient, which possesses all the senses unitedly. If, therefore, we are purified from every life of this kind, when we are liberated from generation, what ought we to think respecting the universe? Is it not, that it has one simple life, that it is wholly vigilantly excited to it, and is equally in every part prepared for the completion of one life? Or must we not in a much greater degree admit these things of the universe? For wholes are more divine than parts, and comprehending than comprehended natures. And thus much as to the common conception of the things proposed.

Since, however, in what is now said, and in what follows, Plato takes away

all sense from the world, viz. seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, let us in the first place consider this, whether the universe is sensitive or not. For of the ancients, some were led to one, and others to another opinion on this subject. We indeed hear theologists speaking of the fountain of sense, and asserting of the father [i. e. of the Demiurgus] that he possesses intelligibles through intellect, but introduces sense to the worlds.\* And again, we hear from the Greeks,

Sun who see'st all things, and dost all things hear.<sup>1</sup>

Seeing and hearing not existing in him partibly, as in us, but according to one life, and one subject. Since in us also, Aristotle proclaims, that there is principally one sense, and one principal sensorium. Nor were the wise men among the Greeks ignorant that there are divine senses, nor did they refuse to assert of the Demiurgus himself,

The undecaying royal ether forms  
His intellect from falsehood free; by which  
He all things indicates and knows; nor voice,<sup>2</sup>  
Nor sound, nor rumor can Jove's ears chide.

And why do I speak of theologists, when Plato himself says that the universe is an animal, and that animal is characterized by sense? So that asserting likewise that a plant is an animal, he immediately imparts to it a certain other sense. On hearing therefore, as I have said, these things, we are unwilling to admit that the universe is without sensation. For in the Theatetus, sense is said to be the frustration of truth; and it is universally agreed that its knowledge is passive, and conversant with the images of things. Hence, it is better, in order that we may be in the middle of both these, to take away from the universe every sense of this kind, and to give to it another more excellent than this, and more adapted to the Gods.

What, therefore, is this sense, and after what manner may it be assumed? That the universe, indeed, is sensitive, we may render manifest from its being an animal, and from the soul of it being dianoetic and doxastic, and imparting to the mundane body a participation of both these; which participation is an image of dia-

<sup>1</sup> This is asserted in the Chaldean Oracles.

<sup>2</sup> Odys. XI. v. 108.

<sup>3</sup> For ἀνὰ here, read ἀνέθ; and for ἡλυθεῖ in the following line, ἡ λυθεῖ. These verses are Orphic.

noia and opinion; and this we say is the mundane phantasy itself, adumbrating intelligence, and possessing invisible sensations<sup>1</sup> of the sensibles which exist in every period. It is possible, therefore, from these and many other arguments, to be persuaded that the universe possesses sensation. But it requires an appropriate inspection, to know what sense it possesses. I say then, that of sense, the first and most principal kind, is that which imitates intellect. For every where things that rank as first, have an imitation of the natures prior to them. Hence, this sense is conjoined to things that are first, comprehending in itself the sensible object of its perception, and neither passing from some things to others; for this is the province of sense distributed into various parts; nor proceeding outwardly; for this is imperfect; but it possesses the whole of what is sensible in itself, and is, as it were, rather consciousness than sense. The second kind of sense after this, is that which proceeds indeed outwardly, but according to a perfect energy, which every where always apprehends the whole object of its knowledge with invariable sameness, and is purified from all passion, and from all the imbecility which is adapted to partible and material organs. But the third kind of sense is that, which suffers from externals, and is mingled from passion and knowledge; beginning indeed from passion, but ending in knowledge. And the last kind of sense is that with which the most obscure knowledge is present, which is full of passion, and proximate to physical sympathy, so as not to have a knowledge of the forms of sensibles. Thus, for instance, it does not know that the thing which acts on it is hot or cold, but alone perceives that what falls on it is pleasant or painful. For Timæus farther on informs us that the sense of plants is a thing of this kind, being an apprehension alone of the pleasing and the painful from sensible objects.

Sense, therefore, thus proceeding supernally, the world, indeed, is sensitive according to the first kind of sense. For according to the whole of itself it is the thing seen, and the eye [by which it is seen]; since we also say that the sun, and each of the stars, is an eye. The whole world therefore is sight and that which is visible, and is truly comprehensible by sense and opinion. Hence the knowledge in it is all-perfect, its sense is indivisible, and it is itself all things, viz. that which is sensible, the sensorium, and sense; just as the Demiurgus of it, is intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. As, likewise, it comprehends in its *whole* body *partial* bodies, so in its *total* sense it contains many senses. And it does not

<sup>1</sup> αἰσθησις is omitted in the original.

know the colours and the sounds of sensibles, but the essence of all of them, so far as it is material and undivided. Hence also it has a sensible essence, and essentially, but not according to accident, sensible. For as that which is always intelligible, is not in a certain respect intelligible, and in a certain respect not, but is wholly intelligible, though not to those beings whose intellectual perception is partible, but to a divine intellect; after the same manner the generated sensible nature, is not in a certain respect sensible, and in a certain respect deprived of sense, but is wholly sensible, not to us whose sensible perception is partible, but to *total* animal, in which also there is a total sense. For as the intellectual perception of the Gods is of one kind, but that of men of another, thus also the sense of Gods is different from that of partible animals; the former having a knowledge of partial essences, but the latter of things alone pertaining to essences. The world therefore, has the first sense, which is immutable, united to the object of knowledge, and all-perfect according to energy. But *total* animals, which are purified from generation, are allotted the second form of sense. For because indeed, they are parts of the universe, the sense of them proceeds to the whole; for there is also something of them which is external. But because they are exempt from generation, they comprehend that which is sensible impassively and energetically. And such partial animals as have communication with generation, and employ as organs, luciform vehicles, possess sense mingled from passion and knowledge. But there are also certain last animals, such as plants, which participate of a vestige only of life and sense; one kind of sense being total, another partible, another knowing the essences, and another the images of sensibles.

It is not proper, therefore, to be disturbed, because Plato takes away from the world, all partible organs. For hearing is not divided in it from sight; since neither, as we say, is the one divided from the other, in our spirit, but there are in it, as Aristotle says, one sense which is truly so called, and one principal sensorium. Hence the world is neither in want of eyes extended to things out of itself, nor of ears,<sup>1</sup> to receive information externally, but it is itself both eye, and that which is visible, ear, and that which is audible; and the one sense in it knows all sensible natures. For whence also is the one sense in us which is prior to the many senses derived except from the universe? The world therefore, knows all the beauty that is in itself, through sight; and through the hearing all the har-

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *οὐραν* here, it is obviously necessary to read *αὐραν*.

mony which pervades through wholes. Hence it neither requires eyes in order to see, nor ears in order to hear. It possesses also this eyeless peculiarity according to the image of the intelligible God,<sup>1</sup> to which it is assimilated. For Orpheus says that this God has *eyeless Love*,

In his breast feeding eyeless, rapid Love.

Thus therefore, the universe is conjoined through love to the natures prior to itself, and beholds the beauty which is in them through that which is in itself; and this not by perceiving with partible senses.

“Nor was it invested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of respiration. Nor again, was it in want of any organ, through which it might receive nutriment into itself, and discharge it when concocted. For there was no possibility that any thing could either accede to, or depart from its nature, since there was nothing through which such changes could be produced. For indeed, the universe affords nutriment to itself through its own consumption; and being artificially fabricated, suffers and acts all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations. For its composing artificer thought that it would be much more excellent, if sufficient to itself, than if in want of other things.”

Through what is here said, Plato takes away two other senses from the universe, the smell and the taste. The former indeed because it is without respiration. For not every thing which respire is in want of smell, though every thing which has smell respire.<sup>2</sup> But that which respire is more perfect. This therefore, he takes away from the universe. He also takes away the taste, because the universe is not nourished. For the animal which is nourished, is in want of the taste. Again therefore, how shall we say? Must it not be thus, that these partible senses are not in the universe, but that it contains one simple sense in itself, which has a knowledge of all colours, sounds, juices, spirits, and qualities, the sensible essences themselves existing in the universe as in a subject. For if the one

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Phanes, or animal itself, the exemplar of the universe.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of το γὰρ ἀσπικὸν δεῖται τῆς σφρησέως, εἰ καὶ μὴ παντὸς εἶχον σφρησιν, ἀσπικενστικὸν ἐστὶ, in this place, it seems requisite to read, ἐν γὰρ παντὶ ἀσπικὸν δεῖται τῆς σφρησέως, εἰ καὶ παντὸς εἶχον κ. λ.

[common] sense which is in us, uses all the partible senses, and knows all things according to the same, how much more must the world know at once all the variety of sensibles, according to one reason, and one sense? As therefore, it is one in essence, and as it is allotted a uniform figure, thus also it has one sense, comprehending in itself all sensibles. For it likewise contains one nature, which connects and vivifies all bodies. And these are the dogmas respecting the universe.

Let us however, discuss the particulars of what is here said by Plato. In the first place therefore, he admirably refers the use of the smell to respiration, but not to the discrimination of fragrances; giving us the more comprehensive cause, as existing in respiring natures. For when we have a sensible perception of fragrant or fetid substances, we respire; but when we respire, we have not entirely a sensation of them. For respiration is more natural, and more comprehensive than the proper subjects of the smell; since such animals as have the sense of smelling, but do not respire, in consequence of not having lungs, are more imperfect than those that do respire. Very properly therefore, does he frame his argument from more perfect animals, that if the universe had the sense of smelling, it would be requisite that it should have it accompanied with respiration, in the same manner as the more perfect of smelling animals. But in the second place, he refers the use of the taste, to nutriment. For nature formed this as a criterion of juices, through which nutriment and increase subsist. For that which is without moisture has the power of manifesting this. The world however, is not in want of nutriment externally, but imparts it to itself, increases itself, and is the cause of its own consumption. And in the first place, if you are willing, it effects this, according to a division into two; the heavens augmenting and changing all things, but the sublunary regions being increased and consumed. For the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. But of each of these,<sup>1</sup> the motion of the heavens is the cause. In the second place, the world effects this from the heavenly bodies themselves, receiving by their motions an analogous increase and consumption, according to their risings and settings, their visibilities and occultations, their elevations and depressions, their illuminations, and mutations of light; through which the celestial bodies receive and lose a certain thing, in the same manner as sublunary natures. For from these, generation also is changed.

<sup>1</sup> For *εκαρεpas* here, it is requisite to read *εκαρεpus*.

*And again you see that the natures which are above the moon, have increase and consumption according to analogy only; but that sublunary natures are essentially the recipients of both these. But the moon is between these, and is truly an isthmus, exhibiting in herself the beginning of mutation according to an increase and diminution of light. For in the bodies prior to it the same form perfectly remains, in their increase and consumption; and in the bodies posterior to it, their very existence is naturally adapted to reciprocate. But in the moon the essence remains, but the light is changed externally according to diminution and increase, which is not the case with the luminaries that are above it. Hence it is not proper to say, that the heavenly bodies are nourished from exhalations, as some fancy they are. For things which are in want of an influx externally, and receive addition and ablation, have not indissoluble bonds. Hence the celestial bodies remain immutable; as of the ancients Proclus, Malotes, and Philonides assert, and of those that are more modern, all the Platonists from Plotinus. For as Plato has not yet delivered to us the generation of the heavens and stars, how could he speak about the nutriment of them? And it seems, that now generating the elements alone, and perceiving that these proceed through each other, and that all are in all, he calls this mutual transition, the nutriment of the universe, of itself by itself; since it both acts upon and suffers in itself, by imparting to all things, all the things of which it consists. Hence when he likewise constitutes the other natures (i. e. the celestial), then he introduces their illuminations, and the communion of all of them with each other, through these. Alone therefore, directing his attention to the composition of the four elements of the universe, and perceiving that in these, there are certain communications with each other, he says, that the consumption of some, is the nutriment of other parts of the universe. But it is not yet manifest what each of these may be. Now however, thus much is evident, that all the parts confer something on each other, in order that the universe may become one, and are in each other, so as to nourish each other, and this without any diminution of themselves. For all things of which the universe consists, are in the earth, and all of them are likewise in the middle elements; and thus the whole world is nourished by itself, from its own parts, having all things in all.*

Farther still, this also may be said, that if nothing proceeds to the universe, there is no body external to it, and that if nothing departs from it, there is no vacuum out of the world. For it would be in vain not being the recipient of any thing, as that is which receives the world; which things were particularly em-



braced by Aristotle, who subverts the existence of a vacuum in energy, and preserves the world only-begotten. But that nothing departs from, or accedes to the universe, Plato infers, the latter indeed, because there is nothing external to it, and the former, from the universe making the consumption of itself, its proper nutriment. As therefore, not having the organs of nutriment in itself, it has nutriment, and is that which itself nourishes itself, and is at the same time nourished; thus also, not having senses extended outwardly, it possesses sense in itself, and is itself sensible to itself. And that Plato intended the latter should be inferred as well as the former, I think he clearly manifests by saying, that "*the universe suffers and acts all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations.*" But if all that is generated, is the consequence of the universe acting on and suffering from itself, it must not be said, that either consumptions or corruptions are simply evils. For neither does a worthy man, and much less the universe, do any evil to himself. And this indeed, is a divine corollary, which is to be assumed from what Plato says.

Again however, he recurs to the true cause of all mundane effects, viz. the demiurgic art, and the principle which is perfective of wholes. For from thence art also proceeds into the demiurgic order. Hence the Oracles call the Demiurgus of the universe *one who produces works by art*; which expression Plato divides, at one time calling the things contained in the world, the *works* of the Demiurgus, [as when he represents the maker of the world saying] "*of whom I am the Demiurgus and father of works*;" just as the Oracles also when they say; *for understanding the works of the paternal self-begotten intellect*; but at another denominating the energy of the Demiurgus art, which in the end becomes the cause of the sufficiency of the universe to itself. For the Demiurgus being good, made all things similar to himself; i. e. he made all things perfect and self-sufficient. For self-sufficiency is an element of *the good*. *By no means however is the world, as possessing the power of being sufficient to itself, divulged through this self-sufficiency from its maker, but is in a greater degree united to him. For by how much the more self-sufficient it is, by so much the more is it constituted in a similitude to him. And by how much the more it is assimilated, by so much the more perfectly is it united, to the demiurgic goodness.* The universe therefore is self-sufficient, as being the object of sense to itself,<sup>1</sup> and as not being in want of other sensibles. For to these the appellation of indigence belongs. But it is in want of the Gods, as being

<sup>1</sup> *Εαυτῷ* is omitted in the original.

always filled by them. Or rather neither is it in want of these, for divinity is every where present, and the universe is always prepared for the reception of divine goods. And as the similar is better than the dissimilar according to the judgment of Jupiter; so likewise, the self-sufficient is more divine than that which is indigent. For the self-sufficient has dominion in the Gods, and similitude<sup>1</sup> in beings. And this is another dogma of the mighty Jupiter.

“ But he neither thought that hands were necessary to the world, as there was nothing for it either to receive or resist; nor yet feet, nor any other members which are subservient to progression and rest.”

The touch is the last of the senses, and of this an animal especially participates according to the whole body, but particularly according to the hands. For these have the greatest power of touching, as may be seen in the operations of them. Since however, the hands afford us a twofold use; for through them we receive things that delight us, and repel such as pain us; but the universe cannot receive anything, for it has every thing which it wishes; nor repel any thing, because there is nothing foreign to it;—this being the case, it is not at all in want of hands. For as Aristotle says, neither nature, nor God, does any thing in vain. So that the Demiurgus did not make hands to adhere to the world, because they would have been added in vain. Since however, that which is motive is suspended from that which is sensitive, but I mean that which is naturally motive, the discussion of Timæus, appropriately and at the same time reasonably proceeds, from the sensitive to the progressive organs. For the feet were formed as instruments for rectilinear motion, as likewise were the other parts subservient to progression, such as the leg, the knee, the thigh, and any other such-like part. It is impossible however, for the universe to be moved in a right line: for, as we have before shown, there is no vacuum external to the universe. Through these things therefore, he takes away the progressive and sensitive parts. And here again it may be said, that in taking away the motive organs, he alone takes away feet, but not wings; because feet are sufficient to more perfect animals for the purposes of motion; doing the same thing here as he did respecting smelling and respiration.

Again however, it must be said, that these organs are by no means in the universe, but that sense and motion after another manner are. For since every

<sup>1</sup> For η ομοιωσις in this place, it is obviously necessary to read η ομολογησις.

thing sensible of whatever kind it may be is comprehended in it, and it is itself the first sensible, it has also one sense conjoined to a sensible of this kind, just as the intelligence of the Demiurgus is conjoined to the whole of the intelligible, and is said to absorb the universe in itself. After the same manner therefore, the universe absorbs itself by the sense of itself, and comprehends the object of knowledge, by a connascent knowledge. Besides, it has indeed powers which apprehend and are the guardians of all things, and these are its hands. It possesses likewise perfective orders, and these are analogous to nutritive parts. And it exhibits vivific causes, which correspond to the parts of respiration. Besides these also, it has other powers, some of which fill it with invisible causes, and others conjoin it to intelligible light; of which the latter are analogous to seeing, but the former to hearing. By those also who survey it physically and theologically, it will be found, that it has a motion analogous to this sense. For as it has a sense of itself with itself, so likewise it has a motion in itself, and circulating about itself, and both these, according to the similitude of its paradigm. For in this there was intelligence converging to itself, life converted to itself, and knowledge not subsisting according to transition, nor according to a distribution into parts, but self-perfect, and united to intelligibles themselves. *For such is the intellect which is there, energizing prior to energy, because [according to the Oracle] it has not proceeded, but abides in the paternal profundity, and in the adytum according to the God-nourished silence.*

“For from among the seven species of local motion, he distributed to it that which especially subsists about intellect and wisdom, and which is adapted and allied to its body.”

Of the ancients, some converting the world to intellect, and imparting to it motion through love about the first appetible, say that nothing proceeds into it from intellect, thus depriving intellect of fecundity,<sup>1</sup> and giving it an arrangement equivalent to that of lovely sensible objects, which have nothing generative in their own nature. Others on the contrary, acknowledge that intellect, or soul, or whatever that may be which is above the world, operates on it, yet they do not give to the world a spontaneous and proper motion, but only say that it is externally convolved in a circle. These however, Aristotle blames, as subverting the

<sup>1</sup> For *μερισμὸν* here, it is necessary to read *γόνιμὸν*.

perpetuity of the universe. *For that which is violent is not perpetual.*<sup>1</sup> But Plato guarding against the oversights of both these, assigns to the world a proper and spontaneous motion, and shows that the Demiurgus is the cause of this motion. And this is the sixth demiurgic gift imparted to the world; as imitating the motion of intellect, which the world possesses both from itself, and from the father. For the expression *he distributed*, refers us to the paternal cause. For from that from which essence, from that also motion according to nature, is imparted to the universe. But the words, "*adapted and allied to its body*," refer us to the peculiar nature of the world through which it is excited by itself to a motion of this kind. For it possesses something adapted and allied to the motion in a circle, both according to the self-motive nature, and to its figure, which is spherical. Perhaps also, if he had asserted one of these things only, the other might have been inferred. For if he had said, that the motion of the universe was adapted and allied to it, whence did it possess this except from the father, from whom also its essence is derived? But if this motion was imparted to it by the Demiurgus, he entirely gave to the recipient an appropriate motion, he being intellect, and assigning to all things that which is according to desert. The Philosopher however, combines both these in order that you may see the similitude of the world to the Demiurgus. For as he himself intellectually perceives himself, is converted to himself, and surveys intelligibles through energizing about them, which become the centres of the demiurgic intelligence; thus also the world is moved about itself, verges to itself, and harmoniously revolves about the middle, which becomes the centre of the mundane motion. And as the Demiurgus is said to absorb the intelligible, by<sup>2</sup> proceeding to it, thus also the world is said to comprehend in itself, the centre of itself. *For the absorptions which are celebrated by theologists, are certain comprehensions.* But the absorptions by grandfathers comprehend intellectuals intelligibly, and those by sons, intelligibles intellectually.

<sup>1</sup> If the principal parts of the universe therefore are perpetual, and that they are so is most fully demonstrated in these commentaries, it necessarily follows that the modern system of astronomy, which fills the heavens with violent motions, is false.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *εἰς αὐτὴν μίμνησκει κίνησις* in this place, I read *αὐτὴν μίμνησκει κίνησις*.

<sup>3</sup> For *εἰς αὐτὸν χωρεῖ* here, read *τρεῖς αὐτὸν χωρεῖ*.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of *ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν προνοοῦσι τὰ νοητὰ περιλαμβάνουσι νοερῶς, αἱ δὲ τῶν παιδῶν, τὰ νοητὰ νοητῶς* in this place, it is necessary to read, *ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν προνοοῦσι τὰ νοητὰ περιλαμβάνουσι νοητῶς, αἱ δὲ τῶν παιδῶν, τὰ νοητὰ νοερῶς*.

For these things, the generators of them again convert them to themselves, and comprehend in their own allness. The universe therefore imitates both these indeed, as it revolves about the centre, and comprehends the centre in imitating the progenic<sup>1</sup> absorption; but so far as it comprehends its own in itself, affording nutriment to itself by its own consumption, and again containing in itself the natures distributed from itself,—so far it imitates the comprehension of children in their fathers. And these things indeed, are asserted for the sake of the analogy of the universe to the two fathers.

Again, however, you may see, how the Aristotelic axiom is here pre-assumed, that the motion is simple of a simple body. In the first place, therefore, the body in the world which is more simple than other bodies, is moved with a circular motion, as being adapted to it; and in the next place, the whole universe is thus moved. For the body which is posterior to it, is as much as possible convolved in a circle. For what else is the meaning of the word *adapted*, than that the motion in a circle is natural to the essence of the universe? For as it was allotted a spherical figure, so likewise a circular motion according to nature. And farther still [another Aristotelian axiom is also here pre-assumed] that a circular motion has nothing contrary to it. For as there are seven local motions, that which is in a circle, the upward, the downward, that which is to the right hand, and that which is to the left, that which is anterior, and that which is to the posterior parts, you will find that six of these have a contrary. For the motions are contrary, which are from contrary to contrary places. But the motion in a circle is exempt from all contrariety. For since the motions in a right line are generated and contained by the motion in a circle, as Mechanics demonstrate, how can it be said that any one of these is contrary to it? For the contrary is corruptive and not generative of the contrary. Nor does Plato stop here, but having mentioned the peculiarity of the circular motion, he shows its admirable transcendency above the other motions. For he denominates it to be that which subsists about intellect and wisdom, and this not simply, but he also adds *especially*. For of these seven motions, the circular imitates intellect, and the intellectual life, being established in the same, and about the same, according to one reason and one order, and possessing a motion which is vanquished by permanency. But all the

<sup>1</sup> i. e. The absorption of Phæon, the paradigm of the world by Jupiter.

<sup>2</sup> For *καταγωγη* here read *καταγωγη*.

remaining<sup>1</sup> motion pertains to soul. For in this, *from whence*, and *whither*, and transition first subsist. In her also the intelligible is the upward, but the sensible downward. And the circle of sameness, indeed, is the right hand, but the circle of difference, the left. Intellect likewise is before her, but nature behind. For thus she was constituted at first. And circulation, indeed, is adapted to intellect, according to both numbers, whether you wish to adduce the monad itself, or the heptad, enumerating it the first or the seventh motion. *For the monad and the heptad, are certain intellectual numbers; the monad indeed being directly intellect, but the heptad, the light according to intellect. And on this account also the mundane intellect is, as Orpheus says, both monadic, and hebdomadic. Farther still, the monad is Apolloniacal, but the heptad Minerval. Again therefore it is intellect and wisdom.* So that circulation through the alliance of numbers, shows that it is suspended from intellect and wisdom. *But rectilinear motion, demonstrates through the heptad its alliance to the psychical peculiarity.* For the number six is allied to the soul, and this will be manifest as we proceed. Let us however pass on to what is next said by Plato.

“Hence by a circumduction according to sameness, in the same, and in itself, he caused it to be moved convolving in a circle. But he separated from it all the six motions, and framed it void of their wandering progressions. And as feet were not requisite to this periodical motion, he generated the universe without legs and feet.”

We have before observed that intellect and wisdom are the paradigms of circulation. But what this is, and how it is assimilated to intellect, is delivered in the words before us. For circulation is a motion which is led round according to sameness, and in the same, and in itself, as Timæus here says, and the Athenian guest in the Laws. Of which definition indeed, the words “*according to sameness*,” signify according to one reason, and one order. For what if the universe should be moved circularly indeed, but should be differently changed at different times, by rising or setting, as the fable says in the Politicus. That we may not therefore apprehend this to be the case, the words “*according to sameness*” are placed respecting it, before the rest. The Platonic Severus therefore, (for we shall here speak freely against him,) is not right in admitting fabulous circulations, and thus making the world to be both generated and unbegotten.

<sup>1</sup> For η δε μονη, συναι την εναντη, I read, η δε δευτη παση, την εναντη.

The universe indeed, Plato says, is moved according to sameness, and after a similar manner; and according to one reason and one order. But such a circulation as Severus speaks of, subverts the one order of motion. The mode, however, in which such a motion is fabulously introduced, is shown by our preceptor in his Commentaries on that dialogue,<sup>1</sup> conformably to the meaning of Plato. But the words "*in the same*," manifest the immutable in transition, and that the motion is vanquished by permanency. For because there is not a vacuum external to the universe, but it is necessary that the universe should be moved, being a physical body; for nature is a principle of motion; it is moved convolved about itself, and in the same place. For the bulk of the universe occupies the whole of place, and possesses by its parts the parts of interval; and as a whole being immutable, it is locally moved in its parts. But the words "*in itself*," manifest that it is moved on account of this very transition of its parts. For it does not require the transition of another thing, in order to the motion of itself, but itself yields to itself, and itself is transferred into the place of itself; so that it is moved in itself, the parts of it being transferred by their motions into the places of each other. Hence, through the words "*according to sameness*," you have the perpetual; but through the words "*in the same*," the immutable; and through the words "*in itself*," the form of the transition. And from all these you have, that circulation is a motion unceasing, remaining in one place, and effected by the transition of the parts into the places of each other. But being such it is evident, that it is most similar to intellect. For intellect eternally energizes intellectually, is established in the same order, and all things in it are intellectual, most energetic, and possess an ever-vigilant life. And this indeed is evident.

It is however worthy of admiration in Plato, that when discoursing about the essence of the universe, he assimilates it to intelligible animal; but that now teaching us concerning the motion of it, he refers the similitude of it to intellect; delivering to us from these things, the analogy which is in them, viz. that the intelligible has the relation of essence, but intellect of energy. When, likewise, he says that the universe is spherical, he at the same time gives it to be moved in a circle, and to be convolved. For it appears to be moved in a circle according to the greatest circle which is in it. Because however a cylinder is moved in a

<sup>1</sup> viz. On the Polticus, in which dialogue it is fabulously asserted that the sun and stars now set in the place from whence they formerly rose. See this fable explained in the notes to my translation of that dialogue.

circle when it is rolled along, he adds, for the sake of accuracy, the word *convolving*.<sup>1</sup> It is also admirable in him, that he takes away the six motions from the universe. For this is most peculiar to the world, there being in the stars an advancing motion. The world, therefore, is truly inerratic, not only because the summit of it is a thing of this kind, but because it is moved with one and the same simple motion.

It is necessary however to observe, how the form of motion which exists in the most principal part of the universe, is said to have been given, as appropriate to the whole world, by the father. For all the other parts, participate of the circulation of the world; and the inerratic is present with some of them more manifestly, but with others more obscurely. For the streams under the earth being moved in a disorderly manner, and differently at different times, are especially said to wander. But the sublunary elements being naturally moved from one place to another, participate of less wandering than the subterranean effluxions. For those things wander which are transferred from one place to another. And the divine bodies in the heavens, wander still less than these. For so far as they are moved according to length, and also according to breadth they are wanderers; but so far as they are moved according to the equable and orderly, and according to one reason of motion, they are inerratic. But the world itself may most properly and principally be called inerratic, as not receiving the representation of any other motion.

If also you are willing to make a division in incorporeal natures, the irrational life wanders in a remarkable degree, not having the measure of its energies from itself. The soul that opines rightly wanders, but less than the irrational life. For this soul also participates in a certain respect of wandering, through being ignorant of cause. But the soul that possesses scientific knowledge, wanders still less than this. For in such a soul, the transitive form of life alone produces the wandering; because it is not arranged to one intelligible, but becomes a different intelligible in different forms. And intellect alone is inerratic among beings, always intellectually perceiving the same thing, and energizing towards and about the same thing. The world, therefore, which imitates intellect in its motion, is deservedly truly inerratic, always making the same uniform period after the same manner. That however which is thus moved, has no need whatever of the addition of feet, or in short, of progressive organs. And hence the universe was generated without feet and legs. *Theologists also wishing in a certain*

<sup>1</sup> For *τροφοποιον* here, it is obviously necessary to read *σπεροφοποιον*.



*respect to indicate this to us, are accustomed to call the God who is the Demiurgus of the corporeal nature, lame in both feet, as constituting the universe without legs and feet. They say too that the Gods laugh at him with inextinguishable laughter, and by their laughing incessantly attend with providential care to mundane natures.*

“ All this reasoning, therefore, being employed by the eternally existing God, about the God that would at a certain time or once exist ; in consequence of this reasoning, he made his body smooth and even, every where from the middle equal and whole, and perfect from perfect bodies.”

33B

What is here said, imitating the one intellect, and the united intellection of wholes, collects all things into the same, and refers them to one summit, the fabrication of the corporeal system. It is necessary, therefore, that we should recollect what has been before said. It was said then, that the elements rendered all things in the world concordant through analogy ; that the universe was generated a whole consisting of wholes ; and that it is spherical and smooth, and has a knowledge of itself, and a motion in itself. But this being the case, it is evident that the whole world itself, is assimilated to all-perfect animal. The orderly distribution of it, however, according to wholes, proceeds analogous to second and third causes. And the number of the elements, indeed, and the unifying bond of them through analogy, proceeds conformably to the essence which is uncoloured, unfigured, and without contact ;<sup>1</sup> for there number subsists. But the first wholeness which adorns all things, and which consists of the whole elements, is assimilated to the intellectual wholeness.<sup>2</sup> The sphericity of the universe is analogous to the intellectual figure.<sup>3</sup> Its self-sufficiency, intellectual motion, and convolution in sameness, are assimilated to the God who absorbs in himself all his progeny [i. e. to Saturn]. Its possession of soul, is analogous to the vivific cause [i. e. to Rhea]. And its participation of intellect, is analogous to the Demiurgic intellect ; though all these proceed from this, and from the natures prior to it, to which these are respectively analogous. And the more excellent natures, indeed, are the

<sup>1</sup> This essence forms the summit of that order of Gods which is called intelligible, and at the same time intellectual.

<sup>2</sup> This forms the middle of the above-mentioned order.

<sup>3</sup> And this forms the extremity of that order.

<sup>4</sup> For *τροπή* here, it is necessary to read *στροφή*.

causes of all the things of which secondary natures are the causes; but the latter are the causes of fewer effects than the former. For the Demiurgus himself, so far, indeed, as he is intellectual, makes all things to be intellectual; but so far as he is being, he is the father of all bodies, and incorporeal natures; and so far as he is a God, he constitutes matter itself. In what is here said, therefore, Plato makes a summary repetition of all such particulars as the universe derives from the intellectual Gods. And thus much concerning the whole theory.

It is requisite, however, that we should understand the truth pertaining to each of the words. Directly, therefore, the words "*all this*," imply that you should survey in one the whole cause of the corporeal-formed nature, and know the division of forms. For wholeness is assimilated to one thing, figure to another, and motion to another. And the word *this* indeed indicates *union*; but the word *all* the number of causes. Moreover, the words "*reasoning employed by the eternally existing God*," make the essence, and at the same time the intelligence of the Demiurgus to be eternal, through which the world is perpetual. It is necessary likewise to observe, that Plato by arranging the Demiurgus among eternal beings, gives to him an eternal order, so that he will not [according to Plato] be soul. For in the Laws he says, that soul is immortal, indeed, and indestructible, but is not eternal. Hence every one who fancies that soul is the Demiurgus, seems to be ignorant of the difference between the eternal and the indestructible. But the word "*reasoning*" is significant of a distributed fabrication. And the words "*that would at a certain time exist*" are not significant of a beginning according to time, as Atticus fancied they were, but that the world has an essence conjoined with time. For time was generated together with heaven [or the universe,] and the world is temporal, and time is mundane. For they were co-produced with each other, and are consubstantial from one fabrication. The words therefore *at a certain time* or *once* do not signify a part of time, but reason is time as compared with eternal being. For that is truly always being; but the temporal always is *once* as with reference to the eternal, just as that which is being, after a generated manner, is non-being with reference to that which is intelligibly being. Hence though the world exists through the whole of time, yet the existence of it consists in becoming to be, and is in a part of time. This however is *once*, and is not simultaneously in all time, but is always once. For the eternal is always in the whole of eternity; but the temporal, in a certain time, is always at a different time in another time. As with reference therefore, to the eternally existing God, the world is very properly called, "*the God that would once exist*." For as with re-

ference to that God who is intellectual, this is sensible. Hence, the sensible world is indeed *generated*, or *becoming to be*, *always*, but *is once*. For it has its existence partially, always advancing to being from eternal being. For since, as we have before observed, it has an eternal power of existing derived from a cause different from itself, and the power which it possesses it possesses terminated, but by always receiving, it always is, having the power in that which is terminated numbered to infinity ;—this being the case, it is evident that it is *once*, from *the once* always acquiring existence, and always becoming to be, in consequence of that which gives it to exist, never ceasing.\* According to its own nature, however, it is once, and has a renovated immortality, as Plato says in the Politicus, possessing its being in advancing into existence, and on this account participating not at once wholly of the whole [of time] but *once* ; and this again and again, existing in generation, and not being without an extension [of existence]. Unless, therefore, the word once signifies with Plato the whole of time. *For the transitive subsistence of time, as compared with eternal energy, is once, and the whole of time has the same ratio to eternity, as the part of time the once to the whole of time.*

If you are willing also to consider what is said after another manner, since Plato has hitherto fashioned a corporeal nature, but has not in words constituted soul and intellect, he denominates the God that would exist, and who subsists in discourse according to a part, *once*. For divinity indeed constitutes collectively parts and the whole, but language divides things which are consubsistent, generates things which are unbegotten, and distributes according to time, eternal natures. The God therefore, that would once exist, is the God that would exist in the discourse, in which there is a distribution into parts, and composition. For the Pythagoric Timæus likewise, indicating this in his treatise to those who are able to understand him, says " that before heaven [or the universe] was generated in words, there were idea and matter, and God the Demiurgus." For that he fashions the generation of the universe in words, he clearly manifests in what he says. Moreover, with respect to *the smooth and the even*, they manifest, as we have before observed, the one comprehension in the world, and the greatest aptitude to the participation of a divine soul. But the words, "*every where from the middle equal*," define the peculiarity of the spherical figure. For this is every where equidistant, according to all intervals. And the words "*whole, and*

\* Instead of *καὶ διὰ το μὴ λέγειν, τὸ εἶδεν αἰετὶ γινόμενος* in this place, it is necessary to read, *καὶ διὰ το μὴ λέγειν τὸ εἶδεν, αἰετὶ γινόμενος*.

*perfect from perfect bodies,*" establish the world in the highest degree of similitude to all-perfect animal; for that was in all respects perfect; and, likewise, to the Demiurgus himself. For as he is the father of fathers, and the supreme of rulers, thus also the world is the most perfect of perfect natures, and the most total of wholes. You may likewise say that the world is smooth, as not being in want of any motive, or nutritive, or sensitive organs. For this was proximately demonstrated. But "it is every where equal from the middle," as having a spherical figure, and "a whole and perfect," as being all-perfect, and leaving nothing external to itself: for this is properly a whole and perfect. And it consists of perfect bodies, as being composed from the four elements. It is also said to be in the singular number *a body*, as being only-begotten. And thus Plato beginning from the only-begotten, and proceeding as far as to perfection, he again converts it through the above-mentioned particulars to the same thing [i. e. to the only-begotten]; imitating the progression of the world from its paradigm, and its perfect conversion to it.

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END OF VOL. I.

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THE  
COMMENTARIES OF PROCLUS

ON THE

TIMÆUS OF PLATO,

IN FIVE BOOKS;

CONTAINING A TREASURY OF

PYTHAGORIC AND PLATONIC PHYSIOLOGY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

Εμοί προς φιλοσοφίαν ἐστὶ φίλια· προς μὲντοι σοφιστὰς, ἢ γραμματιστὰς, ἢ τοιοῦτο γένος ἑτέρον  
ἀνθρώπων κακοδαίμονων, οὐτε εὐν' ἐστὶ φίλια, μηδὲ κείνων ποτε γινώσκω.  
Apollonius Tyaneus.

TWO VOLUMES.

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# PROCLUS

ON

## THE TIMÆUS OF PLATO.

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“Placing also soul in the middle, he extended it through the whole of the world, and besides this, he externally circumvested the body of the universe with soul.”

Divinity produces all things at once, and eternally. For by his very being, and according to an eternal intelligence of wholes, he generates all things from himself, supermundane, and all mundane beings, intellects, souls, natures, bodies, and matter itself. And indeed, the at-once-collected subsists in a greater degree in the demiurgic production of things, than in the solar illumination;<sup>1</sup> though in this the whole light proceeds at one and the same time from the sun. But the sun who imitates his father through the visible fabrication, evidently yields to an eternal and invisible production. As we have said therefore, all things being produced at once and eternally from the fabrication [of the Demiurgus], the order of the effects is at the same time preserved. For in the producing cause there was an eternal intelligence and order prior to the things that are arranged. Whence though all things are at once from one cause, yet some have the first, but others a subordinate dignity. For some things proceed in a greater, but others in a less degree. And some indeed, are co-arranged with the Demiurgus according to union, others according to contact, and others according to participation. For intellect is able to be connascent with intellect through union. But soul is naturally adapted to be conjoined with intellect. And bodies are formed to par-

<sup>1</sup> For *ἐλίας* here, it is obviously necessary to read *ἡλίας*.

ticipate of it alone, just as things in the profundity of the earth, participate of the solar splendour. Since therefore all these exist in the world, viz. intellect, soul and body, and all are produced at once, and since at the same time, there is in these an order proceeding from the Demiurgus, the discourse about them, at one time beginning from on high according to progression, ends in the boundaries of fabrication, but at another time being impelled<sup>1</sup> from the last of things, recurs to the summits of the universe, conformably to things themselves. For all things proceed from, and are converted to the principle and cause from which they proceeded, thus exhibiting a certain demiurgic circle.

In what has been before said, therefore, Plato delivered to us the order of the plenitudes of the world according to progression, when he represented the Demiurgus placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, and thus fabricating<sup>2</sup> the universe. But in what is now said, he gives completion to the world according to conversion. And first indeed, assuming the contraries that are in the universe, he adds two media to these, and unites them through analogy. In the next place, perfecting it a whole of wholes, he surrounds it with an intellectual figure, renders it capable of participating of a divine life, and imparts to it a motion which imitates intellect. Always likewise, causing it to become more perfect by the additions, after all these, he introduces soul into the universe, and fills all things with life, though different natures with a different life. He also places intellect in soul, and through this conjoins soul to its fountain. For the soul of the universe, through participating of intellect, becomes conjoined with intelligibles themselves. And thus he ends at the principle from which the mundane intellect, soul, and the bulk of body proceed. For dividing the universe triply, into intellect, soul, and body, he first discusses the more subordinate of these: for such is the mode according to conversion. And the discussion indeed of the fabrication of body is terminated, having delivered the essence, figure and motion of it.

The theory of soul however, is conjoined to this, just as body itself is suspended from a divine soul, and the animation which the discourse now adds, is the seventh demiurgic gift imparted to the world. But the discussion of the soul is I think twofold; the one indeed delivering the essence of it, but the other its communion with body. Plato however selects the latter of these, and thinks fit to mention it before the former. Perhaps indeed, because it is a medium between the reasoning about body, and the speculations about the essence of soul. For the habitude of soul to body, is in a certain respect a medium between body, and

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *ερωμενος* in this place, it is requisite to read *ερωμενος*.

<sup>2</sup> For *συνεστρωτο* here, it is necessary to read *συνερετασμενο*.

soul itself. And it is necessary that the leading to principles should be through media. Perhaps too, he selected the latter, because he was not willing to connect the soul with body, according to time; nor again, when separate, and existing by itself to conjoin it to the world. But to deliver the communion of soul with body prior to the generation of soul, contributes to this. For the generation of the soul is sufficient to evince, that the corporeal bulk also of the world is unbegotten [according to time]. For if he ascribes generation to unbegotten natures, yet in these there will be another mode of generation. But if prior<sup>1</sup> to the apparent generation, he brings into the same condition both body and soul, such a generation will be unbegotten, and the animation will be perpetual; neither soul being generated in time, nor body differing in time from soul. And thus much concerning the principal parts of the order in what is said.

With respect however, to the middle position of soul, different interpreters explain it differently. For some say that the middle is the centre of the earth; others, that the moon is the middle, as the isthmus of generated and divine natures; others, that it is the sun, as being established in the place of a heart; others, that it is the inerratic sphere; others, that it is the equinoctial, as bounding the breadth of the world; and others, that it is the zodiack. And some indeed, place in the centre the ruling power of the universe; others, in the moon; others, in the sun; others, in the equinoctial; and others, in the zodiack. But to the first of these, the power of the centre bears witness, this being connective of every circulation; to the second, the motion of the moon, which in a various manner changes generation; to the third, the vivific heat of the sun; to the fourth, the facility of the motion of the equinoctial circle; and to the fifth, the circulation of the stars about the zodiack. Against all these however, Porphyry and Iamblichus write, blaming them for understanding the middle locally, and with interval, and inclosing in a certain part the soul of the whole world, which is every where present similarly, and which rules over, and leads all things by its motions. Of these divine men likewise, Porphyry indeed, assuming this to be the soul of the universe, interprets *the middle* according to the psychical essence: for this is the middle of intelligibles and sensibles. In thus speaking however, he will not appear to say any thing, as pertaining to the words of Plato. But if we should assume that the universe derives its completion from intellect, soul and body, and is an animal possessing soul and intellect, in this system we shall find that soul is the middle. Plato therefore, having before said this, will appear to say nothing else now, than that the soul of the world is arranged so as to extend its energies through the universe, being allotted

<sup>1</sup> For *προς της φαινομένης γενέσεως* here, read *προς της, κ. λ.*

the middle order in it. For again secondary natures participate of those prior<sup>1</sup> to them; just as body which is the last of things, participates of soul which ranks in the middle, and soul participates of intellect, which is prior to it. But the philosopher Iamblichus thinks that by soul, we should understand that soul which is exempt, supermundane, and liberated, and which has dominion over all things. For according to him, Plato does not speak of the mundane soul, but of that which is imparticipable, and is arranged as a monad above all mundane souls. For this is the first soul, and *the middle* is in this, as being similarly present to all things, in consequence of not belonging to any body, nor subsisting in any way in habitude, but similarly animating, and being equally separated from all mundane natures. For it is not less separated from some, and more from others; since it is without habitude; but is similarly separated from all; though all things are not separated from it after the same manner. For in the participants of it, there are the more and the less.

Our preceptor however, interprets *the middle* in a way more accommodated to the words of Plato. For since the soul of the universe has indeed that which is supermundane, and exempt from the universe, according to which it is conjoined to intellect, which Plato in the *Phædrus*, and Orphens in what he says about *Hippa*, denominate the head of the soul; and since it has also another multitude of powers, proceeding from this monad, divided about the world, and appropriately present to all the parts of the universe, in one way indeed about the middle, in another about the earth, in another about the sun, and in another about each of the spheres; this being the case, he says that the present words indicate all these, so that soul animates the middle in one way, but the whole bulk in another, and leaves something else prior to these powers, exempt from the universe. In order however, that we may not negligently attend to what is said by Plato, but may exhibit the variety of the psychical powers, thus much must be said, that soul much prior to body, is a vital world, and is both one and number. And through the one indeed, it is superior to every habitude of form; but through multitude, it governs the different parts of the universe. *For by its guardian powers, it contains the centre; since the whole sphere is governed from thence, and converges to it. Besides, every thing turbulent in the world, is collected about the middle, and requires a divine guard, capable of arranging, and detaining it in its proper boundaries. Hence also, theologists terminate the progressions of the highest Gods, in that place; and the Pythagoreans call the middle the tower of Jupiter, and the guard-house of*

<sup>1</sup> Instead of μετεχει γαρ αυτον τα δευτερα των προς αυτων in this place, it is necessary to read μετεχει γαρ αυ τα δευτερα των προ αυτων.

*Jupiter. But by its stable, and at the same time vivifying powers, it contains the sphere of the earth. By its perfective, and generative powers, the sphere of water. By its connective, and motive powers, the air. By its undepiled powers, fire. And by its intellectual powers, all heaven. Of these also, it contains in one way the lunar sphere, in another, the solar sphere, and in another, the sphere of the fixed stars. For the souls of each of these govern in conjunction with the whole soul of the universe, their appropriate portions of the world.*

Such therefore, being the mode of animation, Plato, as he is accustomed to do, beginning from the last of things according to conversion, first animates the middle, afterwards the universe, and in the third place, leaves something of soul external to the universe. For as he constituted body prior to soul, and parts prior to wholes, so likewise he delivers the animation of the world, beginning from the last of things. For according to a progression from on high he said, that the Demiurgus placed intellect in soul, and soul in body; but teaching us in what is now said, animation according to conversion, he first animates the middle, and afterwards the universe. For the river of vivification proceeds as far as to the centre; as the Oracles also say, when speaking of the middle of the five centres, which extends from on high entirely to the opposite part. "And another fifth middle fiery centre, where a life-bearing fire descends as far as to the material rivers." Plato therefore, beginning from those things in which animation ends, recurs to the whole production of life, and prior to this surveys the exempt power of the soul. Hence we must not place the ruling part of the soul in the centre; for this part is exempt from the universe; but a certain power of it, which is the guardian of the whole [mundane] order. For nothing else in the universe, is so capable of entirely subverting wholes as the centre, and the power of the centre, about which there is an harmonic dance of the universe [if they are in a defective condition]. Hence too Plato, divinely as it appears to me, does not place *the* soul in the middle of the universe, but *soul*. For these differ from each other, because the former establishes the *whole* of soul in the centre, but the latter places a *power* of it in the middle, and a different power in different parts of the world. Plato therefore says, "*placing soul in the middle;*" which is the same thing as giving the participation of soul to the middle, and extending its total powers to the universe; the Demiurgus left external to the universe, a power of the soul more divine than all the others, established in itself, and exemptly containing and connecting the whole world. And what occasion is there to be prolix in investigating the meaning of Plato, since the philosopher himself shortly after, when discussing the animation itself of the world, says, "*but soul unfolding herself to the extremity of the universe, from the middle, circularly covered it as with a veil,*

*herself being convolved in herself.*" This however does not at all differ from the words before us. For *to extend every way from the middle*, is the same thing as *to be unfolded from the middle to the extremity of the universe*. But there soul herself from herself, illuminates the centre of the universe, and the whole sphere of it, by her powers; and here the Demiurgus is the cause of animation, and introduces the soul into the universe. For the same thing is effected by both, demiurgically indeed, and intellectually, by the cause, but self-motively, by soul. Now however, the philosopher delivers the bond derived from fabrication alone. For we particularly refer wholes, and such things as are good, to a divine cause, but partial natures, and things which are not good, we think unworthy of divine production, and suspend them from other more proximate causes; though these also, as has been frequently observed, subsist through divinity.

As there is therefore a communion of a divine, and likewise of a partial soul with bodies, *that communion which subsists according to a beneficent will, and does not depart from intelligible progressions, is divine; but that which subsists according to a deluxion of the wings of the soul, or audacity, or flight, is without God, though in this also, there is a complication with self-motive energy, and the will of providence.* Nevertheless, the communion with body which is according to divinity, is manifest through the presence of divinity; but that which is from soul, is apparent through the representation of aberration which it exhibits. Hence, since the animation of the world is two-fold, proceeding from the Demiurgus, and from self-motion, Plato here very properly gives the preference to that cause which subsists according to divinity, as being wholly most adapted to wholes.\* For the words "*placing, he extended, and he covered us with a veil,*" are the names of demiurgic works. For the first of these signifies the termination of the soul, the second, the psychical middle which proceeds through all things, and the third, exempt transcendency. For *to cover us with a veil*, indicates that the soul comprehends the world every way, unites it through herself, leads it to one life, and does not leave any thing external to its appropriate providence, nor destitute of its nature.

34E "And causing circle to revolve in a circle, he established heaven [or the universe] one, single, solitary nature."

The philosopher Porphyry well interprets the meaning of circle revolving in a circle. For it is possible, says he, for that which is not a circle to be moved in a circle, as a stone when whirled round; and also for a circle not to be moved in

\* For τοῖς ἀλλοῖς here, it is necessary to read τοῖς οὐνοῖς.

a circle, as a wheel when rolled along. But it is the peculiarity of the world, that being circular it is moved in a circle, through harmoniously revolving about the centre. In a still greater degree however, the divine Iamblichus, appropriately interprets the meaning of these words. For he says that the circle is twofold, the one being psychical, but the other corporeal, and that the latter is moved in the former. For this is conformable to what has been before said, and accords with what is afterwards asserted. For Plato himself shortly after moves the corporeal nature according to the psychical circle, and renders the twofold circulations analogous to the periods in the soul. And such is the interpretation according to both these philosophers.

Moreover, to comprehend the whole blessedness of the world in three appellations, is most appropriate to that which subsists according to a triple cause, viz. the final, the paradigmatic, and the demiurgic. For of the appellations themselves, the first of them, viz. *one*, is assumed from the final cause; for *the one* is the same with *the good*. But the second, viz. *single* or *only*, is assumed from the paradigmatic cause. For the *only-begotten* and *onlyness* (μονογενής) were, prior to the universe, in all-perfect animal. And the third, viz. the *solitary*, is assumed from the demiurgic cause. For the ability of using itself, and through itself governing the world, proceeds from the demiurgic goodness. The world therefore, is *one*, so far as it is united, and is converted to *the one*. But it is *single*, so far as it participates of the intelligible, and comprehends all things in itself. And it is *solitary*, so far as it is similar to its father, and is able to save itself. From the three however, it appears that it is a God. For *the one*, the *perfect*, and the *self-sufficient*, are the elements of deity. Hence, the world receiving these, is also itself a God; being *one* indeed, according to hyparxis; but *single* or *only* according to a perfection which derives its completion from all sensible natures; and *solitary*, through being sufficient to itself.<sup>1</sup> For those that lead a solitary life, being converted to themselves, have the hopes of salvation in themselves. And that this is the meaning of the term *solitary*, will be evident from the following words of Plato:

“Able through virtue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself.”

For in these words, he clearly manifests what the solitariness is which he ascribes to the world, and that he denominates that being solitary, who looks to himself, to that with which he is furnished, and to his own proper

<sup>1</sup> The world is *single*, or *alone*, because there is not another world equal to it; but it is *solitary*, because it is sufficient to itself. So that the *alone*, and the *solitary*, have not here the same meaning.

measure. For those that live in solitary places are the saviours of themselves, so far as respects human causes. The universe therefore is likewise after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to itself, and preserving itself, not through a diminution, but from an exuberance of power; for self-sufficiency is here indicated; and as he says, through virtue. For he alone among partial animals [such as we are] who possesses virtue, is able to associate with, and love himself with a parental affection. But the vicious man looking to his inward baseness, is indignant with himself and with his own essence, is astonished with externals, and pursues an association with others, in consequence of his inability to behold himself. On the contrary, the worthy man perceiving himself beautiful rejoices and is delighted, and producing in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an association with himself. For we are naturally domesticated to the beautiful, but hastily withdraw ourselves from deformity. Hence, if the world possesses virtue adapted to itself, in its intellectual and psychical essence, and in the perfection of its animal nature, looking to itself, it loves itself, and is present with, and sufficient to itself.

It is proper therefore, to assert these things to those who place intelligibles external to intellect. For how can that which tends to other things, and as being deficient is indigent of externals, be blessed? Hence, if the world is through virtue converted to itself, must not intellect do this in a much greater degree? Intellect therefore intellectually perceives itself. And this is among the number of things immediately known. This also deserves to be remarked, that Plato when he gives animation to the world, directly imparts virtue to it. For the participation of soul is immediately accompanied with the fulness of virtue, in the being which subsists according to nature; since the one cause of the virtues,<sup>1</sup> is also co-arranged with the fountain of souls,<sup>2</sup> and the progression of this fountain is conjoined with the progression of soul. For with respect to virtue, one indeed is unical, primary and all-perfect; but another subsists in the ruling supermundane Gods; another in the liberated Gods; and another is mundane, through which the whole world possesses undefiled intelligence, an undeviating life, an energy converted to itself, and a purity unmingled with the animals which it contains. From this virtue therefore, the world becomes known and friendly to itself. For knowledge precedes familiarity.

Since the universe also is intellectual, an animal, and a God, so far indeed, as it is intellectual, it becomes known to itself; but so far as it is a God, it is friendly to itself. For union is more perfect than knowledge. If therefore, the universe is known to itself, it is intellectual; for that which is primarily known to itself is

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Vesta.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Juno.



intellect. And if it is friendly to itself it is united. But that which is united is deified; for *the one* which is in intellect is a God. Again therefore, you have virtue, a knowledge of, and a friendship with itself, in the world; the first of these proceeding into it from soul; the second from intellect; and the third from deity. Hence Plato very properly adds, that on account of these things, the world was generated by the Demiurgus a blessed God; for the presence of soul, the participation of intellect, and the reception of union, render the universe a God. And the blessed God which he now mentions is the God "*who at a certain time would exist,*" animated, endued with intellect, and united. Union however, is present with it according to the bond of analogy; but much more from the one soul and the one intellect which it participates. For through these, greater bonds, and a more excellent union proceeded into the universe. And still beyond these unions, divine friendship, and the supply of good, contain and connect the whole world. *For the bond which proceeds from intellect and soul is strong, as Orpheus also says; but the union of the golden chain [i. e. of the deific series] is still greater, and is the cause of greater good to all things.*

Moreover, felicity must likewise be assumed in a way adapted to the universe. For since it is suspended from the paternal intellect, and the whole fabrication of things, and since it lives conformably to those causes, it is consequently happy (*εὐδαίμων*)<sup>1</sup> from them. For the Demiurgus also is denominated a daemon by Plato in the Politicus, and a great daemon by Orpheus, when he says,

One the great daemon and the lord of all.<sup>2</sup>

He therefore who lives according to the will of the father, and preserves the intellectual nature which was imparted to him from thence immutable is happy and blessed. The first and the all-perfect form of felicity likewise, is that of the world. The second is that of the mundane Gods, whom Plato in the Phædrus calls happy Gods following the mighty Jupiter. The third is that of the genera superior to us [viz. the felicity of angels, daemons and heroes]. For there is one virtue of angels, another of daemons, and another of the heroic genera: and the form of felicity is triple, being different according to each genus. The fourth form of felicity is that which subsists in the undefiled souls, who make blameless descents [into the realms of generation,] and exert an inflexible and untamed life. The fifth is that of partial souls [such as ours]; and this is multiform. For the soul which is an attendant on the moon, is not similarly happy with the soul that is

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Having a good daemon.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *εἰς δαίμων ἐχέειτο μέγας ἀρχὸς ἀπὸ πάντων*, it is requisite to read *εἰς δαίμων γέρετο μέγας ἀρχὸς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν*.

suspended from the solar order; but as the form of life is different, so likewise perfection is defined by different measures. And the last form of felicity is that which is seen in irrational animals. For every thing which obtains a perfection adapted to it according to nature is happy. For through its proper perfection, it is conjoined to its proper demon, and partakes of his providential care. The forms of felicity therefore, being so many, the first and highest must be placed in the world, and which also is now mentioned by Plato. We must not, however, wonder that he immediately calls the world a God, from its participation of soul. For every thing is deified through that which is proximately prior to it; the corporeal world indeed through soul; but soul through intellect, as the Athenian guest also says; (for he asserts that by receiving intellect soul becomes a God,) and intellect through *the one*. Hence, intellect is divine, but not a God.\* *The one* however is no longer a God through any thing else, but is primarily a God; just as intellect is primarily gnostic, as soul is primarily self-motive, and as body is primarily in place. But these things being perfectly true, and peculiar to Plato, it is necessary to survey in what follows, where he establishes intellect in soul, as here he places soul in body.

“But, indeed, divinity did not thus afterwards artificially produce the soul, as we just now endeavoured to say, junior to the body. For he who conjoined these, would never permit that the more ancient nature should be governed by the younger.”

Plato knew that the mode according to conversion, entirely delivers as first, things which are second in order. For things which are proximately participated, are secondary to those that are exempt; and such as are more known to the hearers, are inferior to invisible things. The cause however of this is, that when we now survey beings we are in a fallen condition. For when we are on high, and behold the things that are here from a certain shadow, we are able to perceive their diminutive nature, in consequence of associating with intelligibles, and having them before our eyes. But falling into generation, and surveying things as it were in a supine condition, we first perceive symbols, and things proximate to our senses, as being placed nearer to us. And beginning from these, we recur through reminiscence to beings themselves and truly existing essence.

\* i. e. Intellect, is in its own nature divine, and not a God; but when a super-essential unity becomes consubstantial with it, it is then a God.

The survey therefore from on high, will be that of souls abiding there ; but the survey from beneath, will be that of souls who have separated themselves [from the intelligible world]. And the judgment indeed, which originates from things essentially more ancient, is that of souls living according to intellect ; but the judgment which proceeds from secondary to first natures, is the judgment of fallen souls. For truly existing being is near to souls that abide in the intelligible ; but non-being to those that are in a fallen condition. For that which abides, abides in being, and that which falls [from the intelligible], is situated in non-being. But to each of these, that in which it dwells is more proximate.

Plato therefore, knowing these things, and that we recur from subordinate to more excellent natures according to a well-arranged progression, thinks fit to make mention of the nature of things, conformably to which the elder is more excellent than the younger, and through this common conception, to arrange the soul prior to the body. For he reminds us that the former is older, but the latter younger, through an hypothetical guidance. For if the soul rules over the body, it is more ancient than the body. But it does rule over the body : for it leads every thing in the universe by its motions. And body, indeed, is alter-motive ; but soul is naturally adapted to move both itself, and other things. It is therefore more ancient than the body. If this however be the case, it is necessary to conceive of it by itself, not as being generated posterior to the body, as we imagine it to be, but giving it a supernal origin, we should survey the corporeal bulk of the universe, unfolded as it were into light from it. For the universe derived its subsistence through soul, imitating the progression of it through its bulk, but the conversion of it through its figure. These things, however, we shall again discuss.

But, if you are willing, let us now survey each of the words of the text of Plato. In the first place therefore, with respect to *the soul*, he manifests that he speaks of every soul by adding the article *the*. For he does not say as he did before, “ *placing soul in the middle*,” but *the soul*. For there, there was a power of the whole soul about the middle ; but here, every soul is said to be more ancient than body. In the next place, *the older* and *the younger*, are not to be assumed according to time, as Atticus apprehended they were : for the father at once constituted the soul, and surrounded the body of the universe with it, as with a veil. But they must be assumed in the order of essence. For the essence which is more proximate to the Demiurgus [is older]. If you wish also to understand the older and the younger according to time ; the time which is in the soul, is older and more divine, but the time which pertains to body is

younger. And soul, so far as soul, is not corporeal time; but the time belonging to body is subordinate to that of soul. For as there is a different form of motion in both, so likewise the time in each is different. In the third place, he uses the expression "*artificially produce*," in the most proper sense, in speaking of the soul; clearly indicating that it is a self-motive thing, that it is full of reasons,<sup>1</sup> and is inventive<sup>2</sup> of all-various contrivances.

Farther still, the power of more ancient ruling over junior natures, proceeds into the universe from intelligibles themselves.<sup>3</sup> For there Protogenus, [or animal itself,] who is so denominated by all [the Gods], is the king of all the intellectual natures. And in the intellectual order, the eldest of the sons of Saturn, is said to be the father of all things.

But Jove was born the first, and more he knows.

For every where that which is older, is the symbol of a more intellectual,<sup>4</sup> total and monadic life; but that which is younger, of a life which is partible, proceeds to secondary natures, and is multiplied. Hence of the vivific Goddesses, they call one older, but the other younger.<sup>5</sup> And of the demiurgic Gods, they denominate one prior, but the other junior, whom likewise they call recent.<sup>6</sup> In the next place, the word *conjoined*, clearly makes the soul which is the subject of the present discussion mundane, and not *liberated*,<sup>7</sup> nor the one soul which exists prior to the many. For the latter is exempt from all souls, and other souls proceed about it as a centre; but the former receives a conjunction with body, effected according to the will of the father.

"We however, participating in a certain respect much of that which is casual and without design assert things of this kind."

What is the reason that we are unwilling to transfer our intellect from things that are of a junior nature, to those that are essentially more ancient? It is

<sup>1</sup> For λογον here, read λογων.

<sup>2</sup> And for ευρητικων read ευρητικων.

<sup>3</sup> For απ' αυτων καθηκει τη νοητη, it is obviously necessary to read in this place, απ' αυτων καθηκει των νοητων.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of νεωτερας in this place, it is requisite to read νεορωτερας.

<sup>5</sup> i. e. Rhea is the older, but Juno the younger vivific Goddess.

<sup>6</sup> The prior Demiurgus, is Jupiter, but the junior Bacchus.

<sup>7</sup> i. e. Not belonging to the order of Gods denominated *liberated*, and who are also called *super-celestial*, as being immediately above the mundane Gods.

<sup>8</sup> In the original, δια πασαν αιτιαν, απο των νεωτερων ως προεργωτερων, επι τη κατ' ουσiam προεργωτερα

because our intellect resembles one asleep, and because we are full of an irrational and disorderly nature. For the words *casual*, and *rashly*, are significant of these things. For since we possess sense, and sensibles are placed before our view, together with which we are nourished, we first apprehend things of a junior nature, as being more familiar to us. And through sense indeed, we are borne along rashly and *without design*; but through sensibles which are placed before us, we live in a *casual manner*. For those that remain on high, as sense is with them at rest, and there is no sensation of the sensibles with which we are now conversant, have nothing occurring to them of a casual nature. But we, since we have sense, and sensibles are before our eyes, live casually and without design. And as it is said, we form a judgment of things with the head downward;<sup>1</sup> which is also conformable to what Empedocles lamenting our fate says:

Many dire words and cares obcloud the mind.<sup>2</sup>

For many things invading us who are truly slaves, as having become exiles from deity, blunt and clog our speculation of real beings. Since however, as this philosopher also says, the casual, and that which is without design, accede to us externally, on this account, Plato says, that we participate of them, and not that these are excited from our essence: for we are essentially intellectual. But since there is likewise a participation from more divine natures, Plato adds the word *much*, in order that he may indicate the indefiniteness and confusion of a participation of this kind. For the participation of diviner natures, introduces to the participants, union, bound and order.

“ But the artificer of the world constituted soul both in generation and virtue prior to and more ancient than body, as the despot [or lord] and ruler of its servile nature; and that from certain things in the following manner.”

Porphyry subdividing, conceives the words to signify, that soul is more ancient than body in generation, but prior to it in virtue. Both however, or either, may be signified, and *prior to and more ancient than*, may be conjoined to the words *in ge-*

μεταβιβαζειν ημων βουλευμεθα τον νοον; but it appears to me that the words *ως προεβυτερον* ought to be expunged, unless we read instead of them *ως οικειωτερον*, (as more familiar to us), and that for *βουλευμεθα*, we should read *εν βουλευμεθα*.

<sup>1</sup> For *καταποιουμεθα* here, it appears to be requisite to read *καρη ποιουμεθα*.

<sup>2</sup> In the original, *πολλα δε δειν' ερεα, τα τε αμλυνουσι μεριμνας*. But for *τα τε* it is obviously necessary to read *τας τε*.

*neration*; and again, either may be conjoined to the words *in virtue*. But generation when ascribed to the soul, is not that which is according to time; for Plato in the *Phædrus* demonstrates that the soul is unbegotten and indestructible; but is an essential progression from intelligible causes. For of beings, some are intelligible and unbegotten, but others are sensible and generated. And the media between these, are intelligible and generated. For some things are entirely in-composite and impartible, and on this account are unbegotten; but others which subsist between these, are intelligible and generated, being naturally impartible and partible, and after another manner simple and composite. Generation therefore, in the soul is one thing but that in the body another. And the one, indeed, is prior and more ancient; for it is more proximate to the Demiurgus of all things; but the other is secondary and more recent; for it is more remote from the one [fabricative] cause of all. Farther still, virtue is present with the soul, and it is also present with the body, and the whole animal; but the virtue of the soul is more divine, and that of the body, abject. And the former is of a more ruling nature, and is nearer to the unical causes of intelligible virtue; but the latter is of an attendant nature, and is more remote from intelligibles. *Generation, however, manifests progression, but virtue, perfection and conversion*; of which, the former is from the fountain of the soul,<sup>1</sup> but the latter is inherent in souls from fountal virtue, [i. e. from *Vesta*]. The prior itself also, and the more ancient, have a certain difference with respect to each other. *For prior indeed, is significant of order alone; but the more ancient, of the transcendency of cause with reference to the thing caused*. Not every thing therefore which is prior, can also be called more ancient, but that which is the leader of essence to secondary natures. Both however are true of the soul. For she is allotted a prior order, being the sister of body, according to the progression of both from one fabrication; and she generates and adorns body in conjunction with the father. For the first progeny of causes, produce as they proceed the second progeny, in conjunction with the causes of themselves.

What, however, shall we say of the words, *the lord and ruler*? Do not both indicate, that the soul supplies all things with good, that it provides in every respect for the body, and that it preserves its own proper good in a flourishing condition.<sup>2</sup> And how is it possible, that Plato should not manifest these things through these words? For a *despot* or *lord*, always refers the good<sup>3</sup> of those that

<sup>1</sup> It is necessary here to supply *της ψυχης*. The fountain of the soul is *Juno*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αἰματωρ* in this place, read *αἰματωρ*.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *τα των δημιουργων αγαθον αναφερεται* in this place, it is requisite to read *τα των δυνάμεων αγαθα αναφερεται*.

he governs, to his own good. But a *ruler* looks to the good of those who are obedient to him, and co-arranges all things with reference to it. The *despotic* peculiarity, however, is present with the soul, in consequence of her performing all things for the sake of herself; but the *ruling* peculiarity, through filling all things with good. For her providential energy is not diminished, through referring all things to her own proper good. And her good remains unchanged, while she gives completion to her providential energies. In another way also she is a *ruler* and a *despot*: for she proceeds both from the ruling, and the fontal soul.\* Because likewise, the universe is her dwelling, she is called a *despot*. And because she leads all things by her motions, she has a *ruling power*. In consequence too, of having dominion over wholes, she is a *despot*; but because she assimilates all things to the intelligible, she *rules* over the universe. If however, she was thus constituted at first, as a despot and a ruler, these things are essential to her, I mean the despotic and the ruling peculiarity. But if they are essential, they are always present with her. And if indeed they were present with her in capacity alone, she would be imperfect, which it is not lawful to assert; but if in energy, that which is governed by her always was, and was adorned by her. The universe itself therefore, if it was so generated, as to be governed by soul, is consubstantial with soul. For that which is governed is simultaneously conjoined with that which governs. Hence through both, we may discover the perpetuity of the universe, and that to govern is not accidental to soul, nor to be governed, to body, but that the soul is, by its very essence, the despot of the body, and body the vassal of the soul. On this account also, they are spontaneously conjoined to each other; and the body is excited to the participation of the soul, and the soul to the care of the body.

Farther still, the intention of the words "*from certain things after the following manner*," is to lead into light the genera and the things which constitute the soul, and also the mode of the mixture of them, and the reasons according to which the mixture is divided. For the corporeal nature was made by divinity to consist of certain elements, and after a certain manner, and he artificially devised a certain analogy of them and physical bond. But if divinity artificially produced the soul from certain things, and after a certain manner, he constituted both the subject of her as it were, and the form. It is ridiculous therefore to say, that the essence of her is unbegotten, if she consists of certain elements, but that the form of her is generated. For Plato says, that divinity produced, both the matter as it were of the soul, and the reason according to which she is diversified

\* viz. She proceeds from Proserpine and Juno.

with such forms as she possesses ; being bound by certain media. If however, divinity generates the elements as it were of her, viz. essence, same, and different, and from these the whole, every thing that is essential in the soul is generated.

“From an essence always impartible, and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again from an essence which is partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence.”

In the first place, it is requisite to show through what cause Plato delivers the generation of the soul, since it is according to him unbegotten ; in the next place, to divide appropriately the whole psychical generation ; in the third place, to demonstrate the middle nature of the soul ; in the fourth place, to speak concerning the genera of those things, from which Plato constitutes all other beings and the soul ; in the fifth place, to show how the mixture of these genera is to be assumed in the soul ; in the sixth place to demonstrate what the impartible and the partible natures are ; and in the seventh place, to unfold the meaning of the words of Plato, and to evince that they accord with all that has been before said. For if we are able to discuss all these particulars, we shall obtain in an appropriate manner the end of this investigation. Let us begin therefore from the first, because some of the ancients have blamed Plato, asserting that he does not rightly investigate the principle of a principle, and the generation of unbegotten thing. For if we investigate the causes of first natures, and conceive generations of things self-subsistent, we shall ignorantly proceed to infinity, and have no end of the theory. For as he who thinks that all things are demonstrative, especially subverts demonstration itself, after the same manner also, he who investigates the causes of all things, entirely subverts all beings, and the order of them proceeding from a certain definite principle. Things of this kind indeed, are objected by Theophrastus to Plato, concerning the generation of the soul, who likewise says, that we ought not to investigate *the why* in all physical inquiries. For, he adds, it would be ridiculous to doubt why fire burns, on what account fire exists, and why snow refrigerates. But those who have written against him in defence of Plato say, that alone to know the *οτι* or *that* of natural things,<sup>1</sup> is irrational knowledge, and is a doxastic, or sensitive apprehension of them ; but that to add likewise *the why*, and to investigate the causes of them, is truly the employment of dianoia, and a scientific intellect. For in this right opinion differs from scientific reason.

<sup>1</sup> viz. Merely to know *that* they exist, without knowing the *εστιν*, or *why* they exist.



We however, attending to what both of them say, think that the latter speak well, but in the first place, we would ask Theophrastus himself, whether the cause of no one thing is to be assigned, or of a certain thing? For if of no one thing, besides subverting science which especially knows causes, he will also accuse himself, by enquiring whence thunder is produced, whence winds arise, and what are the causes of lightning, corruscations, fiery whirlwinds, rain, snow and hail; all which in his *Meteors*, he very properly thinks deserving of an appropriate conjectural discussion. But if the cause of a certain thing is to be assigned, why are some things pertaining to physics to be surveyed according to causes, but others are to be delivered irrationally without cause? For it does not follow that in things in which *that they exist* is manifest, in these it is likewise known *why* they exist. But after Theophrastus, we shall ask the lovers of Plato, whether we are entirely to investigate the causes of all things, or not of all things? For if of all things, we must therefore investigate the cause of *the one*, which we say is more excellent than cause. For *that the one* is, we may learn from principles. For if not *the one*, but multitude [is the principle of things,] what is it that unites; since that which is united is from *the one*, just as that which is essentialized is from essence, and that which is animated is from soul? But *why the one* is one cannot be unfolded, for it is more ancient than every cause. And if we are not to investigate the causes of all things, why should we investigate the cause of soul, and the generation of it from a cause, but should by no means do this in other things?

Since however, we have separately interrogated each of them, we shall doubt with ourselves for both of them, through what cause Plato indeed devises the generation of the soul, and the progression of it from a cause, but Theophrastus condemns all doctrine of this kind. And having doubted we say, that to Theophrastus, and all of the Peripatetic sect, the ascent of their speculation, is [only] as far as to the motive forms of the universe; whether it be proper to call these souls, or intellects.\* But by Plato, these as falling short of the first dignity among beings, in consequence of being participable, are considered as having an order very remote from principles. For prior to these, are the intelligible and intellectual orders of beings, from which these derive their progression. And prior to these orders, is the number of the Gods, causing beings to become one, and connected, and illuminating them with divine light. And again, prior to this number, is the imparticipable one, from which this number unfolds itself into light through the natures by which it is received. For it is necessary that **imparticipable forms**

\* i. e. The souls of the celestial and sublunary spheres.

should subsist prior to those that are participated, and prior to imparticipables, the unities of them. For the united is one thing, and unity another, and prior to the multitude of unities, the one fountain of them exists.

Such therefore being the opinions of both these philosophers, Theophrastus indeed, since he asserts that the soul is the principle of motion, and does not admit that there is any thing else prior to this principle, very properly thinks that principle ought not to be investigated. For he grants that the universe is animated, and on this account divine. *For if it is divine, says he, and has the most excellent life, it is animated; since nothing is honourable without soul*, as he writes in his treatise On the Heaven. But Plato admits that there are mundane intellects, prior to the celestial souls, and prior to these, intellects without habitude[to souls], and prior to these, the divine order. Hence, he very properly delivers the soul produced and generated from another principle; though he also knew that generation of another kind has not only a place in bodies, but also in souls, so far as they participate of time. For in divine souls likewise there is time, since, as Plato says in the Phædrus, they survey through time real being itself. For all transitive motion has time conjoined with it. And thus much for the first of the before-mentioned problems. For at the same time, it is sufficiently demonstrated, that Plato rightly delivers the generation of the soul, though it is essentially unbegotten, and that the argument which is urged against it, is partly right and partly not. For to him who admits that the soul is the first thing, it is consequent to subvert the generation of it. For from what is the generation of it, when there is nothing prior to it? This very thing however, is not true, that soul is the first of all things. For that which Aristotle says concerning body, that being finite, it always receives the power of being always moved, but does not receive the infinite at once,—the same thing also must necessarily be said concerning the soul, that it does not at once energize according to all things, so that it does not at once possess all the infinite power, from which it always energizes, nor does it energize at once according to every power, so as always to possess one energy. For of all power, there is one energy of one power. Hence it always receives the power of energizing always, and on this account does not always energize with invariable sameness, but differently at different times. So that in short it is true, *that every thing which energizes according to time, always receives the power of energizing, yet does not at once receive the whole power, and on this account is generated.*

That the soul however, is not the first of beings<sup>1</sup> is evident. For that which is first is present with all things, and it is necessary that all things should participate

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *οτι δε ου προ των η ψυχη, εηλον*, in this place, it is necessary to read *οτι δε ου πρωτον των ουτων η ψυχη, εηλον*.

of the principle of all, or not participating of it should entirely perish. For essence and *hyparxis* are imparted to all things from the first principle. But soul is not present with all things, nor is it necessary that all things should participate of soul. But of bodies, some are inanimate, and others are animated. It is likewise necessary that the first of all things should be one. For if it were multitude, it would have that which causes things to be one, prior to itself. For there will not be a dispersed multitude. But soul is a multitude. The first of things also is beyond all essence; since every essence has multitude in conjunction with itself; for there are in it<sup>1</sup> difference and sameness, life, and eternal energy. But soul is an essence. Every where too, the first genus is free from evil; but the genus of [partial] souls is at a certain time naturally adapted to become evil. And this in short may be demonstrated through many arguments. The design however of Plato is, through the above-mentioned cause, to unfold to us the psychical essence, to show how it subsists, and to teach us from what elements it is composed, and according to what reasons. For as with respect to our body it is easy to know, that it contains the face and the hands, the thighs and the feet, and all such other parts as are obvious to every one; but to know how it is composed from the inward parts, from what particulars, and according to what ratio, requires medical and anatomical information;—after the same manner with respect to the soul, it is not difficult to show what it is according to its total powers, but to unfold the very essence of it, as far as to the elements of which it consists, and to survey the all-various reasons in it, will be the work of the most accurate theory concerning it. And this indeed, Plato endeavours to do, anatomizing as it were the psychical essence, and denudating the whole of it to those who are able to follow him. As we have said therefore, we may thus reply to the first of the inquiries. For that Plato very properly says, that the essence of the soul is generated, we may learn, by considering that he called the corporeal-formed nature generated, because it is always becoming to be, and receives an infinite power of existing. For the soul also is a thing of this kind, and is not able to receive at once the whole infinity of being. This is evident from its living in a discursive manner, and producing different reasons at different times, not having the whole of an infinite life at once present. By always therefore evolving its own life, it is evident that it has an essence always generated, or becoming to be, and always advancing to the infinite, but not being infinite. Hence it always receives a life which is essential, and entirely natural to it. For that which is perfective of a thing is to that thing entirely according to nature. Moreover, if it

<sup>1</sup> i. e. In the first essence.

is self-motive, [as Timæus asserts, then we must admit, that it imparts to itself at once, the whole of the essential life which it possesses in itself, and thus it will be unbegotten and at the same time] generated; being indeed, through the essence and life which it always possesses, ever-living, and ever-existent, but in consequence of always receiving these, always becoming to be essence and life. *For it exists in a twofold respect, from itself, and from the natures prior to itself. And through itself indeed, always existing; but through the natures prior to itself, always becoming to be. Or rather through the latter having both, viz. to be that which it is, and to be generated, but through itself to be that which it is only.* For it alone possesses from the natures prior to itself the perpetual reception of something; Aristotle also rightly asserting that nothing is the cause of itself, the well-being of which is according to time, and has not an eternal subsistence,<sup>1</sup> lest the cause which ought to be prior to the thing caused, should be consubistent with that which is generated. Hence time and eternity subsist about the soul; eternity indeed, so far as the soul is unbegotten; but time so far as it is generated. On this account the soul is in a certain respect eternal, as indestructible, but is not simply eternal, as Plato also says in the Laws. But the second thing proposed to be done, was to divide the whole generation of the soul in an appropriate manner. This however, we shall afterwards accomplish, again assuming the principle from the things themselves.

In every nature therefore, there are essence, power [and energy. And essence indeed,]<sup>2</sup> is that according to which an existence as fire, or to be fire, is present with fire. But power is one thing, and energy another. For one thing dries, but another heats, and other things produce a change in a different way. It is necessary therefore, that in the soul also one thing should be essence, another power, and another energy. And it is requisite that he who wishes to apprehend and survey the whole of the soul, should speak about all these. Of the generation of the soul therefore, there will in the first place be three heads; the first, concerning its essence; the second concerning its power; and the third concerning its energy. For this will be a perfect disquisition of the things proposed for consideration.

<sup>1</sup> From the version of Leonicius Thomæus, it appears that the words within the brackets are wanting in the printed original, and I have accordingly inserted them from his version.

<sup>2</sup> In the original, ὁρθως καὶ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους εἰρηστος, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐαυτῷ αἴτιον, οὐ κατὰ χρόνον ἐν ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνως, which Leonicius Thomæus erroneously translates as follows: Quamobrem optime Aristoteles loquitur, quando dicit, nullam rem sibi ipsi causam esse, neque temporalem, neque sempiternam. For an eternal nature is self-subsistent.

<sup>3</sup> The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, but both the sense and the version of Thomæus require they should be inserted. Hence after το δε δυναμις, it is necessary to add, το δε ενεργεια καὶ ημεν ουσια.

We may perceive however, that the psychical essence is a certain threefold nature. For the *hyparxis* of it is one thing, and the *harmony* in it another, according to which its essential multitude is connected; since it is not one essence like intellect, nor divisible to infinity, like body which is posterior to it; but it is divisible into more essential parts than one, of which it consists, yet they are finite in number, there not being more parts of the soul than these, since these parts of it cannot be divided into others, as will be evident as we proceed. And the *form* which is effected from these is another thing; so that the essence of the soul is one and threefold. For the monad and the triad are adapted to it, since we divide the whole soul into three parts. Hence its essence is one and triple: for *hyparxis* is one thing, harmony another, and form another. And the first of these indeed, alone defines existence, the second harmonizes the essential multitude, but the third contains the peculiarity of the whole system. All these likewise, are in each other. For *hyparxis* has with itself an harmonized multitude; since it is not without multitude; nor is it multitude alone unharmonized. And harmony is itself essential, and is connective of essence, to which also it gives form. Hence likewise it is shown in what respect the soul is harmony, and in what respect it is not, and that Plato accords with himself in asserting here that the soul is harmony, but in the *Phædo* confuting those who maintain that it is. *For it is one thing to be the harmony of itself, and of other things, and a different thing to be the harmony of another thing alone.* For the latter produces harmony in a subject, and a harmony inseparable from the things harmonized, and established in a foreign seat. But the former produces a separate harmony, subsisting from itself, and converted to itself. *Form likewise, is comprehensive of harmonic reasons, contains the hyparxis of the soul, and is the one reason according to which the soul is that which it is.* All these therefore are in each other, viz. *hyparxis*, harmony, and form, and the essence of the soul is one and triple; since it also consists of three genera, essence, same and different. And again, *hyparxis* indeed, is rather defined according to essence, but harmony according to sameness, and form according to difference, through which it is separated from all things.

Since therefore, we find that the soul is triple from the beginning, possessing essence, power and energy, and again, having essence itself triple, according to *hyparxis*, according to harmony, and according to form, from these we shall make a pentad; arranging *hyparxis* as the first, harmony as the second, idea or form, as the third, power as the fourth, and energy as the fifth. For the pentad is adapted to the soul as to a medium, containing the bond of the monad and the

\* Instead of *ovre mias arias* in this place, it is necessary to read *ovre mias ovrias*.

ennead, just as the soul is the bond of the intelligible and sensible essence. Adopting likewise this arrangement, we shall divide the whole theory concerning the soul into five heads; in the first place, speaking concerning the hyparxis of the soul; in the second place, concerning the reasons and harmony in it; in the third place, discussing the idea of it; in the fourth place, the many powers it contains; and in the fifth place, directing our attention to its energies. For Plato also when he speaks about the mundane body, surveying the corporeal-formed nature of the world itself, by itself, delivers in the first place the nature which is the subject of body, and produces the elements of which the world consists. In the next place, he delivers the harmony of the elements; for analogy, and the bond subsisting through analogy, are an image of the psychical harmony. In the third place, he delivers the idea of the world exhibiting it to us as a spherical whole of wholes. In the fourth place, he unfolds to us the powers of the world, giving to the spheres indeed, partible powers, and such as are effected through partial organs, but to the animal of the universe, whole and perfect powers. And in the fifth place, he delivers to us the energies of the world, surrounding the body of it with a wise and intellectual motion. After the same manner likewise, he divides in these five heads the theory of the soul. That the generation of the soul therefore, is very properly surveyed by Plato, and in how many, and what heads it is divided, may through these things be manifest.

After this however, we must discuss that which we proposed, as the third subject of enquiry, viz. how, and on what account we say that the soul is of a middle nature. For it is necessary that this should be known prior to the reasoning concerning it. Since then there are many things which proceed from *the one*, as far as to formless and the last matter, let us see what are the peculiarities of the first beings, what of the last, and what are allotted a middle order, and how they are adapted to the essence of the soul. The following therefore, are the peculiarities of intelligibles, truly-existing being, the eternal, the impartible, the immoveable, the entire, the perfect, a superplenitude of existence, an unwearied and unrestrained life, that which is motive of all things, similitude, the being present with all things, and the being exempt from all things. For all these properties are unfolded into light in intelligibles, according to the progressions of being. But again, there are certain other peculiarities of sensibles, such as the following, that which is not truly-existing being, that which is temporal according to essence, the partible, that which is moved, the partial, that which is in want of another, that which is always filling with existence, that which lives according to participation, that which is alter-motive, dissimilitude, and that which occupies place by its parts. Between these, which are opposed to each other as things first to things last, there are

certain media, through which it is entirely requisite that the progression from first to last natures, should be effected. For things similar to their producing causes proceed prior to such as are dissimilar; because similitude is allied to *the one*, and all things aspire after *the one*. The media therefore, between these extremes are, that which is not truly-existing being, yet is more excellent than non-being, but is inferior to real being, that which according to essence is in a certain respect eternal being, but exerts its energies in time, that which is impartible, according to its most divine part, but is distributed into parts, according to the all-various progression of reasons, that which itself moves itself, that which rules over alter-motive natures, but is inferior to immoveable beings, that which presents itself to the view partially in conjunction with its wholeness, that which is in a certain respect a whole, according to the possession of all reasons, but which appears to be partial, according to diminution, and transition of energy. It is also that which perfects itself, and is perfected by natures prior to itself, and is more perfect than things which are adapted to be alone perfected by another. It likewise fills itself with power, and is filled by other things, lives from itself, and receives life from others, being more divine than the natures which live only by participation, but inferior to those that primarily possess life. It is moreover, motive of other things, but is moved by first natures, is similar and at the same time dissimilar, and is exempt from the last of things, and is co-ordinated with them.

Such therefore being the peculiarities in essences, let us consider where the soul is to be arranged, whether in the first, or in the last of things. If however, in the first of things, it will be truly-existing being, will be entirely eternal and immoveable, and every thing else consequent to real beings, and we shall neither preserve the partible nature of the psychical reasons, nor psychical time, nor self-motion, nor a transitive energy, nor any other thing of the like kind; though we clearly perceive these things in all our souls. But now we investigate such things as are common to all souls, and which are essentially inherent in them, such as are the above-mentioned peculiarities. So that if they are inherent in all souls, being common, souls will not belong to the first of things, and to eternal beings so far as they are souls. But neither do they rank among the last of things. For if they did, we shall make the soul alter-motive, partible and composite, and alone perfected by other things, every thing contrary to which we see even in our souls. For they move and perfect themselves, and conduct themselves as they please. Much more therefore, will divine souls possess the cause of their proper perfection, will lead all things by their own motions, will be converted to, and know themselves, which it is impossible for alter-motive natures to accomplish.

If however, it is not possible for the soul to be placed either in the first, or in the last of things, we must give to it a certain middle situation; and this very properly, in order that it may imitate the first causes of itself. For the Goddess who is the cause of the soul, has a middle rank among the Gods, as she also appeared to have to theologians, she being collective of the two fathers,<sup>1</sup> and from her own bowels emitting the life of the soul. As in the fontal therefore, so likewise in the ruling Gods, we may see the psychical principle shining forth to the view; so that the soul very properly proceeds as a medium between intelligibles simply and sensibles, between beings that are alone eternal, and those that are simply generated.

176 You must not however, apprehend its middle nature to be a thing of such a kind, as to be collective of the extremes, but exempt from the things collected. For it is not better than intelligibles, but the end of them. Nor again, is it a thing of such a kind, as to be inferior to both: for it transcends sensibles which are moved by it. But since it is a boundary or end, it is the boundary of intelligibles, but the principle of sensibles. By no means, however, must it be said, that it is such a boundary and such a principle, as a point is in a line. For it is not in the things that are bounded as a point is in both the sections of a line. But it is in one way the boundary of intelligibles, as presenting itself to the view after the intelligible hypostasis, and in another way the principle of sensibles as being exempt from, and motive of them. For thus it will afford us a certain analogy, and it will be as alter-motive are to self-motive natures, so are self-motive to immoveable natures. It will also possess the bond of beings through its proper middle condition, evolving indeed united causes, but collecting the dispersed powers of sensibles. And it will be comprehended indeed, by the essence which is immoveable, and always possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, but will comprehend alter-motive, and all-variously mutable generation. *It is likewise intelligible, as with reference to generated natures, but generated as with reference to intelligibles; and thus exhibits the extremes in the middle; imitating in this respect the Goddess who is the cause of it.*<sup>2</sup> For she is on every side luminous, and has a face on every side. She likewise possesses the rudders of the universe, receiving in her bosoms the progressions of intelligibles into her; being filled from the intelligible<sup>3</sup> life, but emitting the rivers of the intellectual<sup>4</sup> life; and containing in herself the centre of the progression

<sup>1</sup> The cause of the soul is Rhea, who is collective of the two fathers, Saturn and Jupiter; Juno also is the cause of the soul, but she is a subordinate cause, being contained in the vital fountain of Rhea.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Rhea.

<sup>3</sup> For *νοεῖς* here, it is necessary to read *νοητός*.

<sup>4</sup> And instead of *νοητός* here, we must read *νοεῖς*.



of all beings. Very properly therefore, is the soul both unbegotten and generated. And this indeed was before demonstrated from the two-fold life which is in her, viz. the essential and the transitive; <sup>1</sup> but it may now be shown from her wholeness and her parts. For how is [real] being unbegotten, except by having the infinite power of existing, at once *wholly* present? And how is body generated, except by having infinite power always flowing into it, in consequence of not being able to receive the whole of it at once?

The soul therefore, as being incorporeal indeed, has through itself an infinite power of existing, not being generated according to the whole of itself, but immortal; but according to its parts, it is always generated to infinity. For if it had the same total infinity always present, there would be the same infinity of the whole and the part, of the perfect and the imperfect, of that which contains and of that which is contained. But this is impossible. Moreover, neither can the whole of it always be in generation, or becoming to be, but a part of it be eternal being, lest the parts should be better than the whole. Hence *vice versa*, the whole is infinite being, but the part becoming to be. So that the hypostasis of it possesses infinite power, and is generated to infinity; and thus at one and the same time, it participates of being, and is the first of generated natures, body <sup>2</sup> both in the whole and in the parts of it being in generation. It is not therefore sufficient to say that it is generated, in consequence of energizing partly, but it is requisite to see how this is pre-existent in the very being of the soul. For every energy which is according to nature, has an essence which antecedently assumes the cause of the energy; so that the soul likewise pre-assumes the seed of a life which is according to time, and which is common to every soul. For it is necessary that this also should be *generated*, and not *alone be*. If however this be the case, since the soul possesses being according to the whole, it has to be generated in its parts. And how this is true we have shown. And thus much may suffice concerning the middle of the soul.

Let also the intelligible breadth, the psychical multitude, and the sensible nature, be separate from each other; and let the last of things be suspended from those that rank as media, and the media from those that are the first. Let the soul likewise, be the one bond of beings, subsisting in them. For *the one* also binds all things, but in an exempt manner. For all things are united to each other as homogeneous, and as being derived from one cause, and extended to

<sup>1</sup> It was before demonstrated that the soul, in consequence of being self-motive, produces itself, and is without generation; but in consequence of always receiving essence and life from the natures superior to itself, it is always becoming to be essence and life, and is always generated.

<sup>2</sup> For *ον σωματος* here, read *του σωματος*.

one object of desire. But the soul likewise binds beings, as existing in them. And as in analogy, the middle pertains to the things that are bound, thus too, the soul must be admitted to be the middle of beings, binding and at the same time being bound, as being of a self-motive nature.

These things being discussed, it is necessary in the next place to show, how, and from what genera this soul, which contains the bond of beings, subsists. But it is more necessary to speak first about the genera themselves, what they are, whence they proceed, and how. For it is requisite to know wholes prior to parts. This therefore, is the fourth of the things proposed, and we shall discuss it to the utmost of our ability. That the intelligible world therefore, comprehends the causes of secondary natures, and that all forms are there, intelligibly or intellectually, or in whatever way you may be willing to call them, for they subsist in both ways, has been demonstrated in many treatises, and will be demonstrated by Plato in what follows. Of forms themselves however, some are most total, and extend to every thing. Others are most partial, and are as it were atomic forms. And others subsist between these, extending to many, but not to all things; as the Elean guest or stranger likewise shows in the Sophista. For man is from man itself, and horse is from horse itself. But the similar which is in men and horses, and in many other things, is from similitude itself; and in like manner the dissimilar. Difference, and sameness however, which are in all beings, are from the sameness and difference which are there. Hence some things are from atomic forms, others from middle, and others from the most total forms; *since also of the sciences which are in us, some look to one scientific object, as medicine to health, but others extend to many, as arithmetic to philosophy, to politics, to the tectonic science, and to many others. And this is not only the case with arithmetic, but also with the measuring science, and with statics. For Plato says, that either all or some of the fabricative arts, require the assistance of these, and without these have no accuracy. But others look to all the arts, and not to those that are fabricative alone, but to such also as contribute to the contemplative sciences, as is the case with the deciding art, as Socrates says in the Philebus.* As therefore in the sciences there are some that are most total, so in intelligible causes, some are most partial, so far as the partial is in them, and are the leaders of appropriate numbers of similar forms; but others are widely extended, such as the equal, the similar, and the whole: for whole so far as whole is not common to all things; since a part, so far as it is a part, is not a whole. Others however, extend to all things, of which all beings participate, so far as they are beings, and not so far as they are living, or animated, or possess some other peculiarity, but according to the appellation of being. For since being is the first [of intelligibles] the causes also of existence will have the most total order in the genera of being. But these genera

are five in number, viz. *essence, sameness, difference, motion, and permanency*. For every being is essentialized, is united to itself, and separated from itself and from other things, proceeds from itself and its proper principle, and participates of a certain quiet and permanency, so far as it preserves its own proper form. Whether therefore, there is an intelligible, or sensible, or middle genus of things, it consists of these; since all things are from these. For all things do not live, nor are all things wholes, or parts, or animated; but of these genera all things participate. And with whatever thing essence is not present, neither will the other genera be present: for they subsist about essence. Sameness also not existing, the whole will be dissipated. And the difference of one thing from another being abolished, there will only be one thing, and that void of multitude. Motion likewise not existing, things would be unenergetic and dead. And without permanency they would be unstable, and immediately hurried away to non-entity. Hence, it is necessary that in all things there should be each of these, and that essence should subsist as the first of them, this being as it were the Vesta and monad of the genera, and having an arrangement analogous to *the one*. But after this it is necessary that sameness and difference should subsist, the former being analogous to bound, but the latter to infinity. And in a similar manner it is requisite that there should be permanency and motion, the former being especially seen about the powers of beings, but the latter about their energies. For every being, so far as being participates after a manner of a certain essence, as it is written in the Sophista, and in the Parmenides. But every essential power is either under sameness, or under difference, or under both; heat indeed, and every separative power, being under difference, but cold and every collective power, under sameness. And whatever power is a medium between these, being under both. For every energy [is either motion or permanency, or is in a certain respect both these. For the energy of intellect,] and every energy which preserves in the same condition that which energizes, or is that about which it energizes, is rather permanency than motion. But the energy of bodies on each other, is a motion which does not suffer them to remain in the same condition, but removes them from the state in which they are. And the energy which changes the subject of its energy in the same and about the same, is a stable motion. Every being therefore, participates by its very existence of this triad, viz. of essence, power and energy, on account of these five genera, and also is, possesses capability and

<sup>1</sup> *αρεν* is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *παρὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἐν* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *παρὰ γὰρ τοῦ οὐ*.

<sup>3</sup> Both the sense and the version of Leonicius Thomæus require the insertion in this place of *ἡ αἰσθησις*, *ἡ ὁρασις*, *ἡ ἀσφῶσις*. *ἐνεργεῖα γὰρ τοῦ νοῦ*.

energizes. In short, since every thing which in any way whatever has existence, consists of bound and infinity, it is essentialized indeed and subsists according to a participation of both these. But it possesses sameness with itself through the communion of these two; and difference, through the division of them. Since also it is not the first, it proceeds from the principle of things, and abides in it, so that it is both moved and is permanent. These five genera therefore, are in every being, so far as it is being, though they subsist differently in different beings. For intelligibles have all these essentially; intelligible and at the same time intellectual natures, possess them according to sameness;<sup>1</sup> intellectuals according to difference; psychical natures according to permanency; and corporeal natures according to motion. But vice versa, if life is motion, and sluggishness permanency: for souls indeed, are essential lives, but bodies are alter-motive. If however, motion and permanency are prior to sameness and difference, as we may demonstrate from other reasonings, calling the progression of each thing from its cause,<sup>2</sup> a motion prior to energy, and its abiding in its cause, a permanency prior to the unenergetic condition which is opposed to energy;—if this be the case, after intelligibles, the intelligible and at the same time intellectual natures, will subsist according to permanency, but intellectuals according to motion. Souls also will thus subsist according to sameness, but bodies according to difference. But if we should say that life is motion, and immutable intelligence permanency, again intelligibles will be characterized according to the essential; but intelligible and at the same time intellectual natures, being lives, according to motion; and intellectual natures, being essentialized in intellect, according to permanency; for mundane natures derive their permanency from intellect. Psychical natures also will thus subsist according to sameness, because they contain the bond<sup>3</sup> of impartibles and partibles; but corporeal natures will subsist according to difference; for in these, as they are partible, strife has dominion. These five natures however, are successive to each other, viz. being, life, intellect, soul, and body; because the total genera which are prior to forms, are likewise five. And thus much may be said concerning the five genera universally; only observing in addition, that the same things are called both genera and elements. And the first of second natures indeed are called genera; but these remaining undiminished and exempt from partial natures, are the causes of their existence. But each of the several

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *τα δε νοερα ισηρα, και κατα το αυτο* here, it is necessary to read *τα δε νοερα και ισηρα, κατα το αυτο*.

<sup>2</sup> This progression is elsewhere elegantly called by Proclus, *an ineffable unfolding into light*.

<sup>3</sup> For a bond is union, and sameness is union of essence.

things of which the whole consists, are called elements. For the genera in the Demurgus give completion to the demiurgic being, and are the elements of it; but they are the genera of all the forms contained in the intellects that proceed from him, and also of all those that are in souls and bodies.<sup>1</sup>

Let us, however, if you are willing, proceed to the fifth head, and consider how these genera subsist in souls, and why Plato assumes them. Since, therefore, it has been shown that the soul is the medium between beings and non-beings, and that it knows all beings, both intelligibles and sensibles, whether according to the same or according to different reasons, as some say, it is necessary that the essence of it should proceed from the genera of being. For if it did not proceed from these, but from certain others, it would not be able to know all things, nor to apply itself to all things. Hence as it knows man according to the reason [or form] which it contains of man, and daemon according to the form which is in it of daemon, thus also it knows being itself, according to the participation in it of being, and difference according to its participation of difference. So that it will contain all the genera, but in a way adapted to itself. For it appears to me, that on this account Plato constitutes the soul from the first genera, and from numbers and harmonic ratios; and likewise, that he places in it the principles of figures and divine motions, in order that by antecedently [or causally] comprehending the reasons of all disciplines and of dialectic, it might thus know all things, viz. the essences, the numbers, the harmonies, the figures, and the motions of which wholes consist. It seems likewise, that he constitutes the soul, as being allied to intelligibles, from the genera of being, which primarily subsist in them; but that he gives figure to the soul, as being allied to sensibles. For things which are truly figured are sensibles. And that as being a medium between intelligibles and sensibles, he binds it with harmonic ratios; though in intelligible forms also, there are the form of harmony, and the form of figure. But harmony itself,<sup>2</sup> is not harmonized, nor is figure itself figured. For things which have a primary subsistence do not exist according to participation. In sensibles also, harmony and the genera of being subsist but partly; but in souls they subsist incorporeally and at the same time compositely,<sup>3</sup> and participation manifests their composite nature.<sup>4</sup> For participation pertains to composites, but incorporeality is the peculiarity of simple natures. It is necessary however for that which primarily parti-

<sup>1</sup> For τῶν ἐκ σώματι γένων here, it is requisite to read τῶν ἐκ σώμασι εἶδων.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of ἡ ἀρμονία in this place, it is necessary to read αὐτὴ ἡ ἀρμονία.

<sup>3</sup> For ἀσυνθετός here, it is necessary to read συνθετός.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of το συνθετὸν αὐτῶν δῆλον in this place, it is requisite to read το συνθετὸν αὐτῶν ἡ μετέξαι δῆλοι.

cipates of them to be a thing of this kind. Plato, therefore, from these genera constitutes the psychical essence, producing in the first place the subject<sup>1</sup> of this essence from the middle genera. For as we have said of the elements, that all of them are in the heavens, in the sublunary region, and under the earth, and that all things consist indeed of the four, yet not of the same elements, but heaven of the summits of them, generation of the second, and the subterranean regions of the last procession of the elements; thus all things consist indeed of these genera; but intelligibles of such of them as are first, impartible, immoveable and entire; self-motive natures, of such as are<sup>2</sup> both impartible and partible; and corporeal-formed natures, of such as are partible. For such as are the genera, such also are the essences. Impartible natures, however, precede those that are impartible, and at the same time partible; and the latter precede partible natures. For the impartible is nearer to *the one*; since it is impartible on account of union. Since therefore the psychical essence has been shown to be the medium of beings, it very properly consists of the middle genera of being, viz. of essence, same, and different [of a middle characteristic]. For Plato in the Phædrus complicating the powers derived from these, denominates them a charioteer and horses; because the existence of the soul is defined by these. But we may survey permanency and motion in the energies of the soul. For permanency and motion are in the essence of it. For it constitutes itself, abides and proceeds, and is eternal; motion and permanency being superior to sameness and difference. For it abides in eternal natures according to permanency, and proceeds, being moved. But through progression it is separated into united multitude. The genera of being however, are more clearly seen in the energies of the soul.

You may also say that Timæus in constituting the essence of the soul, after another manner assumes motion and permanency prior to sameness and difference. For the soul is not only the medium between the impartible and the partible essence, but also between the essence which always subsists with invariable sameness, and that which is in generation, or becoming to be. Hence, through subsisting with invariable sameness, it participates of permanency according to its essentiality, but through being generated, of motion. Unless it should be said, that because same and different appropriately belong to the Demiurgus, Timæus delivers a precedaneous generation of these. What then is the characteristic of each of the middle genera? May we not say, that since essence consists of bound and infinity, when the former vanquishes the latter, it produces the

<sup>1</sup> For *υπερκειμενον* here, read *υποκειμενον*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τα δε αυτοκινητα, αυτων αμεριστων και μεριστων* here, it is necessary to read *τα δε αυτοκινητα εν των αμεριστων και μεριστων*.

impartible essence; but that when infinity vanquishes bound, it produces the partible essence; and that when the power of these two is equal, they produce the middle essence? And again, when sameness vanquishes difference, it makes an impartible; but when difference vanquishes sameness, a partible sameness and difference: and when the power of each is equal, they produce a sameness and difference of a middle nature. When likewise permanency vanquishes motion, an impartible, but when motion subdues permanency, a partible; and when the power of each is equal, a middle motion and permanency is produced. Since however, sameness and difference consist of both these [i. e. of bound and infinity] it is necessary that in these also, either bound should have dominion or infinity, or that the power of each should be equal; and thus that either an impartible, or a partible, or a middle sameness and difference should be effected. And the like must also necessarily take place in motion and permanency. For every hyparxis, power, and energy, are from both these; and are either characterized by bound, or by infinity, or not by one of these more than the other. Hence the whole of the intelligible and intellectual breadth,<sup>1</sup> is said to be *bound*, and to be in such a manner *the same*, as to render it necessary to inquire whether there is *difference* in it; and also to be in such a way permanent, as to render it dubious whether it has any intellectual motion. But every corporeal-formed nature is allied to infinity, to difference, and to motion. And souls exhibit at one and the same time, multitude and union, that which is stable, and that which is moved. For there [i. e. in intelligible and intellectual natures] the essence is one in each intellect; but in soul, there is one and not one essence in each. *For there are many essences in every soul, and as many as the parts into which each may be divided. And as body being partible may be divided into infinites, souls [on the contrary] are divisible into finites, in the same manner as number is divisible into monads. Hence also, some have thought proper to call the soul number, as divisible indeed, but into impartibles, and not into things which may always be divided. Hence too, the impartible of the soul is twofold, viz. according to that which is as it were a whole, and according to the last of the parts. For every number likewise, according to its proper form, is one and impartible, but according to that which is as it were the matter of it, it is partible;*<sup>2</sup> yet not the whole of this, but in this also the last in which the division terminates, is impartible.

<sup>1</sup> Leonicius Thomaus appears from his version to have read in his manuscript *νοητον παν* in this place, instead of *νοητον παρ*; but it appears to me that we should read *νοητον και νοητον παρ πλατος*. For what Proclus here says, applies to every intelligible and intellectual essence, but in a transcendent degree to the former.

<sup>2</sup> Thus for instance, seven monads or units, are as it were the matter of the number seven, but the heptadic form proceeding from the heptad itself which supervenes and invests these monads, is one and impartible.

If you are willing likewise, this may be surveyed after another manner. Since these middle genera are three, when essence vanquishes same and different, then according to the mixture of the media, a divine soul is generated, and the more and the less in the domination, produce the extent according to breadth of divine souls. But when sameness and at the same time essence, vanquish difference, then an angelic soul is generated. When sameness alone predominates, a daemoniacal soul is produced; but when sameness together with difference, have dominion over essence, then an heroic soul is generated; and when difference alone prevails, a human soul is produced. For it is impossible that the extremes should vanquish the medium, because they cannot without it be conjoined with each other. But according to each of the mixtures, the more and the less of the predominating natures produce the breadth of souls. These things, however, will be more fully discussed elsewhere.

6 It remains therefore, in the next place, to consider what the impartible, and also what the partible form of essence is. For among the more ancient interpreters, there was a difference of opinion on this subject. Hence concerning these things, let us first speak more generally, but afterwards, in a manner more proximate to the proposed subjects of inquiry. For it is possible to speak in both these ways. We say, therefore, that every intelligible and intellectual essence, both total and partial, and which is immaterial and separate and prior to the eternal, or which is eternal, is impartible; but that all essences which proceed about bodies whether they are mundane lives, or natures which verge to corporeal masses, or physical reasons which are divided about the body that is void of quality, are partible. For all these are divisible about bodies. And some of them indeed subsist in these visible bodies and are in them as in a subject. But others have an essential subsistence, and are the forms of life, but are inseparable from bodies, as nature. And others are distributed into parts indeed, but collect themselves into the impartible, as sense. And if you are willing, you may say that the impartible essence is triple, subsisting according to being, according to life, and according to intellection. And the essence which subsists according to sensible perception, is instead of intellection; that which subsists according to nature, is instead of life; and that which subsists according to the forms that are divided about the bulks of bodies, is instead of being. For the three latter being images of the three former have a subsistence contrary to them with respect to their order to each other. But the media between these are the being, life, and intellection in souls, which preserve the order of the natures prior to them, through a similitude to them, but have a distribution into parts equal<sup>1</sup> to the natures that

<sup>1</sup> From the version of Leonicius Thomæus, instead of *τοῦ δε μερισμοῦ ἔχοντα ὅσον τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα* in this place, it appears we should read (the sense also requiring this emendation) *τοῦ δε μερισμοῦ ἔχοντα ὅσον τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα*.



are posterior to them. We must therefore give a triple division to all things, and thus dividing, we must arrange the psychical essence between the impartible and the partible nature, as being the image of the former, but the paradigm of the latter; and as abiding and at the same time proceeding; as simple and composite; and as exempt from, and co-arranged with the corporeal essence. For the appropriate middle nature of it, presents itself to the view according to all these. And thus in a general way we may admit every essence between *the one* and the soul to be impartible, and every essence between the soul and bodies to be partible.

If, however, it be requisite to define the partible and the impartible in a more proximate manner, we must speak as follows: The Demiurgus constituted the universe an animal, animated and endued with intellect, conceiving that the animated is better than the inanimate, and the intellectual than that which is deprived of intellect. Hence there is in it a corporeal-formed life, according to which it is an animal: for being bound with animated bonds, it became an animal. The soul itself however, is not mingled with body. For the opinion that it is, Socrates also reprobates in the *Phædrus*. But the soul is divine, according to which the universe is animated, having indeed a connascent life, and having likewise a separate life. There is also in it, an immaterial<sup>1</sup> and divine intellect. For it is necessary to call this an essential intellect, but not<sup>2</sup> an intellect which subsists as a habit of the soul. For the Demiurgus did not constitute the latter, but the soul, according to the motion of itself about the intelligible, as *Timeus* afterwards says. So that the universe has a triple life, viz. corporeal-formed, psychical, and intellectual. And the intellectual life of it, indeed, is impartible, as being eternal, as at once comprehending every intelligible, as immoveable, and as united, according to a supreme transcendency of secondary natures. But the corporeal-formed life is partible, as proceeding about corporeal masses, being mingled with body, and verging to subjects. And the psychical life is the middle between both, transcending the latter through a separate subsistence; through circularly covering externally as with a veil the bulk of the universe, as has been said, and will be again asserted in what follows; through being extended to intellect, and yet again being inferior to it; through perceiving intellectually in time; through evolving the impartibility of the intellectual life; and through in a certain respect coming into contact with body. Plato, however, by constituting the mundane soul from these media, manifests that it is a medium between the natures that are si-

<sup>1</sup> For *αυτος* here, it is necessary to read *αυλος*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αλλα μιν* here, it is necessary to read *αλλ'ον*.

tuated on each side of it, but that it is not the medium between every intellectual and corporeal essence. For it is not the medium of partial intellects, and the forms which are distributed in the parts of the universe. It is likewise the peculiarity of the soul of the universe, neither to consist of numbers, nor of these or those reasons, nor of so many circles. For all these and other things, are common to every divine, daemoniacal, and human soul. *But the peculiarity of it is, for the essence of it, to be the medium between the following extremes, viz. the one mundane intellect, and the whole of the partible essence which is distributed about bodies.* And it is the medium of these, not so far as intellect is gnostic, or vital, nor so far as nature is the life of bodies; for the discourse is not about knowledge, nor about lives; but so far as these are certain essences, the former being an impartible essence, but the latter an essence divisible about bodies. For on this account we also endeavour to assume both being and generation, the impartible and the partible, according to the hyparxis of the soul, dismissing mutations and energies, not seeking to perceive the energies of the soul, but the essence of it, which is unbegotten and at the same time generated.<sup>1</sup>

It is likewise evident, that the essential bound of it, is more unical than all the bounds that are in all other souls, and that the infinite of it is more comprehensive than all the infinities in other souls. For neither is every bound equal to every bound; some bounds being more total, but others more partial; nor is every infinity equal to every power. So that neither is every essence equal to every essence, but one is total, and another partial. The essential therefore, of the soul of the universe, is more total than every psychical essence, the bound in it is the most total of all psychical bounds, and its infinity is the most total of all the infinities in souls. For the extremes of these are, the simply impartible essence, and the simply partible about bodies, not about some, but about all bodies. For the soul of the sun, is the medium between a certain impartible essence, (and not of the impartible indefinitely,) and a certain partible essence, and not every essence which is divisible about bodies. Plato, likewise, assuming this in the first place, as the peculiarity of the mundane soul, connects the remaining particulars, as belonging to the discussion of a soul of this kind, viz. number, harmony, and form. Hence the impartible must not now be said to be every intellectual essence, but only the essence of the mundane intellect. And in the soul of the sun, it must be said to be the essence of the solar intellect, and in a similar manner in the soul of the moon, and in all other souls. For every medium has peculiar proximate extremes, and will be the medium of these, and not of all extremes every where.

<sup>1</sup> There is nothing more in the original in this place than, *ἀλλὰ οὐσίαν καὶ γιγνόμενῃ*; but it is obviously requisite to read *ἀλλὰ οὐσίαν αὐτῇ ἀγχιέστητον ἀμὰ καὶ γιγνόμενῃ*.

Thus too, daemons who are more exalted than partial souls, subsist as media between their proper intellects, and the bodies that are connascent with them. So that Plato, if he had discussed some one of other souls, would not have said that the essence of it is a medium between the impartible essence, and the essence which is divisible about bodies, but between this or that impartible and partible essence belonging to partial natures. For *articles* manifest the transcendent and the total, as Plato elsewhere determines, asserting that when we say *the* beautiful, we manifest one thing, but another when we say beautiful. And the former manifests the exempt, but the latter, some one of the things co-ordinate with others. And if you are willing to adopt here what is said by the illustrious Theodorus, intellect is without habitude, the life about body subsists in habitude, but the soul is the medium between the two, being a certain half-habitude. And according to the great Iamblichus, intellect indeed is exempt; the life about body, is co-arranged with corporeal masses; and the soul is exempt from, and at the same time co-arranged with the corporeal life. Every intellect, therefore, is impartible, as having one essence, one sameness, and one difference, of which it wholly consists. But every soul is partible, because each mixture of the elements in it of which it consists, is divided into many parts, each of which is compounded of all the genera; so that there are many essences in each mixture, many samenesses, and many differences, which are co-divided together with the parts that are in it. What the parts are however, and how many, he demonstrates to us, by using media, and sections through sesquioctaves, and leimmas, as will be manifest as we proceed.

Moreover, this is evident, that we say *that intellect so far as it is intellect, is impartible, conceiving that the multitude of forms though they are in it, are different from it*; and that the soul, so far as it is soul, is partible, not surveying at the same time the forms that are in it, but solely looking to the psychical essence, and also to the intellectual essence, and to each separate from the other. Hence the intellect which is participated by the soul, is called by Plato an impartible essence; but *the corporeal-formed life which proceeds from the soul, and has the relation of splendour to it, is said by him to be divisible about bodies*. For intellect, indeed, is analogous to the sun, soul to the light proceeding from the sun, and the partible life to the splendour from the light. Very properly, therefore, do we conceive these assertions to be more accurate than the former; because it is necessary that the Demiurgus should be the lord of every impartible, and of every partible essence,<sup>1</sup> in order that the recipient may have a place, that the nature which consists of

<sup>1</sup> *Oveias* is omitted in the original.

both may be mingled, and all such other particulars may be effected, as Plato adduces in what follows. Iamblichus, therefore, and together with him Theodorus, refer what is here said to the supermundane soul; but we are of opinion, that Timæus generates through these things the soul of the universe, as the words also manifest.

We think it requisite however, that the lovers of contemplation, should investigate what the partible and the impartible are<sup>1</sup> in the supermundane soul. For a supermundane intellect is seated above every soul. But what is the partible in the supermundane soul? For certain sensible bodies are not suspended from such souls. For as they are supermundane, the reverse of what takes place in human souls is true of them; since bodies are suspended from each of the latter, through which also they are mundane. But a peculiar intellect is not established above them, on which account they do not always perceive intellectually. Bodies, however, are suspended from all the souls that are between human and supermundane souls. Hence also they are mundane, being more redundant than supermundane souls by the connexion of body. And there is a *peculiar* intellect from which they are suspended, on which account likewise they are not always in the intelligible. For the immoveable is effective of eternal energy. Hence since the extremes, viz. supermundane and mundane souls, have a contrary mode of subsistence, and as it would seem, the latter being deficient according to the partible, but the former exceeding according to the impartible;—this being the case, we say that the partible of supermundane souls, is not that which is divided about bodies, but about the mundane souls<sup>2</sup> themselves. For they proximately transcend these, just as mundane souls transcend the partible essence which subsists about bodies. Hence the supermundane souls are media between intellects and mundane souls; intellects having a subsistence unmingled with body, but mundane souls, transition in intellections. *But the impartible of human souls, so far as there is a thing of this kind in them, is in the souls that are above them, which are always intellective, from which human souls are suspended, and of which they at a certain time participate, as far as they are able. For through these, as media, they are likewise conjoined with the intellects that are above souls, and become intellectual.*

These, however, as we have said, being the extremes, all the intermediate souls have a peculiar impartibility and partibility, whether they have a divine or dæmoniacal allotment; rational dæmons, and prior to these the soul of the universe, being media between the whole mundane intellect which has an impartible essence,

<sup>1</sup> The words *τι το μεριστον και* are omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> *Πυχαι* is omitted in the original.

and the partible essence which subsists about bodies. And we assert these things looking to all that has been before said, through which we have manifested the truth of them, from the words themselves of Plato and not from our own conceptions. *For by those who reason from the [Chaldean] Oracles, it must be said that supermundane souls ride in certain supermundane ethereal and empyrean bodies. Or how could those bodies be moved unless souls moved them in a manner more divine than that of mundane souls? But if this be granted, it may also be admitted that partial souls have an impartible intellectual essence above them, and one certain power of intellect, which illuminates similar souls; and that on this account they are partial, and intellective at a certain time, the souls which are suspended from each total intellect being alone always intellective.*

Farther still, in order that these things may accord with the Orphic doctrines, we must say, that Orpheus does not predicate the impartible of every intelligible, or intellectual order, but that according to him there is something superior to this appellation, just as other natures are more excellent than other names. For he does not adapt the appellations of king and father to all the [divine] orders. Where then shall we first see the impartible according to him, in order that we may apprehend the divinely inspired<sup>1</sup> conception of Plato? Orpheus, therefore, establishing a Demiurgus<sup>2</sup> of all-divided fabrication, analogous to the one father who unfolds into light the total fabrication, produces from him the whole mundane intellectual multitude, the number of souls, and corporeal natures; this Demiurgus generating all these unitedly, but the Gods that surround him, dividing and separating his fabrications. He says, however, that all the other fabrications of the God, were distributed into parts by the deities who are of a dividing characteristic; but that the heart alone was undivided through the providence of Minerva. For since he constituted intellects, souls, and bodies, but souls and bodies receive much division and separation into parts in themselves, and intellect remains united and indivisible, being all things in one, and comprehending intelligible wholes in one intellection;—hence he says, that the intellectual essence alone, and the intellectual number, were left preserved by Minerva. For he says,

The intellectual heart alone remain'd.

Clearly calling it intellectual. If therefore the undivided heart is intellectual, it will evidently be intellect and an intellectual number, yet not every intellect, but that which is mundane. For this is the undivided heart; since of this also the

<sup>1</sup> For *εἶθε* here, read *εὐθεὺς*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Bacchus.

divided God was the Demiurgus. Orpheus, therefore, calls the intellect of Bacchus, the impartible essence of the God. But he denominates his genitals, the life which is divisible about body; this being physical and productive of seeds. This also he says Diana, who presides over all the generation in nature, and obstetricates physical reasons, extends as far as to the subterranean realms, distributing the prolific power of Bacchus. But all the remaining body of the God, forms the psychical composition, this likewise being divided into seven parts.

All the seven parts they scatter'd of the boy;

says the theologist concerning the Titans; just as Timæus also divides the soul into seven parts. Perhaps too he reminds us of the Orphic<sup>1</sup> Titanic distribution into parts, when he says that the soul is extended<sup>2</sup> through the whole world; through which the soul not only circularly covers the universe as with a veil, but likewise is extended through the whole of it. Hence, Plato very properly calls the essence which is proximately above soul, impartible. And, in short, he thus denominates the intellect which is participated by the soul, following the Orphic fables, and wishing to be as it were, the interpreter of arcane and mystical assertions. Returning, therefore, to the words of Plato, it is necessary to show that what has been before said accords with his conceptions.

These things, however, being discussed by us, it is wonderful, since intellect is an impartible essence, how Parmenides in the second<sup>3</sup> hypothesis, distributes *being* into infinite parts, and together with *being*, *the one*; as it is acknowledged by nearly all the interpreters that the subject of that hypothesis, is the nature that is beyond souls. Or may it not be said, that the distribution into parts which is there spoken of, signifies the progression of the many unities<sup>4</sup> from the one being [or being characterized by *the one*], these unities proceeding in a well-ordered manner from their proper principles, into an appropriate multitude? Plato, however, does not intend to signify that the one being derives its completion from these many unities, in the same manner as he says, that soul being one, has a multitude which terminates in it. But his meaning is that *the one being* precedes the many unities and at the same time beings, and that the multitude of these is subordinate to it; and also that both unical and all essential number, are causally comprehended in it; just as in this dialogue he calls animal itself one whole, but

<sup>1</sup> For τον τιτανικον μερισμον, τους Ορφικους αναριθμησκει, in this place, I read τον τιτανικον μερισμον του Ορφικου κ. λ.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of τεταγμενην here, it is necessary to read τεταμενην.

<sup>3</sup> For την εσσην here, it is necessary to read την δευτεραν. For the whole progression of true being is discussed in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides. See my translation of it, and the notes on it.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of πολλων εων οντων in this place, it is requisite to read, πολλων οαδων.

the four ideas the parts of it; animal itself not deriving its completion from them, but they being comprehended in it, as distributing by the multitude of themselves the monad of that one being, each of them having the power of a part of it, but all of them not being equivalent to the whole monad of it. For thus also both numbers, the unical and the essential, are parts of that one being [discussed in the *Parmenides*] not being completive of it, so as that it consists of each of these. And thus much in answer to this doubt; but let us proceed to the words before us.<sup>1</sup>

“From an essence always impartible and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again, from an essence which is becoming to be partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence.” 7

That by the one impartible essence, Plato means the intellectual essence, which in the whole of itself participates of eternity, and by the essence which is partible about bodies, that which is inseparable from corporeal masses, and is allotted its hyparxis in the whole of time, he manifests by saying that the former of these “*subsists with invariable sameness*,” and by denominating the latter “*that which is becoming to be*,” in order that he may not only call the soul impartible and at the same time partible, but also intelligible, and the first of generated natures. For an eternal perpetuity is one thing; but that which subsists according to temporal infinity is another, having its hypostasis in extension; and that is another which is mixed from both, such as is the perpetuity of the soul. For the soul is immoveable indeed according to essence, but is moved according to intellections, and is eternal according to the former, but temporal according to the latter. It is likewise evident, that the soul necessarily has something of this kind according to hyparxis, or she would not exhibit in her natural energies, the peculiarity of generation, and temporal extension. And it appears to me that Plato in an admirable manner perceiving this says, that the Demiurgus not only made the soul a medium between the impartible essence, and the essence which is partible about bodies, but also that he made it a medium between the essence which subsists with invariable sameness, and that which is generated, or becoming to be. For how could he appropriately write the *Psychogony*,<sup>2</sup> if there was neither generation, nor composition in the soul? How also would it be possible to take away parts from that which

<sup>1</sup> Leonicus Thomæus has omitted to translate the whole of what is here said about the supermundane soul, beginning from the words, “*We think it is requisite*,” and ending with the above paragraph.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Concerning the generation of the soul.

is essentially impartible ! For of simple natures there is not any generation whatever. And even such forms as are material, are without generation and corruption, as Aristotle says. For through their simplicity, they preserve in the last of things, the peculiarity of the first forms. It is possible, however, to deliver in words the generation of things which receive any kind of composition. In order therefore, that he might demonstrate these things which are very properly circulated about the soul, he calls it the medium between the eternal and the generated hypostasis.

Prior to this, however, we should rather make the following division ; that it is necessary with respect to the impartible and partible, either that both should be prior to the soul, or both posterior to the soul, or both in the soul ; or that the one should be prior, but the other posterior to the soul. Both, therefore, will not be prior to the soul since the soul is better than the partible life<sup>1</sup> which is rising into existence : [for she has a nature separate from bodies, but the partible life is merged in bodies. Nor is it fit to say that both are posterior to the soul :]<sup>2</sup> for the impartible essence is eternal, and subsists with invariable sameness. But the soul is not entirely eternal, since, as he says in the *Laws*, she participates of generation. Nor are both in the soul ; because it is impossible for all these which differ from each other, to give completion to one thing ; viz. for the inseparable and the separate from bodies, the unbegotten and the generated. Hence it remains, that the one which is more excellent should be prior, but that the other which is less excellent should be posterior to it. Since, however, these subsist about it, it is necessary as it does not consist of these, that it should consist of things analogous to them, which either have a subsistence separate from each other, or mingled together. But it is impossible that it should consist of them separate from each other : for Plato clearly says, that these are mingled together. Hence it is necessary that the essential part of the soul should consist from the mixture of these. And since in the soul one thing is better, but another worse, that which is impartible in it [is less excellent than the impartible prior to it, and that which is partible in it]<sup>3</sup> is better than the partible nature which is posterior to it. For being a medium, it has that which is more excellent, in an inferior manner, but that which is less excellent, in a superior manner. And this indeed is evident

<sup>1</sup> Ζωη is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> The words within the brackets are added from the version of Thomas, being omitted in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Here likewise, the words within the brackets, are wanting in the original, and are supplied from the version of Thomas. So that in the original after το μεν ἀμείστον, it is necessary to add, χεῖρον ἐξαι τοῦ προ αὐτῆς ἀμείστον, το δε μερίστον.



since it does not consist of these very things themselves, but<sup>1</sup> of others that are analogous to them.

But that the essence of the soul does not consist of these, as giving completion to it, is evident. For again let us make this very thing the subject of consideration. In the first place, therefore, how is it possible for the impartible to be mingled with the partible, and the eternal with the generated; for these are in a certain respect contrary to, and most remote from each other, so that as we have before said, they can by no means be conjoined with each other. In the second place, shall we not make the soul posterior and secondary to the things that are in it,<sup>2</sup> and the essence inseparable from body more ancient than that which is separate, if it consists of an essence which is divided about bodies? Farther still, how can the soul be justly said to be a third thing; for that which is a third thing is evidently so in conjunction with the other two, which are preserved and not corrupted. But things that are mingled together, are no longer themselves, but a certain other thing, and not a third thing is produced from them. For they themselves have no existence, but are corrupted through the mixture. Again, if the Demiurgus taking a portion of the impartible constituted the soul, that which is said to be an impartible essence will no longer be so. For how can any one take away a part of it, if it is impartible? But if he consumed the whole of the impartible in the essence of the soul, he will no longer be beneficent, in consequence of consuming more divine natures, which are nearer to himself and are more causal, into the hypostasis of less excellent natures. In addition to these things also, if the soul derives its completion from a generated partible nature, that partible nature will not only be divisible about bodies, but likewise about the soul. Hence the impartible itself, and the partible itself do not, as some fancy, give completion to the soul; but that which is asserted by Plato is true, that the Demiurgus from the impartible essence, and from that which is partible about bodies, mingled a middle form of essence. So that the same thing is partible indeed, as with reference to that which is impartible, but impartible with reference to that which is partible, and truly affords us the middle nature of the soul.

Moreover, this third thing itself, exhibits to us the nature of analogy in-existent in the soul. For if the same thing is both the middle and the third, but this is as the first, and is also as the last, the soul is at one and the same time, the first and the last; which analogy is naturally adapted to effect in the most beautiful manner. And if this third thing is also the middle, it will evidently, since it is one thing, be the middle of two certain extremes, and not a middle together with another thing. For it

<sup>1</sup> *ΑΑΧ* is wanting here in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For *εἰς αὐτὸν* in this place, read *εἰς αὐτῶν*.

would be the fourth, four things being analogous. But if three things are analogous of which the soul is the middle, it is not simply the middle of essence and generation, but of an essence which is entirely unbegotten, and of an essence becoming to be partible about bodies, being itself an essence which is both impartible, and becoming to be partible, yet not about bodies, but becoming to be partible by itself, and being not at all in want of bodies, in order to be that which it is. To consist also of both these is adapted to the soul, not only, as some say, because it subsists as a medium between both, but because it is both, being impartibles iconically, but partibles paradigmatically. For it possesses the reasons of both. All things, therefore, subsist in it co-ordinately. Since, however, intellect is all things, and the sensible nature is all things, Plato adds, "*in the middle*," showing by this how all things are to be assumed in the soul, viz. in a middle way, and neither primarily, nor according to the last mode of subsistence.

Again, after another manner also, the essence of the soul consists of both, as being produced by the whole demiurgic intellect, in which impartibles and partibles subsist paradigmatically and according to cause. Since, however, [the mundane] intellect also proceeds according to the whole of this intellect, the words "*in the middle*" manifest the peculiarity of the psychical hypostasis. And how is it possible that the words "*he mingled*," should not be adapted to the essence of the soul, not only because the impartible and partible of it subsist according to union, similar to the mode in which the things that are mingled proceed through each other, but also because the peculiarity of life accords with the soul, and the Demiurgus<sup>1</sup> constitutes the soul in conjunction with the vivific Goddess, and mingles the genera of it in the Crater. Farther still, the word *middle* shows<sup>2</sup> that the soul constitutes itself, and does not alone sustain from the demiurgic energy, the mixture of the genera in each other, as if it were a certain passion.<sup>3</sup> The words likewise "*a form of essence*," sufficiently indicate to us the comprehension of effects in their causes. For if essence in the Demiurgus is a genus, but in the soul a form or species, the former is comprehensive of the latter. But it may be called a genus as being exempt from the form of the soul, and generating it. And by being exempt, indeed, it differs from the co-ordinated genera that are in species; but by generating this form, it transcends things that are heterogeneous. For these are unprolific of genera. After another manner, therefore, these genera and species must be assumed. For they are prolific, full of power, comprehensive of individual forms, and have an exempt nature. Genus, therefore, is the essence

<sup>1</sup> The words, *ὁ δὲ δημιουργός* are wanting in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For *ὅτι δεικνύσθαι* here, read *δεικνύσθαι*.

<sup>3</sup> Leonicius Thomæus has omitted to translate the whole of this sentence.

in the Demiurgus; but the form or species of this, is the impartible essence. The essence likewise, which is the medium between the impartible essence, and that which is divisible about bodies, is the second form. But the third is that which is partible about body. And the last is the corporeal-formed nature. For in these forms there are the prior and the posterior; because the genera produce and give subsistence to the first, middle and last forms. And the whole intellectual essence indeed is impartible as one; that which is partible about bodies, is multiplied on account of its distribution about them; and the medium between these is one and not one. For intellect has one essence, one sameness and one difference, so far as it is intellect. But the parts of the whole soul from which it is composed are many, and adapted to each other. In each of these parts, also, there are essence, same, and different; and there are as many essences, samenesses, and differences as there are parts. These parts, likewise, are indeed numbered, yet are at the same time many, and each of them is one and not<sup>1</sup> one, but intellect is one essence, one sameness, and one difference. And the nature which is partible about bodies, has one of these in this place, but another in that, being co-divided with its subjects, just as body itself is not merely divisible into many, but into infinite parts. But the soul being divided, into the essence of many things, possesses also union, having an hypostasis separate from bodies. So that again, there are here two media, between truly existing essence, and that which is truly generation, and between the impartibility of the former, and the infinite divisibility of the latter, viz. the soul, and the essence which is partible about bodies, and which is not the same with this generation truly so called. And soul indeed, is in a greater degree impartible, in consequence of verging to itself; but the essence which is divisible about bodies, is, in a greater degree, partible, because it belongs to another thing, and does not subsist from itself. Plato therefore says, that the soul consists of this, and the impartible essence, because it is a medium between things which are entirely exempt from bodies, and those which are merged in bodies, and between things which subsist from themselves, and those which belong to others, so that it both subsists from itself and pertains to others.

By no means, therefore, must we say that it is a medium in such a way as to have something incorporeal, and something corporeal, as Eratosthenes apprehended, or ascribe with Severus geometrical interval to the essence of it. For a mixture can never be effected of that which is without, and that which possesses interval, and of the impartible and body: for neither can there be a mixture of a point and a line. But if there can be no mixture of the impartible and a line,

<sup>1</sup> *Ou* is omitted in the original.

much less can there be a mixture of it with a certain other dimension [viz. the dimension of depth]. For that which is triply partible, is more distant from the impartible, than that which is partible in one way only. We say, however, that the intellectual essence always remains one, that the partible consists of many essences, and that the psychical is one, and not one, so as to preserve the one in being multiplied, and multitude in being united. For the Demiurgus did not so divide it, as to consume the whole in the division, but preserved the one of it in the multiplication, and the whole in the division of it. Nor is this wonderful, since in bodies, likewise, all which are partible, there is, as the Elea guest or stranger says, a certain one which is connective of the parts. And Aristotle also asserts that in partible natures there is something impartible; so that the soul will much more remain a whole and one, when multiplied and divided. Hence, likewise, it is impartible, as Timeus says. But if the one of it was not <sup>4</sup> preserved, it would be alone partible: just, for instance, as if you should say that the dianoetic and doxastic powers of the soul, are two essences, and yet at the same time the whole soul is one thing which energizes dianoetically and doxastically, in consequence of converging to itself. We therefore being impelled from what Plato himself says, thus interpret the impartible and the partible essence.

Of those, however, prior to us, and who make the essence of the soul to be mathematical, as being a medium between natural and supernatural things, some asserting that it is number make it to consist of the monad as impartible, and the indefinite duad as partible. But others, considering it as a geometrical hypostasis, assert that it consists of a point and interval, the former being impartible, but the latter partible. Aristander, Numenius, and their followers, and many other of the interpreters, are of the former opinion, but Severus is of the second. Others, again, as Plutarch and Atticus, surveying the physical essence, say, that the irrational part which precedes [in the order of physical theory] the rational part, is the partible essence; but the divine part of the soul, the impartible. And they make the rational essence to consist of the two, of the latter, as that which adorns, and of the former as a subject. They likewise say, that the soul is unbegotten according to its essence, but generated according to its form. Others, however, as Plotinus, who consider the words of Plato in a more philosophic manner, say, that the soul is a medium between intellect and sense, the former being impartible, but the latter divisible about bodies. But others proceeding higher, and placing two intellects prior to the soul, one possessing the ideas of wholes, but the other of partial natures, say that the soul is the medium between these as

<sup>4</sup>  $M\eta$  is omitted in the original.

deriving its subsistence from both. For thus Theodorus, the Asinaean, says, who found this opinion in Porphyry as derived from the Persians. These things, therefore, Antoninus relates who was the disciple of Ammonius. To the first of these, however, it must be said, that since Plato does not make the soul to be number, it is absurd to investigate the principles of number of which the soul consists. But to the second, that Plato says the soul is incorporeal when compared with every body, and that it has a self-motive essence; but that nothing which possesses interval is a thing of this kind. To the third it must be said, that Plato is not of opinion that the irrational is more ancient than the rational part. For divinity, as he says, did not think fit that the more ancient should be governed by the junior nature. To the fourth, that the discussion is not concerning the psychical knowledge, but the psychical essence. And hence it is not proper to say, that the soul is a medium between the two gnostic powers, the intellectual and the sensitive. And to the fifth, that every intellect is unbegotten, and separate from bodies. But Plato calls the soul a partible and generated essence, giving it a division opposite to the essence which subsists with invariable sameness, and to that which is partible about bodies, and separating it from the essence which is external to bodies, and always is. As these particulars, however, have been sufficiently discussed, let us consider what follows.

“And again after the same manner, with respect to the nature of same and the nature of different, he constituted the soul in the middle of the impartibility of these, and of the nature which is divisible about bodies.”

Essence, as we have said, has the first order in the genera, because it is as it were, the Vesta of being. Sameness, therefore, has the second; and difference, the third order. For some consider difference as having a dignity superior to sameness. But Plato, in what he before said, has clearly evinced that the similar is better than the dissimilar; and now assuming sameness after essence, directly gives it the preference to difference. And as we have said that the middle essence is inferior to the intellectual essence, but transcends that which is divisible about body, thus also we say that the sameness of the soul is inferior to the impartible, but is more united than the partible sameness, and in a similar manner with respect to difference. Hence in the essence of intellect, the sameness, being one, collects itself, and also the essential difference, to the essence which is there, and is one; just as the difference being one, separates itself, and the essence and sameness from each other. But in the soul sameness collects into one the differences

which are many in the many parts, and difference separates the samenesses. I know, therefore, that some Platonists, arrange sameness in impartible, but difference in partible natures, and thus make the soul to consist of both, as a medium between sameness and difference. These, however, do not<sup>1</sup> attend to what Plato here says, that the soul is a medium between the impartibility of sameness and difference, and the partibility of the nature which is divisible about bodies. It is likewise requisite to know that these are the genera of being, and that it is necessary these should be every where appropriately, in impartible, and partible natures, and in the media between these, and again in intellectual essences, in souls, in natures, and in corporeal masses. For I should be ashamed to divide the genera as they do, placing one here, but another there. For if they had said, that sameness predominates in intelligible and impartible natures, but difference in sensibles, and partible natures, they would have spoken rightly. But if they assert that impartibles are separate from difference, neither will they be able to give to them sameness. For *the one* differs from *the same*.<sup>2</sup> And if they say that partible natures are separate from sameness, they subvert the essence of them.

Following therefore things themselves, we must admit that the genus of sameness subsists with a demiurgic peculiarity, but that the species of it, is the impartible and the partible, and the medium between both. And again that the genus of difference is demiurgic, but the species of it, the impartible and the partible, and that which is intermediate. Admitting this likewise, we must assign media to the soul, and complicate them with the middle form of essence, in order that we may constitute the existence of the soul. For thus I think we shall be able to adapt the words of Plato to things. For he says, that as in essence, so likewise in the nature of same and the nature of different, the Demiurgus mingled a third thing from both, and after the same manner. And as there, that which was mingled from both was a species or form of essence, so here, the medium between same and different, is a species or form. For it is possible to be a medium not as form, but as a whole composed of the extremes, as an animal which consists of soul and body. In order, therefore, that you may not ignorantly conceive this to be the case, he adds, "*and after the same manner*;" that here also, that which consists of both may be a form and not a whole.

"And taking them as three beings, he mingled all of them into one idea."

<sup>1</sup> *One* is here omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For if impartibles have no difference, they will be the same with each other, and will be *the one*. For in *the one* there is no difference. So that *the one* will not differ from *the same*.

That the three demiurgic genera, are the causes of hypostasis to second and third forms, Plato I think sufficiently manifests in saying, "*and taking them as three things.*" For where do they subsist? Evidently in the Demiurgus. For he contains that which he takes. But he receives them from superior causes. For since sameness having in a greater degree the form of bound, consists of bound and infinity, and also difference which has more the form of infinity consists of these just as essence similarly proceeds according to both, it is evident, that we must rather place in bound [than in infinity] the sameness and difference of the impartible, but those of the media similarly in both, and those of partible natures rather in the infinite than in bound; just as the first difference has the infinite, in a small degree only declining from bound, and the first sameness has bound in a small degree declining from the infinite.<sup>1</sup> Hence Plato says that the Demiurgus received them as three, being separated from each other. And since the forms that are in him,<sup>2</sup> hasten to the generation of other things, on this account also, he constitutes other things from these. If therefore we understand by *beings* things prior to the generation of the media, we must say that these subsist in him according to cause. For these were in him prior to the things generated by him. But if by *beings* we understand the media, we must understand them as things constituted. For they are now beings, because they were produced by him prior to the mixture, each apart from the other; and essence, sameness, and difference were now generated each by itself. May not however the words be interpreted more simply, viz. the Demiurgus "*taking them being three;*" for so many things he effected from the three, the extremes being now now constituted by him, according to the preexistent causes which he contains? And these genera indeed he produced according to demiurgic being; but he added idea to all the three according to the union in himself, and the deity in him, which is the cause of the union of multitude. And you see, that each of the three was a form, and that which was produced from the mixture of the three, was one idea. Hence it is necessary to say, that the soul is a form of forms; and, in short, to conceive nothing in it as a composite and corporeal.

The triad, therefore, is adapted to the essence itself of the soul; since it was before shown that the soul is triadic. For we divided the whole of it into essence, power and energy; essence, into hyparxis, harmony, and form; and hyparxis, into what is properly called essence, same, and different. Nor is it proper to wonder, if we make a part of essence to be essence. For the one genus of being is called essence, and that also which is generated, as it were, from all the ele-

<sup>1</sup> In the original there is an omission here of *rov ανεϊρον*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ev παντι* in this place, it is necessary to read *ev αυτη*.

ments of being, is denominated essence. If, however, we should again inquire, what it is that makes this one idea not to be any casual soul, but the mundane soul, but elsewhere a different soul; we reply, that it is the *total* nature of the genera that are assumed. *For the mundane soul is a medium, not of casual extremes, but of a total intellect, and total corporal nature*, according to which the world is an animal; just as it is endued with intellect according to its impartible nature, and animated according to its middle nature. The predominance likewise of essence, causes it to be the mundane soul; for this makes it to be divine; just as the prevalence of sameness alone, produces a daemoniacal soul, and of difference alone, a partial soul. A different habitude therefore to the extremes, produces a difference in the media. And the mixture of the media, defined according to the prevalence of one thing, evidently changes the whole.

“Co-adapting by force the nature of different which it was difficult to mingle, to the nature of same.”

How is the nature of different difficult to be mingled? because it has a separating and dividing power, and is the cause of progressions and multiplications. But every divine being begins his energy from himself. Hence also the nature of different separates itself from other things and from itself. For it generates multitude in itself. On this account, it is said in the Sophista, that it makes both other things and itself to be non-beings, separating them from other beings. Hence it is difficult to be mingled, possessing this difficulty, not from accident or any deviation, but having an essence which is the cause of *otherness*, of the unconfused hypostasis of forms, and of unmingled simplicity. Possessing likewise such a power as this, it is a certain contrary both to sameness and to essence.<sup>1</sup> And it is contrary indeed to sameness, because sameness is the cause of union, communion and connexion; but difference, of separation, of an inability to be mingled, and of otherness. But it is a certain contrary to essence because essence is being, but difference is non-being, as is demonstrated in the Sophista. For the nature of different being divided into minute parts, becomes the principal of non-being. That we may not, therefore, be involved in ambiguity by perceiving an at-once-collected mixture of the genera, he in the first place mingles same with different; and says that divinity co-adapted the nature of difference to that of sameness, as harmonically conjoining it with middle sameness. Afterwards, he

<sup>1</sup> For *προς την αὐτήν* here, it is necessary to read *προς την αὐτίαν*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *το ταύτων το διαφορεὲν μίγνυσθαι* in this place, it is obviously requisite to read *το ταύτων τῷ διαφορεὲν μίγνυσθαι*.



mingled both these with essence. For Plato having said, that divinity co-adapted the nature of difference to that of sameness adds, "*that he mingled them with essence, and made one thing from the three.*" For because essence is connective of the two genera *same and different*, but these are co-ordinate to each other, it is necessary that these should in the first place be mingled with each other, and in the second place, that both should be mingled with essence. And thus much concerning the order in the mixture. The *force*, however, employed in the mixture, is not adventitious, nor such as the force which is preternatural, *but indicates a transcendency and abundance of power*; for such is demiurgic power. So that it is able to unite difference, to divide sameness; and to produce one harmony from both.

"But having mingled these two with essence, and made one thing from the three, he again divided this whole, into appropriate parts."

As the equal and the unequal are conjoined with quantity; and as all quantity is either equal or unequal, or rather is equal and at the same time unequal, for every quantity at once participates of both; and as the similar and the dissimilar are conjoined with quality, and every quality is both similar and dissimilar; thus, also, same and different are co-existent with essence; and all essence participates of sameness and difference. For these are *essentially*, or according to existence itself, inherent in things, and not according to quantity or quality. Hence they are essential, being the media between the divine genera, and those things which are inherent in quantities and qualities. For sameness, indeed, is suspended from bound, but difference from infinity; just as similitude and equality, are suspended from sameness, but dissimilitude and inequality from difference. Hence, also, Plato in the *Philebus*, produces bound and infinity from [the highest] God: for they are divine genera. But in the *Sophista*, he denominates same and different the genera<sup>1</sup> of being. And the former subsist about *the one*, but the latter about essence. Again, also, you see how much more venerable Plato is than all other physiologists, and even than Aristotle himself. For they making their principles to be contraries, introduce organic, material, and partible contrarieties. And even the most venerable of them, refer contraries to excess and defect; badly assuming the privation of measure in the principles of things. For measure is more divine than the privation of measure. But Plato refers contraries to

<sup>1</sup> For *ωσπερ τονον αψ* here, read *ωσπερ τη ποση*.

<sup>2</sup> For *γενε τον οντος* here, read *γενη τον οντος*.

sameness and difference, through which he comprehends all the contrarieties in soul, in nature, and in body; and he places these in the Demiurgus, in order that he may give to them generative, cosmurgic,<sup>1</sup> immaterial, and exempt powers. Having likewise placed them there, he constitutes the soul from them, producing from these, that which is as it were the subject of it, and the being of it, so far as being, and not so far as it is a being with a certain quality, in order that it may imitate primary being. For he afterwards assigns to the soul harmony, form, powers, and energies, thus rendering the discussion of it perfect. For we shall be able to survey its dignity, and its order in the world, which is of a ruling nature, if we perceive how by all the genera that are in it, it contains mundane essences; how by its own harmony, it co-harmonizes the whole world; how by its own figure, it comprehends all mundane forms and figures; after what manner, by the powers that are in it, it is able to perfect all physical, and all rational, or artificial powers; and how by its own proper energies, it excites mundane productions.

Why, therefore, did not Plato say, that the soul is a medium between intellect and sense? Because he says, that intellect and sense, are certain gnostic powers. But his intention was to deliver the middle nature of it in essences, and not in powers. Why, however, did he not say, that the soul is a medium between idea and things which are invested with form? Because it was not now proposed by him to teach us what the quality is of its form, but what its essence is. But it is not the same thing to speak of the essence, as it is to speak of the form of a certain thing. For form exhibits an essence of a certain quality. Why then, did he not place the soul as a medium between intelligible and sensible numbers? Because in the following part of the discussion, he assigns to it an harmony, according to which it ranks as a medium between separate numbers, and separate harmony, and sensible numbers, and the harmony which is inseparable from subjects. For according to the conception of Plato, the soul is neither harmony itself, nor the harmony which is in things harmonized. Harmony itself, indeed, is uniform and separate, and is exempt from all harmonized natures, of whatever kind they may be; being that alone which is called harmony itself. But the harmony which is in things harmonized, pertains to other things, and is naturally adapted to be moved by others. And the middle of both, is the harmony of the soul. *For this is that which is first harmonized.* Hence also it imparts harmony to other things. For that which is able to impart something to another thing, is either the form itself [which is participated], or primarily participates of it. This harmony therefore of the soul, is inferior to intelligible harmony, and to intelligible

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Powers effective of the world.

numbers, but transcending sensible harmony, it likewise transcends sensible numbers. And if it be requisite to speak concisely about each of these, each of them is fourfold. For with respect to number, the first is divine, the second essential, the third psychical, and the last physical. And the first, indeed, has the form of unity, the second is immoveable, the third is self-motive, and the fourth is alter-motive. With respect to harmony, also, the first is in the Gods, the second is in truly-existing beings, the third is in souls, and the last is in the natures which are harmonized by other things. If, therefore, it had been now proposed by Plato to speak concerning the psychical harmony, he would have said that it is a medium between impartible and partible harmony. But since the present discussion is concerning the essence of the soul, he says that it is a medium between same and different.

Here, likewise, it is necessary to observe, that Plato in what is now said, makes as it were a conversion of the progressions of the psychical essence to their principles. For since the form of the mixtures is twofold, the one subsisting according to the mixture of the extremes, which we have in the mixture of essence, sameness, and difference; but the other, according to again collecting the media into one whole;—this being the case, in the former mixture he began from essence, and ended in the latter; but vice versa in the latter. For he first co-harmonized the latter with sameness, and thus afterwards both with essence, and ended in essence, from which according to progression he began. Every where, however, that which is a whole<sup>1</sup> is subordinate to the two principles. For when he produces the soul from impartibles and partibles, he places the impartible analogous to bound, but the partible to infinity. For the infinite is the cause of multitude, but bound of union. And when he co-harmonizes difference with sameness, he assumes difference as in the genera of being, belonging to the co-ordination of the infinite; but sameness, as belonging to the co-ordination of bound. When likewise he mingles the two with essence, he assumes essence as having the form of unity; but sameness and difference as dyadic, and opposed to each other. And he does not cease collecting the multitude together, till he evinces the whole to be one. For *the one* is more excellent than essence itself, and the bifurmed principles [bound and infinity]. The mixture, however, being as we have said, twofold, the one constituting the elements themselves, the other being that which consists of the elements, Porphyry rightly inquires whether the Demiurgus made both these in the Crater [i. e. Juno], or one of them out of, but the other in it; and he

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *πανταχου δε αυ, εχεται των δυο το εν αρχων* in this place, it is requisite from the version of Leonicius Thomæus to read *πανταχου δε αυ υπεχεται των δυο το ελον αρχων*.

universe, since it is not lawful to refer the deteriorations<sup>1</sup> of partial souls to such as are divine, Plato adds, that divinity divided the soul into appropriate parts. For here that which divides, divides according to an intellectual cause, and that which is divided, is divided essentially. This mode of division, therefore, is adapted both to the divider, and the thing divided; since it is beneficent, and perfective of the essence of the soul, introducing it to intellectual variety,<sup>2</sup> and making it all-perfect, by inserting in it all the reasons of beings.

If then we assert these things rightly, it is not proper to separate the soul from union in the division of it, nor to consume the wholeness of it, into the generation of the parts, as the words of Timæus seem to indicate when he says, that the thing mingled was consumed into these parts. Nor must we fancy that this was as it were the division of a certain rule. For all these modes are corporeal, and by no means adapted to immaterial essences. For every thing which is generated by the Demiurgus, must necessarily remain the same, since he always produces after the same manner, being immoveable and eternal in his energies. It is necessary, therefore, that the whole should always remain a whole; that the generation of the parts should be effected, the wholeness remaining; and that this should not be consumed in the division of the parts. Hence, we must conceive, that the essence of the soul is one, and at the same time many, the whole remaining and being distributed into parts, and possessing continuity, and being, at the same time, divided. Nor must we imagine that the continuity of it is accompanied with interval; *for it is continued and without magnitude, like the continuity of time*; nor that the division of it is according to monadic numbers. For a thing of this kind is quantity which does not accord with continuity.<sup>3</sup> But we must collect these into one, as it is fit with incorporeal natures, and must survey in the soul, the whole in conjunction with<sup>4</sup> the parts. Plato also manifests, that it is not proper to depart from union in the division, through the following words:

“At the same time mingling each part from same, different, and essence. But he began to divide as follows.”

If the genera which constitute the soul, are in all the parts<sup>5</sup> of it, and the whole

<sup>1</sup> For τα ελαττω μερα here, read ελαττωματα.

<sup>2</sup> Ηομοδιαν is omitted in this place in the original, but ought from the version of Thomas, to be inserted.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. a thing of this kind is discrete quantity.

<sup>4</sup> For μεν in this place, read μερα.

<sup>5</sup> Μερεων is omitted in the original.

consists of parts similar to itself, it will in no respect be separated from continuity and union. For if in bodies similars cohere with each other without a medium, how much more in an incorporeal nature must all the things that are as it were parts, be united, and the whole be vanquished by unity, neither the parts being confused, through the position of the whole, nor the wholeness taken away through the separation of the parts? You may also assume from these things, that the soul according to all the parts of itself, is both impartible and partible. For if every part of it participates of all the middle genera, nothing in it can be assumed which does not consist of these. The ancients also, looking to these things, concluded every where concerning it, that all of it is being, life, and intellect, and that whichever you may assume of the three, you may infer that it contains the remaining two; since all things in it proceed through all, the whole is one, the one of it is all-perfect, and a part in it corresponds to the whole. But if each of the parts of it being many, is a certain essence, as numerous as are the parts, so multitudinous also is the essence. In a similar manner also with respect to sameness and difference, each of these in intellect indeed is one, and on this account it is impartible. For in intellect one thing is not a part different from another. But in the soul both these are divided according to essential number, and the parts of it are adapted to each other, causing it to be one thing from many, and a whole from parts.

Moreover, this also deserves to be considered, that according to the generation of the elements, he began as we have said, from essence; but according to the composition of the whole, from difference; co-adapting the nature of *different*, which is difficult to be mingled with *same*, and mingling both with *essence*. But according to the division of the whole into harmonic ratios, he began from sameness. For he says<sup>1</sup> that he divided each part mingled from same, different, and essence. For a commencement from essence is entirely<sup>2</sup> adapted to the generation of simple natures; since essence is more simple than other things. To the composition, however, of the whole, a commencement from difference is adapted. For the generation of the whole from parts begins from things subordinate to the whole. And a commencement from sameness is adapted to the hypostasis of harmony. For the Demiurgus was willing that this should terminate in the sameness and communion of the things that were divided. And, in short, he was willing that harmony should be effective of the sameness of the things harmonized.

These particulars, however, having been discussed by us as far as we are able,

<sup>1</sup> For *ἐνσεν* here it is obviously necessary to read *φρσι*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *πᾶντων* here, read *παντός*.

it is necessary in the next place to premise those things which ought to be readily known by us concerning numbers, and the harmonic ratios of the soul, in order that we may not attempt in vain the interpretation of what follows. It is necessary therefore to premise such things as are usually mentioned in harmonic discussions, viz. what sound, interval, and system are, and that the Pythagoreans did not assume the symphonies in harmony from any thing else than numbers, and not from all these, but from multiples and super-particulars. For they said that the diatessaron is in a sesquitertian ratio; but the diapente in a sesquialter; and the diapason in a duple ratio. And again they said, that the diapason and at the same time diapente is in a triple, but the disdiapason in a quadruple ratio. For the diapason and at the same time diatessaron, did not appear to them to be symphonious, because it consists in a multiple super-partient ratio, viz. in the ratio of 8 to 3. For 6 is a medium between the two, producing with the less number a duple, but with the greater, a subsestertian ratio. These things therefore, must be premised, and also that the sesquioctave is in the ratio of a tone; that the sesquitertian ratio consists of two tones and a leimma; and the sesquialter of three tones and a leimma.\* But we shall afterwards learn what the ratio of the leimma is. Moreover, the Pythagoreans said, that there are three genera of harmonies, the diatonic, the enharmonic, and the chromatic. Likewise, that the diatonic consists of a semitone (but this which I now call a semitone is not properly so, but a leimma), and of a tone, and another tone. But the enharmonic consists of a diesis, another diesis, and a ditone. And the chromatic of a semitone, another semitone, and a trisemitone. But diesis is as it were the fourth part of a tone, not being in reality a fourth, as neither is a leimma accurately a semitone. These things, however, we shall demonstrate in what follows.

But as there are three genera, each of which is a certain division of the tetrachord, Plato appears to have used the diatonic genus alone. For he thinks fit to divide the sesquitertian ratios, into sesquioctaves and leimmas, but not into enharmonic dieses; since some of the ancients called a semitone diesis. Plato, likewise, seems to have assumed this genus, I mean the diatonic, as more grand, simple, and generous, than the other genera; though the enharmonic appears to be more adapted to erudition. And if it be requisite to declare my own predilection on this subject, the enharmonic genus, presides over all the life which is

\* After *λειμματος* in the original, it is necessary to supply from the version of Thomas, the words *το δε ημεδον εκ των τονων και λειμματος*. I refer the reader who is desirous of thoroughly understanding what is here, and farther on, said, to my Theoretic Arithmetic.

divisible about bodies,' just as the diatonic presides over the rational life. Hence the enharmonic genus, is adapted to instruct and discipline the divisible life. But the chromatic genus presides over the corporeal idea itself. Hence it is effeminate and ignoble. The enharmonic genus therefore is deservedly disciplinative. Hence, Socrates in the Republic thinks fit to mention it particularly, in what he says about harmony. And Timæus knowing this, and having heard Socrates asserting these things on the preceding day, at the same time constitutes the essence of the soul through the diatonic, and not through the enharmonic genus; the latter, as we have said, being adapted to erudition. For on this account, the ancients called the leaders [or preceptors] of these disciplines Harmonici [or skilled in music]. Aristoxenus therefore, in the first book of his Harmonic Elements, says, it happened that those were truly called Harmonici, who formerly employed themselves in what pertains to music. For being solely engaged in harmony they neglected every other pursuit. In which Aristoxenus also asserts what is wonderful, viz. that the ancients had no knowledge of the diatonic diagram. For he thus writes: "As an indication of the truth of this, their diagram alone exhibits enharmonic systems, but no one ever saw a diatonic or chromatic diagram delineated by them." It is worthy of admiration, however, that he should assert these things, since Plato exhibits a diagram according to the diatonic genus, and also Timæus himself. Perhaps therefore what Adrastus says is true, who derides Aristoxenus as a man of not very elegant manners,<sup>1</sup> but studious of appearing to say something new.

Plato, therefore, in the diatonic genus, makes a division of tetrachords, and proceeds not only as far as to the diapason, but also as far as to a quadruple diapason and diapente, adding likewise a tone. Or according to Severus, Plato did not produce the tetrachords without a tone, but ended in a leimma, and not in a tone. If, however, some one should doubt, how Plato produced the diagram to such an extent, let him attend to the words of Adrastus. For he says that Aristoxenus, extended the magnitude of his multiform diagram, as far as to the diapason and diatessaron, and the symphony of these, in consequence of preferring the information of the ears to the decision of intellect. But the more modern musicians extended the diagram as far as to the fifteenth mode, viz. to the thrice diapason and tone, in so doing looking solely to our utility, and thinking that those who contend in singing could not exceed this, nor their auditors judge clearly beyond

<sup>1</sup> Instead of τοῖς περὶ τοῖς σωμασι μεριστοῖς in this place, it is necessary to read τῆς περὶ τοῖς σωμασι μεριστῆς.

<sup>2</sup> For το εἶδος here, it is requisite from the version of Thomæus, to read το γένος.

it. Plato, however, looking to nature, constitutes the soul from all these, in order that it might proceed as far as to solid numbers, as it ought to preside over bodies. For the progression as far as to the quadruple diapason and diapente, necessarily follows the seven terms [or bounding numbers]. But this is evident from the greatest term being twenty seven. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

In short, there are these three things into which the consideration of harmony may be divided. One of these is the exposition of the seven parts. The second is the insertion of the two media. The third is the division of the sesquitertian and sesquialter ratios, into sesquioctaves and leimmas. Hence some, as Adrastus, are accustomed to make three triangles, and in one of them, which is the least, to describe the seven parts, making the summit of the triangle to be one of the parts, and distributing the other six about this. In one of the sides also, they describe the whole duple order, but in the other, the whole triple order. Moreover, in the other triangle which is greater, and contains the former, they increased the numbers, and again in a similar manner inserted two media, arranging the duple separate from the triple numbers; and placing one of the parts at the summit. But in the third triangle, which comprehends both the others, they described after the same manner the whole diagram. Others again, adopting a description in the form of the letter  $\lambda$ , arrange the numbers successively, as in the section of a rule, according to three centers, assuming the first, second, and third numbers, as we also shall do. This method likewise is adopted by Porphyry and Severus. And such are the particulars which ought to be premised, and also that Plato divides this head into three parts, in the first of the three, discussing the seven parts, in which there are three duple, and three triple intervals, according to the geometrical middle, i. e. according to the same ratios. But in the second part, he discusses the insertion of the other two media, viz. the harmonic and arithmetic, into each interval of the duple and triple numbers. And in the third part, he considers the division of the sesquitertian and sesquialter ratios, into sesquioctaves and leimmas, and as far as to these extends the discussion of the parts of the soul.

It is necessary however to be well acquainted with such things as are said about the three media, and to know their differences, and what the methods are through which they are discovered. The arithmetical medium, therefore, is that in which the middle term exceeds and is exceeded by an equal <sup>1</sup> quantity, as may be seen in all the numbers that are in a consequent order, conformably to the definition of Timæus himself. But the harmonic medium is that in which the

<sup>1</sup> *Ισόν* is omitted in the original.



middle term is exceeded by the greater, by the same part of the greater, by which it exceeds the less term, as in the numbers 6, 4 and 3. For here 4 is exceeded by 6 by 2, which is the third part of 6, and it exceeds 3 the less term by 1, which is the third part of 3.\* And the geometrical medium is that, in which there is the same ratio of the greater to the middle term, as there is of the middle to the less term.

The methods however of discovering these, must in the next place be unfolded by us. Let two terms, therefore, be given, between which it is proposed to find an harmonic, and also an arithmetical medium; and let the terms have a duple ratio, as for instance 12 and 6. I take, therefore, the excess of the greater number above the less, which is evidently 6, and dividing it into two equal parts, I add the half to the less number, and make this the middle term. Hence 9 is the arithmetical medium between 12 and 6. For the excess is three, both of the greater above the middle, and of the middle above the least term. Again, taking the difference of the extremes, which is 6, I multiply this by the less term, and the product is 36, and dividing this by the sum of the extremes, i. e. by 18, the quotient 2 is produced, which is the breadth of the comparison.<sup>†</sup> To this also, I add 6, and I have the harmonic middle 8.  $\times$  For by that part of the greater term 12 by which 8 is exceeded by it, by this part of the less term 6, 8 exceeds the less. For it is exceeded by the third part of 12, and by a third part of 6 it exceeds 6. Again, let there be a triple interval, as for instance 18 and 6,<sup>‡</sup> adding these together I make 24, of which taking the half, I have the arithmetical middle 12. Again, taking the excess of 18 above 6, i. e. 12, I multiply it by the less term 6, and the product is 72. This I divide by 24 the sum of the extremes, and 3 the breadth of the comparison is produced. Afterwards, I add this to 6, and I have 9 for the harmonic medium, which exceeds and is exceeded by the same part of the extremes. Thus also, if 1 and 2 were the extremes, by adding them together, and taking the half of both, I shall have 1 and the half of 1, for the middle term of the arithmetical middle. But taking the excess of the greater term above unity, and multiplying it by the less term, viz. unity by unity, I have 1 from both. Afterwards dividing<sup>§</sup> this by 3, the sum of the extremes, I shall

\* Harmonic proportion may also be defined to be that, in which the difference between the greatest and middle term, is to the difference between the middle and least term, as the greatest term is to the least. Thus in the numbers 6, 4, 3, as  $6-4:4-3::6:3$ ; viz. as 2 is to 1, so is 6 to 3.

† By the breadth of the comparison, Proclus means the ratio of the terms first proposed to each other, which in this instance is duple.

‡  $\sigma\tau$  is omitted in the original.

§ For  $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\lambda\alpha\beta\omega\nu$  here, it is obviously necessary to read  $\mu\epsilon\pi\epsilon\zeta\omega\nu$ .

have the breadth of the third part of 1; in order that 3 being compared to one may make the third part of 1. Adding therefore, this  $\frac{1}{3}$  to 1, I shall have  $\frac{4}{3}$ , which is the harmonic medium between 1 and  $\frac{1}{3}$ , in the same manner as before. Hence, by employing these methods, we shall in a becoming manner fill all the double and triple intervals, with arithmetical and harmoniacal middles; which Timæus has comprehended in the geometric middle, and which he increases by the insertion of the other middles.

In short, since Plato makes mention of the three middles, which are comprehended in the geometric middle, let the following theorem be added [as a corollary] to what has been said. If the analogy consists in four terms, and one of the intermediate numbers produces an arithmetical middle, the other will produce an harmonic middle, and vice versa. For let there be four terms,  $a, b, c, d$ , so that the first  $a$ ,<sup>1</sup> is to  $b$ , as  $c$  is to  $d$ , and let  $b$  be an arithmetical middle, [so that  $a, b, d$ , are in arithmetical proportion,] I say that  $c$  is an harmonic middle. For because the product of  $a$  by  $d$  is equal to the product of  $b$  by  $c$ , but  $b$  is an arithmetic middle and the product of  $c$  by  $a$  added to the product of  $c$  by  $d$  is the double of the product of  $b$  by  $c$ , as in the arithmetic middle; this being the case, it follows that the product of  $c$  by  $a$  added to the product of  $c$  by  $d$ , is the double of the product of  $a$  by  $d$ .<sup>2</sup> But this was the property of the harmonic middle, viz. that the product of the middle by the extremes, is the double of the product of the extremes. Again, let  $c$  be an harmonic middle, I say that  $b$  is an arithmetic middle. For since the product of  $c$  by  $a$  added to the product of  $c$  by  $d$ , is the double of the product of  $b$  by  $c$ , the sum of  $a$  added to  $d$  is the double of  $b$ .<sup>3</sup> But this is an arithmetical middle, when the sum of the extremes is the double of the middle term. Again of these four terms, let  $b$  be an arithmetic, but  $c$  an harmonic mean, I say that as  $a$  is to  $b$ , so is  $c$  to  $d$ . For because the product of  $c$  by  $a$ , added to the product of  $c$  by  $d$ , is the double of the product of  $a$  by  $d$ , on account of the harmonic middle, but the sum of  $a$  added to  $d$ , is the double of  $b$  on account of the arithmetic middle, hence the product of  $a$  by  $d$  will be equal to the product of  $b$  by  $c$ . As  $a$  therefore is to  $b$ , so is  $c$  to  $d$ .<sup>4</sup> But this was the peculiarity of the geometric middle. Hence those two middles are contained in the geometric

<sup>1</sup>  $a$  is omitted in this place in the original.

<sup>2</sup> As  $a$  is to  $b$ :  $c$ :  $d$  by hypothesis, and therefore  $ad=bc$ . But  $ca+cd=2bc$ ; and because  $bc=ad$ , therefore  $2bc=2ad$ .

<sup>3</sup> Since  $ca+cd=2bc$ , it follows since  $c$  multiplies all the three terms  $ca, cd, 2bc$ , that  $a+d=2b$ .

<sup>4</sup>  $a+d \times c=2ad$ . But  $2b \times c=2ad$ , and therefore  $b \times c=a \times d$ . Hence  $a:b::c:d$ . The truth of this may be seen in numbers, by putting 6, 12, 9, 18, for  $a, b, c, d$ .

middle,<sup>1</sup> and reciprocate with each other. Since however we have premised thus much, let us proceed to the text of Plato.

“In the first place, he took one part from the whole. After this, he separated a second part double of the first: and again, a third part, sesquialter of the second, but triple of the first.”

The mathematical theory is neither to be entirely despised [in the present discussion] nor to be alone embraced itself by itself. For the latter will not exhibit to us the things which Plato intended to represent to us in images, and the former will cause the whole exposition to be unproductive of advantage. For it is necessary to consider the essence of the things which are the subject of discussion, as on a secure foundation. As we observed therefore before, we shall proceed in a middle way, first mathematically, in a manner adapted to the subjects, and after this we shall unfold the division presented to our view in the text. The Pythagoreans then conceive magnificently, respecting the division or section of the rule in this place, viz. that Plato unfolds in it the essential causes, and the reasons which are generative of mathematical theorems. Let us, therefore, as I have said, first mathematically exercise the reasoning power of the reader, by contractedly explaining what is asserted by many, at the same time abstaining from controversy, and investigating the truth by itself. Our discourse, however, will be in short, concerning these five particulars; viz. concerning multiple ratios; the media that subsist between these; the sesquitercian and sesquialter ratios, which present themselves in the middles; the sesquioctaves which fill these intervals; and the lemma. For it is necessary that the diagram should be comprehensive of all these, and be condensed with all these ratios.

That we may proceed therefore in order, we shall assume the ratios which are first mentioned by Plato, in the numbers from unity. Let unity then be posited, and the double of this 2; afterwards 3, which is sesquialter indeed of 2, but triple of 1; then 4 which is the double<sup>2</sup> of 2; afterwards 9, the triple of 3; afterwards 8, the octuple of 1; and after all, the seventh term, which is twenty-seven times 1. Some, therefore, as we have said, arrange these numbers in the form of the letter λ, making the monad the summit, and arranging the double numbers here, but the triple there. But others more conformably to Plato, arrange them in one order only. For he does not say, that the triple were apart from the duple numbers,

<sup>1</sup> After the word *ἴδιον* in the original, it is necessary to supply from the version of Leonicius Thomasius the words, *περιέχεται ἀπὸ αἰδὸς μέρητες ἐν τῇ γεωμετρικῇ μεσότητι*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τριπλασια* here, it is obviously necessary to read *διπλασια*.

but he alternately mixes them, as proceeding in a right line. If, however, Plato had stopped here, there would have been nothing further for us to discuss. But since he himself exhorts us to bind the double and triple intervals with harmonic and arithmetic middles, and it is not possible to discover these middles between 1 and 2, some first number must be assumed, which being the least, may have a half and a third part. For every number may have a double, and this must therefore be investigated. Let then 6 be assumed, and the double of it 12, the former having the same ratio to the latter as 1 to 2. Between these therefore, viz. 1 and 2 multiplied by 6, placing as media 8 and 9, we shall have the above-mentioned middles. For 8 exceeds and is exceeded by the same part of the extremes; but 9 exceeds and is exceeded according to an equal number. Hence by multiplying 1 and 2 six times, we shall find numbers receiving the before-mentioned middles. In a similar manner by multiplying by 6 the remaining double and triple numbers in the before-mentioned order, we shall find the terms which we may be able to condense with arithmetic and harmonic middles. For sextuple numbers will be produced from all the before-mentioned orders, by arranging other numbers, only observing that 48 ought to be placed before 54; in this respect departing from the arrangement of Plato, who places 9 before 8, in order that he might alternately change the duple and triple ratios. We, however, make this alteration, as consentaneous to the multitude of the monads, and the nature of increasing number. Hence 8 and 9 come between 6 and 12; but between 12 and the double of it 24, the harmonic mean is 16, and the arithmetic 18. And between the third double<sup>1</sup> 24 and 48, the harmonic mean is 32, but the arithmetic 36. But in triple numbers, between 6 and 18 which are the first triple, the harmonic middle is 9, but the arithmetic 12. Between the second triple 18, and 54, the harmonic middle is 27, but the arithmetic 36. And between the third triple 54 and 162, the harmonic middle is 81, but the arithmetic 108. The double and triple intervals therefore, are divided by these two middles. So that these terms will be successive to each other, viz. 6. 8. 9. 12. 16. 18. 24. 27. 32. 36. 48. 54. 81. 108. 162.

If, however, it was possible in the terms described by us, to divide the sesquitercian ratios, into sesquiocaves and leimmas, we should have no occasion to proceed any further. But now, as this is not possible, we are in want of another method. Since, therefore, it was proposed at first, to condense the duple ratio, with the before-mentioned middles, and with sesquiocaves, it is necessary that the subduple term, should have the sesquitercian together with the two sesquiocaves.

<sup>1</sup> For *τετραπλάσιον* here, it is obviously necessary to read *εξαπλασιον*.

Let there be taken then in the first place, the third number from unity, according to an octuple ratio, viz. 64. From this it is possible to form two sesquioctaves. For every multiple number is the leader of as many multiple ratios denominated from itself, as it is itself distant from unity. But it has not a sesquitertian.<sup>1</sup> By tripling therefore 64, we shall have 192, the sesquitertian of which is 256, but the sesquioctave 216, and of this the sesquioctave is 243.<sup>2</sup> But the ratio of the leimma is that which remains after the ablation of the two sesquioctaves 243 and 216. For from every sesquitertian two sesquioctaves being taken, the ratio of the leimma is left. But of 256 the sesquioctave is 288, which preserves an arithmetical mean between 192 and 384, which has a duple ratio to 192, and a sesquitertian to 288. If, therefore, it were possible to form two sesquioctaves from 288, we might also condense this sesquitertian with sesquioctaves and a leimma. Now, however, this is not possible. For the sesquioctave of it, 324, has not an eighth part. Hence if we wish to preserve unity always undivided it is impossible there should be a sesquioctave ratio to it. For the eighth part of it is 40 and  $\frac{1}{4}$ . By doubling this, therefore, in order that we may make the half a whole, we shall be able to assume the eighth part of it. On this account, however, we shall be compelled to double all the numbers prior to it, and also those posterior to it. Hence instead of 192, we shall have 384; instead of 216, 432; instead of 243, 486; instead of 256, 512; and instead of 288, 576. And of this the sesquioctave, is 648, and of this 729.<sup>3</sup> Afterwards 768, which is the double of 384, has the ratio of a leimma to 729. After this manner, therefore, the double interval is filled with sesquialter, sesquitertian, and sesquioctave ratios, in the numbers, 384, 432, 486, 512, 576, 648, 729, 768. Hence if we wish to fill the whole diagram, and to describe all the numbers in a consequent order, instead of the first part we must assume 384; instead of the double of the first, 768; instead of the triple of the first, but the sesquialter of the second, 1152; instead of the quadruple of the first, 1536; instead of the fifth part which is triple of the third, 3456; instead of the sixth part which is octuple of the first, 3072; and instead of the seventh part, which is the twenty-seventh part of the first, 10368.

If, therefore, we also wish to condense these terms with harmonic and arithmetic middles, which being inserted, make sesquialter and sesquitertian intervals, the intermediate numbers will be 384, and 768, the double of 384; 512, which produces an harmonic, and 576, which makes an arithmetic middle. But if we

<sup>1</sup> The number 64 has not a sesquitertian in whole numbers. For as 3 is to 4 so is 64 to  $83\frac{1}{2}$ .

<sup>2</sup> For as 9 is to 8, so is 243 to 216.

<sup>3</sup> For as 8 is to 9 so is 576 to 648; and also so is 648 to 729.

wish to assume the above-mentioned middles of the triple interval, viz. of 384 and 1152, then 576 will preserve the harmonic 'middle, which filled for us the arithmetic 'middle in the double 'interval; and 768 will be the arithmetic middle, which was the greater extreme of the double interval. Again, if we wish to assume the same middles of the duple and quadruple, i. e. of the middles between the terms 768 and 1536, the former of which is the double of 384, and the latter the quadruple, the harmonic middle will be 1024, and 1152 the arithmetic middle. If also we wish to condense the second triple, the terms of which are 1152, and 3456 [the former being the double of 576, and the latter the triple of 1152] then 1728 will give us the harmonic, and 2304 the arithmetic middle. And if we wish to condense the third double, which consists in the terms 1536 and 3072, then 2048 will be the harmonic, and 2304 the arithmetic middle. But if we wish to condense the third triple, with similar middles, but I mean the fifth and seventh part, the extremes will be for us 3456, and 10368; but the harmonic middle will be 5184, and the arithmetic 6912. If again, we should condense each of the sesquiterians which present themselves from these middles, and sesquialters, with sesquioctaves and a leimma, this will be manifest to us after the whole exposition, when we exhibit the whole diagram with all the terms in a consequent order, which has indeed 24 sesquioctaves but 9 leimmas.

These things therefore, having been elucidated by us, we shall observe thus much concerning the leimma, that as it is not possible to divide any superparticular into equal ratios, a semitone cannot be assumed in numbers; but taking the ratios which are contiguous to each other, viz. the seventeenth and the sixteenth part, and demonstrating that the seventeenth part is greater than that which is called the leimma, and which is less than an accurate semitone, it is inferred that the leimma and also the seventeenth part are less than a semitone. But that it is less than a semitone, is demonstrated as follows: Let there be given the term 16 and the sesquioctave of it 18. Between these placing 17 it will divide the sesquioctave into unequal ratios, which will be near to the semitonic interval, since 17 differs from the extremes by unity alone. And it is evident that it will make a greater ratio with the less term; because in all arithmetical proportion, the ratio is greater which is in the less terms; so that the seventeenth part is less than a semitone. Moreover, the leimma is less than the seventeenth part, as is evident from the terms exhibited by Plato. For since 256 has to 243 the ratio of the leimma, as we shall demonstrate in what

<sup>1</sup> For ἀριθμητικὴν here, in the original it is necessary to read ἀρμονικὴν.

<sup>2</sup> For ἀρμονικὴν also here, we must read ἀριθμητικὴν.

<sup>3</sup> And for τριπλασίον, it is requisite to read διπλασίον.

follows, where we shall show that the radical ratio of the leimma is in these numbers; and since 256 exceeds 243 by less than the seventeenth part of it; for it exceeds it by 13 unities, but the seventeenth part of 243 is more than 13;—this being the case, much more is the ratio of the leimma less than the semitonic interval. Hence the ratio which remains to the completion of a tone, and which is called the ratio of an apotome, is necessarily greater than a semitone.

Farther still, this may also be demonstrated after another manner, as follows: Let the numbers 256 and 243 be given, and let there be assumed three numbers in a consequent order, in a ratio of this kind; from 256 indeed, 65536, but from 243 59049, and from both 62208. These three numbers, therefore, are analogous in the ratio of the leimma, which, if it is a semitone, will be the tonic ratio of the extremes. But if it is greater than a semitone, that also will be greater than a tone; but if less, that also will be less. The sesquioctave however of 5909, is 664340  $\frac{1}{2}$ . But this is greater than the greater term.

After another and a third way the same thing may also be demonstrated, viz. that a tone cannot be divided into two equal parts, having the same ratio as that of 256 to 243. For if we take the eighth part of 243, which is 30  $\frac{1}{8}$ , and add this part to it, we shall make 75  $\frac{1}{8}$ , which has a sesquioctave ratio to 243. You see therefore that 256 has to 243 a less ratio than 273  $\frac{1}{8}$  to 256. For 256 has to 243 a superpartient ratio, exceeding it by  $\frac{13}{243}$ ; but 273  $\frac{1}{8}$  exceeds 256, by  $\frac{17}{256} = \frac{1}{15\frac{1}{8}}$ . But the ratio is greater which exceeds by seventeen and more, than that which alone exceeds by thirteen, according to the ratio of excess. A tone, therefore, cannot be divided into equal parts, but *this* is the *leimma*, as Plato also calls it, and *that* which has the greater ratio is *apotome*, as musicians are accustomed to denominate it. For let 273  $\frac{1}{8}$  have to 243 a sesquioctave ratio, but 256, to the same 243, the ratio of the leimma, which has a less ratio than that of the seventeenth part, it is evident that 275  $\frac{1}{8}$ , which has the ratio of a tone to 243, will have to 256 the ratio of the apotome, which is the remainder of the leimma, being greater than the seventeenth part, which we have demonstrated to be less than the ratio of the leimma. If therefore we multiply these eight times, we shall find the first numbers which in perfect unities have the ratio of the apotome. For the octuple of 243 is 1944, of 256 is 2048, of 273  $\frac{1}{8}$ , 2187. Hence the ratio of the apotome in radical numbers (*ἐν ῥιζαῖς*) is that of 2187 to 2048. And we shall be in want of these three terms which are in a consequent order, in the diagram. Let then these terms be, 243, 256, 273  $\frac{1}{8}$ . But on account of [the fraction]  $\frac{1}{8}$ , let the octuple of these be the

\* Πρῶτον is a primary ratio, being as it were a bottom or root, from which other ratios arise.

numbers 1944, 2048, 2187, in order that the terms may be in perfect unities, and not in the parts of unity. Because however, it is necessary that the ratio of the *leimma* should be that of 256 to 243, we may demonstrate it to be so as follows: If from the sesquitertian interval, two sesquioctaves are taken away, the terms which comprehend the remaining interval, will have to each other the ratio of 256 to 243. For let  $ab$  be sesquitertian of  $c$ , and let  $c$  be taken away, which is sub-*sesquioctave* of the *sesquioctave*  $ab$ . And in a similar manner let  $d$  be taken from  $c$ . I say that  $d$  will have to  $e$  the proposed ratio. For from  $ab$  let  $c$  be taken which is equal to  $z b$ , and  $d$  which is equal  $e b$ . Since therefore, as  $ab$  is to  $c$ , so is  $c$  to  $d$ ; for they are *sesquioctaves*; it will also be as  $az$  is to  $bz$ , so is  $bz$  to  $be$ . Hence the remainder  $az$  will be to the remainder  $ze$ , as whole to whole, i. e. as  $ab$  to  $bz$ . But  $ab$  is *sesquioctave* of  $bz$ . Hence  $bz$  is *sesquioctave* of  $ze$ . Let  $zh$  be placed equal to  $ze$ . Hence  $zh$  is *octuple* of  $ha$ . But  $ze$  is equal to  $zh$ . Hence  $eh$  is eighteen times  $ha$ . Again, since  $zb$  is *sesquioctave* of  $be$ , for  $c$  is *sesquioctave* of  $d$ , hence  $be$  is *octuple* of  $ez$ . Of such numbers therefore as  $ze$  is 8, of such  $eb$  is 64, and  $zb$  72. For 72 is *sesquioctave* of 64. But the whole  $ab$  is 81; for this is the *sesquioctave* of 72. The numbers, therefore, are *quadruple*. Hence of such numbers as  $ab$  is 324, of such  $eb$ , i. e.  $d$ , is 256. For 324 is *quadruple* of 81, and 256 of 64. But numbers which are equally multiplied, have the same ratio as their parts. Since therefore  $ab$  is sesquitertian of  $c$ , of such numbers as  $ab$  is 324, of such  $c$  will be 243. For 324 contains 243, and a third part of it, viz. 81. But it has appeared, that of such numbers as  $ab$  is 324, of such  $d$  is 256. Hence of such numbers as  $d$  is 256, of such  $e$  is 243.

It is manifest, however, that this ratio of the *leimma* is in the least terms. For they are first terms with relation to each other. And this is evident from subtraction. For they end in unity, the less being always taken from the greater. But if they are first terms, it is evident they are the least of those that have the same ratio with them. If, therefore, two *sesquioctaves* are taken from the *sesquitertian* interval, the remaining terms will have the ratio of 256 to 243.

This therefore being demonstrated, let there be taken in a consequent order  $ab$  for the *tonic* ratio,  $bc$  for the ratio of the *leimma*,  $ad$  for the ratio of that which is called a *semitone*, and  $d$  to  $c$  for the ratio of the *comma*. For the ratio of the excess of the *apotome*, above that which is truly a *semitone*, and which cannot be obtained in numbers, is thus called. This then is demonstrated. To what has been said however, it must be added, that we have called the ratio of  $db$  a *semitone*, not that a *sesquioctave* is divided into two equal ratios; for no *superparticular* ratio is capable of being so divided; but because the followers of *Aristoxenus* assume a *semitone* after two *sesquioctaves*, the ratio of a *semitone* is assumed, as we have said, according to their position, in order to discover what



the ratio is of the comma and apotome to the ratio of the leimma. This therefore is asserted through the cause which has been mentioned by us. For that every superparticular ratio is incapable of being divided into two equal ratios, is one among the things that are demonstrated. Thus much, however, must be added, for the sake of elegant erudition, that as the Pythagoreans neither admit that there is a semitone from which together with two sesquioctaves a sesquitercian ratio is produced, nor the symphony diapason and diatessaron, as the followers of Aristoxenus admit;—this being the case, the musicians posterior to him, the disciples of Ptolemy, grant with the Pythagoreans, that what is called a semitone, is not truly so, but reject the opinion, that the diapason and diatessaron are not symphonies. We, however, necessarily demonstrate the former, on account of the opinion of Plato; but not being compelled to demonstrate the latter, because Plato says nothing about it, we shall at present omit it.

Since then we have shown in what numbers the ratio of the leimma, and the ratio of the apotome are first found, we must likewise show, in what numbers the ratio of the comma, by which the apotome exceeds the leimma, is first discovered. This ratio therefore is in perfect [i. e. in undivided] unities, as the ancients say, that of 531441 to 524288.\* But if to divide unity makes no difference, let the ratio of the leimma be taken in that of the numbers 256 to 243. But the sesquioctave of 243 is 273  $\frac{1}{3}$ , and of 256 288.<sup>†</sup> Another leimma is that of 269 to 243  $\frac{1}{3}$ . For this is the ratio of the leimma. For 269 contains 256 and thirteen units, and 256 also contains 243 and thirteen units. Because therefore 256 consists of 243, and besides this of thirteen units, which are the numerator of 243; hence the 13 by which 256 exceeds 243, contains in itself  $\frac{13}{243}$  parts of 243. Each likewise of the thirteen units by which 256 exceeds 243 contains in itself  $\frac{1}{243}$  of 243. Hence 269 +  $\frac{13}{243}$  will have the same ratio to 256, as 256 to 243,<sup>‡</sup> being in a superpartient ratio to it, and having  $\frac{13}{243}$  parts of it, and 243 units. Hence that which remains, viz. 273  $\frac{1}{3}$ , has the ratio of the comma to 269 and  $\frac{1}{243}$ . So that it is shown in what numbers of the monad when divided, and in what two leimmas taken from the sesquioctave, the ratio of the comma is first found. It is evident therefore, from what has been said, that we have effected what we promised to do. The terms likewise, and all the intervals, are condensed with harmonic and arithmetic middles, and the divisions of the sesquialter and sesquitercian ratios, into sesquioctaves and leimmas, have been effected. For as there is a

\* Leonicius Thomæus has in his version 524298.

† 288 is omitted in the Greek, and also in the version of Thomæus.

‡  $\frac{13}{269 + \frac{13}{243}} = \frac{65380}{243}$ . And as  $\frac{65380}{243} : \frac{256}{1} :: \frac{256}{1} : \frac{15925218}{65380} = \frac{27904}{243 \cdot 65380}$ .

duple interval between 384 and 768, the term 432 which is sesquioctave to 384, and 480 which is sesquioctave to 432, fall between them, and also 512 which makes a leimma with 480. And thus far the sesquitercian ratio consists of two tones and the leimma.

Again 576 is sesquioctave to 512, 648 to 576, 729 to 648, and 768 has the ratio of the leimma to 729. And from these the sesquialter is filled, having three sesquioctaves, and one leimma.<sup>1</sup> But the whole is duple, consisting of five sesquioctaves, and two leimmas. Again, according to the above described terms 384, and 768, the term 512 produces an harmonic, but 576 an arithmetical medium. Farther still, 864 is placed as sesquioctave to 768, but 972 is sesquioctave to 864, and 1024 has the ratio of the leimma to 972. To 1024 also 1152 is sesquioctave. And now after the duple the sesquialter ratio is produced, which makes a triple ratio, viz. the ratio of 1152 to 384. But between this triple interval, 576 is the harmonic middle to the extremes, but 768 the arithmetic middle. *For a theorem of the following kind is universally demonstrated, that if of the same term, one number is double, but another triple, and a certain mean of the double is assumed according to arithmetical proportion, this mean will be to the triple number an harmonic middle. But the greater term in the duple ratio, will become the arithmetical mean in the triple.* Thus for instance, in the above terms, 768 is the double of 384, but 1152 is the triple. Between also the duple terms 768 and 384, an arithmetical mean 576 is assumed; and the same mean between the triple terms 384 and 1152 is seen to be an harmonic mean. And 768 which was duple, becomes between the triple terms an arithmetical mean. Afterwards, 1296 is sesquioctave to 1152, and of this 1458 is the sesquioctave, to which 1536 has the ratio of the leimma. And as far as to this, the second duple is filled, being composed of the sesquialter and sesquitercian ratios, the extremes of which are 768 and 1536, and are divided into five sesquioctaves and two leimmas. It likewise has for the harmonic mean 1024, and for the arithmetical mean 1152.

Again, 1728 is sesquioctave to 1536, of this 1944 is sesquioctave, of this 2137 is sesquioctave, and to this 2304 has the ratio of the leimma. But the sesquioctave of 2304, is 2592; of this 2916 is the sesquioctave, and to this 3072 has the ratio of the leimma, which is octuple of the first part, filling the third double. And farther still, the sesquioctave of 3072 is 3156. And as far as to this the second triple extends, having for its extremes 1152 and 3156, and for its harmonic mean 1728, but for its arithmetical mean 2304. In addition to this also, the

<sup>1</sup> For 768 is sesquialter to 512, and between these two terms, there are the above three sesquioctaves, and one leimma.

sesquioctave of 3456 is 3888, but of this the sesquioctave is 4374, to which 4608 has the ratio of the leimma. The sesquioctave also of 4608 is 5184, and of this again, the sesquioctave is 5832, to which 6144 has the ratio of the leimma, the sesquioctave of which is 6912. And this again is another duple<sup>1</sup> [viz. 3456 and 6912] after the before-mentioned three duples [and afterwards another sesquioctave: for 7776 is sesquioctave to 6912];<sup>2</sup> for in the third triple, there is also a certain duple. And again, the sesquioctave of 7776 is 8748, to which 9216 has the ratio of the leimma, and of 9216 the sesquioctave is 10368. And as far as to this, the third triple is extended, being comprehended in the terms 3456 and 10368, and having two means, the harmonic and the arithmetical, the former of which is 5184, but the latter 6912.

The double and triple intervals therefore are filled with middles, and with sesquioctaves and leimmas. The whole likewise of this diagram has nine leimmas, and twenty-four sesquioctaves. For the intervals are less in number than the terms by one. It also proceeds as far as to a quadruple diapason, and a diapente and tone. Adrastus however, who was a lover of the arts, makes the figure, as we have said, in the form of the letter λ; and places the terms in certain triangles. And in the interior triangle, indeed, he places the ratios that are in monadic numbers [i. e. that consist in the numbers within ten]; but in the triangle next to this, the sextuple of these numbers, which have two middles according to each duple or triple interval. And in the outermost triangle he places the terms which make the whole of the before-mentioned diagram. What we have said, however, will become manifest from the delineation. But between the double and triple intervals, he inscribes all the above-mentioned numbers, which we have not thought fit to add, being unwilling to introduce a [needless] multitude of terms. For such a disposition of terms, and the insertion of the same numbers twice, is immethodical. For many of the same media are found between the duple and triple intervals; since the triple intervals themselves consist of duple terms and sesquialters. What is said by Plato, therefore, has been elucidated by us. For two media have been discovered between all the duple and triple intervals. And from these media sesquialter and sesquitercian ratios having been produced, these are divided by the sesquioctave; a portion being left in both, which has the ratio of the leimma. From these likewise, assumed in an orderly

<sup>1</sup> For διπασσων here, it is necessary to read δικολλασσων.

<sup>2</sup> The words within the brackets are supplied from the version of Thomas, where however it is necessary to read sesquioctavum instead of sesquialterum.

manner, the terms which comprehend the whole diagram will be found to be thirty-four only.\*

Since, however, the Pythagoric Timæus says that the terms of the diagram are thirty-six, and yet assumes the same extremes as Plato, viz. 384 and 10368, in order that these philosophers may not appear to be in any respect discordant with each other, let us show how the other two terms are inserted. These men therefore [i. e. the Pythagoreans] were willing that there should not only be the ratio of the leimma in the diagram, but also that of the apotome, which they twice discovered, both in radical numbers, and in those alone which are the triple of these. Adding likewise one term to each, they introduced this into the diagram. But Plato makes no mention of the apotome; whence also we being satisfied with the leimma, have alone employed the above-enumerated terms. For how, since he assumes the diatonic genus, could he make use of the apotome, the sesquioctave not being divided in this genus; the apotome being produced when the sesquioctave is divided? For the part of the sesquioctave which remains after the leimma, is the apotome. Hence, since Plato does not mention the apotome, and it is not possible for it to occur in the diatonic genus, it would be ridiculous in us to endeavour to insert other terms, in order that we may have the apotome, the thirty-four terms being sufficient to the completion of the sesquioctaves and leimmas. It seems also, that the number 34 is adapted to the diatonic genus, in

\* This will be evident from the following diagram, which also will be found to contain a quadruple diapason, together with the diapente and tone.

Sesq. Sesq. Leimma. Sesq. Sesq. Sesq. Leimma.  
384. 432. 486. 512. 576. 648. 729. 768.  
The first duple interval.

Sesq. Sesq. Leimma. Sesq. Sesq. Sesq. Leimma.  
864. 972. 1024. 1152. 1296. 1458. 1536.  
The second duple interval.

Sesq. Sesq. Leimma. Sesq. Sesq. Leimma.  
1728. 1944. 2187.\* 2304. 2592. 2916. 3072.  
The third duple interval.

Sesq. Sesq. Leimma. Sesq. Sesq. Leimma.  
3456. 3888. 4374. 4608. 5184. 5832. 6144.  
The fourth duple interval.

\* 2187 is the octuple of 273½.

Sesq. Sesq. Leimma. Sesq.  
6912. 7776. 8748. 9216. 10368.  
The third triple interval.

In this diagram it must be observed, that the last term of each interval forms a sesquioctave with the first term of the interval that is next in order. The first triple interval likewise begins with the term 384, and ends at the term 1152. The second triple interval begins at 1152 and ends at 3456. And the third triple interval begins at 3456, and ends at 10368.

which alone the sesquioctave ratio is found. For it consists of the terms 18 and 16, which are to each other in a sesquioctave ratio. For the sesquialter and sesquitercian ratios, and leimmas, are also in the other genera; but the sesquioctaves are found in this alone of the three genera. Hence this ratio of the sesquioctave, very properly produces by composition the number of the parts; and this being the second, is adapted to the second progression of the soul from the first intelligible principles.

If therefore we assume the less term of the third double, viz. 1536, and again the sesquioctave of this 1728, and afterwards the sesquioctave of this 1944, and again the tritone of this 2187, there will be one interval of the extremes. Because however 2048 has a sesquitercian ratio to 1536, but 1944 has to it the ratio of the leimma, it is necessary that 2187 should make an apotome to 2048. For an apotome is, as we have before said, that which remains to a tone, after the leimma. In a similar manner also, by assuming in the third triple, 4608, which contains the tritone<sup>1</sup> 6561,\* and also assuming 6144, which makes a sesquitercian ratio to 4608, but to 5832 has the ratio of the leimma, we shall necessarily have the apotome in the ratio of 6561 to 6144, which are triple of the radical terms that were before discovered by us in the third double. For it is evident that the ratio of the apotome is radically in those terms. For 2187, and 2048, are demonstrated to be first terms to each other by the theorem of subtraction; first terms being necessarily such as are least. The multitude indeed of the terms described by Timæus, is demonstrated by Philolaus; but the diagram of Plato proceeds without the ratio of the apotome. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Since however we have before observed, that if of one term two numbers are assumed, one of which is the double, but the other the triple of it, the mean which between the duple terms is arithmetical, is between the triple terms harmonic, but the duple term is between the triple terms, an arithmetical mean, we will now concisely elucidate and at the same time demonstrate this theorem. Let then  $b$  be the double of  $a$ , but  $c$  the triple of it, and between  $a$  and  $b$ , let the arithmetical mean be  $d$ . I say that will happen which is enunciated in the proposition. For since  $b$  is the double, but  $c$  the triple of  $a$ , of such numbers as  $a$  is two,  $b$  will be four, and  $c$  will be six. Hence of such as  $b$  is four,  $c$  will be six. By so much,

<sup>1</sup> For *πριον* here, it is necessary to read *πριονον*.

\* According to the moderns, a tritone is a dissonant interval, otherwise called a superfluous fourth. It is also a kind of redundant third, consisting of two tones, and two semitones, one greater and one less. And the ratio of the tritone is as 15 to 32. This however does not accord with the ratio of the tritone given by Proclus, both in this place, and above. For 1608 is not to 6561 as 32 to 45, but as 32 to 45  $\frac{32}{45}$ . Nor in the other instance above, is 1944 to 2187 as 32 to 45.

therefore, does  $c$  exceed  $b$  as  $b$  exceeds  $a$ . Hence  $b$  is an arithmetical mean between  $a$  and  $c$ . Again, because of such as  $a$  is two, of such  $b$  is four, but the arithmetical mean between them is  $d$ ; hence  $d$  will be three of such numbers, as  $a$  is two, and  $b$  four.<sup>1</sup> But of such as  $b$  is four, of such  $c$  is six. Of such therefore, as  $a$  is two, of such  $d$  is three, and  $c$  is six. Hence  $d$  compared to  $a$  and to  $c$ , will produce an harmonic middle.<sup>2</sup> For by the same part of the greater it is exceeded by the greater, and by the same part of the less exceeds the less. And thus much concerning this particular.

Severus, however, thinks that this diagram should not end in a tone, but in the leimma, because Plato terminates in this all the discussion concerning the division of the soul. In order, therefore, that it may terminate in the leimma, Severus transfers some of the terms, and makes all of them to be thirty-four. But as in the thirty-fourth term, the half of unity occurs, he doubles the terms, and makes the first part to be 768, which is the double of 384. Of this, therefore, he places the sesquioctave 864, and of this again the sesquioctave 972. To this also he adapts according to the leimma, 1024. But of this he takes the sesquioctave 1152; of this the sesquioctave 1296; and of this again the sesquioctave 1458. But to this he adapts according to the leimma 1536, and places the sesquioctave of this, 1728, and of this again the sesquioctave 1944. To this likewise he adapts according to the ratio of the leimma, 2187. And of this he assumes the sesquioctave 2304; of this the sesquioctave 2602; and of this again the sesquioctave 2916. To this also he assumes 3762, which has the ratio of the leimma to it; to this the sesquioctave 3456; and to this in a similar manner 3888. To this likewise he adapts as the leimma 4374; of this he assumes the sesquioctave 4608; of this the sesquioctave 5184; and of this again the sesquioctave 5832. To this also he adapts according to the ratio of the leimma, 6144; and of this he assumes the sesquioctave 6912; of this the sesquioctave 7776; and of this again the sesquioctave 8748. To this likewise he adapts as a leimma 9216. But of this he makes the sesquioctave 10368; of this also 11664; and of this, again, he makes the sesquioctave 13122. To this he adapts as a leimma 13824; of this also he assumes the sesquioctave 15552; of this the sesquioctave 17496; and of this, again, the sesquioctave 19783. And to this he adapts 20636, having the ratio of the leimma. As far as to this, therefore, he gives completion to the diagram, making the leimma to be the end; except that in these terms, there is first the sesquitercian, afterwards the sesquialter, then the sesquitercian, and afterwards the sesquialter ratio.

<sup>1</sup> Hence as 2, 3, 4 are in arithmetical proportion, so likewise will their equimultiples, 2x. 3x. 4x.

<sup>2</sup> For 2, 3, and 6 are in harmonic proportion, and therefore their equimultiples also are in the same proportion. For 6 exceeds 3 by the half of 6, and 3 exceeds 2 by the half of 2.

And again the sesquitercian, afterwards the sesquialter, and then three sesquialters in a following order, as is evident from the above description.

It happens, therefore, in this diagram, that there is a quadruple diapason, that the diapente occurs once, and that the tone is redundant. For three sesquialters, make one diapason and tone. The diagram, however, does not end in a tone, but in the leimma. But this was the thing proposed to be effected. Severus, therefore, does not take away the tone, but does not end in it. So that the whole diagram according to all the terms, consists of a quadruple diapason, and the diapentes, and one tone. If also we wish in monadic numbers to assume these intervals, we must survey the progression extended as far as to twenty-seven. For 2 is double of unity, 4 is the double of 2, 8 of 4, and 16 of 8. And as far as to this the quadruple diapason extends. But of 16, 24 is the sesquialter, and this is the diapente, and to this 27 has a sesquioctave ratio. So that the before mentioned symphonies are perfected from one part, as far as to twenty-seven. This, therefore, as I have said, is common to all the diagrams. But they differ from each other in this, that some are in the form of the letter  $\lambda$ , but others are in a right line. For of the ancients, Adrastus employs figures in the form of  $\lambda$ , but Severus right lines, which in my opinion is better. For in the figures which are in the form of the letter  $\lambda$ , the same numbers are found twice in different places. But this is discordant with the things themselves. For there are not two parts of the soul which are the same. But all these numbers are parts of the soul. They differ also in this, that some of the diagrams end in a tone, but others in the leimma. Some also are more perspicuous, though the same numbers are assumed twice, as is the case with those diagrams which distribute the duple and triple<sup>1</sup> ratios in the sides of triangles. But others place each number once in all the intervals, though this causes a more difficult division of the duple terms, into super-particular and super-partient ratios. We have therefore premised such things as may contribute to the theory of the psychogonic diagram, to those who survey it mathematically.

As we are entering however on the more important explanation of the words of Plato, we think it requisite to speak in the first place, concerning the division itself according to which the soul is divided in these ratios, and to take away by arguments such things as are an impediment to our apprehending the truth respecting it. Let no one, therefore, think that this division is corporeal. For it has been before demonstrated, that the middle nature of the soul is exempt from bodies, and at the

<sup>1</sup> Both the sense of what is here said, and the version of Thomas, require the insertion in this place of *καὶ τριπλασιους*.

same time from every partible essence which is distributed about them. Nor must it be supposed that the soul is better indeed than bodies, but that it is divided after the same manner as the terms or boundaries, and intervals by which bodies<sup>1</sup> are measured. For things that have interval, are not wholly and through the whole present with themselves, and when divided, are not able to preserve an unconfused union. But the soul participating of an impartible allotment, is united to itself, and exhibits all the same elements subsisting the same in all its parts. Nor again must this section of the soul, be considered as a division of number. For the soul is indeed number, yet not that which is according to quantity, but that which is essential, self-begotten, having the form of unity, and converted to itself. Nor let the presence of these ratios in all the parts be compared to spermiatic reasons. For these are imperfect, corporeal-formed, and material, and entirely fall short of the immaterial and pure essence of the psychical reasons. Nor let any one assimilate the before-mentioned parts to the theorems of science, because each theorem possesses the whole [science of which it is a theorem]. For we do not now consider the knowledge, but the essence of the soul. Nor is it proper to think that the differences of essences, are similar to the distinctions of habits. For the latter are entirely varied in the natures that possess them, but the former are established with invariable sameness in demiurgic boundaries. Hence it is necessary to suspend the primordial principle of the psychogonic division from the demiurgic cause, and from perfect measures, which eternally pre-exist in real beings; to which also the Demiurgus looking, divides the soul. For as he divided this universe by intelligible paradigms, thus also he separates the essence of the soul by the most beautiful boundaries, assimilating it to the more ancient and primordial causes. *The mode therefore of division, is immaterial, intellectual, undefiled, perfective of the essence of the soul, generative of the multitude in it, collective through harmony into one order, and connective of divided parts; at one and the same time being the cause of the unmingled purity of the multitude in the soul, and producing a communion of reasons converging to the same essence.*

And the Demiurgus, indeed, appears to consume the whole by dividing it into parts. For thus also in a certain respect Timæus says, "*that he consumed the whole from which he cut off these parts.*" This, however, is not the case, but it is necessary to preserve both impartible,<sup>2</sup> and that the wholeness remaining impartible.

<sup>1</sup> For αὐτῶν here, it is necessary to read αὐτῶν.

<sup>2</sup> For ἀλλὰ διαμεριστὸν here, it is necessary to read ἀλλ' ἀμεριστὸν.



ble, the division into multitude should be effected. For if we assume one of these only, I mean the section into parts, we shall make the soul to be partible alone. *The whole therefore is distributed into parts, and at the same time the whole remains.* Again, the impartible of the soul equally participates of the impartible and the partible. For it is well said, as we have before observed, by the dæmoniackal Aristotle, that there is something impartible in partible natures, which is connective of them; so that it is much more necessary, that something impartible should remain, in things which have not only a partible, but also an impartible nature. For if this did not remain, that which consists of both would be alone partible. It is evident however, that it is necessary the whole should remain in the generation of the parts, if the Demiurgus is an eternally producing cause. But he constituted the soul one whole, prior to the division of it. For he did not obliterate it in producing something else. But he always produces every thing, and eternally, and causes that which is produced to remain what it is. Hence the wholeness is not destroyed, when the parts are constituted, but it remains, and precedes the parts. For he did not produce the parts prior to the whole, and afterwards generate the whole from these, but vice versa. The essence therefore of the soul is at one and the same time a whole, and has parts, and is one and multitude. And such is the division of the soul which Timæus assumes.

The mode, however, of unfolding it, should accord with the essence of the soul, being liberated from visible, but elevating itself to essential and immaterial harmony, and transferring from images to paradigms. For the symphony which flows into the ears, and which consists in sounds and pulsations, is very different from that which is vital and intellectual. No one, therefore, should stop at the mathematical theory, but should excite himself to a mode<sup>1</sup> of survey adapted to the essence of the soul; nor should he think that we ought to direct our attention to interval, or the differences of motions. For these are assumed remotely, and are by no means adapted to the proposed subjects of investigation. But he should survey the assertions by themselves, and consider how they afford an indication of the psychical middle, and look to the demiurgic providence as their end. In the first place therefore, if you are willing thus to survey, since wholeness is triple, one being prior<sup>2</sup> to parts, another consisting of parts, and another being in each of the parts, as we have frequently elsewhere demonstrated;—this being the case, Plato has already delivered the wholeness of the soul which is prior to parts. For

<sup>1</sup> For *τοπον* here, read *τροπον*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *προς τὰν μέρος* in this place, it is necessary to read *πρὸ τῶν μερῶν*.

he made it to be one whole prior' to all division into parts, and which as we have said, remains what it is, without being consumed in the production of the parts. For to be willing to dissolve that which is well harmonized is the province of an evil nature. But the dissolution is effected by consuming the whole into the parts. In what is now delivered however, he constitutes it a whole from parts, consuming the whole mixture into the division of its essence, and through the harmony of the parts, rendering it a whole *de novo*, and causing it to be complete from all appropriate parts. But he shortly after teaches us the wholeness which is in each of the parts, dividing the whole soul into certain circles, and in each of the circles inserting all the reasons, which he had already made manifest to us in what he had before said. For he had said, that in each of the parts there are three (i. e. same, different, and essence) in the same manner as in the whole. Every part therefore, as well as the whole, is in a certain respect a triadic whole. Hence it is necessary that the soul should have three wholenesses, because it animates the universe, which is a whole of wholes, each of which is a whole according to the wholeness which is in a part. So that the soul animating the universe in a twofold respect, both as it is a whole, and as consisting of total parts, it requires two wholenesses, and transcends the things that are animated, having something external to them, so as circularly to cover the universe, as Timæus says, as with a veil. By the wholeness, therefore, which is prior to parts, the soul entirely runs above the universe, but by the remaining two connects the universe and the parts it contains, these also being wholes.

In the next place, it must be observed, that Plato proceeding from the beginning to the end, preserves the monadic and at the same time dyadic nature of the soul. For he reduces the *hyparxis* of it to essence, same, and different, and distributes the number of it according to a twofold division, beginning from one part, into duple and triple numbers. He also surveys the media or middles, in one of them comprehends the other two,<sup>1</sup> and according to each of these unfolds twofold sesquialter and sesquitercian ratios, and again cuts these into sesquioctaves and leimmas. In what follows likewise, he divides the one length into two, and the one figure of the soul into two periods. And, in short, he nowhere omits the monadic and at the same time dyadic, and this with the greatest

<sup>1</sup> And for *πρὸς πάντας μερισμὸν* here, also, read *πρὸς κ. λ.*

<sup>2</sup> i. e. In the geometric middle or proportion, which comprehends arithmetical and harmonical proportion. For if to any three numbers in arithmetical proportion, a fourth number is added, so as to produce geometrical proportion, then this proportion will comprehend both that which is arithmetical, and that which is harmonical. Thus if to the terms 1, 2, 3 a fourth term is added viz. 6, so that it may be 1 : 2 :: 3 : 6, then 1, 2 and 3 are in arithmetical, and 2, 3 and 6 in harmonic, proportion.

propriety. For the monadic alone pertains to intellect, on which account also intellect is impartible. But the dyadic pertains to body, whence in the generation of the corporeal-formed nature, Plato began from the duad, fire and earth, and arranged two other genera of elements between these. The soul, however, being a medium between intellect and body, is a monad and at the same time a duad. But the cause<sup>1</sup> of this is, that in a certain respect it equally participates of bound and infinity; just as intellect indeed, is allied to bound, but body rather pertains to infinity, on account of its subject matter, and divisibility ad infinitum. And if after this manner, some refer the impartible and the partible to the monad and indefinite duad, they speak conformably to things themselves; but if as making the soul to be number, in no respect differing from monadic numbers, they are very far from asserting that which happens to the essence of the soul. The soul, therefore, is a monad and at the same time a duad, adumbrating by the monadic, intellectual bound, but by the dyadic, infinity; or by the former, being the image, indeed, of the impartible, but by the latter being the paradigm of partible natures.

In addition to these things also, it is requisite to survey, how a two-fold work of the Demiurgus is here delivered. For he divides the soul into parts, harmonizes the divided parts, and renders them concordant with each other. But in effecting these things, he energizes at one and the same time Dionysiacally [i. e. Bacchically] and Apolloniacally. For to divide, and produce wholes into parts, and to preside over the distribution of forms, is Dionysiacal; but to perfect all things harmonically, is Apolloniacal. As the Demiurgus, therefore, comprehends in himself the cause of both these Gods, he both divides and harmonizes the soul. For the hebdomad is a number common to both these divinities, since theologists also say that Bacchus was divided into seven parts:

Into seven parts the Titans cut the boy.

And they refer the heptad to Apollo, as containing all symphonies. For the duple diapason first subsists in the monad, duad, and tetrad, of which numbers the hebdomad consists. Hence they call the God Hebdomagetes, or born on the seventh day, and assert that this day is sacred to him:

For on this day Latona bore<sup>2</sup> the God  
Who wears a golden sword.

Just as the sixth day is sacred to Diana. This number, indeed, in the same manner as the triad, is imparted to the soul from superior causes; the latter from intelligible, but the former from intellectual natures. And it is also imparted from these very divinities [Apollo and Bacchus], in order that by a division into

<sup>1</sup> For αἰδιον &c here, it is obviously necessary to read αἰριον &c.

<sup>2</sup> For χρυσαιρα γειρατο here, read χρυσαιρα γειρατο.

seven parts, the soul may have a signature of the Dionysiacal series, and of the fabulous laceration\* of Bacchus. For it is necessary that it should participate of the Dionysiacal intellect; and as Orpheus says, that bearing the God on its head, it should be divided conformably to him. But it possesses harmony in these parts, as a symbol of the Apolloniacal order. For in the lacerations of Bacchus, it is Apollo who collects and unites the distributed parts of Bacchus, according to the will of the father [Jupiter]. In these numbers also, the three middles are comprehended.<sup>1</sup> These therefore being three, adumbrate not only in the soul but every where, the three daughters of Themis. And the geometric middle, indeed, is the image of Eunomia.<sup>2</sup> Hence Plato in the Laws says, that she adorns politics, and disposes them in an orderly manner, and he likewise celebrates her as the judgment of Jupiter, adorning the universe, and comprehending the true political science. But the harmonic middle is an image of Dice or Justice, distributing a greater ratio to greater, but a less to lesser terms. This however is the work of justice. And the arithmetical middle is an image of Peace.<sup>3</sup> For it is this, as it is also said in the Laws, which imparts to all things the equal according to quantity, and makes people at peace with people. For the solid analogy [i. e. the triplicate proportion] prior to these, is sacred to their mother Themis, who comprehends the powers of all of them.<sup>4</sup> And thus much universally concerning these three middles.

These three middles<sup>5</sup> however, may be said in a way adapted to what has been before observed, to be the sources of union and connexion to the soul, or in other words, to be unions, analogies, and bonds. Hence also Timæus denominates them bonds. For prior to this, he had said, that the geometric middle is the most beautiful of bonds, and that the other middles are contained in this.<sup>6</sup> But every bond is a certain union. If therefore the middles are bonds, and bonds are the unions of the things that are bound, that which follows is evident. Hence these pervade through all the essence of the soul,<sup>7</sup> and render it one from many

<sup>1</sup> For *συνδυασμῶν* in this place, read *συνδυασμῶν*.

<sup>2</sup> *Viz.* in the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, the hebdomad, as Proclus observes, consisting of 1, 2, and 4. For 1, 2, and 3, are in arithmetical proportion. The numbers 2, 3, and 6, and also 3, 4, and 6, are in harmonical proportion. And the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 6, are in geometrical proportion.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *εὐνομία* here, it is necessary to read *Εὐνομία*.

<sup>4</sup> For triplicate, consists of geometrical proportion, and geometrical contains in itself, as we have before shown, the arithmetical, and the harmonical proportion; and therefore triplicate, or solid analogy, comprehends in itself the three middles.

<sup>5</sup> *Μεσότητες* is omitted in the original.

<sup>6</sup> For *ἐν ταύταις* here, it is obviously necessary to read *ἐν ταύταις*.

<sup>7</sup> The words *ψυχῇ οὐρανῷ* are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

wholes, as they are allotted a power of binding together things of a various nature. As however they are three, the geometric middle binds every thing that is essential in souls. For essence is one reason, proceeding through all things, and connecting first, middle, and last natures, just as in the geometric middle, one and the same ratio, pervades perfectly through the three terms [of which the proportion consists]. But the harmonic middle connects all the divided sameness of souls, imparting to the extremes a communion of reasons, and a kindred conjunction. And sameness, indeed, is seen in a greater degree in more total, but in a less degree in more partial natures. And the arithmetical middle binds the all-various diversity of the progression of the soul, and is less inherent in things which are greater, but more in such as are less, according to order. For difference has dominion in more partial, just as sameness has in more total and more excellent natures. And these two middles have something by which they communicate with each other, in the same manner as sameness and difference. As essence also is the monad of the latter, so the geometrical middle is the monad of the former. The geometric middle, therefore, is the union of the essences in all the 34 terms; the harmonic of the equally numerous samenesses; and the arithmetical, of the differences.\* Hence all these extend through all the terms, or how could a certain whole be produced from them, unless they were as much as possible united to each other? Essentially indeed, by the geometric middle, but in another and another way by the remaining two. On this account also the arithmetical and harmonic middles become the consummation of the geometric middle, in the same manner as sameness and difference, contribute to the perfection of essence. For because the arithmetical and harmonic middles subsist oppositely with reference to each other, the geometric middle connects and, as it were, weaves† together their dissension. For the harmonic middle indeed, distributes as we have said, greater ratios to greater terms, and less ratios to less terms; since it evinces that things which are essentially greater and more total, are also more comprehensive in power than such as are of an inferior nature. But vice versa, the arithmetical middle, distributes less ratios to greater terms, but greater ratios to less terms. For difference prevails more in inferior natures, just as sameness on the contrary, has greater authority in superior than in inferior natures. And the geometric middle extends the same ratio to all the terms; imparting by illumination union to first, middle, and last natures, through the presence of essence to all things.

The Demiurgus therefore imparts three connective unions to the soul, which Plato denominates middles, as binding together the middle order of wholes.

\* It is here necessary to supply the words *ὡς ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τῶν ἐτεροτήτων*.

† For *συνφάσκει* here, it is necessary to read *συνέφασκει*.

And of these, the geometric middle collects the multitude of essences, and causes essential progressions to be one: for one ratio is the image of union. But the harmonic middle, binds total samenesses, and the hyparxes of them into one communion. And the arithmetical middle, conjoins first, middle, and last differences. For, in short, difference is the mother of numbers, as we learn in the Parmenides. These three, however, viz. essence, sameness, and difference, are in each part of the soul, and it is requisite to conjoin all of them to each other through a medium and colligative reasons.

In the next place, we say that the soul is a plenitude of reasons, she being more simple than sensibles, but more composite than intelligibles. Hence Timaeus assumes seven ratios in the soul, viz. the ratios of equality, multiplicity, submultiplicity, the superparticular and superpartient ratios, and the opposites of these, the subsuperparticular, and subsuperpartient, but not the ratios which are compounded from these. For these are adapted to corporeal reasons, since they are composite and partible. The reasons in the soul, however, proceed indeed into multitude and partibility, yet together with multitude, they exhibit simplicity, and the uniform in conjunction with a distribution into parts. Hence they are not allotted an hypostasis in the monad, and the impartible, in the same manner as intellect. For intellect is alone monadic and impartible. Nor does the multitude of them proceed into composite reasons. And multiple ratio indeed is in one way only partible, viz. according to the *prologos*<sup>1</sup> or greater term: for the *hypologos*, or less term, is without division, and is not prevented from being unity. But the superparticular, is divisible in a twofold respect, viz. according to the *prologos* and *hypologos*; but is impartible according to difference.<sup>2</sup> And the superpartient is partible, both according to the *prologos* and *hypologos*, and according to difference.<sup>3</sup> So that the first of these, is divisible in one way only, the second bifariously, and the third trifariously. But equality is impartible. The soul therefore constitutes the universe by these ratios; the corporeal-formed nature indeed, by that which is trifariously partible; the nature of superficies by

<sup>1</sup> Thus for instance, 32 to 4 is a multiple ratio, which in its lowest terms, is that of 8 to 1. But 8 is divisible, and 1 accurately speaking is not. Proclus, therefore, in what he now says, speaks of multiple ratio when reduced to its lowest terms.

<sup>2</sup> Thus the superparticular ratio of 6 to 4, is in its lowest terms the ratio of 3 to 2, and both 3 and 2 are divisible. But this ratio according to the difference of the terms, is indivisible; for this difference is 1.

<sup>3</sup> Thus for instance, the superpartient ratio 3 to 5, which is superbipartient, being in its lowest terms, for this is the case with all superpartient ratios, is evidently partible, both according to the *prologos* and *hypologos*; and it is also partible according to the difference of the terms. For this difference is 2.

that which is bifariously partible; every linear nature, by that which is partible in one way only; and by the impartible the impartibility which comprehends all things. For there is something impartible in partible natures. These things, therefore, are truly asserted.

It is necessary however, to survey these after another manner; premising, that numbers which are more simple, and nearer to the monad, ought to be conceived as more primary than those which are more composite. For Plato also, having arranged one part prior to all the rest, refers all of them to this, and ends in terms which are especially composite and solid. Having therefore premised this, I say that equality and the ratio of equality, has the relation of a monad to all ratios. And what the monad is in quantity per se, that the equal is in relative quantity. Hence conformably to this, the soul introduces a common measure to all things which subsist according to the same reasons; which measure likewise, brings with it one idea the image of sameness. But according to the submultiple, and multiple ratio, it governs all the whole series of things, connectedly comprehending them, and exhibiting each total form of mundane natures frequently produced by itself in all mundane beings. Thus, for instance, it produces the solar, and also the lunar form, in divine souls, in demoniacal and human souls, in irrational animals, in plants, and in stones themselves, and adorns the most universal genera by the more partial series. And according to the superparticular and subsuperparticular ratios, it adorns such things as are wholes in their participants, and which are participated according to one certain thing contained in them. But according to the superpartient and subsuperpartient ratios, it adorns such things as are wholly participated by secondary natures, in conjunction with a division into multitude. For of animal indeed, man participates, and the whole of this form is in him, yet not alone, but the whole is in him according to one thing, viz. the human form; so that it is present to its participant with the whole, and one certain thing which is a part of it. But what are called common genera, participate of one genus, yet not of this alone, but together with this of many other genera also, which are parts, and not a part of that one genus. Thus, for instance, a mule participates of the species from which it has a co-mingled generation. Each species, therefore, either participates of one genus according to one, and thus imitates the superparticular ratio which contains the whole, and one part of the whole; or it participates that which is common and many things besides, and thus imitates the superpartient ratio, which together with the whole possesses also many parts of the whole. And besides these there is no other participation of

<sup>1</sup> *Υπερμερῆς* is omitted in the original.

species or forms. Looking also to these things, we may be able to assign the specific causes of those natures which subsist according to one form, as, for instance, of the sun, the moon, and man; as likewise of those that subsist according to many forms, together with that which is common. For there are many things of this kind in the earth, and in the sea; such as animals with a human face and the extremities resembling those of a fish, and animals in the form of dragons, but with a leonine face; these having an essence mingled from many things. All these ratios therefore, are very properly antecedently comprehended in the soul, as they define all the participations of forms in the universe. Nor can there be any other ratios of communion besides these, since all things receive a specific distinction according to these.

Again, therefore, the hebdomad of ratios corresponds to the hebdomad of parts. And the soul is wholly through the whole of itself hebdomadic, in its parts, in its ratios, and in its circles. For if the demiurgic intellect is a monad, but the soul primarily proceeds from intellect, it will have the ratio of the hebdomad to it. For the hebdomad is paternal and motherless. And perhaps equality imparts to all the psychical ratios, a communion of the equal, in order that all may communicate with all. But the multiple ratio affords an indication of the manner in which the ratios that are more single, measure those that are multitudinous, the former wholly proceeding through the whole of the latter; those that are impartible measuring those that are more distributed into parts. The superparticular however, and sub-superparticular ratios, indicate the difference according to which whole ratios do not communicate with whole, but have indeed a partial habitude, yet are conjoined according to one certain most principal part of themselves. And the superpartient and sub-superpartient ratios afford an indication of the last nature, according to which there is a certain partible and multiplied communion of the psychical ratios, on account of diminution and inferiority. For the more elevated of these reasons are united wholly to the whole of each other. But those of the middle rank are conjoined, not through the whole of themselves, but according to the highest part. And those of the third rank, partly coalesce according to multitudes. I say, for instance, essence communicates with all the ratios, measuring all their progressions: for nothing in them is unessential. But<sup>1</sup> sameness, being itself a genus, especially collects the summits of them into one communion. And difference particularly measures their divisions and progressions. The communion, therefore, of the psychical ratios, is every where<sup>2</sup> exhibited. For it is either all-perfect, or alone subsists according to the summits, or according to extensions into multitude.

<sup>1</sup> For  $\alpha\delta\epsilon$  here, it is necessary to read  $\eta\delta\epsilon$ .

<sup>2</sup> Instead of  $\pi\lambda\eta$  in this place, it is requisite to read  $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\chi\omega\upsilon$ .



Farther still, in the next place let us survey, how the seven parts<sup>1</sup> are allotted their hypostasis. The first part then, is most intellectual and the summit of the soul, conjoining it to *the one* itself, and to the hyparxis of the first essence. Hence also it is called *one*, as having the form of unity, and the number of it proceeding<sup>2</sup> into multitude, is detained by union. It is likewise analogous to the cause and centre of the soul. For the soul abides according to this, and does not depart from wholes. And the tetrad indeed, is in the first monads, on account of its stability, and rejoicing in equality and sameness. But the ogdoad is in the monads of the second order, on account of diminution, and the providence of the soul which extends as far as to the last of things, and that which is most material.<sup>3</sup> And the triad is in the monads of the third order, on account of the circumduction to the all-perfect of the multitude which it contains. And at the same time, it is evident from these things as from images, that the summit of the soul, though it has the form of unity, yet is not purely one, but this also is an united multitude. Just as the monad, is not indeed without multitude, yet at the same time is unity. But *the one* of the Gods is one alone. And *the one* of intellect is more one than multitude, though this also is multiplied. But *the one* of the soul is similarly one and multitude; just as the unity of the natures posterior to it, which are divisible about body, is more multitude than one. And *the one* of bodies, is not simply one, but the phantasm and image of unity. Hence the Elean guest, or stranger, says that every thing corporeal is broken in pieces, as having an adventitious unity, and never ceasing to be divided. But the second part multiplies the part prior to it, by generative progressions, which the duad indicates, and unfolds all the progressions of essence. Hence it is said to be double of the first, as imitating the indefinite duad, and the intelligible infinity. And the third part again converts all the soul to its principle; and it is the third of it which is convolved to the principles. This, therefore, is measured by the first part, as being filled with union from it; but is conjoined more partially to the second part. And on this account it is said to be triple of the first, but sesquialter of the second; being half contained indeed by the second, as not having an equal power with it, but perfectly by the first. But again, the fourth part, and besides this the fifth, evince that the soul peculiarly presides over secondary natures. For these parts are the intellectual causes of the incorporeals which are divided about bodies, as they are planes and squares; the former being the square of the second, and the latter of the third part. And the fourth part, indeed, is

<sup>1</sup> These seven parts are the numbers 1. 2. 3. 4. 9. 8. 27.

<sup>2</sup> *προερχομενος* is omitted in the original.

<sup>3</sup> For *αποταρον* here, I read *ενυλοταρον*.

the cause of progression and generation, but the fifth, of conversion and perfection. For both are planes; but one is from the second part, subsisting twice from it, and the other from the third part, thrice proceeding from it.<sup>1</sup> And it seems, that the former of these planes, is imitative<sup>2</sup> of the generative natures which are divisible about bodies; but that the latter is imitative of intellectual conversions.<sup>3</sup> For all knowledge converts that which knows to the thing known; just as every nature wishes to generate, and to make a progression to that which is inferior. And the sixth and seventh parts, contain in themselves, the primordial causes of bodies and solid masses: for these numbers are solids. And the former of them, indeed, is from the second, but the latter from the third part. But Plato in what he says converting the last to the first parts, and the terminations of the soul to its summit, places one part as octuple, but the other as twenty seven times the first. And thus the essence of the soul consists of seven parts as abiding, proceeding, and returning, and as the cause of the progression and regression of the essences divisible about bodies, and of bodies themselves. If, also, you are willing so to speak, because the soul is allotted an hypostasis between impartibles and partibles, she imitates the former through the triad of the terms, but antecedently assumes the latter from the tetrad. But the whole of her consists of all the terms, because the whole of her is the centre of wholes. It is possible also to divide these parts according to the duple order, if you assume the summit of the soul, and consider the permanency, progression, and regression<sup>4</sup> of it, and also the conversion to it of things proximately posterior to it, and the last subjection of solids, or rather the diminution of the cause of them, according to the duple ratio. For you will find that the whole of this co-ordination pertains to the prolific duad. But again the regression of itself to itself, and of the natures proximately posterior to it, and of those that rank in the third degree from it, to the uniform and collective essence of wholes, subsist according to the triple order. The arithmetical therefore and harmonic middles, give completion to these intervals, which are essential, and surveyed according to existence itself; some of them as we have said, binding their samenesses, but others their differences.

Farther still you may also say, in a way more proximate to the things themselves, that the soul according to one part is united to the natures prior to it, and

<sup>1</sup> The third part is 3, and 9 is equal to 3 + 3 + 3.

<sup>2</sup> For γοινητικη here, it is necessary to read μιμητικη.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of γοινητικη δε ορως ειδων την προδου μιμουμενων της ψυχης επιστρεπτικον in this place, it is necessary to read conformably to the version of Thomæus, η δε των ισερων επιστροφων γοινητικη, except that herealso for γοινητικη, it is requisite to read μιμητικη.

<sup>4</sup> There is an omission here in the original, of δε επιστροφην.

this part is the summit of the soul; but according to the duple and triple part, it proceeds from intellect, and returns to it; and according to the double of the double, and the triple of the triple, it proceeds from itself, and again returns to itself, and through itself as a medium, to the principles of itself. For through being filled from these principles it is prolific of secondary natures. And as indeed, the progression from itself is suspended from the natures prior to itself, thus also the conversion or regression to itself is suspended from the regression of the beings that are prior to it. But the last parts, according to which it constitutes the natures posterior to itself, are referred to the first part; in order that a circle without a beginning may be unfolded to the view, the end being conjoined to the beginning, and that the universe may become animated, and at the same time endued with intellect, the solid numbers being co-arranged with the first part. Moreover, he says that from these middles, sesquialter and sesquitercian ratios, and also sesquioctaves, become apparent. What else, therefore, does he intend to indicate by these things, than the more partial difference of the psychical ratios? And the sesquialter ratios indeed present us with an image of partible communion, but according to the first of the parts. The sesquitercian ratios, of partible communion according to the middle terms. And the sesquioctaves of this communion, according to the last terms. Hence also, the middles or proportions are conjoined to each other, according to the sesquioctave ratio. For as being surveyed according to opposite genera, they have the smallest communion; but they are appropriately conjoined to both extremes.

Timæus also adds, that all the sesquitercian ratios are filled by the interval of the sesquioctave, in conjunction with the leimma; indicating that the terminations of all these ratios, end in more partial hypostases, in consequence of the soul comprehending the causes of the last and perfectly partible essences in the world, and pre-establishing in itself, the principles of the order and harmony of them, according to the demiurgic will. The soul therefore, possesses the principles of harmonious progression and regression, and of the division into things first, middle and last; and is one intellectual reason or ratio, receiving its completion from all ratios. And again, that all the harmony of the soul, consists of a quadruple diapason, diapente and tone, is consonant to these things. For since

<sup>1</sup> According to the version of Thomæus, there is an omission here in the original, of the words *κατὰ δὲ τὴν διπλασίαν καὶ τριπλασίαν, ἀπὸ τοῦ γού προεῖσι, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπιστρέφει*. Indeed the sense requires this addition.

<sup>2</sup> For *μονομῶς* in this place, it is necessary to read *γούμῶς*.

<sup>3</sup> The words *οὕτως ἡ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπιστροφή*, which are omitted in the original, ought to be inserted, conformably to the version of Thomæus.

there is harmony in the world, and also in intellect and in soul, on which account Timæus says, that the soul participates of harmony, and is harmony,—hence the world participates of harmony decadically, but the soul tetradically, and harmony pre-exists in intellect monadically. And as the monad is the cause of the tetrad, but the tetrad of the decad, thus also, the intellectual harmony, is the supplier of the psychical, and the psychical of sensible harmony. Hence Timæus conceived that the quadruple diapason, is adapted to the harmony of the soul. For the soul is the proximate paradigm of the harmony in the sensible world. Since however, five<sup>1</sup> figures and five centres in the universe, give completion to the whole, the harmony diapente also, imparts to the world the symphony which is in its parts. Since, likewise, the universe is divided into nine parts, the sesquioctave produces the communion of the soul with the world. And here you may see that the soul comprehends the world, and makes it to be a whole, according to cause,<sup>2</sup> as one, as consisting of four, and also of five parts, and as divided into nine parts, harmonizing and causally comprehending the whole of it. For the monad, the tetrad, the pentad, and the ennead,<sup>3</sup> procure for us the whole number, according to which all the parts of the world are divided. Hence the ancients assert that the Muses and Apollo Musagetes, preside over the universe; the latter supplying the one union of all its harmony; but the former connecting the divided progression of this harmony, and rendering their number concordant with the eight Syrens mentioned in the Republic. Thus therefore, in the middle of the monad and the ennead, the universe is adorned tetradically and pentadically; tetradically indeed, according to the four ideas of animals, which the paradigm comprehends; but pentadically, according to the five figures, through which the Demiurgus distributed all things, himself, as Timæus says, introducing the fifth idea, and arranging this harmonically in the universe.

Again therefore from the beginning, we may say, that the Demiurgus having twofold powers, the one being effective of sameness, as we learn in the Parmenides, but the other, of difference; he both divides and binds the soul. He is also the final cause of these, in order that the soul may become the middle of wholes, being similarly united and divided, two things existing prior to it, divine natures as unities, and beings as things united; and two also being posterior to

<sup>1</sup> For *πεντα* here read *πεντε*. These five figures are the five regular bodies, viz. the dodecahedron, the pyramid, the octahedron, the icosahedron, and the cube. But the five centres are the northern, southern, eastern, and western centres, and the centre of the universe.

<sup>2</sup> From the version of Thomæus, it is necessary to insert in this place the words, *η δυνχη τον κοσμον περιχευει, και ολον καθ' αυταν ποσει*, which are wanting in the original.

<sup>3</sup> For *εννα* here, read *εννεα*.

it, viz. those which are divided in conjunction with others,<sup>1</sup> and those which are in every respect partible, or if you are willing prior to the former, *the one itself*, but posterior to the latter, matter itself. [But the efficient causes of these divisions and bonds, are *same* and *different*, which are the peculiarities of the demiurgic order. And the paradigmatic causes are the sections and bonds of the father. For he<sup>2</sup> first cuts, and binds with ineffable bonds. *These things also, are obscurely indicated by theologists when they speak of the Saturnian sections and bonds with which the maker of the universe is said to surround himself*, and which are mentioned by Socrates in the Cratylus. But the formal causes of the divisions indeed, are the numbers. For according to these the parts are distinguished. But of the bonds, the middles, and the ratios which give completion to these, are the formal causes. For it is impossible to survey concauses which have the relation of matter, in souls which are incorporeal.]<sup>3</sup> These things being premised, it is evident that the Demiurgus energizing with twofold powers, viz. with such as are of a dividing, and such as are of a binding nature, he divides the triformed essence of the soul, and the threefold mixture, the whole remaining that which it is, by the primordial causes of all division, and makes the whole of it to consist of seven parts, and seven members, comprehended in intellectual boundaries. For since the Demiurgus constituted the soul as the medium between an impartible essence, and that essence which is divisible about bodies; but the impartible essence is triple, abiding, proceeding, and returning;—he pre-established the similitude of this in three parts. And he adumbrated indeed, the permanency<sup>4</sup> of this essence by the first part; but the progression of it by the second; on which account, perhaps, it is said to be double of the first part. For every thing which proceeds, has permanency pre-existent to its progression. And he adumbrated its regression by the third part. Hence this part is triple of the first. For every thing which returns, has proceeded and been permanent.

Since, however, the soul produces the essence posterior to itself, it contains the total<sup>5</sup> essences of it in itself; the whole of the incorporeal essence indeed, but which is inseparable from bodies, according to the fourth and fifth part; but the

<sup>1</sup> The words *per' άλλων* are omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted conformably to the version of Thomæus.

<sup>2</sup> For *εκείνων* here, read *εκείνος*. The Chaldean Oracles also say that the Demiurgus glitters with intellectual sections.

<sup>3</sup> All this part within the brackets, is omitted in the version of Thomæus, with whom such omissions are not unfrequent.

<sup>4</sup> For *μονιμον* here, it is necessary to read *μονιμοι*.

<sup>5</sup> Instead of *ολης* here, read *ολας*.

whole of the corporeal essence, according to the solid numbers, viz. the sixth and seventh part. Or [it may be said] that the soul being self-subsistent, and self-energetic, produces itself and converts itself to its principle, according to the square numbers; but all the partible essence posterior to itself according to the cubes. These seven parts therefore, being divided as we have said, into three and four, the one ratio of geometric analogy, binds them essentially; but the harmonic middle, binds them according to sameness; and the arithmetical according to difference. These parts however are inserted between the geometric middle, and are said to give completion to the double and triple intervals;<sup>1</sup> because all sameness and all difference, are uniformly comprehended by essence, and the harmony which subsists according to it. But from these middles, the multitude of sesquialter and sesquitercian ratios, and sesquioctaves, becomes apparent; this multitude indeed, being of a binding and connecting nature, in the same manner as the middles, but more partially. For these indeed, are certain ratios; but each of the middles consists of many ratios, which are either the same or different. As analogy therefore, or proportion, is more comprehensive than ratio, thus also the above-mentioned middles, afford a greater cause to the soul, of connectedly containing the multitude which is in it, since they intellectually pervade<sup>2</sup> through the whole of it. Hence the sesquialter, and sesquitercian ratios, are certain more partial bonds, and are comprehended in the middles; not according to different habitudes of them with reference to the extremes; for this is mathematical; but according to causal comprehension, and a more total hypostasis.

Again, these bonds, contain the second and third progressions of the ratios; the sesquialter indeed, constringing the harmony of the ratios, through the five centres; but the sesquitercian exhibiting their power, through the four elements which are every where; and rendering all things intelligible and allied to each other; and the sesquioctaves co-harmonizing the division into 9 and 8. Hence, as the world consists of eight parts, and also of nine, the ancients, at one time establish eight Syrens, and at another nine Muses, as presiding over the universe, since the harmony of the whole of things proceeds from these. The sesquitercian therefore, and sesquialter ratios, are more total than the sesquioctaves, because they are the suppliers of a more perfect symphony, and antecedently comprehend in less numbers, the harmonious section of the world. Here therefore, the divisions are separated from each other in their participants; but in the incorporeal reasons

<sup>1</sup> The seven terms 1. 2. 3. 4. 9. 8. 27, are said by Proclus to be inserted between the geometric middle, because 1. 2. 4. 8, and also 3. 9. 27, are in geometric proportion.

<sup>2</sup> For *διεκοῦσαν* here, read *διηκούσαν*.

of the soul, the more total contain the more partial. Since, however, the sesquioc-taves are the causes of the most partial symphony, that which is posterior to them is not undeservedly said to be impelled into the last order of the universe. Not that even this is dissonant to the whole itself, since it compels the partial effluxions from each of the elements, into the place under the earth. For as the elements exist in many places, in the heavens, and in the sublunary region, this leimma collects the last dregs of them there, and conjoins them to wholes; so that both together may give completion to the whole harmony of the universe. In short, therefore, the soul is the cause<sup>1</sup> of all the harmony in the centres, and in the elements of the universe. Hence also we say, that the harmony of it is entirely intellectual and essential, causally preceding sensible harmony. And Timæus wishing to indicate this through images,<sup>2</sup> employs harmonic ratios, and pre-supposes in the soul some causes more comprehensive than others, and which subsist prior to every form of the soul and to all its knowledge. Hence I think it is not proper to discuss any thing of this kind, so as to explain [in a merely mathematical way] either the parts, or the ratios, or the analogies; but it is requisite to survey all these essentially, according to the first division itself, and harmony of the soul. It is also necessary to refer all things to the demiurgic and intellectual cause; but to comprehend the sesquioc-taves and leimmas in the sesquitercian and sesquialter ratios; these in the middles; and these in one of them which is the most principal of all; and likewise to reduce the more partial to the more total causes, and survey them divided from them. And thus much concerning the harmonic ratios. But again adducing the text from the beginning, let us endeavour to discuss it more clearly.

“He first took one part from the whole. In the next place he took away the double of this. And after this, a third part, which was sesquialter indeed of the second, but triple of the first.”

We have before observed, that it is not proper to understand what is here said by Plato, mathematically, but physically, or philosophically. For the essence of the soul, does not consist of mathematical numbers and ratios, but all these numbers and ratios, adumbrate its truly<sup>3</sup> existing essence, and the demiurgic and vivific divisions in it. But of what things the mathematical ratios are images,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The words *η ψυχῇ αὐτῇ ἐστὶ*, are omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For *εικόνες* here, it is necessary to read *εἰκονοί*.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *οὐτως* in this place, it is requisite to read *οὕτως*.

<sup>4</sup> For *εἰκονοί* here, it is necessary to read *εἰκονες*.

and how they develop the essence of the soul of the universe, it is not easy for those to assign, who do not look to the conceptions of Plato. But this is manifest from the discord of the interpreters; and the opposition of the modern to the more ancient expositors, evinces the difficulty of this theory. For some of them think fit to refer to the seven spheres, the first seven terms, to which we have assumed as analogous the numbers that exhibit the whole diagram. But others refer them to the distances of the spheres from the centre of the earth, in which place they arrange the monad. Others again, refer them to the motions of the spheres. [Others, to the magnitudes of the stars. And others adapt them to the velocities of the celestial orbs.] But others, refer them to other such like explanations. Their interpretations however, are attended with many difficulties, and among the rest with this, that they are discordant with the observations of recent astronomers, and to the demonstrations given by them. To which also may be added, that Plato no where defines, either the magnitude, or the distance, or the swiftness, or the motion of the stars; but admitting that one star is greater than another, he does not add how much, and after what manner, it is greater. And that the thing proposed by him to be discussed in this part, is psychogony, and not cosmogony. For though it is requisite to effect the same things, in a certain respect, in the soul, and in the world; yet it is proper first<sup>1</sup> to survey the powers in the soul itself, and the reasons of the things which are effected external to it. But their explanation of the terms or numbers given by Plato, is especially contrary to them. For in the terms, that which has the fifth order, is greater than the sixth, as for instance, 9 than 8.<sup>2</sup> In what they say, however, the fifth magnitude, or interval, or whatever they wish to call it, is entirely less than the sixth. Their expositions, therefore, do not accord with the Platonic terms.

After these, there is another tribe of interpreters, who give a more important explanation of these particulars. For Amelius not adopting the opinion,—which he says was that of Plotinus, was delivered by him, in his unwritten or oral conferences, and has been sufficiently confuted by those posterior to him,<sup>3</sup>—endeavours to explain these terms after another manner. For since the soul is comprehensive of all mundane natures, as for instance of Gods, demons, and men; he says, that in one way it comprehends according to the monad, every mundane

<sup>1</sup> The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, and are inserted from the version of Leonicius Thomæus.

<sup>2</sup> For *πυτερον* here, read *πυτερον*.

<sup>3</sup> For *εκατος* here, it is necessary to read *οτατος*.

<sup>4</sup> The beginning of this sentence is wanting in the original, but is supplied from the version of Thomæus.



genus of Gods; nor must we wonder, if the soul should be said to be comprehensive of Gods. This opinion, therefore, some one of those posterior to Amelius refer to him. For God is multifariously predicated, since not only the super-essential and intellect are called Gods, but likewise divine souls, and divine bodies. He is therefore of opinion, that the soul of the universe comprehends according to its unity the divine number; but according to its duad and triad, the daemoniacal genus. For since dæmons are suspended from the Gods, and preside over us, this soul, according to the duad, excites the providence of them; but perfects, according to the triad, the conversion of them to the Gods. For, as we have said, the habitude of them is twofold, because they are between the Gods and us. But according to the tetrad and ennead, it providentially attends to all human life. For this also is twofold, being divided into the better and the worse. And by the ennead indeed, it adorns the more excellent, but by the tetrad arranges the subordinate life. Lastly, by the octad and the number twenty-seven, it proceeds to every thing, and as far as to the last of things, and perfects tame animals by the odd, but savage animals by the even number. For it adorns each thing by appropriate powers; subordinate natures, every where by even numbers, but more venerable and powerful natures, and which in a greater degree are allied to the Gods, by odd numbers.

Porphyry, however, after a certain admirable manner, (though these things have been before related) evinces by many arguments, that the soul is harmonized, and that it fills the whole world with harmony. But he infers this from the soul being a multitude. Being however a multitude, it is either without arrangement, or is harmonized. But it is true to assert the latter of it, and not the former. For being the fabrication of intellect, how can it be inordinate, and unharmonized? He also infers it from this, that the soul conducts every thing in the world by harmonic reasons, and refers the generation of animals, and the one co-ordination of them, to the universe. What, however, these reasons are, which are seen to subsist in the very hypostasis of the soul, he neither teaches, nor thinks them deserving of attention; but says that the essence of the soul possesses in itself harmonic reasons, not as the images of some things, and the principles of others, but as binding together the multitude of powers it contains. For if it is in reality not only impartible, but also partible, it is not only necessary that its essence should be one, but likewise that it should be multitudinous. But if multitudinous it must either be innumerable, or numerable. It is impossible, however, that it should be innumerable. For an innumerable multitude is inordinate. It is therefore numerable. But if numerable, it either consists of unharmonized or of harmonized parts. It is however impossible that it should consist of unhar-

monized parts: for it has not any thing of this kind naturally. It therefore entirely consists of harmonized parts; but if of harmonized parts it must necessarily subsist according to the most excellent harmony, since it is the first of things harmonized. The most excellent harmony however, is that which is according to the diatonic genus: for this is venerable, abundant, and grand. Hence, the soul is entirely harmonized conformably to this; so that its essence will consist of parts harmonized according to the diatonic genus. These things, however, being true, nothing prevents the harmonic ratios from being at the same time images of certain divine things; just as the body of this soul is indeed spherical; yet through its sphericity, is said to be an imitation of intellect, and these things accord with each other. And thus far Porphyry, who, in what he here says, affords us an occasion of collecting something true concerning the soul.

But the divine Iamblichus celebrates these numbers with all his power, as exhibiting certain admirable peculiarities. And he calls indeed the monad, the cause of sameness and union; the duad, the supplier of progression and separation; and the triad, the leader of the regression of the things that have proceeded. He also says, that the tetrad is truly all-harmonic, containing all ratios in itself, and unfolding in itself the second orderly distribution of things; and that the ennead is effective of true perfection and similitude, being perfect from perfect numbers, and participating of the nature of sameness. But he calls the ogdoad, the cause of universal progression, and of pervading through all things. Lastly, he says, that the number twenty-seven is effective of the regression of the last of things to the first, in order that on each side of the tetrad, there may be permanency, progression, and regression, there primarily, but here secondarily. For the ennead has an alliance to the monad, being *a new one* (*εὖ νέον ὅσταν*); but the ogdoad to the duad, being the cube of it; and the number twenty-seven, to the triad, through a similar cause. Through the former numbers therefore, the soul imparts to more simple natures, permanencies, progressions, and regressions, but through the latter it imparts these to more composite natures. But the tetrad being the middle, because indeed, it is a square, has permanency; but because it is evenly-even, has progression; and because it is filled with all ratios from the monad, has regression. These, however, are symbols of divine and arcane things.

After this explanation, which is thus admirable, the philosopher Theodorus, proceeding in a certain path peculiar to himself, says, that the soul is the third principle after the one principle of all things, one soul being total, another universal, and another the soul of this universe. He also says, that the first of these is indivisible, the second divisible, and that the third possesses all-various divisions. Since therefore, there is a triple difference of soul, that which is soul itself

and is fontal, subsists between the impartible and partible essence; of which the former is universal intellect, but the latter is divisible into atoms. Hence the first soul is the medium between these, as subsisting from both which are prior to it, and becoming one whole from the three middle genera. But the second, and which is universal soul, is divided into parts, and is harmonized. For the first soul, abiding wholly in itself, a division is produced, which is a progression from the soul that is a whole prior to parts, into the soul that consists of parts. And the third soul is that which is fabricated through right lines and circles. For in this the division manifests a diminution from that soul which is a whole prior to parts. Hence he divides the whole of this discussion concerning the psychogony into three parts, conformably to the three souls that have been mentioned; one subsisting according to the mingling, another according to the harmonizing, and another according to the forming energy of intellect. Having therefore, made this division of the psychogony and souls, he considers the distribution into parts, and the seven terms, as alone pertaining to the universal soul. Referring likewise these terms to the division of the universal soul, he thinks it necessary that celestial natures should be produced by this soul from the duple, but sublunary natures from the triple order. For he distributes appropriate numbers to each of the elements, to earth indeed 7, to fire 11, to water 9, and to air 13. For the geometrical proportion, which is 1, 2, 4 [and the sum of the terms of which is 7] pertains to earth; perhaps indeed on account of the name; and perhaps also, because as earth contains the remaining elements, so the geometric comprehends the other middles. But the arithmetical proportion which pertains to water, is 2, 3, 4; through 2 communicating with earth, and because likewise, it is especially friendly to multitude, and consists of an element which is the most multitudinous of all others, viz. the icosaedron. And the harmonical proportion, which pertains to air, is 3, 4, 6; because this communicates with the arithmetical, according to two of its terms 3 and 4, which are the greater in the former, but the less terms in the latter, proportion. Since, however, the harmonic middle is twofold, consisting either in the duple ratio of the extremes, or in the triple ratio; for Plato assumes it as the middle of either duple or triple terms;—hence, making the extremes to be 3 and 6, according to the double of the extremes, [i. e. according to a duple ratio] he obtains the peculiar element of the air, viz. the octaedron, which has 6 according to the angles, but 4 according to the base of the two pyramids, and 3 according to the superficies of the octaedron, which is trigonic. But according to the other harmonic middle, which is 2, 3, 6, he obtains the element of fire; because these according to the two terms 3 and 6 communicate with the terms prior to them [3, 4, 6], which are there the extremes, but are here the

greater terms ; and moreover, because the element of fire has 6 sides, but twice the tetrad, in its angles and superficies, and a triangular base. Very properly, therefore, does 7 pertain to earth, 9 to water, 13 to air, but 11 to fire ; the ratios being assumed in the above-mentioned numbers, from which they are produced. For 7 consists of 1. 2. and 4 ; 9, of 2. 3. and 4 ; 13, of 3. 4. and 6 ; and 11, of 2. 3. and 6 ; each having two terms in common with the number next to it, just as the elements have two sides in common. From the composition however of these, a triple order is effected. And of the middle terms of the proportions proximate to each other, the one is greater than the other, which is also the case with the extremes, as is evident in earth and water, and in fire and air,<sup>1</sup> as is evident in the given terms. Again, he attributes the number 15 to celestial natures ; the monad indeed, to the circle of *same*, but the double hebdomad to the circle of *different*, on account of the twofold circulation of each, viz. of the spheres themselves, and the stars contained in them, which are seven, the spheres being also seven. These things, however, which are mathematically asserted, bring with them a certain not inelegant theory. But how they are assimilated to the things which are now discussed, and how they may be Pythagorically interpreted, is not at all noticed by Theodorus, in such a way as to be able to satisfy him who does not negligently attend to what Plato says. All these particulars are indeed elegantly invented, but he refers the analysis of the Platonic diagram to monadic numbers, not looking to the ratios resulting from them, so as to assume every thing, viz. the middles, the sesquialter and sesquitercian ratios, the sesquioctaves and leimmas ; it being by no means possible to discover these in the first numbers, which he employs in the above-mentioned distributions, into the elements and the heavens.

After these, therefore, let us survey another mode of discussion, which is adopted by our preceptor, is generative not of one only, but of many and admirable conceptions, and which we also made use of before. He says then, that each of these things may be considered in a twofold respect, in the whole soul of the universe as one, according to union, and in the many ratios, and in the multitude contained in it, according to division. For the soul is both one and multitude, one reason, and the number of all-various forms, and imitates the demiurgic wholeness, and the separation of the powers of the father. In the first place, therefore, we must understand what it is according to the whole of itself, abiding, and pro-

<sup>1</sup> Thus in the numbers 1. 2. 4, which pertain to earth, and in 2. 3. 4, which pertain to water, the middle term 3 is greater than the middle term 2, and thus is also the case in the numbers 3. 4. 6, and 2. 3. 6, the former of which pertain to air, and the latter to fire. In the extremes also, the extreme 2 is greater than 1, and the extreme 3, than 2.

ceeding in itself, and returning to itself, and also providentially attending in one way to the immaterial and pure forms of mundane natures, but in another to all bodies, and the partible essence. Understanding this likewise, we must say, that it abides according to the one or first part; but proceeds according to the second, the progression being conceived to be divine, and not according to passion or imbecility; and that it returns according to the third part. For the perfective accedes to beings from this. But being all-perfect, and established<sup>1</sup> in intelligibles, and abiding eternally in intellect, it also providentially attends to secondary natures. And in one way indeed, it providentially inspects the natures that are proximately suspended from it, but in another, solid masses themselves. It likewise attends to each of these in a two-fold respect. For the natures which proximately participate of it proceed from, and return to it; proceeding indeed, according to the prolific power of the fourth part, but returning to their one cause, according to the re-elevating power of the fifth part. We may also survey these solid numbers in corporeal masses; which proceed indeed, according to the octuple of the first part, this number being dyadic and solid, and at one and the same time prolific, and capable of proceeding to all things; but they return according to the number twenty-seven, this being a solid conversion, as triadic, and as pertaining to the nature of sameness. For such is the odd number. Hence, there are three progressions, and three regressions, about the one and united permanency of the soul. Hence too, there are three even and three odd numbers, proceeding from the monad, and complicated with each other; because the soul itself also proceeds, and returns. And proceeding indeed, it produces the first receptacles of itself, and that which is primarily invested with figure. Producing it also, it imparts interval to it and bulk. But in its regression to itself, it causes it to be spherical, and on this account causing it to be a thing of this kind, it produces the world in it; effecting the progression of it according to the even<sup>2</sup> number, but the regression according to the odd number, and both these cubically, because it is the generation and regression of solids. The progression therefore, and regression are triple; the first being unfigured, the second accompanied with figure primarily, and the<sup>3</sup> third secondarily; but all these as in numbers.

In the next place, we must pursue the theory, conformably to the multitude which is in the soul, and say that the ratios in it are comprehensive of ratios,

<sup>1</sup> For *ενδρμημενην* here, read *ενδρμημενην*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αριως* in this place, read *αριακως*.

<sup>3</sup> It is necessary here to supply the words *πρωτως, η δε*.

And some of them indeed, are divided in it, after the manner of wholes, but others after the manner of parts.<sup>1</sup> And some are total, others generic, others specific, and others partial. The total indeed, are such as the ratios of the middles; but the generic, are those which are found in the duple, or triple terms; and the specific, are those which are under these.<sup>2</sup> For each of them has a multifarious subsistence. But the partial ratios are those of the sesquioctaves and leimmas, into which, as parts, all the sesquialter and sesquitercian ratios are divided. We must also say, that the soul contains the one union of the ratios, through the essential monad; but the division of the ratios, through the progression of the duad; and the comprehension of them,<sup>3</sup> through the multiple terms. For these are comprehensive of the super-particular ratios, and have an essence more total than these ratios; just as the super-particulars comprehend the sesquioctaves and leimmas; the former having the relation of species, but the latter being arranged in the order of parts. For to make the geometrical proportion alone comprehensive of the other two middles, in the first place, causes the whole essence of the soul to be as it were demiurgic geometry. For elsewhere, Plato calls this analogy the judgment of Jupiter. In the next place, it shows that these two middles, when surveyed with the geometric middle, and comprehended in it, dispose wholes in an orderly manner according to justice; but that when separated from it, they are the causes of confusion and injustice. For a distribution of the equal to things unequal, is entirely unjust; as is also, the conjunction of contraries to each other, without a certain geometrical equality. Hence the harmonic middle is in want of the geometric analogy, in order that it may bring together contraries elegantly, just as Plato did, in harmonizing fire and earth, through the two elements [of air and water]. The arithmetical middle likewise, energizing together with this, possesses rectitude in its operations. For thus the unequal in unequal things is equal.<sup>4</sup> Distributing therefore equals to unequals, it preserves the peculiarity of itself, and exhibits distribution according to desert, which is the prerogative of the geometric middle.

Farther still, we must say, that the soul imitates the first principles of things.

<sup>1</sup> For *μερη* here, it is obviously necessary to read *μερων*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. They are the hypologi, which have been before explained.

<sup>3</sup> Between *δια* and *πολλαπλασιων* here in the original, it is necessary to insert, conformably to the version of Thomæus, the words *της δυαδος προουδου, η δε των λογων περιοχη δια, κ. λ.*

<sup>4</sup> Thus in the terms 1. 2. 3. 6, which are in geometric proportion, the terms 1. 2. 3 also being in arithmetic proportion, the difference is unequal between the terms 2 and 3, and the terms 3 and 6, and also between the terms 1 and 2, and 3 and 6, but the ratio is equal; and therefore, by the union of the arithmetic with the geometric middle, the unequal in unequal numbers is equalized.

Through the first part indeed, the one cause of wholes; through the duple progression, the bifurmed principles after *the one*; through the even and odd numbers, the male and female of the Gods; through the triadic division of each, the intelligible triads; and through the hebdomad of terms, the unical and intellectual hebdomad. Through the first part also the soul makes<sup>1</sup> the world to be a self-perfect God; through the dyadic it exhibits the multitude and variety in it; through the division of even and odd numbers, it divides the whole of the male and female, from the Gods themselves as far as to plants; according to the duad and triad indeed, the male and female in the Gods, but according to the tetrad and ennead, those which are in the genera superior to us; and according to the two cubes, [8 and 27] the male and female which proceed as far as to the terrestrial and ultimate<sup>2</sup> species of life. But through the heptad of terms, it connects and guards all things, provides for them intellectually, and orderly disposes wholes in a becoming manner, stably and invariably. It likewise through this, adorns the parts of these, and the parts of the parts, and whatever there may be among the last of things, which is of itself irrational, and as it were the leimma of the fabrication of the world. Hence conformably to these conceptions, we may be able to interpret the several words of Plato, and looking to these we may dissolve many doubts. Let us therefore from the beginning refer the words of Plato severally to these, according to the explications of our preceptor.

In the first place therefore, not to say that the Demiurgus inserted the parts in the soul, but that he took them away from it as being already<sup>3</sup> in it, and that having taken them away, he again gave completion to the essence of the soul from them, indicates to us, that this mixture is not as it were the subject of the soul, nor as the matter of it, or that it is similar to that which is invested with figure, and receives this figure from the artist; but that being a form, it is the plenitude of forms; so that the indefiniteness and the matter, which are said by the more recent interpreters to be in intelligibles, have no place in the present theory. Secondly, to co-arrange all the other parts, viz. the terms, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8 and 27 with reference to the first part, ascribes the principal dignity to the monad, and does not permit us to conceive it to be such a thing, as the multitude fancy the monad to be, viz. that which is the least in quantity, and having the relation of matter to number, but leads us to consider it as the ruling principle of all the essence of the soul, as the root of the powers contained in it, and the Vesta of the

<sup>1</sup> For καλεῖ here, it is necessary to read ποιεῖ.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of χθονίων in this place, as χερσαίων is just before it, I conceive it to be obviously necessary to read ἐσχατών.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of ἦδ'εἰ here, it is necessary to read ἦδη.

number which gives completion to it. In the next place, does not the expression *the double of the first part*, accord with what has been said by us? For the double is entirely formed by the duad, and is inferior to the hyparxis which is characterized by unity. It also proceeds into multitude, being increased in quantity, but diminished in power. Such also is the mode of the psychical progression. For the soul abiding according to the most divine part of itself, and as Orpheus says, establishing its head in intellect, it proceeds from thence, according to the duad in itself, proceeding into itself, and generating the multitude of reasons, and all-various forms which it contains. Having proceeded however, it again returns to its principle, thus producing a certain essential circle. Through this regression likewise, it is conjoined to the prolific power in itself, according to which it produced itself, and to the monad which establishes it, and causes it to be one. For the perfective and convertive power, is conjoined to both, viz. to the prolific and to the one-making cause. And if it be requisite to speak concisely, as life proceeds from being, but intellect is conjoined to life, and to being, thus also the progression of the soul, is from the prolific cause, but its regression is to both causes; in a sesquialter manner indeed to the cause which is [immediately] above it; but triply to the cause which is beyond this. For it is fit that the convertive or regressive form should pursue the whole [of that to which it returns] and diminish division, which the sesquialter imparts. For the double being vanquished through the whole of itself by the duad, the sesquialter is indeed analogous to it, but diminishes the ratio of subjection.<sup>1</sup>

Farther still, it is evident that the triple exhibits the third interval in that which returns from the abiding principle. To which may be added, that the triad being the first number, and primarily a whole, having a beginning, middle and end, is assimilated to the monad, which comprehends all multitude unically. Through this therefore, Plato shows, that the subject of the soul consisting of three wholes, is again triple. For he divides it into the abiding, proceeding, and returning, according to the division of the divine genera. For in them also there is a triple genera, one of which abides, another proceeds, and another is converted, or returns to its principle. And one indeed is the cause of sameness, stable power, and essence; another, is the primary leader of generations, progressions, and multiplications; and another, is perfective, and the cause of the elevation of secondary to primary natures. But through the words that follow, he shows how

<sup>1</sup> Thus 2 to 1 is a duple, and 3 to 2 is a sesquialter ratio. But the latter is analogous to the former: for  $2 : 1 :: 3 : \frac{1}{2}$ . The sesquialter however diminishes the ratio of subjection. For 2 contains 1 twice, but 3 contains 2 only once and one half of 2 besides.



the soul adorns secondary natures, according to the very essence of itself. For prior to the soul imparting powers or energies, he demonstrates that it contains these ratios in itself, from which, and through which it governs, the first participants of itself, and such things as are adorned by it, according to a second separation from it; itself indeed, having wholly the relation<sup>1</sup> of a monad, but they imitating its<sup>2</sup> progressions and regressions. For the soul prior to them, proceeds indeed dyadically, but is converted triadically. And the whole of it indeed that proceeds, is separated from that which abides; for it is separated doubly. But that which is converted, or returns, is separated by half.<sup>3</sup> For separation is the peculiarity of progression, but sameness and similitude of conversion. For that which returns, is made as it were that which abides, becoming all instead of one, and instead of a whole prior to parts, a whole consisting of parts. And it appears indeed to be the triple of that which abides; but is less than it in power, and comprehensive of the parts contained in it.

“Then a fourth part, double of the second, a fifth, triple of the third, a sixth, octuple of the first, and a seventh twenty-seven times the first.”

The all-perfect essence itself of the soul, is comprehended through the above-mentioned numbers; of which one abides in the soul, another, proceeds from, and another, is converted to it. Since, however, it is necessary to survey the parts of it, and the causes of those things that are in it, these also Plato copiously explains, delivering to us, the comprehending and comprehended ideas in it of all things. Through the fourth therefore, and the fifth parts, the soul comprehends the reasons of all its first participants. And it contains indeed, the progression of them through the fourth part, but their regression through the fifth.<sup>4</sup> [Hence Plato refers the fourth part to the second, but the fifth to the third, because parts imitate wholes, and subsist analogously to them.<sup>5</sup>] But through the sixth and seventh parts, it constitutes, as we have before observed, solid masses themselves; gene-

<sup>1</sup> It is necessary here, to supply the word *λογον*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αυτας* in this place, it is requisite to read *αυτης*.

<sup>3</sup> That which proceeds is separated doubly from that which abides: for the duple ratio 2 to 1, or 2 is doubly separated from 1. But that which is converted, or returns, is separated from the abiding principle by half. For 3 differs from 1 by 1. So that what proceeds, and also that which returns, are here to be considered according to habitude, i. e. according to their proximity and alliance, the former to unity immediately, but the latter to unity through 2 as a medium.

<sup>4</sup> The words, *την δε επιστροφήν δια της πεμπτης*, are omitted in the original.

<sup>5</sup> The words within the brackets are supplied from the version of Thomæus.

rating them indeed, according to the sixth part, but converting them according to the seventh part. For the total form of it, is terminated by the progression of these. And you may see how the numbers, and the order of the progression, are adapted to the soul. For the beginning from the monad, gives to the soul a progression from intellect; but the termination in these cubes, evinces the harmony of all the celestial orbs,<sup>1</sup> for they produce by their composition the celestial harmony. Each of them likewise is a harmony. For the Pythagoreans are accustomed to call a cube harmony, because it is the only figure that has equal<sup>2</sup> angles, analogous to the sides and the superficieses.<sup>3</sup> And the second<sup>4</sup> of the terms indeed, have a progression from, and a regression to the monad. But again, these remaining as wholes, the third<sup>5</sup> of the terms are divided into that which proceeds, and that which returns, and are referred to the terms proximately placed above them.<sup>6</sup> And again, the fourth<sup>7</sup> of the terms, are referred to the monad; because of the seven terms, the monad imitates that which abides; but the middle terms having the form of the duad,<sup>8</sup> imitate that which proceeds; and the last terms, that which returns. For both the last terms are triadic. For the octuple itself, is in a certain respect triadic, as proceeding into the third order. We have therefore the one wholeness of the soul in the mixture, the triple<sup>9</sup> of it in the third, and the quadruple of it in the fourth terms; conformably to which also it fabricates wholes according to each form of providence. And in the wholeness indeed, we shall find it comprehending the triple form, but in the triple the tetradic form, and always collecting parts into union through wholes.

“ But after these things, he filled the double and triple intervals, still cutting off parts from thence [i. e. from the whole], and placed them between the intervals.”

Theologists say, that in the Demiurgus there are dividing and connecting”

<sup>1</sup> For *αρμονιων* here, it is necessary to read *οργανων*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *μυσαι* in this place, it is requisite to read *ισαι*.

<sup>3</sup> The Pythagoreans called a cube harmony, because it has 8 angles, 12 sides, or bounding lines, and 6 superficieses; and 6, 8, 12 are in harmonic proportion.

<sup>4</sup> i. e. 2 and 3.

<sup>5</sup> i. e. 4 and 9.

<sup>6</sup> For *υποκειμενους* here, read *υπερκειμενους*.

<sup>7</sup> i. e. 8 and 27, and these being cubes, are images of stability.

<sup>8</sup> 9 as well as 4 may be said to have the form of the duad, in consequence of being a square number or the second power.

<sup>9</sup> For *επιτλουν* here, it is necessary to read *τριπλουν*.

<sup>10</sup> Instead of *συντακτικας* in this place, it is necessary to read *συνεκτικας*.

powers, and that through the former, he separates his kingdom from that of his father, but through the latter, suspends the whole of his fabrication from the paternal monad. They likewise call energies of this kind, sections and bonds. According to these powers therefore, the Demiurgus now separating the essence of the soul in demiurgic bonds, is said to cut off parts from its wholeness, and again to bind the parts with certain bonds through the middles, through which also, he makes that which is divided, to be connected, just as through the sections he causes that which is united to be divided. Hence, that these things are conformable to theological principles, the words of Plato manifest. Let us however see how they are so, by considering more minutely what he says. That the whole soul then, is with reference to itself, of the same essence, and consists of similar parts, and is as it were of the same colour, being wholly intellectual and intellectual reason, Plato manifests, by making both the wholes and the parts in it, from the same mixture. For the parts which are cut off from it, are certain divided essences in it. That there is also a certain dignity in it of first, middle, and last forms, he evinces by adding the word *still*. For in those things, in which we see the same form more obscure, in these we employ the word *still*; as we do in the celestial essence, in consequence of perceiving a certain mutation about it, and also a similitude to divine bodies, preserved in it. In order therefore that we may not suppose there is the same dignity of all the reasons in the soul, Plato adds the word *still*, indicating by it that which we have mentioned. For by how much the more inwardly we proceed, and investigate the media of media, by so much the more shall we meet with more partial forms. For comprehended are more partial than comprehending natures; and the latter are more divine than the former. The world likewise imitating this, has indeed about generation a divine body, but about body the whole soul. All these before-mentioned sections therefore of the soul, both the generative (for these are the double intervals), and the perfective (for these are the triple intervals), are comprehensive of more partial reasons, through which the parts of the universe are adorned, as far as to the last of things.

“So that in each interval there are two middles, one of which, exceeds and is exceeded by the same part of the extremes; but the other, by an equal number surpasses one extreme, and by an equal number is surpassed by the other.”<sup>1</sup>

In these words it must be observed in the first place, that the two middles are

<sup>1</sup> The word διασηματι is omitted in the text of Proclus.

<sup>2</sup> In the text of Proclus also the following words are wanting, την δ' ισὺν μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑπερχειν, ἰσὺν δὲ ὑπερχομεν.

said by Plato to be comprehended in the geometric middle; and afterwards, that he places the harmonic prior to the arithmetical middle, as being superior to it. For though the arithmetical middle has the spontaneous, and the simple, and an alliance to sameness; for equality is a certain sameness; and hence Plato shows that in politics the arithmetical middle is effective of friendship, since it embraces the equal according to number, just as the harmonic is effective of justice, since it regards distribution according to desert; and still farther, because the arithmetical middle is allotted quantity per se, but the harmonic, relative quantity; and the former is surveyed about the absolute quantity of the parts, but the latter, about the relative quantity; ' for the third, or the fourth part, is the peculiarity of relative quantity;—though all this be the case, yet the harmonic, as being nearer to the geometric, is very properly arranged before the arithmetical middle: For it affords sameness in the extremes, and distributes greater ratios to greater, but less to less terms; and through this, is more adapted to distribution according to desert. It must be said therefore, that the harmonic middle binds together all the psychical sameness, and imparts to celestial natures an indissoluble communion; distributing to the greater circles indeed, greater powers and motions, but to the less, less powers. For the comprehending are moved swifter than the comprehended spheres. For the arithmetical middle connects all the difference in the soul, and imparts to sublunary natures, a communion with each other, according to an equal permutation. For among these, one thing is not at all more acted upon by, than it acts upon, others. And this property of being changed into each other, is equally inherent in all the elements in generation, according to arithmetical equality; which also imparts to more attenuated natures, greater and swifter motions, but slower and less motions to such as consist of larger parts.

“ But as sesquialter, sesquitertian, and sesquioctave intervals were produced from those bonds in the former intervals, he filled with the interval of the sesquioctave, all the sesquitertian parts.”

That from the above-mentioned two middles, the harmonical and the arithmetical bonds being produced in the intervals of the double and triple terms, the sesquitertian and sesquialter ratios appearing in those middles, are cut by the interval of the sesquioctave, is evident from what has been said, and will also be manifest, if you direct your attention to the terms 6, 8, 12, and 18.<sup>1</sup> For in these, the double and

<sup>1</sup> In the original *σηλικονος*, which denotes relative, just as *μοδονος* denotes absolute, quantity.

<sup>2</sup> For 8 to 12, which is diapente, or sesquialter, is compounded of 8 to 9, which is a tone; and 6 to 8, which is sesquitertian, or diatessaron.

triple consist of sesquitertian and sesquialter ratios. But how will these things accord with what has been before said? We reply they must be assumed consequently to them. For as the two middles divide the universe into two parts, so the sesquitertian and sesquialter ratios constitute a more partial order of things. For these ratios adorn things which exist as wholes, and yet are parts of parts. Each of them therefore is a whole according to the prologos, but a part according to the hypologos, and a part of a part, according to the transcendency of the one with reference to the other. And since in each of the spheres there are divine and daemonic, and also partial genera of souls, such as the genera of ours, and the secondary divine genera wholly participate of the whole of those prior to them; but the daemonic genera, though they participate of the whole of divine natures, yet it is according to one certain thing, on which account they are said to be more partial, not being able to receive all the peculiarities of them; but the more partial of daemonic natures, at different times participate of a different peculiarity, and not always of the same characteristics;—hence, the soul partibly contains the ratios of these. And it contains the multiple indeed according to the participation of the whole; but the superparticular, according to one part only, and that the most principal; and the superpartient according to a communion which is both multitudinous and partible of the participants with the things participated. Hence, through these, the elements and the celestial spheres are adorned; participating indeed of the third wholeness, but at the same time being parts of the two sections of the universe; since every wholeness has also parts in conjunction with itself. Different peculiarities therefore pertain to a different sphere,<sup>1</sup> and a different number proceeds with a different element. The sesquiocave ratio also giving completion to the sesquitertian and sesquialter ratios, generates these plenitudes of the total parts, and coharmonizes them with their proper wholenesses. You see therefore, that as in the mathematics, the geometric middle comprehends the remaining two middles, but they comprehend the sesquitertian and sesquialter ratios, and these the sesquiocaves,—after the same manner also, the soul according to the wholeness of itself constitutes the whole world; but according to its essential duad, divides the universe into two parts, and produces the first parts of the universe, which are secondarily wholes. According likewise to the causes of the third wholeness, it disposes in an orderly manner, and adorns the spheres; but according to numbers adapted to these parts, it fills them with appropriate forms and parts.

We may also speak as follows: This universe has indeed whole spheres; and

<sup>1</sup> For *ἅλλη σφαῖρα* here, it is necessary to read *ἅλλης σφαῖρας*.

has likewise divine, dæmoniactal and psychical animals in each sphere. For there are distributions of partial souls about each of the spheres. But the harmonic ratios of the whole soul, harmonize the essences which are divisible about bodies, and bodies themselves. For by its very essence [it contains all these, and the ratios which comprehend them ;'] just as fire, being calefactive by its very existence, is primarily hot. It contains therefore, the diatessaron harmony, through which it harmonizes the essences divisible about bodies of each of the spheres, and of the divine, dæmoniactal, and psychical animals in each, and also bodies to each other. Nor is one thing casually comprehensive of another, nor do some things casually follow others; but dæmoniactal follow divine animals, and psychical, such as are dæmoniactal; and conformably to nature, secondary are always co-adapted to primary essences. Hence the diatessaron harmony is in each of the spheres. And the ratios indeed of each sphere to the divine animals contained in it, and of these to dæmoniactal animals, will be truly sesquioctaves, possessing a perfect interval; being at one and the same time primarily harmonious, and adapted to bodies. For the ogdoad having a triple interval is corporeal-formed, just as the ennead is a plane. But each is allied to equality. And always secondary corporeal essences are suspended from such as are primary, participating of them, and of the corporeal reason which they contain.<sup>1</sup> But this the part manifests which is said to be the eighth of the thing participated. That however which remains, is the ratio of psychical to dæmoniactal animals, which has the relation of the leimma, is superpartient, and is adapted to thirteen parts. For these have not one life, since they ascend and descend, and partibly and anomalously enjoy the natures prior to them. And since the number twelve is ascribed to the [mundane] Gods, and to the natures superior to us, thirteen is adapted to those that do not rank in the number of the Gods. *If also of psychical animals themselves, some pertain to undefiled souls, which Plato is accustomed to call the souls of heroes; but others to gregarious souls, such as ours: if this be the case, the diapente<sup>2</sup> likewise will be in each of the spheres. And heroic souls indeed will preserve towards the dæmoniactal, the sesquioctave ratio, through the undefiled form of life; but the souls of the multitude will have towards them the ratio of the leimma. So that in each of the spheres, there will be sesquitercian, sesquialter, and sesquioctave ratios.*

<sup>1</sup> The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, but are supplied from the version of Thomas.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *rov ev avrō* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read, *rov ev avrois*.

<sup>3</sup> For in each of the spheres there will be divine, dæmoniactal, heroical, and gregarious souls, and appropriate bodies.

Or rather, it may be said, that the universe is divided quadruply, according to the four ideas of its paradigm, but that in each of the four parts, there are all animals, the divine, the daemoniacal, the heroical, and those of human souls, all which are harmonically co-arranged with each other, and with reference to their proper wholeness, whether it be the heavens, the air, the water, or the earth, the wholeness producing the diapente; but without this it may be said there is the diatessaron, in the four species of animals, as Plato himself divides—viz. into the universe, and the all-various forms of animals. Hence, through these things Plato delivers to us ratios comprehensive of ratios, and perfect according to one harmony; with which ratios being replete, the soul fills this visible world, rendering all things effable and familiar with each other.

“Leaving a part of each of them. And then again, the interval of this part being assumed, a comparison is from thence obtained of number to number, viz. of 256 to 243.”

36B

What this leimma is, what ratio it possesses, and how, being adapted to concord, it becomes harmonious when co-arranged with the other ratios, is evident through the mathematics. But there is a thing of this kind in the universe, as in a whole; the ratio of the leimma being in the last of the animals comprehended in it, independently of the before-mentioned demonstration, according to the quadruple section of the whole. For from each of the spheres certain effluxions, and mingled dregs of the elements procced into the subterranean regions; possessing indeed, much of the tumultuous, dark and material, but at the same time contributing to the whole constitution and harmony of the world. Plato, therefore, placing the cause of these in the whole soul, calls it a leimma, which is significant of ultimate diminution. For since theologists arrange the powers of the highest Gods about that place, Jupiter adorning those parts, so as to render them adapted to the participation of such mighty divinities, what ought we to think about the soul of the universe? Is it not that it must in a much greater degree adorn every thing which appears to be disordered, and that it must possess the cause of the hypostasis of an inordinate nature, and arrange it in a becoming manner, according to this cause? How, likewise, could it govern the universe, or conduct all things conformably to intellect, unless it arranges that which is disorderly, and co-harmonizes the last of things, with the one life of the world? But if also in the Demiurgus, the causes of these pre-exist, as Orpheus says,

The distant realms of Tartarus obscure,  
Earth's utmost ends, his holy feet secure.

why should it be wonderful, that the whole soul possessing all such things appropriately in itself, as a divine intellect possesses demiurgically, should antecedently contain the cause of the last parts of the world, and of that which is as it were, the sediment of wholes? For the soul comprehends the invisible prior to the visible and sensible world. What the leimma is therefore, is through these things evident. Hence also the leimma, is both quadruple and single. And it is necessary that the soul should comprehend the reason of both, according to which the leimma subsists quadruply, and singly; since it is requisite that this should contribute to the universe, and to each of its parts.

If also you direct your attention to the numbers of the terms, you will perceive that these preserve a certain admirable analogy. The progression, therefore, into a hundred binaries, manifests an all-perfect diminution and separation from cause. For in the soul, it comprehends that which is most partial, and in the universe, that which is last, and most material. But the four and the five in the tens, suspend that which is last, and most material, from first natures, and co-arrange them with their principles. For the tetrad is allotted a demiurgic, and world-producing quality. But the pentad recalls every thing which has proceeded, to powers which have more of the nature of *the one*. Again the triad and hexad in the units, impart perfection to these, through conversion. But if also the ratio of 243 to 13 is superpartient,<sup>1</sup> neither will this number be dissonant to the universe. For after the all-perfect progression of sensibles, and a diminution as far as to the earth, which is said to be the twelfth part of the world, all that is under it, will be the thirteenth part of the whole. And the representations of the elements, which proceed into the subterranean place, will be adapted to this number. That which is most material in the universe therefore, proceeds to the utmost extent, is adorned as it proceeds, and returns when adorned. In each part likewise, of the universe, there are the last diminished genera of perpetual natures, to which the number twelve is ascribed; and with great propriety, they have habitude, and communion with each other, according to the thirteenth ratio, since the number twelve was dedicated by the ancients to the [mundane] Gods, and to the genera that are always suspended from them. All these therefore, the soul unically comprehends in the ratio of the leimma. In addition to these things likewise, the ennead of the units, which three and six procure for us, indicates the end of the psychical ratios. For beginning from the monad, they proceed to the ennead, and from monads to decads (i. e. from units to tens), and from these to hundreds. For all the progression of the soul is

<sup>1</sup> For 243 contains 13, eighteen times, with a remainder of 9.



triadic, and likewise, its evolution into light from the demiurgic cause, both according to essence, and according to harmony, as we have before observed. And thus we have shown what it is which the leimma manifests in the soul.

The whole psychogonic diagram however, has 34, or 36 terms. And on this account, the number 36 is adapted to the soul, as being generated from the hexad proceeding into itself; the hexad being ascribed by the ancients to the soul, because it is the first evenly-odd number, just as the soul is the medium between impartible and partible natures,<sup>1</sup> to the former of which the odd number is allied, but to the latter, the even; and also, because it is circular, in the same manner as the pentad.<sup>2</sup> *The pentad however, is the image of the intellectual circle, as being masculine, but the hexad of the psychical circle, as being feminine.* If also you direct your attention to 34, this number too, will be adapted to the soul; since intellect is a monad, as being impartible, but the world is a decad, and the soul a tetrad. Hence, all number is said to proceed from the penetralia of the monad, as far as to the divine tetrad, which brought forth the mother of all things, immutable and unwearied, and which is called<sup>3</sup> the sacred decad. But the tetrad has for its side the duad, and the double of the square of it added to 2, produces the above-mentioned number;<sup>4</sup> being an imitation of the soul, which is multiplied by itself, and together with its own prolific power. If likewise 34 is composed from the second sesquioctave, viz. from 16 and 18, it will happen, that as the sesquioctave is especially adapted to the soul, so also is this second sesquioctave. For being a medium between consonant and dissonant intervals, it is adapted to the middle nature of the soul. And in short, the sesquioctave characterizes the diatonic genus, according to which the whole soul is harmonized. But being assumed as the second, it will accord with the order of the soul, in which the genera of being, have entirely a secondary subsistence.

Farther still, in addition to these things, since the whole diagram contains a quadruple diapason, which is the most full of all symphonies, but the diapente once, and ends in one tone, it will possess the quadruple cause of the division of the world into four parts, proceeding as we have said supernally, from animal itself, and the four ideas in it, through soul into the universe, and of the perfect harmony in each of the parts of the world; through which also, heaven is one world, concordant with itself celestially, and the earth has all things terrestrially, and

<sup>1</sup> For the evenly-odd number is a medium between the odd and the even number.

<sup>2</sup> For *επτας* here, it is obviously necessary to read *πεντας*.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *αλευονσι* here, it is necessary to read *ελευονσι*.

<sup>4</sup> i. e.  $2 \times 4^2 + 2 = 34$ .

in a similar manner each of the elements between these. Since, however, the world is not only quadripartite, but has five figures, possessing a fifth idea together with the four, the soul very properly contains in itself, after the quadruple diapason, the symphony diapente; the remaining section being that of the heavens into eight spheres, and of the whole world into nine, over the former of which the Syrens preside, mentioned in the Republic, and over the latter the whole of the Muses, under whom the Syrens subsist. Again therefore, a tone consentaneously closes the whole diagram; and it is not possible to devise any other divisions than these which are delivered to us by Plato, I mean, the division into four, into five, into eight, and into nine parts, some of which are mentioned in this Dialogue, and some in the Republic. Very properly therefore, is the whole psychogonic diagram composed of all the above-mentioned particulars, I mean, a tone, the diapente, and the quadruple diapason, in order that you may see these throughout the whole world, as having the power of the whole diagram. All likewise are assumed according to all the divisions made by Plato of mundane natures, which are triple, viz. according to ideas, according to figures, and according to the spheres.

All the other sesquialter and sesquioctave ratios therefore, were the bonds of more partial orders, comprehended either in the five parts of the universe, or in the divisions of it into eight and nine; as, for instance, in the division of it into Gods, demons, souls, natures, and bodies. And of Gods, into those that preside over different parts of the world. For in each part of it, there are different orders of Gods; those of the second rank being analogous to those that are prior to them. And in a similar manner with respect to demons, some are of this, but others of that series. The like also takes place, in souls, and natures, and bodies. But the diapente symphony, and the sesquioctave ratio, are not in vain assumed after the quadruple diapason, but because they are comprehensive and connective in common, of wholes. I say, for instance, that the ratio of the ninth to the eighth sphere, comprehends and connects as one ratio, all the parts at once that are arranged according to a quintuple division, and all that are divided into eight and nine. But the lemmas of all the sesquitercian ratios are either the ultimate, and very partible diminutions, according to each portion of the quadripartite distribution, or they are the common gifts of all these ratios, into the last place of the universe; through which Gods, demons, partial souls and natures, proceed into that region, and accord with each other, conformably to the ultimate and perfectly partible symphony, such as we say superpartient ratios possess. Hence Plato descending to this adds, that the Demiurgus dividing the mixture, had now consumed the whole of it. For neither God, nor nature, does any thing in vain.

The Demiurgus therefore did not constitute a mixture of parts either exceeding or deficient, but produced it such as was sufficient to the wholeness itself of the soul. For the whole which is from parts, is neither more nor less than its proper parts, but entirely derives its completion from appropriate parts. Hence the whole of that which is mingled, consists of harmonic ratios, and all this harmony is, in short, the essential paradigm of the harmony of the universe, according to all the divisions in the world. Moreover, the whole number of the essential monads of the soul is 105947,<sup>1</sup> proceeding according to all the orders of numbers. Decadically, indeed, in order that the soul may become mundane : for the decad is the number of the world. But pentadically, in order that it may be converted to itself: for the pentad is self-convertive. Enneadically, in order that it may not alone<sup>2</sup> contain the universe monadically, but also as proceeding to the last of things from the monad. But tetradically, as collecting the quadripartite division into one. And hebdomadically, as converting all things to the monad, to which the hebdomad is alone referred, being motherless and virile. And in the soul of the world indeed, the above number subsists totally; in divine souls, as having their energies directed to that<sup>3</sup> soul, it subsists both totally and partially; in daemons, as energizing still more partially, it exists vice versa, partially and totally; and in human souls, alone partially, and alone gnostically. For thus all forms subsist in these souls, such for instance as the form of man, of daemon and of God; in order that through these they may know, that all things subsist in more excellent natures productively, and at the same time gnostically. This mixture therefore, is alone the mixture of the whole soul, and it subsists after the same manner in each divine soul, and similarly in demoniacal souls, each of which has intellect placed above its proper essence, a peculiar vehicle, and a life distributed about this. If, however, in partial souls, it be requisite to assume the peculiarity of each, it is a medium between the impartible which is above, and the partible which is posterior to them,<sup>4</sup> or it is partly the one, and partly the other of these. And though we have elsewhere discussed this largely, yet we shall particularly investigate it, when we come to explain what is said by Plato concerning the generation of partial souls.

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *εκατοναδες τεσσαρες* in this place, it is requisite to read, *εννεακονταδες τεσσαραις*.

<sup>2</sup> It is necessary here to supply *μονον*.

<sup>3</sup> For *προς* *εκεινον* in this place, read *προς* *εκεινην*.

<sup>4</sup> It appears to me that after *εκαστης ιδιον δει λαμβανειν* in the original in this place, the words *μεντοι* are wanting; and that immediately after, instead of *το τε υπερ αυτας αμεριστον, και το μετ' αυτας μεριστον*, we should read *τον τε υπερ αυτας αμεριστον, και τον μετ' αυτας μεριστον*.

"Having, therefore, cut all this double composition according to length, so as to produce two from one, he adapted middle to middle, each to the other, as it were in the form of the letter X."

In the first place, it is requisite to show mathematically of what kind the figure of the soul is, and thus, afterwards, introduce the theory of the things; in order that being led in a becoming manner by the phantasy, we may render ourselves adapted to the scientific apprehension of what is said. All the numbers therefore, must be conceived to be described in one rule, as those who are skilled in music are accustomed to do. And let the rule have the numbers according to the whole of its depth, and be divided according to its length. All the ratios therefore, will be in each of the sections. For if the division was made according to breadth, it would be entirely necessary that some of the numbers should be taken here, but others there. Since however, the section is according to length, but all the numbers are in all the length, there will be the same numbers in each of the parts. For it is evident, that it is not the same thing, to divide the length, and to divide according to the length; since the latter signifies, that the section proceeds through the whole length, but the former, that the length is divided.\* Let the rule, therefore, be thus divided according to length,† and let the two lengths be applied to each other in the points which bisect the lengths, yet not so as to be at right angles; for neither will the circles be at right angles. Let the two lengths likewise be so incurvated, that they may again be conjoined at the extremities. Two circles therefore, will be formed, of which one will be interior, but the other exterior, and they will be oblique to each other. One of these likewise, is called the circle of the same, but the other, the circle of the *different*. And the one indeed, subsists according to the equinoctial circle, but the other, according to the zodiac. For the whole circle of the *different* revolves about the zodiac, but that of the *same* about the equinoctial. Hence, we conceive that the right lines ought not to be applied to each other at right angles, but like

\* In the original of this place there is nothing more than *επεισο γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν, οὐκ οὐ ταύτων τὸ μέτρον*. The rest of the sentence in the translation is added from the version of Thomaſius.

† Thus for instance, let the numbers be disposed according to depth as follows:

$$\begin{array}{r} 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 9 \cdot 8 \cdot 27 \text{ \&c.} \\ 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 9 \cdot 8 \cdot 27 \text{ \&c.} \\ 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 9 \cdot 8 \cdot 27 \text{ \&c.} \\ 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 9 \cdot 8 \cdot 27 \text{ \&c.} \\ 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 9 \cdot 8 \cdot 27 \text{ \&c.} \end{array}$$

Then the lines drawn longitudinally, will represent the division of the rule according to length.

the letter *X* as Plato says, so as to cause the angles to be equal only at the summit, but those on each side, and the successive angles, to be unequal. For the equinoctial circle does not cut the zodiac at right angles. Such therefore, in short, is the mathematical discussion of the figure of the soul.

Again however, surveying the things themselves from the beginning, let us refer what is said by Plato, to the psychical essence. And, in the first place, we must observe, that continued and discrete quantity are divided from each other, according to the mathematical sciences, and are in a certain way opposed to each other, so that it is not possible for the discrete to be continued, or the continued to be discrete quantity. In the soul however, both these concur, viz. union, and separation. For it is a monad and number, one reason, one multitude, and many things. And as being a whole indeed, it is continued; but as number, it is divided, according to the reasons which it contains. Through its continuity likewise, it is assimilated to the union of intelligibles, but through its multitude, to the separation of them. And by ascending still higher than these, we shall find that according to its union, it possesses an image and representation of *the one*, but according to its division, of the multitude of the divine numbers. Hence, it neither has an arithmetical essence alone; for it would not be continuous; nor alone a geometrical essence; for it would not be divided. But it must be said, that it is at one and the same time both the arithmetical, and the geometrical essence. So far however, as it is the arithmetical essence, it has also, at the same time, the harmonical essentially. For the multitude in it is harmonized, and it comprehends in sameness, both absolute and relative quantity. But so far as it is the geometrical, it contains the spherical essence. For the circles in it are both immoveable and moved; immoveable indeed essentially, but moved according to a vital energy. Or rather, it possesses both these at once; for they are self-motive. But the self-motive, is at one and the same time moved and immoveable. For it moves itself. But to move, or be the cause of motion, pertains to immoveable power. The soul therefore, comprehends essentially all sciences; geometry indeed, according to its wholeness, its figure, and its lines; but the arithmetical science, according to its multitude, and the essential monads in it, as we have before shown. But it comprehends the harmonic science, according to the ratios of numbers; and the spheric science, according to its twofold circulations. In reality also, it is the essential, self-motive, intellectual, and united bond of the mathematics, comprehending all things unaccompanied with figure, and with undefiled purity. Hence it comprehends figures unfiguredly, things separated, unitedly, and without interval things accompanied with interval. For these pertain to the essence of the soul. And it is necessary to survey all things in it after this manner.

Moreover, this likewise ought to be assumed from what has been said, that all secondary natures, are analogous to those that are prior to them, and that every where, *the one* precedes multitude. For as the theory of the hyparxis of the soul commenced from its essence, and that of its harmony from the *one* part, thus also the doctrine concerning its figure, places the one length prior to the two. And as sameness and difference are from essence, so the triple and duple ratio are from the monad, but from the one length, the circle of *the same*, and the circle of *the different*. As likewise, the antecedents are to the antecedents, so are the consequents to the consequents, and all things are homologous to each other, viz. essence, harmony, and form. And all things are indeed every where, on account of the psychical life, being as it were of one colour, and of similar parts. *The same* however, and the triple, subsist in a greater degree in the circle of *the same*, but *the different*, and the duple, in the circle of *the different*. All the ratios likewise, are every where, but after a different manner in first and secondary natures; in the former indeed, intellectually, totally, and unitedly; but in the latter, doxastically, distributively, and partially. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Concerning this section however, and the two lengths and circles, it is worth while to consider, what they must be said to be. For the divine Iamblichus soars on high, and solicitously investigates invisible natures, viz. the one soul, and the two souls that proceed from it. For of every order an imparticipable monad is the leader, prior to the things participated, and there is a number appropriate to and connascent with imparticipables. The duad also is from unity, in the same manner as in the Gods themselves. Timæus therefore, he says, having through the psychogony fabricated in words the one and supermundane soul, from which the soul of the universe and other souls are derived, now produces the duad from this. For the section manifests the demiurgic division, which proceeds in sameness and perfection, generating the same things according to second numbers. But the division according to length, exhibits to us the progression supernally proceeding from the Demiurgus. Through these however, two souls are generated, after the one soul, each of which has the same ratios, are conjoined to, and are in each other, and are divided from each other. And they likewise preserve an unmingled purity, together with union with each other. For they are united to their own centres, and this is the adaptation of middle to middle. But since also, these souls are intellectual, and participate of a divine intellect, the Demiurgus prior to the generation of the universe, bent them into a circle, and comprehended them in a motion according to the same, and in the same, making them to be intellectual, imparting to them a divine intellect, and inserting

the duad of souls, in the intellectual duad, which transcends them essentially. [And thus far the divine Iamblichus.]

We therefore admit, that all this is well said so far as pertains to the theory of things: for these particulars are prior to the world. Hence also in mundane natures, there is the monad, afterwards the duad, and afterwards the heptad. For in the universe there is one soul, which is that of the universe. But after this, there are two souls, which divide the heaven into the circulation of *the same*<sup>1</sup> and the circulation of *the different*. And after these, there are seven souls, which distribute in an orderly manner the planetary spheres. We conceive it however, to be more concordant with the words of Plato neither to understand what is now said, as pertaining to those super-mundane souls, nor to the multitude of mundane souls, but as asserted of the soul itself of the universe. Plato therefore himself shortly after, having spoken concerning all the divisions of the soul, says, "*But when all the composition of the soul was produced conformably to the intention of its composing artificer, after this he fashioned within it the whole of a corporeal-formed nature.*" In which words he denominates the soul one, and this as no other than the soul of the universe. For it is this soul which comprehends the whole of a corporeal-formed nature. Hence the demiurgic divisions, and the two-fold lines and circles, must be assumed in this<sup>2</sup> soul; for in so doing we shall not be in want of arguments. Since therefore, it is the collector of all immoveable and alter-motive natures, of impartibles and partibles, of paradigms, and the last images, and of truly-existing beings, and such as are not truly beings, the nature of it is very properly two-fold, partly pertaining to more excellent, and partly to subordinate beings. Because however, these are entirely separated from each other, they require after a certain manner two<sup>3</sup> media. And in corporeal natures indeed, the two conjoining media are separated from each other; but in incorporeal natures it is one biformed essence, which binds together the extremes; one part of which being conjoined to intelligibles, is intellectual, scientific, shining with divine wisdom, anagogic, and comprehending the causes of things; but the other part being proximate to partible natures, is effective of difference, comes into contact with sensibles, recurs to the providential inspection of secondary natures, is artificial, and comprehends such other things as are allied to these. All the ratios however, are in each of these. For in this, the essence of the soul differs from the intellectual essence. For the latter indeed, is uniform, and antee-

<sup>1</sup> For *αὐτὴν* here, it is necessary to read *ταύτην*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *ἐκ' αὐτῆς* in this place, it is requisite to read *ἐκ' αὐτῆς*.

<sup>3</sup> For *ἑξῆς* here, read *δύο*.

definitely comprehends all forms monadically; but the former is dyadic, and contains the same reasons, dianoetically and doxastically; in one way indeed, in the circle of *the same*, but in another in the circle of *the different*. [And thus the soul imitates its cause.]<sup>1</sup> For she is both a monad and a duad, as with reference to the monad [Saturn], the father of the intellectual Gods. And the soul is a monad as with reference to the universe, but a duad, with reference to intellect. For in short division itself and multiplication derive their subsistence from this Goddess [Rhea]. The vivific principle therefore, is the cause of progression, multitude, and multiplication. Hence some philosophers, assimilating to the Gods things which are derived from them, think fit to arrange intellects according to the masculine, but souls according to the feminine genus of the Gods. For intellect is indivisible, and of the form of the odd number; but soul is divisible and bifurmed. And the former is analogous to paternal, but the latter to prolific causes. And the one is allied to bound, but the other to infinity. If likewise, I should be asked how the soul is one, and how it is bifurmed, I should say, that it is one indeed, as self-motive; for this is common to all psychical life, and to the parts it contains; but that it is bifurmed according to two-fold lives, viz. the life which is converted to first natures, and the life which providentially attends to secondary natures. I should also say, that according to the essential it has one life: for self-motion is the essence of the soul. But according to same and different, I should distinguish its two-fold lives.

Why however, did the Demiurgus first constitute the soul rectilinearly, but afterwards circularly, and after what manner is a right line adapted to the essence of the soul? To this we reply, that it is requisite to conceive the soul as analogous to a right line. For as a right line proceeds without curvature, and definitely from this to that point; for there is only one right line between two points; and as it is infinite in its own nature, so likewise the soul is generated an infinite power. Intellect also, like an indivisible point, is the leader of the soul, comprehending it indivisibly, and antecedently containing in an impartible manner the whole of its essence. For the impartible is allied to intellect; but that which is primarily partible to soul. But a point and a line are things of this kind. Hence, a right line is very properly ascribed to the soul, and afterwards a circle, which we say, are simple lines. But a point is ascribed to intellect. For from thence

<sup>1</sup> The words within the brackets are wanting in the original; but it appears to me that they ought to be inserted, though they were likewise wanting in the MS. of Thomasus. In the original therefore after the words *ἄλλως δὲ ἐν τῇ θάρεσσι*, I conceive there is an omission of *καὶ οὕτως ἡ ψυχὴ μιμεῖται τὴν αὐτῆς αἰτίαν*. But the fountal cause of the soul is Rhea.



as from a certain adytum, the reason of the soul presents itself to the view, unfolding the impartibility of intellect, and announcing its occult and ineffable union. Intellect itself however, is firmly established in itself, understanding all things with a tranquil energy; being a point and a centre as with reference to the soul. For if the soul is a circle, intellect is the centre, or<sup>1</sup> the power of the circle. But if the soul is a right line, intellect is a point, comprehending without interval that which has interval, impartibly that which is partible, and centrically<sup>2</sup> the circular form. Intellect itself however, is a circle as with reference to the nature of the good, about which<sup>3</sup> it on all sides converges, through a desire of the one, and of contact with it.

Farther still, after another manner also we may say, that a line is adapted to the soul. For intellect indeed, though some one should give to it motion, yet it has this energy intransitive. For it surveys at once the whole of the intelligible, having an eternal life, and energizing about the same things, in the same nature, and according to the same. But soul possesses a transitive energy. For at different times, it applies itself to different forms. And this is true even of the soul of the universe. For, as Plato says in the Phædrus, it is the peculiarity of soul to energize through time. But every transitive motion is a line. For it has *whence* and *whither*, and the rectilinear, and one thing for the beginning, and another for the end. So that in this respect we refer a line to the psychical life. Again, the immovable cause is motive of self-motive natures; for these proximately participate of it; but the self-moving cause is motive of alter-motive natures. Since therefore, the soul provides for alter-motive natures, being essentially prior to them, and as living from itself, transcends all things that have an adventitious life, conformably to this, it also has the linear form in its providential energies; being motive, and constitutive of alter-motive natures; just as a line is the distance of one thing from another, and an egression or departure from itself. In what is said therefore, about the mixture of the soul, and also in what is said concerning numbers and middles, Plato unfolds the being itself of the soul, and shows how it is one and many, what progressions it has, and what regressions both to superior natures, and to itself; how it produces and converts things posterior to itself; and how it fills with ratios, and binds together the whole world. But in what he says concerning the right line and circles, he delivers to us the vital and intellectual peculiarity of the soul, and indicates how it participates of

<sup>1</sup> For *ἡ* here, it is necessary to read *ἡ*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *κεντρικῶς* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *κεντρικῶς*.

<sup>3</sup> Ο λόγος here appears to be superfluous, as is also *της του εἶος* in the next line. For the original is, *περι ην ο λόγος παταχόθεν συνευει ποθῇ τον εἶος, και της του εἶος, και της προς το εν συναρη.*

the life in intellect, and how it is converted to itself, so far as it is self-vital and self-moved. For the right line manifests the progression of the psychical life from more excellent natures; but the inflexion into a circle indicates intellectual circulation. For the soul is allotted this power, and also that which is productive of the life in itself, from its father. Since however, the psychical life is twofold, the one being dianoetic, but the other doxastic, two lines present themselves, and are bent into two circles.

In short therefore, the essence of the soul, being a whole and consisting of parts, is harmonized number. But its life is rectilinear, and is uniform and bi-formed. And its intellect is dianoetic and doxastic. For there are in it being, life, and intellect. Or rather prior to the gnostic, perceiving that the vital powers are in themselves at one and the same time transitive, and self-motive, we must say, that the right line adumbrates the transitive, but the circle, the self-motive nature of these powers. For they are moved from themselves to themselves. Hence Timæus delivering to us in what is here said, the vital motion by itself alone, assumes the rectilinear, and the circular motion, but in what follows unfolds the gnostic motions of the circles; the soul now becoming self-motive, in consequence of the whole of it moving itself. If therefore, we now admit that the right lines are lives, and these essential; on which account also, the Demiurgus made the composition of the soul itself to be rectilinear, as possessing life by its very existence;—if we admit this, then we must say, that the circle manifests what the quality is of the form of this life, viz. that it is self-moved, beginning from, and returning to itself; and that it is not like the life of irrational natures, tending to externals as it were in a right line, as never being able to converge to itself, and as having an appetite directed to other things placed externally to itself. For the self-motive nature is moved from itself to itself, sees itself, and is present with itself. Hence also, such a form of life as this is circular. For in a circle, the same thing is the end and the beginning, in the same manner as in that which is converted to, begins from, and ends in itself. The right line therefore and the circle of the soul, are without interval; the former being the image of life [simply], but the latter of life convertive to itself, and not absolutely of all life. For both these may be surveyed in souls; the right line indeed, according to the transitions of appetites; but the circle according to a circumduction from the same things to the same. And this Socrates knowing, says in the *Phædrus*, that souls are carried round in a circle, revolving under intelligibles as objects of desire, being at different times happily affected by different things, and returning from the same objects to the same. Why therefore, should we any longer fear those skilful Peripatetics, who ask us, what kind of line Plato here assumes? Is it a

physical line? But this would be absurd: for this is the end of bodies. Is it then a mathematical line? But this is not self-motive, and is not essence. Plato however says,<sup>1</sup> that the soul is an essence, and is separate from bodies. We say therefore, that they in vain make these inquiries. For long before this, we have not ceased asserting that this line is essential. And prior to us Xenocrates calls a line of this kind indivisible. For it would be ridiculous in any one to think that there is an indivisible magnitude. It is evident however, that Xenocrates thought it requisite to call the essential reason of a line an indivisible<sup>2</sup> line. But *Plato, for the sake of concealment, employed mathematical names, as veils of the truth of things, in the same manner as theologists employed fables, and the Pythagoreans symbols.* For it is possible in images to survey paradigms, and through the former to pass to the latter. Against such men however, as these Peripatetics, who are contentious, no arguments are sufficient. But let us return to the words of Plato, and direct our attention to each of them.

Since therefore, the soul is one, is divided according to its parts, and is both one and many, Plato denominates it *this*, as being one, but *all*, as being multitude, and *composition*, as both; which also shows that the essence of it differs both from things discrete, and things continuous. For these are without communion<sup>3</sup> with each other. But the soul is one, and at the same time multitude, and is discrete, and continued. Since however the psychical reasons are biformed; for the soul is of an ambiguous nature, (*αμειπτακος*) and has two faces, conformably to its paradigm, so that it intellectually perceives the impartible essence through the circle of the same, but contains and connects the partible essence, through the circle of the different;—hence Plato calls it *double*. But because it has the same reasons or ratios, above and beneath, and not as some fancy, the duple ratios here, but the triple there, on this account, he delivers it to us divided according to *length*. For this division alone, preserves every where the same ratios. But the scission itself exhibits demiurgic section, which is appropriate to the Demiurgus. For the duad is seated by him, and is refulgent with intellectual sections, as some one of the Gods says.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the words "*middle to middle*" indicate perhaps, that the division and contact of things intangible, are adapted to the psychical middle: for they subsist in a middle way. For in intellect also there is division, because there is difference, but it subsists primarily, and as it were occultly, and indivisibly. In sensibles likewise there is division, but according to an ultimate distribution in-

<sup>1</sup> For φασι here, I read φησι.

<sup>2</sup> The word ἀτομον is omitted in the original.

<sup>3</sup> For ἀκοινητα here, it is necessary to read ἀκοινονητα:

<sup>4</sup> This is asserted in one of the Chaldean oracles.

to parts. Hence also the union in these is obscure and evanescent. But in the soul both have a middle subsistence, in a way adapted to it. And if indeed Plato had spoken concerning intellect and soul, he would have said, that the Demiurgus applied *the first* to the middle, and if about body and soul, that he applied the middle to *the last*. But since he teaches us concerning the psychical duad, he says that the Demiurgus applied middle to middle. Perhaps too, he says this, because the contact of the soul is properly of a middle nature. For the last part of the dianoetic, and the summit of the doxastic power, form the media of all the psychical composition. But these are conjoined to each other, and conformably to these, one union is produced of these two lives. For in every order of beings, the bases of first are united to the summits of secondary natures. The figure *X* however, produced by this application, has a great affinity to the universe, and also to the soul. And as *Porphyry* relates, a character of this kind, viz. *X*, surrounded by a circle,\* is with the Egyptians a symbol of the mundane soul. For perhaps it signifies, through the right lines indeed, the bifurmed progression of the soul, but through the circle its uniform life, and regression according to an intellectual circle. We must not however conceive, that Plato thought a divine essence could be discovered through these things. For the truth of real beings cannot, as some fancy, be known from characters, positions, and vocal emissions. But these are after another manner symbols of divine natures. For as a certain motion, so likewise a certain figure and colour, are symbols of this kind, as the initiators into mysteries say. For different characters and also different signatures are adapted to different Gods; just as the present character is adapted to the soul. For the complication of the right lines indicates the union of a bifurmed life. For a right line itself also, is a symbol of a life which flows from on high. In order however, that we may not, omitting the things themselves, be too busily employed about the theory of the character, Plato adds "*as it were*," indicating that this is assumed as a veil, and for the sake of concealment, thus endeavouring to invest with figure the unfigured nature of the soul.

"Afterwards he bent them into a circle, connecting them both with themselves, and with each other, in such a manner that their extremities might be combined in one, directly opposite to the point of their mutual intersection."

That what is said by Plato manifests through right lines the progression of

\* Instead of *κεκλόν* in this place, it is requisite to read *κεκλόν*.

the soul, and its providential attention to alter-motive natures, is I think evident from what has been already observed. And I also think it is proper to deliver the inflection into a circle analogous to these things. For since regressions are in continuity with progressions, recalling [to the principle] things which have proceeded from it, hence Plato says, that the right lines were bent into circles. And since also, the vital nature of the soul is intellectual, and apocatastatic, and evolves intelligible multitude, hence it is restored to the same thing again. Because likewise, it moves alter-motive natures, the soul being converted to, and moving itself, according to all these particulars, circulation pertains to it. For the progression of it is in continuity with its regression; since it is not imperfect. And the motion of alter-motive natures is suspended from the self-motive life. As the one of these also, is not subverted, but perfected by the other, after the same manner the composition of the right lines is not destroyed through the inflection into circles, but the former remaining, the circles are generated. For all things subsist at once in the soul, so that as the continuous is simultaneous with the discrete, thus also the circular with the rectilinear. For it is necessary that the right and the circular should remain, just as the impartible and the partible subsist together in the soul. For the Demiurgos makes eternally, so that the things which are generated by him, are entirely perpetual. Hence the right and the circular line are simultaneous in the soul, whatever each of them may be.

What therefore are the twofold circles, and how are they in the highest degree adapted to the soul? If then the essence of the soul proceeding from intellect, was such as to be entirely different from the intellectual peculiarity, the circular form would not be adapted to it. But since it is intellectual according to participation, and an evolved and bifurcated intellect, on account of its intellectual nature, it is a circle unfigured, without magnitude, and self-motive; but on account of its dyadic<sup>1</sup> nature, it is a twofold circle. For its progression also, in the same manner as its regression, is twofold, and its reason is twofold; so that its intellectual participation is twofold according to its lives. Since however, these lives are conjoined according to their first progression, but in proceeding are divided from each other, but after the progression are again converted to their principles, hence they are again conjoined according to the peculiarity itself of regression; the first adaptation of the lines manifesting *permanency*; but their separation from each other by division, their *progression*; and their inflection,<sup>2</sup> their *regression* again to the same thing. For the more divine life which subsists

<sup>1</sup> For *μοναδικον* here, it is obviously necessary to read *δυαδικον*.

<sup>2</sup> After *της δε απ' αλληλων σχισιως* in the original, the words *την προοδον, της δε κατακομψους* are evidently wanting.

according to regression, conjoins the end of itself with the beginning; and the more subordinate life converts the progression of itself to that which abides. Hence it converts this progression to the one intellect both of itself, and of the more excellent life. The conjunction, therefore, of the two lives is there the contact of the one, being in an opposite direction to that of the other; because the union of the one is according to progression, but of the other, according to regression, and regression is contrary to progression; for the latter pertains to the nature of sameness, but the former to that of difference. The latter also imparts a collective similitude (but the former, division in the progressions.<sup>1</sup>) For their opinion must not be admitted, who contend that the figure of the soul truly consists of two circles. For if the circles are without breadth, how is it possible to cut one of them, since it has no latitude? But if they are certain rings, how can the soul if it consists of these, be every way extended from the middle to the extreme heaven? For after what manner can rings be extended through the whole of a spherical body? To which may be added, that these circles being corporeal, will exhibit to us a certain body external to the universe, and will also produce a certain vacuum in the superficies of the sphere, in consequence of surrounding it, as is evident in the rings of spheres. And if they are circles, they must have profundity together with the body of the universe, on account of their station from the middle as far as to the extremities of the world. It is necessary therefore to conceive this vivific figure of the soul to be unfigured, and without interval, unless we intend to fill ourselves and also the theory of Plato with much absurdity, such as that which is noticed by Aristotle, who on the supposition that the soul is a magnitude, demonstrates that as such it is alone partible, but by no means impartible, though its essence, together with partibility, has also impartibility. But whether it is a circle, or a ring, it will alone have a partible, and by no means an impartible nature.

“He likewise comprehended them on all sides in that motion which is convolved according to the same and in the same.”

The mode of conception of the divine Iamblichus in what is here said, is truly divine, and firmly adheres to the meaning of Plato; since he does not, like the interpreters prior to him, think that the motion which is convolved according to

<sup>1</sup> The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, but are supplied from the version of Thomas. Hence after the words *η δε συνωργων μοιότητα ἐξέδωκεν*, it is necessary to insert *η δε διαμεσιν ταυ προδου*.

the same, and in the same, should be understood as pertaining to the soul. For the motion of the soul is now in it, and not about it. He conceives, therefore, that the motion now spoken of pertains to intellect and the intellectual life. For in no part of the remainder of this Dialogue does Plato appear to conjoin the soul to intellect. It is necessary, however, that he should, in order that by this addition he may demonstrate the universe to be an animal endued with soul and intellect. We must therefore conceive the motion which is convolved according to the same, and in the same, to be intellectual. For this comprehends the soul in the same manner as the soul circularly covers the heaven as with a veil. Intellect, however, is indeed an immoveable motion; for it subsists wholly and unically at once. But soul is a self-moved motion. And the former is uniform, but the latter bifurcated. The former also is one and indivisible, but the latter divides and multiplies itself. The soul, however, participates of intellect so far as it is intellectual; and through it is conjoined to a divine intellect. For the soul of the universe participating of intellect, ascends to the intelligible. It is necessary, therefore, that the motion which is circumvolved in the same and about the same should be intellectual, being different from the motion of the two circles, since it comprehends them. We must say, therefore, either that this motion pertains to a participated intellect, which is proximately seated above the soul, or that it should be the motion of the Demiurgus of the soul. The latter however is impossible. Hence it must be admitted that this is the motion of a participated intellect. But that the motion which is convolved according to the same, and in the same, being intellectual, and above the soul, is not the motion of the Demiurgus, may be learnt by considering, that he made the universe to be endued with intellect, not giving himself to the universe, in the same manner as the soul, but imparting to it another participated intellect, which we have before demonstrated to be seated above the soul. For placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, he fashioned the universe. And it is evident that he did not effect this by placing himself in soul. For it would be ridiculous that he should co-arrange himself with soul, being separate from it. Plato therefore says, in what follows, of all [true] being, that neither does any other thing proceed into it, nor does it proceed into any other thing. But this being true, the Demiurgus will not place himself in soul; and before he constitutes soul, subsisting by himself, he will generate another being, which when he had generated soul, he placed in the soul. If, however, this be true, the motion of that intellect, which is circumvolved according to the

<sup>1</sup> For  $\eta\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  here, it is necessary to read  $\epsilon\tau\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ .

<sup>2</sup> It is necessary here to supply  $\alpha$ .

same, and in the same, will comprehend these psychical circles, and not the motion of him who constituted both this intellect and soul, and who shortly after is said to abide in his accustomed manner, exempt and separate from the universe. The mundane intellect therefore, is the intellect of which we are speaking, the life of which comprehends the psychical lives, viz. the uniform life comprehends the bifurmed lives, and the eternal life the lives which are not eternally moved. Hence the whole soul proceeds after this manner, being a monad and a duad, and as is evident from what has been said, without difference with respect to itself. That which remains therefore, Plato delivers in what follows, viz. how from the demiurgic divisions, one of the circles contains in itself that which is more divine, but the other, that which is more subordinate. For we have assumed these things for the sake of perspicuity. But let us hear what is next said by Plato.

“And he made one of the circles to be external, but the other internal. He denominated therefore, the lation of the external circle, the motion of the nature of same; but the lation of the internal, the motion of the nature of different.”

The divine Iamblichus refers these divine circles to the intellect which is separate, and to the intellect which is inseparable from souls, and to the motion which is convolved in the same, and on all sides comprehends them; so that one of the circles comprehends the two souls, but the other is in them; and the one is unmingled with the other life and the powers of the soul, but the other is mingled with and governs them; from which cause likewise, the whole soul, stably energizes, and is united to the Demiurgus himself. We however interpret the two circles to be the two-fold lives of the souls, viz. the providentially energizing<sup>1</sup> and convertive or regressive lives; and also to be the two-fold powers, the dianoetic and doxastic. For the soul of the universe has both these; since Plato likewise in the *Phaedrus* says, that of the horses, one pertains to the nature of *same*, but the other to the nature of *different*, though he also attributes horses to the Gods,<sup>2</sup> but such as are good, and consisting of things that are good. Here therefore the external circle is dianoetic, but the internal doxastic. For the De-

<sup>1</sup> For *energeia* in this place, it is necessary to read *πρωτογενεια*. For the soul of the universe always energizes both providentially and convertively, and the latter energy is intellective. Hence, there would be a tautology in saying, the *intellective* (*νοητικα*) and *convertive* lives.

<sup>2</sup> For *τοις θεοις* here, it is necessary to read *τοις θεοις*.



miurgus imparted to the dianoetic circle a power, according to which it is more divine than the doxastic circle. For it is more united, and is intellectual. For you must not suppose that to *denominate*, is the mere position of a name, but in the dianoetic circle is a participation of power, effective of *sameness*; and in the doxastic circle, *of difference*. Prior to this, therefore, Plato taught us the similitude of the soul itself to itself; but now he adds the transcendency and diminution of it with reference to itself, which it possesses, and received from the Demiurgus; who made one of the circles to be external, so far as he rendered it more similar to intellect and the intelligible; *for they are properly external, as being exempt from all secondary natures*; but the other internal, as being contained by the more excellent circle, as being that which ought to be governed by it, and as being of a subordinate nature. It was very far therefore from the intention of Plato, to adumbrate these circles mathematically, who, though they are equal, makes them to be unequal, and though they subsist similarly, renders them dissimilar, attributing to them for their essence, the demiurgic will.

Some, however, here doubt, how, since the soul consists of similar parts, one of the circles pertains to sameness, but the other to difference, and the one is denominated internal, but the other external; for these things subvert similitude of parts. Porphyry, therefore, directing his attention to sensibles, and material mixtures, adduces as instances, water mingled with honey, and honey mingled with wine; the whole consisting indeed of similar parts, but in different persons producing a different passion. For some are more affected by the vinous flavour, but others by the sweetness. Our father [i. e. preceptor] however, thinks we should survey the mixture of the genera in a manner adapted to immaterial and incorporeal natures. But this is, not according to a confusion of forms, nor according to a corruption of powers, but they being preserved, the mixture is according to a union and penetration of them through each other. For corruptions and the diminutions of powers, are in material natures, matter not being able to preserve in herself the different peculiarities unconfused and genuine. For the peculiarity of immaterial mixture is for the same things to remain united and separated, and to be co-mingled and unmingled [but in material mixture, the things which are mingled, are said to be confused, and without separation from each other, because this mixture is through computrefaction, and corruption].<sup>1</sup> It is easy likewise to call to our remembrance such-like immaterial mixtures as we speak of, from the sciences, from physical reasons, and from a multitude of lamps. For the many

<sup>1</sup> In the original here, there is nothing more than, το τα μεμιγμενα και αδιακρετα απ' αλληλων ειναι. The rest in the above translation is supplied from the version of Thomæus.

lights which produce one light, at the same time remain unconfused. And the multitude of physical reasons subsisting all of them at once, are at the same time separated from each other, according to physical difference. The many sciences also are in each other, and are unmingled with each other. But this is evident from their energies. For it is impossible for things that are confused to employ their proper energies with purity. But the sciences energize appropriately each with purity in itself. If therefore the genera of the soul are immaterially mingled, they are in each other, and are established in themselves. By their subsisting likewise in each other, they cause the whole soul to be as it were of a similar colour. Hence every part of it consists of these genera. But through the genera being established in themselves, and preserving their proper purity, different properties shine forth, according to the different powers of the soul, and some things prevail more than others. For in things which are mingled through the whole of themselves, and are corrupted together, there is entirely a similitude of parts, and there is also a similar form. But where there is the unmingled in the mixture, the unconfused in the complication, and purity in the separation, then it is possible for wholes to pervade through wholes, in order that each part may consist of all; and for each part to remain in itself in order that one thing may have dominion in another. Hence, it is not at all wonderful, since all the genera pervade through each other in the soul, and preserve at the same time the idea of themselves, that in one place sameness should predominate, but in another, the nature of difference, and that the genus of essence should be common, defining the one middle of the soul, according to which it is a medium between the impassible essence, and that which is divisible about bodies. Hence too, the soul is one life, as being one essence, but the life is bifurcated, in the same manner as the essence is twofold, on account of the two genera. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

But it is evident that the words "*he made*" are most properly assumed by Plato, in order that again the form of the middle nature may be preserved in the same manner as before when he said, the Demiurgos "*completely filled*" and "*co-mingled*." The expression too, "*he denominates*," is introduced appropriately to the things proposed to be discussed. For since names are given to the circles, according to that which predominates, the expression "*he denominates*" manifests that the appellation is given to them, not from the whole hypothesis, but from that which predominates in them. To assign names likewise after the production of the circles, manifests that names properly so called regard the nature of things. For the Demiurgos does not thus denominate that which is not the circle of the same, but that which was constituted such by him. Or rather, his productive

energy possesses the most principal cause of the name. And the position of the name is an effective energy, since intellection there is not separated from fabrication, but the Gods produce by the very energy of intellectual perception (i. e. their intellectual perception is effective). For thus also by giving names to, they constitute things themselves. And if it be requisite for me to give my own opinion, we may through these things perceive the arcana of the theory of Plato. For he not only delivers the Demiurgus as a nomenclator, who first gives names to the two circulations of the soul; but prior to these unfolds the essential character of it, viz. two separate right lines, and the  $\chi$  produced from them, and also the two circles formed from these lines; which things theurgy likewise unfolded after him,\* giving completion to the character of the soul from chiasmi† and semicircles. Psychological names therefore and characters were first delivered to us by Plato, which he intellectually saw, and which the wise men posterior to him embraced. For it is necessary to think, that there are psychological characters, and not only such as are common, like these, but such as are peculiar, and which are different in different souls; such for instance as those of Hercules, Pentheus, Atreus, and of Plato himself, delivered to us by the Gods themselves. These however, it belongs to the Gods alone both to know and to unfold; but the character which is common to every soul, beginning from the soul of the universe, Plato first beheld, and committed to writing. He also shows that the Demiurgus is the maker of this, who inscribes in the essence of the soul its‡ vivific character; gives names as we have said to its two intellectual circulations, and assumes these from his own essence. For it is the Demiurgus himself, who is especially characterized according to these genera of name, I mean *the same* and *the different*; since one of these eminently pertains to him, as giving form to matter, according to the terminations of forms; but the other, as collecting multitude to the one idea of the fabric of the universe as one production. Hence also with Orpheus, the Demiurgus particularly interrogates Night concerning these things, and says,

Tell me how all things will as one subsist,  
Yet each its nature separate preserve?

For the Demiurgus causes each thing to preserve its nature, separate from others through difference, but he makes all things to be one through sameness. The Oracles likewise, by asserting, that the Demiurgus is refulgent with intellectual

\* For  $\mu\epsilon\tau'$   $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$  here, it is requisite to read  $\mu\epsilon\tau'$   $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$ , and for  $\theta\epsilon\omega\gamma\gamma\alpha$   $\theta\epsilon\omega\gamma\gamma\alpha$ .

† Chiasmi, i. e. figures in the form of the letter  $\chi$ .

‡ It is necessary here in the words  $\tau\omicron\nu$   $\xi\psi\omega\gamma\omicron\nu\kappa\epsilon\nu$   $\alpha\pi'$   $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$   $\chi\alpha\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\eta\rho\alpha$ , to expunge  $\alpha\pi'$ .

sections, manifest that power of him which is effective of difference. But he fills all things with love through the power which is effective of sameness. Hence he very properly gives these names which are demiurgic signatures, to the circles of the soul of the universe from his own essence. This name therefore, "*the circle of the same*," is a divine name, as bearing the signature of the intelligible cause of sameness, as is likewise, "*the circle of the different*," as possessing the symbol of the nature of difference. For with reference to the genera of being, one of these circles is allied to sameness, but the other to difference; but with reference to the intellectual Gods, one of them is suspended from the paternal, connectedly-containing, and immutable causes, but the other from the prolific and vivific causes. And as with reference to intelligibles, the one in a greater degree participates of bound, but the other of infinity. These signatures therefore from all the orders, cause one of these circles to obtain such a name, but the other, a contrary name.

Some one however may say, what, then, is the one essence of the soul destroyed in the division of these twofold circles? We reply, by no means. For in divine natures, division is second to union, and progression is the medium between stable power, and the perfection subsisting in conversion or regression. But since the soul is a monad essentially and a duad, one and multitude, abiding, and at the same time proceeding and returning, and is also united prior to division;—hence, the mixture of the soul subsists one whole, prior to the many parts, and being divided according to progression, is again united according to regression. The less therefore, is comprehended in the greater circle. For as intellect comprehends the soul, illuminating it with its own light, thus also the circle of *the same*\* imparts union and perfection to the circle of *the different*, rendering it undefiled in its providential energies, united in its progressions, and in a certain respect intellectual in its knowledge of sensibles. Hence likewise, in an admirable manner, one of the circles subsists, and is denominated according to *the same*, but the other according to *the different*. But the essential as being common to both, is omitted, and is attributed to no one of the parts. Hence the soul according to this is one, but according to the two circles is biformed, these being after a certain manner opposed to each other.

"He likewise convolved the circle of *the same*, laterally towards the right hand, but the circle of *the different*, diametrically towards the left hand."

\* For αὐτὸν here, it is necessary to read τὸν αὐτόν.

What is here said, as that which remains to be discussed, is concerning the psychical powers, and the demiurgic separation of them from each other. For power is after essence; but energy has the third order, as we have before observed. This also Plato himself manifests to us, denominating the motion of these circles, the *lotion of the same* and the *lotion of the different*, but not the *essence* of these. From these two circles also, he generates different powers, and afterwards unfolds to us what kind of energies they possess. Such things as these likewise, he asserts in the Phædrus, concerning the better and the worse of the two horses of the soul. What therefore does he here say concerning the powers of the soul of the universe? In the first place, as I have said, he divides the whole powers into two, I mean into the power of *the same*, and the power of *the different*; the former being analogous to bound, but the latter to infinity. Afterwards, he divides the power of *the different*, according to other peculiarities, and again collects them into less numbers, and through sameness unites the multitude. In the next place, he attributes things more excellent and divine to the better, but things less excellent to the subordinate powers. Thus, for instance, he attributes a convolution towards the right hand, to the lotion of the circle of *the same*, but to the left hand, to the lotion of the circle of *the different*. And to the former he attributes the lateral, but to the latter the diametrical. For in the two co-ordinations of things, in the more excellent series there are [the same, the right hand, the equilateral and the rational; but in the less excellent series]<sup>1</sup> the contraries to these, the different, the left hand, the longer in the other part, and the irrational. Such therefore, is the whole meaning of the words before us.

Let us however see what the truth is of the things; and in the first place, if you are willing, let us show how the right and the left hand subsist in the universe. For I know that the daemoniacal Aristotle calls indeed the eastern part of the world the right hand, but the western the left hand; since the first motion is from the eastern, but the motion posterior to this, from the western parts. In all animals, however, the principle of motion is on the right hand. And in this thing Aristotle accords with the doctrine of Plato, and also in what he asserts concerning the *same* and *different*. He says therefore that the merratic sphere is the cause to all things of sameness of subsistence, but the planetary spheres of a subsistence different at different times. This however appears to me to be the illustrious peculiarity of the Platonic doctrine, that it does not define these things according to our habitude, but delivers these proper-

<sup>1</sup> The words within the brackets are omitted in the original, but are supplied from the version of Thomæus. Hence after the words *ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς κρείττους ἐστὶν αἰτίας* in the original, it is necessary to add, *το ταυτον, το δεξιον, το εὐσπλευρον, το λογιον' ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς χειρόνους, κ. λ.*

ties as proceeding from the fabrication itself of things. For if the Demiurgus himself inserts in divine souls the right hand and the left, each of these did not proceed into the world, either according to our position, or as a mere habitude, but they are essential peculiarities; just as the paternal and maternal in the Gods, are the peculiarities of divine essences. For even in partial animals nature does not constitute some of the parts on the right, and others on the left hand, according to mere habitude, but according to physical powers. And this is evident from her fashioning some of the parts on one side, but others [different from these] on the other side; and making *this* to be the principle of motion, but *that* not. This being the case, what ought we to think concerning the fabrication itself of things? Is it that it exhibits one thing on the right hand, but another on the left, according to habitude alone? But how is this possible, if we admit that it produces by its very existence that which it produces, or that a divine soul is an essence exempt from every thing which introduces accidents? Or must we not assert, if this is granted, that the nature of the fabrication of things is in a greater degree generative of essence than a divine soul is? But as it appears to me, we must say that this soul physically inserts in bodies the right hand and the left, and suspends from itself in a greater degree the right hand as the principle of motion. Hence, by a much greater priority, it is fit that the maker of soul should produce both these demiurgically in himself, and the right hand an image as it were of himself; and thus in the world, that the inerratic sphere should be circumsolved to the right, but the planetary sphere to the left? the former having a primordial life, acme of power, and efficacious energy; but the latter being prolific and various, and from another source than itself receiving the principles of motion. Hence also in the universe the inerratic sphere has dominion over all things, convolving all things according to one circle; but the planetary sphere is multifarious, and as we have said, is the cause of difference to generated natures. And the one is the image of intellect, but the other of soul; for the circle of *the same* is intellectual. In the soul of the universe however, the right hand is that which is converted to intelligibles, to truly existing beings, and the Gods: for it is a power which fills the soul with divine life. But the left hand is that which is converted to the care, and orderly distribution of sensibles: for it is a power, motive of all secondary natures, and subvertive of inordination. It also produces separation and variety in demiurgic works.

Farther still, the being convolved *diametrically according to the left hand*, may be said to comprehend the motion from the west to the east, and the motion to the oblique parts, through the obliquity [of the zodiac]. But you may say that in the soul itself, the circle of difference, being gnostic of all sensible natures, at once

comprehends the quadruple order of things, through the four centres, according to which the visible motion of the bodies that revolve to the left hand and diametrically is effected; just as the circle of *the same*, knows intelligibles as primordial causes, as supernally unfolding all secondary natures, and convolving according to one union the various order of sensibles. Again also, these things accede to the soul according to its similitude to the *whole vivification*.<sup>1</sup> For as the soul is a monad and duad according to this, so likewise it is allotted through it the right hand and the left. For in the *whole vivification*, these things first present themselves to the view, and are derived from it; one multitude being produced from the right hand, but another from the left hand parts, *whether you call them heads, or hands, or intestines*. For according to all these, theologists deliver to us the prolific powers of the Goddess. These things however being appropriately asserted, it is evident that it is not the same thing to say that a certain thing is moved on the right, or on the left hand, and that it is moved towards the right or the left hand parts. For the latter of these assertions is attributed to things that are moved in a circle, manifesting that to be moved to the right hand parts is to be moved to that part to which the right hand moves, and also that to be moved to the left hand parts, is to be moved to that part to which the left hand moves. Since therefore, the right hand and the left are called the east and the west through the before-mentioned causes, so that the former is the beginning of motion, but the latter follows, and in a similar manner, the one being a power in the circle of *the same*, but the other in the circle of *the different*, from which the motion of each is derived, the words "*towards the right and the left hand*," are very properly introduced by Plato. But to be moved on the right hand or on the left, pertains to things that are moved in a right line, these being the boundaries<sup>2</sup> of the motions according to breadth. Hence Timæus, having before separated the six motions in a right line, from the motion in a circle, and beginning in what is now said, from the soul, deservedly gives to it the difference of the motions towards the right and the left hand. And thus much concerning these motions.

Let us, however, consider the remaining opposition. For Timæus, as in the world, convolves the inerratic sphere according to the side, but the planetary sphere according to the diameter, just as in the soul he convolves the circle of *the same* laterally, but the circle of *the different* diametrically. In the first place, therefore, this must be considered mathematically, by drawing in a quadrilateral figure a

<sup>1</sup> i. e. To Ceres, or Rhea, who contains in her right hand parts Juno the fount of souls, and in her left Vesta the fountain of virtue.

<sup>2</sup> For *κατα τα οὐρα* here, it is necessary to read *περὰ τα οὐρα*.

diameter, and conceiving that the circle of *the same*,<sup>1</sup> is convolved according to the side, but the circle of *the different*, according to the diameter of the figure. The quadrilateral figure, also, must be adapted to the two circles, i. e. to the summer and winter tropics; and we must conceive, that they are moved with the motion towards the right hand parts, according to the two sides which are similarly posited in both the circles; and also that the middle [or the circle of *the same*] is moved according to the greatest of the two circles, but that the circle of *the different*, which is oblique with reference to both, is moved according to the diameter of this quadrilateral figure. For the oblique circle [i. e. the zodiac] is described about this, according to which all the period of the circle of *the different* is convolved.

Leaving however the mathematics, let us consider what the peculiarities are of the diameter and the side. For we shall find those of the latter to be, the unoblique, the effable, the comprehensive, and that which is connective of angles; but on the contrary those of the former to be, obliquity, the irrational, the comprehended, and that which divides angles. For according to all these peculiarities, the side differs from the diameter. And these also are inherent in the circles of the soul. For one of these circles is allied to simplicity, bound, and end; but the other to variety, multitude, and the nature which possesses infinite power. The one likewise is connective, but the other is the cause of division. And the one is allotted the dignity of comprehending, but the other that of being comprehended. Hence the one is very properly said to be convolved according to the side, as immutable,<sup>2</sup> as united, and as uniform; but the other according to the diameter, as rejoicing in progression, and multiplications, and as effective of difference. For the diameter is greater in power than the side, divides the angles, makes many spaces from one, and is situated obliquely. Hence in what follows, Plato says, that the lation of the circle of *the different* is oblique. But all these particulars are indications of the nature of the infinite.

“ But he gave dominion to the circulation of the same and similar. For he suffered it alone to remain undivided.”

This is the demiurgic sacred law, intelligibly proceeding from on high from intelligibles; viz. that more simple should predominate over more various natures,

<sup>1</sup> The circle of *the same*, is in the universe the equinoctial circle; and the circle of *the different*, is the zodiac.

<sup>2</sup> For ἀπαράλειτος in this place, read ἀπαράλλατος.



the more uniform over the multiplied, finites over infinites, and the more over the less intellectual. As therefore in intelligibles, bound has dominion over the infinite, in intellectuals the male over the female, in supermundane natures sameness over difference, and similitude over dissimilitude, thus also in the soul, the period of *the same* predominates over the circulation of *the different*. Hence also in sensibles, the planetary is under the dominion of the inerratic sphere, and every multiform genus of life is contained by the uniform genera. Hence from these things likewise it may be assumed, that sameness is better than difference; that again similitude appears to be more excellent than dissimilitude; and that the opinion of the generality of Platonists is not true, that difference is better than sameness and dissimilitude than similitude. For on account of the form itself of sameness, the circle of *the same* is more divine. For *the undivided*, signifies divine union, an indivisible life, and uniformity in powers. Why therefore, some one may say, if this is better, did not the Demiurgus suffer the whole soul to be undivided? We reply, because it is requisite<sup>1</sup> that the soul should possess all forms, and all the reasons and causes of mundane natures. And that which is comprehensive of twofold circles, is more perfect than that which is defined according to one power. For that which is after such a manner the same, as in sameness to comprehend difference occultly, is more excellent than that which subsists according to the psychical middle. But it pertains to the essence of the soul to have dominion over difference, in conjunction with sameness. For the intelligible and intellect, are as it were the circle of sameness alone. But the sensible essence, is as it were the circle of difference alone. For in the former, difference subsists occultly; but in the latter, sameness has an obscure and superficial subsistence. And the soul is a medium between both, being a duad, and having twofold circles, one of which pertains to intellect, but the other to the sensible essence. It likewise possesses twofold reasons, the one intellectual, but the other effective of the world; and the one proceeding to truly existing beings, but the other coming into contact with sensibles.

“ But as to the interior circle, when he had divided it six times, and had produced seven unequal circles, each according to the interval of the double and triple; each of the intervals being three; he ordered the circles [i. e. orbs] to proceed in a course contrary to each other; three of them indeed revolving with a similar celerity, but the other four dissimilarly to each other, and to the three, yet in a due proportion.”

<sup>1</sup> For εἶναι here, read εἶναι.

In the first place, if you are willing, let us now survey what is said by Plato, astronomically. For this mode of doctrine is appropriate, and let us conceive the depth of the planetary spheres, as one thing, and throughout similar to itself; because, as those who are skilful in things of this kind say, it consists of one matter; but is divided into seven orbs, which revolve in a certain respect contrary to each other. Or as some say, because the sun and the moon are similarly moved in their epicycles, revolving in their orbs with a motion contrary to that of the inerratic sphere. But others make one lation of the equable and the anomalous. Or [there is one depth of the planetary spheres,] because as others say, Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, make the first eastern phases,<sup>1</sup> after their conjunction with the sun, in consequence of the sun being moved with greater celerity than these planets in consequentia! But the moon makes western phases, because being moved more swiftly than the sun, she is perceived more easterly. Mercury and Venus however sometimes appear to us in this way, and sometimes in that. Or there is one depth because the planets make apparent stations, advancing motions, and retrogressions, are diametrically opposed to each other, and revolve in contrary directions, some being moved to the north, but others to the south. Or in whatever way you are willing to consider this affair; for there are different opinions on this subject. Or, which may be more truly asserted, because Plato says, the Demiurgus ordered the orbs to proceed in a course contrary to each other, he does not mean that the seven are moved in contrary directions, but the one orb and the seven, on account of their contrary lation. For thus, in what follows, he says, that the planets and the inerratic sphere, are at one and the same time moved with their proper motions, in contrary directions. Plato, however, neither here nor elsewhere makes mention of epicycles, or eccentrics; but describes the seven circles about one centre. Hence, he does not add other circles to these; nor does he make a mechanical difference of the motions. For independently of his omitting to mention these, the hypothesis of epicycles, and of phases, is by no means adapted to the circles in the soul. The circle of *the different*, therefore, is divided into these seven circles, three of which he says revolve with a similar, but the other four, with a dissimilar celerity. For three of them, viz. the Sun, Mercury and Venus, as it is said in the Republic, are equal in their course; but the other four, viz. the Moon, Saturn, Mars, and Jupiter, are unequal. At the same time, however, all of them revolve in a due proportion, both with reference to each other, and the universe; because the motion of them is evolved according to numbers. [And the periodic circulations of all of them,

<sup>1</sup> For *genesis* here, it is necessary to read *genesis*.

are terminated in a becoming manner.†] It seems also, as is manifest from what is here said, that Plato places the difference of the equality and inequality of the motions in the visible orbs of the planets, in the unequally moved circles [i. e. spheres] in which they are carried, prior to the planets themselves. Hence, placing the circles alone in the soul, without the stars, (for these he had not yet constituted,) he says that some of these are moved with an equal celerity, but others with an unequal celerity, both with reference to the former, and to themselves. And these things indeed are manifest.

The assertion, however, that each of the seven circles was divided according to the interval of the double and triple, each of the intervals being three, is literally considered difficult to be understood. At the same time it signifies, that according to each interval of the double and triple intervals, each being three, (for in four terms there are three intervals) the section was made, which is the same thing as a division according to length; in order that in each of the seven circles, there might be all the intervals, and all the ratios. For if the section had been made according to one interval, some of the intervals would have been distributed into some of the circles, and others into others. But because the division proceeds according to each, each part is a part of each, and all the circles participate of all the ratios. Unless indeed it may be more truly said, that the circles are divided six times, conformably to the number of the double and triple intervals, these being six. For the intervals being placed successively, and not divided according to depth; (but I mean by successively, so as to be extended through the whole circle, just as they were arranged through the whole right line, from which being bent the circle was generated,)—this being the case, it would be ridiculous to make such a section according to depth, as to divide each of the circles in one part.

These things therefore being premised, we shall further observe, beginning from the phenomena, that since the soul of the universe possesses the reasons of all mundane natures, and powers which give subsistence to them, it is necessary that it should not only contain the intellectual causes of man, and horse, and of other animals, but likewise prior to these, of the whole parts of the world; I mean of the inerratic and planetary spheres. It is likewise necessary, that from the duad which is in this soul, the heavens should sustain a division into two parts; that prior to the seven planets, there should pre-exist in it the true hebdomad; and that it should contain the causes of the dissimilitude and similitude of the circles.

† The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, but are inserted from the version of Thomasus.

For as our nature generates according to the reasons [or productive forms] in it, two eyes, five fingers, and seven viscera; for it antecedently comprehends the numbers of these parts, on which account it always produces after the same manner, and generates the same form, when the impediments arising from matter do not prevent the generation according to nature from taking place; and as the one sense in us, possessing the causes of these five senses, generates secondarily from itself, the powers which are distributed about the body; after the same manner also, the circle of *the different*, comprehends in itself the primordial causes of the seven circles [or spheres,] according to which they are adorned, and distributed in an orderly manner. For all heaven participates of both the circles; but the inerratic sphere participates more of the circle of *the same*, and the planetary sphere, more of the circle of *the different*. Hence the former is indeed undivided, but the latter is divided. The former also is moved from the east, but the latter from the west. For the one indeed imitates the uniform [and intellectual power of the soul, but the other its multiform powers,<sup>1</sup>] in consequence of rejoicing in motion and variety, though the inerratic sphere also is comprehensive of many divine animals. The circle of *the same*, likewise, comprehends the causes of all things, but it is without section; because all the multitude in it is connascent with itself through union, and it is vanquished by the bond of sameness. Hence also the inerratic sphere is moved with one lation. But each of the seven spheres, comprehends a multitude of powers, some of which are more total, but others are more partial. Now, however, Timæus delivers the unities, and the first comprehensions of them; but omits the inexplicable decrements of the divine reasons. For the circle [or sphere] of each, is a plenitude of appropriate life, which is either of a connectedly containing, or dividing, or binding, or anagogic, or of some other such-like peculiarity. Many powers likewise contribute to its perfection, some of which are generative of primary and secondary Gods, but others of dæmons, and others of partial souls.

Why however, some one may say, did not the Demiurgus produce a peculiar circle of essence, as well as of sameness and difference? We reply, because these are opposed to each other, but essence is common to the whole soul. Hence according to this the whole soul is one, but is bifurcated according to those; just as of the right lines, one precedes the two. Here likewise the monad precedes the hebdomad, just as the impartible of the soul, is the leader of the division into

<sup>1</sup> Here also the words within the brackets are wanting in the original, and are supplied from the version of Thomæus; so that in the original after *μορσιδῇ*, the words *καὶ νοερίων τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμιν, τοὺς δὲ πολλαίτερας δυνάμεις* must be supplied.

<sup>2</sup> For *τὴν τῆς ἐβδομάδος ἐστίν* in this place, it is necessary to read *πρὸ τῆς ἐβδομάδος ἐστίν*.

seven parts. But the division of the hebdomad into four and three, has a sesquitercian ratio, being the first of the symphonies, and has also the first numbers of the even and the odd. Of the three [circles] however, one [that of the Sun] is analogous to truth; another [that of Venus] to beauty; and the third, [that of Mercury] to symmetry: these three monads, as we learn from the *Philebus*, being situated in the vestibules of *the good*. But of the other four circles, one [that of Saturn] which is most stable, is analogous to *permanency*; another, [that of the Moon] which is moved with the greatest facility, is analogous to *motion*; another, [that of Jupiter,] which is of the most excellent temperature, to *sameness*; and another [that of Mars,] which is of a most dividing nature, to *difference*. Why also, it may be said, did not the Demiurgus place partial forms in the soul of the universe, but only the genera of all-various forms? We reply, because it pertains to *total* fabrication, to effect the latter. For a distribution of reasons into numerous parts, is the province of partible production. For this receiving each soul divided into the common genera of all beings, gives a distinct subsistence to the variety in them, according to the divine dividing art, and produces the division of each, as far as to individual forms. Hence also, this fabrication is said to be partible, and to be secondary to the total fabrication. A division, therefore, adapted to the total genera of souls is delivered, and likewise a mixture of wholes adapted to the fabrication which is the subject of discussion, and is 'total. These things, however, are manifest.

But why, it may be said, do we make the division into the inerratic and planetary spheres alone, or rather into the paradigmatic causes of these, and not into the four elements? For the soul of the universe, contains these also by its powers, and leads them by its motions. In answer to this, therefore, it is said by some, that all the quadruple order of the elements, is comprehended in the circle [or sphere] of the moon. For that which is material is but small as with reference to the universe, and is as it were a certain bottom of the world. For thus in the *Republic*, Plato divides the whole world, into eight whirls, (*στρογγύλαι*) comprehending the whole of a material nature in the ogload. These things therefore are said, and are well said. Again, however, it may be more perfectly said, that through this monad and heptad of circles, he comprehends all the parts of the world. For as in the heavens there are a monad and a heptad, thus also analogously in the sphere of aether, some things are co-ordinate to the inerratic circle, but others to the planetary spheres. And the whole ethereal order which is there, imitates the heavens. This is likewise the case in the profundity of the air, in the masses of

\* For *εμπιχνομένη* here, it is necessary to read *εμπιχνομένη*.

water, and in the bosoms of the earth. For not only the earth is divided analogous to the heavens, but also the other elements, and in each there are monads and heptads, comprehensive of the orders that are in them, and of empyrean, aerial, and aquatic plenitudes. The circles therefore of the soul, antecedently comprehend all these monads and hebdomads; the circle of *the same*, containing some of them, but the circle of *the different* others. *This likewise appeared to be the case, to the most scientific theologists that ever existed.*<sup>1</sup>

Plato also will grant, that series extend from the inerratic and planetary spheres, as far as to terrestrial natures, whether they are divine, or daemoniacal, or those of partial souls; since he is of opinion that series of the twelve liberated leaders extend from on high as far as to the last of things. For it is necessary that the less should follow the more principal periods, and that the several subcelestial should imitate the celestial series. Hence the psychical circles will comprehend the causes of these, as being arranged analogously to them. If these things, however, <sup>2</sup> are admitted, it is evident we must again say that the planets which revolve with an equal celerity are arranged in the middle of the wholes of the universe, not only as being analogous to the monads in the vestibules of *the good*, viz. to *truth, beauty, and symmetry*; but likewise after another manner, which we before mentioned, as possessing the bond of wholes; so that they are established according to that which elevates secondary to first natures, according to that which unfolds into light first to secondary natures, and according to that which similarly binds both of these together. Of the rest, however, we must say that earth and <sup>3</sup> the inerratic sphere are analogous to the *Synoches* Heaven and Earth [of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order of Gods]; but that water and [the planet] Saturn are analogous to Rhea and Saturn [of the intellectual order]; and air and Jupiter, to the Jupiter and Juno [of that order]. After these, it will not be inappropriate to say, that the Moon and Mars <sup>4</sup> have the next order; the latter possessing the power of separating first and masculine from middle natures; but the former of defining and distinguishing third and as it were feminine natures from those of a middle order. But in the media, the extremes are, that which possesses an anagoric power [i. e. Mercury], and that which has the power of unfolding into light [i. e. the Sun]. And the medium between these, is that which connectedly contains all things in amatory bonds [i. e. Venus]. This also theologists.

<sup>1</sup> Proclus, I have no doubt, means by these the Chaldean theologists.

<sup>2</sup> For *ἐκ* here, read *ἐν*.

<sup>3</sup> For *κατα* in this place, it is necessary to read *καί*.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of *αἶσα* here, it is obviously necessary to read *αἶσα*.

manifest. For they call the first of these, the messenger of the Gods; the second, *the gate of ascent*; and the power which is in the middle of both, Venus<sup>1</sup> being the friendship or love, which is the connective medium of the universe; whether the Sun is prior, and Mercury posterior to her, or vice versa. Perhaps too, they will revolve with equal celerity, so far as all of them look to one thing, the bond of wholes; and their energies will have this for their end, to establish all things in one union, so that the universe may be filled with its proper causes. All things therefore, are in the soul, according to unical comprehension. *For the eight circles are powers, unitedly comprehending things which subsist in a divided manner in sensibles, both in the heavens, and in each of the elements.* And thus much may in short be said concerning all the circles.

Again however, considering the circle of *the different* by itself, we say that its division into six parts, is most eminently adapted to the soul. *For according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans the soul is a hexad.* And they arrange the monad as analogous to a point, but the hexad, to that which is animated, and the heptad, to that which is intellectual. But how is it possible we should not say, that the number of seven circles is adapted to the soul, which is produced by the vivific Goddess [Rhea], who is a monad, duad, and heptad, comprehending in herself all the Titanidæ? Farther still, this may be considered after another manner; for the heptad is a number productive of opportunity (*καιροζουτος εστιν αριθμος*), and is perfective and apocatastatic of periods. In this respect therefore, it subsists appropriately with reference to the soul, which produces and directs all things by its motions. If, however, this be the case, it is evident that these circles of the soul are gnostic, and by a much greater priority, vital powers of it, both tetradic and triadic. For through both, they are comprehensive of all sensibles, and through the triad know all the similitude in them, but through the tetrad, all the dissimilitude, and all the variety and genera which they contain. They know likewise, through these, whether sensibles in their existence, whatever it may be, participate of a certain truth, or symmetry, or beauty, from truly-existing beings.

Moreover, the subsistence of these seven geometrical terms in each of the circles, gives a septuple increase to the ratios. But this is an indication of the self-motive nature of the soul. For it generates and multiplies itself, and is at one and the same time a heptad, and a number proceeding from the heptad.

<sup>1</sup> Ἀφροδίτην is omitted in the original, but both the version of Thomæus and the sense of the passage require it should be inserted.

Again, the psychical circles proceeding in a direction contrary to each other manifests that these powers proceed every where, are prolific of all things, and are the causes of the difference which is distributed every where, and of the contraries which subsist about generation. For contraries exist in the soul, in the heavens, and in matter. But of material contraries indeed, generation consists. These contraries, however, derive their subsistence from the psychical through the celestial reasons. For some things have the relation of *from which*, others that of *through which*, and others that of *by which*,<sup>1</sup> in the things which are generated by them. Moreover the similitude of the three and the dissimilitude of the four circles, are assumed appropriately to the numbers. For the triad indeed is perfective, and convertive to the same form. But the tetrad is prolific, and the cause of all multitude. All the numbers therefore, viz. the monad, duad, triad, tetrad, pentad, hexad, and heptad, are entirely in the essence of the soul; and after all these, the square from the heptad.<sup>2</sup> All these likewise terminate in the heptad. Hence, the essence of the soul, is on all sides hebdomadic. And the circle of *the same* indeed, is a monad; but the circle of *the different* is, as we have said, a heptad. *For the former is intellect in motion, but the latter is a light according to intellect; in the same manner as the heptad, according to the Pythagoreans.* The one also is impartible, analogous to intellect, but the other is partible; though it also consists of the impartible essence, and of the essence which is divisible about bodies. [The partible nature however is redundant]<sup>3</sup> in it: for difference has dominion in it. Hence, the one is monadic, but the other hebdomadic; not only because the heptad pertains to the essence of the soul through its similitude to the vivific Goddess;<sup>4</sup> (for she is a monad comprehensive of two triads, which she contains in herself) but also because the primary distribution of the soul into parts is hebdomadic as has been before shown. For things which are distributed into parts from one impartible power, have the first number hebdomadic. The number also which is derived from the heptad, is adapted

<sup>1</sup> For  $\alpha\phi' \omega\nu$  here, it is requisite to read  $\psi\phi' \omega\nu$ .

<sup>2</sup> The double and triple intervals that are filled with the arithmetical and harmonical middles, are the numbers 6, 8, 9, 12, 16, 18, 24, 27, 32, 36, 48, 54, 81, 108, 162. And the double and triple intervals that are filled both with the above-mentioned middles, and with sesquioctaves and leimmas, are the numbers, 384, 432, 486, 512, 576, 648, 729, 768, 864, 972, 1024, 1152, 1296, 1458, 1536, 1728, 1944, 2048, 2304, 2592, 2916, 3072, 3456, 3888, 4374, 4608, 5184, 5832, 6144, 6912, 7776, 8748, 9216, 10368. And the sum of the number of the terms of both these series, is 49, which is the square of 7.

<sup>3</sup> It appears to me that the words  $\piλεοναζει το μεριστον$ , ought to be inserted in the original, after the words  $\alpha\lambda\lambda' \epsilon\nu \alpha\nu\tau\psi$ .

<sup>4</sup> viz. to Rhea.



to dividing powers, in the same manner as the heptad. The latter, however, pertains to supermundane, [but the former to mundane powers.]<sup>1</sup>

If however, it be requisite to refer all the composition of the soul, to the divine orders, for it has the images of all of them, the beginning of the reference, must be assumed from the former part of this dialogue, in which it is said, that the soul was fabricated, not as we say junior to the body, but both in generation and virtue prior to and more ancient, as the mistress and ruler of it. For Timæus thence beginning to speak concerning it, gives to it a superior dignity with respect to the generation of the whole corporeal composition. It must be said, therefore, that its progression, so far as it rules, and is the mistress of the body, must be referred to the principle of all things. But so far as it is allotted a triple and united hypostasis, we must refer it to the summit<sup>2</sup> of intelligibles; and as generated from essence, same and different, to the whole of the truly intelligible breadth; of which essence and being possess the summit; but eternity which is the cause to all things of permanency in the same, the middle; and intelligible animal, which causes itself to be different in its progressions to intelligible animals, the end. For the whole there, as the Parmenides teaches us, consists of dissimilar parts. This triple whole therefore [the soul], which is a mixture of dissimilar elements, is a thing of this kind. But so far as the soul is a self-begotten and intelligible number, we must refer it to the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders. For there the first number subsists in conjunction with difference. For as theologists say, we must survey that first order, as being<sup>3</sup> the cause of the series of things, [and of other co-ordinations]<sup>4</sup> which are divided according to number. But there also, Parmenides gives subsistence to the whole of number, and from thence unfolds all things into light. And so far as the soul is a whole consisting of three elements, we must refer it to the intellectual wholeness, which connectedly contains wholes and parts. For the three middles are derived from those connectedly containing Gods. One [i. e. the geometric middle] proceeding from the first of these Gods, who comprehends the rest, and collects all things according to one reason, into one world, and one union. But another [i. e. the harmo-

<sup>1</sup> The words within the brackets, are wanting in the original, but are supplied from the version of Thomæus. Hence it is requisite to add in the original after *ὑπερκοσμίαις*, the words *οὗτος δὲ τὰς ἐγκοσμίαις*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ῥαυροῖητα* here, I read *ἀπορροῖητα*: for the summit of intelligibles, which consists of *bound, infinity, and that which is mixed*, is the first triple and at the same time united hypostasis.

<sup>3</sup> For *οὐσαν* here, it is requisite to read *οὖσαν*.

<sup>4</sup> The words within the brackets are supplied from the version of Thomæus; so that after *ἀρῶν* in the original, the words *καὶ ἄλλων συντοιχῶν*, must be added.

nic middle] proceeding from the second of these Gods, who imparts a different bond to different things, a greater bond to such as are greater, but a less to such as are less.<sup>1</sup> And another [i. e. the arithmetical middle] being derived from the third of these Gods, who imparts by illumination from himself, communion to natures of a third rank ; through whom things that are less in bulk, are more united, but such as are greater, are united in a less degree.<sup>2</sup> This however, is the distinguishing property of the arithmetical middle. So far also, as the soul has an idea and configuration of such a kind, and employs a rectilinear progression, and circular conversion, for the reason we have before-mentioned, we must refer it to the triad of intellectual figure. For the right, and the circular line, first subsist in that triad. Hence in the idea of the soul, lines were assumed, and circles in conjunction with, and separate from each other. Again, so far as the soul receives monadic and hebdomadic powers, we must refer it to the intellectual hebdomad. But as the medium<sup>3</sup> between intelligibles and sensibles, and as assimilating sensibles to intelligibles, we must refer it to the ruling [supermundane] series. For this series assimilates secondary natures to unical summits. And as energizing according to twofold energies, some of which providentially attend to sensibles, but others adhere to intelligibles, we must refer it to the liberated Gods, who touch and do not touch the universe. These observations therefore, which we have briefly made, will afford assistance to those who wish to peruse the writings of our preceptor, in which the truly arcane conceptions of Plato concerning these things, are unfolded.

I am astonished however at those Platonists, who think that the soul should be divided according to parts into the celestial souls, viz. into the one and the seven of these. For where is it possible in incorporeal natures, that there should be a division of this kind, which abolishes the whole ? For such a distribution into parts as this, is the peculiarity of partible masses. And I also wonder at those, who think that these souls are entirely supercelestial, since Plato in what immediately follows, shows that in all he has said, he speaks concerning one soul, and this mundane. Hence, I think it is better to assume this as a principle, that it is here necessary,

<sup>1</sup> For in the harmonic middle, the greater terms have a greater ratio to each other than the less. Thus in 2. 3. 6. the ratio of 6 to 3 is greater than that of 3 to 2.

<sup>2</sup> Of this union the arithmetical middle is an image ; for in this, there is a greater ratio in the less, and a less ratio in the greater terms. Thus in 5. 6. 7. 8. the ratio of 6 to 5, is greater than that of 8 to 7.

<sup>3</sup> For *μεσση* here, read *μεσση*.

<sup>4</sup> The English reader will find these arcane conceptions of Plato concerning all these orders of Gods, beautifully unfolded in my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

the whole should remain in the divisions, and that the discussion is concerning mundane animations; and having assumed this, to say that the one soul of the world is indivisible, and at the same time is divided according to these powers; first into the duad, secondly into the triad and tetrad, and thirdly into the hebdomad. For the division of it is made according to these numbers. And such is our opinion on this subject.

Theodorus the philosopher however, of Asine, being full of the doctrines of Numenius, speculates the generation of the soul in a more novel manner, from letters, and characters, and numbers.<sup>1</sup> But the divine Iamblichus blames every theory of this kind, in his treatise in confutation of the followers of Amelius, and also of Numenius, whether he includes Numenius among those who adopted this method, or whether he any where met with writings of the disciples of Amelius, containing similar opinions: for I cannot say. The divine Iamblichus therefore says in the first place that it is not proper to make the soul every number, or the geometrical number, on account of the multitude of letters. For the words body (*σῶμα*) and non-being itself (*οὐκ οὐ*) consist of an equal number of letters. Non-being therefore, will also be every number. You may also find many other things, consisting of an equal number of letters, which are of a vile nature, and most contrary to each other; all which it is not right to confound and mingle together. In the second place, he observes, that it is not safe to argue from characters. For these subsist by position, and the ancient was different from the present mode of forming them. Thus for instance the letter Z, which he makes the subject of discussion, had not the opposite lines entirely parallel, nor the middle line oblique, but at right angles, as is evident from the ancient letters. In the third place, he adds, that to analyze into the primary ratios of numbers, and to dwell on these, transfers the theory from some numbers to others. For the heptad is not the same which is in units, and tens, and hundreds. This however, existing in the name of the soul, why is it requisite to introduce the disquisition of primary ratios? For thus he may transfer all things to all numbers, by dividing, or compounding, or multiplying. In short, he accuses the whole of this theory as artificial, and containing nothing sane. I am also not ignorant of the arguments of Aristotle against the psychogony of Plato, and the solutions of those arguments, by certain Platonists; but I have not deemed it requisite to mention them any farther here, as I have elsewhere made them the subject of discussion. For the soul is not a

<sup>1</sup> Proclus gives an epitome of this theory, but as it would be very difficult to render it intelligible to the English reader, and as in the opinion of Iamblichus, the whole of it is artificial, and contains nothing sane, I have omitted to translate it.

circle as magnitude, nor is it requisite to think that to confute this hypothesis, is to embrace the Platonic theory. Hence I have thought fit to omit the farther consideration of these particulars, as I know that I have published a treatise in answer to the oppositions of Aristotle to the Timæus, in which there is no small discussion of these particulars, and where it is shown that magnitude cannot rightly be ascribed to the soul, according to Timæus, and demonstrating from thence, that the soul cannot by magnitude which is partible, intellectually perceive intelligibles which are impartible; as neither is it possible for the impartible to be adapted to the partible. Nor must it be said that the motions of the heavens [are the motions of the soul of the universe];<sup>1</sup> but that according to the doctrine of the Timæus, the former subsist from the latter. Nor must it be admitted that it is impossible frequently to understand the same thing by the same power, but this must necessarily be the case in more transitive intellections, since intelligibles are bounded, and intellection subsists in a circle. Omitting therefore, the farther consideration of these things, which are more amply discussed in the above-mentioned Treatise, let us direct our attention to the words of the philosopher, which appear to me to exhibit the doctrine<sup>2</sup> of things themselves.

"After, therefore, the whole composition of the soul was generated, according to the intellect [or intention] of its composer, in the next place, he fabricated within the soul, the whole of a corporeal-formed nature."

The first head, as we have before observed, of the discussions concerning the soul, was about its hyparxis, the second, about its harmony, the third, about its figure, the fourth, about its powers, and the fifth, about its energies. In all the other heads therefore, the philosopher has most perfectly instructed us. But the last, was that concerning the energies of the soul, which he adds in what is now said. Since however, there is a twofold form of the energy of the soul, I mean the gnostic and the motive, he separately discusses each of these; and shows how the soul by moving itself, moves other things, and how by knowing itself, it knows the natures prior, and also those that are posterior to itself. Such therefore is the scope of the words before us. But that he did not teach us, in what has been already said, concerning the multitude of souls as those assert, who say, that his discussion about the essence of the soul, pertained to that soul which is without habitude [to body]; but about its harmony, to the soul which is called by

<sup>1</sup> The words within the brackets are supplied from the version of Themæus.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of παραδωσειν here, read παραδοσιν.

them *in habitude*; and about its figure, to the soul which ranks in a certain order; and farther still, that he did not teach us about supermundane souls, according to the opinion of others, who assert that he produces one, and seven supermundane souls, is I think through these things sufficiently manifest. For he conjoins to the universe, the soul which was fabricated according to the intention of the father, and constructs within it the whole of a corporeal-formed nature. And this is indeed evident from the whole design of the dialogue. For the whole discussion was concerning the world, and not concerning supermundane progeny.

You may also see with what accuracy Timæus adds each of the words. For the words, *according to the intellect*, manifest that intellect is the paradigm of the universe. For all-perfect animal is intelligible intellect, according to which this universe, and the soul of the universe were constituted. They likewise signify that nothing was constituted in vain, nor more nor less [than was fit]; but that all things requisite to the completion of the psychical essence, were fashioned in a becoming<sup>1</sup> manner, and that the essence of the soul received all the demiurgic will. For material natures, on account of matter, distribute into parts, impartible form, and that which is a whole is received by them as partial, and that which is without interval, as possessing interval. But the soul receives all the demiurgic fabrication, conformably to the will of the Demiurgus. The words also *its composer* manifest universal energy. For the words "*according to intellect*," are indicative of completion; but *its composer* of an energy, the whole of which is at once always present.<sup>2</sup> The words likewise, *the whole composition of the soul*, manifest that nothing escapes the demiurgic art, but that the whole progression of the soul, is governed by the form and power of the Demiurgus. But the words, "*in the next place*" or "*after this*" must not be apprehended as having a temporal meaning, but as significant of order. For the separate life of the soul is one thing, and the secondary life posterior to this, and which communicates with the body, is another. And in a divine essence, things more perfect precede such as are more imperfect. The words likewise, "*within the soul*" evince that the world<sup>3</sup> is connascent with the soul, and the offspring of it. For if the world proceeds in the soul, she is the mistress of its subsistence, comprehends the whole of its essence, and co-operates with the Demiurgus in the orderly

<sup>1</sup> *Ἱερωτικῶς* is wanting here in the original; but according to the version of Thomas, ought to be added.

<sup>2</sup> The word in the original is *συνεταρτι*, in which word, an energy wholly, ever present is indicated by the preposition *συν*.

<sup>3</sup> It is requisite here, to add *τὸν κοσμον*, omitted in the original.

distribution of body. For the soul of the universe is not <sup>1</sup> like partial souls, which receive bodies fashioned by other things, and on this account, at one time rule over them, but at another, are incapable of governing their proper organs. But proceeding from, she produces together with her father, her habitation, or rather her vehicle. Hence also, she governs the universe, and energizes eternally, and without solicitude and labour. For every thing which makes according to essence, makes with facility that which it makes.

Moreover, the words *he fabricated* manifest the production of the Demiurgus proceeding through solid and resisting substances; and also the externally adventitious formation of sensibles; and does all but <sup>2</sup> represent him, employing Vulcanian <sup>3</sup> organs, by which he fashions the whole heaven from brass, depicting all things with forms, giving rotundity to corporeal masses, and figuring each thing with an appropriate form. Since the fabrication however of the universe is triple; the first being that according to which the Demiurgus produced it from the elements bound together by analogy, a whole of wholes; but the second being that according to which he adorned it from the whole spheres, since it is impossible, as it consists of the elements, that it should not be divided into the spheres; and the third being that which gives completion to the universe from celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial animals;—this being the case, Plato in what is now said, unfolds to us the middle fabrication. For he who fabricates the whole of a corporeal-formed nature within the soul which is divided into circles, evidently fabricated it by dividing it into spheres. For the spheres are images of the circles [in the soul] which the Demiurgus forming, is said to have fabricated the whole of a corporeal-formed nature, within the circles of the soul: by which also, it is evident, that the eight circles comprehend in themselves the sublunary region, since the Demiurgus placed in them the whole of a corporeal nature. For if it were not so, Plato would have said, that the Demiurgus fabricated every thing celestial, and not every thing corporeal within them. Every thing subcelestial therefore as being co-divided with the heavens, is in these circles, or as being contained in the circle of the moon; theologists also calling the moon earth, through the alliance of the earth to it. Hence it is common to both of them to conceal the light.

“And collecting middle to middle, he co-harmonized them to each other.”

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *το γαρ* in this place, it is necessary to read *ον γαρ*.

<sup>2</sup> For *μορῶν* here, read *μορῶν*.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *ὀφθαλμοῖς* in this place, it is requisite to read *ἡρώσεως*.

Porphiry, understanding by middle the physical part of the soul, endeavours to co-adapt it to the middle of the universe, though Plato does not here even in words, assume that which is physical. If, however, we wish to interpret what is now said more agreeably to the meaning of Plato, we must say that the Demiurgus placed in the soul, which has a middle order between intellect and body, the middle of the world; and not simply in the soul, but in its most middle part. For this is to collect middle to middle. But that this is his meaning is evident from what follows, in which he says that the soul was every way extended from the middle to the extremities of the universe. From these things therefore, we may assume, that the whole of a corporeal nature is every way similarly animated, and that the whole of the mundane soul is on all sides exempt from the body, in order that it may imitate the whole Demiurgus, who is present to all things, and separate from all. We may also assume, that the corporeal nature being the middle of the soul, makes the animation of it to proceed every way similarly. For if the extremes of the universe were conjoined to the middles themselves, some things would be more remote from, but others nearer to the soul. It is necessary however, that all things should remain as it were rooted in, and filled with life from it. But the adaptation of middle to middle, shows that the soul is similarly exempt from all things, and is equally distant from all. For if it was distant from some things more, but from others less, we must ascribe to it a habitude to secondary natures. Each of the assertions therefore is true, that body is the middle, and that it is adapted to soul, which is also a middle. Moreover, "*to collect*," exhibits the demiurgic union, and the bond according to which the universe is perpetual. But to co-harmonize, indicates the harmonious association of the body with the soul; the latter performing what pertains to itself, and the former preserving its proper order, and neither divulsing, nor drawing downward the intellection of a divine essence. For this is the harmonious form of communion. If however, in the association of the less and the more excellent nature, either the former or the latter falls off from its perfection, and causes perturbation in the energies of the more excellent nature;—in this case, such a communion is unharmonious,<sup>1</sup> disorderly, and confused. Hence the soul subsists according to harmonic ratios, and the whole of a corporeal-formed nature, is seen to be in friendship with it through analogy, and is harmoniously composed. What bonds therefore, can be more indissoluble, more perpetual, or more divine than these? None, except it should be said the will itself of him, by whom the soul is bound, and which is exempt from the things that are bound.

<sup>1</sup> For *εναρμυστος* here, it is necessary to read *αναρμυστος*.

“ But the soul being every way interwoven from the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and circularly covering it as with a veil, at the same time herself revolving in herself, gave rise to the divine commencement of an unceasing and wise life, through the whole of time.”

The mode of animation according to conversion or regression, beginning, as we have before said, from beneath, proceeds to things on high, and from the last, ends in the summits of things; and such is the mode now assumed by Plato. For the soul proceeding from on high, as far as to the last recesses of the earth, and illuminating all things with the light of life, the world being converted to it, beginning from the last of things, is animated both according to its middle, and the whole of its interval. Besides this also, it externally enjoys the intellectual illumination of soul. Hence, the soul is said to occupy the middle of the universe, as placing in it the powers of itself, and a symbol of its proper presence. It is likewise said to extend itself to the extremities of the universe, as vivifying it on all sides; and to circularly cover it as with a veil, in consequence of having powers exempt from partible masses; in so doing, all but projecting the ægis of Minerva, from which

A hundred golden ornaments depend.\*

Through this likewise, it externally surrounds the whole world. And if it be requisite to speak the truth, Plato through these words closes the mouths of those who fancy that the figure of the soul is truly circular, and thus possesses interval. For how is it possible for a circle to be interwoven with a body, and being extended equally to cover it with itself as with a veil, and thus be adapted to it, according to all the interval of the world? This therefore immediately manifests, that the imagination is false of those who apprehend the soul thus to subsist.

In addition to this also, it is necessary to survey that which we before asserted, that the being interwoven with, and circularly covering the universe as with a veil, assimilates the soul to the intellectual life, which prior to this Plato said, surrounds the two circles of the soul. For as this life comprehends the soul, so the soul comprehends the universe. And farther still, it must be considered how the soul is assimilated to those Gods, to whom Parmenides attributes the similar and dis-

\* This verse is from the Iliad, but it has suffered much from the transcribers. For in the Commentary of Proclus it is *της εκατον χρυσαυοι χρυσοι ηρεθοται*, whereas it ought to be,

*Της εκατον θυσανοι παγχρυσοι ηρεθοντο.*

Iliad. lib. ii. 443.



similar. For the interweaving exhibits the presence of the soul in the world, through similitude. For all communion of essences, powers, and energies, subsists from this. But the circularly covering the universe as with a veil, as it signifies transcendency, represents to us, how the soul is incommensurable to the world, an through its incommensurability, is imparticipable. For that which is incommensurable, is certainly dissimilar to that to which it is incommensurable. Perhaps however both have both. For to be interwoven, is the province of things, which are partly similar, and partly dissimilar. And to circularly cover as with a veil, together with the inseparable, exhibits intellectual comprehension, which is secondarily present to the universe. For through this comprehension, the universe imitates intellect, of which it becomes ' the first resemblance. Hence it is present with the universe, in a separate manner, and illuminates all things, without<sup>1</sup> being itself converted to the illuminated natures, or receiving habitude, or co-ordination with them. For these things are foreign to the whole soul [or to the soul which ranks as a whole]. Because however body proceeds together with the soul, but not the soul together with body; and the soul by its infinite power, comprehends the world; by its non-possession of interval, all interval; by its impartible nature, every thing partible; and by its simplicity, that which is composite;—hence, the fabrication of body is suspended from the generation of the soul, but not vice versa. The essence of the soul therefore, is the leader, as being more allied to intellect, and body is suspended from the soul, as from its cause. Is there then any reason why we should endure to admit such an *interweaving*, as some adduce, who conceive the soul to be present with body, through partible powers, *entelechia*,<sup>2</sup> and inseparable lives? By no means. For every distribution of this kind, is secondary to the one soul [of the universe]. Since in us also, the *entelechia* animates the body in one way, but the separate soul in another; the former indeed, being divided about the corporeal masses; but the latter being established in itself, and impartibly present everywhere, and containing partible lives, by its own impartible powers. But if it be requisite to speak in a manner becoming the dignity of the whole soul of the universe, the *interweaving* is an unmingled union of the body with the soul, and a communion, connected comprehension, and vivification of the soul, proceeding from the Demiurgus, and being again converted to him. For as we must not understand the “*circularly covering as with a veil*,” either ac-

<sup>1</sup> For γενομενη here, it is obviously necessary to read γενομενον.

<sup>2</sup> Ουκ is omitted here, in the original.

<sup>3</sup> The cause by which the animal is *vitally* moved, is the rational soul, but the cause by which the animal thus moved, is defined or bounded, is called by Aristotle *entelechia*. See my translation of his treatise On the Soul.

accompanied with interval, or locally, but as signifying that the soul is on all sides similarly exempt from the body, and by being thus exempt uniformly comprehends it; thus also, we must not understand the "*being interwoven*," as accompanied with contact, but as manifesting the animation which pervades through all things, and the union of all things with it. For the soul filling all things with itself, and connectedly containing all things, contains, prior<sup>1</sup> to other things, itself in purity, and converts the world to itself. Hence, by a much greater priority, it is itself converted to itself. On this account, Timæus adds, that it is itself convolved in itself in order that he may indicate the difference between the soul, and the body of the universe, which is indeed convolved, yet not in itself, but in the whole of place which it occupies. For this is convolved locally, but the soul vitally and intellectually, understanding itself, and finding itself to be all things. For it is the plenitude of wholes, and contains the images of all things, which intellectually perceiving, it is said to revolve in itself; the revolution indicating the intellectual and at the same time apocatastatic; but its revolving in itself, the peculiarity of self motion. For the universe also revolves, but is moved by another (i. e. by soul).

Here, therefore, we have a solution of that which was investigated by us. For we inquired, looking to the whole of the psychogony, where Plato has delivered to us the gnostic peculiarity of the soul, in the same manner as he has the essential and the vital peculiarities; the former indeed through the triple mixture; but the latter through the motion in *the same*. Through the circular conversion therefore, of the soul to itself, the Demiurgus effected its gnostic peculiarity, and which Plato in what is now said, more clearly manifests. For in order to show how the soul knows all things, he says, that it revolves in itself, and thus revolving, began to live a wise and intellectual life. Hence, it is immediately evident, that the conversion to itself, is the knowledge of itself, and of every thing in, prior to, and proceeding from itself. *For all knowledge is a conversion to the object of knowledge, and an alliance and adaptation to it. And on this account also, truth is an agreement of that which knows with the thing known.* Since however, conversion or regression is two-fold, the one returning as to the good, but the other as to being, hence the vital conversion of all things is directed to the good, but the gnostic to being. Hence too, the former when converted, is said to have the good, but the latter to have being. *The apprehension of truth also, is the comprehension of being, whether existing in that by which it is apprehended, or prior to, or posterior to it.* This therefore, as I have said, becomes evident to us from these things.

<sup>1</sup> For *πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων* in this place, read *πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων*.

Since however, in the souls of partial animals, reason at one time energizes intellectually, and is converted to itself, but not immediately from the first generation [of the animal]; for in animals, the progression is from the imperfect to the perfect, and reminiscence is after oblivion; on this account Plato says, that the soul gave rise to the divine commencement of a wise life, beginning from on high, and from the first of its energies. For it has some energies, which are divine and separate, but others, which are motive of the universe. It likewise always has the more perfect, prior to those that are secondary. For proceeding from the Demiurgus, and beginning to energize, it commences from those energies that are more divine; and through these moves the secondary, viz. the intellectual and the doxastic energies. This beginning however is entirely divine. But that which commences from things imperfect, is evidently material. [For in the Gods, the more perfect energies precede those that are subordinate;'] but vice versa in material natures. For generation begins from things imperfect, and proceeds to the perfect. *The human soul therefore, though it sometimes energizes divinely, yet it ends in this energy, being satisfied at first to energize conformably to right opinion, after this scientifically, and then divinely, exciting<sup>1</sup> the one of itself, which is more excellent than its intellect.* But a divine soul, has this for its first energy, and on account of this, moves all the secondary gnostic powers of itself, and always the subordinate through the superior powers. By a much greater priority therefore, did the soul of the universe give rise to the divine commencement of a wise life, energizing first according to its divine part [or *the one* of its essence], but afterwards supernally according to its dianotic part, moving this, and causing it to be deiform. Unceasing energy however is the consequence of this. For that which is generated, and that which exerts a divine energy in time, is naturally adapted to proceed from the imperfect to the perfect. But that which begins from the most perfect and divine energies, neither at any time ceases from this energy, nor ranks among things which have a temporal subsistence. If therefore the soul of the universe gave rise to a divine commencement of energy, it energizes incessantly, and always, and with invariable sameness. For that which receives the perfection of itself in time, begins from the imperfect, and not from a divine commencement. From this also, again it follows, that the life of a divine soul is wise. For if the life of this soul is unceasing, it is defined by intellect and wisdom.

<sup>1</sup> The words within the brackets are omitted in the original, but are inserted from the version of Thomæus. Hence in the original, after the words *δηλον ὡς ενεργος εστιν*, it is requisite to add, *και γαρ τοις θεοις, αι ενεργειαι τελειοτεραι προηγουνται των καταδεεστων*.

<sup>2</sup> For *εγερσασα* here, it is necessary to read *εγειρησασα*.

For we must admit one of three<sup>1</sup> things, either that the life of it is always wise, or always destitute of wisdom, which it is not lawful to say, or that it is at one time wise, but at another time unwise. It remains therefore, that a wise life in a divine soul, in consequence of being incessant, never<sup>2</sup> fails.

In another respect also, wisdom is adapted to this soul, because it participates of divine wisdom; but life, because it evolves the impartibility of the intellectual life, and has an extension in its energies, and transition in its motions. For life (*βίος*) is most adapted to the soul. For if at any time, this word is used in speaking of intellect, as in the *Philebus* there is said to be a certain (*βίος*) life of intellect, it signifies the peculiarity of the life. *For the word βίος manifests these two things, viz. the peculiar form of each life, and the evolution of the choice from which it has its progression.* It is properly therefore asserted of souls; for in these there is an evolution [of choice]. Sometimes also it is asserted of intellect, and then it indicates to us the peculiarity of the life of intellect. It may be said however, that all these particulars, are inherent in all divine souls, viz. to commence a divine beginning, to energize incessantly, and to possess a wise life. In what respect therefore, does the soul of the universe transcend other divine souls? Plato then foreseeing this, adds, "*through the whole of time.*" For all souls indeed, energize transitively, and have different periods, greater or less. But the soul which ranks as a whole, alone receives the first and the one interval of time, and the whole and first measure, which comprehends the periods of other souls. For as of different divine bodies, there are different periods, but the period of a divine generated<sup>3</sup> nature contains in itself all of them, comprehending apocatastatically, many Saturnian, many Solar, and many Lunar periods; and all time exists in the one period of the universe; after the same manner also other divine souls, have their apocatastatic periods in more partial times. Since however, the intelligible breadth is bounded, but the apocatastasis is different to different souls, to some being shorter, and to others longer, because the object of intellection to them, is more or less excellent; and since the apocatastasis of the universe, has for its measure, the whole extension of time, and the whole evolution of it, than which there is no greater, except by the again and again; for thus time is infinite; and of those beings that intellectually perceive according to one form, the soul of the universe is the first

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *πολλὰ* here, it is requisite to read *τρία*.

<sup>2</sup> *Μη* is omitted in the original.

<sup>3</sup> i. e. Of the body of the whole world. For the epithet *a divine generated nature*, is primarily applicable to this; though it also signifies every body, which is moved perpetually and circularly, whether in the heavens, or under the moon.

participant of time; this being the case, it is necessary that this soul, should receive the whole form and measure<sup>1</sup> of time. Hence it is necessary, that the soul of the universe alone should energize through the whole of time, but other souls according to a part of this whole, conformably to which their apocatastasis is defined; [in the same manner as may be seen to be the case in other forms. For whatever participates of a certain form, primarily<sup>2</sup> is seen to receive the whole of it.] *Supermundane souls therefore, if there are such, though they perceive intellectually with transition (for every soul understands after this manner, according to which also, intellect and soul differ) yet they apprehend more than one object of intellection. For as they are nearer to intellect, which intellectually perceives all things at once, it is necessary that they should at once understand more than one thing. But the soul of the universe, is the first which intellectually perceives one object only at once, which makes it to be mundane.* In this respect therefore, all mundane differ from supermundane souls. Hence, the soul of the universe, understanding one thing at once, has its apocatastasis according to the whole of time, which comprehends the period of the divinely generated nature. And according to the former indeed, it is inferior to supermundane; but according to the latter, it transcends all mundane souls. For all these have their apocatastatic periods in some part of the whole of time;<sup>3</sup> but the soul of the universe, intellectually perceiving the one intelligible world,<sup>4</sup> and running as it were round it, completes its period in the whole of time. For it is necessary, being the soul of the world, that its mundane [intellect] should evolve the whole intelligible world, and that on this account it should make the intellectual apocatastasis of its mundane period, according to the perfect number, conformably to which it makes the whole corporeal period. For this universe imitates the invisible period of the mundane soul, through its own proper circulation, and makes its apocatastasis locally in conjunction with the apocatastasis of the soul, which is accomplished intellectually. And this is the illustrious peculiarity of the mundane soul, which Plato unfolds in what he now says, to those who are able to apprehend his meaning. After this manner therefore, his words are to be understood.

<sup>1</sup> The words *καὶ ὅλον τοῦτον τὸν μέτρον*, are omitted in the original, but are supplied from the version of Thomæus.

<sup>2</sup> The words within the brackets, are also omitted in the original, and are added from the version of Thomæus, except the word *primarily*, *πρωτῶς*, which is not in his version, but ought to be inserted.

<sup>3</sup> In the original *ἐν μέρει τοῦ ἐνός, ἐν τῷ παντί χρόνῳ*, which is evidently erroneous; but ought to be conformably to the version of Thomæus, and the above translation, *ἐν τινὶ τοῦ ὅλου χρόνου μέρει*.

<sup>4</sup> I have here also followed the version of Thomæus. For the original is, *ἡ δὲ νοῦσα, τὸν ἐπὶ κόσμον νοοῦσα*.

Again however, it must be investigated, what it is which produces in the soul a transitive motion, and an intelligence not fixed like that of intellect, and also time instead of eternity? In answer to which, it must be said, that as the soul has a partible essence, so likewise it has a life not one, but co-divided with its essence, and this is also the case with its intelligence. For the soul instead of being essence, is essentialized, instead of life, is vitalized, and instead of intellect, is intellectualized; participating of these primarily, in consequence of their being prior to the soul. In intellect therefore, the essence is one, and the life is one, and the intelligence of essence is impartible, in the same manner as the essence, and being adapted to it, like a point to a point, has no transition. The intelligence of the soul however, is not impartible alone, but as we have said, is also partible, and not having sufficient strength to be adapted to the impartible, but distributing itself about the impartibility of intellect, it always applies another and another part of itself to intellect which is fixed, in order that it may wholly apprehend that which is established prior to the whole of itself. After this manner therefore, it produces a transition of energy, that which is partible in it, evolving itself about the impartible, and together with the transition, it generates time. Its transition however is effected in a two-fold way, either by being evolved about *the one*, and according to all the parts of itself having *the one*; for into as many parts as it is divided in so many ways the essential, the same, and the different are contained in it. Applying itself therefore to *the one*, by each of its parts, and frequently coming into contact with it, it introduces transition to its intellection, in order that the whole of it may intellectually perceive that which is prior to it. But in another way, its transition is effected, by each part of it energizing about all things. For every part of it has these three, viz. essence, the same, and the different. Not being adapted therefore to the whole of each, it wholly applies itself to each, so far as it participates of each; to essence indeed, through that which is partially a thing of this kind, and to other things after a similar manner. Thus therefore we solve the doubt.

In addition to this also, it may be inquired how Plato not having yet delivered to us the generation of time, now says that the soul lives through the whole of time? To this inquiry likewise it must be said, that he delivers the generation of that time, of which the animal nature of the world participates. For he says, that the father on beholding the universe moving and living, constituted time, for the purpose of measuring the motion in it. Since therefore, this life, and this motion to the universe which has a body, is adventitious, so likewise, time is imparted by its generator, from whom it has life and motion through soul. But the soul also has these from the father, I mean life, and the motion which is

according to time. Since however, it has something self-subsistent, it co-introduces something to the progression of itself into existence from its generator. As the Demiurgus therefore, moves the soul, and it is also self-motive, after the same manner, the soul likewise is the cause to itself of being moved according to time. Hence before the Demiurgus gave to this universe time, the soul is said to be moved through the whole of time. For thus it gives subsistence in conjunction with the Demiurgus to animal time, just as in conjunction with him, it constitutes the life, according to which<sup>1</sup> motion subsists. It also governs according to nature, that which lives and is moved through it, and has not as it were, a casual inspection of it, imparting nothing to that which it governs. Concerning time however, we shall again speak.

But from these things, thus much may be summarily collected, that the soul of the universe, moves indeed the universe, establishing in the middle of it guardian powers, filling the whole of it with vivification, and intellectually containing it externally; imitating in this respect its cause which generates three principalities of Gods, viz. the guardian, the vivific, and the demiurgic. The soul, however, by a much greater priority moves itself divinely, beginning from its first energies; and on this account moves both itself and the universe incessantly. Hence likewise it conducts itself, and all heaven wisely. Again, the soul making the one extension of time the measure of its proper period, convolves the universe with invariable sameness. For the universe accomplishes its apocatastasis in conjunction with the apocatastasis of the soul. For it does not accomplish this prior to the apocatastasis of the soul; since the same things take place again and again in the world,<sup>2</sup> and generated natures are produced according to the intellections of the soul; nor posterior to it, in order that this restitution to its pristine state may not be without a cause. For what else but the period of the soul will comprehend the whole of it. If, however, we assert these things rightly, again the soul will have that which is divine from the one being, the unceasing from eternity, wisdom from intellect, and all things from the one cause of all.

“And the body of the universe indeed, was generated visible; but the soul is invisible, participating of the rational energy and harmony, and pertaining to intelligibles and perpetual beings, being generated by the best of causes, the best of generated natures.”

<sup>1</sup> For καθ' ἐν here, it is necessary to read καθ' ἑν.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of ἐπειδὴ πάλιν ἐν τῇ κοσμῳ, in this place in the original, it is necessary to read, ἐπειδὴ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῇ κοσμῳ.

<sup>3</sup> The version of Leonicus Thomæus ends here.

Since Plato gives to the soul afterwards, all such things as he before gave to the body, viz. essence, harmony, figure, powers, and motion, and conjoins both to the completion of one animal; in order that you may not ignorantly suppose that body and soul are of a similar dignity, being deceived by homonymous appellations, he concisely reminds us of the difference between the two, and does not superfluously say, that body is visible, but the soul invisible; and shows that body is the object of opinion, because it is sensible and generated, but that the soul is unbegotten, as with reference to the body, but generated, as with reference to intellect. For it belongs at one and the same time to eternal beings, and generated natures, but is the last of the former; since time has now a place in it. And that indeed, which is primarily eternal being, is in both respects eternal, viz. both according to essence, and according to energy. For it has not an energy different from its essence. But that which is generated, is in both respects generated, always becoming to be, and always energizing, as being in generation according to time. The soul, however, in a certain respect participates of eternity, and in a certain respect of generation; but it energizes temporally. And the extremes indeed, [i. e. eternal beings and generated natures,] are in one way only perpetual, the one eternally, but the other temporally. But the medium between the two, is perpetual in a twofold respect, as being bifurmed, and on this account, of an ambiguous nature; not only according to the partible and impartible, and according to its two circles, but also according to perpetual being, and that which is generated. Hence it belongs to eternal beings, and is the best of generated natures, being produced by the best of causes. And again you see, the difference of the soul with reference to body. For Plato had before called body the most beautiful of generated natures; but now he calls the soul the best of things generated. But it is common to both to have been generated by the most excellent cause. The soul however, as being nearer to its maker, is *the best*; but body, as being more remote from him, is indeed *most beautiful*, yet not *the best*. For the *most beautiful*, is secondary to *the best*, in the same manner as *beauty* to *the good*.

In what is here said, however, Plato may seem to call the Demiurgus the best of intelligible and eternal beings, in the same manner as he calls the soul the best of generated natures; and thus to bear witness to those who make one God prior to the world.<sup>1</sup> But if some one should thus understand the words, by inverting them, yet at the same time it is evident from analogy, that we must not place in-

<sup>1</sup> Proclus in what he here says, alludes to the Christians.



telligible and eternal beings, as forms<sup>1</sup> in the Demiurgus, but other essences posterior to him, if soul has the same ratio to all generated natures, that the Demiurgus has to eternal beings. And we must either make him look to things posterior to him, though in his speech to the junior Gods, when he commits to them the fabrication of mortal natures, he orders them to imitate his power about their generation. He does not, therefore, fabricate immortal animals, by imitating things posterior to him, but things entirely prior to him, in the same manner as he wishes the junior Gods to fabricate mortal natures by imitating him. Or if we avoid this inconvenience, we must admit that there are many intelligible Gods, though they are posterior to the Demiurgus, which those above alluded to, will not grant. Will it not therefore be better to assert, either that the soul is said by Plato, to belong to intelligibles and eternal beings, as being the best of generated natures, and as truly both impartible and partible, in consequence of its middle subsistence between the two; or that because he says it participates of rational energy and harmony, it belongs to [or primarily participates of] intelligibles and perpetual beings? For the harmony which is in it is generated, not being harmony itself, but harmonized. And its rational energy is not eternal being, but has generation, as subsisting according to time, and being transitive. How therefore does the soul participate of the rational energy and harmony? And how does it happen, that harmony and the rational energy, are not primarily in the soul, but according to participation? I answer, because these have a prior subsistence in the Demiurgus. For he produces the Muses, and *Mousagetes* [or the leader of the Muses, Apollo], and also the Mercurial series. Hence the rational demiurgic energy and harmony, subsist in him primarily; the former being Mercurial, but the latter Apolloniacal. And the soul being filled from these, participates of the rational energy, and of harmony. And if it be requisite to speak clearly, what appears to me to be the case, *harmony must be conceived to have a three-fold subsistence; so as to be, either harmony itself, or that which is first harmonized; being a thing of this kind according to the whole of itself; or that which is secondarily harmonized, and in a certain respect participates of harmony. And the first of these must be assigned to intellect; the second to soul; and the third to body.* The rational likewise, or reasoning energy, has a three-fold subsistence; the first being primordial; the second according to participation; and the third according to representation or resemblance. For there is also a certain vestige of the rational energy, in some irrational animals. We likewise understand essence, figure, and power, in a three-fold respect. For essence, according to its primary subsistence,

<sup>1</sup> For εἶδη here, it is necessary to read εἶδη.

and the first figure, and the first power, are in intelligibles. But that which participates in a certain respect of all these is the corporeal nature. For there is also something [i. e. matter] which is unfigured, unessential, and powerless. The soul, however, has each of these according to participation; but wholly participates of them according to the whole of itself. For it is wholly corroborated, is wholly invested with figure, and wholly<sup>1</sup> essentialized. For the unfigured in it, does not precede the figured; nor the powerless, power; nor the unessential, essence: since if they did, it would not at all differ from material bodies. The soul therefore, participates of the reasoning energy, of harmony, figure and power, and wholly participates of each of these; but body participates of them partially. Again also, from these things, the middle nature of the soul presents itself to the view, and it is also evident that Plato very properly says, that it was generated by the best of causes, the first and best of generated natures, and that it is invisible, but the first participant of intelligible harmony.

372 " Since therefore the soul was mingled from these three, viz. from the nature of same and different, and from essence, and was distributed into parts, and bound according to analogy, itself at the same time returning by a circular energy to itself; hence, when it touches on a certain thing possessing a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible, it then speaks concerning it, being moved through the whole of itself."

We divide the energies of the soul in a twofold way, the first of which is into the motive and gnostic energies; for both these are adapted to the soul, as the daemoniacal Aristotle also says. Of the motive energies however, we find some inherent in the soul itself; others, proceeding into the universe; and others, subsisting between both these. For those indeed which extend through the whole world, from the middle to the extremity of the universe, are mundane alone. But those which convolve the soul, are alone separate. And those that circularly cover the universe as with a veil, are separate and at the same time inseparable, abiding and proceeding about the universe. But of the gnostic energies, some pertain to the first of things; others, to those of a middle nature; and others, to the last of things. For the soul knows itself, and the natures prior to, and posterior to itself; since it is the image of things prior, but the paradigm of things posterior to itself. Hence perceiving itself, and evolving itself, it knows all things, not at all departing from its own proper power. For it is not proper that it should recur

<sup>1</sup> For *μὲν* in this place it is necessary to read *ἐν*.

to any other place, in order to perceive beings, but that it should intellectually see itself. Enough therefore, has been said concerning the motive energies of the soul. But here, and in what follows, he speaks concerning its gnostic energies. And that the soul indeed knows beings, and especially the soul of the universe, is evident; since we see that they are also apprehended by our soul. If however it knows, it remains to be considered how it knows, and after what manner it knows intelligibles, and after what manner sensibles, whether by the same, or by different powers, and whether by looking to itself, and the reasons it contains, or by being extended to the objects of knowledge themselves, just as the sight to that which is visible, and which is external to it.

In short therefore, Plato denominates these gnostic motions of the soul, contacts with the objects of knowledge; indicating by this, the immediate nature of their apprehension, and their impartible communion with the things known. If, however, each knowledge is a contact, the soul will come into contact with both intelligibles and sensibles, according to an appropriate application of itself to them, yet not so as to apprehend both by the same projecting energy. For it does not come into contact with sensibles, through its application of itself to intelligibles, nor with intelligibles through its application to sensibles. Both these however, viz. to touch and not to touch, are the peculiarities of the liberated Gods, as we learn from the *Parmenides*. Hence, we before rightly asserted, that the soul according to the gnostic energies which it possesses essentially, and through which it knows things prior and posterior to itself, is assimilated to those Gods. As Plato therefore, in what he now says, speaks concerning these energies, he first wishes to remind us of what has been before said, the mention of which is not superfluous, but contributes to what follows. For from these and those, the discussion will have an appropriate explication. The particulars however, of which he had before spoken were, concerning the essence, concerning the harmony, concerning the form, and concerning the powers of the soul. Hence Plato recapitulating says, that the soul is entirely mingled from three parts, essence, same, and different. And it has been shown what the mixture is, and that it is vivific. For the uniform cause of souls, constitutes the soul in conjunction with the Demiurgus. It has likewise been shown how the triad pertains to the soul, and from what genera, and that it is from the middle genera. The soul also, was divided by the duple intervals according to the geometric middle, and was again bound through the remaining middles. For he called them bonds. A circular motion likewise, was given to it, through the circles, which comprehend its harmony, and its form. For in the harmony, the distribution into parts preceded the analogy, and in the form, the division preceded the contact. That which

remains however, is in each. For the colligation has a representation of the solution; since binding pertains to things which are loosened. The distribution also of the colligation is analogous. For analogy, as we have before observed, is the most beautiful of bonds. And the soul is divided Titanically, but is adapted harmonically, and is mingled vivifically. Farther still therefore, in the third place, it is divided into those powers in it, according to which it returns by a circular energy to itself. For the twofold circles are the powers of it. Hence these things being premised, that which follows must be demonstrated.

Since therefore the soul consists of three parts, essence, same and different, and has these genera, as media between impartible and partible natures, it knows both through them. For it is the image of the former, but the paradigm of the latter. Hence as Empedocles says,

Water by water, earth by earthly sight,  
Ether divine we see by ether's light;  
Fire ever splendid we discern by fire;  
View love by love, by strife contention dire.

After the same manner, we also say, that the soul by its essence, knows all the essences from which it is derived, and all those which it essentially precedes. But by its sameness, it knows the sameness subsisting in all intelligible, intellectual, and sensible natures. And by its difference, the difference which proceeds through all things. Since likewise it is essentially harmonized, it knows through its own proper harmony, both intelligible and sensible harmony. Since too, it has intellectual powers, through these it knows power wherever it exists. From what has been before said therefore, the discussion of the gnostic energies of the soul is rendered manifest. For the soul, from the things which it possesses essentially, knows both the paradigms, and the images of them. And through the reasons which the Demiurgus imparted to it, it intellectually perceives both the natures that are prior, and those that are posterior to itself. For returning by a circular energy to itself, it comes into contact, as Timeus says, with both impartible and partible essences; and entering into itself, finds itself to be the reason of all things. For all knowledge derives its completion through a similitude of that which knows to the thing known. And similitude is completed by the communion of one form. Hence, there is one reason in that which knows and the thing known, and being the same, it conjoins these to each other. Since however, the reasons in gnostic essences are different,<sup>1</sup> according to the measures and diminutions of the essences, on this account knowledge receives an all-various

<sup>1</sup> For διαφορως here, read διαφοροι\* and for γνωστικης shortly after, read γνωστικοι.

difference. For intellectual knowledge is impartible and eternal, because the reasons in it of things are of this kind. But psychical knowledge is evolved, and subsists in discursive energies; because the reasons of the soul, through which it knows things, have an evolved nature.

Farther still, intellectual knowledge is uniform, because the reasons in it subsist monadically, for they are primordial. But the psychical knowledge is biformed; because the reasons also have a twofold subsistence, the dianoetic subsisting in one way but the doxastic in another. Knowledge therefore is both one and twofold, according to the essential division of reasons. For if one of the circles knows the intelligible, but the other the sensible essence, what is it which says that these are different from each other, and that the former is a paradigm, but the latter an image? For it is not possible for that which has not a knowledge of both, to speak concerning the difference of them, as we may learn in the Theætetus. Hence, as it is there said, that the nature which knows visibles and audibles, the former through the sight, and the latter through the hearing, and says that these are different from each other, ought to know both; so this reason which is different from the two circles, speaking through all the soul, some things concerning intelligibles, but others concerning sensibles, and being common to both the circles, is, as I should say, the energy of the essential part of the soul. For so far as the soul is one essence, according to this, it has this one gnostic energy, which Plato calls reason. Hence also, we simply call the whole soul rational. This reason therefore is the one knowledge of the soul, which through the circle of *the same* knows the impartible, but through the circle of *the different* the dissipated essence. For though both the circles have a subsistence between the impartible and the partible essence, yet the circle of *the same* participates in a greater degree of the impartible, but the circle of *the different* of the partible essence. And this is the one essential reason, as the essence is one, prior to *the same* and *the different*. The life of it likewise, is the self-motion, which exists in the two circles; but the knowledge of it is transitive, this also being common to both the circles. And on this account, the soul is not only biformed, but also uniform. Thus much therefore, has been said, for the sake of the comprehension of the whole dogma.

Descending however to particulars, it must be observed, that Plato says the soul consists of three parts, and that it is mingled from these; through the mixture indeed, indicating the union of the congregated parts; but through the *number*, their unmingled purity. For they would not remain *three*, unless they preserved their proper essence unconfused. It must also be observed, that speaking of partible natures, he says, "*when the soul touches on a certain thing having a dissipated essence.*" For the word to *have* (το τε γὰρ εχειν) pertains to things which

possess the essential and being, adventitiously, and the subject of which is unessential and non-being. And the word (*το τινος*) *a certain thing*, is most adapted to things which in some way or other are partible, and endued with interval. Farther still, *to touch* is appropriately asserted, because the soul proximately presides over sensibles, and is suspended from intelligibles; *the contact manifesting a knowledge which is clear, immediate, and established according to a definite projection towards the object of knowledge.* "*As a contact,*" says some one of the Gods. But concerning impartible essences, Plato was satisfied with alone saying, "*and taken on that which is impartible.*" For the simple and the uniform are the peculiarities of the impartible essence alone. Moreover, *to speak*, appropriately signifies the psychical intelligence. For the soul is reason, but *to speak* is the energy (*ενεργημα*)<sup>1</sup> of reason, in the same manner as to perceive intellectually, is the energy of intellect, and to germinate, of nature. For the energies of essences, are paronymously denominated with the essences themselves.

We ought not however to be ignorant of what Porphyry relates concerning the words *it speaks*, and *it ends* (*περι του λεγει, και ληγει*); and that he met with one interpreter, Amelius,<sup>2</sup> who instead of "*it speaks being moved,*" reads, "*it ends being moved;*" though it is difficult to adapt this reading to the soul, which is moved incessantly, as we have before observed. Porphyry adds, that he said to Amelius, *it speaks* should be adopted, and not *it ends*, and that Amelius was very much hurt [at this emendation], but that he afterwards found one Socrates who reads *λεγει* as well as Amelius. It must therefore, be written by us, "*it speaks being moved through the whole of itself,*" and not "*it ends being moved,*" as that Socrates and Amelius wrote, according to the narration of Porphyry. For *to speak*, is the essential<sup>3</sup> energy of reason. The soul therefore, being reason, and a rational intellect, speaks and sees intellectually through the whole of itself, (when it comes into contact with a partible, or an impartible essence,) what that is which is the object of its perception, because it is itself both impartible and partible. And if indeed, the genera in it, were alone divided from each other, the whole soul would not from essence possessing knowledge, have a knowledge of essence. But if the genera, were entirely corrupted, there would not be a definite knowledge of beings,

<sup>1</sup> As *κίνημα*, as we learn from Simplicius, is the boundary of motion, just as *το νυν the now* is the boundary of time, so *ενεργημα* is the boundary of energy. Thus too *νοημα* is the boundary of *νοησις*, or intellectual perception, and *αισθημα* of *αισθησις*, or sensible perception. And as *αισθημα* being the termination of sensible perception, is an impression of it in the sensuous, that which is analogous to this must be conceived to take place in *κίνημα*, *ενεργημα*, and *νοημα*.

<sup>2</sup> *Αμελιος* is omitted in the original.

<sup>3</sup> For *ουσιωδους* here, it is necessary to read *ουσιωδης*.

nor would it be possible to say, that essence is one thing, but sameness another. Since however, the middle genera are mingled with each other, yet not so as to be confounded, the soul understands each thing definitely, and as Plato says, through the whole of itself. But if it speaks, being moved through the whole of itself, it is evident that it is one and not one; that it has a knowledge common to the extremes, and yet differing from them; and that as one, it wholly speaks about all things, and not wholly, as not being [entirely] one. The circle of *the same* likewise, in the knowledge of intelligibles, knows sensibles as from paradigms; and the circle of *the different* knows intelligibles, as from images. For each having perfectly the object of its knowledge, necessarily sees that one is the paradigm of the other, but the other the image; or not knowing that the one is a paradigm, or that the other is an image, it will not know in a self-perfect manner. Knowing however, that the one is a paradigm, it knows that of which it is the paradigm, and knowing that the other is an image, it knows that of which it is the image. Very properly therefore, is it said that the soul speaks of all things, through the whole of itself. And thus much concerning the things themselves.

Since however, some erroneously read *it ends*, and not *it speaks through the whole of itself*, as we have said Porphyry relates, and that Amelius thus reading, was not able to unfold the meaning of the words of Plato, thus much must be added, that to read *it speaks being moved*, is attended with less difficulty, but that we may also read *it ends*; the word  $\alpha\gamma\gamma\epsilon\iota$  signifying one apprehension from many conceptions, of things knowable, arriving at the peculiar and definite intuition of each; in order that the meaning of the whole may be, *the soul being moved, ends at the knowledge of each thing [with which it comes into contact]*. For the end of being moved is to cease to be moved, the soul never ceasing to be moved, and always arriving at a certain intelligence. Aristotle also, perceiving this to be the case in the heavens, says that they are always moved in *the end*.

“It also asserts what that is with which any thing is the same, from what it is different, to what it is especially related, and in what respect, and how it subsists; and when any thing of this kind happens either *to be*, or *to suffer*, both in things which are generated, with reference to each, and also with reference to such as possess an eternal sameness of being.”

There are three interpretations of the proposed words, all which are reasonable, and it is requisite to exhibit the power of each. For the first interpretation makes the whole to be one sentence; but the second makes it to be two sentences, dividing the words as we do; and the third makes it to be three, form-

ing the division according to each of the colon. The first interpretation also, is as follows: "*When the soul touches on a certain thing which has a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible,*" here the interpretation making a small stop, [i. e. a comma] it adduces the rest of the words, viz. "*it says being moved through the whole of itself, what that is with which any thing is the same, &c.*" For Plato asserts, that the soul says all these things, being moved through the whole of itself, both of the impartible and the partible essence, coming into contact in both, with sameness and difference, habitudes and qualities, actions and passions. For all these are analogously in intelligibles and sensibles. But the second interpretation makes one sentence to be that which we have before mentioned, viz. "*When the soul touches on a certain thing which has a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible.*" And the second sentence to be, "*It also asserts being moved, what that is with which any thing is the same, from what it is different, to what it is related, in what respect, and how it subsists, &c.*" This interpretation however, differs from the former, because it separates what is said about essence from what is said about things pertaining to essence. And the third interpretation makes a rapid division of the colons. For it makes one division to be that which we have before mentioned; the second, "*It also asserts what that is with which any thing is the same, and from what it is different;*" and the third, all that follows. As we have said therefore, the words have a threefold interpretation. We should direct our attention however, especially to the things themselves.

That sameness, then, and difference are in intelligibles, is evident. But how are relation, situation, quality, when, and passion there? For these are well known to exist in sensibles, but how do they subsist in intelligibles? May it not be said, that the genera of being manifestly subsist in intelligibles, because they are properly beings? You may also assume that relation, situation, &c. may be surveyed analogously in intelligibles; relation indeed, if you are willing, according to the paternal and maternal, and also the similar and dissimilar, the equal and unequal, only you must not assume unessential habitudes, but such as are adapted to intelligible essences. For the most principal habitude is there, where there is a more abundant communion, and all things subsist primarily. Hence Plato says, "*and to what it is especially related.*" But the *in a certain respect* ( $\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\iota$ ) subsists in intelligibles, so far as each of them is not wholly *the one*, but after a certain manner ( $\pi\alpha\rho$ ): for *the one* is simply one. And again, *the same* which is there, is also *different*, but is not simply different; since if it were, difference<sup>1</sup> would be no other than sameness. The like also takes place in the rest. All things

<sup>1</sup> For  $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma$  here, it is obviously necessary to read  $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma$ .



therefore, says he, are all, and each is one according to essence, but all things according to participation. And this is what the *in a certain respect* is in intelligibles.

Again, the *how it subsists*, is there according to the differences of participations. For many things participate differently of the same peculiarity. Thus for instance, permanency participates of sameness, and motion also participates of it, yet not after the same manner, but the former more, and the latter less. In the orders of forms likewise, intelligibles participate in one way of *the one*, or of essence, but intellectuals in another way, and of these some differently from others, according to the measures of the essence of each. Hence the *how it subsists* is there. But the *when* is there, either according to the operations of intelligibles on sublimary natures; for these sometimes participate of them, and they become sometimes participable by certain things; or it is there, according to the intellections themselves of the soul. For the soul applying itself at different times to different forms, at one time, intellectually perceives these, but at another those. And eternal being sometimes accedes to it, in the same manner as sometimes the intelligible. Each thing likewise is there, *with reference to each*, so far as all things are in each other, and proceed through each other, and all things are allied and adapted to all; or so far as they are suspended from a certain one, or so far as one is cause, but another the thing caused; or so far as in some way or other they subsist differently. And *to suffer* is there, so far as they are filled from each other, and all things impart to all their own peculiarities. For Plato frequently manifests *participation* by the word *suffering*, as we may learn in the Sophista. For he there says, that *whole* is *the suffering one* [or that which is passive to *the one*], but is not *the one itself*, because it participates of *the one*. These things therefore, are in intelligibles and in sensibles, because both in the latter and in the former, it happens that each exists and suffers with reference to each. Plato therefore, [as I have said,] is accustomed to indicate *participations* by *suffering*, and as we have said, to call every thing which participates, that which suffers the thing<sup>1</sup> of which it participates.

In short, the soul of the universe speaks through the whole of itself according to one knowledge, both of generated natures, and of those which possess an eternal sameness of being, and asserts of each what that is with which it is the same, and from which it is different, and how each subsists according to existence, or action, or passion. For both among real beings, and generated natures, one thing in a greater degree suffers from another, and one thing in a greater degree acts on

<sup>1</sup> For *causum* here, it is requisite to read *causivum*.

another; all which the soul intellectually perceiving, asserts some indeed through the circle of *the same*, but others through the circle of *the different*. For it antecedently comprehends all sensibles, and their actions and passions. For since the universe is one animal, it is copassive with itself, so that all generated natures are parts of the life of the universe, as of one drama. Just as if a tragic poet should compose a drama, in which the gods and heroes, and other persons, are introduced, and in which also he assigns to such of the players as are willing the utterance of heroic or certain other speeches; the poet himself in the mean time comprehending the one cause of all that is said. It is requisite therefore, to conceive a thing of this kind in the whole soul of the universe. For giving subsistence to all the life of the world, which is one and various, like a many-headed animal speaking with all its heads, and uttering partly Grecian and partly Barbaric language, this soul comprehends the causes of all generated natures; and knows particulars by universals, accidents by essences, and parts by wholes. But it knows all things simply according to its divine part. For a God so far as a God knows things partial, and preternatural, and in short all things, even though you should adduce matter itself. For every thing, whatever it may be is one, so far as it is from *the one*. The knowledge therefore of all things simply and immediately, is divine.

“ But reason becoming true according to *same*, and also being conversant with *different*, and revolving about *same* without speech and sound, in that which is moved by it.”

Atticus by *reason* here, understands the *attentive* power of the soul; but Porphyry, the charioteer, moving the twofold horses; and Iamblichus the whole soul. For the soul moves the whole of itself, and through the whole of itself is the reason of beings. And all the interpretations indeed, appear to exhibit the meaning of Plato, but that of Porphyry is more concordant, both with what is here and elsewhere said. For this reason which is now assumed, is neither that which is essential, nor that which subsists in energy, but that which is as the one power of the essence of souls, according to which also the soul is one, just as it is bifurmed according to sameness and difference. Or why were there not three circles, one according to each of the elements which are three, but two only, unless there is one essence in both? The power therefore of this one essence, is this reason, which is neither essence itself, nor the energy from essence having the third order. Hence this reason being one, knows according to the same. For it does not sometimes know the intelligible, and sometimes the sensible, like our reason, which is not able to apprehend both according to the same. This reason

therefore, knows at once both *same* and *different* about the intelligible, and about the sensible essence, not *being* true, like intellect, but *becoming* true about both, on account of the transitive nature of its knowledge of both. So that the words *according to same*, signify the difference between the knowledge of a divine soul, and our knowledge; but the word *becoming* signifies the difference between psychical and intellectual knowledge. This reason therefore, knows intelligibles and sensibles, by coming into contact with intelligible and sensible sameness and difference; but it passes through the whole soul, here indeed, moving the circle of *the same*, but there, the circle of *the different*; and by the one surveying intelligibles, but by the other sensibles. In this respect likewise, it adumbrates the whole Demiurgus, concerning whom it is said, [by the Chaldean Oracles] "by intellect he possesses intelligibles, but he introduces sense to the worlds." For thus also the psychical reason, being borne along in the soul so as to move both itself and the whole soul, about intelligible and sensible sameness and difference, at one time produces opinions and persuasions, but at another, intellect and science, *becoming* indeed, and not *being* true, in the same manner as intellect itself. For intellect is *really* true, and is true according to *same*; either as at once knowing both beings and generated natures, or as always being such, and not sometimes, like the reason of partial souls. For this is not always invariably true, being filled with error and ignorance through generation. Or this reason is *becoming* to be true, as being transitive in its twofold knowledge; but is true according to *same*, as always comprehending the whole form of each object of knowledge, and not conformably to our reason, evolving each of the forms which it beholds, but surveying at once the whole of every thing which it sees. For we meeting with a different part of the same thing, do not see according to *same*, but we perceive each thing partially. Or it may be said, that this reason is *according to same*, when conversant with sameness and difference, *becoming* simply after the same manner true, both about the intelligible and the sensible, as knowing both at once, so far as *same*, and so far as *different*, that it may see and tell that the one has its progression from the other.

To be therefore, *according to same*, manifests that this reason is gnostic, according to one projecting energy, both of that which is truly *different*, and that which is truly *same*. For possessing at once a transitive knowledge of these, this reason is *becoming* to be true, and of which the energy is to speak of that which is truly *same*, and of that which is truly *different*, in the intelligible,<sup>1</sup> and in the sensible nature. For the work of this reason is to see in what intelligibles differ from sensibles. For it is necessary that there should be a certain thing

<sup>1</sup> There is an omission here in the original of *rov ev ty νοητῇ*.

which is gnostic of both, in order that it may say intelligibles <sup>1</sup> are one thing, but sensibles another. But "*it is borne along in that which is moved by it,*" as proceeding into the twofold circles, and moving both itself and them. For the *lotion* manifests the progression from one knowledge, divided into a twofold knowledge. This reason itself however, is a uniform knowledge [or a knowledge having the form of *the one*], both of intelligibles and sensibles. Or it may be said, that it speaks in the soul, because the intelligible is one thing and the sensible another; or that it knows <sup>2</sup> both, being prior to both the circles, which know intelligibles and sensibles in a divided manner. For since the soul is both a monad and a duad, according to one knowledge, it unitedly comprehends intelligibles and sensibles; and again, it comprehends some things according to the circle of the *same*, but others, according to the circle of the *different*. As therefore, in essence, the monadic precedes the bifurmed, and this is also the case in harmony, in form, and in powers, thus also in gnostic energies, the one reason is the primary leader of distributed knowledge. These things however, have been frequently repeated by me, through the ambiguity in which the interpreters are involved in explaining them.

Plato therefore, indicating these particulars, says that reason itself becoming true is borne along [i. e. revolves] about both the intelligible and the sensible, in that which is moved by it, i. e. in each of the circles. But it is borne along without speech and sound. For inward reason is not at all in want of either of these; but they are requisite to that reason which proceeds through the mouth. So that it is just as if he had said, that this reason has a motion more perfect than every<sup>3</sup> energy which proceeds externally. For sound and voice are assumed as symbols of sensible motions. Inward reason therefore, as being the charioteer, and moving in its course each of the circles, produces in us a twofold knowledge, which Plato delivers in what follows. But if we read, as we find it written in the most accurate manuscripts, *in that which is moved by itself*, and not, *in that which is moved by it*, viz. by reason, this will manifest the whole soul, signifying it from its definition. For the thing defined, is in a certain respect the same with the definition of it. Reason therefore, being borne along in the soul; for it is the soul which is moved by itself; at one time knows the *same* and *different* of sensibles, but at another, of intelligibles. And it seems that *same* and *different* especially characterize knowledge, in the same manner as motion and permanency characterize life. Hence

<sup>1</sup> For *αἰσθητά* in this place, it is necessary to read *νοητά*.

<sup>2</sup> For *εἶδος* here, read *εἰδω*.

<sup>3</sup> For *πᾶσαν* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *πᾶσιν*.

also, Plato particularly makes mention of these, because all knowledge has an alliance to them.

"When it is conversant with a sensible nature, and the circle of the *different* proceeding with rectitude, enunciates what it perceives to the whole soul; then stable and true opinions and belief are produced."

In what is here said, Plato speaks about the knowledge of sensibles, and how the reason in the soul of the universe generates this knowledge, viz. by moving the circle of the *different*, and the reasons in it which preside over the orderly distribution of wholes, and by preserving this circle in a state of undeviating rectitude. For *rectitude* manifests *right opinion*, as Porphyry interprets, and Iamblichus admits. It likewise manifests the untamed and the non-verging in providential energies. For unwearied, and rapidly-moving power, are adapted to intelligence; but the inflexible, and the uninclined, to providence and prolific energies. And to the impartible essence indeed, purity<sup>1</sup> of intelligence, is adapted; but to the partible essence, undefiled energy. Porphyry therefore, considers the circle which is moved with rectitude to be impartible; but that which is not accurately a circle, but in a certain respect participates of a right line, to be partible. For the knowledge of sensibles tends to externals, and is again reflected to the soul itself. Hence, that which is not accurately a circle in the soul, is neither a right line alone, such as is the knowledge of sense, nor a circle, such as is the knowledge of dianoia. Iamblichus however, rejects all this, as pertaining to human, and not to divine knowledge. When therefore, the charioteer moves the circle of the *different*, but this remaining undeviating and converted to itself, excites the reasons of sensibles, and announces to the whole soul the quality of each sensible object; (since the whole soul knows according to this, every thing sensible; for the circle of the *same* when it beholds intelligibles, knows also sensibles as from cause, but the circle of the *different* knows them immediately, and as it were in a co-ordinate manner)—when this is the case, then stable and true opinions and belief, are generated in it. For the more divine soul judiciously approving, or rather, imparting by illumination, a more intellectual energy to the doxastic circle, this circle possesses with purity its own proper life, and the knowledge in it is rendered stable, antecedently comprehending in itself in a stable manner things that are locally moved, but such as are flowing and contingent, faithfully and stably.

<sup>1</sup> For *καθαροτης* here, it is necessary to read *καθορητις*.

*For opinion indeed, is the energy and knowledge of the doxastic soul ; but faith is the stable and undeviating judgment of opinion. And thus much concerning this particular.*

It deserves to be investigated however, how the circle of *the different* is, as has been said, gnostic of every thing sensible, and the circle of *the same*, is gnostic of intelligibles, as will be said. For though by dividing the motive powers from each other, one of the circles is the cause of motion to the right hand, but the other of motion to the left, yet the gnostic powers must not be separated after the same manner, but it must be admitted that they have a knowledge of sensibles or intelligibles. May it not therefore be said, that the vital motions pertain to progressions, but the gnostic to regressions ? And the circle of *the same*, indeed, as being proximate to intelligibles, proceeding from thence, is by proceeding moved vitally, forms by its progression the first period, and through it moves the whole world. For the less principal follow the more principal periods. The assertion of Aristotle also is true, that generation is moved according to both ; possessing the invariable from the motion to the right hand, but the variable from the circulation to the left hand. The circle of *the same* therefore, is converted to the intelligible ; and on this account is gnostic of intelligibles. Hence it is necessary that every where conversion or regression should follow permanency. But the circle of *the different*, abiding in the circle of *the same* ; for it is proximately comprehended in this, just as this is by intellect ; proceeds through vital motion, to the second thing, which is moved by it, I mean to the second circulation ;<sup>1</sup> and through this also moves generation, just as the circle of *the same*, through the inercatic sphere, moves the universe. Being converted however, or returning through knowledge, it is converted to the vital motion of the circle of *the same* which is proximately above it. But returning to it through knowledge, it is gnostically converted to that which the vital motion of the circle of *the same* administers vitally. And thus it obtains a knowledge of the whole world, conjoining the regression of itself to this circle of sameness, which abides prior to it. Thus too, the one circle becomes gnostic of intelligibles, but the other of sensibles. For if the latter moves the period of *the different*, it is necessary that it should know this period and also the things of which it is the leader, and what being a medium it follows ; just as it is necessary that the circle of *the same*, if it moves the universe, should know to what being assimilated, it lives this life. So that to the one of these circles the regression is through a part to the whole ; but to the other,

<sup>1</sup> viz. The circulation of the planetary spheres.

through a whole to another whole.' And thus much has been said by us in answer to this inquiry, which demands profound consideration.

It is not proper therefore, to think that the soul of the universe receives the knowledge of sensibles externally, or that it is in want of organs to the apprehension of them. For these things pertain to partial souls. But we ought to conceive, that being converted to itself, it has the reasons of sensibles, produced in energy from itself. Hence also, Plato accurately says, that the circle of the different energizes *about* that which is sensible, but not *towards* the sensible essence, in order that he might indicate the causal comprehension of sensibles in the reasons of the soul, but not a knowledge co-ordinate with sensibles, and firmly established in them. And thus much concerning the things themselves. The words however, "*enunciates to the whole soul,*" are concordant with the words, "*it speaks, being moved through the whole of itself.*" But they indicate, that the circle of the *different*, proximately comes into contact with sensibles; and that through this the whole soul obtains a knowledge of them. The word *αυτου* however [i. e. *of it*] may, as Porphyry also has observed, be multifariously interpreted, but ought rather to be attributed to *reason*. For opinions, and the belief of the circle proceeding with rectitude, and enunciating sensibles, are the progeny of reason. For opinions and belief are in the doxastic part of the soul indeed, but pertain to reason, so far as they are moved, excited, and contained by it. And thus much concerning the co-arrangement of reason with the circle of the *different*. But in the next place, Plato speaks of its co-arrangement with the circle of the *same*, adding as follows:

"But when again, it is conversant with the logistic<sup>1</sup> power, and the circle of the *same* revolving with facility indicates its perceptions, then intellect and science are necessarily produced."

Plato entirely opposes<sup>2</sup> the *rational* to the *sensible*, the *revolving with facility* to the *straight or right*, the *is* to the *generated*, *indication* to *enunciation*, *intellect* to *opinion*, and *science* to *faith*. The *logistic* however, is not that which reasons, as some one may suppose, but the intelligible itself. For this he opposes to the *sensible*, because reasoning there is more divine than in the soul, as we have

<sup>1</sup> i. e. The regression of the circle of the *same*, is through the world to its paradigm: each of these being a *whole*, but the former a *sensible*, and the latter an intelligible *whole*.

<sup>2</sup> For λογικον here, it is necessary to read λογιστικον.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of ανεθηκεν in this place, read ανρεθηκεν.

frequently observed, and in intelligibles always subsists in energy. And it seems that he thus denominates the *rational* the *logistic*, just as he afterwards calls the *sensible* the *sensitive*. For the sensible is motive of sense, and the intelligible of the reasoning of the soul. Hence the *logistic*<sup>1</sup> will be that which is comprehended by the reasoning of the soul; and this antecedently comprehending cause, is homonymously to *reasoning* called *logistic*. But he calls the intellectual voluble, as having the unimpeded in transition, and also the circular, and the flourishing, likewise perfection in intellections, the energizing about divinity, the boniform, and the revolving about the intelligible as a centre, "hastening to conjoin yourself to the centre of resounding light," says some one of the Gods. The word *being* likewise signifies that which is filled with truly existing beings, and is united to them. But the word *indicates* signifies, to unfold as it were into light, to teach, and to produce from that which is arcane. Farther still, by *intellect* here, must be understood the intellect which is according to habit. For *intellect has a threefold subsistence; the first indeed, being divine, such as is the demiurgic intellect; but the second, being that which is participated by soul, and is essential and self-perfect; and the third, that which subsists according to habit, and on account of which the soul is intellectual.* And *science* is the first knowledge which is filled from intelligibles, and exists with an uninclining, non-verging, and immutable energy. But it differs from intellect,<sup>2</sup> so far as the latter is surveyed in the simple projections alone of the soul. For through it the soul at once intellectually perceives the whole of each object of intellection; since the at-once-collected in energies, is the peculiarity of intellect. But science is surveyed in the knowledge from cause. For this is the peculiarity of science as is also the composition and division of forms. For it is evident, that having a knowledge of beings, it also knows which among them have the order of causes, and which of effects. But all knowledge of this kind is called science, *just as the simple apprehension of each object of intellection is called intelligence.* And such is our explanation.

Iamblichus however, conceives this intellect to be more ancient than soul, supernally containing, and giving perfection to it. He also contends against those, who either immediately conjoin the soul to all-perfect intellect, (for it is necessary that the transition should not be immediate from exempt natures to participants, but that there should be middle essences co-arranged with the things that participate) or who suppose intellect to be a habit of the soul. For it is ne-

<sup>1</sup> Here also for λογικόν, read λογιστικόν.

<sup>2</sup> Νοῦς is omitted here in the original.



cessary that prior to that which is in another, that should exist which is in itself. And this indeed, is rightly asserted with reference to things; but it is more consonant to the words of Plato, to survey this intellect as a habit in the soul itself. For Timæus says it is produced from the energy of the circle of *the same*. But that intellect which the Demiurgus constituted, must be said to be above soul, when he placed analogously soul in body, and intellect in soul. For it is evident that this intellect is more ancient than soul, just as soul, according to Timæus, is more ancient than body. The intellect however, which is now mentioned, being the effect of the motion of reason about the intelligible, through the circle of *the same*; for he says it is produced, in consequence of that circle revolving with facility about that which is apprehended by the reasoning power; will not be more ancient than the soul, but a certain habit of it, in the same manner as science. Hence also, he says, that it is *ingenerated* in the soul, in the same manner as science, opinion, and faith. From all that has been said therefore, this one thing may be summarily collected, *that when reason is conversant with the intelligible, and the circle of the same unfolds through its intellectual energy, the nature of beings to reason, then intellect and science are produced in the soul.* And this indeed, must necessarily be the case. For a perfection adapted to such energies, is consubsistent with them. What then, some one may say, is reason at one time conversant with intelligibles, but at another with sensibles? By no means is this the case with the total soul [or soul of the universe], but it is always on high, and is always directed to intelligibles. It likewise abides and is established there, and providentially attends to sensibles, with an untamed energy; and through the facility of the motion of the circle of *the same*, the rectitude of the circle of *the different* is permanent. But the words *when, is generated*, and the like, manifest differences of power. For the energy is not every where similarly according to all the powers: for this is the peculiarity of divine intelligibles, on account of the simplicity of their essence. But according to the energy of the circle of *the same*, reason is more conversant with intelligibles than with sensibles; and from the energy of the circle of *the different*, is more conversant with sensibles than with intelligibles. It is requisite also not to overlook this, that Timæus says, "*the circle of the different proceeding with rectitude*," looking in so saying to the circles of a partial soul, of which, when in a fallen condition he asserts, that the circle of *the same* is *fettered*, and the circle of *the different* distorted. For in saying this he opposes rectitude to distortion, and to the being fettered facility of motion,\* which signifies the unincumbered; just as rectitude there, indicates a lation undistorted by inferior

\* For ἀρρηκτόν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read εὐρρηκτόν.

objects, and an irreprehensible judgment; so that he celebrates appropriately each of the circles.

“Whoever therefore asserts, that this is ever ingenerated in any other being than soul, asserts every thing rather than the truth.”

What does he intend to signify by the word *this*? Is it intellect and science? If so, he does not mean the circle of *the different*. Or rather does he not speak of the twofold conjunctions, [intellect and science,<sup>1</sup> opinion and faith? For intellect and science are one of the conjunctions, and opinion and faith are the second. But through these he comprehends every soul. Every thing therefore, which is the recipient of intellect and science, opinion and faith,<sup>2</sup> is soul. For all these knowledges are rational and transitive. And because indeed, they are rational, they are exempt from the irrational powers; but because they are transitive, they are subordinate to intellectual knowledge. For if science and intellect are in intelligibles, yet they are not *ingenerated* in them, as he says they are in the soul. For sciences in the soul subsist according to participation; since they participate of science itself, the soul being essentialized according to participation. For the middle proceed from the first genera, and are similarly harmonized; since the harmony in the soul is from harmony itself. The soul likewise possesses figure, similarly to the first genera. For intellectual figure is comprehensive of all various figures. The soul also possesses powers after the same manner. For intellectual and intelligible powers are prior to it. It likewise receives motion from the genera of being, and knowledge from the demiurgic intelligence, where also permanency is unfolded into light. *For all knowledge is a certain permanency and comprehension of the thing known, and an apt conjunction with it.* The motion therefore of the soul participates of the whole psychical knowledge, so far as it knows itself,<sup>3</sup> and looking to itself moves; and knowledge participates of motion so far as it is transitive. Peculiarly however, the motive energy is defined according<sup>4</sup> to motion; but the gnostic, according to permanency. And the circle of *the different* is rather motive than gnostic, but the circle of *the same* is rather gnostic than motive; because permanency pertains to sameness, but motion to difference. In the circle of *the different* however, there is knowledge, and in the circle of *the*

<sup>1</sup> The words *νοῦς καὶ επιστήμη* are omitted in this place in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For *πιστῶς* here, read *πιστεῶς*.

<sup>3</sup> For *αὐτῇ* here, it is obviously necessary to read *αὐτῆς*.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of *πέρα τῆς κινήσεως* in this place, it is requisite to read *κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν*.

*same*, motion ; just as in the latter there is sameness, and in the former difference. But the whole soul participates through the whole of itself of the genera of being. As far therefore, as to these particulars, the psychogony obtains its completion, being divided into the before-mentioned heads. For the hypostasis, harmony, figure, powers and energies of the soul, have been discussed.\*\*\*

Since however the soul is a multitude, and the first of composite natures ; but it is composed, not of infinities, but of things numbered, and these not without co-arrangement, but harmonized ; this being the case, numbers and harmony were very properly assumed in the generation of it. Since too, it comprehends the principles of all analogy, and all harmony, in consequence of being the soul of the world, no analogy is omitted [in the composition of it]. Because however, it was constituted by divinity, the more divine of the genera was assumed, viz. the diatonic : for it is entheastic. And at first indeed, because essence, same, and different were assumed, that whole of the soul which is prior to parts, was constituted ; but now, through the psychogony, the whole which is in the parts. For the Demiurgus divides, and unites the parts through analogies. But through the circles, the wholeness in each of the parts, is delivered. It must likewise be assumed, that the Demiurgus in the Timæus, energizes in conjunction with all the demiurgic Gods. For he cuts into seven parts Titanically ; unites Apollonically ; produces body, and invests it with figure, as containing in himself Vulcan ; and bounds the measures of ascents and descents, and inscribes the laws of Fate, as possessing Necessity. In the psychogony also, it is necessary to refer what has been said, to the essence of the soul, or to the things which are administered by it, or rather to both. For the natures contained in the world, are under the dominion of the powers which are essentially inherent in the soul. It is likewise requisite to investigate what the middles are, what the multiple, superparticular and superpartient ratios are, what the lemma is, and what the seven parts are ; and why the diagram proceeds to a quadruple diapason, and the diapente, and tone.

Of the three middles also, the geometrical, arithmetical, and musical, the solid analogy which is composed from the three is the equality of Themis, from whom every order is derived. But the three middles proceed from the three daughters of Themis, viz. Eunomia, Dice, and Irene ; the arithmetical from Irene, which surpasses and is surpassed by the equal ; which also we employ in the time of peace in contracts, and through which the elements are quiescent ; but the geometrical from Eunomia which likewise Plato denominates the judgment of

\* There is unfortunately an hiatus here in the original.

Jupiter, and through which the world is adorned with geometrical analogies ; and the harmonic from Dice, through which greater things have a greater, but less a less ratio. Since therefore, the geometrical middle comprehends the other two, ~~as~~ has been demonstrated, the essence of the soul is adorned by the geometric middle, the soul being the same through the whole of itself, and every where both partible and impartible. But it is adorned according to the arithmetical middle, because the common powers in it, which recur from the impartible to the partible, or from things partible to the impartible, equally surpass and are surpassed by things entirely partible and impartible. And by the harmonic middle,<sup>1</sup> because of the powers that are in it, some are in a greater degree separated from their producing causes, and have a greater transcendency, but others a less. And again, the sameness of forms subsists every where appropriately through the whole world, corporeally and vitally, in a plant, in an animal, and in a stone ; because the whole world is adorned with geometrical proportion. But the arithmetical middle presents itself to the view in the sublunary elements, which it equalizes according to powers. And the harmonic middle is seen in the world, according to the [celestial] spheres, their motions, and their intervals. For Ptolemy demonstrates, that their intervals are in harmonic proportion.

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *η δε αρμονικη μεσοτης* in this place, it is requisite to read *τη δε αρμονικη μεσοτητι*.

## BOOK IV.

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"BUT when the generating father understood that this generated statue or resemblance of the perpetual Gods, moved and lived,<sup>1</sup> he was delighted and exhilarated, and in consequence of this delight, considered how he might fabricate it still more similar to its paradigm. Hence, as that is an eternal animal<sup>2</sup> he endeavoured also to render this universe such,<sup>3</sup> to the utmost of his ability."

The one Demiurgus, who also fabricates wholes, generates collectively and at once, according to sameness, and converts, perfects, and assimilates his fabrications to their paradigms; whether one and the same essence effects this, and one and the same generative, recalling, perfective and assimilative power, as is asserted by some<sup>4</sup> of the ancients, or different powers, as appeared to be the case to certain others. For there is no small dissension, and as it were opposition, between these men. There are likewise some, who uniting, are at the same time unwilling to admit that *the one* is without the efficacy of multitude; and there are others who, though they divide, yet cannot endure to say, that the number of powers is unco-ordinated and mutilated, but they willingly admit and demonstrate that these powers are comprehended in their proper monad, and are united and preserved by it. Hence it happens, that some assert that these powers are a tetradic monad, but others again, that they are an united tetrad, or as they love to call it, a *monadized* tetrad. It is evident however, that the Demiurgus here mentioned being

<sup>1</sup> The words *re αὐτῷ καὶ ζῶν*, are omitted in the text of Proclus.

<sup>2</sup> For *ζῶντι* here, read *ζῶντι*.

<sup>3</sup> The word *τοιοῦτον* is also omitted in the text of Proclus.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of *καθ' αὐτὸν* in this place, it is necessary to read *καθ' αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον*.

one, inserts in the junior Demiurgi posterior to him, at one and the same time an assimilative power when he orders them to imitate his power about their generation; a generative power, when he orders them to produce and generate animals in common; and an analysing power, when he commands them to receive back again the parts that were borrowed from the whole elements, the substances composed from them being dissolved, and to recall them to their wholes. And after all these, he inserts in them a guardian power, in consequence of which, he immediately constitutes the governors of the world, guardians of the numbers of time, and earth the guardian of day and night.

The Demiurgus therefore, as I began to say, by whom all things were produced, generated them consubsistent with himself, and assimilated, and perfected, and converted them to himself; their order not being confounded by the at-once-collected evolution, as it were, of all things into light, but being in a much greater degree guarded and connected. For he neither deprives inferior natures of the providential care of more excellent beings; nor more perfect natures of the dominion pertaining to them over such as are more imperfect. For he does not comprehend one of these prior in time to the other; nor do either secondary natures remain destitute of the inspection of providence, nor such as are more ancient, sluggish and unprolific; as if the former did not yet receive the providential energies of the latter. We however, not being able to understand, and much less to explain the beneficent energy of the father of wholes from eternity, about the world, must be satisfied with perceiving and speaking of him, as at one time generating, at another adorning, at another perfecting, and at another assimilating, which also the words of the philosopher now previously suffering, are prepared to operate upon us. For the world now participates of motion and life, according to the doctrine of the father.<sup>1</sup> For soul that dwells together with it, preserves to itself the different kinds of its own peculiar knowledge, according to which it knows both intelligibles and mundane natures. But motion and life, which do not flourish in itself alone, it also imparts to all the bulk of the body of the universe. And on this very account either alone or especially, the fabric of the world being completely fashioned a resemblance of the intelligible Gods, the Demiurgus was in a still greater degree *delighted* and *exhilarated*, and in consequence of this delight and exhilaration, caused it to possess a greater and more perfect similitude to intelligibles. Hence also, he considered how he might make it as it were perpetual. For the intelligible is properly, and primarily perpetual, but that is secondarily perpetual which is co-extended with the progression and evolution of time. For *the ever* is twofold, the

<sup>1</sup> For *wasros* in this place, it is necessary to read *warpos*.

one being eternal, but the other temporal. Why therefore, after all the before-mentioned benefits, does Plato introduce this eighth gift of the Demiurgus? Because it is the greatest and most perfect, and transfers the image to the highest similitude to its paradigm. But it is necessary that he who once exhibits the generation of wholes in words, should pass from things more imperfect to such as are more perfect. For conformably to this very thing, things which subsist *per se* or essentially, and those which are ingenerated in others, are, as it were, opposed to each other; because in things which are established in themselves, and which in no respect whatever pertain to others, it is necessary to say that the more venerable of these rank as leaders, through which the final, the demiurgic, and the other causes consequent to these, present themselves to the view. But in things which are participated by others, such as are more imperfect occur, which become as it were subjects to more perfect natures, and show themselves to be of posterior origin. Such therefore, is the whole design of the words before us.

It follows in the next place, that we should show through what causes, and from the possession of what nature, the Demiurgus of wholes constituted time in conjunction with the soul and the universe; and also what the good is imparted by it, and on account of which it was produced. It is likewise especially requisite that we should show this, because many, even of the friends of Plato, apprehend time to be a certain obscure form, and nothing more than that which is numbered of motions; *not considering, that of the ten gifts which the father imparts to the world, each of the following is entirely greater than each of the gifts that precedes it.* If therefore, having now animated the world, and rendered it a blessed God, he afterwards imparts time to it, it is evident that time will be<sup>1</sup> superior to soul, and to the possession of a blessed life on account of soul, and that a life which is defined according to time will live periodically. Hence time will not be a thing of such a kind as the multitude say it is, but will have an essence more divine than that of souls, and psychical good. This therefore, we shall again more fully enforce.

We must say however, directing our attention to the words of Plato, that the Demiurgus intellectually perceives the life, and motion, and order of the universe, and its possession of form, not in so doing looking to the world itself. For neither in short, is the world intelligible according to the whole of itself; but is rather according to its bulk, the object of opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. Nor does the Demiurgus in his intellections tend to external objects; but

<sup>1</sup> For *πᾶσαν* here, read *πᾶσα*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *ὑπερπρεπον αἰετι ο χρονος*, it is necessary to read *ὑπερπρεπον αν ειη ο χρονος*.

every intellect' is converted to itself. Hence, because he intellectually perceives himself, and contains in himself the generative, and providential cause of wholes; by beholding himself, he surveys both the essence and the perfection of his own progeny. But Plato says, that the world was generated the statue or resemblance of the perpetual Gods; not that it is the image of the mundane Gods; for he does not alone speak about the corporeal-formed nature of the universe, but also about the animated and intellectual animal, which comprehends in itself the mundane Gods; but he says this, because it is the resemblance of the intelligible Gods. For it is filled with deity from them, and the progressions of the mundane Gods into it, are, as it were, certain rivers and illuminations of the intelligible Gods. The world also, receives these progressions, not only according to its celestial part, but according to the whole of itself. For in the air, in the earth, and in the sea, there are advents of the terrestrial, aquatic, and aerial Gods. The world therefore, is filled with deity according to the whole of itself, and on this account is wholly a resemblance of the intelligible Gods; not indeed, receiving the intelligible Gods themselves; for neither do statues receive the exempt essences of the total Gods; but being fitly adorned, it receives the illuminations derived from thence to secondary orders, to which it has a commensurate subsistence.

That by the *perpetual* however, he means *all the intelligible Gods*, and not the Gods that are in the world, he renders evident by immediately adding, "*Hence as that is an eternal animal*," viz. the intelligible [or animal itself]. But who the intelligible Gods are, may be assumed from division. For it must either be admitted that they are prior to animal itself; or in animal itself, being the monads as it were of the four ideas which are there; or posterior to animal itself. It would be ridiculous therefore, to arrange them prior to animal itself; for they would then comprehend eternity, to which he has not yet said the universe is assimilated. But it is impossible to arrange them in animal itself. For how could Plato call the universe, the statue or resemblance of those Gods, to which he had not yet according to the order of the discourse, assimilated the plenitudes of the universe? For he does this afterwards, when he produces the partial plenitudes of the universe. So that he would not have said, that the universe was now generated the resemblance of these Gods, but *since it will be*. It remains therefore, that the *perpetual Gods*, are all those posterior to animal itself, which subsist between the intelligible paradigm and the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus rendered the universe similar to all these, so far as each of them comprehends the form of the wholeness of the world. This then is demonstrated.

<sup>1</sup> *Nous* is omitted in the original in this place.



Hence the world is the statue of the intelligible Gods, when it is assumed in conjunction with soul and intellect, and the deity which accedes to it. But it is a statue in motion, and full of life,<sup>1</sup> and deity; fashioned from all things within itself; preserving all things, and filled with an at-once-collected abundance of all good from the father. It likewise peculiarly receives from nature motion, more than any thing else; but from soul, motion and life; and from intellect, intelligence and life, and the receptacle of the mundane Gods. From the mundane Gods however, it receives that which remains, viz. the being fashioned in perfection, the most true statue, or resemblance, of the intelligible Gods. And again, from this it is evident, that Plato establishes the Demiurgus conformably to the most consummate of the initiators into the mysteries. *For he exhibits him as the statuary of the world, just as before he represented him the maker of divine names, and the enunciator of divine characters, through which he gave perfection to the soul. For these things are effected by those that are telestæ<sup>2</sup> in reality, who give completion to statues, through characters and vital names, and render them living and moving.* With great propriety therefore, was the father of wholes delighted with his fabrication, and being exhilarated with it, endeavoured to render it still more similar to its paradigm. He was delighted with, and admired however, not that which proceeded from, and through him was completely effected a thing of this kind, but with his own power, which caused the universe, from being moved in a confused and disorderly manner, to become orderly, animated, endued with intellect, and divine. And as by knowing himself, he knows the world, so by admiring his own demiurgic power, he makes his fabrication to be admirable, and the true statue or resemblance of the perpetual Gods. *For in a certain respect, the universe is said to be a statue (αγαλμα) from divinity being delighted with it (παρὰ το ἀγαλλεσθαι τὸν θεὸν ἐπ' αὐτῷ).* He was delighted however, and exulted, not rejoicing in a thing situated externally; for how being intellect can he look outwardly; but his delight was produced from being filled with his own boniform will, and from his beneficent power proceeding to the unenvying and exuberant communication and supply of more perfect goods. This also Plato sufficiently indicates, by saying that the Demiurgus in consequence of being delighted, endeavoured to render the universe still more

<sup>1</sup> For ζῶν here, it is obviously necessary to read ζῶνς.

<sup>2</sup> For τελεσταί here, read τελεστᾶν. The *telestæ* were initiators into the mysteries, and were *theurgists*, or capable of performing divine operations. This *theurgy*, in which these initiators were deeply skilled, formed the last part of the sacerdotal science. See an interesting account of it, from a very rare Greek MS. of Psellus, *On Demons according to the Dogmas of the Greeks*, in the Notes to my Pausanias, Vol. 3. p. 324.

similar to its paradigm. For he was primarily delighted indeed, through the inward intellection of himself, comprehending and benevolently receiving the intelligible universe, with a simple, unimpeded, and collected embrace, through permanency in, and a perfect union with it. But he was delighted secondarily, if it be lawful so to speak, on account of the aptitude of the natures which receive the supply of good, externally proceeding from him.

And here you may see, how Plato delivers the three causes of the participation of good; proceeding into this world from the father. One indeed, and the first, is that which proceeds from the *power* of the effective cause. For it is the *Demiurgus* who now generates time; through his own unenvying and prolific abundance, desiring to fill all things with first, middle, and last goods. But the second cause, is that which arises from the *aptitude* of the receiving thing. For the communicator of good is then delighted, when that which receives it, is aptly disposed to its reception. And the third cause, is that which proceeds from the *symmetry*, and as it were *conspiration and symphony of both power and aptitude*. For on account of this, though the Gods always extend to all things good co-ordinate<sup>1</sup> to their essences, yet it is not always received by all of us; because we are not adapted to its reception, and have not always a subsistence commensurate to its power. If however, we wish that divinity should rejoice in us,<sup>2</sup> as he is naturally disposed to rejoice, and be delighted on our account, though he always possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, we must render ourselves adapted to the reception of the good which is extended by him; in order that the gift of divinity, may not with respect to us be inefficacious, though he is not impeded by any thing. These things therefore it is the business of another discussion to survey more fully.

Now, however, let us see how the universe becomes more similar to its paradigm, through the generation of time. Because the paradigm therefore is primarily eternal, if the sensible world did not receive a secondary perpetuity, it is evident to every one, that it would be in a less degree assimilated to the intelligible. And it likewise is not difficult to perceive, that the nature which has its generation in mutation, if it were separated from time, would be so far from being perpetual, that it would not be possible for it to remain for a moment. Hence, a certain perpetuity is necessary to that which is to be in a still greater

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *συνίκετα* in this place, it is necessary to read *συνόριχα*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. If we wish to receive his beneficent illuminations. For these are always extended, after the same manner, because, as Proclus observes, divinity possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence. Hence when we receive the good, which he perpetually extends to us, he is said to be delighted, his delight indicating our *proper* reception of this good.

degree assimilated to the intelligible. But to that which is perpetual indeed, yet has not the perpetuity at once present with it, in the same manner as the intelligible, the whole extension of time is necessary. Moreover, he who considers the nature of time, will more clearly know<sup>1</sup> how time not only contributes to the perpetuity of the whole world, and to the great parts of the world, but also to the perfection and felicity of each of them, and comprehends all these at once; which in the course of the interpretation we shall endeavour to manifest, by investigating the plenitudes of time.

“The nature indeed of animal itself was eternal, and this it is impossible to adapt perfectly to that which is generated. Hence he formed the design of producing a certain moveable<sup>2</sup> image<sup>3</sup> of eternity;<sup>4</sup> and in consequence of this, while he was adorning the universe, he made this eternal image proceeding according to number, of eternity abiding in one, and which we denominate time.”

That animal itself is the plenitude of the multitude of intelligible animals, and that it possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, is a thing frequently and fully asserted, and is not considered as at all dubious by the Platonic philosophers. But what eternity is, and the moveable time which imitates it, are things perfectly difficult to understand, and to explain sufficiently to others. At the same time however, it is requisite to narrate the more elegant opinions of the ancients about it, and to add, if we are able, any thing which may contribute to the elucidation, and distinct consideration of the things to be discussed.

The multitude therefore, have a conception and co-sensation of time, in consequence of looking to the sublunary and celestial motions, and are of opinion that time is something pertaining to motion, such for instance as the number, or extension of motion, or something else of the like kind. But the more excellent of these, proceeding to the consideration<sup>5</sup> of eternity, and perceiving that there is not simply motion, but a perpetual and orderly motion in the universe, and which circulates with invariable sameness,—conceived from hence, that this invariable sameness, was inherent in moveable natures, from a certain other cause, and not

<sup>1</sup> For *εἰδέναι* here, it is requisite to read *εἰδέναι*.

<sup>2</sup> For *κίνητον* here, read *κίνητον*.

<sup>3</sup> And for *εἰκὼν* read *εἰκὼν*.

<sup>4</sup> For *αἰών* likewise, it is necessary to read *αἰώνιος*.

<sup>5</sup> Instead of *εἰδέναι* in this place, it is requisite to read *εἰδέναι*.

from themselves. This cause therefore, will either be immoveable, or moved. And if indeed, it is moved at a certain time only, how will it be the cause of that which always is invariably the same? But if it is moved always, this perpetuity of its motion must again be derived from something else, and either<sup>1</sup> this will be the case ad infinitum, or there will be something immoveable, which is the cause of perpetual motion, to things which are always moved. And the energy of this being immoveable, is no longer according to time, but is eternal. For the peculiarity of things which subsist according to time, is *to be always in generation, or becoming to be*; but of eternal natures, *to exist always*. For common conception opines, that eternity is denominated from *existing always*, just as it thinks that time derives its appellation from dancing [ $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\ \tau\eta\ \chi\omega\rho\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ ] being a measured motion, and which has its existence in generation. On this account, it appears to me that the multitude assumed the first conception of time, but the wise of eternity, by the former directing their attention to the nature which is always moved, and the latter to the nature which is always stable. It must now however be shown what each of these is, and in a manner most conformable to the doctrine of Plato.

Aristotle indeed, admitting time to be the number of motion, asserts that it is so, not according to that which numbers, but according to that which is numbered. Hence, he very properly inquires what that is which numbers it, if time is that which is numbered. For these are relatives, and the one existing, the other also exists. He solves the inquiry however weakly, by saying that it is a certain soul which numbers time.<sup>2</sup> For it is necessary, that prior to perpetual number, there should be a perpetual numerator, in order that he may always produce, that which is generated always existing. Admitting therefore time to be the number of motion, he also says that eternity is intelligible, deriving its appellation from *existing always*, and possessing and comprehending the whole of time. Hence also he says, the existence and life of all things are suspended from this, of some things more obscurely, but of others more clearly. It is necessary however at present, that we should particularly see what eternity and time are according to Plato, and that we should not admit the image of time to be time alone, nor eternity to be simply a certain intelligible God, but in the first place show, in what order of the

<sup>1</sup> For  $\epsilon\kappa\ \epsilon\tau'\ \alpha\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$  in this place, it is necessary to read  $\eta\ \epsilon\tau'\ \alpha\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ .

<sup>2</sup> In defence of Aristotle however, it may be said, that when he asserts that it is a certain soul which numbers time, he does not speak of time according to its first subsistence, but the time which is participated by material natures, and of which, the multitude, as Proclus observes, have a conception, and co-sensation.

intelligibles it subsists. For this is especially the peculiarity of the science of Plato.

It is manifest then to every one, that eternity is more venerable, primordial, and as it were more stable than animal itself, though animal itself is the most beautiful, and most perfect of intelligible animals, as Plato has before said. For if the eternal is said to be, and is eternal as participating [of eternity,] but eternity is not said to participate of animal itself, nor to receive its appellation from it, it is evident that the former is secondary, but the latter more simple and more primary. For eternity neither participates of animal itself, because it is not an animal; for neither is time a visible animal; nor is it any other animal. For it has been demonstrated that animal itself is only-begotten and eternal, because eternity is more excellent. For the eternal is neither that which eternity is, nor is more excellent than eternity. But as we all say that the participant of intellect, and the animated, are posterior to intellect and soul, so likewise the eternal is secondary to eternity. What then some one may say, will eternity be, if it is more venerable than animal itself, which is said to be the most beautiful of intelligibles, and in every respect perfect? May it not be said, that it is especially most beautiful, in consequence of receiving the summit of beauty, on account of excessive participation, but that it does not receive the summit of *the good*: for it is not said to be *most excellent*. So that it may be subordinate to that which is the best. To which may be added, that it is not simply the most beautiful of all intelligibles, but of intelligible animals. Hence eternity<sup>1</sup> is no animal, but if it is life, it is infinite life. In the next place, it is not necessary that what is in every respect perfect should be the first. For the perfect has all things, so that it has things first, middle, and last. But that which is above this division will be super-perfect. Hence nothing prevents eternity from being superior to the animal which is the most beautiful of all intelligible animals, and is in every respect perfect, if eternity is most excellent and super-perfect. Farther still, animal itself has not<sup>2</sup> an arrangement prior to the multitude of intelligible animals. On this account therefore, Plato says, "*For to that which is the most beautiful of intelligibles and in every respect perfect.*" But eternity is prior to the multitude of intelligible animals. For these are eternal; but eternal natures participate of eternity, which is not co-arranged with the multitude of them, and has rather an arrangement contrary to them. For it unites multitude, and is said to abide in one, as being void of mul-

<sup>1</sup> There is an omission in the original in this place of *o new*.

<sup>2</sup> *Or* is omitted here in the original.

titude. Animal itself however, comprehends all such animals as are intelligible ; on which account also, it is in want of eternity, in order that it may participate through it, of union, containing power, and a firm and immutable life. Hence too, he says that it is eternal, yet does not add, that it has multitude in itself, but speaks of it in the singular number ; signifying that union is especially present with it from eternity, so that the whole essence of intelligible animals shines forth as one nature, on account of eternity.

If therefore, these things are rightly asserted, eternity will not be one certain genus of being, as some think it is, such for instance as essence, or permanency, or sameness. For all these are parts of animal itself ; and each of them has that to which it is as it were opposed. Thus for instance, essence is opposed to non-being, to permanency, motion, and to sameness, difference. But to eternity nothing is opposed. All these therefore, are similarly eternal, viz. sameness, difference, permanency and motion. This however, would not be the case, if eternity was one of these. For motion and permanency are not similarly eternal with eternity. But all intelligibles are similarly perpetual and eternal beings. Eternity therefore is not opposed to any one, either of these or of the things posterior to it. For time, which may seem to subsist dissimilarly with reference to it, in the first place is not convolved about the same things as eternity, but about things which do not receive connexion from eternity. In the next place, it is an image, and not the opposition of it, as we have already observed, and shall demonstrate. Neither therefore, will eternity be one genus of being, nor the whole collection of the genera of it. For again multitude being in it, it would be in want of the union of that which abides in one. But eternity is that which abides in one. So that it would both abide, and not abide in one. It would abide indeed, as eternity, and as the cause of union to beings. But it would not abide, as consisting of multitude. In addition to all that has been said likewise, it is intellect which consists of<sup>1</sup> these genera, and perceives their consummation. The conception however, of intellect, is different from that of eternity, just as the conception of soul, is different from that of time. For *the energy of intellect, is intransitive intelligence, but of eternity, impartible perpetuity*. And after this manner indeed, the things are distinguished from each other. But those who mingle all things into the same, and assert that there is only one intellect between soul and *the good*, are compelled to acknowledge that intellect and eternity are the same.

What then will eternity be, if it is neither one of the genera of being, nor con-

<sup>1</sup> The words *συνεστάναι* ex appear to be wanting in this place in the original.

sists of all the five, since all these are eternal, and eternity<sup>1</sup> is above these? We reply, what else can it be than the comprehension<sup>2</sup> of the intelligible unities? But I mean by the unities, the ideas of intelligible animals, and the genera of all these intelligible ideas. The one comprehension therefore of these, and of the summit of their multitude, and the cause of the immutable permanency of all of them is eternity, not existing in the multitude of intelligibles, nor collected from them; but being present with them exemptly, disposing and as it were forming them by itself, and making this very thing to be at the same time a whole. For the all-various idea of intelligibles is not produced immediately after *the good*, which is entirely without any representation of multitude, but there are certain intermediate natures, which are indeed more united than all-perfect multitude, but exhibit the parturiency and representation of the progeny of wholes, and of connectedly-containing power in themselves. The number however and nature of these, the Gods know divinely, but the mystic tradition of the Parmenides teaches us in a human manner, and philosophically, to which we refer the reader for the accurate discussion of these particulars. But now we shall demonstrate through the words themselves of the philosopher, that eternity is above all-perfect animal, and that it is proximately above it. For because animal itself is said to be eternal, it will be secondary to eternity. But because there is no eternal nature prior to it, it will be proximately posterior to eternity. Whence therefore, is this evident? We reply, because neither is there any thing temporal prior to [time] the image of eternity, but the world primarily participates of time, and animal itself, of eternity. For if as eternity is to time, so is animal itself to the world, then alternately, as geometricians would say, as eternity is to animal itself, so is time to the world. But time is first participated by the world; for it had no existence whatever, prior to the orderly distribution of the universe. Eternity therefore, is first participated by animal itself. If likewise, time is not the sensible animal which comprehends in itself all other sensible animals [i. e. if it is not the universe]; for it is generated together with it; but that which is generated with it, is not that with which it is generated; -- if this be the case, neither will eternity be the intelligible animal. Hence neither will it be an animal, lest there should be two [all-comprehending] intelligible animals. For it has been before demonstrated by Plato, that animal itself is only begotten. So that in short, eternity will not be an animal. For if it were, it would either be an animal different from, or the same with animal itself. It is not however, possible to assert

<sup>1</sup> For *αιωνος* here it is necessary to read *αιων*.

<sup>2</sup> The word *περιεργη* is omitted here in the original, but from what follows, either this word, or *αυρα* or *ποτα* or *ενοια* ought evidently to be inserted.

either of these, as we have shown; partly indeed, because animal itself is only begotten, and partly because time, and that which is temporal, are not the same. But if it is participated, and does not participate of intelligible animal, it will be a God prior to animal itself, intelligible indeed, but not yet an animal; since animal itself also is a God. And this because the world likewise is a God. For that which is participated there, but does not participate of a participated nature, is entirely more total.

It is evident however, that the participation is not equal in both. *For the communion and union of intelligibles, which now employing we call participation, is different from that of sensible natures.* It appears therefore, that the order of eternity, is superior to that of animal itself, and is proximately superior, and that it is the cause to intelligibles of an invariable sameness of subsistence. Hence some one may consider it as the same with *permanency*. This however, is a co-ordinated cause, and rather imparts a sameness of subsistence about energy. But *eternity* is an exempt cause. It also appears, that eternity is the comprehension and union of many intelligible unities. Hence it is said by the [Chaldaean] Oracles to be *father-begotten light*, because it illuminates all things with unifying light. "For this alone, [says the Oracle] by plucking abundantly from the strength of the father, the flower of intellect is enabled by intellection<sup>1</sup> to impart a paternal intellect to all the fountains and principles; together with intellectual energy, and a perpetual permanency, according to an unsluggish revolution." For being full of paternal deity, which the Oracle calls the flower of intellect, it illuminates all things with intellect, and with intellectual perception invariably the same, and also with the ability of revolving and energizing in an amatory manner, about the principle of all things. These things however, I evolve in the inaccessible recesses of the reasoning power.

Again however, on all sides investigating the conceptions of the philosopher about eternity, let us consider what is meant by *eternity abiding in one*. For we ask in what one? Is it in *the good*, as appeared to be the case, to the most theological of the interpreters? But *the good*, does not even abide in itself, on account of its simplicity, as we may learn in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, and as he admits. Much less therefore, can any thing else abide in it. For in short, nothing is in it,<sup>2</sup> nothing subsists together with it, on account of its being exempt from a co-ordination with any thing whatever. To which may be added, that it is not usual to call it either good, or one, but *the good*, and *the one*, in order that we may form a conception of its monadic transcendency, which is beyond

<sup>1</sup> For *to see* here, read *to see*.

<sup>2</sup> All things are comprehended by *the one*, but nothing subsists *peculiarly* in it. And the comprehension of all things by it, is nothing more than the ineffable union which it imparts to all things, and through which all things become *bounded* by it.



every known nature. Now however, eternity is not said to abide in *the one*, but in *one*; so that it does not abide in *the good*. Does therefore, the abiding of eternity in one, signify the united nature as it were of it, and the abiding of it in its own one; and manifest that it is one multitude? Or, in short, does it indicate the number of that which does not proceed, in order that it may be the cause of union to the multitude of intelligibles? This indeed, we also say is true, in order that it may impart to itself the stable, and the whole, prior to eternal natures. For this is to *abide* in one; viz. to have the whole at once present, and the same immutable *hyparxis*. Every divine nature therefore, begins its energy from itself; so that eternity will establish itself in one, and connectedly contain itself after the same manner, prior to eternal beings. Hence it is not being, as Strato the physiologist says, which is the cause of permanency,<sup>1</sup> but eternity. And it is the cause of a permanency,<sup>2</sup> not always in generation, or becoming to be, but which immutably exists in one, as Timæus says.

If however, eternity exhibits a duad, though we frequently endeavour to conceal it; for *the always* is conjoined to *being* according to the same, and eternity (*αἰών*) is, *that which always is* (*οἰσεῖσιν*); it appears that it will have the monad of being prior to itself, and the one being; and that it will abide in this one, as our preceptor also thought concerning it; in order that it may be one prior to the duad, as not departing from unity. And the duad indeed, antecedently exhibiting multitude in itself, is united to the one being, in which eternity abides; but the multitude of intelligibles is united to eternity itself, which comprehends exemptly and unically, all the summits of them. For that the conception of the one being and of eternity differ, is evident. For *to be always*, and *to be simply*, are entirely different. If therefore, a certain thing *always is*, this thing also *is*; but not vice versa, if a certain thing *is*, it likewise *always is*. Hence to *exist* is more total and generic, than to *exist always*. And on this account likewise, it is nearer to the cause of all beings, of the unities in beings, and of generation and matter. These three things therefore, are successive; viz. *the one being*, as the monad of beings; *eternity* as a duad, having the *always* in conjunction with *existence*; and *the eternal*, which participates both of existence, and the always, and is not primarily perpetual being like eternity. And the one being indeed, is alone the cause of existence to all things of whatever kind they may be, whether they exist truly, or not truly. But eternity is the cause of permanency in existence. Strato therefore, ought rather to have asserted this, and not to have defined being to be the per-

<sup>1</sup> For *δαιμον* in this place, it is necessary to read *δαίμων*.

<sup>2</sup> Here too for *δαιμον*, read *δαίμων*.

manency<sup>1</sup> of beings; as he writes in his treatise *Concerning Being*, thus transferring the peculiarity of eternity to being. For neither in generated natures, is it the same thing to be generated, and to remain generated. But the peculiarity of generation is for that which has it to exhibit another and another[condition of subsistence]; and the peculiarity of generation remaining, or being permanent, is time in which generation exists. And what time is in generation, that eternity is in essence. Concerning the developement however, of that mighty divinity eternity abiding in one, let thus much suffice.

But why does Plato say, "*the nature of animal itself was eternal*," and not *is*, though to eternity *the now* is more adapted than *the past time*? He employs therefore, elsewhere this form of diction, as when he says of the Demiurgus who is always good, "*he was good*;" signifying that he is not this from time, but that he always was so; and *that in divine natures, the ends are antecedently assumed and co-assumed with the beginnings, prior to all extension*. At present however, the word *was* is more opportunely used. For since Plato adorns the universe according to hypothesis, but prior to the adorning, intelligibles existed, though not in time, yet in dignity, and also such things as subsist together with intelligibles;—on this account he says, "*it was*." But again by employing the word *being*<sup>2</sup> (ὄντα), he assists the imbecility of the *imperfect* verb. For he also makes it to be essential, and no less so than the *present*. He likewise, adapts to eternity what he says concerning it; to its perfection indeed, through the word *was*; and to its essential being, by co-introducing the word *being*. And thus much concerning the lit. the words [which Plato employs.]

Why however, was it not possible perfectly to adapt the eternal to the generated? Is it not because every thing generated, may be said to have its existence in mutation; but that which is perfectly eternal, is immutable and unbegotten? These natures therefore being opposed to each other, if some one should violently endeavour to connect the perfectly eternal with that which is generated, he would not make it immutable, and would destroy its nature. Is then eternity present with that which is sensible, after a certain manner, and not entirely? But how is it possible we should not acknowledge this? For that which participates of the image of eternity, participates also in a certain respect of eternity; though not in such a way as that which participates of it immediately. And in short superior causes always adorn the dominion of such as are subordinate, so that eternity

<sup>1</sup> And here also for διαμονή, read διαμνη.

<sup>2</sup> The words of Plato are, *ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῶον φύσις ἐννυχάται οὐτα αἰώνως*, in which, as Proclus observes, the imperfect verb ἐννυχάται, *was*, is assisted by the participle οὐτα, *being*.

likewise, is in a certain respect present with the natures that are adorned by time. For according to one all-perfect boundary indeed, it is present with intelligibles alone; but it is likewise capable of being present with mundane things multitudinously, according to divided perfections and definite measures of life, and especially according to the essences of the celestial souls. The world itself also receives eternity, not as it is; and on this account neither is it said to be eternal; but as far as it is able, it receives its impartible presence and illumination. This therefore, is the transcendent good in eternity of a divine cause and comprehension. Hence it comprehends partible essences, and such as are as it were contrary to its own nature, according to the concatenation of cause. And thus much for this particular.

But how is time said to be the image of eternity? Is it because eternity indeed *abides in one*, but time *proceeds according to number*? This however, rather shows the dissimilitude than the similitude of them. For Plato nearly opposes all things [pertaining to eternity and time] to all, viz. *proceeding*, to *abiding*; *according to number*, to *one*; the *image*, to the *thing itself*. It is better therefore to say, that divinity produced these two, I mean eternity and time, as the measures of beings, the former of intelligible but the latter of mundane beings. As therefore, the world is said to be the image of the intelligible, thus also the mundane measure is denominated the image of the intelligible measure. Eternity however, is indeed a measure as unity, but time as number. For each measures, the former things which become one, but the latter such as are numbered. And the former measures the *permanency* of *beings*, but the latter the *extension*<sup>1</sup> of *generated natures*. The apparent oppositions however, of the two, do not exhibit dissimilitude of measures, but indicate that secondary are produced by more venerable and ancient natures. For progression is from permanency, and number from unity. But is not time on this account the image of eternity, because it is effective of the perfection of mundane natures, just as eternity is the container and guardian of beings? For as *things which are unable to live according to intellect, are brought under the order of Fate, lest by flying from divinity, they should become perfectly disorderly*, thus also things which proceed from eternity, and are not able to participate of a stable perfection, which is at once whole, and always the same end indeed under the dominion of time, but are excited by it to their own appropriate energies, by which they are enabled to receive the end adapted to them, through certain apocatastatic periods.

<sup>1</sup> For *καταστατικόν* here, read *καταστατικόν*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *εαυτῶν* here, it is necessary to read *εαυτῶν*.

It is also well that Plato calls the production of time, the *conception or contrivance*, (*επινοία*), of the Demiurgus. For to impart to beings which are not naturally eternal, an adventitious and temporal perpetuity, and also to confer perfection on things imperfect, and a circular apocatastasis, on things which proceed in a right line, does not appear to fall far short of *invention* and *contrivance*. Hence, in what follows, he says that divinity *contrived* the generation of the parts of time. But how is the image of eternity said to be moveable? Is it<sup>1</sup> because all of it is moved and the whole is in motion? Or is not this impossible? For nothing is moved according to the whole of itself, nor is this the case, even with such things as are essentially changed: for the subject of these remains. Much more therefore, will things which are moved according to the other motions, remain according to essence, whether they are increased, or changed in quality, or locally moved. For if they did not remain according to something, their motion likewise would vanish, together with them: for all motion is in a certain thing. Nothing therefore, as we have said, is wholly moved, and this is especially the case with perpetual natures, which ought to be established in their proper principles, and to remain in themselves, if they are to be continually preserved. But it is particularly requisite, that the image of eternity should have a perpetual sameness of subsistence, and stability; so that it is impossible that time should be moveable according to the whole of itself, since it is not possible for this to be the case with any thing else. It is necessarily requisite therefore, that something of it should remain; since every thing which is moved, is moved in consequence of having something of itself which remains. Hence the monad of time remains suspended from the Demiurgus. But being full of measuring power, and wishing to measure the motions of the psychical<sup>2</sup> essence, and the existence, energies and passions of the physical and corporeal essence, it proceeds according to number. Time therefore abiding by its impartible and inward energy, proceeds according to number by its external energy and which is participated by the natures which it measures; viz. it proceeds according to a certain intellectual number, or rather according to the first number, which Parmenides would say, being analogous to the *one being*, presides over the intellectual, in the same manner as that does over the intelligible orders. It proceeds therefore, according to that number. Hence also, it distributes an appropriate measure to each<sup>3</sup> of the mundane forms.

You may likewise say still more proximately, that true time proceeds accord-

<sup>1</sup> For *κατὰ* here, read *κατὰ*.

<sup>2</sup> There is an omission here in the original, of *ἡ*.

<sup>3</sup> For *ἐκαστῶν* here, read *ἐκαστῶν*.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of *ἐκαστῶν* in this place, it is necessary to read *ἐκαστῶν*.

ing to true number, participating<sup>1</sup> of the numbers of it, and being itself intellectual number, which Socrates speaks of, and obscurely signifies, when he says, that swiftness itself and slowness itself are in *true number*, by which the things measured by time, differ, being moved more swiftly, or more slowly. Hence also Timæus does not speak much about this number because Socrates on the preceding day had perfectly unfolded it, but about that which proceeds from it. For *that* being truly existing number, he says *this* proceeds according to number. It proceeds therefore, according to intelligible number, by which it numbers its participants, just as, vice versa, the time which is in sensibles, proceeds according to that which numbers, being itself that which is numbered, and still possessing the image of essential time, through which all things are numbered by greater or less numbers of their life. So that an ox lives for this, but man for that length of time, but the sun is restored to its pristine state in one, and the moon in another period of time, and other things accomplish their periods according to other measures. Time therefore, is the measure of motions, not as that by which we measure; for this the conception about time effects, and not time itself, but as productive, and definitive of the existence of the life, and every other motion of things in time, and as measuring them and assimilating them according to paradigms. For as it refers itself to the similitude of eternity, which comprehends paradigmatic causes, thus also it refers the things which are perfected by itself, and which are convolved in a circle, to the more venerable imitation of eternal principles. How therefore, being such and so great a God, will it be the measure of motion, or in short of generation,<sup>2</sup> as it appeared to some that it is, who neither perceived the power of it, nor its demiurgic<sup>3</sup> presence with all things? When also, they say that it is rather the cause of corruption, than of generation, and of oblivion than preservation, and of these according to accident, and not essentially, they very much resemble those that are asleep, and who are unable to collect by a reasoning process what the benefits are conferred by and through time on the soul and the body, on all heaven through the whole of itself, and on all generation. *Theurgists likewise confirm what we have asserted, when they say, that time is a God, and deliver to us the discipline of it, by which we are enabled to excite it to become visible; and when also, they celebrate it as older and younger, and as a circularly revolving and eternal God, not only as the image of eternity, but as eternally receiving it. They*

<sup>1</sup> For μετεμμεχοντα here, read μετεμμεχοντα.

<sup>2</sup> Or is omitted here in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of κρηνης in this place, it is obviously necessary to read γενεσων.

<sup>4</sup> For τοι, δημιουργικοι here, read τη δημιουργικη.

*likewise add, that it intellectually perceives the whole number of all the natures that are moved in the world, according to which it convolves and restores to their pristine state all moving substances, by swifter or slower periods. And besides this they assert, that it is infinite in power. For to circulate again and again, [without end] is the province of infinite power. Together with these things likewise, they say that it is of a spiral form, as measuring according to one power, both things that are moved in a right line, and those that are moved in a circle; just as a spiral line uniformly [or according to one form] comprehends the right and the circular line.*

We must not therefore, accede to the opinion of those, who consider time as subsisting in mere conceptions, or who make it to be a certain accident. Nor must we assent to those who are more venerable than these, and who approaching nearer to the peculiarity of the things themselves, say that time is generated from the total soul energizing transitively, or from it energizing collectively and without transition, and measuring by time, the celestial circulations, and the periods of other souls;—not even to these must we assent, though they are not very remote from the truth. For in the first place Plato, with whom we all desire to accord about divine concerns, says of the Demiurgus, that he constituted time, the world being now arranged both according to soul, and according to body, and did not produce it within the soul, as he did the harmonic ratios; nor does he represent divinity fashioning time in the soul, in the same manner as he says that he fabricated the corporeal-formed nature within it; but having spoken concerning the essence, harmony, power, motions, and the all-various knowledge of the soul after all these, in order to give perfection both to soul and body, he generated the essence of time, as guarding, measuring, and assimilating all these to their paradigmatic principles. For what advantage would mundane natures derive from possessing all things beautifully, if they did not perpetually remain? Or from imitating after a certain manner, the idea of the paradigm, but not as much as possible evolving the whole of it, and partibly receiving impartible intellection? On these accounts therefore, the philosopher places over the progression of time, a demiurgic, and not a psychical cause.

In the next place, looking to things themselves, you may say that if soul generated time, it would not so participate of it, as to be perfected by it. For that the soul is perfected by time, and measured according to its energies, is not immanifest; since every thing which does not receive collectively, now, and at once, the whole of energy, requires time, in order to its perfection and apocatastasis, through which every thing collects the appropriate good, which it is incapable of receiving impartibly, and without time. Hence, as we have before observed, eternity and time, are the measures of the permanency and perfection

of beings; the former being the one and unmultiplied comprehension of the intelligible unities, but the latter being the boundary and demiurgic measure of the perpetuity, or of the more or less permanency of the things which proceed from intelligibles. If, therefore, the soul, after the same manner as intellect and the Gods, apprehended every object of its knowledge by one projecting energy, and by an energy always the same, understanding intransitively, it might, perhaps, have generated time, but it would not have been in want of time to its perfection. But since it understands, or perceives intellectually, with transition, and apocatastastically, and one soul requires the whole of time, but another a certain part<sup>1</sup> of it, in order to the possession of intellectual and genesiurgic lives; and if, in short, no cause is in want of its offspring to the perfection of itself; if this be the case, soul would thus be both perfect and imperfect, prior to constituting that which is secondary to itself. It would be perfect indeed, in order that it might generate; since nothing imperfect is generative of another thing. And it would also be imperfect, because it would never participate of that which causes it to be perfect. And it is altogether absurd to say, that causes are in want of the things which proceed from them. Let this, therefore, be considered by you as the greatest argument, that time is not the progeny of soul, but that it is first participated by soul.

After this, however, it is requisite to understand, that inanimate natures also participate of time, and that they do not then alone participate of it when they rise into existence, in the same manner as they do, of form and habit; but even when they appear to be deprived of all life, they then participate of time, and not in such a way as they are said to live, because they are co-arranged with wholes, and are co-passive with the universe. For they peculiarly and essentially participate of a certain time, and this so far as they are inanimate, and are always in a perishing condition till their perfect corruption. For time is every where present. And the architect indeed, is able to say for how long a time a wall will endure, and the weaver can tell the extent of the duration of a shirt, or in short of a garment.<sup>2</sup> In a similar manner also, every artist can say what will be the duration of his own work; though he cannot speak so definitely as concerning the productions of nature. But the prophet speaks about the duration of all things, as being able to survey the temporal interval distributed to things from the universe. In addition to these things also, since the psychical and corporeal mutations, motions and rests, and in short all such mundane natures, as are opposed to

<sup>1</sup> For *μυρίων* here, read *μυρίων*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αἰσθητός* here, it is necessary to read *εὐσθητός*.

each other, are measured by time, it is necessary that time should be exempt from all these. For that which being one and the same, is participated by many things, and these dissimilar, and always pre-subsists by itself, must be in an exempt manner participated by them. And still more being in all things, it is every where impartible, so that it is every where one being, impartible according to number, and peculiar to no one of the things which are said to subsist according to it; which Aristotle also perceiving he shows that in partible<sup>1</sup> natures, there is something incorporeal and impartible, which is every where the same; assuming<sup>2</sup> this to be *the now* or an instant.

Farther still, if time were not an essence but an accident, it would not thus exhibit a demiurgic power,<sup>3</sup> so as to make some things to be perpetually generated, but others of a longer or shorter duration, according as their nature is stronger, or weaker; and to distribute to all things an appropriate measure of duration among beings. If however, it is a demiurgic essence, it will neither be the whole soul [of the universe] nor a part of soul. For the conception of soul is different from that of time, and each is the cause of different, and not<sup>4</sup> of the same things. For soul imparts life, and moves all things. Hence the world also, as it approaches to soul, is filled with life, and participates of motion. But time which<sup>5</sup> excites demiurgic effects to their perfection, and to the measure of them by wholes, and which is the supplier of a certain perpetuity,<sup>6</sup> will not be subordinate to soul, since soul likewise participates of it; and though not essentially, yet according to its transitive energies. For the soul of the universe is said to energize incessantly, and to live wisely through the whole of time. It remains therefore that time is an essence, and is not secondary to soul. After all however, it must be considered, that if eternity was the offspring of intellect, or a certain intellectual power, it would be requisite to say that time is something of this kind pertaining to soul. But if eternity is the exempt measure of the multitude of intelligibles, and the comprehension of the perpetuity and perfection of all things, how is it possible that time also should not have this ratio to soul, and the psychical order; differing from them in the same way, as all proceeding differ from abiding causes? For eternity exhibits a greater transcendency than time,

<sup>1</sup> The word *μετρώον* is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *λαμβάνει* here, it is requisite to read *λαμβάνει*.

<sup>3</sup> For *πνευματικόν* here, read *δυναμικόν*.

<sup>4</sup> *Οὐ* is omitted here in the original.

<sup>5</sup> *ε* Likewise is omitted in this place in the original.

<sup>6</sup> For *αἰώνιος* here, it is necessary to read *αἰδιότης*.



with respect to the things that are measured by it. For the former comprehends exemptly, both the essences and the unities of intelligibles; but the latter does not measure the essences of the first souls, <sup>1</sup> as rather subsisting co-ordinately with them, and being generated together with them. As some Platonists likewise say, time does not measure the intellectual energies of the first souls; though Plato clearly says, that the soul of the universe leads a divine and wise life through the whole of time. Intelligibles also, are more united to eternity than mundane natures to time; and the union of them is so great, that some of the more contemplative philosophers have apprehended eternity to be nothing else than the one and total intellect [which comprehends all other intellects]. But no one of the more wise is willing to admit that time is the same with the things that are in time, on account of the great separation and difference between them.

What then will time be, if it is neither something belonging to motion, nor a concomitant of the psychical energy, nor in short, the progeny of soul, nor as some innovating in divine concerns say, who conceive time to be the psychical circle of *the different*, but eternity the psychical circle of *the same*? For I have heard that Theodorus philosophized things of this kind. He however, who endeavours to correct this opinion, will never admit that these parts of the soul are the same as eternity and time; but he will grant that the circle of *the different* verges to temporal, but the circle of *the same*, to eternal natures. Since therefore, we do not approve any one of these opinions, what will time be? For it is not perhaps sufficient to say, that it is the measure of mundane natures, nor to enumerate the benefits of which it is the cause, but the peculiarity of it is to be apprehended to the utmost of our power. Shall we therefore say, that the essence of it being most excellent, perfective of soul and present with all things, is an intellect not alone abiding, but also moving; abiding indeed, according to the inward energy, by which it is truly eternal; but moved, according to the externally proceeding energy, according to which it bounds all transition. For eternity possessing permanency, both according to its inward energy, and according to that which it exerts towards eternal natures, time adumbrates it, according to one of these, but becomes separated from it according to the other, in consequence of abiding and being moved. Hence it will be something at once intelligible and generated, and something at once partible and impartible. At the same time, however, we admit all these things in the psychical essence, and we are no otherwise able perfectly to apprehend this middle nature, than by employing after a certain manner opposites in surveying it. Why therefore is it wonderful,

<sup>1</sup> i. e. of supermundane souls.

if we perceiving the nature of time, to be partly immoveable and partly moved, or rather not we, but prior to us the philosopher, he should exhibit the intellectual monad of it abiding in sameness, through its being *eternal*, but should indicate that energy of it which has an external tendency, and is participated by soul, and the whole world, through its being *moved*. For we must not imagine that this eternal [of time] merely signifies that it is the image of eternity. For what should have hindered him from directly saying, that time is the *image* of eternity, and not that it is the *eternal* image of it? But he wished to manifest this very thing, that time has an eternal nature, yet that it is not eternal in such a way as animal itself. For animal itself is eternal both in essence and in energy. But time by its inward energy indeed, is eternal, but by its externally proceeding gift, is moveable. Hence theurgists also call it eternal, and Plato very properly denominates it not eternal only.<sup>1</sup> For one thing indeed is alone and essentially moveable, and is alone the cause of motion, according to the participants of it, and such a thing as this is soul. It alone therefore, moves itself, and other things. But another thing is alone immoveable, preserving itself immutable, and being the cause to other things of an invariable sameness of subsistence, and to things that are moved on account of soul. [And this thing is intellect.] Hence it is necessary that the medium between these two which are extremes, viz. between that which is immoveable both in essence and energy, and that which is moveable both according to its own nature and according to what it imparts to other things, should be that which is at once immoveable and moved; immoveable indeed essentially, but moved in its participants. And a thing of this kind is time. For if there is that which is in its participants as number in that which is numbered,<sup>2</sup> what will that be which subsists according to numbering it? It is absurd, therefore, to say that it is a partial soul which thus subsists. For that which in this soul numbers time is of posterior origin, as is that which in us numbers the fingers. Hence this is not effected by him who makes the five fingers, but by him who numbers so many that are produced by nature. We however, investigate the cause of time being that which is numbered. Time therefore is that which remaining immoveable, by itself evolves that which is numbered.

In short, if visible time is moveable, but every thing which is moveable is moveable, being a certain other thing; for not motion, but that which is moved, is moveable; it is necessary that there should be time which subsists by itself, in order that there may be moveable time. So far therefore, as it is *truly* time, and

<sup>1</sup> For μένος here, it is necessary to read εν μένω.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of ως το αριθμούμενον αριθμός in this place, it is necessary to read, ως εν τῷ αριθμούμενῳ αριθμός.

<sup>3</sup> For τούτων here, it is necessary to read τούτους.

so far as it is in itself, it is immoveable;<sup>1</sup> but so far as it is in its participants, it is moveable, and together with them, unfolds itself into them. Hence time is eternal indeed, and a monad, and a centre essentially, and according to the energy which abides in it. At the same time however, it is continued, and number, and a circle, according to its proceeding and participated energy. *It is, therefore, a certain proceeding intellect, established indeed in eternity, and on this account also is said to be eternal. For it would not otherwise contribute to the more perfect assimilation of mundane natures to their paradigms, unless it was itself previously exempt from them. But it proceeds, and flows abundantly into the things, which are guarded by it. Whence also I think, the most consummate of theurgists celebrate it as a God, as Julian in the seventh book of his treatise On the Zones, and venerate it by those names through which it is unfolded into light in its participants; causing some things to be more ancient, but others to be more recent, and convolving all things in a circle.* For it would be ridiculous since it is the image of eternity, that it should alone be this temporal image which subsists in things that are numbered. For how is it possible that a thing of this kind which is in a subject, should be the image of so great a deity as eternity? Especially since it rather *appears* to be in a subject [than is so in *reality*], and is itself an accident of that which is an accident.

If, however, intellect is secondary to eternity, but soul is the resemblance of intellect, how is it possible that time which is the image of eternity, should not be something more excellent, and more essential than soul? For as intellect is to soul, so will eternity be to time. And alternately, as time is to soul,<sup>2</sup> so is eternity to intellect.<sup>3</sup> And time does not participate of soul,<sup>4</sup> as neither does eternity of intellect; but vice versa. Time therefore having a certain intellectual nature, convolves its participants, both other things and souls, according to number. For time indeed is eternal, not only in essence, but also in its inward energy, in which it is always the same. But by the energy according to which alone it is participated by external natures, it is moveable, co-extending together with, and adapting to them, its gift. Every soul, however, is moved transitively, both according to its inward energies, and also its external energies, through which it moves bodies. And it appears to me, that it was thus denominated *time*, by those who perceived that this was its nature; and who wished by this appellation to say, that it is a certain *dance*,<sup>5</sup> and as it were a *dancing intellect*

<sup>1</sup> For *κατ' εἰκόνα* in this place, it is necessary to read *ἀκίνητον*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *πρὸ ψυχῆς* here, it is necessary to read *πρὸς ψυχῆν*.

<sup>3</sup> Here also for *πρὸ σου*, it is necessary to read *πρὸς σου*.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of *καὶ μετέχοντι τῇ αὐτῇ* in this place it is requisite to read, *οὐ μετέχει οὐ χρόνος αὐτῇ*.

<sup>5</sup> For *χρόνον* here, read *χορόν*.

(καὶ οὖν χορεύοντα σου). But by a co-division, they named it for the sake of concealment time. Perhaps, likewise, they gave it this appellation because it at once abides, and proceeds with a measured motion; and by one part of itself abides, but by the other proceeds; as if it were half intellect, and half saltant. Hence by a composition of both the parts, they signified the admirable and demiurgic nature of this God. It appears likewise, that as the Demiurgus being intellectual, began from intellect to adorn the universe, so time being supermundane, began from soul to perfect it. For that time is not only mundane, but by a much greater priority supermundane, is evident; since as eternity is to animal itself, so is time to this world, which is animated and endued with intellect, and is wholly the image of animal itself, in the same manner as time is of eternity.

If therefore time is, it both abides and proceeds in measured motion. And through its abiding, the harmonious dances are infinite, and apocatastatic. For being the first intellect that dances about the whole fabrication of things, so far indeed as it subsists invariably the same, and is essentially intellect, it is said to be eternal; but so far as it dances, it convolves souls, and natures, and bodies in a circle; and in short, is periodically restored to its pristine state. For the world is moved indeed, as participating of soul; but it is moved in an orderly manner, because it participates of intellect. For thus also Plato says in the *Laws*, "*that the soul receiving a divine intellect, governs with rectitude and wisdom.*" And the world is moved periodically, by the motion of it from the same to the same; in consequence of which, it may be said to imitate the permanency of intellect in sameness, through the imitation of eternity by time. And this it is, to make the world more similar to its paradigm which abides in one; viz. to be convolved periodically to one and the same thing, through the circulation according to time. From all these particulars likewise, you have all the causes of time according to Plato. For the Demiurgus indeed, is the effective cause of time; eternity is the paradigm of it; and the end [or the final cause] of it, is the circumduction to one thing of the natures that are moved, according to periods. For that which does not abide in one, aspires after the circumduction to one; desiring through this to obtain *the one*, which is the same with *the good*. For that there should not be one certain progression of things in a right line, so as to form a line as it were, infinite both ways, but that the progression should be definite and circumscribed, dancing about the father of wholes, and the monad of time, evolving all the strength of fabrication, and again returning to its pristine condition, and effecting this frequently, or rather infinitely, that which is consentaneous to reason requires, if it is fit to call what is necessary reasonable. For whence do the participants of time derive the power of being restored to their pristine condition, unless that

which they participate had this power and peculiarity of motion? In addition also, to the reasonableness of this, the explanation of the name alone bears witness to its truth, with which likewise, the demonstrations of the most sagacious legislators accord, and the words of Plato himself who says, that time in these things imitating eternity, and circulating according to number, was now generated. *For time circulating the first of moveable natures, according to an energy proceeding to externals, and returning to its pristine state, after all the evolution of its power, thus also restores the periods of other natures to their pristine condition.* And it convolves indeed, through the whole of itself which proceeds, the soul which is the first participant of it; but through certain parts of itself, it convolves other souls and natures, the celestial circulations, and in the last place, all generation. For in consequence of time circulating, all things are convolved in a circle. Of the circulations however, some are shorter, but others longer.

For again, if the Demiurgus himself, made time to be the moveable image of eternity, and gave subsistence to it, according to his intellection about eternity, it is necessary that the moveable nature of time should be circular, and proceed with a dancing [or measured] motion; in order that it may neither depart from eternity, and may evolve the intellection of the father about it. For, in short, the moveable nature of time being comprehensive of all motions, ought to be bounded much prior to the things which are measured by it. For not the privation of measure, but the first measure, measures beings: as neither does infinity give bound to things, but this is the province of the first bound. But time is moved, neither according to soul, nor according to nature, nor according to the corporeal-formed and visible essence; for thus the motions of it would be partible, and not comprehensive of wholes. Besides this also, they would participate of the anomalous, either more or less, and would be themselves in want of time. For the motions according to soul, nature and body, are all of them surveyed in time, and not in progression like those which measure wholes, but in a certain quality of life, or lation, or passion. The motion of time however, is a pure progression, without difference, imperceptible, unbroken,<sup>1</sup> orderly,<sup>2</sup> equal, similar and the same. For it is exempt both from equable and unequable motions, and is similarly present with both, not being changed in quality, by the alliation in their motions, but remaining the same separate from all inequality; being efficacious of whole motions according to nature, and measuring them, and restoring them to their pristine state. It likewise subsists unmingled with the natures that are measured by it, conformably

<sup>1</sup> For ἀγλαστος here, read αἰσλαστος.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of ἀσφατος in this place, it is necessary to read εὐσφατος.

to the peculiarity of intellectual energy; but proceeds transitively and self-motively. And in this respect, it pertains to the psychical order, but is inherent in the things which are defined and perfected by it in a way conformable to the nature of a primordial cause. It is not however, allied in *all respects* to any one being. For it is necessary that the measure of wholes should be in *a certain respect* similar and allied to all things, but should not be the same with any one of the natures which it measures.

The motion therefore of time proceeds, evolving and dividing impartible and abiding power, and partly unfolding it into light. For just as a certain number<sup>1</sup> receives divisibly all the forms of the monad, and converts, and circularly leads them to itself; thus also, the motion of time, proceeding according to the measures in the temporal monad, conjoins the end to the beginning, and this infinitely; having indeed itself a divine order, yet not an arranged, as the philosopher Iamblichus also says, but an arranging order, nor an order which follows precedaneous natures, but which is the primary leader of things which are perfectly effected. At the same time however, it is measured by nothing that has interval. For it would be ridiculous to say, that things which have a more ancient nature and dignity, are measured by such as are of posterior origin. But the motion of time is alone measured by the temporal monad, which the progression of time is said to evolve, and by a much greater priority, by the Demiurgus, and eternity itself, of which it is said to be the image, and with reference to which it is made to be moveable. With reference to eternity therefore, which is perfectly immoveable, time is said to be moveable; just as if some one should say, that soul, as with relation to intellect, is partible about bodies. Not that it is this alone, but that when compared with intellect, it may appear to be a thing of this kind; though it is impartible, with reference to the partible essence. Thus also time, though it is naturally eternal, yet is said to be moveable, as with reference to eternity itself. On account of the order likewise of it, and the continuity in its progression, it is by no means proper to think that the prior and posterior in it are such as some apprehend them to be. For it must not be definitely surveyed, either alone according to the mutations of motions, as in the celestial motions; nor in the evolutions of lives, as in the soul; nor according to the gradual progressions of corporeal generations, as in nature; nor according to any thing else of the like kind: (for these are the peculiarities of the orders posterior<sup>2</sup> to it) but it must be surveyed according to a precedency of causes, and connexion in the continuity

<sup>1</sup> i. e. The decad.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *μετ' αὐτῶν* here, it is necessary to read *μετ' αὐτῶν*.

of its progeny, and according to a primordial energy, and a power efficacious of all-various motions.

*Time therefore is moveable, not by itself, [or essentially], but according to the participation of it which is apparent in motions, and by which motions are measured and defined.\* Just as if some one should say, that the soul is divisible about bodies, so far as there is a certain divisible participation of it about bodies, of which the soul comprehends the cause. For thus also time is moveable, as possessing the cause of the energy proceeding from it, and which is partly seen in motions, and is co-divided together with them. Hence, as motions become temporal through participation, so likewise time is moveable, through being participated by motions; to which physiologists only looking, think that time is that which is numbered of motion, not being able to perceive the cause of this.*

In the first place therefore, it must be said, that neither does the universe alone subsist in motion, but it is necessary that something of it should entirely remain, in order that this being permanent, it may be moved. It is demonstrated therefore, in the Theætetus, that it is impossible for any thing to be entirely moved in all respects. Hence it is necessary that something should remain prior to the time which is in participation, and subsists in motion, in consequence of being co-extended with motion. And that this indeed, should be inefficacious is impossible. But if it is efficacious, and is moved, it will again be in want of another thing, which may measure its motion. *If however, it energizes immovably, this will be the true peculiarity of time.* In the second place, we are persuaded from common conceptions, that the Seasons are Goddesses, and that Month is a God, both which we worship in temples. We likewise say, that Day and Night are divinities, of whom also we possess invocations, imparted by the Gods themselves. Much more therefore, is it necessary that time itself should be a God, since it is comprehensive of Month, and the Seasons, of Day and Night. In the third place, if time is something numbered; but it is necessary that prior to that which is numbered, that which numbers should exist, so that prior to that which is numbered in capacity, there should be that which numbers in capacity, and that which numbers in energy, prior to that which is numbered in energy; if this be the case, that is time in reality, which is the number itself, of all periods, and which numbers each of them. In the fourth place, whatever participates of soul, participates also of time, but not vice versa: for inanimate natures participate of time. It must be admitted therefore, that time is beyond soul. But soul is prior

\* For μετεϊσθαι και ορχιζομαι in this place, read μερπουσαν και οριζουσαν.

to its participants, itself by itself. Much more therefore is time itself by itself beyond the participants of time.

How then will a thing of this kind be the image of eternity? For again it must be discussed, on account of the difficulty with which the knowledge of the things is attended. Because, says the divine Iamblichus, it exhibits the infinity of eternity, (which is now being, is at once all, abides in *the now*, and is the unmeasured measure of intelligibles,) in a circular evolution, in continuity, and in that which is successive; and also in separating beginnings, middles, and ends, and not deserting any one of the things comprehended by it. And as it is not simply moveable, but is moveable as with reference to eternity, so neither is it simply an image, but the whole of this may be justly said to be the image of eternity. For being a true essence, and in short, measuring, comprehending, and restoring motions to their pristine state, it is at the same time said to be an eternal image. *It appears also, that it is the first of images.* For all-perfect intellect is not properly said to be the image of the first cause. For what can be assimilated to that which is entirely without form? But time will be the first participant of intellect and an impartible nature between all-perfect intellect, and sensibles. And in short, if it is necessary that image should belong to things which participate; for it wishes to preserve the form of another more ancient and venerable nature, from which it receives the peculiarity of its idea; it is requisite, that image should neither be in the first essences; (for they being first, do not participate, but rather, they are participated by other things, not being ingenerated in their participants, but after another manner, being converted to themselves;) nor in sensibles alone. For middle also participate of first natures, and not sensibles alone, which<sup>1</sup> are assimilated to first, through the representations of middle natures. Time therefore, is said to be the image of eternity, and the whole world, of animal itself, according to soul, and according to body. Hence, if as Porphyry, and some other Platonists thought, sensibles alone participate of truly-existing beings, we must investigate images in them alone. But if, as Amelius writes, and prior to Amelius, Numenius, there is also participation in intelligibles, there will likewise be images in them. If however according to the divine Plato, images are neither in the first of beings, nor in sensibles alone, Iamblichus, who nearly surpasses all philosophers in all things, will in these also be victorious, by exhorting us to survey participations, in the middle, and in the last of beings. And thus much may suffice at present concerning eternity, and the image of eternity, which is at

<sup>1</sup> 'A is omitted in the original.



once moveable, and always subsists with invariable sameness, and which proceeding according to intellectual forms, the father of wholes established in his fabrications; as they were not able to sustain the all-perfect measure of eternity. Let us therefore, now turn to the investigation of the following words.

“ He likewise contrived the generation of days and nights, and months and years, which had no subsistence prior to the universe, but which were constituted together with it. But all these are parts of time,<sup>1</sup> and *was* and *will be*, were generated species of time.” 37E

That prior to the generation of the universe (but I now speak of the universe, as surveyed in conjunction with soul, and the whole life of the world) there was an impartible essence abiding in eternity, in the same manner as eternity abides in one, and that it was no part of proceeding and participated time, is perfectly manifest. But what day and night, and month and year are, and how these indeed, are parts of time, but *was* and *will be* are said to be species, and not parts of time, will require a more abundant discussion, and a more profound consideration. If therefore, we should say that day is air illuminated by the sun, in the first place, we shall speak of something which takes place in the day, and not that which day is. For when we say a long, and a short day, we do not predicate an increase or diminution of the air. In the next place, it is difficult to devise how this will be a part of time. But if we should say that day is the temporal interval, according to which the sun proceeds from east to west, we shall perhaps avoid indeed the former objections, but we shall fall into more impervious difficulties. For if we survey the interval itself without habitude to the sun, and say that it is day, it will appear to be dubious, how the same interval being every where according to the same, day is not every where. But if we survey it in connexion with the solar motion, and this merely so, day will always be in the heavens, and there will not be night. And how is it possible that a part of time should not be every where. For it is here clearly said, that night, day, and month, are parts of time. If however, we do not merely connect the interval with the circulation of the sun, but say that day is the motion of the sun from east to west, and night the motion of it from west to east, the universe will neither have days nor nights, which are said to be parts of time. And it is also evident that neither will they have months, nor years. We conceive however that time both according to the

<sup>1</sup> The words, *παντα δε παντα μερος χρονου*, are through the fault of the transcribers omitted in the text of Proclus.

whole of itself which abides, and according to every part of its progression, is present to the whole world. For one and the same now is every where the same. It is necessary therefore, that day, and such other things as we say are parts of time, should be every where the same, though they are participated partly and with dispersion by sensible fabrications; to which also some looking, adopt the more usual rather than the more accurate signification of names.

Hence, as our father [Syrianus] philosophizes, these things are not asserted for the purpose of subverting the phenomena: for Timæus says what is usually said by the multitude. But our father referring these, as he is accustomed to do, to more principal hypostases says, *that day and night are demiurgic measures of time, exciting and convoking all the visible and invisible life and motion, and orderly distribution of the inerratic sphere. For these are the true parts of time, are essentially present with all things, and comprehend the primordial cause of apparent day and night, each of which are different in visible time.* And Timæus also looking to this, reminds us how time was generated together with the universe. Hence he says in the plural number days and nights, as likewise months and years. These therefore, are obvious to all men. For the invisible causes of these, have a uniform subsistence prior to things multiplied, and circulating to infinity. The immoveable causes of these likewise subsist prior to things that are moved, and the intellectual causes of them prior to sensibles. Such, therefore, must day and night be conceived to be according to their first subsistence. *But it must be said, that month is that which convokes the lunar sphere, and every termination of the circulation about the zodiac, being truly a divine temporal measure. And year is that which perfects and contains the whole middle fabrication, according to which the sun is seen possessing the greatest power, and measuring all things together with time. For neither is day, nor night, nor month, nor much less year without the sun, nor any thing else pertaining to the world. And I do not say this, with reference to the visible fabrication alone, for of these measures the visible sun is the cause; but in the invisible and superior fabrication, the more true sun measures all things together with time, being in reality time of time, according to the oracle of the Gods concerning it.* For that Plato not only knew these visible parts of time, but also the divine parts homonymous to these, is evident from what he says in the tenth book of the Laws. For he there shows, that the seasons and months are divine in conjunction with all the other [mundane] Gods, in consequence of having divine lives and divine intellects presiding over them in the same manner as the universe. But it is not wonderful, if he now rather speaks about the visible parts of time, because his design at present is to physiologize. Let these therefore be the parts of time, of which some are adapted to the fixed stars, but others to the stars that revolve about the poles of

the zodiac, and others to other Gods, or the attendants of the Gods, or to mortal animals, or to the more elevated or more low parts of the universe.

Plato however, says that *was* and *will be* are species, and not parts of time, in the same manner as days and nights, and months and years. For divine orders which give completion to the whole series of time, preside over the latter. Hence, he calls them parts of time. But *was* and *will be*, are entirely surveyed according to each of these. And hence, they are certain species, as not having a peculiar matter; I mean, a diurnal, or nocturnal, or some other such-like matter. If however, these are species of time, which was generated together with the universe, *was* had no existence prior to the generation of the universe. But if *was* had no existence prior to it, neither had motion; for in all motion, there are *was* and *will be*, because there are prior and posterior. If however, motion was not prior to the universe, neither was disorderly motion. Hence Atticus and his followers speak in vain, when they say, that time was prior to the generation of the world, but not an arranged time. For where there is time, there are also the past and the future. And where these are, there *the was*, and *the will be* entirely subsist. Moreover, *the was* and *the will be*, are species of time generated by the Demiurgus. Hence also Plato calls them *generated*. Neither therefore was there a certain time prior to the fabrication of things. It is necessary therefore, that the much-celebrated disorderly motion of Atticus and his followers, either, if it existed, should not be in time, or that there should not be in short, a certain time when it was produced. It is necessary however, motion existing, that there should be a time in which it was generated: one part of it having the past,<sup>a</sup> another the present, and another the future. Hence, it is not possible that there should have been motion prior to the generation of time; since neither could there have been disorderly time. For disorderly time would have *the was* and *the will be*; the former of which would be the past, but the latter the future. Or, if it alone had *the is*, without these, it would have been eternity, and not time, and disorderly motion would be eternal which is impossible. For Aristotle has sufficiently demonstrated, that all motion is in time, both that which is disorderly, and that which is orderly, each entirely having the prior, and the posterior; in order that the motion may be that which it is said to be, and may not be permanency instead of motion. But that *the was* and *the will be*, were not prior to the fabrication of things, Plato clearly teaches us, as I have before observed by saying that as days and nights were generated as parts, so *the was* and *the will be*, were generated as species of time. They however say, that the disorderly motion was unbegotten. Hence, if there was then

<sup>a</sup> For προελθον here, it is necessary to read παρελθον.

a certain time, it was unbegotten; so that *the was* and *the will be*, were unbegotten. *The was* and *the will be* therefore, were not prior to the generation of the world, but were simultaneous with the world; time being one and the same, and being the number both of disorderly and of orderly motions, and existing without difference. This therefore, is demonstrated through these methods as a corollary.

If however, you wish to survey these as species of time, in the way in which they appeared to be so to our preceptor, assume for me a perfect period, and an entire progression of time, one part having now become the past, but another the future, and behold *the was*, and *the will be* as species of time. For if we do not thus, but partly understand the words of Plato, the venerable and entire idea of time, will not be manifested to us, according to each of these species, but that which happens to some of the things that are in generation, and mutation. *Unless indeed, the was indicates the perfective order of time, but the will be, that order of it which unfolds into light, just as the is, indicates its connectedly containing order. For time unfolds things which as yet are not, connectedly contains such as are present, and perfects such as are past, and introduces an appropriate end to their periods. And thus much concerning the parts and the species of time.*

With respect however, to the word *contrived*, though we have before observed that time is in reality the work of divine and demiurgic contrivance, by which natures that are changed remain through the whole, and partake of perfection, perpetuity, defence, measure and comprehension; yet it may be said, do not divine natures measure themselves,<sup>1</sup> and especially do not those that revolve in the heavens, define their own motions? This indeed, we must most readily admit. For material and corruptible natures have their existence, and the extent of their duration from other things; but divine natures have these, both from primordial causes and themselves. Hence Plato, when he begins to speak about the times that are unfolded into light in the heavens, says "*that the stars were generated for the sake of co-operating in the production of time;*" and again, "*that they were generated as instruments of time;*" and in the third place, "*that they were produced for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers of time.*" In what is here said however, the term *co-operating* shows that time indeed existed prior to the stars, but that it is unfolded into light about the world through these. For time being in them, is unfolded through their motion. But the term *instruments* again after another manner, in a certain respect, indicates the same thing; viz. that the whole of time was produced, both that which abides, and that which proceeds,

<sup>1</sup> For *εαυτο* here, read *εαυτα*.

by the father and maker of all things, for the purpose of measuring mundane natures; but that the bodies which revolve in the heavens, are partial measures, and are comprehended in the one time; each in an especial manner, more organically producing in conjunction with time, such things as are appropriate in it. For in short, all the second fabrication has this relation to the one and impartible production of things. For each of the bodies that revolve in the heavens, is said especially to contribute to the measure of itself. Thus for instance, *the sun though it contributes to all things, on account of its ruling dignity, yet it particularly contributes to the year, which it constitutes in conjunction with the Demiurgus, and the whole of time, as the peculiar measure of itself. But the moon contributes to month; and the inerratic sphere, to day and night.* The mode also of operation in the rest of the heavenly bodies, is evident; though neither night, nor much less day, is without the sun, nor year without the inerratic sphere, and the zodiac. At the same time however, some measures are more adapted to some of these, than to others.

The stars also may be said to be the instruments of time, in consequence of time possessing an effective dignity, with reference to and through them, and adorning generation as it were through instruments. By which also it is evident, that time is not only that which is participated, and is the number of motion, since the governors of the world have the order of instruments with reference to it; but likewise, that it is an invisible God, energizing eternally about all motions, and the whole period of the world, but using for instruments these divinities, as more partial measures of itself. But the assertion, that the stars were generated, for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers of time, clearly shows that the one time proceeds from the Demiurgus, and his will; and that remaining one, and a whole, and without difference, it becomes through the motion of these stars, multitudinous according to number, and that each of the measures adapted to it, is as it were cut and divided from the whole of time, which is always the guardian of each, through its equable and orderly motion. In reality however, the celestial Gods, are rather guarded by the numbers of time, and obtain through these, the distinction of the periods which they make, and of their restitutions to their pristine state; but at the same time, since we endeavour to collect the truth pertaining to invisible from visible natures, we infer that the numbers of time are guarded, through the circulation of the stars.

With these things however, not only Plato as we have before observed, but theurgists likewise accord. For they celebrate time as a mundane God, eternal, boundless, young and old, and of a spiral form. And besides this also, as having its essence in eternity, as abiding always the same, and as possessing

infinite power. For how could it otherwise comprehend the infinity of apparent time, and circularly lead all things to their former condition, and renovate them, and also recall things which become old through it, to their proper measure, as being at once comprehensive both of things that are moved in a circle, and according to a right line. For a spiral is a thing of this kind; and hence, as I have before observed, time is celebrated by theurgists, as having a spiral form. For they not only celebrate time as a God, but likewise day and night, and month and year, are considered by them as Gods. For of things which circulate perpetually, it is entirely necessary, that there should be an immoveable cause; and a different cause of things specifically different. On this account therefore, they have delivered to us, congresses, invocations, and teletic sacred laws. It is necessary likewise, not to survey all these particulars superficially, but to venerate them as divine, invisible, and immoveable causes, prior to these moveable natures which are apparent to all men; Plato himself in the *Laws*, bearing testimony, as we have said, to the truth of this, by speaking of these causes as Gods. *For from the Greeks we receive the sacred rites of Month, and we learn that by the Phrygians Month is celebrated as Sabazius, and also in the middle mysteries of Sabazius.* For that which they first beheld to be the measurer of a perpetual circulation, they apprehended to be a God, and this they honoured, through the mysteries, and all-sacred worship; in the same manner as they also honoured the seasons. For they were able to perceive [the divinity of] these, from their effects; though not similarly the divinity of the year. For men indeed, who were divinely wise, have likewise celebrated this; but it was not easy for all men to know and worship it, on account of the difficulty of understanding the period which is measured by it. This also is the case with the whole of time, on account of the ignorance of the one period of all things; so that the investigation of this whole, as existing, and as a God, is attended with extreme difficulty; though if an immoveable cause precedes perpetual motion, it is necessary that prior to perpetuity itself, there should exist that which unitedly defines the whole of it, and which numbers it; perpetuity itself being that which is numbered.

“These things however, through oblivion, are not rightly transferred by us to an eternal essence. For we say that it *was*, and *will be*, though in reality, to this the term *it is*, alone pertains.”

In the first place, it deserves to be remarked, that Plato again considers the eternal as the same with the intelligible essence; in order that we may more clearly be persuaded, that when he asserted the world was generated the statue

of the eternal Gods, he meant by the eternal, the intelligible Gods. In the next place, it must be observed, that in consequence of perceiving that men conceive and assert nothing sane about these particulars, he himself recurs to true conceptions of the things, at the same time purifying the use of words, through which the teacher ' necessarily produces recollection in the minds of the well-disposed. What is now said therefore, in consequence of the mildness ' of Plato's manners, does not seem to accense severely the assertions of mankind. For the expression *not rightly*, since it is common both to the accuser and the accused, is not accustomed to bring with it great disgrace. The words of the text however, have a sharp ' and percussive power. For with respect to those things which the Demiurgus imparted to the last of beings, in consequence of their incapacity of receiving a more venerable comprehension, if men endeavour to adapt these to the essences which abide in eternity, they engage in a certain gigantic war, defaming the will and power \* of the Demiurgus, and in reality, hastening to hurl rocks and oaks against the heavens. Why therefore, are not *the was* and *the will be*, adapted to intelligibles? Because the measure of intelligibles is firm and immoveable, and causes the things which are measured by it to be exempt from all mutation. But why does the *it is*, in reality alone pertain to them? Because that which they are, they always are, not losing, nor receiving any thing, neither according to essence, nor according to life, nor according to intelligence, nor much more according to union. *Shall we say therefore, that of these three, the was, the is, and the will be, the extremes do not pertain to intelligibles, but the middle alone? Or is this by no means the case? For neither does the is, which is co-arranged with the was, and the will be, pertain to intelligibles; but that which is exempt from all these, has no representation whatever of time, and is defined according to the eternal measure itself, must be attributed to the Gods, and to intelligibles. For us with respect to the always, one was eternal, but the other temporal, so likewise, the is, is twofold, the one being adapted to truly existing beings, but the other to mundane things. When therefore, he says, that to this in reality, the term, it is, alone pertains, by transferring the word alone, we shall find what is said to be more scientific. For it will then be, to this, the alone is pertains; viz. the is, which is by itself exempt from a co-arrangement with the species of time.*

' For διδασκαλιῶν here, it is necessary to read διδασκαλῶν.

² Instead of ἐπισκεῖται in this place, read ἐπιτελεῖται.

³ For ἐργεῖται here, read ἐργίται.

⁴ It appears to me that the word ἐν αἰῶνι is wanting here in the original.

How came men therefore, to err in so great a degree in this respect, and to attribute to the intelligible Gods things which do not at all pertain to them? The whole cause indeed, is the oblivion of divine natures, on account of the defluxion of our wings, our lapse, and our communion with mortal bodies. Hence Plato also says, "*that these things through oblivion, are not rightly transferred by us to an eternal essence.*" Theurgists however, are not thus affected; for it is not lawful for them to be so. But they celebrate time itself as a God, and as we have said, they denominate one time zonic, but another azonic, which measures the period of the third of the ethereal worlds. They likewise celebrate a certain archangelic time, in the middle of the ethereal worlds; and another *ruling* time, which presides over the first of those worlds. And after all these, they speak of another fontal time, which is the leader of the empyrean world, and conducts, and defines its period, proceeding from the fontal Goddess [Rhea] herself, who generates all life, and all motion. For she produces fontal time, and causes it to preside over all moveable natures, and to measure the periods of all things, as far as to the last of beings. For these also are measured according to periods. In things likewise, which are perfectly corruptible,<sup>1</sup> Plato teaches us, that every thing which lives is generated from that which is dead, and every thing which is dead, from that which is living; and that there is a period of all things, and an apocatastasis of generated natures, and not alone of such as are incorruptible. For the individual which was generated from non-being according to a certain period, departs into non-being [again], since motion from the same to the same, is a period.

Time therefore, measures all things, and defines the periods of all things, as far as to the last of beings. And the Demiurgus added this to moveable natures, in order that they might imitate the continued permanency of intellect in eternity<sup>2</sup> itself, through the periodical progression from the same to the same, which time imparts to all moveable beings. The multitude however, frequently confound the nature of things, not distinguishing between what is adapted to truly-existing beings, and to such as are generated. But in a particular manner, the ignorance concerning eternity and time, produces this dire confusion, and illegality. The similitude of the things likewise, operates something. For last are not separated from first natures, but are suspended from, and proceed according to them, and become invested with the form of images. It is also a dire thing, for those who

<sup>1</sup> For *καρπορ* here, it is necessary to read *καρπορρω*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *αω* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *αω*.



have not a scientific knowledge of similitudes, to reason falsely, and transfer some things to others, to be persuaded to associate with images as if they were paradigms, and to think that a primordial essence is nothing else than its visible image. Perceiving therefore, among sensibles, the mixture of being with non-being, and the domination of being in a certain respect, when we say that a thing is, but of non-being in a certain respect, when we assert concerning it, that it *was*, or that it *will be*, we transfer these to the eternal order of real beings, where nothing is past, nor any thing will be future, nor in short, will be changed, and where there is no progression of time, nor representation of being according to privation; but where there is true essence, and truly-existing being, an invariable sameness of subsistence, the all in the now, and the ends subsisting at once, not as different in different things, but as the same with their subjects. For in things in which as I may say, the whole of the *hyparxis* consists of beauty and goodness, well-being does not differ from existence.

“ But *the was*, and *the will be*, are adapted to be asserted of generation proceeding in time. For these are motions. It is not however, fit, that the nature which always subsists with invariable sameness, immoveably, should become through time, either older, or younger, or should formerly have been generated, or be now generated, or altogether will be hereafter; or should receive any such things as generation adapts to the natures that are borne along in the sensible region. But these are generated species of time imitating eternity, and circulating according to number.”

These three things, says Plato, pertain, on account of time, to generation; one, *the was* and *the will be*; the second, *to become younger and older*; and the third, *to have been generated formerly*, or *to be now generated*, or *to be hereafter*. Of these, the divine Iamblichus says that time produces the first in the realms of generation, as proceeding from real being; but the second, as being impelled from life; and the third, as being suspended from the intellectual order. But these things being asserted with great wisdom, in the first place he inquires, if it is more proper to survey them as three, and not as two, understanding by the expression *to have been generated formerly*, the younger or older, and also by the expressions, *to be now generated*, and *to be hereafter*; in order that it may not only be erroneous to adapt any thing of this kind to the Gods according to the being generated, but also according to all the parts of time, and generation. In the next place, recurring to the beginning of the whole of what Plato now says, it must be consi-

dered, whether we can rightly assert the two alone of generation, I mean *the was*, and *the will be*, or that also, which is as it were the middle of them, *the is*; which is not now named, because *the eternal is* pertains to intelligibles, lest the homonymy should again produce disturbance in what is said. Moreover, it is evident to every one, that each image participates in a certain respect of its paradigm, but that the whole world, in an especial manner participates of the intelligible. So that if truly-existing being is in the intelligible, being will also after a certain manner, exist in the sensible world. *The is* however, is not con-numerated with *the was*, and *the will be*, because that which is *properly is*, is not among sensibles, and because it has a secondary subsistence from the intelligible, so that it is more adapted to it [than to sensibles], and because the design was to show what the peculiarities are of each of the natures, and not if the one participates of a certain thing from the other, though *the was*, and *the will be* are rather characterized by non-being [than by being:] the former, by *the no longer*, but the latter, by *the not yet*. Do sensibles therefore, after a certain manner entirely participate of being? Or may we not say that they are not denominated according to a deflection from it, but through the domination in them of non-being they are only adapted to generation, but by no means pertain to truly-existing beings! Besides, the monad, or *the is*, is more allied to eternity, and intelligibles, but the duad of *the was* and *the will be*, to generation and time. *This power however, and strength of temporal energy is great, that it co-arranges that which no longer is with beings, and that which is not yet with things that are present. For all these become continued according to time, and the present through time is dismissed to the was, so as not even then to be hurried away to that which in no respect whatever exists, but on account of time, is after a certain manner co-arranged with beings.*

How therefore, in generated natures, can *the was*, and *the will be*, be fitly said to be species of time? May we not say, that the species of time are one thing; for temporal progressions alone, and the intervals which measure wholes, are more simple; but the things which are arranged in the natures generated in time, another! For time was, and the war was, are not the same thing; as neither is the downward of place, the same as the downward of the earth. But the former is simple and one, but the latter composite and twofold. And the one comprehends, but the other is comprehended. Thus also in *the was*, the temporal indeed, comprehends and measures, and is simple, but that which is assumed in the generation which is in time, is comprehended, and measured, and participates of time, but is not time. That all generation however, is comprehended by time, just as time itself is by intelligibles, is evident. And time is said to proceed from intelligibles according to number, as making its progression according to the

forms and measures that are in them. But generation is said to proceed in time, as being measured and perfected by time. Again, time, on account of its imitation of eternity, is said to circulate (just as the heaven on account of its imitation of intellect, is said to be of a spherical form) and to have as species *the was*, and *the will be*, and such things as are allied to these; and it is evident that these are simple, and the primary leaders of the natures that are borne along in generation. For that which has the measures of all generation in itself, inserts the images and impressions of them, in the things which proceed according to it. Generation therefore, loses its vigour, and on this account requires the renovating aid of time. It also is imperfect at first, and is in want of time, to make it more perfect, and older. But the intelligible is always perfect, and always flourishing, and always has an invariable sameness of subsistence; whence also something which is older subsists there,

But Jove was born the first,

and likewise that which is younger,

Hebe august, for them the nectar pours.

Yet these are not present with them through time. This also is very accurately added by Plato, that it is not fit the intelligible should become either older or younger through time, nor in short, that the unbegotten should *be* generated, or *have been* generated, or *will be* generated. And in one word, generation indeed, though it is not essence, yet participates of essence; but it is by no means lawful that essence should be filled with generation. Hence, neither is it right to introduce to truly-existing beings, things which are adapted to generation through time.

“And in addition to these things also, we assert that a thing which *was* generated, *is* generated; that what subsists *in becoming to be*, *is* generated; that what *will be*, *is* to be; and that *non-being is* non-being; no one of which assertions is accurate. Perhaps however, a perfect discussion of these things, is not adapted to the present discourse.”

Previously to this, Plato blamed the custom of the Greeks, for introducing to truly-existing beings, words adapted to things in generation; but now he accuses the multitude of co-arranging with generation, that which is adapted to intelligibles. For their illegality, is either twofold, or is entirely one and great. For when they say that a thing which *was* generated, *is* generated, and that *will be*, *is* to be, they erroneously adapt the peculiarity of eternal essences, to generated

natures. For this *is*, pertains to superior divine beings; just as to be generated, or subsist in becoming to be, pertains to sensibles. They likewise erroneously confound the parts of time, and subvert the order which is in it, by making *the now*, or the present time, the same as the past. But when they say, that what subsists in *becoming to be*, *is*, they fall into the former error alone. Though this however, is an error of the greatest consequence, yet, if it be lawful so to speak, it is a still greater error to say that non-being is. For if generation is a medium between non-being and being, it is a less error, to introduce the peculiarities of being to generation, than to non-being. One apology however, for these things, may be made conformably to nature. For in consequence of non-being participating in generation of being, in the same manner as every thing temporal appears to participate of eternity, it is usual to refer these to eternity and truly-existing being, which are exempt from all interval and distribution into parts. And again, it is usual to preserve and detain generation, which is borne along in motion, and exists in time. It is not at all wonderful therefore, if men wishing to detain among beings, that which has already been generated, should say that it is generated; and also being willing to co-arrange with things in existence, that which is not yet generated, they should say, it *is* to be generated. For through these two things, non-being is in a certain respect able to accede to, and be co-arranged with beings; viz. through the participation of being, and through the present temporal interval, both which may appear to introduce existence. And hence indeed, the frequent use of these words in this sense was assumed. Nevertheless the transposition of this perturbation has not any thing [as Plato says] accurate and scientific, by which he signifies, as far as is adapted to the present speculation, which is more physical, that a more abundant investigation of these things, pertains to another discussion, which, as most of the interpreters think, is logical. For in logical discussions, it is usual to inquire whether non-being is the object of opinion. As Iamblichus says however, and I am persuaded, it is theological. For in the Sophista, much is said about all-various non-being, and likewise in the Parmenides, the speculation of which, Timæus also evinces to be appropriate. Now however, as he separates and distinguishes things from each other, viz., into that which is always being, and that which is generated and perishes, into image and paradigm, the eternal and the temporal, thus also, he wishes to give appellations adapted to each of these, so as neither to transfer things which pertain to generation through time, to more simple and divine essences, nor to mingle the transcendent goods of more excellent natures, with things which are borne along in motion and mutation. But he refers to more appropriate opportunities, the more profound investigation of these particulars. For this was usual both with Plato himself, and prior to Plato, with the Pytha-

goreans. Aristotle also, especially emulating this custom, discusses philosophical problems in a way adapted to the design of his treatise.

“Time therefore, was generated together with the universe, in order that being generated together with it, it may also be dissolved together with it, if ever a certain dissolution of it should take place. It was also generated according to the paradigm of an eternal nature, in order that it might, as much as possible, be similar to it. For the paradigm of it indeed, is through all eternity [real] being. But the universe forever through the whole of time, was generated, is, and will be.”

Plato says that time was generated together with the universe, now animated, and endued with intellect; because the world first participates of time, according to soul, and the corporeal-formed nature. But the words, “*that being generated together with it, it may also be dissolved together with it, if ever a certain dissolution of it should take place,*” clearly show that the universe is unbegotten and incorruptible. For if it was generated, it was generated in time. But if it was generated together with time, it was not generated in time. For neither was time generated in time, lest there should be time prior to time. If therefore, the universe was generated together with time, it was not generated, [according to the usual acceptance of the word.] For it is necessary that every thing which was generated, should be posterior to time. The universe however is by no means posterior to time. Again, if every thing which is dissolved, is dissolved at a certain time, but time cannot be dissolved in a part of itself, time cannot ever be dissolved; so that neither can the universe. For it is indissoluble, as long as time is indissoluble. Besides, time is indissoluble through a simplicity of nature; unless some one is willing to denominate the progression of it, and its return to the Demingus, which are motions contrary to each other, the generation and dissolution of it. Thus also the universe, has dissolution and generation according to cause. Just therefore, as if some one being willing that the revolutions of the circle of *the different*, should be odd in number, should say that the heptad is co-existent with them, in order that if ever the heptad should become an even number, they also may become even, signifying by this, that the circulations will not fall into the even number; thus likewise, we must now conceive respecting the all-various indissolubility of the world and time, in consequence of time having an indissoluble nature.

One cause therefore, of time having been generated together with the universe, is that the universe may be indissoluble and perpetual. But a second cause is,

that it may be most similar to its paradigm. For Plato says that the universe itself, is most similar to its paradigm. How therefore, does the universe become more similar to animal itself through time? Because, says he, as intelligibles receive all the power of eternity, which now unites, and connectedly contains them at once, collectively, and unically,—thus also the world, sustains all the measured motion of time partly, and in a divided manner, through which also it was, and is, and will be, not having the three in the whole of time, but each in a portion of time. It receives however, each of the three in the whole of time, on account of the past and the future period, and because being of the nature of things generated, it has the perfect in generation according to every part of time. And it exists indeed, or *is*, because in the whole of the present circulation of time, it participates of being. But it *will be*, because the measured motions of the whole of time, will never cease, and the circulations conjoin, and assimilate time to intelligible causes. If however, the universe exists for ever through the whole of time, and is, and was, and will be, it is, and will be in the time to come, in consequence of being incorruptible. Hence it was generated in *all* the past time, as being unbegotten. For it is similarly present with all time according to each of these.<sup>1</sup> Or if this is not admitted it no longer will be hereafter infinitely, or was generated from infinity. And those are ridiculous<sup>2</sup> who say that the world was once generated, and that it will at a certain time cease to be, since Plato ascribes to it the whole of time, on account of both [the past and the future.] And you see, that he now attributes the three parts of time to it, and does not refuse to ascribe being to it. Hence it is evident, that when before he attributes *the is* to an eternal nature, and not to generation, *the is* there, is exempt from all temporal extension, and being established according to the eternal itself, pertains to intelligibles; since he grants that the whole of *the was* and *the will be*, are for ever present with sensibles, according to the participation of truly-existing being.

How therefore, if the nature of time, as the divine Iamblichus says, and as I am persuaded, is a medium between eternity and the universe, of the latter of which it is the leader, and is assimilated to the former,—how, if this be the case, was time constituted for the sake of the universe? For how was that which is comprehensive and perfective, and which in a greater degree assimilates the image to its paradigm,—how was this generated for the sake of that which is comprehended and assimilated? For thus things which subsist for the sake of some-

<sup>1</sup> i. e. According to *the was*, *the is*, and *the will be*.

<sup>2</sup> Proclus here alludes to such of the ancient Christians, as endeavoured to prove, from the authority of Plato, that the world was produced at a certain time, and will at a certain time be destroyed.

thing else, will be more venerable than ends, and more excellent natures will make a progression to beings, for the sake of things subordinate. Nothing of this kind however, is to be found in the arrangements of Plato. For neither was time generated, for the sake of the universe alone, nor was the universe constituted for the sake of time alone, but each was constituted for the sake of itself, and of the other, and for the sake of both. For in order that all the fabrication of things might have perfection, such was the universe, and such was time consummately produced. Moreover, it happens that each greatly contributes to the assimilation of each to its proper paradigm. For time would not imitate eternity without the existence of the universe; for after what manner would it proceed, or what is there among beings, that it would ever measure, or connect, or perfect? nor would the universe, without the existence of time, imitate as much as possible, the all-perfect and eternal nature of animal itself. Each therefore was generated, not for the sake of itself alone, nor for the sake of the other alone, but for the sake of all the fabrication of things, in order that each might become most perfect, and most similar to its paradigm, or rather, each was generated for the sake of goodness, and the father of wholes, on account of which also the production of things possesses perfection. But each being generated that which it is with reference to the other, each contributes greatly to the permanency, order and good condition of all mundane natures. And thus much Plato philosophizes concerning time, which is the one and whole measure of all things, and which is moved and proceeds from the Demiurgus alone, and its proper monad. But in what follows, he discusses the time which is unfolded in the heavens, and is as it were co-divided with the various latitudes of the stars, which would not have subsisted without the revolution of the circle of *the same*, and the circle of *the different*, about the invisible and one time, which cuts off from itself, unfolds into light, and always preserves a measure adapted to each of these circles. In what follows also, in order that this secondary time might proceed into the visible world, and be universally known through the partial measures of itself, which it imparts, and that it might be more distributed, he constitutes the planets, among which the sun and moon are enumerated. From all which we may infer, what great dignity is allotted by the philosopher, or rather by the Demiurgus himself of wholes, to the time which is first and one.

“ From this reason therefore, and from such a discursive energy of divinity about the generation of time, in order that time might be generated, he produced the sun and moon, and the other five stars, which have the appellation of planets, for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers of time.”

The fabrication of things, as we have frequently observed, being twofold; the one invisible, one and simple, super-mundane and total; but the other visible, multitudinous and multiform, distributed into parts<sup>1</sup> in the world; and having twofold energies, the one primordial, immoveable, and intellectual; but the other secondary, proceeding with motion, and revolving about intellect; and the one being exempt from effects, but the other being co-arranged with them; this being the case, a twofold time also proceeds to beings. And the one indeed is super-mundane, but the other mundane. The one also both abides, and at the same time proceeds; but the other is borne along in motion. That also which is participated is twofold, the one subsisting according to simple participation, but the other in the periods of the celestial stars, which produce months and days, and nights and years. Such therefore being the difference of times, Plato having delivered the conceptions, about the one and simple essence of time, is now about to discuss the variety of the time, which is participated partibly, and to which the theory of the planets contributes. For through the motion of these dancing round the sun, the time which is known to us is completely effected; introducing this as a ninth gift to the world. In order however, that from the introduction itself, you may have an indication of the inferiority of this time to that which is super-mundane, he says that it was constituted *by the discursive energy of divinity*; and further still, *that it distinguishes and guards the numbers of time, through the motion of the stars*. To both likewise, we must direct our attention, viz. to the distinction of the many temporal measures after the one [super-mundane] time; and to the defence and preservation of the same measures perpetually, for the sake of which he says, the stars were generated. And the Demiurgus indeed, produced the former time, looking to eternity, and energizing according to one simple intelligence; but he produced the second time, as Plato says, from reason, and a discursive energy; [*καὶ διανοίας*] indicating by this, the divisible nature of *dianoia*,<sup>2</sup> and its distribution into multitude from one intelligence. For a divine intellect is one thing, and divine reason another; the former being united, but the latter multiplied; and the former comprehending wholes, but the latter dividing union into multitude; the former also, abiding in itself, but the latter unfolding itself into light. Hence, the secondary time, if it is universally apparent, is very properly said to proceed from the demiurgic reason, which receives as it were its progression from intellect; *reason* indeed, manifesting the cause, but *dianoia*, the

<sup>1</sup> For *περιζόμενης* here, read *μεριζομένης*.

<sup>2</sup> *Dianoia*, as has been before observed, when ascribed to the Demiurgus, indicates a distributive cause of things, or a cause, as Proclus expresses it, which divides union into multitude.



knowledge in the Demiurgus, which is of a biformed nature. Truly-existing time also, [or the first time] which is the number of all the periods in the universe, is one thing; but the time which flows from this, and proceeds according to number, is another.

Farther still, truly-existing time comprehends all measures uniformly, according to which also the periods both of souls and bodies are accomplished, and the one measure of the whole apocatastasis. For there is a period of that which is divinely generated, which a perfect number comprehends, as Socrates says in the Republic. But secondary time distinguishes and guards the measures in souls and corporeal natures. For it distributes measures adapted to each of these. And by this indeed, it divides the unical power of the first time, but guards the measure pertaining to each soul, and each corporeal nature. Conformably to this likewise it makes apocatastases. For there is one measure of the solar period, another of the lunar, and another of the period of the meteors. For in these also, there is a certain circle, adumbrating the celestial circle. Of different animals likewise, there is a different period. For of these there are periods, and measures of life, as also the daemoniacal Aristotle says. Such therefore are the conclusions which may be now assumed from these things, concerning the difference of these times.

It appears likewise, that Plato does not in vain say, "*in order that time might be generated,*" but for the purpose of manifesting, that invisible time was antecedent, being a whole, and one, and an intellectual number, prior to the time which is participated, and which proceeds according to number. Every thing therefore, which is generated, is prior to its generation, invisibly established in its cause. Hence generation signifies a progression into participants, according to which time unfolds into light different forms,<sup>1</sup> primarily and secondarily. It likewise signifies that time proceeds from more total to more partial natures, as far as to the last of things, as for instance, animals and plants. To us however, the whole of time becomes known from partial but orderly measures. For the whole is difficult to be known, and that which is disorderly cannot become the measure of other things. But since, as we have said, the period of the planets, and particularly the solar circle, contributes to the generation of secondary time, or rather, to the comprehension of the many measures contained in it, through which being different, as for instance months and years, we are accustomed to measure the whole of time,—hence, Plato says, that the sun and moon, and the five planets, were first generated by the Demiurgus, though each of the fixed stars likewise, being

<sup>1</sup> For αἰὲρ here, it is necessary to read αἰῶν.

spherical, performs its period about its own centre, according to a certain temporal measure. To us however, these measures are not known, as those of the planets are, according to which they make their periods about the zodiac. For in the fixed stars, we do not know the periods of them about their proper centres. Plato therefore, speaks concerning the planets, and says they were generated, in order that they might co-operate in the production of visible time; unfolding a different measure of different things, the sun being allotted a primordial and ruling dignity, and particularly according to the generation of time. Hence, he is called time of time by theologists, as unfolding into light the first time; and the period of the seasons is accomplished according to him. But the moon has the second order, as proximately moving, increasing, and diminishing, every thing in generation, by her powers. Hence, as the sun is said to change his forms every hour, and in each sign of the zodiac,\* so the moon changes her form every day; so that as the theologist says, she undergoes as many changes in a month as the sun in a year. But the other planets by their various motions, connect in a regular series, the diversity of generation. For different effects follow from the apocatas-tasis of different planets, which according to different measures, bring their own lives to a period.

Since however, the planets revolve with one continued, equable, and unceasing motion, but the order of them, and the equability and sameness of their motions, are latent, on account of their apparently advancing, receding, and becoming stationary, on this account, Plato says, they have the appellation of planets. Hence, you may assume, that it is the stars, and not the spheres in which the stars advance and recede, that suffer such things as these, and which are moved upward and downward, antecedently containing as orderly paradigms, the all-various disor-

\* This is well explained by Iamblichus *De Mysteriis*, p. 152, as follows: "Since every part of the heavens, and every sign of the zodiac, every celestial motion likewise, every time according to which the world is moved, and every thing contained in the wholes of the universe, receive powers descending from the sun, some of which are complicated with these things themselves, but others transcend commixture, the symbolical mode of signification indicates this, by asserting that the sun is diversified according to the signs of the zodiac, and that every hour he changes his form. At the same time however, it indicates his immutable, stable, never-fading, and at-once-collected communication of good to the whole world. But since the recipients of the impartible gift of the God are variously affected towards it, and receive multiform powers from the sun, according to their peculiar motions,—hence the symbolical doctrine evinces through the multitude of the gifts that the God is one, and exhibits his one power, through multiform powers. Hence also it says, that he is one and the same, but that the vicissitudes of his form, and his configurations, must be admitted to exist in the recipients. On this account, it asserts, that he is changed every hour, according to the sign of the zodiac, in consequence of these being variously changed about the God, according to the many modes by which they receive him."

derly motions of the sublunary region, viz. the motions there that are upward and downward, behind and before. For as Plato says in the *Laws*, those sin against divinity, who dare to ascribe wandering to the celestial Gods, in consequence of not knowing their order, their harmonious dance, and the equability of their motion. For inequability is alone apparent in them, through the lation and contrary circulation of their evolving circles, whether on account of epicycles, and eccentrics, or from other causes. For all the hypotheses have not the same<sup>1</sup> probability. But some of them indeed, are remote from the simplicity of divine natures, and others are as it were mechanical contrivances, devised by the moderns, to account for the motion of the celestial orbs. And it seems that Plato in the *Republic*, by making the whirls concentric, and in these the seven circles, and mentioning these alone, and not epicycles, ascribes to the stars themselves inequability, and this possessing arrangement and order. For this inequability returns to its pristine state, in orderly periods of time, in consequence of the planets being media between things that are moved with a motion perfectly equable, and those that are moved anomalously in every respect. For they are allotted a motion which is equably anomalous, or anomalously equable.

Time therefore, is unfolded into light, and makes its progression into the universe, through all the celestial orbs, and not only through the planets, but likewise through the fixed stars. Plato however, especially makes mention of the planets, in the generation of time, because they differ from the fixed stars in the variety of their periods, and from sublunary natures, in their motions being always invariably the same; the former of which, the distinction of many temporal measures manifests, and the latter, the perpetual preservation of the same periods, and apocatastases. For it is necessary to survey the same things, the multitude of measures always remaining. These therefore, have an orderly arrangement, after the one measure of the whole period. And the one monad indeed itself of time, is a perfect and entire number. But from this, and in each circulation, there is an appropriate measure, Saturnian, or Jovian, or Lunar, receiving its peculiarity from the soul, and motive deity, which is in each of the spheres. For one number pertains to the sun, another to a horse, and another to a plant. But the mundane number is common to all of them. On this account also we say, that there is the same time every where. For the world has one life, in the same manner as it has one nature, and one intellect. If however it has one  $\Sigma\alpha\alpha\gamma$ , it will also have one  $\Sigma\mu\gamma$ . But if this be the case, it will likewise have one temporal measure. And as each of the parts in it lives according to total nature, so likewise, it is

<sup>1</sup> For  $\alpha\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ , read  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\epsilon$ .

measured according to total time. And this is the common measure of all things. But after this monad there is a triad, the *summit* of which is the measure of the first circulation; but the *middle*, of all the circle of the *different*. For of all the planets, as of one animal, there is one life, (*zōē* *αἷς*) one period, and one apocatastatic time. And the third, or the *extremity*, is the measure of the circulation which takes place in generation. For on account of this, the mutations of the elements, the transmutations of moveable natures, and regeneration, are again allotted an hypostasis. After this triad however, time proceeds, according to other and other numbers, measuring wholes, and distinguishing all things by appropriate measures. These things therefore, we shall again consider.

It ought not however to be unnoticed, that Plato having given subsistence to wholes, and not yet mentioned partial animals, constitutes the planets, but afterwards the fixed stars, in the generation of partial animals. For what are called the planets, are *cosmocrators*, or governors of the world, and are allotted a total power. And as the inerratic sphere has a number of starry animals, so likewise each of the planets is the leader of a multitude of animals, or of certain other things of this kind. Hence also from this the doubt may be solved, how the one sphere [of the fixed stars] comprehends a multitude of stars; but with respect to the many spheres of the planets, each convolves one star. For it must be said that there [i. e. in the fixed stars] the sphere is a monad, being one, comprehending in itself an appropriate multitude, and is sufficient to the comprehension of the multitude, this being the first multitude. But in the planets, that which is the leader is twofold, the one being the sphere, [in which the planet is carried] but the other, each of the *cosmocrators*, being a monad<sup>1</sup> co-arranged with multitude. For subordinate natures require a greater number of leaders, and the multitude in each is invisible, on account of the subordination. And in the sublunary region, there is a still greater number of orders, which are the leaders of the genera in each of the elements, as we may learn from the *Theogony* which has been transmitted to us. Let these things therefore, be admitted as evident.

But thus much deserves to be considered in what is said about the generation of time; that if time is posterior to soul, how is soul moved according to time? and if it is prior to soul, how is it said to be generated? For Plato has said that soul is the best of generated natures. But if time is co-ordinate with soul, how is it that eternity is not co-ordinate with, but prior to, intellect? And it must be said

<sup>1</sup> The sphere is a leader, a co-arranged monad, and a wholeness; but each of the *cosmocrators* is a leader, and a monad, but is not a wholeness.

in answer to this, that time is indeed prior to soul, as eternity is prior to intellect; but that soul is the best of generated natures, which are *essentially* generated, and not only according to their being present with secondary natures, but also have a generation according to their inward energy, and an essence divisible into a multitude of parts, such as Plato himself has delivered to us. But time being, as we have demonstrated, essentially an eternal intellect, is participated in a generated manner, not at once wholly, nor immoveably, like the intellects prior to it, but moveably. Whence also as intellect, it perfects the soul, and is generated according to participations; flowing abundantly into its participants, and making generations to be as things numbered. Thus therefore, in consequence of entirely running together with the numbers of generations, <sup>1</sup> it may be shown to be generated. Hence too, proceeding according to number, it is said to be moveable; but not to be number, as the time is, which is prior to things numbered. For these reasons therefore, Plato here calls time eternal, because it is eternal according to its inward energy, the whole of which it possesses at once present. But in the *Laws* he says, that the soul is indeed indestructible, yet not eternal, because it is not allotted an immutable inward energy.

“ But the divinity having made the bodies of these stars, placed them, being seven in number, in the seven circulations; formed by the periodic motion of the circle of *the different*.”

That Plato denominates the sun and moon, and the other five stars, as animals endued with soul and intellect, is manifest from his adding in what is now said, that *the divinity made the bodies of each of them*, in consequence of the stars themselves being intellectual and vital. For he does not say, that he made *the bodies themselves*, <sup>2</sup> but *the bodies of them*. It must be said therefore, that the circulations of them are epicycles, or evolving circles, or the whole spheres, in which each of the stars is placed. Or it must be said, that they are no one of these, but as the divine Iamblichus apprehends, the circulations signify the intellectual souls of the planets. For as before, the divinity fashioned the whole bulk of the world within the soul, so now likewise, he places the seven bodies in the seven intellectual souls, at the same time causing souls and intellects to preside over these bodies. Since however, much prior to this, Plato represented the

<sup>1</sup> Instead of τῶν ἐκείνων συνεκδρομῶντα παντὶ ἀριθμῶν in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read, τοῖς ἐκείνων συνεκδρομῶντα παντὶ ἀριθμῶσι.

<sup>2</sup> For αὐτὴν here, it is necessary to read αὐτά.

period of the circle of *the different* in the whole soul, as presiding over these seven divine bodies, he very properly adds, (reminding us of what had been before said,) "*in the seven circulations formed by the periodic motion of the circle of the different in the whole soul.*" And again he manifests this, by speaking in the singular number. For this circle is undivided, though it is said to have been cut. And it does not lose its unity by the division of it into seven circles.

Perhaps however, it will be better to say, that the Demiurgus established the bodies of the cosmocrators, in the powers of the whole soul, but not yet in their proper souls, nor in their spheres. For the words, "*formed by the periodic motion of the circle of the different,*" manifest that this circle does not by its motion circumsolve these bodies. For this circle being one, and divided into seven parts, proceeds round the lives of these divine bodies. For farther on Plato says, that the fixed stars are placed in the wisdom of intellect, which is the soul of the circle of *the same*. For that is most powerful and excellent to which the Demiurgus imparted power. But the wisdom of this is an intellectual life. Thus therefore, he now places the seven bodies in the seven circles of the whole soul. And again, it will through these things be evident, how the simplicity of the soul is preserved, as with reference to the corporeal periods. For the one circle of *the same* animates according to one union, both the inerratic sphere, and the stars it contains. And in a similar manner each of the seven planets, according to one common power, animates both the spheres,<sup>1</sup> and the stars they contain. Now therefore, Plato speaks of the soul which is common to them; but shortly after he also delivers the soul peculiar to each, when he says, "that being bound with animated bonds they became animals." For then they are no longer animated as parts, but as animals, through their proper souls.

"And the moon indeed, he placed in the first circulation about the earth; but the sun, in the second above the earth; and the star called Lucifer,<sup>2</sup> and that which is sacred to Mercury, in circulations proceeding with a swiftness equal to that of the sun, to which at the same time they are allotted a contrary power. Hence the Sun, Lucifer, and Mercury, mutually comprehend, and are comprehended by each other."

Not only from what is here said, it is evident what order Spherics give to the

<sup>1</sup> In the original *σφαῖρας κατὰ δυνάμιν μὴ καὶ τὰς σφαῖρας*, which is evidently defective, and erroneous. I read therefore, instead of this, *σφαῖρας κατὰ δυνάμιν μὴ καὶ κατὰ τὴν δυνάμιν τὰς σφαῖρας*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Venus.

planets, according to Plato, but also from what is written in the Republic. For he arranges the Moon after the Sun;<sup>1</sup> since there is a certain most abundant communion of these divinities in the visible production of things. For the one has the order of father, but the other of mother. Both the intelligible and intellectual causes of them likewise are united to each other, and are unfolded into light from one cause. For the same Goddess produced

——the mighty Sun, and splendid Moon

[as Orpheus says]. Perhaps likewise the [Chaldaean] Oracles teach us this, since they every where arrange the Moon after the Sun, and the air after the Moon, both when they deliver the order of them from above, and when from beneath. For they say, "The ætherial course, the immense impulse of the Moon, and the aerial streams." And again, "O æther, Sun, spirit of the Moon, and ye leaders of the air." And elsewhere, "Of the solar circles,<sup>2</sup> the lunar rattlings, and the aerial bosoms." And afterwards, "The portion of æther, of the Sun, of the rivers of the Moon, and of the air." In another place likewise they say, "The broad air, the lunar course, and the perpetual pole of the Sun." Perhaps therefore, as I have said, it is possible to be persuaded from the Oracles, that the Sun is immediately prior to the Moon, as the Moon is prior to the air, all heaven having the order of fire; which also was the opinion of Plato,<sup>3</sup> who after the celestial arranges the ætherial idea, in what he shortly after says about the four ideas [in animal-itself]. Unless therefore, it is not necessary that the Sun should be immediately above the Moon, on account of the analogy to æther: for neither is æther immediately above the Sun. So that again, this analogy will not suffer the Sun to be arranged immediately above the Moon. Nevertheless ancient rumor gives this order to the Sun. For Aristotle was of this opinion, and likewise Eudoxus and his followers. If however, some adopting the hypotheses of mathematicians, should think fit to arrange the Sun in the middle of the seven planets, who collects and binds the triads on each side of him, it must be observed<sup>4</sup> that there is not any stability in what they say from the mathematics. For to say, that Venus and Mercury would be obscured, if they were after the Sun, in the same manner as the Moon is sometimes by the Sun, is confuted by showing that when they are in conjunction with the Sun according to longitude, they entirely

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *τον γαρ ηλιον ταρτει μετα σεληνην* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read, *την γαρ σεληνην ταρτει μετα ηλιον*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ηλιακοις τε κυκλον* here, it is necessary to read *ηλιακων τε κυκλων*.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *ο και Πλατων δοκει* in this place, read *ο και Πλατωνι δοκει*.

<sup>4</sup> For *εσθωσαν* here, it is requisite to read *ισθωσαν*.

differ according to latitude. And this is the cause of their not being obscured. As it does not, however, necessarily follow that the Sun has a middle position among the planets, mathematicians cannot procure that credibility through demonstrations that it has, which they are accustomed to obtain about most things.

Ptolemy therefore says, in his *Syntaxis*,<sup>1</sup> that it is fit in conformity to good and probable reasoning, to place the Sun in the middle of the seven planets, in order that of the five planets prior to him, there may be those that are perfectly separated from him; and after him, those that are in conjunction with him, and precede, or attend him like satellites. But in his *Hypotheses*,<sup>2</sup> he does not very much contend for the truth of this, nor infer it from the intervals of the planets, neither in that work, nor in his *Syntaxis*. Much attention therefore, is not to be paid to mathematicians, when they reason from probability. But the theurgist<sup>3</sup> clearly says, "that the Demiurgus suspended six zones, and for the seventh hurled into the middle the fire of the Sun;" and it is not lawful to disbelieve in what he says. Plato however, looking to the abundant communion, and consascent progression of the Sun and Moon from the same cause, and also their ingress into the world, delivers them to us as conjoined. Nor was he the author of this hypothesis of the Moon subsisting immediately after the Sun, but Anaxagoras, as Eudemus relates, was the first that was of this opinion.

Again, this also is a subject of inquiry, on what account the Sun, Venus and Mercury, revolve with equal celerity. And some indeed, say from the mathematics, that the epicycles of these three stars are conjoined, and that their centres are in one right line. As therefore, there is one apocatastasis of the motion of one right line, thus also the epicycles of these planets make the same apocatastasis; and of the epicycles themselves, the extremes are less, but the middle epicycle is greater; so that both the equable and anomalous motions of them, are in the same ratio. But the interpreters of Plato, Porphyry and Theodorus, who investigate the cause of this, refer the principle of the equality and inequality of the course of these planets to their lives. For according to them, the inequality or equality of their swiftness, is either from their intellects tending directly through many media to essence, and ending in the same

<sup>1</sup> The whole title of this work is, *Μεγάλη Συναξίς τῆς Αστρονομίας*, or THE GREAT CONSTRUCTION OF ASTRONOMY. By the Arabians, it was called the *Almagest*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. In his work entitled *Υποθέσεις τῶν Πλανητικῶν*, or THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE PLANETS. This work was illustrated by Jo. Bainbridge, with a Latin version, and mathematical figures. Lond. 1620. 4to.

<sup>3</sup> i. e. The Chaldean Julian.



thing, though through different media; or from the tendency of them to another and another thing. For the sun being essence, proceeds to intellect through life; Venus, being intellect, proceeds through life to an intellect [different from itself]; and Mercury being life, proceeds also to intellect; though the intellect in which the three terminate, is in the first essential, but in the second intellectual, and in the third vital. Hence also they are moved with equal celerity, and though they appear to leave, and precede each other, yet they end in the same thing. Saturn, however, Jupiter, and Mars, may be considered as differing in dignity, and on this account, not of equal celerity; though their not moving with the same celerity may also arise from not revolving through equal media. Thus for instance, if Saturn being essence, should immediately proceed to essence, but Jupiter should proceed to it through intellect alone, and Mars through both intellect and life; the first indeed will proceed without a medium to essence, but the second through one equality, and the third through two. And thus, they will not move with equal celerity. For of the planets, the first triad is elevated to essence; but the second, to intellect; and the Moon, to life, which comprehends in itself all generation, and proceeds as far as to the last recesses of the earth. These things therefore, are said by Porphyry and Theodorus, in conformity to their own hypotheses; asserting that all these are every where, viz. essence, life, and intellect, and that each of the Gods participate of these three, but that a different peculiarity predominates in different divinities, and also that the energy is different of different Gods, and that the elevation is through different media.<sup>1</sup>

The divine Iamblichus however, neither admits the introduction of epicycles, as being mechanical, and foreign from the meaning of Plato; nor the conception arising from life [essence and intellect] as vainly employing such like disjunctions, ingressions, egressions, and complications, as in a dream, and in no respect conformable to Plato. For where does Plato assert, that the elevation to essence is through life, intellect, and essence? Where also, does he arrange Saturn according to essence, but Jupiter according to intellect, and Mars according to life? Rejecting therefore, these assertions, he delivers a more simple theory, and says that the Moon first is arranged in the place<sup>2</sup> about the earth, as having the relation of nature and a mother to generation. For all things are convolved by her, are co-increased when she increases, and are diminished when she is diminished. But that the Sun is [the next] above the Moon, because it evidently fills the Moon with powers, and has the relation of a father to generation. But above

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *δι ἄλλων μέσων* here, read *ἐν ἄλλων μέσων*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *εἰς τὸν περὶ γῆν λόγον* here, it is necessary to read *εἰς τὸν περὶ γῆν τόπον*.

the Sun are Venus and Mercury, these planets being solar, and fabricating in conjunction with the Sun, and also contributing together with him to the perfection of wholes. Hence their course is equally swift with that of the Sun, and they revolve about him, as communicating with him in the production of things. They are however, contrary to him; not only according to the lation in their epicycles, as we have before observed, and as mathematicians say; nor so far as the one is the cause of the evolution into light of things concealed, but the other is the cause of concealment, as astrologers strenuously assert. For they are so on these accounts, and also on account of the divine power itself,<sup>1</sup> which we have before mentioned. For there is a certain admirable and transcendant power of the Sun; and on this account it is of itself incommensurate. But the powers of Venus and Mercury impart by illumination symmetry, and good temperament, and in consequence of always revolving in conjunction with the Sun render the solar motion harmonious. For both are the causes of communion; Mercury being common in diurnal and nocturnal productions, and possessing both a masculine and feminine power; and Venus possessing a binding power, and which co-adapts things that are separated from each other.

You may also say, that because the Sun neither uses ablations, nor additions of motions, nor becomes stationary, but Mercury and Venus, employ advancing and receding motions, and are at times stationary, they are allotted according to appearance, powers contrary to the Sun, and not so far as they proceed analogous to the first three monads, which are in the vestibules of *the good*, as we have before observed. For the Sun, as we learn in the Republic, gives subsistence to light, which is the image of truth. But Venus is the cause of beauty to generated natures, which is the imitation of intelligible beauty. And Mercury is the cause of symmetry to all things, subsisting as reason to things in generation. For all symmetry proceeds according to one ratio, and according to number, of which this God is the giver. Those monads therefore, subsisting analogously to, and in conjunction with each other, these planets very properly desire to be with each other, and revolve together. On this account also, they comprehend and are comprehended, through producing and co-operating with each other in demiurgic works. But if at one time they are moved swifter, and at another slower, and when one<sup>2</sup> is moved swifter the others are not, nor when one is moved slower, the rest are also slower in their motions; if this be the case, those that are moved swifter, are very properly said to comprehend those that are moved slower, and

<sup>1</sup> For αὐτός here, read αὐτῆς.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of οὐ κρείσσον here, it is requisite to read οὐ κρείσσον.

vice versa, the latter are said to be comprehended by the former. And there is one period indeed, of all things; but the parts of the periods differing in swiftness and slowness, cause some of these at one time and some at another, to comprehend and be comprehended by each other, according to different parts of their periods. Hence, through these things, and from what has been before said, we may collect, that according to Plato, the motion of the inerratic sphere is one and equable,<sup>1</sup> but that the motions of the seven planets are in themselves equable, but with reference to each other anomalous; except that three of them are equally swift in their course. For before he produced the seven planets, he said that their circles were equally swift. But that the motion of each of them is equable, Socrates in the Republic manifests, when he says, that a Syren presides over the eight circles, uttering one voice in one tone; so that an equable motion is common to them. The seven stars however are moved about their own centres, and also through the depth of their spheres. And both the other four planets, and the three, comprehend, and are comprehended by each other, on account of the inequality of their peculiar motions. For if as spheres they were equably moved, they would never at any time suffer this, but they would always be similarly separated from each other. This therefore, Plato also says, that they proceed through the heavens, having mutations in their motions.

Hence, above this triad, which is thus harmonious, in consequence of Venus uniting, and leading to communion the Mercurial production, which is of a remitted nature, and the solar fabrication which possesses intensity of power, there is another triad, consisting of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars. And Saturn and Mars indeed, are the extremes, and are contrary to each other, so far as the one is the cause of connexion, but the other of division; and the one of cold, but the other of heat. But Jupiter is arranged in the middle, and leads the demiurgic productions of Saturn and Mars into an excellent temperament. If however, you wish to survey the middle arrangement of the Sun, after another manner, conceive two pentads on each side of him, beneath the Moon, and the tetractys of the elements; in order that you may understand the ethereal nature to have something different from what is properly called air, or that you may also comprehend with it the nature of sublunary fire, which co-administers the natures of all the elements, moves all things, and excites their productions. For whatever is destitute of fire is dead, refrigeration being contrary to life. But above the Sun are the governors of the

<sup>1</sup> In the original here, there is nothing more than *συναγαγμεν οτι κατα Πλατωνα η μια και ομαλη*, but the sense requires that we should read, conformably to the above translation, *συναγαγμεν οτι κατα Πλατωνα, η της απλανους κυησιν, μια και ομαλη*.

whole of generation, having all of them in common, what neither the Sun, nor the Moon have, viz. advancing and receding motions; through which the nature of sublunary substances is all-variously changed, by additions and ablations, accessions and remissions of productive powers, of life, and of the whole of their essence. But the Sun is entirely extended from the middle. And of the Gods indeed prior to him, he perfects the productions; but excites, resuscitates, and variously changes the powers that are posterior to him. *Hence the theologist calls him the guardian of the universe, and leaves about him, demiurgic, undeified, elevating, perfective, and many other cathartic and separating powers, according to which, revolving perpetually, he adorns the universe.*

“ But with respect to the other stars, if any one should think fit to investigate the causes, through which the Demiurgus established all of them, the labour would be greater than that of the discourse itself, for the sake of which they were introduced. These things therefore, may perhaps hereafter be discussed by us at our leisure, in such a way as they deserve.”

By *the other stars* it is evident that Plato means Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. But the word *established*, exhibits to us their perpetual and incorruptible fabrication. If however, as we find in some copies, you read *they established*,<sup>1</sup> this reading will afford you an indication, that the universe was generated and adorned by the Demiurgus, and by other causes. For a little before, Plato said that the divinity distributed in an orderly manner the seven bodies, and the period of the circle of *the different*; and in addition to this the peculiar souls of the stars, which he denominated circulations. But these are said [according to this reading] to have been established by all the causes, in conjunction with which the Demiurgus fabricated them severally, making the whole world a statue, and establishing in it the statues of the partial Gods. It is here however necessary to call to mind, what we are accustomed to say concerning the order of all mundane natures; viz. that the inerratic sphere is the cause to all things of an invariable sameness of subsistence; but that of the triad under it, Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, the first is the cause of connexion, the second of symmetry, and the third of separation. And again, the Moon indeed is a monad, the cause of all generation and corruption; but the elements in generation, form a triad under

<sup>1</sup> In the original ἐπνεύσθη.

this monad. The media between this triad of planets and the Moon, are the planets that revolve with equal celerity. And the Sun indeed unfolds truth into light, as we have frequently said. But Venus unfolds beauty; and Mercury, the symmetry of reasons, according to the analogy<sup>\*</sup> of the monads in the vestibules of the good. If you are willing also, you may say, that of the beneficent planets, the Moon is the cause to mortals of nature, being herself the visible statue of fontal nature. But the Sun is the Demiurgus of every thing sensible, in consequence of being the cause of sight and visibility. Mercury is the cause of the motions of the phantasy: for of the phantastic essence itself, so far as sense and phantasy are one, the Sun is the producing cause. But Venus is the cause of epithymetic appetites; and Mars of the irascible motions which are according to nature. Of all vital powers however, Jupiter is the common cause; but of all gnostic powers Saturn. For all the irrational forms are divided into these. The causes therefore of these, are antecedently comprehended in celestial natures.

Some one however, may reasonably doubt from what has been said, where Plato constitutes the soul of the inerratic sphere, being afraid lest he should make the soul of the world to be the same with the soul of that sphere; as Aristotle did afterwards. For we have the peculiar souls of the stars, through the before mentioned circulations, and a little farther on, Plato speaks concerning them. For he says, that being bound with animated bonds, they became animals. May we not say therefore, that as he places in the whole soul of the universe, twofold circles, and twofold circulations, he gives subsistence together with them to twofold souls, that of the inerratic sphere, and that of the whole planetary sphere, as one circulation? And again, assuming in the circle of the *different*, seven circles, he had together with them seven souls, carried as in vehicles in the seven spheres. For the animation just now delivered was not of the spheres themselves. Hence in what he said of the inerratic sphere, he made mention of the animation of the stars, omitting the animation of the whole spheres, as being comprehended in the circles of the whole soul. For on account of the form of discussion usual with the ancients, he omits the subtle elaboration of various animation. For universal animation is one thing; that which is posterior to this, and is universal partial animation, is another; partial universal animation is another; and the last of all, is partial animation. According to all the forms of animation likewise, the whole world and the parts of it are animated. May it not be said also, that Timæus having on the preceding day heard Socrates subtly discussing these animations, conceived that the peculiar elaboration of them would be superfluous.

\* There is an omission in the original here of *κατ' αναλογίαν*.

Socrates therefore placed souls which he called Syrens, over the eight whirls [or spheres]. And again, he places one soul over the inerratic portion of the world; one, over the whole planetary region; and one over the whole heaven; unfolding the peculiar souls of all these, and animating the inerratic sphere in a twofold respect, both as one circle, having a division opposed to that of the seven circles, and as comprehending the multitude of the fixed stars, and being itself a world universal and at the same time partial. And thus much in answer to this doubt. But the reason why Plato makes the discussion of the stars to be superfluous, is evident. For the thing proposed by him was to show what secondary time is, and how, and whence it is consummately effected.

“When therefore, each of the natures necessary to a joint fabrication of time, had arrived at a local motion adapted to its condition, and they became animals through the connecting power of vital bonds, they then learned their prescribed order.”

What the animation is of the bodies of the seven *cosmocrators*, and what the order, has been shown through what has been already said. But how each of them is an animal, and is suspended from a more divine soul, and what each contributes to the perfection of the universe, Plato delivers in these words, to those who are able to perceive his meaning. For each of them is allotted an appropriate life and motion. For since the demiurgic sacred law distributes to each of the mortal natures that which is adapted to it, what will you say concerning the leaders and rulers of the universe? Must it not be this, that they receive from the father that which is adapted to them and is their good, and that being resplendent with beauty they not only co-operate with the father in the generation of time, but also lead and govern the whole world? And how is it possible that thus speaking concerning them, we should not speak rightly? In addition to these things also, they not only receive from the deminrgic monad the beautiful and the good, but being self-motive, impart these to themselves, and begin from themselves the donation of good; which Plato indicating, says “*that each of them arrived at a local motion adapted to its condition,*” as defining to itself the measure of the life and order and motion which it is allotted in the universe. Since however, each of them, I mean each of the seven bodies, has a twofold life, the one inseparable, but the other separable; and the one intellectual and established in itself in a leading and ruling manner, but the other distributed about body, which it connectedly contains, and moves; and since according to the latter, each is an animal, but according to the former

a God;—this being the case, Plato separating both these, and considering the divine and intellectual soul, and which does not depart from intelligibles, as one thing, but the animal which is suspended from this, has its life from, and is the image of it, as another, he says “*that being bound with vital bonds, they became animals, and learned their prescribed order.*” For a divine soul learns the demiurgic will, and understands the works of the father.<sup>1</sup> It also co-operates with him in the production of mundane natures, by intellectually perceiving him, and being filled by him with divine powers. For it is not possible for either intellect or soul, to provide for wholes in an exempt<sup>2</sup> manner, in any other way than by the participation of deity, and through a divinely-inspired life.

Their co-operating therefore, in the production of time, manifests that they are allotted a secondary power, in the fabrication of it; the father of them possessing a primordial power. For he indeed generates the wholeness of time; but they produce, together with him, the parts of which time consists. For the periods of these are the parts of the whole of time; just as they were generated the parts of the world. But the animal bound with vital bonds, is the animated body, which has life from the soul allotted to it, according to the demiurgic allotments. For if with us, the animal is different from the man, and the visible Socrates is one thing, but the true Socrates another, much more are the Sun and Jupiter [different from the visible orbs of them] which consist of body and soul. Hence Socrates in the Phædrus blames those, who assert that a divine animal consists of body and soul. “For ignorantly, and without sufficiently understanding, says he, we feign a God to be an immortal animal, having a soul, and having a body, and these connascent with each other through the whole of time.” And if it be requisite to speak what appears to me to be the truth, the unity which is in each and which is the ineffable participation of the fountain of whole unical numbers, is *primarily* a God. But *secondarily* intellect, which contains every thing stably,<sup>3</sup> uniformly, and inflexibly. And in *the third place* soul, being filled from intellect, and unfolding the one comprehension of it. The first of these also, is truly a God; the second is most divine; and the third, is likewise divine, but illuminates the animal with the peculiarity of deity. According to this also, the animal is divine, being bound with vital bonds, which you may say are vivific, demiurgic, and indissoluble bonds, as Timæus says farther on. For the divine bodies, are wholly bound in souls, and are comprehended by, and established in them. The *binding* likewise, indicates the stable and immutable comprehension of the bodies in the souls, and the undis-

<sup>1</sup> For τοῦ παντός here, it is necessary to read τοῦ πατρὸς.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of ἐξηρημένος in this place, it is necessary to read ἐξηρημένος.

<sup>3</sup> For ὁμοιότητος here, it is requisite to read μονιότητος.

joined communion of them with souls: Divine bodies however, being such, co-operate with the Demiurgus in the production of time, call forth the one and invisible power of time, and afford to it a progression into the world, which unfolds into light many temporal measures. Hence through this the whole of time derives its completion, imitating the time which consists in *numbering*, since it consists itself in being numbered, and in short becomes what it is from many numbers, in order that it may be similar to that which is truly total time, and is comprehensive of all apocatastatic numbers. The *joint fabrication* therefore, indicates production proceeding to the end, and a perfect energy.

“That according to the oblique lation of the circle of *the different*, which moves in subjection to the circle of *the same*, these orbs should by their revolution, partly form a greater, and partly a less circle; and that the orb which formed a less circle should revolve swifter, but that which produced a greater, more slow.”

You may say that the oblique lation of the circle of the different, signifies a lation according to the obliquity of the zodiac. For the motion of the planets is according to the poles of the zodiac, that we may speak mathematically. For such an explanation is not to be despised by those who discourse about the celestial bodies. Or, according to a more intimate perception of the thing, you may say, that this obliquity manifests the cause of generation, and the mutation which pre-exists in the celestial orbs. For generation indeed, participates of difference and variety from the revolution of the circle of *the different* [i. e. from the circulation of the planets]; but it participates of sameness, and a subsistence which is always the same, from the circle of *the same* [or the inerratic sphere], as Aristotle also says. For if the circle of *the same* alone existed, there would not be mutation and generation, but all things would be uniform, and being always generated, would remain invariably the same. And if the circle of *the different* alone existed, all things would be without stability, and would be in continual motion. In order therefore, that there may be both permanency and motion, and that this whole may be, as it is said, an immutable mutation, and an immoveable motion, the universe has both these circulations. And the variety indeed of generation, becomes apparent through the circulation of the circle of *the different*; but communion and immutability, through the circle of *the same*. But of these again, the one is effected through the circle of sameness of the soul, and the other through the soul's circle of difference. And of these also, the one is through intellectual sameness, but the other through demiurgic difference. And of these last, the one is through intelli-



gible bound, but the other through intelligible infinity. After this manner therefore, the *obliquity* must be understood.

And here you may see what the difference is, as delivered by Plato, between the psychical lation of the circle of difference, and the corporeal. For he calls the former *straight*, but the latter *oblique*. For the former is undefiled and inflexible, but the latter proximately governs the variety of generated natures, and has a visible inequability, and a certain position and habitude with respect to the universe. But the revolution of the circle of *the different* being such, it proceeds<sup>1</sup> through the circle of *the same*, and is governed by it. For it is moved by invisible causes, and by the innerratic sphere itself. Or rather, it receives through it motive powers; and is governed by it, because it is convolved, according to the one, and innerratic motion of it. And this indeed, is said mathematically. But after another manner, you may say that the nature of the same and similar has dominion, in order that the world may be one; that all things may as much as possible be perpetual; and that the world may imitate animal itself, in which all things have an eternal subsistence. For if the circle of *the different* had dominion over the circle of *the same*, there would be less of the immutable than of the mutable, in the universe, and the world would not receive all the perpetuity which it is capable of receiving. But in this case, it would be less similar to animal itself. The lation therefore, of the circle of *the different* being governed by the lation of the circle of *the same*, proceeds<sup>2</sup> within it, circulates through its concavity, and revolves together with it.

“ And with respect to the seven bodies, some of them being slower, but others swifter; those that revolve in a less circle, revolve more swiftly;’ but Saturn revolving in a greater circle, moves more slowly.”

Plato says this, looking to the apocatastases of the planets. Hence, he says, that they revolve swifter or slower, and not that they simply proceed swifter, but revolve slower. For when, as circle is to circle, so is time to time, then the

<sup>1</sup> For εἶσι here, it is necessary to read προεἶσι.

<sup>2</sup> Here likewise for εἶσι, read προεἶσι.

<sup>3</sup> This portion of the text is omitted in all the printed editions of the *Timæus*. The original is as follows: εἰσὶναι τὰ ἐκτὰ σῶματα, τὰ μὲν βραδύτερα οἷτα, τὰ δὲ θάπτε. τὰ μὲν ἐλαττω περίεστα ἐνελον, θαυτερον (lege θαυτον) περιεῖσιν· οὐ δὲ κρονος μείζω περιων βραδύτερον. This portion of text, appears also to have been wanting in the Medicean manuscript from which Ficinus made his translation of Plato, for he has not translated it.

bodies which are moved are equally swift. For let one circle be double of another, and one time of another, then the greater circle which is moved in the double time, will be moved [over the same space] in half the time of the less, but the less will be moved in half the time, over the same space. Hence, they are equally swift. For things are equally swift, which are moved over the same space in the same time. But when one circle is to another, in a greater ratio than one time to another, the motion of the greater circle is the swifter. For let this be so,<sup>1</sup> and let it be as circle is to circle, so is time to a certain time, which will therefore be less than the time from the first. For the same thing will have a greater ratio to the less. The greater circle therefore, in this less time, which is less than the time from the first, will pass over the same space as the less circle. For it has been demonstrated, that if circle is to circle, as time to time, the motion of the less is equally swift with that of the greater circle. Moreover, the motion of the less circle from the first was performed in a less time than the time from the first. Hence the same interval, is passed over by the one circle in a greater, but by the other in a less time. The motion therefore of the less circle, is slower than that of the greater. Again, if the ratio of one circle to another, is less than that of one time to another, the motion of the greater circle will be slower than that of the less. For if you make as circle is to circle, so is time to another time, you will make it to be to a greater time. For the same thing has to the greater a less ratio. So that the greater circle will in a greater time pass over the same space, than the less circle. It is therefore slower. Hence, these things thus subsisting, Plato does not now investigate what the condition is of the planets with respect to swiftness and slowness; for this requires a more ample consideration; but he adds, that there is a different apocatastasis of different planets, and of some slower, but of others more swift; the swiftness and slowness, being produced, either from the anomalous nature of the motions, or, which is more true, from the stars<sup>2</sup> being all of them moved with equal celerity, but one circle having to another a greater ratio, than one time to another.

In short, thus much ought to be known concerning the motion of the stars, that they have not a rolling motion alone on their spheres. For this motion is foreign to spherical bodies. Nor do they alone remain fixed. For how would they be any longer of a circulating nature? But they circulate about their centres, imitating the universe, according to the opinion of Plato; without being at all in want of the hypotheses employed by astronomers, as I have before observed. For if Plato thinks that the fixed stars are thus moved, through an imitation of the

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Let what has been before demonstrated be admitted.

<sup>2</sup> For ἀστρων here, read ἀστρον.

universe, much more will he grant that those stars which are allotted the government of the universe, and a leading dignity, imitate the whole world. These therefore, are moved about their centres; but the spheres in which they are contained, and which are as it were moving rulers, convolve them either swifter, or slower. Except that Plato gives to them a more various motion, because they are media between things that proceed in a right line, and things that by themselves are alone moved in a circle, and moves each of them about its centre, and through its proper sphere, so as to become elevated, and near the earth, and to revolve about the northern and southern parts; by which motions they are inferior to the fixed stars, though they are otherwise allotted a liberated dignity and power.

“But from the lation of the circle of the same, the orbs which comprehend, appear through the circulation of those that move more slowly, to be comprehended. For all the circles of them revolve with a spiral motion, because at one and the same time they are moved in two contrary directions; and in consequence of this, the sphere which has the slowest revolution, is nearest to that to which its course is retrograde, and which is the swiftest of all the spheres.”

Circulation, as we have frequently observed, being twofold, one from the east to the west, but the other from the west to the east, he who understands both these circulations, will know what is the common, and what the peculiar motion of the stars, and which of them are moved swifter, and which more slow. For he will look to their peculiar motions, and will know that those are swifter which are *in consequentia*; and thus, he will not admit that Saturn is swifter than the Moon, but he will see that the Moon is more eastern, and that Saturn is comprehended, but the Moon comprehends. But he who fancies, that there is only one simple motion of all the stars, which is from east to west, when he sees that Saturn and the Moon, are at one time together, but that at another time Saturn is more western, as having moved to a greater extent, will say that the Moon is comprehended by Saturn, viz. the swifter by the slower. The cause however of this error, arises from alone looking to the period of the circle of *the same*, which possesses much power and strength, and not considering the peculiar motions of the planets, nor perceiving that they do not make their transition *in antecedentia*, but *in consequentia*. For asserting this also, the Athenian guest or stranger blames the multitude and those who are ignorant of astronomy. “For it is disgraceful,” says he, “if we survey a stadium, and do not know which of the racers runs swifter, and which

slower; and he must be considered as absurd, who fancies that the swifter is the slower course. But it is much more disgraceful for those who perceive truly Olympic races, not to know the swifter and slower period, through ignorance of astronomy." For the bodies that revolve with the greatest celerity, appear to be comprehended by those that revolve more slowly, though they in reality will be seen to comprehend, by those who are able to look to their proper motion. But the lation of the circle of *the same*, vanquishing the body which is nearest to it, causes it to appear most rapid in its motion. That however, is nearest to it, which is the least distant from it. For let, if it should so happen, the Moon and Saturn be near the Cor Leonis, or heart of the Lion; then the Moon being moved with its peculiar motion, will depart from this fixed star; but Saturn for many nights will be seen about the same place. The astronomer therefore, knows that the Moon departs from this star more rapidly, on account of the motion of the Cor Leonis in consequentia. But he who is ignorant of astronomy, will fancy that the Moon and Saturn being moved with the universe towards the same parts, do not make their apocatastases after the same manner; but that the one, as swifter, arrives at the west before the other; but that the other as slower, arrives at a more western part. This therefore, would be the conclusion according to the opinion of the multitude. This may however, happen to be true, I mean that Saturn is the swifter; if, as we have before observed, the ratio of the circle of Saturn, to the circle of the Moon, is greater than the ratio of the apocatastasis of one time to that of the other. For the body which is nearer to the sphere of the fixed stars, will be swifter, for the before-mentioned reasons.

But what is the meaning of the assertion, that the planets "*revolve with a spiral motion, because at one and the same time they are moved in two contrary directions?*" And how are we to admit of contrariety in a circular motion? For each of the planets being moved with two local motions, is not the cause of the spiral motion; but this arises from their being moved in the oblique circle [i. e. in the zodiac] towards the equinoctial. Thus, if some one supposes that the Sun is moved with the universe towards the equinoctial, the cause of this will not be a spiral motion, though there is an anti-circulation. Nor must it be simply admitted that the motion which is contrary to a circular motion, is another motion [i. e. is a motion of a different kind]. For many beautiful arguments have been urged against this opinion. May not therefore the words, *moved at the same time in two contrary directions* mean, that they are not only moved at one and the same time to the east and west, but also that they become both according to breadth, and according to depth, nearer to, or more remote from the earth, and more northern, or more southern? For these two motions, make a spiral, in conjunction with the lation

of the universe. The spiral likewise, is adapted to the planets, which are media between the fixed stars, and sublunary bodies; the former being moved according to a circle alone, and the latter, in right lines. Just again, as it is natural to the planets being media, to be moved both anomalously and equably, according to length, breadth, and depth; in order that they may have the paradigms of the natures that are all-variously moved posterior to themselves, and may imitate through circulation the uniform subsistence of the natures prior to them. These things therefore, are manifest to every one.

It is however, not at all wonderful, that contrariety should exist in the heavens prior to the contrarieties in the revolution of the circle of *the different*; since in the genera of being there is said to be a contrariety of sameness and difference, motion and permanency, and in the principles themselves of these, bound and infinity. For these are contraries, because in the terminations of them, there is a certain contest and dissention, though they always possess the power of acting in conjunction with each other. It is by no means wonderful therefore, that there should also be in the heavens, a contrariety of these motions. For those contraries are not now assumed, which are hostile to, and corruptive of each other; for these are material and partible natures; but simply those, which are effective of contraries, and those which are most distant from each other. For this also is a certain mode of contrariety in nature; since, that the apparent motion of the heavenly bodies is one thing, and their true motion another, indicates the pre-subsistence there of non-being, and its complication with being. The figure of the spiral likewise, is no vain, fortuitous thing, but gives completion to the media between bodies that move in right lines, and those that are moved in a circle. For the circle alone, as we have said, is in the inerratic sphere, but the right line in generation. And the spiral is in the planetary region, as having a co-mixture of the periphery and the right line. The motions also according to breadth and according to depth, are the proximate causes and paradigms of the motions in the sublunary region, viz. of the upward and downward, and the oblique motions. Perhaps likewise, the theurgist [Julian] in celebrating time as of a spiral form, and as both young and old, directed his attention to this, conceiving that the temporal periods, were especially to be known through the motion of the planets. And thus much concerning these particulars. But Plato adds in the next place as follows:

“And that these circles might possess a certain conspicuous measure of slowness and swiftness with reference to each other, and that the

motion of the eight circulations might be manifest, the divinity enkindled a light, which we now denominate the Sun in the second revolution from the earth, in order that the heaven [i. e. the world] might in the most eminent degree become universally apparent, and that such animals might participate of number as are adapted to its participation, receiving numerical information from the circulation of the same and the similar."

Plato here delivers the one ruling cause of the generation of visible time. For as the Demiurgus constituted invisible time, so the Sun produces the time which is visible, and which measures the motion of bodies. For through light, it leads into visibility every temporal interval, bounds all periods, and exhibits the measures of the restitutions of things to their pristine state. Deservedly therefore is the Sun a conspicuous measure, as especially unfolding the progression<sup>1</sup> of time according to number, into the universe. For it has a more accurate period than that of the five planets, its motions being less anomalous than theirs; and also than that of the Moon, by always terminating at the same point its progressions to the north and the south. But if it has a more accurate period, it is deservedly a measure of measures, and from itself bounds<sup>2</sup> the periodic measures of the other planets, and the swiftness of their motions with reference to each other. It also in a greater degree imitates the perpetual permanency of eternity, by always revolving after the same manner. In this way therefore, it differs from the planets.

After another manner likewise, the Sun is a more manifest measure than the measure of the inerratic sphere. For though this sphere has a certain appropriate measure, a proper interval, and one immutable number of its peculiar motion, yet the solar light causes this measure and all the evolution of apparent time to be manifest and known. Hence Plato says, "*In order that there might be a certain conspicuous measure.*" For though there is a certain measure in the other planets, yet it is not clear and manifest. But the sun unfolds into light both other intelligibles and time. You must not however on this account say that the solar light was generated for the sake of measurement. For how is it possible that wholes should subsist for the sake of parts; governing natures for the sake of the governed; and perpetual for the sake of corruptible natures? But we should rather say that light possessing an evolving power unfolds total time, and calls forth its

<sup>1</sup> For περιόδον here, it is necessary to read προόδον.

<sup>2</sup> For γυροποιεῖν here, it is necessary to read οριζει.

supermundane monad, and one measure into the measurement of the periods of bodies. And this makes time to be, as it were, sensible. Hence it is the light of the Sun which causes every thing that is moved to have a clear and manifest measure. And this indeed is its whole good. After wholes, however, it likewise benefits parts in a secondary degree. For it imparts the generation of number and measure to the natures which are adapted to participate of these. For irrational beings indeed are destitute of these; but the genera of dæmons, who follow the periods of the Gods and men, become partakers of them. The supply of good therefore through the solar light, beginning supernally from wholes, descends as far as to parts. And if beginning from visible natures, you are willing to speak of such as are invisible, the light of the Sun gives splendor to the whole world, causes a corporeal-formed nature to be divine, and wholly filled through the whole of itself with life. But it leads souls through undefiled light, imparts to them a pure and elevating power, and governs the world by its rays. And it likewise fills souls with empyrean fruits. For the order of the Sun is supernally derived from supermundane natures. Hence Plato does not here fabricate the solar light, but says that the Demiurgus enkindled it, as giving subsistence from his own essence to this sphere, and emitting from the solar fountain a life extended into interval, and continually renewed. *And this also is asserted by theologists concerning the supermundane firmaments.*

On this account, it appears to me that Plato delivers a twofold generation of the Sun; one indeed, in conjunction with the seven governors of the world, when he fashions the bodies of them, and inserts them in their circulations; but the other according to the enkindling of light, through which he imparts to the Sun supermundane power. For it is one thing to generate the bulk of the Sun itself by itself, and another in conjunction with a ruling characteristic, through which the Sun is called the king of every visible nature, and is established analogous to the one fountain of good. For as this fountain, being better than the intelligible essence, illuminates both intellect and the intelligible, thus also the sun being better than a visible nature, illuminates both that which is visible and sight. But if the Sun is beyond a visible essence, it will have a supermundane nature. For the world is visible and tangible, and has a body. Hence, we must survey the Sun in a twofold respect; viz. as one of the seven planets, and as the leader of wholes; and as mundane and supermundane, according to the latter of which he splendidly emits a divine light. For in the same manner as *the good* luminously emits truth which deifies the intelligible and intellectual orders; as Phanes in Orpheus sends forth intelligible light which fills with intelligence all the intellectual Gods; and as Jupiter enkindles an intellectual and de-

miurgic light in all the supermundane Gods; thus also the Sun illuminates every thing visible through this undefiled light. The illuminating cause too is always in an order superior to the illuminated natures. For neither is *the good* intelligible, nor Planes intellectual, nor Jupiter supermundane. In consequence of this reasoning therefore, the Sun being supermundane emits the fountains of light. And according to the most mystic doctrines, the wholeness of the Sun is in the supermundane orders; for in them there is a solar world, and a total light, as the Chaldean oracles' assert, and which I am persuaded is true. And thus much concerning these things.

It is requisite however to return to the words of the text, and to explain them as follows: The words then, "*in order that there might be a measure,*" do not signify a devised measure, but that which itself measures and defines corporeal motions, and generates visible time. The words also, "*that the motion of the eight circulations might be manifest,*" refer to this measure, which passes through, and measures the measures pertaining to the paths of the eight circulations. For we say that the common apocatastasis of the eight revolutions consists of so many years. But we obtain a knowledge of the solar year through light. For through this we know what portion of the zodiac the Sun occupies, what portion he leaves, and to what part of it he proceeds. Hence also, we know by the transition of light, the quantity of the time, in which the sun passes through his proper circle, and performs his revolution, and in how many years all the periods of the eight circles are completed. By this likewise, we are able to measure the solar period, and the common period of the other circulations, which is the same thing as to measure their joint apocatastasis. But the words, "*the divinity enkindled a light,*" exhibit to us the non-temporal hypostasis of light, proceeding from an invisible cause, and from the demiurgic essence. Again, the words, "*in order that the heaven, or world might in the most eminent degree become universally apparent,*" have a cause of the following kind. It is necessary that the whole world should as much as possible be filled with the solar light. But the mass of the earth is naturally dark. Hence, it is requisite that the Sun should be nearer to the earth, in order that it may relieve its darkness. For that which is nearer illuminates more abundantly. And when that which illuminates is greater than the thing illuminated, it is able more largely to impart its light. But the words, "*in the most*

<sup>1</sup> According to the Chaldaic dogmas as explained by Psellus, there are seven corporeal worlds, one empyrean and the first; after this three ethereal; and then three material worlds, viz. the inerratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region. They also assert that there are two solar worlds; one which is subservient to the ethereal profundity; the other zonaic, being one of the seven spheres.



*eminent degree*," signify that the Sun illuminates all the world *as much as possible*. For he is not able at once to illuminate the whole earth; but partially, by his circular motion. In the least time however, he at once illuminates the whole earth, according to the equinoctial circle. For when he rises and sets, giving light to more than half the earth, he in this one circulation illuminates the whole earth. But if by the word *heaven*, we understand that which is moved in a circle, neither does the Sun at once illuminate the whole of this. For there are also shadows there, on account of the obumbrations of the stars and the Moon. Nothing however, except the Sun, is free from shadow in the world, as neither is any thing mundane without matter. But supermundane natures alone, are without shadow, and immaterial. Hence the Sun is truly shadowless, and unreceptive of generation, all other bodies receiving at different times, different illuminative additions.

Why therefore, it may be said, did not the divinity enkindle a light in the first of the circulations from the earth? We reply, because the fulgid splendor of the Sun is of itself incommensurable to generation. But the Moon being a medium between the two, and first receiving the light of the Sun, makes it to be commensurate to the realms of generation. For the Moon, as Aristotle says, is as it were a less Sun. It is necessary however, that being proximately above generation, it should not be the most splendid and the most luminous of bodies. For it is not lawful that a thing of this kind should approximate to that which is obscure and dark, but that which is secondarily fulgid; and which has always indeed, its own proper light, but in the participation of a superior light, exhibits mutation, and this in an orderly manner. For that which has arrangement and order, is more excellent than that which is without order; that through this mutation, it may be the paradigm of the very mutable nature, which matter introduces to generated things; just as the opposition of the earth introduces the privation of light. These things however, admit of a more ample discussion.

But that the stars, and all heaven, receive light from the Sun, may be easily perceived. For that which is common in many things, exists from one cause, and exists from it in one way as exempt, but in another as co-arranged; but this latter mode of the subsistence of the cause, is that in which it primarily participates of that one form. But that primarily participates, in which this form subsists primarily, or<sup>1</sup> especially. If therefore, light especially subsists in the Sun, this will be the first light; and from this, the light which is in other things will be derived. And thus much for this particular. We have however shown the

<sup>1</sup> For *εὐρε* here, it is obviously necessary to read *ἔ*. What is in this place demonstrated by Proclus, viz. that all mundane light is derived from the Sun, completely subverts the rambling opinion of the moderns, that the fixed stars are so many suns.

meaning of the words, "*that the heaven might in the most eminent degree become universally apparent.*" For if by *heaven* you understand that which revolves in a circle, the Sun does not always illuminate the whole of the Moon, but only during the time from the conjunction to the full. But if you understand by it the whole world, then, as we have said, the Sun only accurately illuminates the whole earth, in one day, when he is in the equinoctial circle, and in rising and setting, is diametrically opposite to the earth. It remains therefore, to see what the *number* is which is produced by the lation of the same and the similar, through the inspective guardianship of day and night. This number then, is neither intellectual nor dianoetic, but doxastic, affording a document of the numbers which pre-exist in forms. For there are many differences in many things of generated numbers. And as we know the number of invisible time, by the dianoetic number, so by that which is doxastic, we apprehend the number of visible time.

"Night therefore, and Day were thus generated, and on account of these the period of one most wise circulation was effected. And Month was produced, when the Moon having completed her circle, became in conjunction with the Sun. But Year when the Sun in revolving had completed his circle. A few only of mankind however, understand the periods of the other stars, give names to them, and measure them with relation to each other, regarding the numbers adapted to this purpose; so that, as I may say, they do not know that time is the wanderings of these bodies, which employ lations infinite in multitude, and admirably diversified."

Through the generation of light nights and days had their progression, and the smallest measure of time is divided by these intervals. For the period, says he, of one most wise circulation, is effected by night and day; the intellection of the inerratic sphere, or the circle of the same, being the one most wise circulation; but the period of this circle, being the circulation of that sphere. For circulation is an energy and a period. The intellection however, is of a more principal nature; but the period is the effect of intellection, imitating circulation. The space therefore of day and night is this. By this however, years and months are measured. For we measure greater by less intervals; just as by years, the whole apocatastatic time of the universe is measured. It is likewise requisite to observe, how the peculiarity of these is a medium between monadic forms, and the forms which subsist in the multitude of

individuals. For some forms are indeed in one thing, yet not always in the same thing according to number, but in many things. Year however, and Month, are always in one thing according to number, on account of the mutual vicissitude of individuals [i. e. of the sun and moon] in a circle. For one month succeeds another; and one year another; but each is always one. These things therefore do not require much discussion.

Perhaps however some one may doubt how Plato says, that Night and Day formed the period of one most wise circulation. For this is the very thing for which Aristotle accuses Plato, viz. to call circulation time; though now Plato adds time to the universe when in motion, as being something different from motion. But if the motion of the universe is different from the time of the universe, the motion also of each of the bodies that are moved in a circle, is different from the periodic time of the motion. This therefore may be the occasion of doubt in the words before us. How likewise is the period of the inerratic sphere the swiftest, but the bodies which are nearer to it are slower according to their apocatastasis than those that are farther from it? May it not therefore, be proper to say, in answer to the former doubt, that period signifies two things, at one time motion itself, but at another, the measure and condition of motion; just as a *medimnus* and a *cotyle*, and each of such like measures, are denominated in a twofold respect. Hence the period of the inerratic sphere must not now be said to be the motion of it, but the temporal interval of the motion. May it not also be said, that when Plato calls time the wanderings of the heavenly bodies, he means nothing else than that the periods of these are time? For these are things numbered. But time, as they also say, is that which is numbered of motion. It is just therefore as if it should be said, those oxen are a number of such a magnitude. For thus also periods are time, as being a number of a certain magnitude.

But in answer to the second doubt it may be said, that Plato assumes the apparent apocatastasis of the inerratic sphere, and which makes the space of a day and night; since there is another true apocatastasis. For the point which now rises, does not rise according to the same hour with that which follows it, nor do the other points subsist similarly, all which however contribute to the apocatastasis of the inerratic sphere. For neither do all the points in that sphere, and all the fixed stars, make their apocatastases according to the same period. It is necessary however, that they should, if we assume an accurate apocatastasis, which takes place in a great length of time. For it is evident, that all the stars which are in the inerratic sphere, and are moved by it, and which have habitudes to each other, and to it, subsist differently at different times, and together with these things, have at a different time, a different lation towards the centres; and

also, that their apocatastasis to the same things in every respect, is effected in a very great length of time.

Moreover, some one may also doubt, how Plato calls the measure of the apocatastasis of the lation of the inerratic sphere, Night and Day. For this measure is every where supernally derived, from the one intelligible cause of the universe, and from the first paradigm. But Night and Day are in the sublunary region. In answer to this doubt, it may be said, that the temporal interval which is primarily in the circulation of the inerratic sphere, and the solar light, are effective of Day and Night. From things last therefore, and which are known to us, the whole measure is defined. For this space of night and day is one thing, and that which is in invisible time, another. The former also is the image, and ultimate termination of the latter. For their are many orders of Night and Day, intelligible, intellectual, supermundane, celestial, and sublunary, as likewise the Orphic theology teaches. And some of these indeed, are prior to the fabrication of things; but others are comprehended in it; and others proceed from it. Some likewise are invisible, but others are visible: since with respect to Month and Year also, those that are invisible are of one kind, and which are mensurative, connective, and perfective of the intellectual and corporeal periods of the Sun and Moon; but those that are visible are of another kind, which are the termination and measure of the solar revolution. The like also takes place in other Gods. For there is one invisible Saturnian number, and another visible; and in a similar manner, an invisible and visible Martial, Jovian, and Mercurial number. For the Month itself, and also the Year, which exist according to each period, being each of them one, and always the same, are Gods immoveably defining the measure of motion. For whence have the periods a subsistence always invariably the same, except from a certain immoveable cause? Whence also, is the difference of apocatastases derived, except from different immoveable causes? And whence proceeds the unceasing, and the again and again to infinity, except from the infinite powers which Month and Year contain?

It must likewise be admitted, that all this temporal series subsist under one first time, which defines the period of a divinely generated [or perpetually circulating] nature, and which is itself true number, as we have before observed. From these invisible periods however, we must conceive the visible to be derived; and which proceed according to the being numbered, from the invisible, which are able both to number and generate them; all which, astronomy beautifully teaches, doxastically apprehending the number of the periodical apocatastases of each. It also makes comparisons of the ratio of the periods to each other; such for instance as that the Saturnian period is double and one half besides of the Jovian period;

and in a similar manner in the other planets. For if there are different apocatastases of them, they have a different ratio to each other. Sacred rumour also venerates those invisible periods, and which are the causes of the visible; delivering the divine names of Night and Day, and also the causes that constitute, and the invocations, and self-manifestations of Month and Year. Hence, they are not to be surveyed superficially, but in divine essences which the laws of sacred institutions, and the oracles of Apollo order us to worship and honour, by statues and sacrifices, as histories inform us. When these also are revered, mankind are supplied with the benefits arising from the periods of the Seasons, and of the other divinities in a similar manner; but a preternatural disposition of every thing about the earth, is the consequence of the worship of these being neglected.\* Plato likewise in the Laws proclaims that all these are Gods, viz. the Seasons, Years and Months, in the same manner as the Stars and the Sun; and we do not introduce any thing new, by thinking it proper to direct our attention to the invisible powers of these prior to those that are visible. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Let us however return to the text. Plato then, mentions Night before Day, as conveying an image of invisible and intellectual measures. For common rumour arranges the former prior to the latter. Hence we are accustomed to say the *nycthemeron* [or the space of night and day]; because in the intelligible causes of these, Night subsists prior to Day.† But with respect to the words *thus*, and *on account of these*, the word *thus* manifests the producing cause of Night and Day, and indicates that it is light in conjunction with the inerratic sphere. And the words, *on account of these*, manifest the final cause; in order that the *nycthemeron* may be the conspicuous measure of all the circulations. But he denominates *the one most wise circulation*, the revolution of the circle of the same, as being uniform and intellectual, and most allied to the permanency and sameness of intel-

\* "But we will certainly do whatsoever thing goeth forth out of our own mouth, to burn incense to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink-offerings unto her, as we have done, we, and our fathers, our kings, and our princes, in the cities of Judah, and in the streets of Jerusalem: for then had we plenty of rituals, and were well, and saw no evil. But since we left off to burn incense to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink-offerings unto her, we have wanted all things, and have been consumed by the sword and by famine." Jeremiah, Chap. xlv. 17, 18.

† In the original the part which should immediately follow the words *πο το ημερας αι νυκτες νυκthemeron*, p. 266, is by a strange confusion, connected with the latter part of the commentary on the following text, and begins at the words *το δε ουτως και δια ταυτα* l. xi. p. 270. The order of the text likewise, in p. 266, is perverted, the commentary on which beginning at the words *και η ρηση* l. xxxv. is imperfect.

lect, and as possessing uniformity from the one principle of things; the *wisdom* of it being derived from intellect, but its *circulation* from the psychical peculiarity. He likewise asserts time to be the wanderings of the stars, not as making the motion of these to be time, but as conceiving the temporal intervals to be the measures of motions. *For the number of the visible life of each of these, is secondary time.* But he calls both the peculiar, and the common time of the motions of each, *infinite in multitude.* For he co-assumes the all-various circulations and configurations of them. And he says that they are *admirably diversified*, on account of their dances, their oppositions and conjunctions, their harmonious motion, and the order of their apocatastases. For such are the wanderings of the celestial bodies, the whole of them being inerratically erratic, existing always in the end, and hastening to one end.

“ At the same time however, it is no less possible to conceive, that the perfect number of time will then accomplish a perfect year, when the celerities of all the eight periods being terminated with reference to each other, shall have a summit, as they are measured by the circle of that which subsists according to the same and the similar.”

After the demiurgic generation of the spheres, the period of the seven bodies, the animation of them, and the order which the father inserted in them, and also after the various motions of them, the temporal measures of their several periods, and the differences of their apocatastases; the discussion proceeds to the monad of the temporal multitude, and to the one number according to which all motion is measured, under which all other measures are comprehended, and according to which all the life of the world, the all-various evolution of bodies, and the whole of the psychical life, are defined, conformably to an all-perfect period. This period however, ought not to be surveyed doxastically, by adding myriads to myriads of years. For thus some are accustomed to speak of it, assuming the accurate apocatastasis of the Moon, and in a similar manner of the Sun, and then adding the one to the other, and afterwards adding to these, the apocatastases of Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn; and in the last place, the apocatastasis of the inerratic sphere, to the one common apocatastasis of the planets. After this manner therefore they speak, if the apocatastatic times compared with each other are primary. But if they are not primary, then assuming a common measure, they see according to what numbers this measures each of the given apocatastatic times, and by the number according to which it measures the less of these times they multiply the greater, but by the number according to which it measures

the greater, they multiply the less ; and thus they have from both multiplications the common time of the apocatastasis of both, and which also is measured by both.

It is not proper however, to survey merely and alone after this manner, the whole mundane time, but to survey scientifically by intellect, and the discursive energies of reason, one number, one evolved power, and one perfective progression, extending to all the life of the world ; and this proceeding to the end, returning to the beginning, and converging to itself ; and on this account making the measured motion to be circular. For as the monad bounds the infinity of number, and antecedently comprehends the indefiniteness of the duad, thus also time measures the whole motion, and converts the end of it to the beginning. Hence also it is called a number, and perfect. For a month is a number, and likewise a year, but not a perfect number : for they are parts of other numbers. But the time of the period of the universe is perfect, because it is not a part of any period, but is a whole, in order that it may imitate eternity. For eternity is primarily a wholeness. It introduces however, to beings at once all its wholeness ; but time with extension. For the temporal wholeness is an evolution of the wholeness which abides conglomerated in eternity. The whole mundane time therefore, measures the one life of the universe, according to which all the celerities are terminated of the celestial and sublunary circles. For in these also, there are periods, which have for the summit of their apocatastasis the lation of the circle of *the same*. For they are referred to this as to their principle, because it is the most simple of all. For the apocatastases are surveyed with reference to the points of it. Thus for instance, all of them make their apocatastasis about the equinoctial point,\* or about the summer tropic ; or though the joint apocatastasis should not be considered to be according to the same point, but with reference to the same, when for instance, rising, or culminating, yet all of them will have with reference to it, a figure of such a kind. For now the present order is entirely a certain apocatastasis of all the heavenly bodies, yet the configuration is not seen about the same, but with reference to the same point. Once however, it was about the same, and according to one certain point ; at which if it should again take place, the whole of time will have an end. One certain apocatastasis likewise, seems to have been mentioned. Hence it is said, that Cancer is the horoscope of the world, and this year is called Cynic, or pertaining to the dog, because among the constellations, the splendid star of the Dog rises together with Cancer. If therefore the planets

\* For *ισμεριον* here, it is obviously necessary to read *ισμεριον*. It must also be observed, that there are two equinoctial points, or signs, and these are Aries and Libra.

should again meet in the same point of Cancer, this concurrence will be one period of the universe. If however, the apocatastasis takes place in Cancer about the equinoctial point, that also which is from the summer tropic, will be directed towards the summer tropic, and the number of the one will be equal to the number of the other, and the time of the one, to the time of the other. For each of them is one period, and is defined by quantity, on account of the order of the bodies that are moved. And thus much concerning the one time of the universe, which measures all corporeal motions; in the same manner as the world measures psychical, and eternity intellectual lives. It is likewise evident from what has been said, what this one time is, whence it derives its subsistence, and what benefit it affords to the universe. In addition however, to what has been said, it must be observed, that this perfect number differs from that mentioned in the Republic, which comprehends the period of every divinely generated nature; since it is of a more partial nature, and is apocatastatic of the eight periods alone. For the other perfect number comprehends the peculiar motions of the fixed stars, and in short, of all the divine genera that are moved in the heavens, whether visibly or invisibly, and also of the celestial genera posterior to the Gods, and of the longer or shorter periods of sublunary natures, together with the periods of fertility and sterility. Hence likewise, it is the lord of the period of the human race.

“ Conformably therefore to, and for the sake of these things, such of the stars as proceeding through the heavens have revolutions, were generated, in order that this universe might be most similar to perfect and intelligible animal, through the imitation of an eternal nature. And other forms indeed, were fabricated, as far as to the generation of time, according to the similitude of that to which they were assimilated.”

That the world became more perfect through the generation of time, imitating all-perfect animal according to the eternal, and that generation derived its subsistence through the lation of the seven cosmocrators; for from this lation, the variety according to generation, was unfolded into light; is evident from what has been before said. That which remains therefore of Plato's speculations concerning time, deserves to be assumed, viz. that time proceeds analogous to soul, being at once eternal and generated. Hence as soul belongs to eternal beings, and is the best of generated natures; so likewise time is both eternal and generated; so far as it is co-mingled with souls and bodies, and so far as it proceeds and



extends through all secondary beings. For it is number proceeding and a circle: but itself by itself, is both a monad and a centre. For the Demiurgus produced a medium of this kind, between things immoveable, and things that are moved, according to a similitude to himself. For he also is a medium between the abiding and proceeding Gods,<sup>1</sup> according to an assimilation to the paradigm; because this also is a medium between the intelligible and intellectual Gods,<sup>2</sup> between eternity and number,<sup>3</sup> and the *eternal and perpetual Gods*.<sup>4</sup> For it participates of eternity, but it primarily participates, and is the monad of intelligible animals. Hence also, the world being generated perpetual through the whole of time, was perfectly assimilated to its paradigm. For as its paradigm received the whole gift of eternity; since every thing which primarily participates of a certain thing receives the whole of its gift; thus also the world lives through the whole of time, and lives according to the whole perfect number of it. Hence likewise, it is perpetual. For every thing which is able to receive the whole evolution of time, is indestructible. But the whole of time is the perfect number of the apocatastasis of the universe, as we have frequently observed.

Farther still, this also is to be assumed from what has been before said, that Plato was very far from conceiving time to be a thing of such a kind as the Stoics, and also many of the Peripatetics apprehended it to be. For the former supposed it to be a mere conception of the mind, evanescent, and most proximate to non-entity. For time with them, was one of the clearly significant<sup>5</sup> things which they despised, as inefficacious, as having no real being, and existing in mere conceptions alone. But the latter assert that it is an accident of motion. We may ask however, of what motion? Is it an accident of continued motion? But time is every where. And motion is in things which are moved. Is it then an accident of all motion? There are therefore many times. And what is the monad of them, and how is time that which is numbered of motion? For it will truly subsist in habitude, and time will be something relative, and that which numbers not existing, neither will time exist. Plato therefore perceiving that all these assertions are unworthy

<sup>1</sup> viz. The Demiurgus is a medium between the intelligible Gods, who are characterized by *permanency*, and the supermundane Gods, who are characterized by *proceeding*; just as the mundane Gods are characterized by *regression*. See my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Between the intelligible triads of being itself and life itself, and the intellectual order.

<sup>3</sup> viz. Between the middle triad of the intelligible order; for in this eternity first subsists, and the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order.

<sup>4</sup> i. e. Between the Gods prior to animal itself, and all the Gods that subsist between it and the Demiurgus.

<sup>5</sup> For *εἰρηπαιετός* in this place, I read *εὐρηπαιετός*.

the theory concerning time, gives to time a subsistence supernally from the intelligible and intellectual Gods, it being a supermundane intellect, connectedly containing all psychical life, measuring the psychical and corporeal periods, and perfecting the motion of them which proceeds into extension. From this monad likewise, he constitutes different times, according to the triad<sup>1</sup> and heptad,<sup>2</sup> and produces all these about the one time, which measures the one life of the universe. He also gives to time so great a power, as to make the world through it more similar to its paradigm. And for the sake<sup>3</sup> of the generation of these times, he produces the Sun, and the other *cosmocrators*, as calling forth invisible time, unfolding it into light, distributing it into parts, and dividing it, and perpetually convolving it with invariable sameness.

Since however, he says that the planets proceeding through the heavens have revolutions, let us see whether he does not conceive the motion of these to be various: since they move about their own centres, and revolve through the heavens, according to length, breadth, and depth, viz. through their own spheres, which are parts of the heavens, and give completion to the universe. For he does not say that they are moved *in* the heavens, as if they occupied the same place, but *through* the heavens, as being moved through arches, and wholly transferred according to place; and in addition to this, that they always revolve about their own centres, in order that they may have a certain mixed motion; just as they are media between the fixed stars, which always occupy the same place, and sublunary natures, which are not moved about a certain middle. It is now therefore evident, that according to Plato, all the spheres are concentric, and have the same centre with the universe. But the apparent inequability of the motions of the seven planets, arises from their revolutions, as they all-variously change their motion, through increasing and diminishing, advancing, being elevated, and approximating to the earth; and this without the contrivance of epicycles. For Plato makes no mention of these, and nature every where requires a medium. The medium however, between all equable and orderly natures, and those that are anomalous and disorderly, is that which is anomalous and orderly; such as is the form of the motion of the planets, which alternately exhibits an inequability according to a certain order perpetually the same, of swiftness and slowness, and of a revolution to the same things, or to contraries. But if some have employed certain epicycles, or equable eccentrics, hypothetically introducing motions, in

<sup>1</sup> i. e. According to the past, the present, and the future.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. According to the seven planets.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *ενα*, *ενα* in this place, it is necessary to read *ενα*.

order that they might be able to discover by the composition of these, the numbers of the motions of the epicycles, eccentrics, and of the stars which are moved in them, the conception is beautiful, and adapted to rational souls, but is foreign from the scope of the nature of wholes, to which alone Plato directed his attention.

“But as the universe did not yet comprehend all animals generated within itself, in this respect it still subsisted dissimilarly. Its artificer therefore supplied this defect, by impressing it with forms, according to the nature of its paradigm.”

That always assimilating the world to animal itself, Plato makes mention of it thrice, causing the universe to be only begotten, rendering it perfectly perpetual, and fabricating it all-perfect, is evident, and is so very properly. For animal itself is characterized by these three things, the only-begotten, the eternal, and the all-perfect. For being allotted the third order in intelligibles, it has the only-begotten from the first [or the summit of this order] according to which *the one being* subsists; but the eternal from the second, according to which eternity subsists; and it has the all-perfect from itself. It is necessary however to survey not negligently what this all-perfectness is. Wholeness therefore, as we have frequently observed being triple, and originating supernally from intelligibles, it is necessary that this world being the image of the most beautiful of intelligibles, should subsist according to each of these wholenesses; according to the first indeed, which is prior to parts, according to the second also, which is from parts; and through this according to the remaining wholeness [which is in a part]. The Demiurgus therefore, had prior to this adorned the world, according to the first form of wholeness; for he made it to be an animal possessing soul and intellect, adorning that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner, and causing it to receive order, in consequence of the accession of soul, intellect, and divine union. But the discussion proceeding, he likewise gave to it the second wholeness which consists of parts, constituting the twofold circulations, binding the elements through analogy,<sup>1</sup> and arranging the circles of the soul, according to the monad, triad, tetrad, and heptad. For of all these the universe consists as of parts; because these give completion to the universe as the universe [or the all]. And in the words before us, he gives to it the third form of wholeness. For it is necessary that each part of it should become a whole, and that it should have all

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *ἐκ ἀλογίας* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *ἐκ ἀναλογίας*

things appropriately in itself; viz. the heavens celestially, the air aerially, and the earth terrestrially. For this is the whole in a part, and through this, it is in a greater degree assimilated to its paradigm, which is comprehensive of all animals. For that is both a monad and number. And it is necessary that the world should contain all animals in itself, in order that it may become perfectly similar to the allness of its paradigm; by not only receiving the whole plenitudes of the world, and subsisting<sup>1</sup> a whole of wholes, but also comprehending in itself, the partial animals, through which every part of the world derives its completion, and all the divine, demoniacal, and mortal orders. For thus the most perfect similitude of the world to animal itself will be effected. And this is the tenth gift imparted by the Demiurgus to the world, and is the greatest of all. We do not however say, that the Demiurgus brought the world to a similitude of the intelligible, from dissimilitude; for thus the imperfect would precede the perfect, in the demiurgic generation of things; but the order of the discussion delivers the precedency in forms, and a dominion causally antecedent to the second and third goods which are imparted,<sup>2</sup> in order that the world may as much as possible be impressed as by a seal with all the evolved forms of intelligibles. Since therefore, the paradigm was monadic, and comprehensive of all intelligible animals, it is necessary that the world should not be alone only-begotten, and a whole of wholes, but likewise that it should be comprehensive of all sensible animals. Here therefore, the discussion of vivification proceeds, filling all the parts of the universe with appropriate genera of animals; adorning all the genera with proper numbers; and generating all numbers according to a similitude to the paradigm.

“Whatever ideas therefore, intellect perceived in that which is animal itself, such and so many it dianoctically conceived it to be necessary for this universe to contain.”

\*\*\*\*\*<sup>3</sup> And the third wholeness is imparted to the world through fabrication, weaving together parts with wholes, and numbers<sup>4</sup> with monads, and making each part of the universe a world, and that which is in a part, a whole and all.

<sup>1</sup> For ἀφιστάμενος here, it is necessary to read ἐπιστάμενος.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. The order of the discussion, delivers the whole prior to parts, before the whole which consists of parts, and this latter, before the whole which is in a part.

<sup>3</sup> The beginning of this commentary is wanting in the original; and by an unaccountable error this part of it that is extant, instead of immediately following the text in p. 272, is inserted in p. 266, as if it belonged to the Commentary on the words, “*Night therefore and Day were thus generated,*” &c.

<sup>4</sup> For τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς here, it is necessary to read τοὺς ἀριθμούς.

For the world is allotted this through a similitude to animal itself; because that also is an entire monad and number. It is likewise an all-perfect intelligible intellect, and a plenitude of intelligible causes, which it generates so that they may abide eternally in itself. For the multitude which abides in its cause is of one kind, and that which proceeds and is distributed into parts, of another. For the Demiurgus himself indeed, constitutes some genera of Gods in himself, but produces others from himself, into second and third orders. And the father of the Demiurgus [i. e. Saturn] generates some paradigmatic causes of fabrication to abide in himself, but he produces others, as demiurgic causes themselves, that have an arrangement prior to wholes. His grandfather also Heaven, retains some causes in himself, but leads others forth into a separation from himself. And theologists manifest these things by mystic appellations, denominating them either concealment, or absorption, or nurture in Fate. Much prior therefore to these, does intelligible intellect the father of wholes, generate some causes in himself, and unfold them into light, but produce others from himself, and constitute the orders of the Gods posterior to him;<sup>1</sup> containing indeed, uniform, whole, and all-perfect causes within the comprehension of himself; but producing into other orders, those which are multiplied, and distributed into parts through difference. Hence, since every paternal order constitutes after this manner, this world also, being an imitation of the intelligible orders, and suspended from them, possesses one *allness* prior to partial animals; but another, deriving its completion from them, and together with the former receives the latter, in order that it may be most similar to its demiurgic and paradigmatic cause. Such therefore, is the mode in which this takes place.

But the words, "*in that which is animal itself*," we have before explained, and shown what animal itself is, according to our opinion. And now also we say, that of the intelligible breadth, one part is the summit, is united, and occult; but another part, is the power of the summit, and proceeds, and at the same time abides; and another part, unfolds itself into light through energy, and exhibits in itself intelligible multitude. Of these likewise, the first indeed, is intelligible being, the second, is intelligible life, and the third, is intelligible intellect. The first being itself however, cannot be animal itself: for multitude is not there, nor the tetrad of ideas; but through its oneness, and ineffable union, it is denominated *one* by Plato. And in short, animal itself is said to participate of eternity, but the first

<sup>1</sup> Instead of τοῖς δε, τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διακρίσιν in this place, it is requisite to read τοὺς δε, πρὶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διακρίσιν.

<sup>2</sup> For τοῖς μεθ' αὐτῶν ταῖς αὐτῶν ὑφίστησι τῶν θεῶν in this place, it is necessary to read τοὺς μεθ' αὐτοῦ ταῖς αὐτῶν ὑφίστησι τῶν θεῶν.

being itself, does not participate of any thing, except some one should say that it participates of the *one*, which in every respect is worthy of consideration. For may not that which is above it, be superior even to this appellation [*the one*]. But being itself is primarily that which it is, and not according to participation. Hence, being itself cannot be animal itself for the above-mentioned causes. Nor can intelligible life be animal itself. For animal is secondary to life; and is said to be animal through the participation of life. In short, if animal itself was the second, eternity would be being itself. This however, is impossible. For *the one being* is one thing, and eternal being another; the former being the monad of being, but the latter a duad, having *the always* complicated with being. And the former is the cause of existence to all things, but the latter of permanency according to existence. If therefore, neither the one being itself is animal itself, nor that which is immediately posterior to the one being; for this is eternity, which is intelligible power, infinite life, and wholeness itself, according to which each of the divinities is at once a whole; it is necessary that the third, [or intelligible intellect], should be animal itself. For it is necessary that animal itself should be after a certain manner intellect; since the image of it subsists entirely in conjunction with sense. But sense is the image of intellect; so that in that which is primarily animal, intellect primarily subsists. Hence, if animal itself is secondary to life, it necessarily exists according to intelligible intellect. For being intelligible, and as Plato says, an animal, the most beautiful of intelligibles, and only-begotten, it will have this order. For all things after this form are produced in conjunction with other things, and fall short of intelligible altness.

Animal itself therefore, is intelligible intellect, comprehending in itself the intellectual orders of the Gods, collecting, uniting, and perfecting them,<sup>1</sup> and being the most beautiful boundary of intelligibles. It also unfolds into light to intellectual natures, the united and unknown cause of intelligibles, exciting itself to ideas and all-various powers, but producing all the second orders of the Gods. Hence likewise, Orpheus calls it the God *Phanes*, as *unfolding into light* the intelligible unities; and gives to it various forms, as exhibiting in itself the first cause of intelligible animals. He also inserts in it multiform ideas, as primarily comprehending intelligible ideas, and calls it the key of intellect, because it bounds every intelligible essence, and connectedly-contains intellectual life. From this so great a God therefore, the Demiurgus of the universe is suspended, being himself, as we have before said, intellect, but intellectual intellect, and in a particular manner the cause of intellect. Hence also, he is said to see animal itself: for sight is the

<sup>1</sup> For *avrv* here, read *avrov*.

peculiarity of the intellectual Gods. For the theologist calls intelligible intellect *eyeless*. He says therefore, concerning it:

In his breast feeding eyeless, rapid Love.

For the boundary of its energy is the intelligible. But the Demiurgus being intellect, does not rank among participated intellects; in order that he may be the Demiurgus of wholes, and that he may be able to look to animal itself. Being however imparticipable, he is truly intellectual intellect. And through simple intelligence indeed, he is united to the intelligible; but through various intellection, he hastens to the generation of secondary natures. Hence his intelligence is denominated vision, as being non-multitudinous, and as shining with intelligible light. But his second energy is called dianoetic, as proceeding through simple intelligence, and advancing to the generation of demiurgic works. And Plato indeed says, that he looks to animal itself; but Orpheus, that he leaps to, and absorbs it, through the indication of Night. For through Night, who is intelligible and at the same time intellectual, intellectual intellect is conjoined to the intelligible. You must not, however, on this account say, that the Demiurgus looks to that which is external to himself; for this is not lawful for him to do; but that being converted to himself, and to the fountain of ideas which is in himself, he is also conjoined to the monad of the all-various orders of forms. For intellect is not without the intelligible,<sup>\*</sup> and does not subsist separate from it, according to the Oracle. For if we say, that our soul looking to itself knows all things, and things prior to itself, are not external to it, how is it possible that the demiurgic intellect should not in a much greater degree, by intellectually perceiving himself, survey the intelligible world? For animal itself is also in him, yet not monadically, but according to a certain divine number. Hence likewise, being himself intellectual, he is said by theologists, as we have observed, to absorb that intelligible God, in consequence of every intelligible, the divisions of forms, and the intelligible number, being perceived by him. Plato, also, indicating this, denominates the ideas of the Demiurgus, *such* and *so many*; by the former, manifesting the peculiarities of the causes, but by the latter, the separation of them according to number.

If however these things subsist after this manner, it is not proper to admit, as some do, that there is an infinity of forms in intelligibles. For the definite is more allied to principles than the indefinite, as Plato also indicates. And first natures are always contracted in quantity, but transcend in power, those that are posterior to and proceed from them. Nor must it be said, that those who separate animal itself from the Demiurgus, make the intelligible to be external to intellect.

<sup>\*</sup> Instead of *δια νοητου* in this place, it is necessary to read *νοητου* alone.

For we do not make that which is seen to be posterior to that which sees, in order that it may be external to it, but we assert that the former is prior to the latter. But more divine intelligibles are intellectually perceived by more various natures, as existing in them; since the soul also entering into itself, is said to discover all beings, and as Socrates says, ' God and wisdom. Animal itself therefore, is prior to the Demiurgus, and is not external to him. And there indeed, all things, subsist totally, and intelligibly; but in the Demiurgus, intellectually, and with division. For in him the separate causes of the sun and moon pre-exist, and not only the one idea of the celestial Gods, which gives subsistence to all the celestial genera. Hence, the [Chaldean] Oracles say, that the demiurgic energies are borne along like swarms of bees, bursting about the bodies of the world. For a divine intellect evolves the *total* separation of them in the intelligible, ' into all the demiurgic multitude. And these observations indeed, are to be assumed as corollaries.

In the next place however, it is worth while to relate such opinions of the more ancient interpreters, as introduce a more novel meaning of the words of the text. Amelius therefore from these words, especially constitutes a triad of demiurgic intellects; calling the first *that which is*, from " *that which is animal*;" but the second *that which has*, from the words " *in that*," for the second is not [ideas,] but they enter into it; and the third *that which sees*, from the word " *perceived*;" though Plato says, that ideas are in that which is animal, and does not assert, that animal itself is one thing, and that in which the ideas of animals are contained, another. Hence *that which is*, is not different from *that which has*; if the one is that which is animal, but the other that in which ideas subsist. Again, Numenius arranges the first [God] according to that which is animal, and says that it intellectually sees for the use of the second; but he arranges the second after intellect, and says that it fabricates for the use of the third; and the third is arranged by him, according to that which energizes dianoetically. But it is evident that these have certain essential differences. Such a division, however, is not now made by Plato, in which one thing is an intellect perceiving intellectually, but another an intellect energizing dianoetically. For Plato does not divide energies contrarily to the energizers; since energies proceed from those that energize. Or rather, in divine essences, energies concur with essences. But *to conceive dianoetically*, and *to perceive*, are at present assumed as *the boundaries of the energies* (*ἐνεργηματα*) of the demiurgic intellect. By no means therefore, ought

\* This is asserted by Socrates in the First Alcibiades.

\* For *εἰ τοῦτο* in this place, it is necessary to read *εἰ τοῦτο νοητόν*.



these to be contrarily divided in the Demiurgus, since they concur with his hypostasias. These therefore, the divine Iamblichus has sufficiently confuted, adding, that Plato does not make such distinctions of divine natures, in the Sophista, Philebus, and Parmenides, as they speak of, but separately discusses each of the divine orders which are there mentioned, and divides the hypotheses from each other; separately indeed discussing *the one*, separately *whole*, and successively in a similar manner, circumscribing each hypothesis, by appropriate definitions. We however, for our design is not to confute the opinions of others, remind ourselves, that the things proposed to be considered are, what the one intelligible paradigm is, who the whole Demiurgus is, and what the union is of both. Let us therefore see, how, in what follows, the multitude of paradigms, and the many fabrications of things, are delivered.

“ But these ideas are four; one indeed, being the genus of the celestial Gods; another of winged, and air-wandering animals; the third, being the aquatic species; and the fourth, the pedestrious, and terrene.”

As in the demiurgic intelligence itself, a monad is the leader of the intellectual multitude, and as in the paradigm, unical form has a subsistence prior to number, thus also discourse, which is the interpreter of divine concerns, adumbrating the nature of the things of which it is the messenger, first assumes the whole object of knowledge collectively, and according to an enthusiastic conception; but afterwards unfolds that which was conglomerated, and develops the one intellection, through words. It also divides that which is united, according to this nature of the things, at one time, explaining their union, but at another, their separation. For it is not naturally adapted, nor is it possible for it, to comprehend both of these at once. The discourse of Plato also, being thus affected, first in a divinely inspired manner, unfolds into light the whole number of intelligible ideas, and afterwards, distributes into parts, the progressions which this number contains. For there the intelligible multitude shines forth, where there are the first monads of ideas. And that this indeed is the custom of Plato, we have before shown in many instances, as in, “*it was generated*,” “*he was good*,” “*one*,” and in all the before-mentioned examples.

Betaking ourselves however, from words to things, let us consider in the first place, what the tetrad itself of ideas is, and whence this number is derived; and in the next place, what the four ideas are, and how they subsist in animal itself, whether the all-perfectness of it derives its completion through them, or whether

they subsist in some other way. For by proceeding in an orderly manner through these speculations, we shall discover the divinely-inspired conception of Plato. It is necessary therefore, again to recur to the before-mentioned demonstrations, in which we said, that the first, united, and most simple intelligible essence of the Gods, proceeding supernally from the unity of unities, but according to a certain mode, ineffable, and incomprehensible by all things; one thing<sup>1</sup> is first, occult, and paternal; another is second,<sup>2</sup> and is the one power of wholes, and an uncircumscribed measure; and a third thing<sup>3</sup> proceeds into energy, and all-various powers, and is at once both paternal and effective. The first of these also, is a monad, because it is the summit of all the intelligible breadth, and the fountain and cause of divine numbers. But the second is a duad: for it abides and proceeds, as in the intelligible genera, and has *the ever* complicated with *being*. That however, which is now investigated [is the third], and is the tetrad, which receives all the occult cause of the monad, and unfolds into light in itself, its unproceeding power. For such things as are in the monad, primarily, unically, and with an unproceeding subsistence, these the tetrad exhibits distributedly, and now separated according to number, and a production into secondary natures. Since however, the third has indeed an order adapted to, but also entirely participates of the causes prior to itself, it is not only a tetrad, but as a monad it is greater than this, and is allotted a paternal transcendency; and as a duad, it is effective and prolific. So far therefore, as it is called animal itself, it is the monad of the nature of all animals, vital, intellectual, and corporeal. But so far as it is comprehensive at once of the male and female, it is a duad. For these are appropriately in all the orders of animals, in one way in the Gods, in another in demons, and in another in mortals. And it is necessary that the first unities of these, should have a primordial subsistence, in the one comprehension of animal itself. But so far as it constitutes from this duad, the four ideas of animals in itself, it is a tetrad. For conformably to these ideas, the fourfold fabrication proceeds, and the first effective cause of wholes, is a tetrad. Plato therefore, teaching this tetradic power of the paradigm, says that the most unical ideas of mundane natures are four, and are comprehended in one idea animal itself. For there, animal itself is one idea; but the male and the female are a duad.

If you are willing also, you will have genera and species, in the division of Plato. For he calls the two ideas, the intellectual, and the air-wandering, genera,

<sup>1</sup> i. e. The one being itself, the summit of the intelligible order.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Intelligible life, in which eternity subsists.

<sup>3</sup> i. e. Animal itself, or intelligible intellect, the end of the intelligible order.

but the remaining two, species, as being subordinate to the former two. But animal itself is also a tetrad. And as far as to this, intelligible forms extend. After this however, ideas proceed according to different numbers. For there is an appropriate number of them in each order; and the less number, is comprehensive of more total ideas; but the more multitudinous number, of such as are more partial. For diviner natures are more contracted in quantity, but have a transcendent power. The forms also of secondary natures are more multiplied than those that are prior to them; intellectuals than intelligibles, supermundane than intellectual natures, and mundane than supermundane natures. Mundane forms therefore, are those which have proceeded to an ultimate distribution; just as intelligible forms receive the highest union. For all progression diminishes power, but increases multitude. Hence, if Timeus had discussed a certain intellectual order, he would have mentioned another number, such as the hebdomadic or decadic. But since he is speaking of the intelligible cause of ideas, which comprehends all intelligible animals, he says that the first ideas are four. For the tetrad is there, which proceeds from the intelligible monad, and fills the demiurgic decad. For as the Pythagoric hymn says, "Divine number proceeds from the occult profundities of the undecaying monad, till it arrives at the divine tetrad, which produced the mother of all things, the universal recipient, ancient, and venerable, placing a boundary about all things, immutable, and unwearied, [and which both the immortal Gods, and earth-born men, denominate the sacred decad.]" And the hymn indeed, calls the uniform and occult cause of the one being, *the undecaying monad*, and *the occult profundities of the monad*; but the evolution into light of intelligible multitude, which the duad, the medium between the monad and the tetrad, unfolds, *the divine tetrad*. And the world itself, which receives the images of all the divine numbers, supernally imparted to it, it denominates *the decad*. For the above words may be thus understood, by directing our attention to the fabrication of the world. And thus much concerning the tetrad itself.

In the next place, let us show what the four ideas are, and to what kind of things they give subsistence. For some of the interpreters differ from others in their opinion on this subject; some indeed asserting, that the progression of these ideas, is into Gods, and the mortal genera, especially directing their attention to the [literal meaning of the] words of Plato; but others looking to things, say that the progression is into the Gods, and the genera superior to us; because

<sup>1</sup> The words within the brackets, are supplied from the Commentary of Syrianus on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The original is, *Αθανάτοι τε θεοί, καὶ γηγενεῖς ἀνθρώποι.*

these genera subsist prior to mortals, and it is necessary that the Demiurgus should not produce mortal, immediately from divine natures. Others again, conjoining both these opinions, and following what is written in the *Epinomis*, assert that Gods sub-sist in the heavens, demons in the air, demigods in water, and men, and other mortals, in earth. Such however being the difference of opinion among the interpreters, we admire indeed, the lovers of things, but shall endeavour to follow our leader [Syrianus]. We say therefore, that the celestial genus of Gods, is comprehensive of all the celestial genera, whether they are divine, or angelic, or daemoniacal. The air-wandering genus comprehends all the natures that are arranged in the air, whether they be Gods that are allotted the air, or demons that follow these, or mortal animals that live in the air. The aquatic is comprehensive of all the genera that are allotted the water, and of all that are nourished in water. And the pedestrious comprehends all the genera that preside over the parts of the earth, and all the animals that are constituted and generated in the earth. For the Demiurgus is entirely the cause of all mundane natures, and the common father of all of them; generating indeed, divine, and daemoniacal natures, by and through himself alone; but delivering mortal natures to the junior Gods, as they are able to generate these by a proximate energy. And the paradigm is not the cause of some, and not of other animals, but it possesses the most total causes of all animals. For again, if it was the cause of the divine and daemonical genera, but by no means, of the mortal genera,—in this case, mortals not being generated, the universe would be imperfect, as not containing all the genera of animals. For it is similar to its paradigm, and all-perfect, through imitating the four ideas of animal itself.

If, on the contrary, some one should say, that these genera comprehend Gods and mortals, how shall we accord with Plato, who after the fabrication of the celestial animals says, "*But to speak concerning the other demons, and to know the generation of them, exceeds our ability;*" having also mentioned the Gods that proceed into the sublunary world. For here indeed after the aerial, he arranges the aquatic, and after this, the pedestrious genus. In the generation however, of mortal animals, he no longer preserves this order, but generating all of them through the human soul, he leads it into the pedestrious genus, after the polity of it in the heavens, in order that he may consummately produce man; and after the human soul has acted erroneously, he again conducts it to the winged, pedestrious, and savage genus, and afterwards to the aquatic tribe. Hence it seems, that the three genera are not only the causes<sup>\*</sup> of mortal natures, but that they are the causes of

\* For *apria* here, it is necessary to read *actia*.

these prior to other things, in which the same order of the three ideas are preserved, secondary natures proceeding from those prior to them through diminution. It is necessary therefore, that all things should be generated through these ideas, viz. both the divine and mortal genera; and that the intelligible ideas, as being most total, should give subsistence to all genera. It is likewise necessary to sum up the words before us appropriately according to each order; as for instance, the genus of Gods in one way, in those that are properly called Gods, and in another way, in the genera superior to us, and which are arranged in the heavens. For we say that there are celestial angels, demons, and heroes, and that all these are called Gods, because the divine peculiarity predominates over their own peculiarity. Again, the winged and air-wandering genus, subsists in one way in the aerial Gods, in another, in aerial demons, and in another in aerial mortal animals. For the intellectual peculiarity of these Gods, is denominated winged; but the providential peculiarity is called air-wandering, as extending through all the sphere of the air, and connectedly containing the whole of it. But in demons *the winged* is significant of rapidity of energy; and *the air-wandering*, manifests the being every where present without impediment, and proceeding through all things. And in mortal natures, *the winged* manifests motion through one organ, which alone employs things that surround; but *the air wandering*, the all-various motion through bodies. For nothing hinders but that partial souls, which live in the air, may wander through the air. Farther still, the aquatic in divine natures, indicates a providential inspection and government, inseparable from water. Hence also the Oracle calls these Gods *water-walkers*.<sup>1</sup> But in the genera that follow the Gods, it signifies that which connectedly contains the moist nature. Moreover, the pedestrious, in one place signifies that which contains the last seat, and proceeds through it, as the terrestrial, and which stably governs it, and gives perfection to it, through all-various powers and lives. But in another place, it indicates that which governs and regulates at different times, different parts of the earth through its own proper motion. And thus much concerning the names.

From these things however, it may be assumed, that intelligible animal itself, is entirely different from that which is in the Demiurgus. For the former does not contain the separate ideas of mortal animals. For the Demiurgus made mortal

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *αυτὸρροποι* in this place, I read *σημαίνοντες*.

<sup>2</sup> In the original here, p. 270, after the words *ὅτι καὶ το λόγιον ὑπερβατῶν καλεῖ, τοὺς θεοὺς τούτους*, i. e. "Hence also the Oracle calls these Gods *water-walkers*," the words *το δὲ οὕτως καὶ διὰ ταῦτα*, immediately follow, which belong to the Commentary in p. 266. And the part which should immediately follow the word *water-walkers*, and begins with *ἐν δὲ τῶν ἐπομενῶν τοὺς θεοὺς γένει*, i. e. "But in the genera that follow the Gods," is to be found in p. 272, line 6, from the bottom.

animals, being willing to assimilate mundane natures to all the forms contained in himself, in order that he might make the world all-perfect. But he contains the distinct ideas of these, producing mortal from immortal natures.\* He knew therefore, mortal natures. And it is evident that he knew them by his inherent forms; and that he thought it fit the junior Gods should fabricate them, looking to him, and not to animal itself, as having in himself separately the ideas of mortal, and those of immortal natures. In animal itself therefore, there was the aerial, or the aquatic, or the pedestrious, there being one idea of each, viz. of all aerial, or aquatic, or pedestrious animals whatever; but in the Demiurgus they are divided. And some indeed, are the formal [or specific] comprehensions of immortal, but others of mortal, aerial animals, and in a similar manner of such as are aquatic and terrestrials. Hence the formal multitude in animal itself, is not the same as the demiurgic, as may be inferred from these arguments. The manner also, in which the division of these genera is made, must be considered. For it is into a monad and triad; opposing the summit of the celestial genus, to the total genera; and also, into two duads. For he calls the celestial, and also the winged, genus; but the aquatic, and also the pedestrious, species, as having an order inferior to the former, just as species is subordinate to genus.

Moreover, it is likewise necessary to survey this, that he omits the idea of fire in what he now says, because the divine genus comprehends the summit of fire, according to its own nature. For of the sublunary bodies fire alone, has not an appropriate place, but alone subsists in mutation, and is always in want of nourishment from air, and water. For the upper region is the place adapted to fire. But it is not there. For it would be seen if it was there, since it is naturally visible. Nor does it arrive thither, since it is extinguished by the surrounding air, which is dissimilar to it. If therefore, it is necessary, that there should be a wholeness of fire, and that fire having a form should exist somewhere, and should not alone subsist in becoming to be; but sublunary fire is not a thing of this kind; if this be the case, fire will alone exist in the heavens, and will there remain such as it is, and always possess its proper place. For the motion to the upper region, is not the natural motion of fire, but of fire having a preternatural subsistence. Thus also the Sacred Discourse of the Chaldeans, conjoins the aerial bosoms with the lunar rattlings, and attributes to fire the celestial region, according to the distribution of the elements into the world. For the fire which is in generation, is a certain effluxion of the celestial fire, and is in the cavities of the other

\* Instead of *απο τα αθανατα παραγουσιν* in this place, it appears to me that we should read *απο των αθανατων θηρα παραγων*.

elements; there not being a sphere of fire by itself; but the summits of air imitate the purity of the upper fire. We say therefore, that these summits are sublunary fire, and that the place of fire is under the heavens. For this place is most similar to the celestial profundity, just as the lowest extremity of air is most similar to water, in consequence of being thick and nebulous. This also, as it would seem, appears to have been the conception of Aristotle; for he thought fit thus to denominate the fire which is here. But he calls the fire which is immediately under the heavens, and which he says, revolves in conjunction with the heavens, *fiery-formed*. If however, this be the case, it is perfectly requisite to ask him, where that which is truly fire, and ranks as a whole, exists? For it cannot be the fire which is here, since it is not a whole, nor truly-existing fire; since the fire which is truly so, is not fiery-formed. He must therefore be compelled to admit, that fire which is truly so, and which is pure light, exists in the heavens. You must not however wonder, if most attenuated, and most pure fire, is in the summits of the air, just as the most gross and turbid fire, is in the bosom of the earth; not as making this fire to be another wholeness different from that of air, but as admitting, from its being the most attenuated, that it is carried in the pores of the air, which are most narrow. Hence it is not visible, through two causes; one, from not being distinctly formed, and the other, from not resisting our sight, in consequence of consisting of the smallest parts. And this also is the case with the light of the eyes. Truly-existing fire therefore, is in the heavens. But the purest of sublunary fire, is in the air proximate to the heavenly bodies, which Plato farther on, calls aether. And fire of the grossest nature is contained in the bosom of the earth. Since therefore Plato has spoken concerning the four genera in common, let us survey how he constitutes each of them, in what follows.

“The idea therefore, of that which is divine, he for the most part produced from fire, in order that it might be most splendid and beautiful to the view. [But assimilating it to the universe, he made it to be round.”<sup>1</sup>]

The sphere of the fixed stars is the first of partial animals, which also the De-

<sup>1</sup> In the original, immediately after the text the following words occur, as a title to the comment, and which were inserted, I suppose, by some Scholiast, τα ζητούμενα περὶ τοῦ ἀπλανοῦ ζώου. περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ. περὶ τοῦ σχήματος. περὶ τῆς θεσεως. περὶ τῆς κινήσεως. i. e. “Inquiries concerning the inerratic animal [i. e. the sphere of the fixed stars]. Concerning the essence of it, its figure, position, and motion.” That part of the text also within the brackets, is omitted in Proclus, though he comments upon it.

miurgus first constituted, producing it for the most part from the idea of fire. For it is necessary in the first place, that we should discuss the essence of it, in the next place, the figure, in the third place, the position, and in the fourth place, the motion of it. The discussion therefore, of its essence, is the occasion of much discord among the interpreters. For how does it possess for the most part the idea of fire? is it as some say, because it is mingled from all the elements, but participates mostly of fire? Or is it because every celestial genus consists of all the elements, but the greatest part of it is fiery? For it is possible to assert either of these; just as if we should say, that all things consist of all the genera of being, but that intelligibles have most of sameness. Or is it not as he would interpret, who truly surveys things themselves, that a subsistence for the most part from the idea of fire, signifies that fire possesses most abundantly the idea of the fifth body, as being the recipient of many productive powers, of which each of the divine bodies is full? Or shall we say, that it is not according to any one of these modes, but as others assert, that divine animals consist of fire, but of fire which has an essence possessing interval, and is multitudinous? For the intelligible has the form of unity, but the corporeal is multitudinous, as being partible, and possesses interval, in consequence of having bulk. Or may we not say, as the most true of all the assertions, that we should look to all these conceptions, and survey one truth as the result of all of them? For we place all the elements in the heavens, but immaterially, so far as the immaterial can subsist in material natures. We also say, that the elements subsist in the heavens, but according to the summits of them only. For if the forms of fire, air, water and earth, are in intelligibles, it is necessary that the heavens should be the first participants of this tetrad. But fabrication proceeding, constitutes also the last nature of the elements, and which is truly material. We likewise assert, that the idea of the stars, for the most part, consists of fire. For though all the elements are in them, yet fire predominates; because in the elements of generation, fire has the relation of form to the other elements. It is necessary therefore, in the [celestial] Gods, that the fiery characteristic should be most abundant, in order that form may have dominion over the subject essence; but that there should be the least of the other elements, because this least portion has the order of a subject. Hence, the terrestrial nature is there, as being a certain solid essence, and tangible bulk. On this account also, it resists our sight. The fiery nature likewise is there, as illuminating and giving form to bulk and interval. But the elements which are between these, subsist there, as connecting the extremes, and causing them to be one. Fire however, predominates over all the other elements, because the form which is there, vanquishes the subject, connectedly contains, and preserves it on all sides, and is itself full of life and self-motive power. Hence also it is full of divine and demi-



urgic productive powers, and proceeds into multitude and interval, every way defining that which possesses dimensions, and comprehending the bulk of body.

Nor must we fear the skilful in dialectic, who looking to a certain small part of nature, revile Plato for saying, that fire tends upward, but that the stars have a circular motion. For a tendency upward has no place in the fire of the heavens; just as neither does self-motion pertain to intelligible fire, nor to that which is of a corporeal-formed nature. For the reason [i. e. form, or productive principle of fire] in intellect, is intellectual fire. For motions are consubistent with things according to the order of essences. But if divine fire is that which has the power of constituting the stars, it is not such as this most material and gross [sublunary fire]. And if it is most splendid and beautiful, it is different from this obscure fire, which is mingled with the deformity of matter. For the last matter is darkness and deformity. But this divine fire is most splendid and beautiful, both which are indubitable signs of truth. For the super-luminous transparent splendor of light, is the image of divine goodness, and its being decorated with beauty, is an indication of intelligible symmetry. Divine fire therefore, is very different from that which is not divine. Hence, it appears that truly existing fire is there in the highest place; and that on this account, the stars are fiery, and are allotted the place of fire. The summit likewise of earth is there. On the contrary, the whole of earth<sup>1</sup> is here, which participates as much as being earth, it is possible of the last fire, which is most terrestrial and gross; just as the fire which is in the heavens possesses the summit of earth, the earth which is there being superior to the obscurity and grossness of this sublunary earth. This also is conformable to the doctrine of Ptolemy and Plotinus, that every body, when it is in its proper place, is either fixed, or revolves in a circle; but that a tendency upward or a tendency downward are the motions of bodies, which not being in their proper places, strive to obtain their proper place. So that each of the other elements, when in its proper place, will either remain fixed in it, or will be moved in a circle. And if it should be of a fiery nature and tend upward, it will entirely be in a foreign place.

We must not therefore, disbelieve in theologists, who place in the heavens an empyreal essence: for there are many species of fire. Simply to assert likewise, that the celestial body is a fifth body, is not to assert any thing clear concerning it, except that it is different from the four elements. Plato however, unfolds all the nature of it, leaving in the heavens the summits of the elements. The syllogism therefore, of those who fancy they can confute the doctrine of Plato concerning the stars, as having an essence consisting for the most part of fire, is itself confuted, by not admitting one of the propositions which says, that fire tends

<sup>1</sup> For *τῇ* in this place it is obviously necessary to read *γῇ*.

upward. For it is not proper to characterize the nature of fire, from that fire which has a preternatural subsistence, and which proceeds to a subsistence according to nature; but it must be characterized from that which is in a condition conformable to nature. But a thing of this kind is either fixed or revolves in a circle. The Demiurgus however assimilating each of the stars<sup>1</sup> to the universe, made each of them to be round, and to have a twofold similitude, one to its proper wholeness, but the other, to the paradigm from which it is suspended. The parts of them also have a twofold similitude, one to the whole, but the other to the idea of their wholeness. Thus likewise, a partial soul is assimilated to the soul which ranks as a whole, and to intellect. But the soul which ranks as a whole and is one, is assimilated to the one and total intellect. Total nature also is assimilated to soul; but a partial nature to its own wholeness, and to soul. Conformably to this likewise, each of the stars is assimilated to the whole world, and to its proper paradigm. And the similitude is different. For each is assimilated to the latter according to its whole essence; but to the former, according to figure, and according to motion. For each is fabricated round, just as the world is spherical. For the universe is primarily a sphere, as in sensibles. Hence through this it imitates both the Demiurgus and the intelligible paradigm. For each of them through converging to itself, constitutes this visible animal [the world]. The convergency which is there however, connects here, excellence of condition with the circle, because the universe expresses as much as possible, all the peculiarity of the paradigm. And thus much concerning these particulars.

If however, we wish to investigate the cause through which a part of the universe was generated similar to the whole, we shall not be in want of arguments to show why it was so generated. For it is not possible that this should happen in all things. For neither would it have been best for the eye to have been generated with a figure similar to that of the whole body, nor is the assertion true, of the heart, or of the head.<sup>2</sup> But where the wholeness is prior to the parts, it is possible for the parts to be assimilated to the whole, and for good to be present with them, through this similitude. On the contrary, where the wholeness is from the parts, here the part does not possess excellence of condition, through an assimilation to the whole. The universe however, is a thing of this kind. For it is a whole prior to parts,<sup>3</sup> and is complete through containing the partial genera

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *μερῶν* here, it is necessary to read *σφαιρῶν*, and immediately after it, to supply *καὶ*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *ἐπεὶ ἡ καρδία* in this place, it is necessary to read, *ἐπεὶ κεφαλὴ*.

<sup>3</sup> The universe is a whole prior to parts, because it is the cause of all the partial natures contained in it.

of animals, according to the third species of wholeness,<sup>1</sup> as we have before observed ; since animal itself also is a whole, and all-perfect, as a monad, but comprehends all intelligible animals, through the before-mentioned tetrad.

“ He placed it also in the wisdom of the most excellent and powerful nature, so that it might follow that which is best, and distributed it in a circle about all heaven ; causing it to be a *true world*, diversified through the whole of itself.”

In what is here said, Plato speaks concerning the position of the stars, that they are on all sides circularly placed in the revolution of the circle of *the same*, and that, as the poets say, they revolve in an orb round the heavens ; some of them being arranged in an order different from that of others, and exhibiting an admirable variety. If however, you are willing to speak more magnificently than this, you may say, that the Demiurgus placed the stars in the divine soul of the inerratic sphere, thus animating them, and imparting to them a proper life and intellect. In like manner, he inserted the planets in the circulations, caused by the period of the circle of *the different*. For being divine animals, it is necessary that they should have an intellectual soul, and a divine intellect. For that they are not alone animated by the soul of the universe, but that each has also a peculiar soul presiding over it, we may learn by considering, that of the animals which are here, those are more excellent, that together with being animated by the whole soul of the world, have also a peculiar soul, and are illuminated by it with life. Thus for instance, man is superior to such animals as are alone animated by the whole soul, and are the last of the fabrication of things. Hence, some animals are preserved in a twofold respect, but others are scarcely preserved by the whole soul of the universe. If however, this is true, and the celestial are more excellent than our bodies, they will in a greater degree be animated both by the mundane and their own peculiar souls ; since they are similar to the whole of the heavens in which they revolve. But if this be the case, all of them are moved in a circle about their own centres. And if this be admitted, and every perpetual motion, has also a perpetually moving cause, and as numerous as are the bodies which are perpetually moved, so many likewise are, as Aristotle says, the moving causes ; if this be the case, it is necessary that each of the stars should have a peculiar soul by which it is moved. If also they are moved in an orderly manner, it is

<sup>1</sup> The third species of wholeness is that in which whole subsists in a part. The partial genera of animals therefore are wholes, but the partial in them predominates over the total.

necessary that their souls should be intellectual; for if they were moved in a disorderly manner, which it is not lawful to assert of divine bodies, their souls would be irrational. Hence, it is necessary that each of the stars should have a divine presiding soul; and through intellect be united to the intellect which ranks as a whole. For since mortal bodies [such as ours] partake of reason and intellect, what ought we to think of divine bodies themselves?

Each therefore, through its own soul, is inserted in the lation of the circle of *the same*, which Plato very properly calls *most excellent and powerful as vanquishing* all the circulations, and convolving all of them intellectually. For as the genus of the stars is convolved by the lation of the inerratic sphere,<sup>1</sup> thus also the souls of them are contained by the one soul of the circulation of *the same*, and their intellects by the intellect of it. For again, it is necessary that the monad which is co-arranged with multitude, should subsist conformably to the monad which is exempt from multitude. The first of the four ideas therefore, being the exempt monad, the multitude of the stars proceeding from it is comprehended by the inerratic sphere, as a co-arranged monad. In a similar manner likewise, in each of the celestial spheres, the whole sphere has the relation of a monad, but the cosmocrators are the leaders of the multitude in each. For in each a number analogous to the choir of the fixed stars, subsists with appropriate circulations. If, however, in the fixed stars, there is one monad, the wholeness of them, but in the planets, there is both a wholeness, and each of the planets, is also a leader, it is not wonderful. For as the motion of the revolutions of the circle of *the different* is more various, thus also there are more leaders than one. For the multitude proceeds to a greater extent. But in the sublunary region, there is a still greater number of leaders. For the monads in the heavens generate numbers analogous to them. As we have said therefore, the animation of the stars, inserts them in their proper souls; but it also connects them with the whole soul of the lation of the circle of *the same*; elevates them to the mundane soul; and establishes them in the intelligible paradigm itself. The divine Iamblichus also, in an eminent degree perceiving this to be the case, places the wisdom of that which is most excellent and powerful, in the paradigm. But the inerratic sphere was generated *a true world*, because it is more properly a world than the sublunary region, which is always in want of foreign arrangement, and is continually changing. The sphere of the fixed stars likewise, is a world so diversified, as to express intellectual variety, which it receives uniformly about, and in the whole of itself; imitating the beauty of the celestial para-

<sup>1</sup> For *υπο της αλλης φoρας* in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read, *υπο της απλανους φoρας*.

digns. To *distribute* also, and to *distribute* in a circle, are adapted to the fixed stars: for the latter signifies intellectual distribution, but the former the demiurgic order. On this account likewise, theologists establish Eunomia in the inerratic sphere, who separates the multitude in it, and always preserves each of the stars in its proper order. Hence too, celebrating Vulcan as the maker of the heavens, they conjoin him with Aglaia, as adorning and giving splendor and hilarity to all heaven, through the variety of the stars. And again, of the Seasons, they place Dice over the planetary region, because it is just that irregularity should be reduced to regularity according to reason; but of the Graces, Thalia, as always causing their lives to be consummately flourishing. They also give the superintendence of the sub-lunary region to Irene, as pacifying the war of the elements; but to Euphrosyne of the Graces, as imparting to each of them facility of energy according to nature.

“ But he adapted to each of them two motions, one being in the same, according to the same things, through which they always dianoctically perceive in themselves, the same<sup>\*</sup> about the same things; but the other, being an advancing motion, through the domination of the same and similar circulation. He likewise rendered them immoveable and stable, as to the other five motions, in order that each of them might become as much as possible most excellent.”

The discussion of motion is consequent to that of animation. For because each of the stars is animated, on this account also, each is allotted a peculiar motion. For soul is the principle of motion. The discussion of motion also, is connected with the theory of figure. For that which has an appropriate circular figure, and receives this from the demiurgic cause, must necessarily have an energy and a circular lation, adapted to the figure. For every natural body is moved essentially, and not according to accident; since nature is the principle of motion and mutation, in that in which it is primarily *per se*, and not *accidentally*. The body of the stars however, is immoveable according to all other motions, as being perpetual through the whole of time; but is alone capable of receiving local motion, and this circular, as being moved in its own place. Farther still, how, as I have before said, can that which does not circulate according to a certain pecu-

<sup>\*</sup> Instead of *ταυτο* here, as in the text of Proclus, all the printed editions of Plato have *τα αλλα*, but erroneously, according to the commentary of Proclus on these words.

liar motion, be of the same essence with the whole heaven? And how can it otherwise imitate the universe, than by being moved about the centre of itself? It is necessary therefore, that the stars should be moved with twofold motions; one, which is essential to them, about their own centres; but the other, in conjunction with their wholeness.

What then are these two motions? For there are different opinions concerning them. And some indeed say, that both these motions are corporeal; but others assert, that the one is psychical, and the other corporeal. It is better however, to make both the psychical and the corporeal motion twofold. For the soul of these divine animals [the stars] has an appropriate life, and through an appropriate energy is conjoined with intelligibles. And besides this, it is convolved together with the whole soul of the universe. For in divine natures, things which are as it were parts, energize according to their own energies, and in conjunction with wholes. The soul of the stars therefore, is moved in a twofold respect. The body of each also, is convolved about its own centre, imitating the proper energy of its soul and its intellect, and is likewise moved with an advancing motion, imitating the co-operating energy of the soul of the inerratic sphere, with its wholeness, and the establishment of the intellect of this soul, in the intellect which ranks as a whole. A twofold motion therefore, must be assumed in both, viz. in the starry soul, and the starry body. For the starry soul is especially wise in the same, and about the same things, always perceives intellectually after the same manner, and is moved with an advancing motion, through following its wholeness. For in consequence of participating a more divine power, it recurs to the summit itself of intelligibles, which may be said to have the order of leaders, and to be before the soul, as being intellectually apprehended, and perceived by it. And the starry body indeed, is moved towards the leading parts, in conjunction with the whole circulation, but it has also a perpetual motion, originating from itself, and bearing a resemblance of dianoetic energy, and of intellectual and eternal motion. Through a motion also in the same, it has the same motion with the universe, but through always discursively proceeding about the same things, it has always an arrangement referring to the same end, participates of the same soul, and is converted to the same intellect.

It is necessary therefore, to make a division of the words of Plato conformably to these dogmas, after the following manner: He gave to each of the stars two motions, one, in the same, and about the same things, by the same, understanding the motion about the proper centre of the star. Afterwards, making a stop, it will be necessary to add, always dianoetically, perceiving in itself the same thing about the same things. For it is evident that the psychical motion which is here

signified, has always a dianoetic perception of real beings. For this is manifested by the words, "*about the same things, and the same thing.*" For the starry soul does not at different times, dianoetically perceive differently about the same things, as is the case with our souls. Again, we must say that by *the advancing motion*, is meant the corporeal motion of the star, according to which it wholly passes from one place to another. And afterwards by making a stop, we must add, *Through the domination of the same and similar circulation*, calling this circulation, the motion of the circle of *the same* of the whole soul of the universe, by which also, the soul of each of the stars is vanquished, and through the imitation of which it is moved to that which is *before* itself. And this is truly to be led by its intellectual energies, and to co-assimilate<sup>1</sup> itself to the divine periods of it. It is evident however, that this advancing motion alone pertains to things that are wholly transferred from one place to another. For the stars indeed, have an advancing motion, but not the inerratic sphere, since this is alone moved in a circle. Thus also the planets are moved with an advancing motion, but not the spheres of the planets.<sup>2</sup>

Again therefore, we may perceive the order of the things, from the number of the motions. For the motion of the universe is uniform; that of the fixed stars, is biformed; and that of sublunary bodies, is multiform and indefinite. For though each of the planets is moved with a uniform motion, yet the commixture of many periods, both of the period appropriate to each, and of that which is in conjunction with the inerratic sphere, causes the lation to be various. For it is requisite that the causes of variety, and the principles of contrariety, should be antecedently comprehended in the heavens. Or how could the heavens contain<sup>3</sup> generation, how could they govern the mutation of the sublunary elements, unless they comprehended in themselves the cause of contrariety? Since however, they are immaterial, so far as this is possible in sensibles, the contraries in them are not hostile to, nor in sedition with each other, but they are consubsistent with each other, and the same thing is moved with twofold circulations, one of which is not essential, and the other according to accident, if I may speak what appears to me to be the case; but both the circulations are essential. For what is there in the heavens which is an accident, since all things there are immaterial, and all things derive their subsistence from the whole fabrication? Hence figure and motion are there essential. Since therefore the heavens are immaterial; by which I mean,

<sup>1</sup> For *συνεζωμιοντα* here, read *συνεζωμιοντα*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *αι πλαυμειαι* in this place, it is necessary to read *αι πλαυμειων σφαιραι*.

<sup>3</sup> For *περιζει* here, it is requisite to read *περιχει*.

that they are exempt from this sublunary matter, which is inefficacious, possesses a spurious beauty, and is deformity itself; this being the case, they comprehend in themselves at once, contrary motions. For being external to this sublunary matter, which sustains nothing, contraries concur in them, and are united to each other. But in this sublunary matter there are hostile oppositions, from not being able through its imbecility, to receive the presence of both the forms. And thus much concerning the motions of the stars.

It is evident however, that the five motions which Plato takes away from the fixed stars are, the upward and downward, the backward motion, and the motion to the right hand, and the left. For he had before taken the six motions from the innerratic sphere. To the fixed stars however, he gave an advancing motion, in order that they might be moved with the motion of the universe; but to the planets he gives, not only an advancing, or direct motion, but also a retrograde motion; for according to the latter alone, they are said to wander. Nor ought we to wonder, if what he before called to the right hand, he now denominates to the anterior part. For as with reference to the whole circulation it is to the right hand; but as with reference to the stars, to the anterior part. And it seems, that so far as the world is one, it has one motion which is especially about Intellect and wisdom; but so far as it is divided into the innerratic sphere and planetary region, it has through a twofold circulation, a motion to the right hand, and to the left; and so far as it contains partial animals, fixed and wandering, it has a direct and retrograde motion; the former being the motion of the fixed stars, but the latter of the planets. It seems also, so far as it is possible to predict from these things, that each of the fixed stars moves similarly to the innerratic sphere, about its own centre, but as circulating towards the west. For thus likewise each being moved by the whole sphere, is moved to that which is before itself. For that to which the motion of a thing is directed according to nature, is anterior to the thing. Hence that to which the circulation of each of the stars is directed, is towards the west, that thus the motion of it, may be similar to that of its wholeness; just as the east is anterior to the planets to which they are moved according to nature. An advancing motion therefore, is the motion of the fixed stars, and not of the planets. For there is something external to the former; since one thing in them is the leader, but the other follows.<sup>1</sup> The whole sphere however, of the fixed stars transcends all rectilinear motion, and is alone moved circularly. You may also say, that the planets have a peculiar motion, and that this is towards the east; but that at the

<sup>1</sup> i. e. In the fixed stars, the whole sphere is the leader but each of the stars in this sphere follows the sphere itself.



same time, they circulate wholly through the depth of their spheres; and likewise, that the east is anterior to them, but that through the inerratic sphere, they have a retrograde motion, which is contrary to their own proper motion.

Of the six motions therefore, Plato ascribes to the fixed stars, that which is to the anterior parts; and hence you may infer, that this motion is more honourable than the rest. For as Aristotle says, the motion of that which is most excellent, is most excellent. Hence, of the other motions, the local is the best; but of local motions, the first, is the circular, but the second, the advancing or direct motion. For the latter motion pertains to the fixed stars; but each of them is immoveable and stable, with respect to the five motions. For Plato mentions both these, lest you should think that this immobility is a remission, sluggishness, and privation, and in order that you may conceive it to pertain to the fixed stars, through a transcendency of nature. But this is evident from what follows: for he says, that it is "*in order that each of them, might become as much as possible most excellent.*" For if an immobility with respect to the five motions, has for its ultimate end, the beauty and good of the order of the celestial bodies, it is not the non-possession of vitality, and privation, but a power which predominates over variety. For the circle of the inerratic sphere, comprehends all motion, in whatever way it may be effected; but the advancing motion of the stars contained in it, evidently unfolds into light, the principle of a rectilinear progression; and the variety of the planets conducts and governs all the indefiniteness of generation, as proximately moving it in an all-various manner by their evolutions. Plato therefore, ascribes a motion of this kind to the fixed stars.

Let such however, as move them in consequentia, or with a retrograde motion, about the poles of the zodiac, through a portion of a hundred years, as Ptolemy and Hipparchus prior to him did, confiding in observations, know in the first place, that the Egyptians prior to these, employing observations, and still prior to the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, being taught by the Gods, prior to observations, were of a similar opinion with Plato, concerning the motion of the fixed stars. For the Oracles not once only but frequently speak of the advancing procession of the fixed stars. For they say, "*The menstrual course, and the starry advancing procession.*" And again, "*The advancing starry procession was not generated for your sake.*" The theurgist [Julian] likewise, in his doctrinal treatises, when speaking about the third father<sup>1</sup> says, "*He established the numerous multitude of fixed stars, compelling fire to fire. But he fixed them with a stability<sup>2</sup> void of a wandering motion.*" In which words, he clearly testifies, that the fixed stars move in the same place, and

<sup>1</sup> i. e. About Jupiter the Demiurgus.

<sup>2</sup> For *πῆξε παλιν* in this place, it is necessary to read *πῆξε δε παλιν*.

about the same things; so that the opinion of Plato derives credibility from both. To which may be added, that the phenomena are sufficient to persuade those that have eyes. For it is evident, that if the fixed stars were moved about the poles of the zodiac with a retrograde motion, the Bear which sets in these places, and which from the times of Homer, has been so often celebrated as always splendid in the same manner as it is now, ought to have been moved more than fifteen degrees, and not about the pole of the equinoctial. The star Canopus<sup>1</sup> also, ought no longer to appear making a short period, above the horizon, to those in the third climate;<sup>2</sup> but as Posydonius says, ought to be seen by those in Rhodes passing by the horizon. The Bear however is always resplendent, and Canopus preserves the same position. The motion of the fixed stars therefore in consequentia, which is so much celebrated by these men, is not true. But if adducing the baneful motions of the planets, and the calculations of nativities, in proof of this retrograde motion of the fixed stars, they fancy they shall speak conformably to the phenomena, it must be said to them, that those also who are not of this opinion respecting the motion of the fixed stars, accord in a remarkable degree with the phenomena. And also that in forming canons respecting the motions of the planets, and in studying the doctrine of nativities, they are not at all in want of this hypothesis of the motion of the fixed stars in consequentia. *But the men I particularly allude to, are the Chaldeans, who had observations of whole mundane periods.* Why therefore, should we adduce as a testimony, the records of a few observations, and views of a juvenile nature, which are not accompanied with such great accuracy, when the very extended observations of the Chaldeans bear witness to the dogma of the ancients, concerning the motion of the fixed stars?<sup>3</sup> For those who do

<sup>1</sup> Canopus or Canopus, is a most bright fixed star of the first magnitude, in the helm of the ship Argo.

<sup>2</sup> viz. In Alexandria. For according to the ancients there are seven climates, the first of which was called Meroë; the second, Syene; the third, Alexandria; the fourth, Rhodes; the fifth, Rome, or the Hellespont; the sixth, the Euxine sea; and the seventh, the mouth of the Boristhenes. Vid. Plin. Hist. Nat. l. 6. c. 8.

<sup>3</sup> In the original, *εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ψυχροῦς τῆς τῶν πλανητῶν κινήσεως*, which is very corrupt, there being no such word as *ψυχροῦς*. I read therefore, *εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰς ψυχροῦς τῶν πλανητῶν κινήσει*.

<sup>4</sup> The precession of the equinoxes is however admitted by Simplicius, who in the 2nd book of his Commentary on Aristotle's Treatise on the Heavens, observes respecting the motion of the innerratic sphere as follows:

"If the innerratic sphere is really innerratic, and the observation of Hipparchus and Ptolemy concerning it, is not admitted, that it is moved one degree in a hundred years in a contrary direction,—if this be the case, it will be moved with one simple motion, but the stars contained in it with two motions, viz. with their own circumrotatory motion, and the motion of the universe. But the planets will be moved

this, are ignorant that it is possible to collect something true from false hypotheses, and that it is not proper to think, that a conclusion which accords with the phenomena, is a sufficient proof of the truth of the hypotheses.

“And from this cause, such of the stars as are inerratic were generated, being divine animals; and on this account they always remain revolving in *same*. But the stars which both revolve and have such a wandering, as we have before mentioned, were produced conformably to these.”

The cause of the generation of the stars comprehends all the most proper principles of them, viz. the paradigmatic, the demiurgic, and the final. For from all these, the stars were generated such as they are, and with the motions which they possess. The inerratic sphere however, exhibits a uniform motion, and which always proceeds after the same manner. But their being called *divine animals*, indicates that intellect and a divine soul are present with them, and prior to these, the one unity, according to which each is a God. For because each is an animal, it has a soul by which it is moved; but because also, each is a divine animal, it is suspended from a divine intellect. For it is not intellect which

with three motions, viz. with their own proper motion, with that of the spheres which contain them, and with the motion of the universe. Since however, he adds, my preceptor Ammonius [viz. the celebrated Ammonius Hermias, who was the disciple of Proclus,] observing the stars through an astrolabe while I was present, in Alexandria, found that the star Arcturus, according to the epoch of Ptolemy, had been moved so much, as it was necessary it should have been moved at the rate of one degree in a hundred years; it will be more true to say, that the starless sphere which comprehends all the spheres, and which was unknown in the time of Aristotle, being moved with one simple motion from the east, convolves at the same time all the other spheres. But that which is called by us the inerratic sphere, is moved with two motions, viz. with the motion of the universe from the east, and with its own motion from the west; and all the stars in it are moved with these two motions, and with their own circumrotatory motion. In like manner also, with respect to the successive spheres, and the stars in them, the former are moved with two, but the latter with three of the same motions.”

I am however decidedly of the opinion of Proclus, that the records of a few observations, and views of a juvenile nature, are not to be adduced in opposition to the very extended observations of the Chaldeans, which embraced a whole mundane period, i. e. a period of 300,000 years. And what Proclus here asserts of the Chaldeans, is also confirmed by Cicero in his first book On Divination, who says, that they had records of the stars for the space of 370,000 years; and by Diodorus Siculus Bibl. lib. 11. p. 118. who says that their observations comprehended the space of 473,000 years.

<sup>1</sup> The text of Proclus has erroneously in this place *διναμεν*, instead of which, it appears from the Commentary of Proclus, we should read *ἐναμεν*: though all the printed editions of the *Timæus* have instead of this *μεν*.

makes it to be divine, since there are likewise angelical and dæmoniacal intellects; but the divine intellect of the whole of this, differs from that which is not divine in this, that it is suspended from deity, which causes it to be a divine intellect. But *revolution always remaining in same*, exhibits a perpetuity in the heavens, according to which the stars always occupy the same place of the heavens, being moved about their own centres, and also the possession of an evolved energy, and an unceasing life. Such therefore as make the stars to be inanimate, or fancy that the souls of the celestial bodies are mutable like ours, or that the generation of them is in time, wander from the meaning of Plato. For if a certain animal is divine, it has a divine soul, and is not alone animated by the soul of the universe. For there is also in the Earth a divine animal, since Earth is the oldest and most venerable of the Gods; and there are likewise certain living things in it, which have *entelechias* from the soul of the universe alone; but these are not animals. And farther still, because the stars always remain in motion, they neither possessed a soul from a certain time, nor will at a certain time, lose it. For the term *always*, manifests temporal immutability, both according to the past and the future time. And thus much concerning the fixed stars.

With respect to the planets however, Plato again reminds us, that they have various motions, but orderly, and according to measures and boundaries. For the simplicity of them comprehends multitude, order connects their variety, and measure defines their wandering. What then does Plato now mean by reminding us of this, and what indication does it afford us? Some therefore say that it manifests this, that though the planets in a certain respect transcend the fixed stars, so far as they are allotted a ruling and cosmocratic dignity<sup>1</sup> in the universe, and as theologists say an azonic authority; for in each of the *cosmocrators* there is an azonic<sup>2</sup> order of Gods: yet at the same time, they are inferior to them, through their wandering and the all-various diversity of their motions. And we also say that there is no absurdity in admitting, that the same thing may surpass and be surpassed by the same things, according to different conceptions. But we should consider, whether Plato by speaking of the planets prior to the fixed stars, and delivering the order, motion, and powers of them, and also their periods, and apocatastases, and again, resuming the mention of them after the fixed stars,

<sup>1</sup> For *αἰτίας* here, it is requisite to read *ἀγίας*.

<sup>2</sup> The *azonic* Gods are those that form that order of divinities which is immediately situated above the *mundane* Gods. These Gods who are called *azonic* by the Chaldean, are denominated *liberated* by the Greek theologists. According to the former likewise, Serapis, Bacchus, and the series of Osiris, and of Apollo, are azonic Gods.

does not do this, because the discussion of them is secondary to that of the fixed stars, through the variety of their motion.' It is common therefore, both to the fixed stars and the planets, that all of them are divine animals. For this is clearly asserted of both. And of the fixed stars indeed it is peculiarly asserted, that they are moved with a proper motion in the same, and about the same things; but of the planets, that proceeding through the heavens, they have revolutions; just as he now says, that they have a revolving motion. Hence he is evidently of opinion, that the planets become through themselves, more remote from, and nearer to the earth, and that their revolutions according to breadth, are made by their own progressions, and not through being carried by other things, such as evolvents, or epicycles. That this likewise arises from the one nature of them, possessing both one, and a various motion, through which they advance and recede, being transformed in their revolutions, in a spiral and all-various manner. Hence the lation of them is triple; one being that by which together with being moved about their centres, they are also moved according to breadth and depth; another through which they are convolved in a circle by their proper spheres,\* to the left hand; and another, by which they are moved, through the lation of the circle of the same vanquishing that of all the circle of the different. And thus much concerning these particulars, which are speculations peculiar to the philosophy of Plato.

If however you should inquire what the nature is of the planets, both of the stars themselves, and the whole spheres, and whether that of the former is the same as the nature of the latter, or different, we reply by recurring to the Platonic principles, that all heaven consists of all the elements; but that in one place, fire in conjunction with earth has dominion, but in another, fire in conjunction with the summit of water, and in another, fire with the summit of air; and that through each of these, the variety is most abundant. Hence, some things in the heavens are more visible than others; and these are such as have fire in conjunction with solidity. But others are less visible,<sup>1</sup> and these are such as have fire in conjunction with transparent splendor, and the diaphanous. And on this account indeed it is possible to see the bodies which are in the higher region in the same manner as bodies can be seen through the air. But the bodies which have fire in conjunction with transparency, darken our sight [through excess of splendor]. If

\* For *κίνησις* here, read *κίνησις*.

<sup>1</sup> In the original *σφαῖρα* is omitted, but ought evidently to be inserted.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *σφαῖρα* here, it is necessary to read *σφαῖρα*.

however,<sup>1</sup> these things are rightly asserted by us, the spheres indeed of the stars have very properly a more attenuated and diaphanous, but the stars, a more solid essence. But fire every where predominates, and all heaven is characterized by its power. The fire however, which is there, is neither caustic, (since this is not even the case with the first of the sublunary elements, which Aristotle is accustomed to call fiery-formed,) nor corruptive of any thing, nor contrary to earth, but is resplendent with vivific heat and illuminative power, with purity and transparent splendor. For the vehement is one thing, and the pure another, as Socrates shows in the *Philebus*. Hence, the fire which is there is light; and it is not proper to disturb the discussion of it, by directing our attention to the gross and dark fire of the sublunary region. After this manner therefore, the speculation of the planets will be adapted to what has been before said.

There are however, other divine animals<sup>2</sup> following the circulations of the planets, the leaders of which are the seven planets; all which Plato comprehends in what is here said. For these also revolve, and have a wandering of such a kind as that which he a little before, mentioned of the seven planets. For they revolve in conjunction with, and make their apocatastases together with their principles, just as the fixed stars are governed by the whole circulation [of the inerratic sphere]. These planetary bodies therefore, which were produced conformably to the fixed stars, he says were made for the sake of the generation of time, in order that they might co-operate in its production, leading forth into the world different temporal measures, through their anomalous and perpetual motion; of which the one time is comprehensive, possessing one periodic number, which contains all-various periodic numbers in itself. But when he asserts that the fixed stars are moved about their centres, in conjunction with an advancing motion, he does not also say that they co-operate in the production of time, though they have a periodic number of their proper apocatastasis, according to which the whole of time is measured; but speaking about the planets in a way adapted to physiology, he particularly mentions those things in which he had sense as a witness of the different motion of the planets. For we cannot assume any thing from sense, respecting the different numbers of the motion of the fixed stars, and of the periods which they make in their revolutions. He particularly therefore, makes mention of this, viz. that the planets were generated for the sake of time, through the evidence, which we derive from sense, as he himself reminds us.

<sup>1</sup> For *εὐδαιμονία* here, it is requisite to read *εὐδαιμονία*.

<sup>2</sup> And these, as we have before observed, are what the moderns call *satellites*.

But we have already answered those, who deny that the heavens consist of fire, because fire naturally tends upward. Again therefore, it is necessary to remind them, as they are lovers of contention, that they speak absurdly. For they look to the fire which is here, and which has a preternatural subsistence. For though you should assume the fire which is immediately under the moon, yet to be moved upward is not natural to it, but to abide in its own place. But to be moved upward, leads indeed to a subsistence according to nature, yet is not itself according to nature. For a tendency to health is not according to nature to a body, but to be well; but to be convalescent, is alone natural to a diseased body; just as to fire, which is not perfectly fire, to tend upward is according to nature, but to fire which is in energy, it is natural to abide on high, in which place abiding, if it should be moved, it would alone have a circular motion. But if it is true, that the summit of fire in the sublunary region, is moved in a circle in conjunction with æther, as Aristotle says, this in a greater degree demonstrates that fire is of a circulating nature. For if this fire also, is always moved in a circle, as far as it is able, it is so moved according to nature. For that which is preternatural is not perpetual. But every thing violent is preternatural. If therefore the fire which is immediately under the moon, is a thing of this kind, why do they doubt respecting the heavenly bodies, and so frequently adduce the motion of fire towards the upper regions.

As Aristotle however, inquires why the sphere of the fixed stars, being one, comprehends many stars, but in each of the planetary spheres, which are many, there is only one star, the solution of this conformably to his opinion, may be obtained from his writings. But we have already said something concerning this, and now agreeably to what has been before asserted, we say, that each of the planets is a whole world, comprehending in itself many divine genera invisible to us. Of all these however, the visible star has the government. And in this, the fixed stars differ from those in the planetary spheres, that the former have one monad,<sup>1</sup> which is the wholeness of them; but that in each of the latter there are invisible stars, which revolve together with their spheres; so that in each, there is both the wholeness, and a leader which is allotted an exempt transcendency. For the planets being secondary to the fixed stars, require a twofold prefecture, the one more total, but the other more partial. But that in each of these, there is a multitude co-ordinate with each, you may infer from the extremes. For if the inerratic sphere has a multitude co-ordinate with itself, and earth is the wholeness of terrestrial, in the same manner as the inerratic sphere is of celestial

<sup>1</sup> And this one monad is the sphere of the fixed stars.

animals, it is necessary that each [intermediate] wholeness, should entirely possess certain partial animals co-ordinate with itself; through which also, they are said to be wholenesses. The intermediate natures however, are concealed from our sense, the extremes being manifest: one of them through its transcendently luminous essence, and the other through its alliance to us. If likewise, partial souls are disseminated about them, some about the sun, others about the moon, and others about each of the rest, and prior to souls, daemons give completion to the herds of which they are the leaders, it is evidently well said, that each of the spheres is a world; theologists also teaching us these things when they say that there are Gods in each prior to daemons, some of which are under the government of others. Thus for instance, they assert concerning our mistress the Moon, that the Goddess Hecate, is contained in her,<sup>1</sup> and also Diana. Thus too, in speaking of the sovereign Sun, and the Gods that are there, they celebrate Bacchus as being there:

The Sun's assessor, who with watchful eye surveys  
The sacred pole.

They likewise celebrate the Jupiter who is there, Osiris, the solar Pan, and others of which the books of theologists and theurgists are full: from all which it is evident, that each of the planets is truly said to be the leader of many Gods, who give completion to its peculiar circulation.<sup>2</sup> After this manner therefore, we dissolve the doubt.

<sup>1</sup> Instead of  $\eta$  *Εκατη θεα* *τοιαυτην εν αυτη* in this place, which is evidently erroneous, I read  $\eta$  *Εκατη θεα* *εστιν εν αυτη*.

<sup>2</sup> From this extraordinary passage, we may perceive at one view why the sun in the Orphic hymns is called Jupiter, why Apollo is called Pan, and Bacchus the Sun; why the Moon seems to be the same with Rhea, Ceres, Proserpine, Juno, Venus, &c. and in short why any one divinity is celebrated with the names and epithets of so many of the rest. For from this sublime theory it follows that every sphere contains a Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, and in short every deity, each sphere at the same time conferring on these Gods the peculiar characteristic of its nature; so that for instance in the Sun they all possess a solar property, in the Moon a lunar one, and so of the rest. From this theory too we may perceive the truth of that divine saying of the ancients, that all things are full of Gods; for more particular orders proceed from such as are more general, the mundane from the supermundane, and the sublunary from the celestial; while earth becomes the general receptacle of the illuminations of all the Gods. "Hence as Proclus shortly after observes, there is a terrestrial Ceres, Vesta, and I-is, as likewise a terrestrial Jupiter and a terrestrial Hermes, established about the one divinity of the earth; just as a multitude of celestial Gods proceeds about the one divinity of the heavens. For there are progressions of all the celestial Gods into the Earth; and Earth contains all things, in an earthly manner, which Heaven comprehends celestially. Hence we speak of a terrestrial Bacchus and a terrestrial Apollo, who bestows the all-various streams of water with which the earth abounds, and openings prophetic of futurity." And if to all this we only add,



It is requisite however, from what has been said, to collect this one thing, that the fixed stars, according to Plato, are superior to the planets, not only in place, but also in dignity. For of the former he says, "*that the Demiurgus placed them in the wisdom of the circle of the same;*" but of the latter, "*that the Demiurgus placed them in the circulations, made by the period of the circle of the different;*" so that the former alone live in conjunction with the intellectual life of the circle of *the same*, but the latter with the revolution of the circle of *the different*. For this is entirely the case with the latter, because they are convolved in conjunction with the inerratic sphere in the same manner as the fixed stars, but they are also convolved together with the period<sup>1</sup> of the circle of *the different*. If therefore, the former immediately participate of a more divine life, but the latter through the medium of an inferior life, it necessarily follows, that the former are of a superior, but the latter of a subordinate dignity. Hence it seems, if it be requisite to infer any thing from these things, that the souls of the fixed stars, though they have both the circles; but they have both, because our souls also, as Plato says, have the circle of *the same*, and the circle of *the different*; yet they live more according to the former circle, and on this account, live in a greater degree in conjunction with the circle which resembles that of the whole soul of the universe. But the souls of the planets, live in a greater degree according to the latter circle. Hence, also their bodies are moved with various motions, and are inserted in the revolutions of the circle of *the different*. These inferences likewise, may be reasonably made by those, who look to the motions of them alone, which is the peculiarity of the physical theory. Thus too, the [Chaldean] theurgist [Julian] teaching us concerning the wisdom of the fixed stars and the planets, says of the fabrication of the fixed stars: "The father established the numerous multitude of inerratic stars, not by a laborious and evil tension, but so as that they might be moved<sup>2</sup> with a stability void of a wandering motion." But by the word *established*, the theurgist manifests a motion in the same, and according to the same things. And concerning the planets he says, "The father made the planets six in number

that all the other mundane Gods subsist in the twelve above-mentioned, and that the first triad of these is *demiurgic or fabricative*, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; the second, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, *defensive*; the third, Ceres, Juno, Diana, *revivific*; and the fourth, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, *elevating and harmonic*:—I say, if we unite this with the preceding theory, there is nothing in the ancient theology that will not appear admirably sublime and beautifully connected, accurate in all its parts, scientific, and divine.

<sup>1</sup> For *μετα δε τῆ τοῦ θατερου περιόδου* in this place, it is necessary to read, *μετα δε τῆς τοῦ θατερου περιόδου*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *πηζει δε πλανην ουκ εχουση χρωμενων* in this place, it is requisite to read, conformably to the collection of the Chaldean Oracles by Patricius, *πηζει δε πλανην ουκ εχουση φερεσθαι*.

and for the seventh, he hurled into the midst the fire of the sun ; suspending their disorderly motion in orderly disposed zones." Calling the anomalous nature of their motions, *disorderly* ; but the motion which predominates over the zones in which they are arranged, *orderly disposed* ; representing to us the circumduction of disorder into order. For they are not moved anomalously through imbecility, like inanimate natures, but through the will of the powers that preside over them. He also exhibits to us their different intellections which he calls zones, through the order in which they are arranged. And he says that the apparent irregularity<sup>1</sup> of their bodies, is circularly led by them to an appropriate order, in consequence of preserving each of them by their powers.

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C 3 " But he machinated Earth our nurse ; who being conglobed about the pole, which is extended through the universe, is the guardian and Demiurgus of night and day, and is the first and most ancient of the Gods<sup>2</sup> that were generated within the heavens."

The physiology concerning the earth is proximately connected with the discussion of the motion of the stars ; not that Timæus now first produces it through these, for he had already constituted it, when he represented the world as consisting of the whole elements, both the extreme and the middle ; but because the consideration of the earth contributes to the discussion of the progression of the planets and fixed stars, of time, and the temporal periods, as it was generated the guardian of night and day. For all heaven dances round, and circularly revolves about it, and as ranking among physical bodies, it is the centre of the universe. For the impartible centre is one thing, as in the most true sphere, which comprehends on all sides that which is physical, which also is the power of the sphere, having an arrangement analogous to the poles ; and the physical centre is another, which nature established in the middle, about which all the stars are moved in a circle, and to which they transmit their energies, and which also we say is the earth. Hence, Plato having spoken concerning the circulation of the heavenly bodies, very properly conjoins with what has been said, the discussion of the

<sup>1</sup> For *εναγίας* here, it is necessary to read *αραγίας*.

<sup>2</sup> The Bipont, and therefore I suppose all the editions of Plato, have here erroneously *σωμάτων* instead of *θεῶν*. The manuscript however, from which Ficinus made his translation of the Timæus had the right reading in this place. For his version of this part is, " Terram autem altricem nostram, circa polum per universum extensam alligatam, diei noctisque effectricem et custodem esse voluit, necnon primam antiquissimamque deorum omnium quæ intra cælum sunt geniti."

earth. Farther still, according to another mode, the nature of the earth has the relation of a mother, to the celestial order. For such things as Heaven produces paternally, Earth produces maternally. For all the meteors, through which the circle of generation is effected,<sup>1</sup> derive their subsistence from Heaven, as from a father, who governs supernally every material and flowing essence, but from Earth as from a mother. For she affords matter for exhalations, from the substances which flow together into her, just as Heaven imparts to them form and morphe. Through this cause therefore, Plato very properly co-arranges the discussion of the earth with that of the heavens, looking to the nature itself of things, the concord and communion of the two, and surveying their kindred conjunction in their principles. Moreover, through the order of his discussion, he makes the power of analogy to be manifest in reality; by assuming the discourse about the planets in the first place; and in the middle, and delivering the discussion of Earth, prior to that of other sublunary dæmons. For thus the extremes become the first and the middle, and again, the media are transferred into the order of the extremes: but analogy is especially adapted to accomplish this. According to all modes therefore, the physiology of the Earth is connascent with the theory of the Heavens. And thus much concerning the order of the discussion.

What however is Earth, whence does she proceed, how is she said to be our nurse, and how is she the most ancient and first of the Gods? For if we shall be able to understand these things, we shall obtain the theory concerning her sufficiently for the present purpose. Earth then proceeds primarily from the intelligible earth which unically comprehends all the intelligible orders of the Gods, and is eternally established in the father.<sup>2</sup> It also proceeds from the intellectual Earth which is co-arranged with Heaven, and all the productions of which it receives. For being analogous to these, it also abides perpetually as in the centre of the heavens, and being contained on all sides by them, is full of generative power, and demiurgic perfection. The true earth therefore, is neither this corporeal-formed and gross bulk; for it will not be the most ancient of the Gods from its bulk, nor the first of the Gods that are arranged within the heavens; nor is it the soul of this body; for it would not be, as Plato says it is, extended about the pole of the universe, since not the soul, but the body of the earth is a thing of this kind; but if it be necessary to speak what is most true concerning it,

<sup>1</sup> For *επιπορεύειν* here, it is necessary to read *επιπλάττειν*.

<sup>2</sup> *Viz. in ether or bound, the summit of the intelligible triad.*

it is an animal consisting of a divine soul, and a living body. Hence the whole is, as Plato says, an animal. For there are in it an immaterial and separate intellect; a divine soul dancing round this intellect; an ethereal body proximately suspended from its informing soul; and in the last place this visible bulk, which is on all sides inspired with life by the vehicle<sup>1</sup> of this soul, with which also being filled, it generates and nourishes all-various animals. For some animals<sup>2</sup> are rooted in it, but others are moved about it. And this likewise, Aristotle perceiving, was ashamed not to give to the earth a natural life. For whence is it that plants while they remain in the earth live, but when divulsed from it die, unless this earthly mass was full of life? It is necessary also to assume universally, that wholes are animated prior to parts. For it would be ridiculous that man indeed should participate of a rational soul and of intellect, but that no soul should be assigned to the earth and the air, supernally riding in [as it were] and governing the elements, and preserving them in their proper boundaries. For wholes, as Theophrastus says, would have less authority than parts, and perpetual than corruptible natures, if they were destitute of soul. Hence, it is necessary to grant that a soul and an intellect are in the earth; the former causing it to be prolific, but the latter connectedly containing it in the middle of the universe.

Earth herself therefore, being a divine animal, is also a plenitude of intellectual and psychical essences, and of immaterial powers. For if a partial soul has besides a material body an immaterial vehicle as we have elsewhere shown, what ought we to think of a soul so divine as that of the earth? Is it not, that by a much greater priority visible bodies are suspended from this soul through other vehicles as media, and that through these the visible bodies are able to receive the illuminations of soul? Such then being the nature of Earth herself, she is said to be our nurse; in the first place indeed, as possessing a power in a certain respect equivalent to Heaven. For as that comprehends in itself divine animals, thus also Earth is seen to contain terrestrial animals. But in the second place, she is our nurse, as inspiring our lives from her own proper life. For she not only produces fruits, and nourishes our bodies through these, but she also fills our souls with the illuminations of herself. For being a divine animal, and generating us who are partial animals, through her own body indeed, she nourishes and connectedly contains our bulk; but from her own soul perfects ours. By her own intellect likewise, she excites the intellect which is in us; and thus according to the whole

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *σχηματος* here, it is necessary to read *οχηματος*.

<sup>2</sup> For according to Plato, plants also, as having life, are animals.

of herself becomes the nurse of our whole composition. On this account it appears to me that Plato calls her our nurse, indicating by this her intellectual nutritive energy. For if she is our nurse, but we are truly souls and intellects, according to these especially, she will be the perfecter of our essence, moving and exciting our intellectual part. But being a divine animal and comprehending in herself many partial animals, she is said by Plato to be conglobed about the pole which is extended through the universe; because she is contained and compressed about its axis. For the axis also is the pole. And the pole is thus now denominated, because the universe revolves about it. Because however the pole [properly so called] is impartible, but the axis is a pole with interval, just as if some one should say that a line is a flowing point,—on this account, the pole is said by Plato to be extended through the universe,\* as entirely pervading through the centre of the Earth.

But the word *αλλομεννν*,<sup>1</sup> which he here uses, manifests the conglobed, and the connectedly contained. For it does not signify, as Aristotle supposed it did, that which is moved. For Plato, in a particular manner preserves the Earth immoveable; and in the *Phædo* adds the cause, through which it is immoveably established. “For he says that a thing which is equally inclined, when placed in the middle of a certain similar nature, cannot tend more or less to one part than another, but subsisting on all sides similarly affected, will remain free from all inclination.” The Grecian use of words also testifies, that το *αλλομεννν* signifies το *συναχμεννν*, that which is collected or congregated, and not that which is moved. For it calls bonds *αλλαδης*. Timæus likewise himself in what follows says, “that the hairs which are rooted and conglomerated in the head, within the skin, are conglobed (*αλλεσθαι*). From these things therefore, it is evident how he applies the word *αλλεσθαι* in what he now says, to the Earth. But if as some say, the assertion hat “*Vesta alone abides in the dwelling of the Gods*,”<sup>2</sup> is spoken of this earth, Plato will be very far from giving motion to the Earth. If however we do not admit that the Vesta there mentioned is the Earth, yet it must be granted, that there is a guardian power in the Earth of the nature of Vesta. For as we say, that in the Heavens, the poles are connectedly contained by Vesta, thus also among the elements,

<sup>1</sup> Plato says *δια παντος*, and not *δια τον παντος*: for Proclus observes, that he could not have employed the latter mode of expression, without pronunciation through a soft breathing.

<sup>2</sup> See what is said by Simplicius concerning this word in the notes to my translation of Aristotle's treatise *On the Heavens*, p. 236.

<sup>3</sup> This is asserted in the *Phædrus* of Plato.

<sup>4</sup> For *πολλοις* here, it is obviously necessary to read *πολυις*.

the Earth. And as<sup>1</sup> the supermundane Vesta, is to the great leader of the twelve Gods, so in mundane natures is the Earth to the Heavens. If likewise, we direct our attention to the Pythagoric Timæus, we shall in a still greater degree refuse to admit, that the Earth is moved. For he says "that the Earth is *established* in the middle." And how is it reasonable, that understanding *ἰσχυμένην* as signifying *ειλούμενην*, we should make the Earth to revolve, as conformable to the doctrine of Plato? Let Heraclides Ponticus therefore, who was an auditor of<sup>2</sup> Plato, be of this opinion; for he ascribed a circular motion to the Earth; but let it be admitted that Plato established it immoveable. For if he had made the perfect year to consist not only of the eight periods [of the stars] but had enumerated the earth as the ninth, giving to it an apocatastasis with the others, and making one apocatastasis from all of them with that of the circle of the same [then we might apprehend that the Earth is moved according to Plato.<sup>3</sup>] After this manner therefore, we should interpret the pole and the axis, and the Earth which is contained about these.

It is necessary however from these assertions to betake ourselves to the nature<sup>4</sup> of the Earth, and survey the poles as powers that give stability to the universe, exciting indeed the whole bulk of it to intelligible love, and impartibly connecting that which is partible, and unitedly and without interval that which is extended by interval. Hence also, Plato in the Republic, makes the spindle of Lachesis of adamant, indicating, as we have said, their inflexible and untamed power. And we must consider the axis, as that one divinity which collects the centres of the universe, which is connective of the whole world, and motive of the divine circulations; as that also about which wholes dance and are convolved, and as sustaining all Heaven, being on this account denominated Atlas, as possessing an immutable and unwearied energy. The word *τεταμένον* also, or *extended*, used here by Plato, indicates that this one power is Titanic, guarding the circulation of wholes. But if, as the divine Iamblichus says, we understand by the pole extended through the universe, the Heavens, neither thus shall we wander from the conception of Plato. For as Plato says in the Cratylus, those who are skilled in astronomy call the Heavens the pole, as harmoniously revolving. According to this conception therefore, you may call Heaven the pole extended

<sup>1</sup> In the original, *ως* is omitted.

<sup>2</sup> For *ὁν Πλάτωνος* here, read *τοῦ Πλάτωνος*.

<sup>3</sup> The words within the brackets are omitted in the original, but ought evidently to be inserted. Hence it is necessary to supply in this place the words, *τοτε υπολαβόμεν εἰσεσθαι τὴν γῆν κατὰ Πλάτωνα*.

<sup>4</sup> For *ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν μετρίσαι* in this place, I read, *ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ φύσιν μετρίσαι*.

through the universe, as being incurvated through the whole of itself in consequence of being without an angle. For after this manner the superficies of a circle is extended. About this however Earth is conglobed, not locally, but through a desire of becoming assimilated to it converging to the middle, in order that as Heaven is moved about the centre, so she by tending to the centre, may become similar to that which is essentially spherical, being herself as much as possible conglobed. Hence she is compressed about Heaven in such a way as to be wholly extended about [i. e. towards] it.

According to each of these conceptions therefore, Plato delivers the cause through which Earth is contained in the middle. For the axis is a power connective of Earth; and Earth is on all sides compressed by the circulation of Heaven, and is collected together into the centre of the universe. Earth therefore being such, Timæus afterwards clearly shows what utility she affords to the universe; for he calls her the guardian and artificer of day and night. And indeed, that she is the maker of night, is evident. For she produces a conical shadow; and her magnitude and figure are the causes of the dimension and quality of the figure of this shadow. But after what manner is she likewise the fabricator of day? Or does she not produce this day which is conjoined with night? For about her the risings and settings of the Sun are surveyed. And that Plato assumes this day which is convolved with night, is evident from his arranging the former under the latter; as also prior to this when he says, night therefore and day were thus generated. Earth therefore, is the fabricator of both these, producing both in conjunction with the Sun; the Sun indeed, being in a greater degree the cause of day, but the earth of night.

Being however, the fabricator, she is also the guardian of them, preserving their boundaries and contrariety with reference to each other, and also their augmentations and diminutions, according to a certain analogy. Hence, some denominate her Isis, as equalizing the inequality, and bringing to an analogy the increase and decrease of both day and night. But others looking to her prolific power call her Ceres, as Plotinus, who denominates the intellect of the Earth, Vesta, but the soul of it, Ceres. We however say, that the first causes of these divinities are intellectual, ruling and liberated; but that from these causes illuminations and powers extend to the Earth. Hence there is a terrestrial Ceres and Vesta, and a terrestrial Isis, in the same manner as there is a terrestrial Jupiter, and a terrestrial Hermes; these terrene deities being arranged about the one divinity of the earth; just as a multitude of celestial Gods proceeds about the one divinity of the heavens. For there are progressions and terminations of all the celestial

<sup>1</sup> For *δαίμονας* here, it is necessary to read *ἡγεμόνας*.

Gods into Earth; and all things are in her terrestrially, which are contained in the heavens celestially. For the intellectual Earth receives the paternal powers of Heaven, and contains all things after a generative manner. Thus therefore, we say that there is a terrestrial Bacchus, and a terrestrial Apollo, who is the source of prophetic<sup>1</sup> waters in many parts of the earth, and of openings which predict future events. But the Paonian<sup>2</sup> and judicial powers which proceed into it, render other places of it of a purifying or medicinal nature. All the other powers of Earth however, it is impossible to enumerate. For divine powers are indeed inexplicable. But the orders of angels and daemons that follow these powers are still more numerous, and are circularly allotted the whole earth, and dance round its one divinity, its one intellect, and one soul.

It remains in the next place, that we should survey how Earth is said to be the most ancient, and the first of the Gods within the heavens. For this will be taken literally by those who are accustomed to look only to its material, gross, and dark bulk. But we indeed, grant them that there is something of such a kind in the bulk of the Earth as they say there is; but we think it proper that they should likewise look to the other goods of the Earth through which it surpasses the prerogatives of the other elements, viz. its stability, its generative power, its concord with the heavens, and its position in the centre of the universe. For the centre has great power in the universe, as being connective of every circulation. Hence also, the Pythagoreans call the centre the tower of Jupiter, in consequence of containing in itself a demiurgic guard. We shall likewise remind our opponents of the Platonic hypotheses concerning the earth, mentioned by Socrates in the *Phædo*, where he says that the place of our abode is hollow and dark, and bound by the sea; but that there is another true earth, containing the receptacles of the Gods, and possessing a beauty resembling that of the heavens. We ought not therefore to wonder, if now the Earth is said to be the most ancient and the first of the Gods within the heavens, since she possesses so great an altitude, and such a surpassing beauty, and as Socrates afterwards says was fashioned by the Demiurgus resembling a sphere covered with twelve skins, just as the heaven according to Timæus was painted by the Demiurgus similar to a dodecahedron. We must likewise understand that the Demiurgus gave to Earth alone among the elements, to have all the elements separately, causing her to be wholly a world, variegated analagous to the heavens. For she contains a river of fire, of air, and of water, and of another earth, which has the same relation to her, which she has to the universe, as

<sup>1</sup> *ἡστυα* is erroneously printed in the original for *παιστια*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αἰωνία*, it is evidently necessary to read in this place *παιωνία*.



Socrates says in the *Phædo*. But if this be the case, she very much transcends the other elements as imitating the heavens, and possessing every thing in herself terrestrially, which is celestially contained in the heavens.

To this also we may add, that the Demiurgus produced these two elements the first, earth and fire; but the others for the sake of these, in order that they might have the ratio of bonds with respect to them. And that the four elements are both in the heavens, and in the sublunary region; but in the former indeed, according to a fiery characteristic, since fire there predominates, as Plato says, but in the latter according to a terrestrial peculiarity. For the profundity of air, and the bulk of water are spread round the earth, and possess much of an earthly property, on which account they are in their own nature dark. In the heavens therefore, there is a predominance of fire, but in the sublunary region of earth. Since however, generation is connascently conjoined with the heavens, the end of the latter is earth [i. e. is the moon], so far as earth is in the heavens, but the beginning of generation is fire, considered as subsisting in generation. For it is usual to call the moon Earth, as having the same ratio to the Sun, which Earth has to fire. "But [the Demiurgus] says Orpheus fabricated another infinite earth, which the immortals call *Selene*, but terrestrials *Mene*." And it is usual to denominate the summit of generation fire, which Aristotle also does, when he calls ether fire. In another place however, he does not think it proper to call ether fire, but fiery-formed, as we have frequently observed. Hence, the end of the heavens is not entirely destitute of mutation, in consequence of its propinquity to generation; but the beginning of generation is moved in a circle, imitating the heavens.

Farther still, this likewise must be considered, that we ought not to judge of the dignity of things from places, but from powers and essence, as we have elsewhere demonstrated. By what peculiarities therefore, are we to form a judgment of transcendencies? By what others than those which the divine orders exhibit? For transcendency truly so called is with the Gods. From the divine orders therefore, we must assume *the monadic, the stable, the all-perfect, the prolific, the connective, the perfective, the every-way extended, the vivific, the adorning, the assimilative, and the comprehending power*. For these are the peculiarities of all the divine orders. According to all these however, Earth surpasses the other elements, so that she may justly be called the most ancient, and the first of the Gods.

Again, a twofold nature of things may be surveyed, the one indeed, according to progression, which always makes things that have a secondary arrangement subordinate to those that are prior to them; but the other according to conversion,

which conjoins extremes to primary natures through similitude, and produces one circle of the whole generation. Since also the world is spherical, but a figure of this kind is the peculiarity of things that subsist according to conversion, Earth likewise must be conjoined in it to the heavens, through one circle, and one similitude. For thus also the centre is most similar to the poles. For the heavens indeed, entirely comprehend wholes, being moved about the poles; but the earth is allotted permanency in the centre. For it is appropriate to generation that the immoveable should be more ancient than that which is moved. Hence, according to all these conceptions it may be said, that Earth, as co-ordinate with Heaven, is the most ancient of the Gods within the heavens. For she is within them, as being on all sides comprehended by them. For as the Demiurgus fashioned the whole of a corporeal nature within the soul of the world, thus also he fabricated Earth within the heavens, as compressed and contained by them, and in conjunction with them fabricating wholes.

She has however, so far as she is *the first* of the Gods, an indication of transcendency according to essence; but so far as she is *the most ancient*, she exhibits to our view the dignity which she is allotted. For how is it possible not to admit that she is allotted a great portion in the world, and is very honourable, in whom there are the tower of Jupiter, and the progression of Saturn! For not only Tartarus, which is the extremity of the earth, is on all sides comprehended by Saturn, and the Saturnian power, but also whatever else may be conceived subordinate to this. For Homer says that this is connectedly-contained through the sub-tartarean Gods. Not that he arranges Gods beyond Tartarus, as the words indicate; but that Tartarus itself is on all sides comprehended by them.

Farther still, we may survey the analogy which Earth has to the intellectual Earth. For as the latter comprehends and gives subsistence to perfective, guardian, and Titanic orders of Gods, of which the Orphic theologists are full, so likewise the former possesses various powers. And as a nurse indeed, she imitates the perfective order, according to which the Athenians also are accustomed to call her *κορυτορροζος*, or *the nourisher of youth*, and *αντισταλαα*, or *scattering gifts*, as producing and nourishing plants and animals. But as a guard she imitates the guardian, and as conglobed about the pole which is *extended* (*τεταμειν*) through the universe, the *Titannic* order. Since however, the intellectual Earth, prior to other divinities generated Aigle and the Hesperian Erithya, thus also our Earth is the fabricator of day and night. And the analogy of the latter to the former is evident.<sup>1</sup> And thus much concerning these particulars.

<sup>1</sup> For Aigle signifies splendor, which is analogous to day, and Hesperus is the evening.

If also you are willing after another manner to understand that she is the first and most ancient of the Gods, as deriving her subsistence from the first and most ancient causes, this reason also will be attended with probability, since first causes proceed by their energies to the utmost extent of things; and besides this, the last of things frequently preserve the analogy of such as are first, as possessing their order from them alone. Hence, every way the assertion of Plato is true, whether you are willing to look to the bulk of Earth, or to the powers which she contains. But it is requisite to think, that the word *machinated*, bears witness to the great intellectual power, employed in the fabrication of the Earth. For we shall find, that as neither the Sun by itself, is able to make night and day, nor the Earth alone; (for the privation of light is one thing, and night another) the production of both, through the Sun and the Earth, is the work of demiurgic machination. For the order of the earth in the middle, the dance of the sun, and the circulation of the sphere of the fixed stars about it, produce about the Earth, nights and days. Farther still, the position of the Earth in the centre, makes the mutation of nights and days to be analogous, which would not be the case, if some one depriving the Earth of its situation in the middle, should establish it elsewhere. These things therefore, and many more than these, may be collected through the word machination.

“But with respect to the measured motions of these divinities, their concursions with each other, the revolutions and advancing motions of their circles, how they are situated with relation to each other, in their conjunctions and oppositions, on account of which they obumbrate each other, and at what times, and in what manner they become concealed, and again emerging to our view, cause terror, and exhibit tokens of future events, to such as are able to discover their signification,—of all this to attempt an explanation, without inspecting the imitations of these divinities, would be a vain labour.”

[“But of this enough, and let what has been said be the end of our discourse, concerning the visible and generated Gods.”]

The thing now proposed by Plato, is not to introduce a theory derived from astronomy, nor the arguments which are badly employed by some concerning

\* The words within the brackets are omitted in the text of Proclus, but ought to be inserted in it.

hypotheses, and astrological observations, in which they do not speak conformably to Plato; because the philosopher at present avoids the discussion of these particulars. For a great work still remains to be accomplished, and it is not proper to dwell on these things. For astronomy is one thing, and physiology another, as Aristotle also determines in the second book of his *Physics*. To which may be added, that much leisure is requisite, first to survey these things in images, and thus afterwards to assign the reasons of them. For, as he says, to speak about them, without surveying their imitations, is a vain labour. For it is necessary to behold these divine bodies with the *abacus*,<sup>1</sup> 'the armillary sphere,' the *paradigm*,<sup>2</sup> and the *astrolabe*,<sup>3</sup> and thus betake ourselves to the theory of wholes. Observation likewise is necessary, which instruments afford to those who are conversant with these things. For these reasons therefore, the philosopher avoids the discussion of these particulars.

What he now says however, must be considered in a twofold respect, mathematically and philosophically; for it pertains both to the corporeal, and psychical motions of the stars. And if you are willing, let us in the first place, mathematically and then philosophically consider *the measured motions or dances* of these divine bodies. By these therefore, we must understand their orderly and harmonious circulations; for the sake of which Plato inserted the discussion of the Earth. For he does not say that the Earth being conglobed dances, but that the *stars dance about the earth*. For they dance being moved with one concordant motion about the same thing. But by their *concursions* we must understand their co-arrangements according to length, when they differ according to breadth or depth, I mean their joint risings and settings. And "*the revolutions and advancing motions of their circles*," signify their direct and retrograde motions. For in their direct motions, they proceed to their apocatastases; but in their retrograde motions, they circulate among themselves. But he now calls the spheres circles, according to which the stars are moved, and not the epicycles. For he no where makes mention of these, as neither does he mention the eccentrics of the circles. For it would be ridiculous to make certain little orbs, moved in each sphere with a motion contrary to it, or to admit that they are parts of a sphere comprehend-

<sup>1</sup> A mathematical table, in which the ancients described lines and figures.

<sup>2</sup> In the original, ἐκ τῆς ἐκκωρῆς σφαίρας, i. e. in a sphere surrounded with rings, which therefore is evidently what the moderns call the *armillary sphere*.

<sup>3</sup> By the *paradigm*, I suppose Proclus means an astronomical globe, or as it is now called, the celestial globe.

<sup>4</sup> The *astrolabe* is a mathematical instrument, representing nearly the whole of the celestial doctrine in a plane, whence also it is called a *planisphere*.

ing indeed the centre, but not moved about it. For this would subvert the common axiom of physics, that every simple motion is either about the middle of the universe, or from the middle, or to the middle. But this hypothesis of eccentrics, either divides the spheres into arches, moved in contrary directions, and destroys the continuity of each, or introduces circles to the celestial bodies, of a nature different from them, and connects motions from things dissimilar, and without sympathy with each other, through the dissimilitude of their compositions.

It is necessary however to consider whether these things thus subsist. For again, we must give our opinion on this subject, which requires much discussion. For Plato moves the stars in different ways, not at all requiring contrivances of this kind, as unworthy of a divine essence. Hence [according to him] it is necessary to suspend this variety from the motion of their informing souls, their bodies being moved swifter or slower conformably to the will of these, and not as the multitude think through imbecility. This inequality and diversity of motion also, is effected in orderly periods of time, the stars themselves being moved about their centres, and proceeding variously through their proper spheres; in order that being media between bodies that are inerratic, and those that are moved in a right line, they may have a mixed motion, being borne along according to altitude and depth, and with a direct and retrograde motion, and this in orderly periods of time. For he says that, "*the stars proceeding with an advancing motion through the heavens, have revolutions.*" But if they proceed through the heavens, it is evident that all of them are moved through their spheres according to the depth of them. For bodies which proceed through a certain thing, do not abide in the same place, but pass from one part of that through which they proceed, to another. If also, they have rotations, their all-various mutations are the revolutions of them in their spheres, according to breadth and depth. The spheres however, are alone moved to the east, and not about the same poles as the sphere of the fixed stars. For in the Republic, he makes the one axis of them to be the distaff, but the poles of the eight spheres to be the spindles, and he says, that about these there is one simple motion, just as there is of the sphere of the fixed stars. Afterwards, in that dialogue, he says that the Fates preside over these circles, and that a different Fate moves them differently. Here however, he convolves one of the spheres laterally, but the other diametrically, in the same manner as the circles of the soul, in which he established the causes of the whole spheres themselves, and the planets. On this account, he moved them obliquely, according to a diameter. Hence he says, that some of the planets are moved similarly, but others, dissimilarly, in the same manner as the spheres. The difference therefore

of the planetary spheres, and the sphere of the fixed stars, is conformably to these things, and also according to a motion to the right hand, or to the left.

Such therefore, is the fabrication of the sphere according to Plato, the seven spheres having a conjoint revolution, and possessing that difference which we have mentioned, with reference to the one circulation [of the innerratic sphere.] Conformably to this also, the fixed stars are alone moved about their centres; but the planets are both moved about their centres, and proceed through the depth of the spheres in which each is placed, variously revolving upward and downward, and with a retrograde motion. Each of these likewise, and the poles of these, are moved in another circle about the zodiac; but the spheres in which they exist, are all of them moved similarly to the innerratic sphere; viz. they are moved about one pole which is common to all of them. The sphere of the fixed stars also, is by itself moved with one motion; but the planetary sphere, with a twofold motion, one being the motion of itself, and which is oblique, but the other being a revolution in conjunction with the innerratic sphere. With respect to the stars however, those that are fixed, revolve about their own centres, and have likewise an advancing motion, in conjunction with their sphere. But the planets revolve in conjunction with the innerratic sphere, and each is moved together with its sphere to the east, and revolves by itself according to breadth and depth, and about its proper centre. For it is necessary that each being spherical, should be moved with this motion, imitating its proper wholeness; just as the fixed stars are co-arranged with the innerratic sphere. To which may be added, that proceeding through the heavens, they have also as Plato says, all-various revolutions.

These things therefore, being true, as we have before demonstrated, the hypotheses of epicycles, or eccentrics are not vain, but they analyze various into simple motions, in order that we may easily apprehend the apocatastases of various motions, which are not of themselves easily understood, but are only to be comprehended from the fixed stars. Hence it is an excellent contrivance to discover what simple, produce various motions, and through them to investigate the measures of such as are various. Just as if some one, not being able to measure a spiral motion about a cylinder, but afterwards assuming a right line moved about it, and a point in the right line measuring its motions, should find what the quantity is of the motion about the spiral in a given time. To this therefore, the attention of those is directed, who employ evolvents, epicycles, and eccentrics, through simple motions, from which they discover a various motion. These things

<sup>1</sup> For *περι λεξων* here, it is necessary to read *περι λεξου*.

however, deserve to be [more fully] considered, and on this account the lovers of speculation should excite themselves to the more accurate apprehension of them.

But by their *conjunctions*, their *synods* must be understood, and the configurations<sup>1</sup> which they make with each other; whether trigonically, or tetragonically, or hexagonically, or diametrically. For Plato alone assuming their conjunction and station in a direct line, comprehends in these as in the extremes, all the remaining figures. But their *obumbrations* are situations according to which they darken us and other things. For the body which is arranged after another body, becomes situated in the front of that which is posterior to it. And the stars are the causes of darkness to us when they run under each other. By "*their becoming concealed also, and again emerging to our view, at stated times,*" we must understand their occultations under the sun, and their evolutions into light, both which are said by those who are skilful in these things, to be effective and significant of certain great events. To speak therefore of all these particulars, *without imitations through the sight*, i. e. without organic assistance, *would be a vain labour*.

After the mathematical theory however, let us survey what is said by Plato, philosophically. The *dances* therefore of souls, are their being inspired with Bacchic mania, and their periods about the intelligible; and also their intellectual apocatastases. For as Socrates says in the Phædrus, following their more divine leader, they also are harmoniously moved. But their *concursions* are their intellectual perceptions of each other. For all things there are splendid, they see each other, and one soul is not ignorant of the concerns of another. Farther still, they adapt the forms of themselves, as vestiges and types, to intelligibles which are their paradigms. But the *revolutions and advancing motions of their circles*, are the conversions from themselves to intellect, and from intellect again to themselves. For both these are effected by them perpetually, and from themselves they know intellect, and from intellect themselves. Their *conjunctions* also, and *diametrical stations*, are the unions of each other with the intelligible, according to which they are mutually conjoined; and also their progressions. For when they conjoin *the one* of themselves to *the one* of intellect, there is a *synod or conjunction* of both. For in these conjunctions it is necessary that the centres of the things conjoined should be in one right line. But proceeding from thence to the providential inspection of secondary natures, they become situated *oppositely* to this union. Since however, they subsist always after the same manner, and abide and at the same time proceed, they are connected, and diametrically opposed. But

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *χορηγισμοὺς* in this place, it is necessary to read *σχηματισμοὺς*.

<sup>2</sup> For *καταλήψεις* here, it is requisite to read *κατακαλύψεις*.

*the obumbrations of each other, and of us, are the media which are between divine souls and us.* For all of them are not immediately united to all, but some are united to others through more or fewer media. And their *concealments and evolutions into light, at stated times*, are their apocatastases, and the beginnings of periods. For according to these especially, they cause revolutions and mutations in the world, introducing copious corruptions, and mighty changes, as Plato says in the Republic. To assert therefore, all these particulars, without viewing the imitations of these things which are surveyed about the heavens, would be a vain labour. For it is necessary to recur from the phenomena to the reminiscence of invisible natures. For as from these instruments and shadows, we are enabled to commence the contemplation of the celestial bodies; thus also from the latter, we recal to our recollection invisible circulations. For the heavens are a medium between generated and intelligible natures.

Since however, Plato says, that the figures and motions of the heavenly bodies *cause terror, and exhibit tokens of future events, to such as are able to discover their signification*, it is requisite to observe, that they not only signify future events, but also are tokens of past events. Hence also he makes mention of energies which are in themselves precedaneous significant. But Theophrastus says, that in his time,<sup>1</sup> the theory of the Chaldeans, about these things, was most admirable, as it predicted both other particulars, and the life and death of each individual, and not common events only, such as stormy and fair weather. For he adds, that according to them, the planet Mercury, when it is seen in winter, signifies cold;<sup>2</sup> but when in summer, excessive heat. In his treatise On Signs therefore, he says that they predicted all things, both such as are particular, and such as are common, from the celestial bodies. Let us however here finish the discussion of the nature of the visible and generated Gods, as what we have said concerning it is sufficient. For the work of science consists in this,<sup>3</sup> to adapt an appropriate measure to words, and to give them as much extent as may contribute to the proposed theory. This also, Plato does, in what is here said. For in the words before us, he finishes his discussion of the celestial bodies, and starry animals, for the sake of which he likewise assumed what he says about the earth; because it also produces time, in conjunction with the celestial circulations. Here therefore, the above mentioned particulars are terminated. For here, the consideration of the visible and generated Gods, whom we call starry, and in short celestial, is brought by him to an end. He calls them

<sup>1</sup> For *χρονον* here, read *χρονος*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ψυχη* here, it is necessary to read *ψυχα*.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *εν και τουτον*, it is requisite to read *εν και τουτ*.



however *visible*, because they are mundane, and have something of sensibles suspended from their intellectual essence; but *generated*, as having soul, which he calls the first of generated natures. For they are not visible, according to every thing which they are; but there is something which is generated indeed, yet is at the same time invisible. But that the discussion of the earth was assumed for the sake of the measured motion of the stars about it, he manifests by directly adding, after what he had said about it, "*And the natures successive to these,*"<sup>1</sup> through which I think, he clearly shows, that his design was to speak about the celestial Gods, and the genera attendant on them, which sometimes are concealed by the splendors of their leading Gods, and sometimes when they become visible, produce terror, and tokens of future events.<sup>2</sup> For what is said, is adapted to these, according to an appropriate definition.

"To speak however, concerning the other dæmons, and to know their generation, exceeds our ability."

Plato now intending to speak about the sublunary Gods, says that the discourse about them is admirable, and exceeds our ability, as transcending all that has been transmitted to us by tradition, if we intend to discover the generation of them, and promulgate it to others. For what he before said of the Demiurgus, that it is difficult to discover him, and impossible to speak of him to all men, this he now says of the sublunary Gods, that to know and to speak of the generation of them, surpasses our ability. What therefore, does Plato mean by this mode of indication? For as he has delivered so many and such admirable things concerning all heaven, and the intelligible paradigm, how is it that he says, that to speak of the Gods who are the fabricators of generation, is a task beyond our ability to perform? Perhaps it is because many physiologists considered these sublunary elements to be inanimate natures, casually borne along, and destitute of providential care. For they acknowledged that the celestial bodies, on account of their orderly motions, participate of intellect and the Gods; but they left generation, as being very mutable and indefinite, deprived of providential inspection. For

<sup>1</sup> In the original, *καὶ τὰ πρὸς ταῖς ἀστέρας*. These words however, are not to be found in the text of Plato, but form a remarkable addition to it. For the *natures successive* to the stars, are evidently their satellites, which have more than once been mentioned by Proclus.

<sup>2</sup> From what is here said by Proclus, it appears that the fixed stars, as well as the planets, have satellites, and that the stars which sometimes are visible, and at other times disappear, are of this description.

thus Aristotle afterwards, alone placed immoveable causes over the celestial circulations, whether eight in number, or more; but left these elements inanimate.

In order therefore, that we might not be affected in the same manner as they were, he antecedently celebrates and proclaims the generation of the sublunary Gods to be divine and intellectual, requiring no such mode of indication in speaking of the celestial Gods. Perhaps also it may be said, that souls more swiftly forget things nearer to themselves, but have a greater remembrance of superior principles. For they in a greater degree operate upon them through transcendency of power, and appear through energy to be present with them. The same thing also happens with respect to our sight. For though we do not see many things that are situated on the earth, yet at the same time we appear to see the inerratic sphere, and the stars themselves, because they illuminate our sight with their light. The eye of the soul therefore, becomes in a greater degree oblivious of and blind to more proximate than to higher and more divine principles. Thus, all religions and sects acknowledge that there is a first principle of things, and all men invoke God as their helper; but all do not believe that there are Gods posterior to this principle, and that a providential energy proceeds from them into the universe. For *the one* is seen by them in a clearer manner than multitude. Others again, believe indeed that there are Gods, but after the Gods, admitting the daemoniacal genus, they are ignorant of the heroic order. And in short, this is the greatest work of science, subtilly to distinguish the media and the progressions of beings. If therefore, we rightly assert these things, Plato, when speaking of the celestial Gods, very properly indicates nothing of the difficulty of the subject; but intending to speak of the sublunary Gods, says that it surpasses our ability. For the discussion of these is more difficult, because we cannot collect any thing about them from apparent objects, but it alone requires a divinely-inspired energy, and intellectual projection. And thus much concerning this doubt.

Again however, some one may doubt, on what account Plato calls the sublunary Gods daemons. For some have been impelled by this, to place Gods in the heavens, but to assign the superintendency of the sublunary region to daemons. That he conceived however, that these also are Gods, may be easily assumed from what he adds, "*Let the generation therefore, of these Gods, be admitted to be as follows.*" For in short he does not appear to have spoken particularly about those powers that are properly denominated daemons, as not having the physical principles of them from sense, from which it is necessary that physical discussions should originate. Hence also, he mentions the name of daemons; in one place, where he calls our rational soul the daemon of the animal; but in another, as

here, where he calls the Gods who produce generation, *dæmons*. Why therefore, you may say; for this doubt must be first dissolved; does he not make mention of *dæmons*, who are such essentially? Is it because this was exhibited on the preceding day by Socrates, to his auditors [in the *Republic*] in which he spoke concerning the souls that preside over the lives of men, and those that punish offenders in Hades? Hence, he omits to mention these things, as being evident. From what he had there said however, he was led to the recollection of the *dæmons* celebrated by him. Thus also, having given a peculiar soul to each of the eight spheres, he omits the animation of the whole of the inerratic circle, as one, and of the stars comprehended by it, and likewise, of the whole planetary sphere, as one, and of the planets contained in it, in consequence of these having been previously delivered by Socrates. This however, is attended with a probable reason.

Returning therefore, to the before-mentioned enquiry, let us assign the reason why, in what is here said, Plato denominates these generation-producing Gods, *dæmons*. Theodorus then, considering these things after another manner, says that they are called *dæmons* as subsisting in habitude, but Gods, as being without habitude; arranging them in the sublunary parts of the whole world, and asserting that some of them animate the universe differently from others. But our preceptor Syrianus, in the first place thinks it proper, that they should be considered as *dæmons*, with reference to the celestial Gods. For they are suspended from these, and together with these, providentially attend to their proper allotments. And this arrangement is peculiarly Platonic. For in the *Banquet*, Plato denominates Love a *daemon*, as the attendant of Venus, and as proceeding from the truly-existing God Porus; though in the *Phædrus*, he admits Love to be a God, as with reference to the life which is elevated by him.

In the next place, according to another conception, we may say, that in the celestial regions there are *dæmons*, but in the sublunary region Gods. In the former however the genus is indeed divine,\* though *dæmons* also are generated according to it;† but in the latter the whole multitude are *dæmons*. For there indeed, the divine peculiarity, but here the *daemoniacal* predominates; to which some alone looking, have divided the divine and the *daemoniacal*, according to the heavens and generation. They ought however, to have arranged both in both; but in the former indeed the divine nature, and in the latter the

\* It is necessary here to supply the word *θεῶν*.

† It is requisite to read *κατ' ἐξέχον*, instead of *κατ' ἐξέχον*.

dæmoniacal predominates; though <sup>1</sup> in the latter there is also the divine peculiarity. For if the whole world is a blessed God, no one of the parts which give completion to it is destitute of divinity and providential inspection. But if all things participate of deity and providence, the world is allotted a divine nature. And if this be the case, appropriate orders of Gods preside over its different parts. For if the heavens<sup>2</sup> through souls and intellects as media, participate of one soul, and one intellect, what ought we to think of these sublunary elements? How is it possible, that these should not in a much greater degree participate through certain middle divine orders, of the one deity of the world?

Farther still, it would also be absurd that the telestic art (or the art pertaining to mystic ceremonies) should establish on the earth places fitted for oracles, and statues of the Gods, and through certain symbols should cause things generated from a partial and corruptible matter, to become adapted to the participation of deity, to be moved by him, and to predict future events; but that the Demiurgus of wholes should not place over the whole elements which are the incorruptible plenitudes of the world, divine souls, intellects, and Gods. For whether was he unwilling? But how could he be unwilling, since he wished to make all things similar to himself? Was he then unable? But what could hinder him? For we see that this is possible from telestic works. But if he was both willing and able, it is evident that he gave subsistence to Gods, who have allotments in, and are the inspective guardians of, generation. Since however the genus of dæmons is every where an attendant on the Gods, there are also dæmons who are the fabricators of generation; some of whom indeed rule over the whole elements, but others are the guardians of climates, others are the rulers of nations, others of cities, others of certain families, and others are the guardians of individuals. For the guardianship of dæmons extends as far as to the most extreme division.

Having therefore solved the problem pertaining to the essence, let us in the next place consider the order of the sublunary Gods. For let them be Gods, and let them be called dæmons through the above-mentioned cause, but where must we arrange them? Must it be as we have before said, under the moon, or prior to the celestial<sup>3</sup> Gods? For this may appear to be proper for these two reasons; one indeed, because Plato indicates that he ascends to a greater order, by saying that it exceeds our ability to speak concerning them, having already spoken concern-

<sup>1</sup> *κατοι* is erroneously omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> If the heavens require media in order to the participation of one soul and one intellect, the sublunary elements require these in a much greater degree, on account of their inferiority to the heavens.

<sup>3</sup> The word *εναρπιων* is omitted in the original.

ing the celestial Gods; but the other, because he follows in what he says, those who have delivered to us Theogonies. For they prior to the world and the Demiurgus, delivered these generations of Gods proceeding from Heaven and Earth. In answer to this query however, we must say, that he produces them after the celestial Gods, and through this from Heaven and Earth. For on this account he said that Earth was the most ancient of the Gods within the Heaven, because from this and Heaven, he was about to produce the other Gods which the heavens contain. This we demonstrate from the Demiurgus addressing his speech to these Gods, and to all the rest, as being produced by him within the universe. Why however, Plato says that he follows the theogony, and why he shall omit to speak concerning the sublunary deities, we must refer to his having no clear indications of the subsistence of these from the phenomena, as he had of the celestial divinities, from the order of their periods, which is adapted to the government of Gods. It exceeds the province therefore of physiology to speak of beings, concerning whom natural effects afford us no stable belief. Hence Plato says, as a physiologist, that it surpasses his ability to speak of these.

If however, he says that he follows those who are divinely inspired, but they speaking concerning the superecestial Gods, he adopts a similar theogony, though discoursing of the sub-celestial divinities, we must not consider this as wonderful. For he knew that all the orders of the Gods proceed as far as to the last of things, from the arrangement which is the principle of their progression, every where generating series from themselves analogous to the superior deities from which they proceed. Hence, though the orders of these Gods which are celebrated by theologists, are above the world, yet they subsist also in the sensible universe. And as this visible heaven is allied to that which is supermundane, so likewise our earth is allied to the earth which is there, and the orders subsisting from the one to the orders proceeding from the other. From these things too, this also may be assumed, that according to Plato as well as according to other theologists, first natures as they proceed, produce things subordinate in conjunction with the causes of themselves. For these sublunary Gods proceeding from the Demiurgus, are also said to be generated from Heaven and Earth that first proceed from him. The Demiurgus therefore says to all of them that they ought to fabricate mortal natures, imitating his<sup>1</sup> power about their generation. Hence all of them proceed from one producing cause, though those of a secondary order proceed likewise from the gods that are prior to them. It follows therefore from this, that not every thing which is produced by the junior Gods is mortal, since some of these

<sup>1</sup> It is obviously necessary here, for *εαυτου* to read *εαυτου*.

proceed from other junior Gods; but the contrary alone is true, that every thing mortal is generated by these divinities. And again it follows from this, that the junior Gods produce some things according to the immoveable, but others according to the moveable hyparxes of themselves. For they would not be the causes of immortals, if they produced all things according to moveable hyparxes; if it be true that every thing which subsists from a moveable cause, is essentially mutable.

From this conception also, we may solve the doubt if there are irrational demons, as theurgists say there are, whence they subsist? For if from the junior Gods, it may be asked, how they are immortal; since these Gods are the fathers of mortal natures? But if from the Demiurgus, how are they irrational? For he is father in conjunction with intellect. The solution therefore of the inquiry is this, that they derive their subsistence from the junior Gods, and yet are not on this account mortal, since some of the junior Gods generate others. And perhaps these Gods are on this account called demons, in order that we may know that demons truly so denominated, are constituted by them. But irrational demons also proceed from the one Demiurgus. For he, as Timæus says, is the cause of all immortal natures. If however the one Demiurgus imparts intellect to all things, there is likewise in these demons, a certain ultimate vestige of the intellectual peculiarity, so far as they energize with facility according to imagination: for this is the last resounding echo,<sup>1</sup> as it were, of intellect. Hence, the phantasy is said [by Aristotle] to be a passive intellect, and others not badly, assert the same thing of it. So that among demons, properly so called, those that are irrational are half mortal. Plato however, has previously disseminated for us the principles by which we may solve the enquiry concerning the last genera of demons. For if there is a certain daemoniacal genus, which employs reason, it is evident that we must refer this to the one Demiurgus, whether as produced [immediately] by him, or through certain intermediate Gods, who were generated by him; the celestial Gods being the sources of celestial, but the subcelestial, of subcelestial demons. For of the subcelestial gods, some are the fathers of others, as Plato teaches us, conformably to the theogonics. Hence, it is not at all wonderful that these Gods should generate demons co-ordinate with themselves, and not only irrational, but also rational demons, since they are the generators of Gods; just as the celestial Gods are the generators of celestial demons. Hence, it is necessary that the speculation concerning demons, should possess the whole of its arrangement.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For ἀποχημα here, read ἀπηχημα.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of δειλὴν εἶναι ἐκ τούτων τὴν διαίταν here, which is evidently erroneous, I read δεῖ ὅλην εἶναι ἐκ τούτων τὴν διαταξιν.

from these considerations, conformably to Platonic doctrines. For from what Plato has said concerning the genesiurgic Gods, it becomes evident what his answer would be, if he were asked concerning the generation of daemons truly so called. For in short, he who knows the genus of daemons which subsist according to habitude, will by a much greater priority know daemons that subsist according to hyparxis, and which give completion to this universe. How also, is it possible that he should not grant, there is a genus of daemons according to habitude, who says that our soul is allotted the order of a daemon, with reference to the mortal animal, by the powers that fabricated mortal natures? It is necessary therefore, that there should be the essential demoniacal life prior to that which subsists according to habitude, and that those who grant the latter, should also admit the existence of the former. Plato however, who [verbally] constitutes the rulers of the universe, is also of opinion, that the perpetual attendants of these, received their hypostasis together with, and from these.

“It is therefore necessary to believe in ancient men, who being the progeny of the Gods as they themselves assert, must have a clear knowledge of their parents; for it is impossible not to believe in the children of the Gods, though they should speak without probable arguments and necessary demonstrations.”

We may collect from this, that he who simply believes in things which seem difficult to be known, and which are of a dubious nature, runs in the paths of abundance, recurring to divine knowledge and deific intelligence, through which all things become apparent and known. For all things are contained in the Gods. But that which antecedently comprehends all things, is likewise able to fill other things with the knowledge of itself. Hence, Timæus here sends us to theologists, and to the generation of the Gods celebrated by them. Who therefore are they, and what is their knowledge? They indeed are the progeny of the Gods, and clearly know their progenitors; *being the progeny and children of the Gods, as preserving the form of their presiding deity according to the present life.*<sup>1</sup> For Apolloniæal souls, in consequence of choosing a prophetic or teletic life, are called the children and progeny of Apollo; children indeed, so far as they are

<sup>1</sup> For a most ample and beautiful account of these heroic souls by Proclus, see the Additional notes to my translation of the Cratylus of Plato.

souls pertaining to this God, and adapted to this series; but progeny because they demonstrate their present life to be conformable to these characteristics of the God. All souls therefore, are the children of the Gods; but all do not know their presiding God. Such however, as have this knowledge and choose a similar life, are called the children and progeny<sup>1</sup> of the Gods. Hence Plato adds, "*as they say*;" for they unfold the order from which they came. Thus the Sibyl<sup>2</sup> as soon as she was born, uttered oracles; and Hercules appeared at his birth with demiurgic symbols. But souls of this kind convert themselves to their progenitors, and are filled from them with deific knowledge. Their knowledge however is enthusiastic, being conjoined to deity through divine light, and exempt from all other knowledge, both that which is probable, and that which is demonstrative. For the former is conversant with nature, and the universal in particulars; but the latter with an incorporeal essence, and the objects of science. Divinely inspired knowledge however, alone, is conjoined with the Gods themselves.

405 "But as they declare that their narrations are about affairs, to which they are naturally allied, it is proper that complying with the law we should assent to their tradition. Let therefore, the generation of these Gods according to them, be admitted, and said by us to be this."

From these words, he who considers them accurately may assume many things, such as that divinely-inspired knowledge is perfected through familiarity with and alliance to the Gods. For the sun is seen through solar-form light, and divinity becomes apparent through divine illumination. It may likewise be inferred that the divine law defines the orders of the Gods which the divinely-inspired conceptions of the ancients unfold, according to which also souls energizing, though not enthusiastically, are persuaded by those that enthusiastically energize. Complying with this law, Timæus in the beginning of this dialogue says, that he shall invoke the Gods and Goddesses. From these words also we may infer, that all the kingdoms both in the heavens and the sublunary region, are

<sup>1</sup> Εγγονοι is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> This is doubtless the Sibyl of whom Proclus also observes (in these Commentaries, p. 325.) "that proceeding into light, she knew her own order, and manifested that she came from the Gods, saying, I am the medium between Gods and men." εἶδε γὰρ τοὶ Σιβυλλὰ προελθούσα εἰς φῶς, καὶ τὴν τάξιν αὐτῆς, καὶ οἱ ἐκ θεῶν ἡκεὶ δεικνύων, εἰμι δ' ἐγὼ μεσση τε θεῶν εἰκονοῦσα μεση τε ἀνθρώπων.



adorned and distributed in order, according to the first and intellectual principles ; and that all of them are everywhere according to the analogous. Likewise that the order of things precedes our conceptions. And such like dogmas indeed may be assumed from the words before us. But it is Pythagoric to follow the Orphic genealogies. *For the science concerning the Gods proceeded from the Orphic tradition through Pythagoras, to the Greeks, as Pythagoras himself says in THE SACRED DISCOURSE.*

## BOOK V.

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THE theory of the sublunary is immediately connected with that of the celestial Gods; and in consequence of being suspended from it, possesses the perfect and the scientific. For the generation-producing choir of Gods, follows the Gods in the heavens, and in imitation of the celestial circle, convolves also the circle in generation. For secondary follow the natures prior to them, according to an indivisible and united progression. Because however, the divinities that govern generation, subsist immediately from the celestial Gods, on this account also they are converted to them according to one undisjoined union; just as the celestial are converted to the supercelestial deities, from whom they were proximately generated; but the supercelestial to the intellectual, by whom they were adorned and distributed; and again the intellectual to the intelligible Gods, from whom they were ineffably unfolded into light, and who indescribably and occultly comprehend all things.

Of the whole of this truly golden chain therefore, the summit is indeed the genus of the intelligible Gods, but the end is that of the sublunary deities, who govern<sup>1</sup> generation in an unbegotten, and nature in a supernatural manner, to which the demiurgic intellect now gives subsistence; the dominion of the Gods extending supernally from the heavens as far as to the last of things. Of these sublunary deities however, of whom it is proposed by us to speak, it is necessary to observe in the first place, that all of them preserve the generative and perfective energy of their generating cause, and also his demiurgic and stable productive power. They likewise receive measures, boundaries, and order from their father. And such things as he governs exemptly and totally, they being divided accord-

<sup>1</sup> For ἐπιπορευόντων, it is necessary to read ἐπιτροπεύοντων.

ing to allotments, fabricate, generate, and perfect. Some of them also are proximate to the celestial Gods; but others proceed to a greater distance from them. Hence, some preserve the idea of these Gods, so far as it can be preserved in the sublunary order; but others are established according to their appropriate power. For of every order, the summit is analogous to the order prior to it. Thus the summit of intelligibles is unity; of intellectuals is intelligible; of the supermundane order, is intellectual; and of the mundane order, supermundane. And some of the sublunary Gods indeed, are in a greater degree united to the demiurgic monad; but others are more distant from it. Hence, some being analogous to it, are the leaders of the whole of this series; but others have a more partial similitude to it. For the father established in every order powers analogous to him in their arrangement; since in all the divine orders a certain cause presubsists analogous to *the good*.<sup>1</sup>

Conformably to these causes which are thus analogous to the ineffable principle of things, and which with reference to it are called monads, the sublunary Gods proceed and adorn and distribute generation in a becoming manner. And some indeed give completion to this, but others to some other will of their father. For some complete his connective, others his prolific, others his motive, others his guardian will, and others, some other will of the Demiurgus pertaining to the wholes in the sublunary region. And some of them have dominion over souls, others over daemons, and others over Gods. All of them however are intellectual according to essence, but mundane according to allotment. They are also perfective and powerful, governing generation in an unbegotten manner, beings deprived of intellect, intellectually, and inanimate natures, vitally. For they adorn all things according to their own essence, and not according to the imbecility of the recipients. But Plato is evidently of opinion that these Gods use certain other bodies more simple and perpetual than these elements by saying, that they appear when they please, and become visible to us. That he likewise gives them souls is manifest, from his saying that every mundane God is conjoined to bodies through soul. For he then first called the world itself a God, when he had established a soul in it. And again, that he suspends intellects from them, through which their souls are intellectual and are immediately converted to the Demiurgus, is evident from the speech of the Demiurgus to them.<sup>2</sup>

If likewise it is requisite that the whole world should be perfect, it is necessary that together with the divine genera we should conceive that the dæmoniacal

<sup>1</sup> In what immediately follows here, the text is so corrupt as to be unintelligible.

<sup>2</sup> Here also in the two lines that immediately follow, the text is so corrupt as to be incapable of emendation.

order was generated prior to our souls, (which Plato shortly after constitutes,) and which receives a triple division, viz. into angels, dæmons properly so called, and heroes. For the whole of this order fills up the middle space between Gods and men; because there is an all-perfect separation or interval between our concerns, and those of the Gods. For the latter are eternal, but the former are frail and mortal. And the former indeed are satisfied with the enjoyment of intellect in energy partially; but the latter ascend into total intellects themselves. On this account, there is a triad which conjoins our concerns with the Gods, and which proceeds analogous to the three principal causes of things; though Plato is accustomed to call the whole of this triad daemoniacal. For the angelic is analogous to being, or the intelligible, which is first unfolded into light from the ineffable and occult fountain of beings. Hence also, it unfolds the Gods themselves, and announces that which is occult in their essence. But the daemoniacal is analogous to infinite life. On which account it proceeds every where, according to many orders, and is of a multiform nature. And the heroic is analogous to intellect and conversion. Hence also, it is the inspective guardian of purification, and is the supplier of a magnificent and elevated life. Farther still, the angelic indeed proceeds according to the intellectual life of the Demiurgus. Hence it also is essentially intellectual, and interprets and transmits a divine intellect to secondary natures. But the daemoniacal proceeds according to the demiurgic providence of wholes, governs nature, and rightly gives completion to the order of the whole world. And the heroic again, proceeds according to the convertive providence of all these. Hence, this genus likewise, is elevated, raises souls on high, and is the cause of a grand and vigorous energy.

Such therefore, being the nature of these triple genera, they are suspended from the Gods; some indeed from the celestial Gods, but others from the divinities who are the inspective guardians of generation. And about every God their is an appropriate number of angels, heroes, and dæmons. For every God is the leader of a multitude which receives his characteristic form. Hence of the celestial Gods, the angels, dæmons, and heroes are celestial; but of the fabricators of generation, they have a generation-producing characteristic. Of the elevating Gods, they have an elevating property; but of the demiurgic, a demiurgic; of the vivific, a vivific property; and so of the rest. And again, among the elevating Gods, of those that are of a Saturnian characteristic, the angels, dæmons, and heroes are Saturnian; but of those that are Solar, they are Solar. Among the vivific Gods likewise, of those that are Lunar, the ministrant powers are Lunar; but of

<sup>1</sup> For η ψυχῆ in this place, it is necessary to read νῦν ἡμῶν.

the Aphrodisiacal or those that have the characteristic of Venns, they are Aphrodisiacal. For they bear the names of the Gods from whom they are suspended, as being in connected continuity with them, and receiving one and the same idea with an appropriate subjection. Nor is this wonderful, since partial souls also, when they know their patron and leading Gods, call themselves by their names. Or whence were the Esculapiuses, the Bacchuses, and the Dioscuri denominated [who being men of an heroic character, took the names of the deities from whom they descended?] As therefore of the celestial, so likewise of the Gods who are the fabricators of generation, it is necessary to survey about each of them, a co-ordinate angelical, daemonical, and heroical multitude; and to admit that the number suspended from them retains the appellation of its producing monad. Hence there is a celestial God, angel, and hero; and the like is also true of the earth.<sup>1</sup> In a similar manner we must say that Ocean and Tethys proceed into all the orders; and conformably to this the other Gods. For there is likewise a Jovian, a Junonian, and a Saturnian multitude, which is called by the same appellation of life. Nor is there any absurdity, in giving the name of man, both to the intelligible and the sensible man; though in these, there is a much greater separation and interval.<sup>2</sup> And thus much in common concerning the Gods and demons who are the fabricators of generation, in order that we may survey the discussion about demons conjoined at the same time with that of the Gods. For Plato comprehends both these genera through the same names; and it seems that through this cause, he calls the same powers demons and Gods, in order that we may understand that the daemonical genus is at the same time co-suspended from these Gods, and may adapt names to them as to Gods. He likewise does the same thing elsewhere, indicating the every-where extended nature of the theory, and the eye of science contemplating all things at once, and in uninterrupted connexion.

Again however, it is evident that we should preserve the specific separation of these genera; surveying indeed, every genesiurgic God, according to goodness itself, and this surrounded with intellect, soul, and a divine body; a certain portion of each of which, is imparted by these Gods to sublunary natures. And in this the sublunary, are more redundant than the celestial Gods. We must also survey every [rational] daemon, as more excellent than our souls, and as having an intel-

<sup>1</sup> Some of the moderns, from being profoundly ignorant of this circumstance, have stupidly supposed that the Gods of the ancients were nothing more than dead men deified; taking for their guides on this important subject, mere historians, philologists, and rhetoricians, instead of philosophers.

<sup>2</sup> For *ἐκείνη*, it is necessary to read *ἐκείνη*.

<sup>3</sup> For *ἀποκαταστάσις*, it is requisite to read *ἀποστάσις*.

lectual soul, and an ethereal vehicle; since a certain thing of this kind, is, as Plato says, suspended from the human soul. "The Demiurgus therefore, says he, caused the soul to ascend into its vehicle." For it is necessary that every soul prior to mortal bodies, should use certain perpetual easily-moved, and orbicular bodies, as possessing essentially a motive power. But we have before spoken concerning irrational demons, and shown what Gods ought to be conceived to be the makers of them; since with respect to demons that use rational souls, it is evident that the Demiurgus must be considered as the cause of these. Nor does Plato at one time call the genesiurgic divinities Gods, but at another demons; as if the celestial powers, though they should happen to be demons, ought to be called Gods, but the sublunary, though they should be Gods, ought to be denominated demons; but he does this, in order that he may make the discussion common, both to the genesiurgic Gods, and to the demons that are proximately suspended from them. Of this however, we have assigned other not improbable causes.

It now remains to show what conceptions we ought to have of the Gods now mentioned by Plato. For of the ancients, some referred what is said about them to fables, others to the fathers of cities, others to guardian powers, others to ethical explanations, and others to souls. These however, are sufficiently confuted by the divine Iamblichus, who demonstrates that they wander from the meaning of Plato, and from the truth of things. After this manner therefore, we must say, that Timæus being a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagorean principles. But these are the Orphic traditions. For what Orpheus delivered mystically through arcane narrations, this Pythagoras learned, being initiated by Aglaophemus<sup>1</sup> in the mystic wisdom which Orpheus derived from his mother Calliope. *For these things Pythagoras says in The Sacred Discourse.* What then are the Orphic traditions, since we are of opinion that the doctrine of Timæus about the Gods should be referred to these? They are as follow: Orpheus delivered the kingdoms of the Gods who preside over wholes, according to a perfect number, viz. Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus. For Phanes is the first that bears a sceptre, and the first king is the celebrated Ericapæus. But the second is Night, who receives the sceptre from her father [Phanes]. The third is Heaven, who receives it from Night. The fourth is Saturn, who, as they say offered violence to his father. The fifth is Jupiter, who subdued his father. And after him, the sixth is Bacchus. All these kings therefore, beginning supernally from the intelligible and intellectual Gods, proceed through the middle orders, and into the world,

<sup>1</sup> Instead of αἰλαοφῆμος here, it is necessary to read Ἀγλαοφῆμος.

that they may adorn mundane affairs. For Phanes is not only in intelligibles, but also in intellectals, in the demiurgic, and in the supermundane order; and in a similar manner, Heaven and Night. For the peculiarities of them proceed through all the middle orders. And with respect to the mighty Saturn, is he not arranged prior to Jupiter, and does he not after the Jovian kingdom, divide the Bacchic fabrication in conjunction with the other Titans? And this indeed, he effects in one way in the heavens, and in another in the sublunary region; in one way in the inerratic sphere, and in another among the planets. And in a similar manner Jupiter and Bacchus. *These things therefore are clearly asserted by the ancients.*

If however, we are right in these assertions, these divinities have every where an analogous subsistence; and he who wishes to survey the progressions of them into the heavens, or the sublunary region, should look to the first and principal causes of their kingdoms. For from thence, and according to them, their generation is derived. It is requisite therefore, that we also should look to these. Some therefore say that Plato omits to investigate the Gods who are analogous to the two kings in the heavens, I mean Phanes and Night. For it is necessary to place them in a superior order, and not among the mundane Gods; because prior to the world, they are the leaders of the intellectual Gods, being eternally established in the adytum, as Orpheus says of Phanes, *who by the word adytum signifies their occult and immanifest order.* Whether therefore we refer the circulation of same and different [mentioned by Plato in this dialogue] to the analogy of these, as male and female, or paternal and generative, we shall not wander from the truth. Or whether we refer the sun and moon, as opposed to each other among the planets, to the same analogy, we shall not err. [For the sun indeed through his light preserves a similitude to Phanes, but the moon to Night. Jupiter, or the Demiurgus, in the intellectual, is analogous to Phanes in the intelligible order. And the vivific crater Juno is analogous to Night, who produces all life in conjunction with Phanes from unapparent causes; just as Juno is parturient with, and emits into light, all the soul contained in the world.\*] For it is better to conceive both these as prior to the world, and to arrange the Demiurgus himself as analogous to Phanes; since he is said to be assimilated to him according to the production of wholes; but to arrange the power conjoined with Jupiter, (i. e. Juno) and which is generative of wholes, analogous to Night, who produces all things invi-

\* The greater part of what is here contained within the brackets is in so mutilated a state in the original, as to be illegible. The sense however, I have endeavoured as much as possible to restore in the translation.

bly from the father Phanes. After these however, we must consider the remaining as analogous to the intellectual kingdoms.

If likewise, it should be asked why Plato does not mention the kingdoms of Phanes and Night, to whom we have said Jupiter and Juno are analogous? It may be readily answered, that the tradition of Orpheus contains these; on which account Plato celebrates the kingdom of Heaven and Earth as the first, the Greeks being more accustomed to this than to the Orphic traditions; as he himself says in the *Cratylus*, where he particularly mentions the theogony of Hesiod, and recurs as far as to this kingdom, according to that poet. Beginning therefore, from this theogony as more known, and assuming Heaven and Earth as the first kingdoms above the world, he produces the visible Heaven and Earth analogous to those in the intellectual order, and celebrates the latter as the most ancient of the Gods within the former. From these also, he begins the theogony of the sublunary Gods. These things however, if divinity pleases, will be manifest from what follows. At present we shall only add, that it is requisite to survey all these names divinely or demoniacally, and according to the allotments of these divinities in the four elements. For this emend is in ether and water, in earth and in air, all-variously, according to the divine, and also according to the demoniacal peculiarity. And again, these names are to be surveyed aquatically and acrially, and likewise in the earth terrestrially, in order that all these powers may be everywhere, according to an all-various mode of subsistence. For there are many modes of providence divine and demoniacal, and many allotments according to the division of the elements; lest all things not being everywhere, the number of the same and the similar should be destroyed. And thus much concerning these particulars. But let us now return to the text of Plato, and explore its meaning to the utmost of our ability.

40E "That Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of Heaven and Earth."

As this whole world is ample and various, as adumbrating the intellectual order of forms, it contains these two extremities in itself, Earth and Heaven; the latter having the relation of a father, but the former of a mother. On this account Plato calls Earth the most ancient of the Gods within the heavens, in order that conformably to this he might say, that Earth is the mother of all that Heaven is the father; at the same time evincing that partial causes are not only subordinate to their progeny, as Poverty<sup>1</sup> [in the Banquet of Plato] to Love, but are likewise

<sup>1</sup> Μῆ is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For *πρῶτα* here, it is necessary to read *Πρῶτα*.



superior to them, as alone receiving the offspring proceeding from the fathers. These two extremities therefore, must be conceived in the world, Heaven as the father, and Earth as the mother of her common progeny. For all the rest terminate in these, some giving completion to the celestial number, but others to the wholeness of Earth. After the same manner likewise, in each of the elements of the world, these two principles, Heaven and Earth, must be admitted, subsisting aërially indeed in air, but aquatically in water, and terrestrially in earth; and according to all the above-mentioned modes; in order that each may be a perfect world, adorned and distributed from analogous<sup>1</sup> principles. For if man is said to be a microcosm, is it not necessary that each of the elements by a much greater priority should contain in itself appropriately all that the world contains totally? Hence, it appears to me that Plato immediately after, speaking about Heaven and Earth, delivers the theory of these Gods, beginning from those two divinities; for the other divinities proceed analogous to Heaven and Earth. These two divinities however, are totally the causes of all the Gods that are now produced. And these divinities that are the progeny of Heaven and Earth, are analogous to the whole of each. These two likewise, as we have before observed, are in each of the elements aërially, or aquatically, or terrestrially. For Heaven is in Earth, and Earth in Heaven.\* And here indeed, Heaven subsists terrestrially, but there Earth

<sup>1</sup> In the original, *ἀλογον* is erroneously printed for *ἀναλογον*.

\* This is a very ancient Egyptian doctrine. And hence Kircher in his *Œdipus Egyptiacus* says that he read the following words engraved in a stone near Memphis: *Cœlum sursum, cœlum deorsum, quod sursum id omne deorsum, hæc cape et beaberis, i. e. Heaven is above, and Heaven is beneath. Every thing which is above is also beneath. Understand this, and you will be blessed.* Conformably to this also the celebrated Smaragdine Table, which is of such great authority with the Alchemists, and which whether originally written or not by Hermes Trismegistus, is doubtless of great antiquity, says that all that is beneath resembles all that is above. But the table itself is as follows: *Verum sine mendacio, certum et verissimum: quod est inferius, est sicut id quod est superius, et quod est superius, est sicut id quod est inferius, ad perpetrandum miraculum unius rei. Et sicut res omnes fuerunt ab uno mediatione unius, sic omnes res natae ab hac re adoptione. Pater ejus est sol, mater ejus luna. Portavit illud ventus in ventre suo. Nutrix ejus terra, pater omnis telesmi totius mundi est hic. Virtus ejus integra est, si versa fuerit in terram. Separabis terram ab igne, subtile a spisso suaviter cum magno ingenio. Ascendit a terra in cœlum, iterumque descendit in terram, et recipit vim superiorum et inferiorum. Sic habebis gloriam totius mundi, ideo fugiet à te omnis obscuritas. Hæc est totius fortitudinis fortitudo fortis, quia vincet omnem rem subtilem, omniaque solida penetrabit. Sic mundus creatus est. Hinc erunt adoptiones mirabiles, quarum modus hic est. Itaque vocatus sum Hermes Trismegistus habens tres partes philosophiæ totius mundi. Completum est quod dixi de opere solis." i. e. "It is true without a lie, certain, and most true, that what is beneath is like that which is above, and what is above is like that which is beneath, for the purpose of accomplishing the miracle of one thing. And as all things were from one through the mediation of one, so all things were generated from this thing*

celestially. For Orpheus calls the moon celestial earth.\* Nor is it proper to wonder that this should be the case.† For we may survey the same things everywhere according to the analogous in intelligibles, in intellects, in the supermundane order, in the heavens, and in generation, conformably to the proper order of each.

With respect however, to each of these divinities, some of the interpreters of Plato understand by Earth, this solid bulk which is the object of sensible inspection; others, as that which has an arrangement analogous to matter, and is supposed to exist prior to generated natures; others, as intelligible matter; others, as the power of intellect; others, as life; others, as an incorporeal form inseparable from earth; others conceive it to be soul; and others intellect. In a similar manner with respect to Heaven, some suppose it to be the visible heavens; others, the motion about the middle of the universe; others, power aptly proceeding in conjunction with motion; others, that which possesses intellect; others, a pure and separate intellect; others, the nature of circulation; others, soul; and others, intellect. I know likewise, that the divine Iamblichus understands by Earth, every thing stable and firm, according to the essence of the mundane Gods, and which according to energy and a perpetual circulation, comprehends more excellent powers and total lives. But by Heaven, he understands the total and perfect energy proceeding from the Demiurgus, which is full of appropriate power, and subsists about the Demiurgus, as being the boundary of itself and of wholes. I know likewise that the admirable Theodorus establishes both these powers in the first life which subsists according to habitude. For in the life according to habitude of the soul of the world, through which descending into itself, it again ends in the fontal soul, with difference, three first habitudes, are immediately to be

by adoption [i. e. by participation]. The sun is its father, and the moon its mother. The wind carried it in its belly. The earth is its nurse. This is the father of all the perfection of the whole world. Its power is entire when it is converted into earth. You must separate the earth from the fire, the subtle from the thick sweetly with great genius. It ascends from earth to heaven, and again descends to the earth, and receives the power of things superior and inferior. Thus you will have the glory of the whole world, and thus all obscurity will lie from you. This is the strong fortitude of all fortitude, because it vanquishes every subtle thing, and penetrates all solid substances. Thus the world was fabricated. Hence admirable adoptions will take place, of which this is the mode. I am therefore called Hermes Trismegistus, possessing three parts of the philosophy of the whole world. That which I have said concerning the work of the sun is complete."

\* Instead of *καὶ γὰρ οὐρανίαν καὶ τὴν σελήνην Ὀρφεὺς προσηγορεύσας*, the sense requires we should read *καὶ γὰρ οὐρανίαν γῆν τὴν σελήνην*, κ. λ.

† The two immediately following lines in this place in the original, are in so mutilated a state as to be perfectly unintelligible.

surveyed, together with the wholeness. And the first of these indeed, consists of the wholeness which is on each side, has the wholeness prior to parts, and terminates in the whole fortal soul. - But the second preserves the whole fortal soul, yet divides itself into parts, and has the wholeness which consists of parts. And the third distributes the fortal soul, but preserves itself a whole. In the first likewise of these three, Earth and Heaven are contained. For the material nature which is in the first, is called Earth, matter being thus denominated by the ancient theologists. But Heaven is an intellect of this kind, as separating the last from the first in habitude, and as constituting this visible Heaven through its own habitude. In us therefore, the habitude likewise of the soul to the body preserves the body. Knowing these things however, I think it is requisite to adhere, as by a firm cable, to the doctrine of our preceptor [Syriannus]. For through this, we shall avoid confused and erroneous opinions, and shall conjoin ourselves to the most pure conceptions of Iamblichus.

In the first place therefore, we should recollect that Plato is now speaking of the sublimary Gods, that all of them are everywhere, and that they proceed according to the analogy of the intelligible and intellectual kings. And in the second place we must say, that as the first Heaven is the boundary of and connectedly contains the intellectual Gods, containing the measure which proceeds from *the good*,<sup>1</sup> and the intelligible Gods, into the intellectual orders, after the same manner the Heaven which is now mentioned by Plato, is the boundary and container of the Gods that are the fabricators of generation, comprehending in one bound the demiurgic measure, and also that which proceeds from the celestial Gods to those divinities that are allotted the realms of generation, and connecting them with the celestial government of the Gods. For as the Demiurgus is to *the good itself*, so is the one divinity of this Heaven, to the intellectual Heaven. Hence as there, measure and bound proceed from *the good* through Heaven to all the intellectual Gods, so likewise here a bound arrives to the Gods the fabricators of generation, and to the more excellent genera, [viz. to angels, daemons and heroes] from the Demiurgus, and the summit of the mundane Gods; viz. through the connectedly-containing medium of this Heaven.<sup>2</sup> For the everywhere proceeding Heaven is allotted this order; in one procession of things indeed, unitedly and occultly; but in another manifestly and separately. For in one order it introduces bound to souls; in another to the works of nature,

<sup>1</sup> For εκ τ' αυτου, it is necessary to read εκ τ' αγαθου.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of λεγω δη τοις του Ουρανου ταυτε συνοχητης μεσσητος, it is requisite to read, λεγω δια της του Ουρανου, κ. λ.

and in another in a different manner to other things. And in air indeed, it effects this primarily; but in the aquatic orders secondarily; and in earth, and terrestrial works, in an ultimate degree. But there are also complications of these. For the divine mode of subsistence, and also the daemoniacal are different in the air and in the earth. For in one place, the mode is the same in different orders; but in another the mode is different in one allotment.<sup>1</sup> And thus much concerning the power of Heaven.

In the next place, directing our attention to Earth, and invoking her aid, we shall derive the whole of the theory concerning her from her first evolution into light. She first becomes manifest therefore, in the middle triads<sup>2</sup> of the intellectual Gods, together with Heaven, who connectedly contains the whole intellectual order. She likewise proceeds analogous to the intelligible Earth, which we find to be the first of the intelligible<sup>3</sup> triads. And as ranking in the vivific orders, she is assimilated to the first infinity. But she is the receiving bosom of the generative deity of Heaven, and the middle centre of his paternal goodness. She also reigns together with him, and is the power of him who ranks as a father. The Earth however, which is analogous to her, and presides in the sublunary regions, is as it were the prolific power of the Heaven pertaining to the realms of generation, unfolding into light his paternal, definitive, measuring and containing providence, which prolifically<sup>4</sup> extends to all things. She likewise generates all the sublunary infinity;<sup>5</sup> just as Heaven who belongs to the co-ordination of bound, introduces termination and end to secondary natures. Bound therefore and end define the hyparxis of every thing according to which Gods and daemons, souls and bodies are connected and made to be one, imitating the one unity of wholes, or in other words, the ineffable principle of things; but infinity multiplies the powers of every being. For there is much bound in all sublunary natures, and likewise much infinity, which through divinity, and after the Gods, extends to all things. We have therefore, these two orders, which are generative of the divine or daemoniacal progressions, in all the sublunary genera and elements; and one kingdom of them in the same manner as in the intellectual orders.

From these however, a second duad proceeds, Ocean and Tethys, this generation not being effected by copulation, nor by any conjunction of things separated, nor by division, nor according to a certain abscission, for all these are foreign

<sup>1</sup> For *λεξως* here, read *ληξως*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τριάδην* it is necessary to read *τριάδας*.

<sup>3</sup> For *ισερων* read *ισητων*.

<sup>4</sup> For *γνομις* here, read *γνομιως*.

<sup>5</sup> Instead of *αποριαν* here, it is necessary to read *απειριαν*.

from the Gods; but it is accomplished according to one union and indivisible conjunction of powers. And this union theologists are accustomed to call marriage. For marriage, as the theologist Orpheus says, is appropriate to this order. For he calls Earth the first Nymph, and the union of her with Heaven the first marriage; since there is no marriage in the divinities that are in the most eminent degree united. Hence there is no marriage between Phanes and Night, who are intelligibly united to each other; but there is marriage among the Gods, who exhibit division of powers and energies, in conjunction with union. And marriage appears on this account to be adapted to the Heaven and Earth, which we are at present considering, so far as they adumbrate the intellectual Heaven and Earth; which the sacred laws of the Athenians likewise knowing, ordered that the marriages of Heaven and Earth should be celebrated, as preparatory to initiation into the mysteries. Directing their attention to these also, in the Eleusinian mysteries, looking upward to the heavens, they exclaimed, O son! but looking downward to the earth, O parent!" According to this union therefore, in conjunction with separation, Heaven and Earth produce through their goodness Ocean and Tethys. Or rather, they do not immediately produce these, but prior to these two monads, two triads, and duple hebdomads, among which are Ocean and Tethys. And the monads indeed together with the triads remain with the father. But of the hebdomads, Ocean together with Tethys, abide and at the same time proceed. All the rest however, proceed into another order of Gods. And this indeed, is the mode of their subsistence in the intellectual order. But here, Plato entirely omits the causes that abide in the father, but delivers to us those that proceed and at the same time abide, because his intention is to speak of the Gods that are the fabricators of generation. To these however, progression, motion, and difference are adapted, and a co-arrangement of the male with the female; in order that there may be generation, that matter may be adorned<sup>1</sup> with forms, and that difference may be combined with sameness. Hence Plato commences from the duad, proceeds through it, and again returns to it. For the duad is adapted to material natures, as well as difference, on account of the division of forms about matter. Having mentioned a duad likewise, he begins from Earth; for this is more adapted to things pertaining to generation.

With respect to these two divinities however, Ocean and Tethys, who abide in

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps by the former of these exclamations in the mysteries, the divine and celestial origin of the human soul was signified; but by the latter its terrestrial origin, through its union with a terrene body.

<sup>2</sup> For κοσμουμένης here, it is necessary to read κοσμουμένης.

their causes, and at the same time proceed from them,<sup>1</sup> some say that Ocean is a corporeal essence; others, that it is a swiftly pervading nature; others, that it is the motion of a humid essence; others, that it is ether through the velocity of its motion; and others, that it is the intelligible profundity itself of life. The divine Iamblichus however, defines it to be the middle motive divine cause, which middle souls, lives and intellections, efficacious natures, and those elements that are pneumatic, such as air and fire, first participate. And with respect to Tethys, some say, that it is a humid essence; others, that it is a very mutable nature; and others, that it is the hilarity of the universe. But the divine Iamblichus asserts it to be a productive power, possessing in energizing an efficacious establishment, the stable intellections of which, souls, natures, and powers participate, and which is likewise participated by certain solid receptacles, either of earth or water, which prepare a seat for the elements. Theodorus however, places Earth and Heaven in the first part of the before-mentioned first triad, according to animation in habitude, I mean, in the first of the wholes prior to parts, and considers Heaven as analogous to the intellectual, but Earth to the material nature: and of the rest, that which subsists according to the whole from parts, he calls Ocean; but the third, which subsists according to the wholeness of a part, he denominates Tethys.

We however, again assuming our principles say, that the causes of these are indeed in the intellectual Gods, and that they are likewise in the sensible universe. For Ocean every where distinguishes first from second orders, in consequence of which poets do not improperly call it the boundary of the earth. But the Ocean which is now the subject of discussion, is the cause of motion, progression and power; inserting in intellectual lives indeed, acme, and prolific abundance; but in souls, celerity and vigour in their energies, and purity in their generations; and in bodies, facility of motion. And in the Gods indeed, it imparts a motive and providential cause; but in angels an unfolding and intellectual celerity and vigour. Again, in demons it is the supplier of efficacious power; but in heroes, of a magnificent and flourishing life. It likewise subsists in each of the elements, according to its characteristic peculiarity. Hence, the aerial Ocean is the cause of all the mutation of aerial natures, and of the circle of the meteors, as also Aristotle says. But the aquatic Ocean gives subsistence to fertility, facility of motion, and all-various powers. For according to the poets,

From this all seas, and every river flow.

And the terrestrial ocean is the producing cause of generative perfection, of the

<sup>1</sup> For  $\alpha\pi'$   $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$  here, read  $\alpha\pi'$   $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\upsilon$ .

separation of forms, and of generation and corruption. Whether also there are certain terrestrial orders, vivific and demiurgic, it is the source of their distinction; or whether there are powers connective of the productive principles of the earth, and the inspective guardians of generation, these also it excites and multiplies, and calls into motion.

With respect to Tethys, as the name indeed evinces, she is the most ancient and the progenitor of the Gods, in the same manner as it is fit to acknowledge of the mother Rhea. For theologists denominate another Goddess prior to her Maia. Thus Orpheus,

Maia, of Gods supreme, immortal Night,  
What mean you say.

But according to the etymology of Plato, she is a certain fontal deity. For the undefiled and pure, and that which percolates are signified through her name. For since Ocean produces all things, and is the source of all motions, whence also it is called the generation of the Gods, Tethys separates the unical cause of his motions, into primary and secondary motions. Hence Plato says that she derives her appellation from *leaping* and *percolating*. For these are separative names, in the same manner as he says in the Sophista, of the words (το ξαίνειν καὶ κερκίζειν) to card, and to separate threads in weaving, with a shuttle. Ocean therefore, generating all motion collectively, whether divine, or intellectual, or psychical, or physical, Tethys separating both internal and external motions, is so called from causing material motions to leap and be percolated from such as are immaterial. Hence, the separating characteristic is adapted to the female, and the unical<sup>\*</sup> to the male. Plato therefore would assert such peculiarities as these of Ocean and Tethys, and does assert them in the Cratylus. But according to the divine Iamblichus, Tethys must be defined to be the supplier of position and firm establishment. From all that has been said however, it may be summarily asserted that Tethys is the cause of permanency and a firm establishment of things in herself, separating them from the motions that proceed externally. In short, Ocean is the cause of all motion, intellectual, psychical and physical to all secondary natures; but Tethys is the cause of all the separation of the streams proceeding from Ocean, imparting to each a proper purity in the motion adapted to it by nature; through which each though it may move itself, or though it may move other things, yet moves in a transcendent manner. *But theologists manifest that Ocean is the supplier of all motion, when they say that he sends forth ten streams, nine of which proceed into the sea; because it is necessary, that of motions nine should be*

<sup>\*</sup> For ενιαυρον here, it is necessary to read ενιαιον.

corporeal, but that there should be one alone of the essence which is separate from bodies, as we are informed by Plato in the *Laws*.<sup>1</sup> Such divine natures therefore as the mighty Ocean generates, these he excites to motion and renders them efficacious. But Tethys distinguishes these, preserving generative causes pure from their progeny, and establishing them in energies more ancient than those that proceed into the external world. And thus much concerning each of these divinities Ocean and Tethys.

Since however as we have said, the generation of these, is from the prior divinities Heaven and Earth, but is not effected either by a copulation such as that which is in sensibles, nor according to such a union as that of Night and Phanes in intelligibles, it very properly follows that their progeny are separated from each other, analogously to their parents, and that each receives a similitude to both. For Ocean indeed, as being the male, is assimilated to the paternal cause Heaven; but as the supplier of motion, to the maternal cause Earth, who is the cause of progressions. And Tethys indeed, as the female, is assimilated to the prolific cause; but as producing a firm establishment<sup>2</sup> of her progeny in their proper lives, she is assimilated to the fabricating cause. For the male is analogous to the monadic; but the female to the dyadic. And the stable is adapted to the former; but the motive to the latter. A duad therefore, proceeding from a duad, and being assimilated according to the whole of itself to the duad which is generative of it, defines and distinguishes the causes of itself, and all the number posterior to itself; in order that everywhere we may ascribe that which defines and separates, to the order of Ocean and Tethys. For on this account also, many Oceans are delivered to us by theologists.<sup>3</sup>

Here however, it may be doubted, why the generation of these Gods, is from Heaven and Earth, and not from the soul of the universe. For Plato nowhere gives a peculiar soul to the heavens. The solution of these doubts is this. It must be said that the soul which subsists from the psychogony, is the mundane soul of all the parts of the universe. For Plato says, that the divinity fabricated the whole of a corporeal nature within this soul, and not only the heavens. Being however, the soul of the universe, it illuminates the heavens primarily, and

<sup>1</sup> Plato in the 10th book of the *Laws* distinguishes the genus of motions into ten species, viz. circulation about an immoveable centre, local transition, condensation, rarefaction, increase, decrease, generation, corruption, mutation or alteration produced in another by another, and a mutation produced from a thing itself, both in itself, and in another. This last is the motion of an essence separate from bodies, and is the motion of soul.

<sup>2</sup> For γοιμον here, it is necessary to read ποιμον.

<sup>3</sup> Here also unfortunately the part that immediately follows in the original, is in so mutilated a state, as to be perfectly unintelligible.



vivifies the sublunary region, as suspended from the heavens. Hence this soul is primarily celestial. And of this, you may assume a sufficient example from the human soul. For Plato says, that this which governs the whole animal of us, is at the same time allotted the head for its place of abode, as from thence ruling over the whole body, and deluding as through a channel, sense to every part of the corporeal frame. As Socrates therefore, had on the preceding day established the Fates over the inerratic and planetary spheres, Plato does not now introduce a peculiar animation to each of them, but as having already employed them, constitutes these circulations of the whole soul. But to the stars themselves contained in the spheres, he distributes peculiar souls, because Socrates had said nothing about them in the Republic, and the peculiar animation of them was not known to his auditors. For it was proper to extend such particulars as were unknown to them, but not to discuss with prolixity, such as are apparent.\*

“ But from Ocean and Tethys, Phoreys, Saturn and Rhea, and such as subsist together with these were produced.”

In the former progeny, a duad, generative, and motive, was produced from a terminating and definitive duad; viz. Ocean and Tethys, from Heaven and Earth; but in the second progeny, a multitude converted to its causes through the triad, is generated from the duad; indicating likewise an all-perfect progression. For this multitude also is divided, into the analogous to bound, and the co-ordinate to infinity. For the triad is the bound in this multitude; but the nameless number is the infinity in it. And of the triad itself likewise, one thing is analogous to the monad and bound, but another to the duad and infinity. And in the former progression indeed, the progeny alone proceeded according to bound and the intellectual; but in this there is also a mixture of the indefinite. But after the boundary from the triad, Plato adds, “ *And such as subsist together with these,*” indicating the entire progression and separation of these triple orders; so that the progeny of this progression is triadic through the peculiarity of conversion, and dyadic through the intervention of the infinite and indefinite.

Since however, these differ according to their intellectual causes, in the same manner as the before-mentioned orders; but in them Ocean and Tethys were said to be the brethren, and not the fathers† of Saturn and Rhea; for the progression to these was from Heaven and Earth, and all the Titannic order is thence

\* Five lines in the original of the above Paragraph are likewise illegible, in consequence of being in such a mutilated state.

† Παρρος is erroneously printed instead of παρeres.

derived; let us see on what account Plato here gives subsistence to Phorcys, Saturn and Rhea, from Ocean and Tethys. For he may appear to say this not conformably to the Orphic principles. For "Earth latently bore from Heaven, as the theologist says, seven pure beautiful virgins with rolling eyes, and seven sons that were kings with fine long hair. And the daughters, indeed, were Themis, and the joyful Tethys, Mnemosyne with thick-curved hair, and the blessed Thea. She likewise bore Dione, having a very graceful form, and Phœbe, and Rhea, the mother of king Jupiter. But the venerable Earth brought forth those celestial youths, who are called by the appellation of Titans, because they revenged the mighty starry Heaven. And she also bore Cœus, the great Crœus, and the strong Phorcys, and likewise Saturn, and Ocean, Hyperion and Iapetus." These things then having been written by the theologist prior to Plato, how is it that Timæus produces Saturn and Rhea from Ocean and Tethys? In answer to this;<sup>1</sup> as we have before arranged Ocean and Tethys above Saturn and Rhea, as being the media between these and the fathers, and guardians of the boundaries of both, as it is usual to celebrate them; we must say in the first place, indeed, that it is not wonderful that the same divinities should be brothers, and yet through transcendency of dignity should be called the fathers of certain Gods. For such things as are first, when they proceed from their causes, produce in conjunction with those causes, the natures posterior to themselves. Thus all souls indeed, are sisters, according to one demiurgic cause, and according to the vivific principle and fountain from which they proceed; at the same time divine souls produce partial souls, together with the Demiurgus and vivific causes, in consequence of first proceeding into light, and abiding in their wholeness; receiving the power of fabricating natures similar to themselves. Besides, in the Gods themselves, all the offspring of Saturn are brethren, according to the one generative monad by which they were produced; yet at the same time Jupiter is called father, in the divine poet Homer, both by Juno and Neptune:

One word permit me thund'ring father Jove;<sup>2</sup>

And,

What mortal now in all the boundless earth,

O father Jove, will counsel to th' immortals give.<sup>3</sup>

For in the former verse Juno, and in the latter Neptune, calls Jupiter father.

So that it is not at all wonderful if Ocean and Tethys are called both brethren

<sup>1</sup> For  $\pi\omega\iota$  here, it is necessary to read  $\pi\pi\omega\iota$ .

<sup>2</sup> *Iliad.* 19. v. 121.

<sup>3</sup> *Iliad.* 7. v. 447. But in Proclus for  $\text{Ἥρα}$ , read  $\text{Ἥρα}$ .

and fathers of Saturn and Rhea; in consequence of preserving as among brethren the paternal peculiarity. In the first place, therefore, the doubt may after this manner be solved.

In the next place, it may be said, that of the divine Titanic hebdomads, Ocean, indeed, both abides and proceeds, uniting himself to his father, and not departing from his kingdom. But all the rest rejoicing in progression, are said to have given completion to the will of Earth, but to have assaulted their father, dividing themselves from his kingdom, and proceeding into another order. Or rather, of all the celestial genera, some alone abide in their principles, as the two first triads. "For, as soon as Heaven understood that they had an implacable heart, and a lawless nature, he hurled them into Tartarus, the profundity of the Earth" [says Orpheus]. He concealed them therefore in the unapparent, through transcendency of power. But others both abide in, and proceed from their principles, as Ocean and Tethys. For when the other Titans proceeded to assault their father Heaven, Ocean prohibited them from obeying the mandates of their mother, being dubious of their rectitude.

"But Ocean [says Orpheus] remained within his place of abode, considering to what he should direct his attention, and whether he should deprive his father of strength, and unjustly mutilate him in conjunction with Saturn, and the other brethren, who were obedient to their dear mother; or leaving these, stay quietly at home. After much fluctuation of thought however, he remained peaceably at home, being angry with his mother, but still more so with his brethren."

He therefore abides, and at the same time proceeds together with Tethys; for she is conjoined with him according to the first progeny. But the other Titans are induced to separation and progression. And the leader of these is the mighty Saturn, as the theologist says; though he evinces that Saturn is superior to Ocean by saying, that Saturn himself received the celestial Olympus, and that there being throned he reigns over the Titans; but that Ocean obtained all the middle allotment. For he says, that he dwells in the divine streams which are posterior to Olympus, and that he environs the Heaven which is there, and not the highest Heaven, but as the fable says, that which fell from Olympus, and was there arranged.\*

\* As this is a remarkably curious Orphic fragment, and is not to be found in Gesner's collection of the Orphic remains, I shall give the original for the sake of the learned reader: *καιτοι γε οτι ο κρονος υπερτεροι επι του ωκεανου, δεδωλκεν ο θεολογος πικριν λεγων· τον μεν κρονον αυτον καταλαμβανειν τον ουρανιον ολυμπον, εκει θρονησθεστα, βασιλευειν των τιτανων· τον δε ωκεανον την ληξιν απασαν την μεσην. ναιεν γαρ αυτον εν τοις θεσπεσιαις ρειθροις τοις μετα τον ολυμπον, και τον εκει περιεπειν ουρανον, αλλ' ου τον αιροτατον, ως δε φησιν ο μυθος, τον εμπεσοστα τον ολυμπον, και εκει τεταγμενον.*

Ocean and Tethys therefore, so far as they abide, and are united to Heaven, produce in conjunction with him the kingdom of Saturn and Rhea; and so far as they are established in the first power of their mother, so far they produce Phoreys in conjunction with her.<sup>1</sup> For she produces him together with Nereus and Thaummas,<sup>2</sup> from being mingled through love with the sea. For Phoreys is not celestial but Ocean, as is evident from the Theogony.<sup>3</sup> And so far as Tethys is full of Earth, so far being as it were a certain Earth, she may be said to produce this Phoreys in conjunction with Ocean; so far as Ocean also comprehends the intelligible in himself. Hence Tethys, so far as she is Earth according to participation, and Ocean so far as he is causally the sea, give subsistence in conjunction with Saturn and Rhea to this God. If however, any arguments should demonstrate that in the intellectual order Saturn is above Ocean, or Rhea above Tethys, it must be said that this arrangement is indeed there; for in that order the causes of intellection are superior to those of motion; but that here on the contrary, all things are in mutation and a flowing condition; so that here Ocean is very properly prior to Saturn, since it is the fountain of motion, and Tethys is prior to Rhea. Hence, after another manner the doubt may be thus solved.

That we may speak however, about each of these Gods, Theodorus refers souls that subsist in habitude to these divinities, and arranges them as presiding over the three divisions of the world. And Phoreys indeed, he arranges in the starless sphere, as moving the lation of the universe. He ought however to persuade us that Plato was acquainted with a certain starless sphere, and afterwards, that he thus arranged Phoreys in this sphere. But he places Saturn over the motions of the stars, because time<sup>4</sup> is from these, and the generations and corruptions of things. And he places Rhea over the material part of the world, because by materiality, she has a redundancy with respect to the divinities prior to herself. But the divine Iamblichus arranges them in the three spheres between the heavens and the earth. For some of the sublunary deities give a two-fold division to the sublunary region, but these divide it in a three-fold manner. And Phoreys indeed, according to him, presides over the whole<sup>5</sup> of a humid essence, containing all of it impartibly. But Rhea is a divinity connective of flowing and aerial-formed spirits. And Saturn governs the highest and most attenuated sphere of ether, having a

<sup>1</sup> For μετ' αὐτοῦ, it is necessary to read μετ' αὐτῆς.

<sup>2</sup> For Θαυμαντα, it is requisite to read Θαυμαντος; and for ποιτον, ποιτην.

<sup>3</sup> The original here is evidently erroneous; for it is, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ Φορεὺς οὐρανοῖδεῖς ἀλλὰ ὁ Φορεὺς, ὡς ἐστὶ δὴλον ἐκ τῆς θεογονίας. For ἀλλὰ ὁ Φορεὺς therefore, I read ἀλλὰ ὁ Ωκεανος; Ocean according to the Theogony of Hesiod, being the progeny of Heaven and Earth.

<sup>4</sup> Κρονος is erroneously printed for χρονος.

<sup>5</sup> For τῆς υγρᾶς υλησὺς οὐσίας, I read τῆς υγρᾶς ὀλῆς οὐσίας.

middle arrangement according to Plato; because the middle and the centre in incorporeal essences, have a greater authority than the powers situated about the middle. We indeed, admire this intellectual explanation of Iamblichus; but we think it proper to survey these Gods every where, both in all the elements, and all orders. For thus we shall behold that which is common in them, and which extends to all things. And we say indeed, that Phorcys is the inspective guardian of every spermatic essence, and of physical, and as it were, spermatic productive principles, as being pregnant with, and the cause of generation. For there are spermatic productive principles in each of the elements; and different orders of Gods and daemons preside over them, all which Plato comprehends through Phorcys. But king Saturn divides forms and productive principles, and produces more total into more partial powers. Hence he is not only an animal but pedestrious, aquatic, and a bird. And he is not only pedestrious, but likewise man and horse. For the productive principles in him are more partial than in the celestial deities. Among the intellectual Gods therefore, he is allotted this power, viz. to multiply and divide intelligibles. Hence, he is the leader of the Titans, as being especially characterized by the dividing peculiarity.

Again, we say that Rhea receives the unapparent powers of king Saturn, leads them forth to secondary natures, and excites the paternal powers to the fabrication of visible objects. For thus also, her first order is moved, is filled with power and life, and produces into that which is apparent, the causes that abide in Saturn. Hence Saturn is every where the supplier of intellectual forms; Rhea is the cause of all souls, and of every kind of life; and Phorcys is prolific with physical productive principles. Since however another number of Gods pertains to the kingdom of these, and which Saturn and Rhea comprehend, on this account Plato adds, "*and such as subsist together with these.*" For he not only through this comprehends daemons, as some say, but both the angelic and the daemoniacal Saturn have with themselves a multitude, the one angelic, but the other daemoniacal. And the multitude which is in the Gods is divine; that which is in the air is aerial; and in a similar manner in the other elements, and in the other more excellent genera arranged under these Gods.

By the words also "*such as subsist together with these,*" Plato appears to signify the remaining Titans viz. Cœus and Hyperion, Crœus, Iapetus, and likewise the remaining Titannidae, viz. Phœbe, Theia, Mnemosyne, Themis, and Dione, with whom Saturn and Rhea proceeded into light. Also, those that proceeded together with Phorcys, viz. Nereus and Thaumas, the most motive Eurybia, and those who especially contain and connect the whole of generation. Moreover, it is worth while to observe that it is not proper to discuss accurately the arrangement in

these divinities, and whether Saturn or Phorcys is the superior deity ; for they are united and similar to each other. But if it be requisite to make a division, it is better to adopt the arrangement of the divine Iamblichus, viz. that Saturn is a monad ; but Rhea a certain duad, calling forth the powers that are in Saturn ; and that Phorcys gives perfection to their progression. It now remains therefore that we direct our attention to the other kings who produce the apparent sublunary order of things ; for such is the arrangement which they are allotted.

11 A " But from Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and all such as we know are called the brethren of these descended, and also the other progeny of these."

This is the third progression of the Gods who are the fabricators of generation, but the fourth order, closing as a tetrad the nomination of the leading Gods. For the tetrad is comprehensive of the divine orders. But as a duad this progression is assimilated to the first kingdom ; because that as well as this is dyadic. There are however, present with it, the all-perfect according to progression, and the uncircumscribed according to number. But Plato here, not only adds the words "*such as*," as in the progression prior to it, but likewise the word "*all*," that he may indicate the progression of them to every thing. For we use the term *το οσον*, *such as*, in speaking of things united, but the term *το παντας*, *all*, in speaking of things now divided and multiplied. The total (*το ελικον*) likewise pertains to this progression. For the Gods which are denominated in it, and those that proceed every where together with them, are characterized according to this form of fabrication. *For all Demiurgi are total.* Who therefore are they, and what kind of order do they possess ?

The divine Iamblichus then asserts that Jupiter is the perfecter of all generation ; but that Juno is the cause of power, connexion, plenitude, and life to all things ; and that the brethren of them are those that communicate with them in the fabrication of generation, being also themselves intellects, and receiving a completion according to a perfection and power similar to them. But Theodorus, again dividing the life which animates the total in habitude, and forming it as he is accustomed to do into triads, calls Jupiter the power that governs the upper region as far as to the air ; but Juno the power who is allotted the aerial part of the world ; and the brethren of them those that give completion to the remaining parts. For Jupiter is the essential of the soul that subsists in a material habit, because there is nothing more vital than essence. But Juno is the intellectual part of such a soul, because the natures on the earth are governed by the produc-

tive principles proceeding from the air. And the other number is the psychical distributed into particulars.

We however consequently<sup>1</sup> to what has been before asserted say, that according to Plato there are many orders of Jupiter. For one is the Demiurgus, as it is written in the Cratylus; another, is the first of the Saturnian triad, as it is asserted in the Gorgias; another is the liberated, as it is delivered in the Phædrus; and another is the celestial, whether in the inerratic sphere, or among the planets. Moreover, as the first Jupiter produced into the visible fabrication the power of his father, which was concealed in the unapparent, being excited<sup>2</sup> to this by his mother Rhea; after the same manner the Jupiter delivered here, who is the fabricator of generation, causes the unapparent divisions and separations of forms made by Saturn to become apparent; but Rhea calls them forth into motion and generation; and Phorcys inserts them in matter, produces sensible natures, and adorns the visible essence, in order that there may not only be divisions of productive principles in natures and in souls and in intellectual essences prior to these, *but likewise in sensibles. For this is the peculiarity of fabrication.* And if it be requisite to speak what appears to me to be the truth, Saturn indeed produces intellectual sections, but Rhea such as are psychical, and Phorcys such as are physical. For all spermatic productive principles are under nature. But Jupiter adorning sensible and visible sections, gives a specific distinction to such beings in the sublunary region as are totally vital, and causes them to be moved. Since however, these sensible forms which are generated and perfected, are multiformly evolved, being moved and changed according to all-various evolutions, on this account the queen Juno is conjoined with Jupiter, giving perfection to this motion of visible natures, and to the evolution of forms. Hence fables represent her as at one time sending mania to certain persons, but ordering others to undergo severe labours, in order that through intellect being present with all things, and partial souls energizing divinely both theoretically and practically, every progression and all the generation of the sublunary region may obtain complete perfection.

Such therefore being the nature of this duad, there are also other demiurgic powers which triply divide the apparent<sup>3</sup> world of generation; one of these being allotted the government of air; another that of water; and another that of earth, conformably to demiurgic allotments. Hence they are said to be the brothers of

<sup>1</sup> The words *ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀποφαινομεν* are omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For *διανοητής*, it is necessary to read *διαικονητής*.

<sup>3</sup> For *ἀσφαρῆ* here, it is necessary to read *ἐμφανῆ*.

these, because they also preside over the visible fabrication. And further still, there are others the progeny of these ; which is the last progression of the divinities mentioned in this place by Plato. Hence, they are delivered anonymously ; Plato by this indicating the diminution of it as far as to the last division. For as in the Gods that are above the world, the partible proceeds from the total fabrication, and the series of kings terminates in this ; after the same manner also among the sublunary Gods, the progeny of Jupiter proceed from the Jovian order ; among which progeny likewise, is the choir of partible fabrication. For the before-mentioned Demiurgi producing sensibles totally, it is necessary that those deities should have a subsistence who distribute different powers and peculiarities to different natures, and divide the sublunary generation into multitude. Hence Plato alone denominates them *others*, and does not employ the expressions *such as*, and *all*, because they associate with all-various diversity. In what has been said therefore by Plato, we have the whole analogous kingdoms, Heaven and Earth having the first arrangement, but afterwards the sublunary kingdoms, the celestial, the Saturnian, and the Dionysiacal. But between these two kingdoms, the order of Ocean is first assumed, as defining and distinguishing all the progressions from the fathers, as causes, and as itself abiding and at the same time proceeding, analogously to the intellectual hypostases of them. What occasion therefore, is there, to proceed any further, since all the governments are here delivered, and each is conjoined with its proper multitude. For Heaven terminates, Earth corroborates, and Ocean moves all generation. But Tethys establishes every thing in its proper motion ; intellectual essences in intellectual, middle essences in psychical, and such as are corporeal in physical, motion ; Ocean at the same time collectively moving<sup>\*</sup> all things. Saturn alone divides intellectually ; Rhea vivifies ; Phoreys distributes spermatic productive principles ; Jupiter perfects things apparent from such as are unapparent ; and Juno evolves according to the all-various mutations of visible natures. And thus through this ennead all the sublunary world derives its completion, and is fitly arranged ; divinely indeed from the Gods, but angelically, as we say, from angels, and daemoniacally from demons ; the Gods indeed subsisting about bodies, souls, and intellects ; but angels exhibiting their providence about souls and bodies ; and demons being distributed about the fabrication of nature, and the providential care of bodies. But again, the number of the ennead is adapted to generation. For it proceeds from the monad as far as to the extremities without retrogression ; which is the peculiarity of generation. For reasons (i. e. productive principles) fall into matter, and are unable to convert themselves to the principles of their

\* Instead of τοῦ ὡραίου πάντα κινουμένων ἄλλως in this place, it is obviously necessary to read τοῦ ὡραίου πάντα κινουμένης ἄλλως.



existence. Moreover, the duad being triadic, for three dyadic orders were assumed,<sup>1</sup> manifests the complication here of the perfect and the imperfect, and of bound with infinity. For all celestial natures are definite, and as Aristotle says, are always in the end. But things in generation proceed<sup>2</sup> from the imperfect to the perfect, and receive the same boundary indefinitely. Besides this, the tetrad arising from the generation of these divinities is adapted to the orders of the fabricators of the sublunary region; in order that they may contain multitude unitedly, and the partible impartibly; and also to the natures that exist in generation. For the sublunary elements are four; the seasons according to which generation is evolved are four; and the centres are four. And in short, there is an abundant dominion of the tetrad in generation.

Why however, it may be said, does Plato comprehend all the multitude of the Gods that fabricate generation, in this ennead? I answer, because this ennead gives completion to all the fabrication of generation. For in the sublunary realms there are bodies and natures, souls and intellects, and this both totally and partially. And all these are in both respects in each of the elements,<sup>3</sup> because wholes and parts are consubistent with each other. Heaven and Earth however generate the unapparent essences of these, i. e. of wholes and parts, the former indeed according to union, but the latter according to multiplication; and the former according to bound, but the latter according to infinity, being the leaders of essence to all things. But Ocean and Tethys give perfection to both the common and divided motion of them. There is however a different motion of different things, viz. of total intellect, of total soul, and of total nature, and in a similar manner in such of these as are partial. The sublunary wholes therefore, being thus adorned and distributed, Saturn indeed, divides partial from total natures, but intellectually; Rhea calls forth this division from intellectuals into all-various progressions,<sup>4</sup> as far as to the last forms of life, being a vivific deity; but Phoreys produces the Titanic separation, to physical productive principles. After these three are the fathers of composite natures. And Jupiter indeed, adorns sensibles totally, according to an imitation of Heaven. For the Jupiter in the intellectual order, proceeds analogous to the intellectual Heaven, in the royal series. But Juno moves wholes, fills them with powers, and evolves according to every pro-

<sup>1</sup> Viz. Heaven and Earth; Ocean and Tethys; Jupiter and Juno. And this last duad ranks as the fourth progression, because prior to it, is the triad Phoreys, Saturn and Rhea.

<sup>2</sup> For *εἶσι* here, it is requisite to read *ἔρπονται*.

<sup>3</sup> This ennead in each of the elements is as follows, viz. total and partial bodies, total and partial natures, total and partial souls, and total and partial intellects, and the monad which contains these, viz. the elementary sphere itself.

<sup>4</sup> *Προόδους* is omitted in the original.

gression. And the Gods posterior to these fabricate the partial works of sensibles, some according to one, but others according to another peculiarity, either demiurgic, or vivific, or perfective, or connective, being evolved and dividing themselves, as far as to the last of things, analogously to the Saturnian order. For the dividing peculiarity originates from the Saturnian dominion.

41A "When therefore, all such Gods as visibly revolve, and such as become visible when they please, were generated, he who produced this universe thus addressed them."

Plato having comprehended in what he has said, all the mundane Gods, both those in the heavens, and those that preside over generation, and having produced them from the demiurgic monad, some monadically, but others hebdomadically, and others according to the number of the ennead, again converts them to the demiurgic cause, collects them about the one father, through whom they are all allied to each other, and fills them with demiurgic intellections; in order that they may imitate the providence of the father. And this indeed, will be hereafter manifest. Now however, it is evident that he calls the celestial Gods those that visibly revolve. For their vehicles are solar-form, and imitate intellectual splendor.

But why does Plato denominate the sublunary deities "such as become apparent when they please." Shall we say it is because these material elements are hurled forth before them as veils<sup>1</sup> of the splendor of the ethereal vehicles which are proximately suspended from them? For it is evident that being mundane they must also necessarily have a mundane starry vehicle. The light of them however, shines forth to the view, when they are about to benefit the places that receive their illumination. But if Plato says that they become visible when they please, it is necessary that this appearance of them should either be an evolution into light of the incorporeal powers which they contain, or of the bodies which are entirely spread under them. But if it is an evolution of their incorporeal powers, this is also common to the visible Gods. For they are not always apparent by their incorporeal powers, but only sometimes, and when they please. It is not proper therefore to divide the sublunary oppositely to the visible Gods, according to that which is common to both, but so far as they have entirely something peculiar. But if they produce a luminous evolution of certain bodies when they please, they must necessarily use other bodies prior to these material elements; and which then

<sup>1</sup> In the original it is *παράπτερα* instead of *παράπτερσματα*.

become visible to us, when it seems fit to the powers that use them. Hence, other bodies more divine than such as are apparent, are spread under the invisible Gods; and according to these, they are said to be, and are mundane. Through these also as media, they ride in and govern these elements. For they impart to them as much of themselves as they are able to receive, and contain the forms and the natures of them in their powers. For since no one of these is an object of sense, and it is necessary that the vehicles of rational souls should be things of this kind, it is evident that they must use other vehicles prior to these visible bodies. Farther still, if in short, no body is suspended from them, it would be wonderful, since the celestial souls use bodies, that these divine sublunary souls should be exempt from all bodies, and this though they are mundane. But if they also have something corporeal, they either have these visible bodies, or other bodies prior to these. And if the former, how is it possible they can ascend into [or be immediately connected with] bodies which are generated and corruptible? For if these bodies have a sensible perception of the preternatural disposition in them, in consequence of perceiving the life of the powers that use them, they will not suffer them to remain unemployed. But if they have not, they will not be animals. For every animal is sensitive, according to Plato. Hence also, he imparts to plants a sense of the last kind, and calls them animals. But that every thing which is suspended from soul, is animated and an animal, is also again asserted by Plato. If therefore, such bodies as are the objects of sense, are [immediately] suspended from the divine sublunary souls, it is dubious how this is possible. They have therefore, other bodies prior to these. And this is what Plato manifests when he says, "*that they become apparent when they please,*" at other times being invisible to us. And thus much concerning the words of the text.

With respect however, to all the Gods that govern generation, we must not say, that they have an essence mingled with matter, as the Stoics assert they have. For nothing which verges to matter is able to govern with intellect and wisdom, nor is properly a producing cause, but an organ of something else. Nor must we say that they have an essence unmingled with matter, but powers and energies mingled with it, as Numenius and his followers assert. For the energies of the Gods concur with their essences, and their inward, subsist prior to their externally proceeding energies; since a partial soul also prior to the life which is inserted in the animal suspended from it, contains a more principal life in itself; and prior to the externally proceeding motion, through which it moves other things, it is moved with a motion converted to itself. The sublunary Gods

<sup>1</sup> For *per* here, it is necessary to read *μν*.

therefore, are entirely unmingled with matter ; adorning indeed things mingled in an unmingled, and things generated in an unbegotten manner. They likewise contain partibles impartibly, are the causes of life, the suppliers of intellect, the replenishers of power, the givers of soul, the primary leaders of all good, and the sources of order, providence, and the best administration. They also give subsistence to more excellent animals about themselves, are the leaders of angels, the rulers of demons, and the prefects of heroes ; governing through this triple army the whole of generation. If therefore, we assert that the appropriate order of these divinities about generation, is the basis and seat of the total Gods, we shall speak rightly. And we shall likewise not err in asserting that they convolve the end of the divine decrement to the beginning. Such then being the nature of these divinities, Plato indeed looking to the Gods that are both intelligible and intellectual, and to those that are properly called intellectual, surveyed four progressions of them in common. But they also contain powers derived from the supermundane Gods ; whether they proceed from the twelve leaders, or from certain other deities.

From the celestial choir of Gods likewise, a certain order proceeds into generation, which, as the divine Iamblichus says, is doubled in its progression. For from the twenty-one leaders, forty-two governments of Gods who are the fabricators of generation, are derived according to each elementary allotment. But from the thirty-six decadarchs,<sup>1</sup> seventy-two sublunary rulers proceed ; and in a similar manner other Gods ; being the double of the celestial Gods in multitude, but falling short of them in power. It is likewise necessary to survey their triple progressions, their quintuple divisions, and their divine generation according to the hebdomad. For they receive an orderly distribution in a threefold, fivefold, and sevenfold manner, analogous to the whole world ; in order that each of the elements may be a world, and may be truly an imitation of the universe. Such therefore is the concise doctrine concerning the sublunary Gods, according to twofold essences, lives, and allotments ; just as Plato also makes the ruling progeny of them to be dyadic.

In the next place, let us consider the words of the father, and what that is, for the sake of which they proceed. The words therefore, are neither those which proceed through the mouth : for this is foreign from an immaterial and separate essence ; nor physical, for these are not primarily imparted to mundane natures by the Demiurgus,

<sup>1</sup> These thirty-six decadarchs are the divinities alluded to by the Emperor Julian in his Oration to the Sun, when he says, " that the Sun divides the zodiac into twelve powers of Gods, and each of these into three others, so that thirty-six are produced in the whole."

but by the one nature of the universe; nor psychical, for the one soul of the world, and all such other souls as have a generation, antecedently comprehend these; nor intellectual; for in short<sup>1</sup> the intellect of the universe, and all the intellects that constitute it, comprehend these in themselves. But it must be said, as that which is worthy of the speaker, that they are demiurgic and divine, causing all the generated Gods to be demiurgi, and to be characterized by the power of the speaking God. For words are communications of powers from first to secondary natures, and of the divine providence and admirable life, which the Demiurgus of wholes, antecedently comprehends in himself. Such therefore are, as we have said, the words.

The end of them however, is to render the Gods by whom they are received, demiurgic. For as the reasons [or productive powers] which proceed from art into matter, make artificial forms; those that proceed from nature, physical; from soul animated; and from intellect, intellectual; after the same manner the reasons [or words], that proceed from the Gods, make all the genera that are obedient to them divine. But since of the Gods themselves, some are of the demiurgic, and others, of the vivific order, some are characterized by an immutable and pure life, but others have some other characteristic property,—hence the form of the words, is defined according to the peculiarities of the speakers. For it is either demiurgic, or the cause of a divine life, or the supplier of immutability and purity. Hence, since he who now delivers the words is the Demiurgus, the words proceed characterized by demiurgic power conformably to the peculiarity of the speaker, and render the recipients of them Demiurgi. For though there are different orders of the mundane Gods, viz. demiurgic, vivific, connectedly-containing, perfective, guardian, judicial, and cathartic orders, in the same manner as there are of the Gods established above the heavens; since the former proceed according to the latter: yet at the same time, all of them participate of all powers. Different Gods however, are defined more or less by a different peculiarity. Hence, each participates of demiurgic power, so far as all of them are co-arranged with the demiurgic monad; of vivific power, so far as they are illuminated by the vivific fountain; and in a similar manner, in the other powers. If, however, the speaker was a vivific God, we should say, that he filled his auditors through his words, with divine life. But since he who delivers the speech is the Demiurgus, he imparts to the Gods the demiurgic peculiarity, disseminates his one fabrication into the multitude of mundane Gods, and renders them fabricators of other mortal genera, he himself being eternally established in his own place of survey, according to divinely-inspired poetry, on the summit of Olympus. Such

<sup>1</sup> For *ολως* here, it is necessary to read *ολως ο νους*.

therefore are the words, and this is the end of this demiurgic speech. It now remains that we should proceed to the developement of the words themselves.

“Gods of Gods.”

The scope of this speech is to insert demiurgic power and providence in the mundane genera of Gods, to lead them forth to the generation of the remaining kinds of animals, and to place them over mortals, analogously to the father of wholes over the one orderly distribution of the universe. For it is necessary that some things should be primarily generated by the demiurgic monad, and others through other media; the Demiurgus indeed, producing all things from himself at once and eternally, but the things produced in order, and first proceeding from him, producing together with him the natures posterior to themselves. Thus, for instance, the celestial produce sublunary Gods, and these<sup>1</sup> generate mortal animals; the Demiurgus at the same time fabricating these in conjunction with the celestial and sublunary divinities. For in speaking he understands all things, and by understanding all things he also makes the mortal genera of animals; these requiring another proximate generating cause, so far as they are mortal, and through this receiving a progression into being. But the character of the words is enthusiastic, shining with intellectual intuitions, pure and venerable as being perfected by the father of the Gods, differing from and transcending human conceptions, delicate and at the same time astonishing, full of grace and beauty, at once concise and perfectly accurate. Plato, therefore, particularly studies these things in the imitations of divine speeches; as he also evinces in the Republic, when he represents the Muses speaking sublimely, and the prophet ascending to a lofty seat. He also adorns both these speeches with conciseness and venerableness, employing the accurate powers of colons, directly shadowing forth divine intellections through such a form of words. But in the words before us he omits no transcendency either of the grand and robust in the sentences and the names adapted to these devices, or of magnitude in the conceptions and the figures which give completion to this idea. Besides this, also, much distinction and purity, the unfolding of truth, and the illustrious prerogatives of beauty, are mingled with the idea of magnitude, this being especially adapted to the subject things, to the speaker and to the hearers. For the objects of this speech are, the perfection of the universe, an assimilation to all-perfect animal [i. e. to its paradigm], and the generation of all mortal animals; the maker of all things, at the same time, presubstisting and

<sup>1</sup> For *ταυτων* here, it is necessary to read *ταυτων*.

adorning all things, through exempt transcendency; but the secondary fabricators adding what was wanting to the formation of the universe. All, therefore, being great and divine, as well the persons as the things, and shining with beauty and a distinction from each other, Plato has employed words adapted to the form of the speech.

Homer, also, when energizing enthusiastically, represents Jupiter speaking, converting to himself the two-fold co-ordinations of Gods; becoming himself, as it were, the centre of all the divine genera in the world, and making all things obedient to his intellection. But at one time he conjoins the multitude of Gods with himself without a medium, and at another through Themis as the medium:

But Jove to Themis gives command to call  
The Gods to council.\*

For this Goddess pervading every where collects the divine number, and converts it to the demiurgic monad. For the Gods are both separate from mundane affairs, and eternally provide for all things, being at the same time exempt from them through the highest transcendency, and extending their providence everywhere. For their unmingled nature is not without providential energy, nor is their providence mingled with matter. Through transcendency of power they are not filled with the subjects of their government, and through beneficent will, they make all things similar to themselves; in permanently abiding, proceeding, and in being separated from all things, being similarly present to all things. Since, therefore, the Gods that govern the world, and the demons the attendants of these, receive after this manner unmingled purity, and providential administration from their father; at one time he converts them to himself without a medium, and illuminates them with a separate, unmingled, and pure form of life. Whence also I think he orders them to be separated from all things, to remain exempt in Olympus, and neither convert themselves to Greeks nor Barbarians; which is just the same as to say, that they must transcend the two-fold orders of mundane natures, and abide immutably in undefiled intellection. But at another time he converts them to a providential attention to secondary natures, through Themis, and calls upon them to direct the mundane battle, and excites different Gods to different works. These divinities, therefore, especially require the assistance of Themis, who contains in herself the divine laws, according to which providence is intimately connected with wholes. Homer, therefore, divinely delivers two-fold speeches, accompanying the two-fold energies of Jupiter; but Plato,

\* *Iliad*, xx. v. 4.

through this one speech, comprehends these two-fold modes of discourse. For the Demiurgus renders the Gods unmingled with secondary natures, and causes them to provide for, and give existence to mortals. But he orders them to fabricate in imitation of himself: and in an injunction of this kind, both these are comprehended; viz. the unmingled through the imitation of the father, for he is separate, being exempt from mundane wholes; but providential energy, through the command to fabricate, nourish, and increase mortal natures. Or rather, we may survey both in each; for in imitating the Demiurgus, they provide for secondary natures, as he does for the immortals; and in fabricating they are separate from the things fabricated. For every demiurgic cause is exempt from the things generated by it; but that which is mingled with and filled from them is imbecile and inefficacious, and is unable to adorn and fabricate them. And thus much in common respecting the whole of the speech.

Let us then, in the first place, consider what we are to understand by "Gods of Gods," and what power it possesses; for that this invocation is collective and convertive of multitude to its monad, that it calls upwards the natures which have proceeded to the one fabrication of them, and inserts a boundary and divine measure in them, is clear to those who are not entirely unacquainted with such-like discourses. But how those that are allotted the world by their father are called Gods of Gods, and according to what conception, cannot easily be indicated to the many; for there is an unfolding of one divine intelligence in these names. Hence through this cause, some conjoin the words "*of Gods*" with what follows, erroneously making the whole to be, "*of the Gods of whom I am the Demiurgus.*" For it is not proper to represent the Demiurgus as the fabricator of some things but the father of others, and these latter less honorable natures. For they say, that Plato by calling the Demiurgus the fabricator of Gods, but the father of works, separates the latter from the former, as different, and less honorable. [They do not however speak rightly;] for the paternal is more venerable than the demiurgic characteristic. Neither is it right to introduce these repetitions where the diction is continued. For when the intermediate words are many, then there is occasion for this parenthesis, but otherwise, the thing is superfluous. Others say, that the mundane Gods are *of the intelligible Gods*, as being the images of them, just as the whole world is the statue of the eternal Gods, according to Timæus. Neither however, do these speak rightly; because they do not assert any thing peculiarly illustrious of the Gods. For in a similar manner what Plato says would be adapted to every mortal nature. For all these, are *of the Gods*, as images of intelligibles. And if it were requisite to refer to them the words "*of Gods*," I should think it would be



rather proper to call them *Gods of the God*, as being alone produced by the one Demiurgus, mortal natures not being produced by him; since he who speaks is the Demiurgus himself. Hence it would be more proper to speak in the singular, than in the plural number. But others say that the most total unities of the mundane Gods, are called by the father, "*Gods of Gods*," leaders of leaders, and kings of kings, as being analogous to the father himself; because he also, according to the poets, is the father of fathers, and supreme of rulers. To these however, it is easy to reply, that Plato delivers the Demiurgus speaking to all the mundane Gods, or attendants of the Gods, and not to some of them alone. For if both such Gods as visibly revolve, and such as become visible when they please, collect themselves about the one Demiurgus, and the Demiurgus says these things, to all these Gods themselves it is not proper to understand the words "*Gods of Gods*" partially, as applicable to the leaders alone.

If therefore, none of the above mentioned assertions are conformable to the conception of Plato, we must show what his conception is. It will here however be better to recur to the explanation of these words by our preceptor. He says therefore, that all the mundane Gods are not simply Gods, but that they are wholly Gods which participate. For there is in them that which is separate, invisible, and supermundane, and also that which is the visible statue of them, and which has an orderly establishment in the world. And the invisible nature of them indeed, is primarily a God; for this must now be understood, as that which is indivisible and one. But this vehicle which is suspended from their invisible essence, is secondarily a God. For if with respect to us, man is two-fold, one inward, according to the soul, the other apparent, which we see, much more must both these be asserted of the mundane Gods; divinity in them being two-fold, one unapparent, and the other apparent. This being the case, we must say, that "*Gods of Gods*" is addressed to all the mundane divinities, in whom there is a connection of unapparent with apparent Gods; for they are Gods that participate. In short, since two-fold orders are produced by the Demiurgus, some being supermundane, and others mundane, and some being without, and others with participation [of body], if the Demiurgus now addressed the supermundane orders, he would have alone said to them "*Gods*;" for they are without participation [i. e. without the participation of body,] are separate and unapparent;—but since the speech is to the mundane Gods, he calls them *Gods of Gods*, as being participated by other apparent divinities. In these also daemons are comprehended; for they also are Gods, as to their order with respect to the Gods, whose peculiarly they indivisibly participate. Thus also Plato, in the *Phædrus*, when he calls the twelve Gods the leaders of daemons, at the same time

denominates all the attendants of the divinities Gods, adding, "*and this is the life of the Gods.*" All these, therefore, are Gods<sup>1</sup> of Gods, aspossessing the apparent connected with the unapparent, and the mundane with the supermundane. And thus much concerning the whole meaning of the words.

It is necessary however, since we have said the words are demiurgic or fabricative, that they should be received in a manner adapted to demiurgic providence. But if these words are intellectual conceptions, and the intellectual conceptions themselves are productions, what shall we say the Demiurgos effects in the multitude of mundane Gods by the first words of his speech? Is it not evident we must say that this energy of his is deific? For this one divine intellectual conception which is the first and most simple proceeding from the Demiurgos, deifies all the recipients of it, and makes them demiurgic Gods, participated Gods, and Gods invisible and at the same time visible. For this, as has been said, is the meaning of "*Gods of Gods.*" For the term Gods is not alone adapted to them; since they are not alone invisible; nor the word Gods twice enunciated, as if some one should say Gods and Gods; for every bond of this kind is artificial, and foreign from divine union. These things therefore, have been sufficiently discussed.

It is also necessary to observe in order to make the interpretations concordant, that every mundane God has an animal suspended from him, according to which he is denominated mundane. He has likewise a divine soul, which rules over its depending vehicle; and an immaterial and separate intellect, according to which he is united to the intelligible, in order that he may imitate the world in which all these are contained. And by the animal suspended from him, he is indeed a part of the sensible universe; but by intellect he belongs to an intelligible essence; and by soul he conjoins the impartible life which is in him, with the life that is divisible about body. Such a composition however being triple in each mundane God, neither does Plato here deliver the Demiurgos speaking to intellects; for intellects subsist in unproceeding union with the divine intellect, and are entirely unbegotten; but soul is the first of generated natures; and shortly after the Demiurgos addresses these when he says, "*since ye are generated.*" Nor does he represent the Demiurgos as speaking only to the animals which are suspended from the souls of these Gods; for they pertain to corporeal natures, and are not adapted to enjoy the one demiurgic intelligence, without a medium. Nor yet does he represent him as speaking to souls by themselves; for they are entirely immortal; but the Gods whom he now addresses are said by him not<sup>2</sup> to be in every respect immortal. If therefore it be requisite for me to say what appears to

<sup>1</sup> Θεοι is omitted here in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For *μὴ εἶναι το σαρταρ ὑπαρτον* in the original, it is necessary to read *μὴ εἶναι κ. τ. λ.*

me to be the truth, the words of the Demiurgus are addressed to the composite from soul and animal, viz. to the animal which is divine, and partakes of a soul. For intellect does not know the demiurgic will through reason, but through intelligence, or in other words, through intellectual vision; nor through conversion, but through a union with that intellect which ranks as a whole, as being itself intellect, and as it were of the same colour with it. But soul as being reason, and not intellect itself, requires appropriately to its essence the energy of reason, and a rational conversion to the intelligible.<sup>1</sup> To these therefore, as being essentially rational, and as being essentialized in reasons, the demiurgic speech proceeds. And it is adapted to them in a twofold respect, first, as being participated by bodies; for they are Gods of those Gods; and secondly, as participating of intellects; for they are Gods of [viz. derived from] intellects which are also Gods. And they participate of intellects, and are participable by bodies. Hence the assertions that they are generated, and that they are not entirely immortal, and every thing else in the speech, are appropriately adapted to them, so far as they have a certain co-ordination and connexion with mundane natures, and so far as they are participated by them. But the mandates "*learn and generate*," and every thing else of this kind which is more divine than generated natures, are adapted to them as intellectual essences.

"Of whom I am the Demiurgus and father of works, whatever is generated by me is indissoluble, such being my will in its fabrication."

Plato as I may summarily say, appears to give a triple division to the energy of the one Demiurgus in his total production of the junior Gods, viz. a division into the deific, into that which imparts connexion, and into that which supplies a similitude to animal itself. For the address of the Demiurgus evinces those to be Gods that proceed from him. But the assertions respecting the indissoluble and dissoluble, by defining the measure of a medium between these, impart a distribution and connexion commensurate to the order of the mundane Gods. And the words calling on them to the fabrication of mortal natures, cause them to be the sources of perfection to the universe, and the fabricators of secondary animals, conformably to the imitation of the paradigm. But through these three energies the Demiurgus elevates his offspring to all the intelligible Gods, and establishes them in the intelligible triads. In the one being indeed, [or the summit of these

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *νοητον*, it is requisite to read *νοητη*.

triads] through the first of these energies; for that is primarily deified, in which *the one* is deity, but *being* is the first participant of it. For *the one itself* is alone deity, without habitude to any thing, and is not participable; but *the one being* in which there is the first participation is God of God. And *being* is deity as the summit of all beings; but *the one* of it is deity as proceeding from *the one itself*, which is primarily God. But through the second of these energies the Demiurgus establishes his offspring in the second of the intelligible triads, i. e. in eternity itself. For eternity is the cause of this indissoluble permanency to every thing which continues perpetually undissolved. Hence all mundane natures are bound according to the demiurgic will, and have something of the indissoluble through the participation of him; the natures which are primarily indissoluble being different from these, and those that are truly immortal subsisting for his sake. And he establishes them in all-perfect animal [or the third of the intelligible triads] through the third of these energies. For to this the vivific assimilates the mundane Gods, and inserts in them the paradigms of animals which they generate. And this indeed, will be one scope of fabrication, the converting and perfecting the proceeding multitude of the Gods. But after the one there will be a triple design, which establishes them in the three intelligible orders.

This second demiurgic intelligence therefore, after the first which is deific, illuminates the mundane Gods with a firm establishment, an immutable power, and an eternal essence, through which the whole world, and all the divine allotments subsist always the same, participating through the father of an immutable nature and undecaying power. For every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, is indissoluble and immutable; but all the progeny of a moveable cause are mutable. Hence among mundane natures, such as proceed from the demiurgic cause alone, in consequence of being generated according to an invariable sameness, are permanent, and are exempt from every mutable and variable essence. But such as proceed both from this cause, and from other moveable principles, are indeed immutable so far as they proceed from the Demiurgus, but mutable so far as they proceed from the latter. For those natures which the Demiurgus alone generates, these he fabricates immutable and indissoluble, both according to their own nature, and according to his power and will. For he imparts to them a guardian and preserving power, and he connects their essence in a manner transcendent and except. For all things are preserved in a two-fold respect, from the power which he contains, and from his providential goodness, which is truly able and willing to preserve every thing which may be lawfully perpetually saved. The most divine of visible natures therefore, are as we have said from their own nature indissoluble;

but they are likewise so from the demiurgic power which pervades through all things, and eternally connects them. For this power is the guard and the divine law which connectedly contains all things. But a still greater and more principle cause than these is the demiurgic will which employs this power in its productions. For what is superior to goodness, or what bond is more perfect than this, which imparts by illumination union, connects an eternal essence, and is the bond and measure of all things; to which also the Demiurgus now refers the cause of immutable power, saying, "*such being my will in its fabrication.*" For he established his own will as a guard over his own proper works, as that which gives union, connexion and measure to the whole of things.

Who the Demiurgus however is, and who the father is, has been unfolded by us before, and will be now also concisely shown. There are then these four; father alone; maker alone; father and maker; maker and father. And father indeed, is aether [or bound] being the first procession from *the one*. Father and maker is the divinity who subsists according to the intelligible paradigm [at the extremity of the intelligible order,] and whom Orpheus says the blessed Gods call Phanes Protogonus. But maker and father is Jupiter, who is now called by himself the Demiurgus, but whom the Orphic writers would call the father of works. And maker alone, is the cause of partible fabrication,<sup>1</sup> as the same writers would say. To father alone therefore, all intelligible, intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures are in subjection. To father and maker, all intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures are subordinate. To maker and father who is an intellectual deity, supermundane and mundane natures are subservient. But to maker alone, mundane natures alone are in subjection. And all these particulars we learn from the narration of Orpheus; for according to each peculiarity of the four there is a subject multitude of Gods. But what are the works of the Demiurgus and father? Is it not evident, that they are all bodies, the composition of animals, and the number of participated souls. All these therefore, are indissoluble, through the will of the father. For this imparts to them the power of immutable permanency, and connects and guards them with exempt transcendency. The intellects however, which supernally ascend into souls, cannot be said to be *the works* of the father. For they had not a generation, but were unfolded into light in an unbegotten manner; being as it were fashioned within, and not proceeding out of the adyta. For neither are there paradigms of intellect, but of middle natures, and such as are last. For soul is the first of images; but wholes, such as animals, animated natures, such as participate of intellect, and

<sup>1</sup> This divinity is Vulcan.

such as are generated, derive their subsistence from the intelligible paradigms, of which animal itself is comprehensive.

41 B "Every thing therefore, which is bound is dissoluble, but to be willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized and well composed, is the province of an evil nature."

It is requisite to consider how the dissoluble and indissoluble are asserted of the Gods, and to conjoin proper modes of solution with appropriate bonds. For every thing is not bound after a similar manner, nor is that which is bound in one way, dissolved in different ways. But that which is in a certain respect bound, has also its dissolution according to this mode. That which is in every respect bound, is likewise in every respect dissolved. And that which is bound by itself is also by itself dissolved. But that which is bound by something different from itself, has also on that its dissolution depending. That likewise which is bound in time, is also dissolved according to time. But that which is allotted a perpetual bond, must also be said to be perpetually dissolved. For in short, dissolution is conjoined with every bond. For a bond is not union without multitude; since *the one* does not require a bond. Nor is it an assemblage of many and different things, no longer preserving their characteristic peculiarities. For a thing of this kind is confusion; and that which results from them is one thing consisting of things corrupted together, but does not become bound. For it is necessary that things that are bound should remain as they are; but not be bound when corrupted. Hence a bond then alone takes place, when there are many things, and which are preserved, having one power connective and collective of them, whether this power be corporeal or incorporeal. If this however be the case, things that are bound are united through the bond, and separated, because each preserves its own proper nature.

Every where therefore, as we have said, a bond has also dissolution connected with it. Bonds however and their dissolutions differ in subsisting in a certain respect, and simply, from themselves, and from others, according to time, and perpetually. For in these their differences consist. We must not therefore wonder if the same thing is both dissoluble and indissoluble; and if it is in a certain respect indissoluble, and in a certain respect dissoluble. So that the works of the father, if they are indeed indissoluble, are so, as not to be dissolved according to time. But they are dissoluble as having together with a bond, a separation of the simple things of which they consist, according to the definite causes of things, that are bound, existing in him that binds. For as that which is self-subsistent is said

to be so in a twofold respect, one, as supplying all things from itself alone, but another, as subsisting indeed from itself, and also from another, which is the cause of it, thus also the indissoluble is so, from another,<sup>1</sup> and from itself; just as that which is moved is twofold, and subsists in a similar manner.

To these two modes however, two modes of dissolution are also opposed; viz. that which is dissoluble from another and from itself is opposed to that which is indissoluble from another and from itself. And the former indeed, is dissoluble in itself, as consisting of things that are separate. But in consequence of having in something else prior to itself the causes of its subsistence, by this cause, and according to this mode alone, it becomes dissoluble. Again, that which is simply dissoluble in a twofold respect, and which contains in itself the cause of its dissolution, and also receives it from another, is opposed to that which is simply indissoluble in a twofold respect, from itself and from another. These therefore are four in number, viz. that which is simply indissoluble from another and from itself. And again, that which is indissoluble after a certain manner in a twofold respect; that which is dissoluble after a certain manner in a twofold respect; and that which is dissoluble simply from itself, and from another.<sup>2</sup> Of these four however, the first pertains to intelligibles; for they are indissoluble, as being entirely simple, and receiving no composition or dissolution whatever. But the fourth belongs to mortal natures, which are dissoluble from themselves and from others, as consisting of many things, and being composed by their causes in such a way, as to be at a certain time dissolved. And the middles pertain to the mundane Gods; for the second and the third of these four concur with them. For after a certain manner, these as being the works of the father are indissoluble; and they are saved from themselves, and through his will. And again, they are in a certain respect dissoluble, because they are bound by him; and he contains the productive principle of those simple natures from which they are composed. Every thing therefore which is bound is dissoluble; and this is also the case with the works of the father.

For bodies indeed, are bound through analogy; for this is the most beautiful bond of them. But animals are bound with animated bonds, as we have before observed. And souls which contain something of a partible nature are bound by media, [viz. by geometrical, arithmetical and harmonical ratios:] for Plato calls these and all the productive principles of which the soul consists, bonds. For impartible natures alone are unindigent of bonds; but those that are bound,

<sup>1</sup> Παρ' ἑτερου is omitted in the original.

<sup>2</sup> The words καὶ ἑαυτον ἄλλως παρ' ἑαυτον καὶ παρ' ἑτερου, are omitted in the original.

consist of things that have a separate subsistence; these not being separated according to time, but according to the causal comprehension of simple natures in the Demiurgus. After this manner therefore, the dissoluble of the mundane Gods as from another, or rather as in another, subsists. Hence they are in a certain respect, but by no means simply dissoluble. For if they were dissoluble from themselves, but indissoluble according to the will of the father, as Severus, Atticus, and Plutarch are accustomed to say, against whom many arguments are adduced by many;<sup>1</sup> if this were the case, whence did they derive the being dissoluble from themselves? For if dissolution is natural to them, who imparted to them this natural power? For it was not any other than the Demiurgus. If however, he is the supplier of nature to them, he also is the cause of their dissolution. But if the being dissoluble is preternatural to them, the contrary, the indissoluble, is natural to them. And if it is natural to them, they will possess the indissoluble from themselves; and the very existence of them will be a thing of this kind; in the same manner as self-motion is natural to soul, levity to fire, and to every thing, that which necessarily exists in it essentially; so that the mundane Gods will possess this from themselves. But I say from themselves, because they will possess it from their proper composition, which they are essentially allotted; for they will not possess it as self-subsistent. It is ridiculous therefore to say, that being dissoluble of themselves, they are alone indissoluble through the will of the father, which these men assert to be the case, in consequence of wishing to preserve the axiom, that every thing generated has corruption, and who also contend that the world was generated, lest Timæus should appear to contradict Socrates, whom he had heard on the preceding day admitting that the unbegotten,<sup>2</sup> is incorruptible. Hence, if the genus of the mundane Gods is of itself indissoluble, it is also of itself unbegotten, and not alone through the will of the father. For unless we admit this, how can we accord with Plato, who makes a twofold indissoluble, one according to nature, but another according to the demiurgic will? And, if we deny this, must we not also speak impiously of the Demiurgus himself? For if being willing to make his fabrications indissoluble, he does not possess the power of effecting this, we must separate his will from his power, which would be absurd, since this does not take place with worthy men. But if he is both willing and able to make these indissoluble, being able, he will make them to be indissoluble; so that the indissoluble in them is according to nature. For each of them was generated indissoluble, but was

<sup>1</sup> For *απο πολλὰ* here, read *απο πολλων*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *γεννητον* here, it is obviously necessary to read *αγεννητον*.



not generated dissoluble, and afterwards was made indissoluble, since the works of the father are indissoluble through the power which he contains. They are likewise indissoluble from the demiurgic will, since they are of a composite nature, and possess the indissoluble with a bond. But there is likewise in a certain respect a dissolution of them, so far as they consist of things of a simple nature, of which the father contains in himself the definite causes. At one and the same time therefore, they are indissoluble and dissoluble. They are not however, so indissoluble as the intelligible; for that is indissoluble through transcendency of simplicity. But these are at the same time indissoluble and dissoluble, as consisting of simple natures, and as being perpetually bound. For all the natures that are bound being dissoluble, such as are perpetual, possessing through the whole of time beauty from the intelligible, divine union and demiurgic harmony, are indissoluble. But mortal natures are dissoluble alone, because they are connected with the deformity and inaptitude of matter. And the former indeed, are beautifully harmonized through the union inserted in them by their harmonizing cause; but this is not the case with the latter, on account of the multitude of causes which no longer insert in them a similar union;<sup>1</sup> for their union is dissipated through the multitude which is mingled in their composition; so that they are very properly allotted a remitted<sup>2</sup> harmony.

Hence, every thing which is bound is dissoluble. But one thing is thus dissoluble and indissoluble, and another is dissoluble only, just as the intelligible is alone indissoluble. Why therefore, is that which is primarily bound, at one and the same time dissoluble and indissoluble? Because it is *beautifully* harmonized, and is *well* composed. For from being *well* composed it obtains union; since *goodness* is unific. But from the intelligible it obtains the *beautifully*; for from thence beauty is derived. And from fabricating power it obtains *harmony*; for this is the cause of the Muses, and is the source of harmonical arrangement to mundane natures. Hence we again have the three causes, the final through the *well*, the paradigmatic through the *beautifully*, and the demiurgic through the *harmonized*.<sup>3</sup> But it is necessary that a composition of this kind, harmonized by the one fabricating power, filled with divine beauty, and obtaining a boniform union, should be indissoluble; for the Demiurgus says that to dissolve it is the province of an evil nature.

<sup>1</sup> For εἰδοσιν it is necessary to read εἰωπον.

<sup>2</sup> Κεχαρτισμένην is erroneously printed for κεχαλασμένην.

<sup>3</sup> After την παραδειγματικην it is necessary to supply the words δια του καλως, την δημιουργικην, which are wanting in the original.

Moreover, prior to this Plato had said, that the universe is indissoluble except by him by whom it was bound. If however it is entirely impossible for the universe to be dissolved by any other, but the father alone is able to dissolve it, and it is impossible for him to effect this, for it is the province of an evil nature,—it is impossible for the universe to be dissolved. For either he must dissolve it, or some other. But if some other, who is it that is able to offer violence to the Demiurgus? For it is impossible that a dissolution of it should be effected except by him that bound it. But if he dissolves it, how being good, can he dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized and well composed? For that which is subvertive of these, is productive of evil; just as that which is subvertive of evil is allotted a beneficent nature. Hence, there is an equal necessity that the Demiurgus should be depraved, if it be lawful so to speak, or that this world should be dissolved [viz. each of these is equally impossible]. Such therefore is the necessity which Plato assigns to the incorruptibility of the universe. Hence, that Plato gives the indissoluble to the composition of the mundane Gods, he clearly manifests, when he orders them to bind mortal natures, not with those indissoluble bonds with which they are connected. For if the connective bonds of these Gods are indissoluble, they themselves must be essentially indissoluble. Here however he says that they are not in every respect indissoluble. It is evident therefore from both these assertions, that they are indissoluble, and at the same time dissolvable; and that they are not in every respect indissoluble in consequence of their being appropriately bound. But if these things are true, there is every necessity that the dissolution of them should be very different from that which we call corruption. For that which is dissolvable after such a manner as the corruptible, in consequence of not being indissoluble, is so far from being not in every respect indissoluble, that it is in every respect dissolvable. Hence it is not proper to say that the mundane Gods are of themselves corruptible, but remain incorruptible through the will of the father; but we ought to say that they are in their own nature incorruptible.

“Hence so far as you are generated, you are not immortal, nor in every respect indissoluble; yet you shall never be dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death; being allotted my will, which is a much

\* For *εἰς* here, read *εἰς*.

† The words *καὶ αὐτοὶ* are omitted in the original.

‡ For *αὐτὸν φεῖν*, it is necessary to read *αὐτὸν φεῖν*.

greater and more excellent bond than the vital connectives with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation."

Since all the mundane Gods to whom these words are addressed consist of divine souls, and animals suspended from them, or in other words, since they are participated souls, and since the Demiurgus denominates them indissoluble and at the same time dissoluble, because the indissoluble of them is not intelligible, and their dissolubility is not mortal, but the former is through a composition<sup>1</sup> from simple natures, of which the Demiurgus comprehends the separate causes, and the latter is through the immutable connexion of the bond, which the father inserts in them;—this being the case, he now wishes to collect into one point of view, and into one truth, all that he had said separately about them. For at one and the same time he takes away from them the immortal and the indissoluble, and again confers these on them through a subversion of their opposites. For media are allotted this nature, not receiving the nature of the extremes, and appearing to comprehend the whole of both. Just as if some one should call the soul impartible and at the same time partible, as consisting of both, and neither impartible, nor partible, as being different from the extremes. For see how a middle of this kind may be surveyed in the mundane Gods. That is principally and primarily called immortal, which supplies itself with immortality; since that also is primarily being which is being from itself; intellect which is intellect from itself; and one which is from itself one. For every where that which primarily possesses any thing is such from itself; since if it were not so from itself but from another, that other would be primarily, either intellect, or life, or *the one*, or something else; and either this would be primarily so, or if there is nothing primarily, the ascent will be to infinity. Thus therefore, that is truly immortal which is immortal from itself, and which imparts to itself immortality. But that which is neither vital according to the whole of itself, nor self-subsistent, nor possesses immortality from itself, is not primarily immortal. Hence as that which is secondarily being is not being, so that which is secondarily immortal is not immortal, yet it is not mortal; for this is entirely a defection or departure from the immortal,<sup>2</sup> neither possessing a connascent life, nor infinite power. For these three are in a successive order. That which possesses from itself infinite life; that which receives infinite life from another; and that which neither from itself nor another

<sup>1</sup> For *παρεδόν* here, I read *συσθεταίν*. For prior to this, Proclus in speaking of these Gods says, *το θεόν εν τούτοις, αὐτόν αἰμα καὶ λυτὸν ἐστίν, ὡς ἐξ ἀλλῶν συσθεταίν*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τὸν θάνατον* here, it is obviously necessary to read *τὸν ἀθάνατον*.

exhibits the infinity of life. And the first indeed, is immortal; the second is not immortal; the third is mortal; and the middle is adapted to the mundane Gods. For they neither have the immortal from themselves, so far as they derive it from that which is truly and primarily immortal, and so far as bodies are suspended from them; nor have they a finite life; but they are filled indeed from the eternal Gods, and produce mortal natures. For the second fabrication is connected with the first, proceeds about it, is governed by it, and refers to it the production of the mortal genera.

Again, with respect to the indissoluble, that which is principally and primarily so is simple and free from all composition. For where there is no composition what representation can there be of dissolution? But that is secondarily indissoluble which is indissoluble with a bond; which is at the same time dissoluble in consequence of proceeding from divided causes. For it is not simply dissoluble, but dissoluble by its cause. For that which is bound prior to all time is alone bound according to cause; but that which is alone causally bound, is alone causally dissolved. For every thing is adapted to be dissolved, by that by which and after the manner in which it is bound. And the third from that which is properly indissoluble, is that which was indissoluble for a certain time, because the first indeed, is properly indissoluble in conjunction with simplicity; but the second is subordinately so, together with composition; and the third, falling off from both, is in its own nature dissoluble.

Neither therefore, are the mundane Gods entirely indissoluble; for this pertains to the most simple natures. Nor are they dissoluble according to time; for the composition of them proceeds from the demiurgic union. As therefore in the cause, union precedes things of a simple nature, after the same manner here also, a bond precedes dissolution; for it is more excellent, and the resemblance of a more divine power. And this is seen in souls; for there were bonds and media in them, as has been before observed in the generation of the soul. It is also seen in bodies; for analogy is a bond. And likewise in animals; for being bound with animated bonds, they became animals. Hence, the immortal and the indissoluble do not entirely pertain to the mundane Gods; yet at the same time they do pertain to them. And because they are not in every respect present with them, nor in such a manner as in intelligibles, immortality must be taken from them. For in the Banquet also, Plato does not think fit to call Love immortal, yet he does not denominate it mortal; but asserts it to be something between both these. For there is a great extent of the mortal and immortal, and they are bound together by many media. It appears likewise, with respect to the

immortal, that one kind of it is common to all the beings that differ from a mortal nature,<sup>1</sup> and which consists in not being deprived of the life which it possesses. According to this sense of the word, Plato says that the Demiurgus is the cause of immortal natures; but the junior Gods, of such as are mortal. But another kind of the immortal is the peculiarity of intelligibles, being eternally so. And another belongs to the mundane Gods, which is an immortality perpetually rising into existence, and having its subsistence in always becoming to be. Hence, it may be said that the immortal and mortal are oppositely divided without a medium, if the common signification of the immortal is assumed; and that they are not opposed to each other without a medium, if that which is primarily immortal is considered; and this is that which is always immortal. For the medium between this and the mortal is that which is always *becoming to be* immortal. But that which is properly immortal possesses the whole of its life in eternity. That however which has its life evolved through the whole of time, and has not <sup>a</sup> always one and the same indivisible life, this possesses an immortality co-extended with the flux of generation, but is not immortal according to the stability of being. And again, the medium between the immortality of the mundane Gods and that of partial souls, is that which has a life always rising into existence, and which ascends and descends in intellectual energy, so as to be nearer to mortal natures, leaving indeed a more excellent intellection, but transferring itself into one that is subordinate, and again recurring to its pristine condition without oblivion. And of these, the former indeed, is the peculiarity of the mundane Gods; but the latter of daemons, the attendants on these Gods. But if the nature which remains is filled with oblivion in descending, becomes most proximate to mortals, entirely destroys the true life which it contains, and alone possesses the essential life,—such an immortality as this belongs to partial souls. Hence, the Demiurgus in his speech calls the immortality in these homonymous to that of the immortals. If however there is any nature after these which casts aside its essential life, this is alone <sup>b</sup> mortal. Hence, the primarily immortal and the mortal are the extremes. But the immortality of the mundane Gods, and that of partial souls, are the sub-extremes. And the immortality which is truly the medium between these, is that of daemons. Hence too, daemons are in reality entirely of a middle nature. And thus much concerning the whole design of the words.

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *τοις μὴ θνητοῖς*, it is necessary to read *τοις ὁμοῖοις*.

<sup>2</sup> For *μὴ* here, it is necessary to read *μὴ*.

<sup>3</sup> The original has erroneously *μὴ* instead of *μὴ*.

Let us however, if you are willing, concisely recur to particulars. After what manner therefore, generation is adapted to the mundane Gods, I have frequently shown, and have observed, that it manifests composition, a life in conjunction with time, and a progression from another cause, and which is co-extended with the whole of time, but is not always [or has not an eternal subsistence]. But the words, "*ye are not immortal, nor indissoluble*," manifest that they are *generated* immortal and indissoluble. For to *be* each of these, is present with eternal natures alone; but to be *generated* each of them, is adapted to those generated natures, whose life is extended with the whole of time. And *not to be entirely immortal, nor entirely indissoluble*, delivers to us many species of immortality. Plato therefore, shortly after calls divine souls immortal, and partial souls homonymously immortal. But the words, "*you shall never be dissolved nor become subject to the fatality of death*," take away from the Gods all the mortal-formed nature, and a perpetually convertible and mutable life. For mortality is an allotment of life, which is now mingled with non-being. And "*the fatality of death*" again occultly exhibits to us many differences of deaths. For the death pertaining to those who are called dæmons according to habitude is of one kind; that of partial souls is of another kind; that of animals, of another; and that of animated bodies, is different from all these. For the first of these imitates as it were, the casting off a garment; the second is accompanied with sympathy towards the mortal nature, being the lapse of the soul into it; the third is the dissolution of the body and soul from each other; and the fourth, is the privation of the life which is in the subject body. But from these the mundane Gods, and essential dæmons, the attendants of the Gods, are perfectly exempt. For even the first kind of death is not adapted to these, as the divine Iamblichus also asserts, who preserves the dæmoniacal genus, truly so called, immutable. Why therefore, is there a bond of these.<sup>1</sup> Is it not because goodness, according to which the demiurgic will is defined, unites, and measures all things, and leads them to one conspiracy? And it seems that according to this especially, the mundane Gods are consummately produced. For it is a bond of bonds, being superior<sup>2</sup> to the things that are bound. But the word *allotted* exhibits the allotment of beneficent providence by the many Gods, from the one Demiurgus. For being divided according to the allotments of Justice, they distribute the one and total providence of the father, and the one

<sup>1</sup> Instead of ταῦτα μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ δεσμός, I read τούτων μὲν οὐκ εἰς τι ἐστὶ δεσμός;

<sup>2</sup> For ὑπὲρ τὸν νοῦν here, it appears to me to be requisite to read ὑπερτερῆς,

bond which proceeds from the demiurgic monad. The celestial therefore, and in short, all the mundane Gods are neither indissoluble nor dissoluble, but are simply both. It is inferred however, that they are neither immortal nor indissoluble, from their being generated. For this is manifested by the words, "*because you are generated.*" For every thing generated has a renovated immortality, and a bond imparted to it by something different from itself, in consequence of not being able to connect or vivify itself. But again, it is inferred, that they are neither dissoluble nor mortal, from the bonds which they essentially participate, and which they receive from the demiurgic will. The latter however is manifested through union, but the former through multitude; since the paternal union is a bond of bonds, and is the monad of the union of the participated Gods.

"Learn now therefore, what I say to you<sup>1</sup> indicating my desire."

The first address to the mundane Gods was deific of, or deified the auditors; for it evinced all of them to be Gods, and to be participated by the bodies in which they ride. For these very bodies also are Gods, as being the statues of Gods; since Plato likewise calls the earth the first and most ancient of the Gods within the heavens. But these deified bodies are participants of the Gods truly so called, from which they are suspended, and which are prior to generation. For these bodies have, as he says, generation. But the second address to the mundane Gods, inserted in them an eternal power, through the participation of an indissoluble connexion. And the present words fill them with divine and demiurgic conceptions, proceeding supernally from intelligible animal [the paradigm of the universe.] For the being instructed in the fabrication of animals, so far as it is mathesis or learning, is adapted to soul. But these words fill the multitude of Gods with the demiurgic intelligence of all the forms that are contained in intelligible animal. And through the word *now* indeed, the *eternal* is after a manner indicated; through the word *what* the united and convolved; through *I say*, that which proceeds into multitude, and is disseminated about the many Gods; and through *indication* a plenitude derived from intelligible and unapparent causes is signified. For we only *indicate* in things unapparent to the multitude. But through all the words together, it is evident that the Demiurgus establishes himself analogous to intelligible intellect, and fills the mundane number of Gods with intellectual conceptions. Farther still, these words convert this multitude to the

<sup>1</sup> In the text of Proclus, *ημας* is erroneously printed for *υμας*.

one demiurgic intelligence, and prior to a providential attention to secondary natures, illuminate it with unmingled purity and stable intellection. For as the Demiurgus makes by energizing intellectually, and generates from inward, externally proceeding energy, thus also he wishes the mundane Gods first to learn and understand the will of their father, and thus afterwards to imitate his power.

"Three genera of mortals yet remain to be produced. Without the generation of these therefore, the universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain in itself all the genera of animals. But it ought to contain them, that it may be sufficiently perfect. Yet if these are generated and participate of life through me, they will become equalized to the Gods."

The most total, first, and most divine of ideas, not only give subsistence to such mundane natures as are perpetual, in an exempt manner, but likewise to all mortal natures, according to one united cause. For the idea of winged natures which is there, is the paradigm of all winged animals whatever; the idea of the aquatic, of all aquatic; and the idea of the pedestrian, of all pedestrian animals. But the progressions of intelligibles into the intellectual orders, become the sources of the division of united ideas, produce into multitude total causes, and unfold the definite principles of multiform natures. For there is not in intelligibles one intellectual cause of all aerial animals; since there is not a separate intellection of perpetual animals of this kind; nor one intellectual cause of aquatic, nor in a similar manner of terrestrial animals; but the power of difference [in the intellectual order] minutely distributes the whole into parts, and monads into numbers. Hence the causes of divine animals, according to which the Demiurgus gives subsistence to the orders of Gods and daemons that produce generation, exist in him separate from the causes of mortal natures, according to which he calls on the junior Gods to generate mortal animals. For the Demiurgus precedes the generative energy of these Gods, and makes by merely saying that a thing is to be made. *For the words of the father are demiurgic intellections, and his intellections are creations*; but a proximate creating is adapted to the multitude of Gods. And again you see how the order of effective and generative causes is unfolded into light. For the choir of mundane Gods produces indeed mortal animals, but in conjunction with motion and mutation.<sup>1</sup> And the Demiurgus

<sup>1</sup> For *μετα βούλης*, I read *μεταβούλης*. For the mundane Gods are in no part of the Timæus represented as consulting about the fabrication of things. Nor is consultation adapted to a divine nature, because it implies imperfection.



also produces them but by speaking, viz. by intellection. For he speaks indeed, intellectually perceiving, and immoveably and intellectually. Animal itself also produces them; for it contains the one cause of all winged, of all aquatic, and of all terrestrial animals. But it produces them with silence by its very essence, and intelligibly. For the demiurgic speech receives indeed the paternal silence, but the intellectual production, the intelligible cause, and the generation which subsists according to energizing, the providence according to existence. Motion also receives the demiurgic words, but the orderly distribution which is mingled with a sensible nature, receives the intellectual energy. For the fabrications which exist at the extremity of things require a producing cause of this kind. *Every thing therefore which is mutable, which is changed in quality, which is generated and corruptible, is generated from a cause, immovable indeed according to essence, but moved according to energy. For the motion which is there separated from essence, here produces an essence which is moved.* Hence, because that which makes, makes both according to essence and according to energy, both which are as it were woven together, mutation of essence thence derives its progression. Mortal natures therefore require moveable causes, and those that are very mutable, many such causes. For it is impossible that these causes should remain only-begotten; since the mortal genera would not have an existence.

It is necessary however, that the mortal nature should exist, in the first place, in order that every thing may have a subsistence which is capable of being generated, viz. both perpetual beings, and those which at a certain time cease to exist. For beyond these is that which in no respect whatever is. In the next place, this is necessary in order that divine natures and being may not be the last of things; since that which is generative of any thing is more excellent and more divine than the thing which it generates. And in the third place it is necessary, in order that the world may not be imperfect, not comprehending every thing, the causes of which are contained in animal itself. For the winged which is there, is the cause of all winged natures, the aquatic of all aquatic, and the terrestrial of all terrestrial natures, whether divine or mortal. Hence Orpheus says that the vivific cause<sup>\*</sup> of partible natures, while she remained on high, weaving the order of celestials, was a nymph, as being undefiled; and in consequence of this connected with Jupiter, and abiding in her appropriate manners; but that proceeding from her proper habitation, she left her webs unfinished, was ravished, having been ravished was married, and being married generated, in order that she might animate things which have an adventitious life. For the unfinished state of her

<sup>\*</sup> i. e. Proserpine.

webs<sup>1</sup> indicates I think, that the universe is imperfect or unfinished as far as to perpetual animals. Hence Plato says, that the one Demiurgus calls on the many Demiurgi to weave together the mortal and immortal natures, after a manner reminding us that the addition of the mortal genera is the perfection of the textorial life of the universe, and also exciting our recollection of the divine Orphic fable, and affording us interpretative causes of the unfinished webs [of Proserpine].

The divine number therefore, has its proper boundary and end, and is perfect. But it is also necessary that the mortal nature should exist, and have an appropriate limit; and this triply, aerially, aquatically and terrestrially. For celestially, is impossible, because the summit and the first genus of every order is undefiled and perpetual, in consequence of being assimilated to the cause which is prior to it. As therefore, the first of intellectuals is intelligible, and the first of angels is a God, thus also the first of sensibles is perpetual and divine. But in generation the mortal is connected with the divine nature. Hence Plato denominates the mortal genera *the remainder*, being as it were the refuse of the fabrication of the Gods, and dregs generated from the Gods themselves. But how are these said to be *not generated*? Is it as not being yet generated? For because there is order in the things which give completion to the universe, and the Demiurgus has definitely made such of them as are secondary in order, to differ from those that are prior to them, on this account he says, that the former are not yet generated, the latter pre-existing. Perhaps too, after another manner, they may be said to be *not generated*, so far as they are produced by the demiurgic monad, and by an immoveable and eternal effective energy! but that they are *mortal*, so far as they are produced by the junior Gods. These however, participate of a certain perpetuity; because they are incorruptible indeed, according to form or species, but are individually corruptible. For in these, form is distinct from the individual, and the whole form is not contained in them, as it is in divine animals, and which are alone perpetual; in consequence of their inability to receive the whole progression of their paradigms. The perpetuity therefore, of mortal natures is derived from the one fabrication, through which the form is immutable and one, and is the same in many participants. But the mutability arising from the partible motion of the causes, changes the nature of the things produced. It is necessary however, that the mortal nature should exist, in order that the world may be perfect, not divisibly indeed, on account of the intelligible cause of it, but that it may at the same time, be all-variously impressed with

<sup>1</sup> Conformably to this, Claudian in his poem, *De Raptu Proserpinæ*, says of Proserpine,  
*Sensit adesce Deas, imperfectumque laborem*  
*Descriit.*

forms. For such things as the one cause of all winged natures comprehends, these the sensible nature is allotted partibly, and the monad which is there, generates the number that is here. But if these things be admitted, the Demiurgus (intellectually perceiving each of the mortal natures, so far as each is unbegotten, or without generation, because he comprehends that which is mortal in an unbegotten manner,) not only possesses the four ideas [contained in animal itself,] but the sub-divisions also of these, into the unbegotten causes of immortal and of mortal natures. Intelligible animal therefore, is one thing, and the intellectual animal in the Demiurgus another; the latter employing more partial animals, which are more numerous, but less in power, than intelligible animal.

Since however, there are many perfections of the world, for it is perfect, and a whole of wholes, is perfect also from receiving time, and is perfect from comprehending all animals,—hence Plato indicating what the form of this perfection is, adds, “*that it may be sufficiently perfect.*” For it thus will be all-perfect, through containing in itself all animals, embosoming all intelligible and intellectual powers, and receiving the distributed images of all-united paradigms. Why therefore, some one may say, if it is necessary that the world should contain within itself all animals, and likewise mortal natures, through an assimilation to its paradigm,—why, if this be the case, does not the Demiurgus himself constitute these? Plato therefore, immediately subjoins the cause of this, by adding, “*but these participating of life through me will become equal to the Gods.*” By which words he directly confirms what has been before observed, that every thing which is produced by an immoveable cause, is unbegotten and immutable; but that a thing which is produced by an immoveable cause, through a cause that is moved as the medium, is partly unbegotten and partly mutable. For it receives from the immoveable cause unity, but from the moveable cause multitude; and from the former indeed existence, and form; but from the latter individuality, and the being generated, or becoming to be; through which it is preserved according to form, but perishes according to the individual. Since therefore, some one may say, the Demiurgus himself constitutes rational souls, according to which they become equalised to the Gods, how does Plato shortly after call these souls homonymous to divine souls, according to the immortal? Must it not therefore be said that the word *ισαζουτο*, *equalised*, is added with great caution; the Demiurgus not saying that they will be entirely equal to the Gods, but that they will be similar to them? For that which is *equalised*, passes into a *similitude* to the equal. But the equal is a symbol of the mundane Gods, as we may learn from the Parmenides. To which we may add, that the rational form of life when it is purified, and becomes perfect, is divine; so that some persons do not refuse to call

it a God, through a divine nature being exerted in it, according to which also it is conjoined with the truly-existing Gods. And thus much concerning this particular.

It is likewise accurately said, "*through me*." For the mortal genera are generated *by* the Demiurgus, but eternal natures *through* him. For he possesses according to one united cause, both the *by which*, and *through which*. And as father indeed, he produces all things *by* himself; but as the Demiurgus he produces eternal natures *through* himself. And mortal natures are generated in a divided manner *by* him, but *through* the junior Gods. The junior fabrication however must not be despised, because it has the relation of *through* which to the supermundane cause. For more proximate causes have always the order of *through which*, with reference to exempt productions. For *nature is the organ of the junior fabrication, and of nature again, innate heat*. Hence, such Platonists, as for instance the great Theodorus, as adapt to the first cause of all, the *from which*, and *to which*; but to intellect, the *on account of which*, and *with relation to which*; and to soul, the *by which*, and *according to which*, introduce indeed, a certain division of names, which is not inelegant, but wander from the decision of Plato. For he adapts to the demiurgic intellect, the *by which*, and *through which*, and it is not at all necessary to divide names according to the divine orders; except that *on account of which*, denotes the final, but *with relation to which*, the paradigmatic cause. Nothing however hinders us from surveying all these in the Demiurgus; as a God indeed, the *on account of which*; for goodness is the end [of all things]; but as intellective, the *through which*; for he produces through intellective energy, the knowledge not being precedaneous, but contributing through itself to fabrication, energizing previously according to intellect. Moreover, the words *participating of life*, are very divinely added. For what if the whole elements should have been generated by the Demiurgus, viz. fire, and air, earth and water, but at the same time without animation; would they in this case have been equalised to the Gods, in the same manner as we call the earth a God, and fire a God? By no means. For it is soul which primarily deifies total bodies, as it is said in the Laws. But if they were generated *through* him and participate of life *through* him, they will have life and soul. For (*βίος*) life is in souls. And if they have also animation in conjunction with wholeness, they will be equalised to the Gods. For when he first gave a soul to the world, he then first celebrated it as a blessed God, in consequence of soul possessing a deifying power, with reference to every thing corporeal, and being essentially divine.

"That mortal natures therefore may subsist, and that the universe

may be truly all, convert yourselves according to nature to the fabrication of animals, imitating the power which I employed in your generation."

A twofold scope of fabrication is here delivered, one indeed providential, but the other assimilative; the one being more proximate, but the other more total. For to fabricate for the sake of giving subsistence to mortal natures, indicates providence and the perfection<sup>1</sup> of power. For all super-plentitude of power is prolific of other things subordinate to itself. But to fabricate for the sake of giving completion to the universe, indicates an energy according to assimilative power, in order that this universe may be rendered similar to all-perfect animal, in consequence of being adorned with all the numbers of divine and mortal animals. For if all things were immortal, the most divine<sup>2</sup> of sensible natures would be unprolific. And if the universe was not filled with all the forms of life, it would not be perfect, nor sufficiently similar to all-perfect animal. That neither of these defects therefore might happen, the first Demiurgus excites the second fabrication supernally from his own exalted place of survey. He also pours on the mundane Gods vivific and demiurgic power, through which they generate from themselves secondary essences, fill them with life, and give them a specific distinction. For the peculiarity of vivific deity is to vivify, but of demiurgic deity to be productive of form. The expression therefore "*convert yourselves*" is of an exciting nature, and is similar to the mandate of Jupiter to the Gods in Homer.

Haste, to the Greek and Trojan hosts descend.<sup>3</sup>

For as that calls them to the war of generation, so this in Plato excites them to the fabrication of mortals, which they effect through motion. And this indeed is accomplished by all the mundane Gods, but especially by the governors of the world [or the planets], for they are those who are *converted* or turned, and in the most eminent degree by the sovereign Sun. For the Demiurgus gave him dominion over wholes, fabricated him as a guardian, and ordered him, as Orpheus says,

——— O'er all to rule.

The words likewise, "*according to nature*," bound their fabrication according to measure and the good; and besides this, spread under them all physical production as an instrument to their energies. This therefore, which is subservient to their will, they move and govern. And in the third place, these words define their subsistence as media; for it pertains to the middle to fabricate the extremes

<sup>1</sup> For *τελειότητα* here, it is necessary to read *τελειότητα*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τα θεϊα* in this place, it is necessary to read *τα θεϊοτάτα*.

<sup>3</sup> Iliad, 20. v. 24.

according to nature. For things which sometimes have an existence are suspended from those that are perpetual according to time; and the latter are suspended from eternal entities. And primary natures indeed are generative of media; but media are productive of such beings as are last in the series of things. The word "*yourselves*" also, which denotes manual operation, excites the divine lives themselves to fabrication. Nor ought we to wonder whence demiurgic power is derived to divine souls, this being the peculiarity of the superessential Gods. For as Orpheus placing an intellectual essence in Jupiter, renders it demiurgic, thus also Plato producing words from the father, evinces that the souls which rank as wholes are divine and demiurgic. Nor must we doubt why of mundane natures<sup>1</sup> some are immortal but others mortal, since all of them are generated according to intelligible causes; for some of them proceed from one, but others from another proximate producing cause. And it is necessary to look to these, and not to paradigms alone. Nor must we investigate ideas of Socrates, Plato, or of any thing that ranks as a particular. For the Demiurgus divides mortal animals according to genera, and stops at total intellections; and through these comprehends every thing of a partial nature. For as the Demiurgus makes that which is material immaterially, and that which is generated ingenerably, thus also he produces mortal natures immortally.<sup>2</sup> For he makes these indeed, but through the junior Gods; since prior to their making, he made by intellection alone. Nor must we deny that mortal natures subsist also divinely, and not mortally only. For the things which the Demiurgus now extends in his speech are hypostases or subsisting natures, about the junior or mundane Gods, which the heavens primarily receive; and according to which the Gods fabricate the mortal genera. For the monads of every mortal-formed life proceed into the heavens from the intelligible forms. But from these monads which are divine, all the multitude of material animals is generated. For if we adopt these conceptions we shall accord with Plato, and shall not wander from the nature of things.

Again, when the Demiurgus says, "*Imitating the power which I employed in your generation,*" we must understand by this, that an assimilation to the one exempt fabrication of things, and a conversion to it, is the highest end of the second fabrication. For it is necessary that self-motive<sup>3</sup> should follow immoveable natures, and such as are very mutable such as are always moved, and that there should be perpetually a series of secondary beings assimilated to those that

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *δια τῶν ἐγκοσμιῶν*, it is necessary to read *ἐκ τῶν ἐγκοσμιῶν*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ἀθανάτως* is omitted in the original.

<sup>3</sup> For *αὐτοκίνητα* here, it is necessary to read *αὐτοκίνητα*.

are prior to them. Since however there was a divine will, and a divine power in the Demiurgus, he unfolds his will to the mundane Gods through *learning*; and through this perfects their demiurgic will. But he unfolds his power to them through this *imitation*, according to which he orders them to imitate the power of the one Demiurgus, conformably to which they were generated by him. For by saying that which he wills, he imparts to them will; and by saying that which he is able to effect, he supplies them with power. And in the last place, he demonstrates them to be secondary fabricators, imitators of their father. Whether therefore there is a mundane power, or an efficacious energy of demons, or a fortitude and supernatural strength of heroes, to all this the Demiurgus gives subsistence, and imparts it to those that give completion to the whole of the second fabrication. For the first power is in him, and the monad of demiurgic powers. Since however, he is also intellect and father, all things will be in him, viz. father, the power of the father, and the paternal intellect. Hence Plato was not ignorant of this division; and on this account the Demiurgus as being father, calls power his power. This also he manifests by adding, "*which I employed in your generation.*" For the father is the cause of this in conjunction with power; just as father here, in conjunction with the female, is the cause of the propagation of the human species. [For power is of a feminine characteristic.]

"And so far indeed, as among such of these as are always willing to follow justice and you, it is fit there should be that which is homonymous to the immortals,<sup>1</sup> which is called divine, and which has dominion in these, —of this I will deliver the seed and beginning."

The fabrication of all animals, is divided into the generation of divine and mortal animals; and again, the generation of the latter is complicated from the immortal, and a certain mortal nature, yet not the whole of the latter, but that part of it which possesses a rational form of life, whether there be something of this kind in aerial, or pedestrian animals, or in those that have an intermediate subsistence. For plants being animals according to Plato,<sup>2</sup> are mortal, not having a rational animating soul, as he clearly says. The father of wholes also, constitutes by himself all the fabrication of divine animals, and the rational form of the life of mortals, which is surveyed in each of the three genera. That which remains likewise, the Demiurgus constitutes indeed, but he delivers the generation

<sup>1</sup> In the text of Proclus, *αθάνατος* is erroneously printed for *αθάνατος*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αἴατα* here, read *αὐτοῖς*.

of it to the junior Gods, and evinces them to be the lords of all the mortal nature. He also receiving every thing visible which was moved in a disorderly manner, and which had a prior existence from another cause, brought it into order from disorder. Thus therefore, he delivers the ends of the production of the universe to other powers, viz. to the junior Gods. Hence, in consequence of receiving and delivering, he is a medium between the intelligible God, who subsists according to animal itself, and the many Demiurgi. What then, does he not deliver to the mundane Gods the generation of that in us, which is homonymous to the immortals, if they also are certain fathers of the immortals themselves, as we may learn from the Theogony? Or is he not represented by Plato thus speaking, in order that we may know, that the one Demiurgus is the cause of all things, since he produced the first of immortals, and those beings that are homonymous to the immortals? For if he had committed the generation of the latter to the junior Gods, he might appear to be the [immediate] cause of the celestials alone, producing sublunary natures from these, but souls from all these. He has however contrived, through the production of the extremes, to exhibit the generation of all the natures that are immortal, whatsoever they may be, from the one Demiurgus. This also he afterwards shows when he says, that the Demiurgus is the father of immortals, but that he committed to other Gods the generation of mortals. And thus much concerning the whole design of these words.

From these things however, we are impelled to speak freely against those Platonists, who assert that our soul is of equal dignity with the Gods, and is of the same essence with divine souls; and also against those who say that it becomes intellect itself, the intelligible itself, and *the one* itself, leaving every soul behind it, and being established according to union. For Plato is very far from asserting a thing of this kind concerning it, since he calls it homonymously immortal with divine souls. Nor does it, according to him, sustain this from generation, but is allotted this order from the Demiurgus, and is *called* divine, but is not *simply* divine. For *the divine* pertains to undefiled souls, and which are always intellective; and *the immortal*, to those souls that are established remote from mortal natures. But that which falls into generation, has an essence of this kind, and is capable of being mingled with mortal natures; is neither simply divine, nor immortal. And again, you see other media and an order of other things. For some beings are primarily immortal; others, are immortal indeed, but secondarily; others are homonymously immortal; and others are mortal. For the nature of beings extends as far as to these; and beyond these, is that which in no respect whatever is. It must neither therefore be said, that our soul is simply divine, nor that it is simply immortal, though it is frequently demonstrated to be immortal. But it neither has immortality primarily, nor the immortality which has a secondary sub-



sistence, yet exists genuinely, but it has that which is mingled with the mortal nature; to which some directing their attention, have apprehended that it is mortal. Moreover, neither must we admit that it is the same with forms separate from matter, or with irrational lives. For it is allotted, as Plato here says, a ruling nature by the father by whom it was generated. Hence it is natural to it to have dominion over the irrational life. It likewise follows Justice and the Gods, as being converted to, filled from, and attending on them. Every such form of life therefore, as the rational, derives its subsistence from the one fabrication. For it is necessary that it should be produced by intellect, and by total intellect. For there are these three things, that which is of the same order, but is total; that which is of a more excellent order, but is partial; and that which is of a more excellent order, and is total. For the fourth is not attended with any ambiguity with respect to generating; since it does not<sup>1</sup> differ from the thing generated. For this is partial, and the one is of the same order with the other. It is impossible however, that the nature which is arranged in the more excellent order, but is partial, should have the same dominion over the generation of things as wholes. For it is entirely necessary that what is truly a cause, should predominate. And that which is total indeed, but exists of the same order, has not the true power of generating, as being of one series [with the thing generated]. Hence, that alone is the most principle cause, which is a whole in the more excellent order; in consequence of surpassing its progeny in both respects. The Demiurgus therefore produces and fabricates other things in conjunction with this. And on this account, the [partial] soul proceeds indeed, primarily from the Demiurgus, secondarily from the total soul of the universe, and proximately from a partial intellect. But by a partial intellect, I mean that intellect which is in the order of intelligibles, what a partial soul is, in the series of souls. This intellect therefore, makes the soul to be partial; but the total soul makes it to be rational. And the Demiurgus makes it to be both. Hence he is primarily cause. On this account we here say, that the Demiurgus presides over the generation of the soul. But in the *Philebus*, Plato gives to the partial soul an essence, from the total soul. For as the fire which is in us, is from the mundane fire, and the earth, water, and air, which are in us, are from the wholes [of these elements], thus also he says, that the partial soul which is there mentioned, is generated from the soul of the universe. And thus much concerning this particular.

Plato likewise, very properly co-arranges Justice with the mundane Gods.

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *το γὰρ* in this place, it is necessary to read *οὐ γὰρ*.

For Justice is, as Orpheus says, the companion of Jupiter; since, according to him,

Laborious Justice follows Jove.——

And the Athenian guest also asserts, that Justice always follows Jupiter. But Justice is co-established with the mundane Gods, and governs in conjunction with them, the universe according to desert. For from the middle of the solar sphere, it entirely extends its providential inspection, and disseminates the distribution of good.

What however, are we to understand by the *semination*? Is it that which many of the Platonists so much speak of, the distribution of souls about the stars? For Plato says, that the Demiurgus disseminated some of them into the earth, others into the sun, and others into the moon. And we admit that there is a two-fold semination, one about the Gods, but the other about generation, which is delivered in the Politicus. Now, however, Plato refers the cause of the essence of souls to the Demiurgus. For it is necessary, that they should first be generated, and thus afterwards, that different souls should be distributed about different leaders. It is better therefore, according to the decision of our preceptor, to understand by this semination, generation; since it pertains to father to disseminate, and to generate reasons [or productive powers]. For soul is a reason of reasons, and proceeds from the father who is the Demiurgus of wholes. For this indeed, is the first semination. The second is that which is about the junior Gods. And the third, is about the realms of generation. And of the first indeed, divine souls participate; but of the second, daemons. For the orders of these, are distributed about the Gods. But the third alone pertains to the souls that are distributed about generation. Very properly also does the Demiurgus say that he will deliver the *beginning*, or that he will *begin* the production of the rational soul; because other causes also, generate it in conjunction with the Demiurgus; I mean for instance, such causes as the vivific. He likewise very properly says this, because he generates the vehicle of the soul, and all the life contained in it, which the junior Gods weave together with the mortal form of life. Hence it appears to me that the immortal is assumed in both [the rational soul and its vehicle], this being common, and not the rational; and that it is indicated that this proceeds from the one fabrication, by the words, "*and so far as among these, it is fit there should be that which is homonymous to the immortals.*" For every vehicle together with its appropriate life, and the rational soul from which it is suspended, is essentially perpetual. Both therefore, are generated by the Demiurgus, accord-

ing to a similitude of the stars, the souls, and the vehicles of which the Demi-urgus produces. He disseminates the soul therefore, generating as the father of reasons; but producing the vehicle, he delivers the *beginning*. For this is now the beginning of the mortal-formed life.

“It is your \* business to accomplish the rest, and to weave together the immortal \* and mortal nature.”

What this immortal, and also what this mortal nature is, is unfolded by the interpreters of Plato. And some indeed, leaving the rational soul alone immortal, destroy all the irrational life, and the pneumatic vehicle of the soul, giving a subsistence to both these, through the tendency of the soul to generation. But they alone preserve intellect immortal, as alone remaining, and being assimilated to the Gods, and not suffering corruption. Such is the explanation of the more ancient interpreters, who follow the words of Plato, and decide through what cause he destroys the irrational part, which they call the mortal nature, I mean the Attiuses and Albinuses, and such like. But others more moderate and mild than these, such as Porphyry and his followers, refuse indeed to admit this corruption, as it is called, which dissipates the vehicle and the irrational soul; but they say that these are renovated and analysed after a certain manner into the spheres from which they were allotted their composition. They add, that these are mixtures derived from the celestial spheres, and collected by the soul as she descends; so that these exist, and yet do not exist. For they have no individuality, nor does the peculiarity of them remain. And the authors of these assertions appear to follow the [Chaldean] Oracles, which in speaking of the descent of the soul say, that it collects as it descends, a portion of ether, of the sun and the moon, and such things as are contained in the air. Against these however, the words of Plato must be adduced, in which he evidently does not destroy the whole of the irrational nature. And again, in the third place, there are others, who taking away all corruption from the irrational nature, do not simply give an hypostasis to it, from divine bodies, lest being generated from moveable causes, it should be essentially mutable, but from the Gods themselves who govern the world, and produce all things eternally.

Such therefore, and so many being the opinions on this subject, there is an explanation of it, which immediately preserves the mortal nature, and accords

\* In the text of Proclus, *ημεν* is erroneously printed for *ημεν*.

\* Here also for *θαυαρν*, read *αθαυαρν*.

with things themselves, and all the Platonic dogmas. For that Plato is of opinion, that the irrational life is preserved, after the corruption of the material body, he renders evident by delivering to us the soul punished in Hades, through anger and desire, though it does not require any punishment, so far as it is liberated from all passion. For it was pure reason, and prior to body, in its elections of lives, chose through voracity such as are tyrannical, and through the desire of glory, sophistical and popular lives. And these things happen to the soul in its first descent from the heavens, and to the soul that has been recently perfected. But that he preserves the vehicle of the soul perpetual, is evident from his representing souls using their vehicles in Hades. For ascending into their vehicles, as Socrates says in the *Phædo*, they pass over the river. Now also, he generates the vehicle from the Demiurgus. For it is he who causes the soul to ascend into its vehicle, according to the similitude of divine souls. For how could it be possible for the soul to be mundane, except by having a vehicle in the universe? For every thing mundane has a seat and order in the world, and gives completion to a part of it. Whether therefore, will a partial soul be better prior to the suspension of a vehicle from it, or worse? For if better, it will be more divine than total souls, to which the Demiurgus gave vehicles. But if worse, how is it, that the Demiurgus immediately after it was generated, caused it to ascend into a vehicle? For things that are perpetual, do not begin from a preternatural, but from a natural condition of being. It is evident therefore, that these things are conformable to the opinion of Plato.

Since however, he here clearly calls that which is woven together by the mundane Gods, mortal, is therefore that which is asserted by some true, that he says the life which is in the vehicle is woven by the junior Gods; that he denominates it mortal, because it is corporeal-formed, and is conversant with the mortal nature; and that in a certain place, he calls that which is woven by the junior Gods immortal, in order that we may apprehend the mortal nature which is here mentioned to be a thing of this kind? But how does he deliver to us universally, that the Demiurgus is the cause of immortal natures, and that the generation of mortals is committed to the junior Gods? Hence, after the delivery of fabrication, the junior Gods are alone the Demiurgi of mortal natures. Is therefore that true, which is asserted by some, that the vehicle and the irrational soul both remain and are dissolved, through being analysed into the spheres from which they were derived; and that on this account they are mortal, and yet not mortal? This however, is of itself absurd. For when the union is dissolved, how can we any longer say that the same thing remains? For the irrational soul is not a coaccervation of animals, but one multiform life. In addition also to these things, it must

be admitted, that at one time something is taken away from, and at another, something is added to the celestial bodies, which is entirely foreign from their nature. Is the irrational soul therefore corruptible, and shall we admit that this life is dissipated together with the body? But if this be the case, how will there be punishments, how will there be purifications, how will there be elections of lives, some according to the phantasy, others according to anger, and others according to desire, and also the ingressions <sup>1</sup> into irrational animals? For the contact with the analogous is through analogy,<sup>2</sup> just as the contact with intellect, is through intellect.

Will it not therefore be better to say with our preceptor, that the spirit, [or pneumatic part of the soul,] comprehends the summits of the irrational life, and that these exist perpetually, together with the vehicle, as being produced by the Demiurgus? And that these being extended and distributed into parts, make this life which is woven by the junior Gods, and which is mortal, because it is necessary that the soul should lay aside this distribution, when having obtained purification it is restored to its pristine state of felicity? This life however, is of longer duration than the life of the present body; and hence the soul when in Hades, and choosing different lives, has a life of this kind. For through its propensity, or inclination [to body], it receives this mortal life from the junior Gods. If therefore, this be admitted, the Demiurgus constitutes the summit of the irrational life, but does not constitute the life itself. For in producing demons, he evidently produces likewise the irrational life which is in them, but not this life, which the junior Gods weave in us. For this is alone adapted to souls that fall into generation. The mundane Gods therefore, having themselves intellectual souls, illuminate their vehicles with rational-formed lives. But demons, who are peculiarly defined according to reason, employ irrational powers, over which they have dominion. And our souls have much more a life in the vehicle which is irrational, as with reference to them. But in this, they exceed demons, that they receive another irrational life, which is a departure from the life in the spirit, and which is woven by the junior Gods. Hence, all that is immortal, which it possesses according to an imitation of wholes; but the addition pertains to a second, or mortal-formed life. If therefore, in the [ethereal] vehicle, there is one impassive life, this will generate in the pneumatic vehicle, one passive sense; and this latter will generate in the testaceous [or this outward] body, many and passive senses. The orectic power likewise, in the ethereal vehicle will produce many orectic powers in the pneuma-

<sup>1</sup> For *δυσαις* here, it is necessary to read *εἰσδυσαις*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *πῶς δι' ἀλογίας γὰρ* in this place, it is necessary to read *δι' ἀναλογίας γὰρ*.

tic vehicle, which will possess something separate from the testaceous body, and capable of being disciplined. And these will produce in this outward body, ultimate and material orectic powers. Since however, parts energize in conjunction with wholes, the Gods by a much greater priority, the causes of these secondarily operative powers and the powers of souls, produce together with them things analogous to themselves. Hence also they inspire and corroborate that which they produce. And that Plato indeed, gives here to the soul a certain vehicle, is evident. For shortly after, he represents the soul ascending as into a vehicle, and thus makes it to be mundane, and a citizen of the world.

It is likewise necessary to understand, that he gives a subsistence to the irrational soul, prior to this outward body. For if this be not admitted, one of two things must follow, either that producing the irrational soul in that vehicle, he does not establish it in another vehicle, or that he constitutes it in this outward body alone.\* But if the latter be the case, this soul may very properly be called mortal; and we shall no longer be able to preserve what is said of it elsewhere, I mean, the elections of lives, and the punishments in Hades, in which there is entirely the irrational nature. And if we say that this soul is in the [ethereal] vehicle, it will be necessarily immortal, and the assertion which immortalizes it will predominate, and it will be no longer true, that the one Demiurgus is the cause of immortals, but the many Demiurgi, of mortal natures. By showing therefore, as we have said, that the junior Gods produce the irrational soul prior to this outward body, and that another pneumatic vehicle, such as Aristotle also admitted, exists together, and is co-introduced with our immortal vehicle, but is at the same time mortal, all that produces our doubts on this subject will be dissolved. These things however, will, as we proceed, become more apparent. But whence the junior Gods commence their fabrication, what media they possess, and what ends they employ, the philosopher through these things sufficiently teaches.

“Elaborate and generate animals, cause them to increase by giving them nutriment, and receive them back again, when dissolved by corruption.”

The generation of the irrational life, of which the vehicle of the soul comprehends the summits, is therefore the beginning of the fabrication. But since the complete production and generation of animals, proceeds together with this, hence the Demiurgus orders the junior Gods to elaborate and generate animals, weav-

\* For *τομῶν* here, it is necessary to read *μορῶν*.

ing together the mortal with the immortal nature. And this he says indefinitely, and not all animals; because Plato further on, calls plants also animals, and shows that it is requisite thus to denominate them. Through the immortal soul therefore, the junior Gods produce animals, viz. such as not only possess the last form of life, the *epithymetic*, and are on this account called animals, but likewise every mortal animal. If however, the Demiurgus calls on the junior Gods not only to fabricate man, weaving together the mortal with the immortal nature, but likewise animals, they evidently fabricate all other animals. Hence Timæus very properly, towards the end of this dialogue, represents other animals as generated, through the transformation of the human soul into them, and this conformably to the demiurgic mandate, the junior Gods alone producing plants, without the assistance of this soul. For in these, there is not a rational soul. And because this soul is the principle of motion, it is necessary that it should be the principle of the first motion to animals. But the first motion to these, is that which is according to place, as Aristotle also has shown. So that every animal which is moved according to place, has a self-motive soul present with it. On this account, a plant rooted in the earth, has not this soul; so that the junior Gods very properly generate and elaborate other animals except plants, by weaving together the mortal with the immortal nature. But they afford other animals nutriment, by contriving the generation of plants, through which men and other animals are nourished. For nothing hinders certain animals from being nourished by such things as afford nutriment to men, and also by other things, to which their nature is allied, in the same manner as the nature of the animals, by which we are nourished, is allied to us. Through this elaboration therefore, the junior Gods give completion to the production of the one Demiurgus. For he imparts the beginning [or summit] only, but they elaborate, and through generation constitute the whole animal. And through elaboration indeed, they imitate the demiurgic power, but through generation, the paternal' power. Through elaboration also, they produce the mortal-formed parts of rational animals; but through generation, irrational animals, so far as they are irrational. For they constitute the whole of such like animals. But if they receive the immortal nature which the Demiurgus produces, and which he orders them to weave with the mortal nature, and thus to fabricate animals, it is evident that according to the demiurgic will, every soul has an immortal prior to the mortal life; and that the junior Gods elaborate the latter, but the one Demiurgus the former. And if indeed, the Demiurgus constituted both irrational and rational

<sup>1</sup> For *μενέμενον* in this place, it is necessary to read *παρμένον*.

souls, nothing would hinder that which is immortal in them from being irrational; *but since here, he alone generates rational souls, to whom also he speaks, inserting in them the laws of Fate, it is evident that every animal which is properly an animal, by participating of local motion, has necessarily a rational and immortal soul.* Plato therefore, when he transfers the soul into irrational habitations, does not assent to those who say that these are human souls, according to the irrational animal belonging to men, but that they are truly the souls of irrational animals. For it is not only evident that he asserts this through these arguments, but likewise from what he says of other animals, in the generation of mortal natures, viz. that the generation of all of them is effected through the human soul, from which transferring<sup>1</sup> it into different animals, he fashions the ideas of bodies, according to the transition of this, and according to the form of life, through the exertion of which, it receives a habitude to these animals. The father therefore, orders the junior Gods to elaborate and generate all animals, by weaving together the mortal with the immortal nature. And we have shown that the immortal nature is twofold, viz. the soul and its vehicle, and in a similar manner, that the mortal nature is twofold, and that the one is analogous to the other, viz. mortal to immortal natures.

In the next place, the gift of nutriment is perfective of mortals. Hence the junior Gods produced all plants, for the sake of more honorable natures. The Demiurgus therefore, is very far from admitting the eating of animals, since after the generation of all animals, he orders the junior Gods to produce for them nutriment. The fabrication also of these Gods beautifully ends, according to the will of the father, in regeneration. For to receive back again things which are corrupted, is nothing else than a renewal of generation, and a revocation of corruption to generation. For through this, nothing departs into that which has no existence whatever; because the Gods who preside over generation, conjoin the periods of it with their own periods, and make generation to be in continuity with corruption, giving form to the non-being of the latter, and circularly leading privation into *morphe*. The Demiurgus therefore, inserted in the junior Gods the fabrication of mortal natures from the beginning, and the cause of regeneration; just as he inserted the fabrication of all mundane natures in the monad of the junior Gods, [i. e. in Bacchus,] which also Orpheus denominates the Juvenile God. You see therefore, how the Demiurgus imparts to them unifying and deifying powers, by calling them Gods of Gods; connective and stable powers, through the medium of the dissoluble and indissoluble; gnostic powers through discipline; perfective powers, through

<sup>1</sup> For *μεγιστας* here, read *μεθιστας*.



giving perfection to the world by the addition of mortals ; demiurgic powers, through fabrication ; and motive and assimilative powers, through the imitation of the father. And again, you may say that he imparted to them Vulcanian powers, through the energy according to nature ; Minerval powers, through the command to weave together the mortal with the immortal nature ; Cerealian and Coric powers, through the command to generate and nourish ; Titannic powers, through ordering them to produce mortal and perishable natures ; and Dionysiacal powers, through regeneration. For the things which they generate they receive back again, when they are corrupted, returning them to the wholes from which they were derived, and distributing each to its proper source ; from these wholes again receiving other parts, and compounding them into the generation of other things. For all the elements are spread under them, in order to the generation of mortal animals, and they perpetually and without ceasing, give completion to the circle of generations and corruptions. Hence, they receive such things as they imparted to generated natures, when they are corrupted, and deliver to wholes that which they took from them. This likewise has an infinite permutation, through the immobility [i. e. immutability] of all the Gods that fabricate mortal natures.

“ These things spake the father to those to whom he committed the fabrication [of mortal natures]. ”

Plato divides the whole of the fabrication of things into the generation of divine, and the generation of mortal natures. The generation of divine natures likewise, he divides into that of the whole world prior to its parts, and into that of the great and perpetual parts which it contains. And again, he divides the latter into the generation of celestial and sublunary natures. But again, he divides the generation of mortal natures into the production of that which is divine, and immortal in them, and the plastic generation of all that is mortal. The latter likewise he divides into the production of souls and bodies. And the production of bodies, into that of wholes, and parts, such as the head, the heart, and the liver. And the Demiurgus of wholes indeed, binds to himself all the first fabrication ; but of the second, he again, producing that which is immortal in it, places over the remainder the many Demiurgi. For these being the plastic framers of mortal animals, and being always themselves filled with life, impart to that which is mortal in the second fabrication ; their own providential energy, so far as it is able to receive it, and fill it with genesiurgic life and material fabrication. For every-

where the last of things are constituted by those that rank as media; and the media between the first immortals, and mortal natures, are those that are always filled with perpetually-generated life. The natures therefore, that are immortal from themselves, resemble the fountains of water; but those that are filled from these, may be assimilated to perpetually flowing rivers; and those that are sometimes vivified, and sometimes<sup>1</sup> lose their life, to rivers that cease to flow. But everywhere, that which is more full, desires to fill, and hastens to generate. Hence, it is necessary that media should impart from themselves a progression to the last of things, and those that are always filled with life, a progression to those that are sometimes able to live. And thus much concerning the order of the things with reference to each other.

But the words "*These things spake*," bring with them an admirable indication. And in the first place, indeed, they indicate the perfect, and that which is filled with appropriate boundaries. For not being able to comprehend in one word the unical perfection, eternal energy, and infinite power of divine natures, we apprehend these in a divisible manner through temporal names; signifying indeed, perfection through the past, but the never-failing through the present. The word *spake* therefore, is a symbol of the *perfection* of demiurgic intellections. For as they are all-perfect, so likewise are the demiurgic words, which are the energies of them, and which proceed to the multitude of the Gods. Thus too, in the [Chaldean] Oracles, the energies of the Gods, and of the father himself, are manifested through the word *spake*, as when they say; "The intellect of the eternal father, governing all things by intellect, *spake* and *said*, into three." For *to speak* is neither the energy of existence, nor of life, but of intellection. This then is the first thing which the words indicate. But farther still, this word *spake* manifests that *words* are adapted to souls; for *to speak*, is an energy familiar and allied to these. For from *το επος*, a word, *το ειπειν*, to speak, is derived. But reason (*λογος*) or speech, pertains to souls, and to the order of souls, as Plato observed before, when he spake of reason energizing about the intelligible, and the sensible nature, and when he called *to perceive intellectually*, *to speak*. Again, the addition of the words *these things*, unites the multitude of intellections, about the one intelligence of the Demiurgus, and collects the divided powers of speech to the monad of the paternal intellection. It is necessary likewise to understand this concerning divine speeches in Plato, that all of them are either addressed to souls, or are on account of souls. Thus the speech of the Muses, and that of the prophet, in the Republic, are addressed to souls. But the speech in the Banquet by Aristot-

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *τα δε απολειποντα*, it is necessary to read, *ποτε δε απολειποντα*.

planes, and also that which is delivered in the *Politicus*,<sup>1</sup> are on account of souls; the former, pertaining to souls that are about to descend; but the latter, to those that are conversant with generation. And the reason of this is, as we have said, because speech especially pertains to souls.

“And again, into the former *Crater*, in which mingling he had tempered the soul of the universe, he poured mingling, the remainder of the former things.”

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That the demiurgic intelligence is production, and that these do not differ from each other in the Gods, but that with them to perceive intellectually, and to make are the same thing, and that no other motion is necessary to the generation of things, but that they constitute all things by their very being or existence is manifested by these words. For the Demiurgus having spoke, immediately turns to the Crater, and to the mixture<sup>2</sup> of the genera. Nor is there any thing between these, but the delivery of the works separate from the words arises from our imbecility, not being able to perceive in one, the exempt intelligence of the father, and his production which constitutes partial souls. That the genus also of partial souls proceeds according to each order, and entirely differs from divine souls, is indicated by these words, to those that are not perfectly blind; since they are constituted separately, and in a different time. And this not only arises from the imbecility of language, but is assumed conformably to the nature of things. For in reality, if you assume participated time, there is not the same time in total and in partial souls; since neither is there the same intellection, nor the same form of motion; but the time of divine souls is one thing, and that of partial souls another. Farther still, Plato produces partial souls from the same father indeed, yet not entirely so. For the word *again* indicates, that the progression of these is according to a more partial power of the Demiurgus, and is in a certain respect the same, and yet not the same, with that which is prior to it. For because the *again* is not temporal (since it is not lawful in eternal natures, that there should be a certain difference of energies according to time) it alone manifests an order of fabrications causally different; so that in a certain respect there is the same, and not the same, father.

Farther still, partial are from the same Crater as total souls, yet at the same time with diminution. For divine souls indeed, abide and proceed in the Crater,

<sup>1</sup> For Πλατωνικῇ here, it is necessary to read Πολιτικῇ.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of τὰν here, it is necessary to read μίαν.

and do not depart from thence. But our souls are entirely separated from it, and the separation of them is manifest. To which we may also add, that the genera are the same and different. For all souls are from the middle genera, but some are from the first of these, and others from the remains and last of the mixture, from which those prior to them were constituted. Again, the mode likewise, is at once the same, and not the same: for in partial souls, difference is more abundant [than sameness.] Hence also in speaking of these, there is a more frequent mention of mixture. We must not therefore admit the opinion of those more recent interpreters, who endeavour to show that our soul is of an equal dignity, or of the same essence, or I know not how they wish to speak, with a divine soul; though Plato asserts that partial souls are deficient in a second and third degree, separates them from the Crater, and produces them from the Demiurgus, according to a secondary, which is the same thing as according to a more partial intelligence. For he who says these things introduces essential differences of souls, and not differences according to energies alone, as the divine Plotinus shows. For let it be admitted that some of them look to total, but others to partial intellects; that some employ undefiled intellections, but others sometimes abandon real beings; that some always fabricate and adorn wholes, but others sometimes revolve in conjunction with the Gods; that some always move and govern Fate, but others sometimes become situated under Fate, and fatal laws; that some are leaders to the intelligible, but others sometimes are allotted the order of followers; that some are alone divine, but others are at different times transferred to a different order, either demoniacal, or heroical, or human; that some employ horses, all of which are good, and consist of things that are good, but others, such as are mingled from good and evil; that some have that life alone, which they received from the one fabrication, but others have also the mortal form, which was woven by the junior Gods; and that some energize according to all their powers, but others exert different lives at different times. Let these therefore, be the differences of souls, yet essential commutation and demiurgic division, precede all these. For through these, they are separated by time, by cause, by progression, by the mode of subsistence, and by diminution of genera. As they differ therefore, by all these particulars, how is it possible that they should be of the same essence? For,

Ne'er can the tribe of men that live on earth,  
Be like th' immortal Gods.

The rational nature itself likewise, is different. For in the Gods it is intellectual, but in our souls it is mingled with the irrational nature. And in the middle genera, it is defined according to its own medium. This is also the case with each

of the rest, viz. with the reasons, the form of life, intelligence, and time. For these subsist divinely in divine souls, but after a human manner in ours. And thus much against those who fancy that our soul is of the same essence with the soul of the universe, and with other divine souls, and that we are all things unaccompanied with habitude, viz. the planets, and the fixed stars, and other things in the same manner as the stars, as Theodorus Asinaus also, somewhere says. For such magnificent language on this subject, is very remote from the theory of Plato.

With respect to the Crater however, let us see what it is, what order it possesses with reference to the Demiurgus, and what are the particulars of which it is the cause to souls. For there is much discussion concerning this, and it deserves the most ample consideration. The above-mentioned Theodorus therefore, makes a twofold Crater, and asserts that the mixture is one of these. For the second Crater, according to him, is the mixture; but the other Crater consists of the portions of the mixture, viz. the soul of the universe, the souls of the celestial Gods, and our souls. For he calls soul itself the first Crater, this being the universal soul; but he denominates the Crater and at the same time the mixture, the second Crater; though Plato speaks of one Crater, and in it mingles all souls, some primarily, and others secondarily, but makes no mention whatever of a second Crater, nor of a mixture in it. For if there was a second Crater, what occasion would there be for the use of the first, in the generation of our souls? I wonder therefore, that the most laborious Atticus, should say that he found in the Timæus a twofold Crater, since it is usual with him to follow strictly the words of Plato. At the same time however, in interpreting the Phædrus, he makes mention of the twofold Crater. But according to the divine Iamblichus, the Crater is the one vivific cause, comprehensive of the whole of life, and collective of it; itself sustaining itself, by certain demiurgic reasons, which pervade through all life, and through the whole psychical orders, but allotting to each soul in its proper order, appropriate measures of connexion; allotting to some from the beginning first measures, through the first mixture, but secondary measures, to those that have been again mingled. For such as is the order which they have with reference to each other, such also is the progression which they are allotted from the Crater, receiving from thence the boundaries of life. Such therefore, are the dogmas which we have received from these men.

Our preceptor however, surveying real beings from on high, as from a watch-tower, and following the narration of theologists, places in the father himself and Demiurgus of wholes, a prolific power, according to which imitating the intelligible God, he possesses both a maternal and paternal cause with reference to the mundane Gods, being himself the source of essence, of life, and of form.

Since however, it is necessary<sup>1</sup> there should be a definite and separate cause of the psychical life, fabricating in conjunction with the Demiurgus the whole world, and generating all the psychical essence, this cause, he says, is delivered to us through the Crater. He adds, that theologists arcanelly asserting that which they assert, have devised marriages and offspring of the Gods, through which they obscurely signify the kindred communion of progeny in the Gods; but that Plato mythologically introduced mixtures and com-mixtures, assuming the genera of being instead of seeds, but mixture instead of marriage. For souls indeed, according to the being which is in them, were produced by the Demiurgus; but according to the life which is in them, from the Crater. For this is the vivific cause of essential life. Since however, they are in a greater degree *lives* than *beings*, and are allied to the vivific order; on this account, the mixture originated from the Demiurgus, but is perfected in the Crater. For this on all sides comprehends in itself the genera of souls, and generates them in conjunction with the Demiurgus. These therefore are four, viz. he who mingles, the Crater, the things mingled, and the mixture. And the first indeed, has the order of father; the second is generative, and definitive of the form of souls; the third, proceeds from both, but in a greater degree from the father; and the fourth is formalized, according to the generative cause, so as to become one thing, through the Crater.

But if it be requisite to develop the conceptions of our preceptor on this subject, it must be observed that as the vivific deity,<sup>2</sup> comprehends in itself all the fountains of life, viz. such as are generative of souls, and of the diemoniacal order, such as bring forth the angelic series, and such as produce nature in the last of things,—one certain vivific deity<sup>3</sup> proceeds from it, which is the fountain of all the progression and generation of souls, and which being co-arranged with the Demiurgus, produces together with him, the whole psychical order, every supermundane and mundane soul, and proceeds to all things, and vivifies the whole world. Orpheus celebrates this vivific deity as equal to the Demiurgus, and connecting and conjoining it with him, makes it to be the one mother of all the things of which Jupiter is the father. But Plato calls it the Crater, as being the fountain of the psychical life. For this Crater receives the generative energy of the father of souls, and according to this the form of souls receives its specific distinction; whence also this form is called a mixture. Jupiter indeed contains in himself a royal soul, as Socrates says in the *Philebus*; but he likewise contains this fountain, which co-operates with him in the production of the psychical order.

<sup>1</sup> It is requisite here, to supply the word &c.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Rhea.

<sup>3</sup> i. e. Juno.

And the Barbarians call this vivific cause the fountal soul, which is unfolded into light, together with fountal virtue,<sup>1</sup> from the intestines of the whole vivific Goddess, in which the fountains of all life, the divine, the angelic, the demoniacal, and the psychical, are contained. But the theologist of the Greeks denominates this vivific cause Juno, who presents herself to the view together with Vesta, from the mighty Rhea, who comprehends in herself all the vivific powers, and who at last brings forth Nature herself; though he conjoins Juno with the Demiurgus, as mother with father, and represents her as the source of all the Titanic division, which is surveyed in souls, according to portions, and the cause of separation. Plato however assumes the Crater, the mixture and the portions; for the Crater is the cause of the division of the portions. Hence, he does not divide, till he has disseminated the genera in the Crater.

In short therefore, being impelled by these observations, we say, it is evident that the Crater is different from the Demiurgus. For every where, he who mingles, the Crater, and the things that are mingled, are distinguished from each other. For it is also evident, that the Crater is different from the Demiurgus, because it is psychogonic, or generative of soul. For neither in the production of intellect, nor in the fabrication of bodies, is the Crater assumed, but alone in giving subsistence to souls; because mixture is adapted to these, as being of a middle nature. But if the Crater is psychogonic, it is doubtless peculiarly<sup>2</sup> the cause of souls. And if it is co-ordinate with the Demiurgus, lest it should be in want of things posterior to itself, or should have something more total than itself, and thus should not be entirely the cause of all the things, of which the Demiurgus is the cause, but he is an intellectual God, and the best of causes;—if this be the case, the Crater likewise is intellectual; and if the former is fountal, the latter also is fountal. And why is it necessary to observe, that the Barbarians likewise, call the partial causes<sup>3</sup> [of soul] fountal Craters? This Crater therefore, is a fountal Crater; since it is the cause of souls so far as they are souls, and not of all life. For it is neither the cause of intellectual, nor of physical life. Plato likewise elsewhere calls soul itself the fountain of prudence; and in the Phædrus, he denominates it the fountain and principle of motion. Much more therefore, should we call according to him, the first soul fountal, and the Crater fountal, if there is a Crater established with the Demiurgus of wholes; since other Craters also are delivered both by Orpheus

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Vesta. For, according to the Chaldeans, as we learn from Proclus on the Cratylus, Rhea contains Juno, the fountain of souls, in her right-hand parts, and Vesta, the fountain of virtue, in her left-hand parts.

<sup>2</sup> For *ἰδίως* here, it is necessary to read *ἰδίως*.

<sup>3</sup> The word *αἰτίαι* is omitted here in the original.

and Plato. For Plato in the *Philebus* mentions two Craters, the one Vulcanian, but the other Dionysiacal. *And Orpheus knew indeed of the Crater of Bacchus, but he also establishes many others about the solar table.* And with respect to Homer, does he not represent Hebe as pouring out wine, and Vulcan drinking from a bowl, and distributing nectar to all the Gods? These things however, require a more abundant discussion. But what has been said will be sufficient for the present purpose, since in another work, we shall investigate a more perfect development of each particular, if it pleases the Gods.

Some one however, may doubt, through what cause Plato, when generating the soul of the universe, makes no mention of the Crater, but only of the mixture and commixture; but in the generation of partial souls, he at the same time mentions it, and reminds us of the mixture of the soul of the universe? In answer to this, it must be said, that in the first place divine souls in proceeding, abide in the Crater, and do not depart from their fountain; but partial souls are separated from, and frequently proceed out of it, through verging to generation. In the former therefore, as being vehemently united, he does not separate the Crater from the mixture. Hence some apprehend that the soul of the universe is the first soul; and others denominate it Juno, not being able to divide it from its proper fountain. But in these [i. e. in partial souls], as being separated from the Crater, Plato disjoins the cause [i. e. the Crater] from the things posterior to it. In the second place, it must be said, that the whole of the psychical order is constituted by both, viz. by the mingler and the Crater; but since one part of this order abides, but the other proceeds, and one rejoices in union, but the other is a friend to division,—hence, the Demiurgus in a greater degree constitutes the former, than the Crater; but the latter as being more material, is more allied to the prolific cause [i. e. to the Crater]. On this account, in the former, the whole is attributed to the Demiurgus; but in the generation of partial souls, the Crater is assumed. The fables of the Greeks also assert things of this kind. For they say that Juno is the cause of insanity, but Jupiter of temperance; and the former, of labours about generation; but the latter, of an elevation from it. For Juno excites all things to progression, multiplies them, and causes them by her illuminations, to be prolific. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

But I think it fit that the divine Iamblicus should look to these words of Plato, and assume from them, that Plato constitutes the soul of the world, and not the supercelestial soul, from the mixture of the middle genera. For how, as his design was to constitute the universe, could he opportunely make mention of the supermundane soul, since when he mentions time, which is allotted a supermundane order, he at the same time co-arranges it with the universe? For he says that



time was generated together with the heaven. And thus much for this admonition. But whether Plato knew, or did not know that there are supermundane souls, is to be investigated. For it is worthy of inquiry, since he nowhere clearly says that there is a soul of this kind. And to those who do not admit that there are supermundane souls, it must be said, that it is requisite there should be souls of this kind, which are impartible, but understand transitively, and in this differ from intellect; and which likewise intellectually perceive more than one thing at a time, and in this transcend mundane souls. For the progression is not collectively, from understanding all things at once, to the intellectual perception of one thing at a time; but is through the perception of more things than one, yet not of all things at once. It follows therefore, that those who through these reasons admit, that there are souls prior to the world, should show how these souls are media between the impartible and partible essence, and if they are partible, what this partibility is, and if they are distributed into parts, and similarly fashioned with mundane souls, by what contrivance they are prior to these, when they do not at all differ from them according to hypostasis?

If also it be requisite that I should pay some attention to my own oracle, I should say, that each of these supermundane souls has the intellectual nature, which it participates for the impartible which is above it. For *that* supermundane intellect is primarily partible. Each likewise, has the partible nature not simply, but so far as the multitude of mundane natures is suspended from them. Hence, they are more impartible than partible, just as on the contrary, the last of souls are more partible than impartible, because the partible and not the impartible, is the peculiarity of their essence. Hence too, each of these is the peculiarity of the souls that subsist between the supermundane and the last of souls. For the impartible is peculiar to them, because a peculiar intellect is established above each of them; and also the partible, because a peculiar body is suspended from each. And as in the latitude of souls there are so many differences, these differences cause the soul either not<sup>1</sup> always to abide on high, or to abide and be supermundane, or to abide and be mundane. By conceiving therefore, the soul which ranks as a medium between these, to be a thing of this kind, we shall not wonder if souls were generated equal according to section, but that some of them have their boundaries as far as to superficies, and others, as far as to solids; which also makes the latter to be mundane, and to proceed into bodies; but preserves the former prior to the world, and without any contact with body. Perhaps too, some of them proceed as far as to linear boundaries, but others as far as to superficies. Hence, some of them are alone supermundane, but others are media

<sup>1</sup> Or is omitted here in the original.

between supermundane and mundane souls, just as superficies are media between linear boundaries and solids.

Moreover, it is not at all wonderful that the harmony should be different from the three genera of modulations in sensibles. For it is not necessary that there should be only three harmonies, but that this number of them should be apprehended in sounds commensurate with sense. It is not however impossible that there may be certain harmonies more excellent than these, since these three genera are not assumed from division, but from experiment and sense. These also may be admitted to exist in supermundane souls, by the insertion of two media as far as to linear boundaries, and as far as to superficies, in the first duple and triple alone, or in the intervals that follow, and in these producing two circles. *Here* likewise, cutting the internal circles only in half; for there are two intervals; but *there*, into three parts. For so many are the intervals of the five boundaries. Hence *here*, one and three are generated, but *there* one and five, just as Plato in the mundane souls, makes one and seven. According to all things therefore, it is possible for these supermundane to differ from mundane souls, and according to the medium and the multitude of circles. The ratios of Plato also, have that which is common, and which extends to every psychical essence, elevating us from the psychogony which proceeds into solid numbers, to that which is more simple than this, and proceeds as far as to superficies, and from this to that which proceeds only as far as to lines. They also produce three psychogonies, which accord with the three genera of souls. For the progression from an essence perfectly impartible, into that which is distributed according to all numbers, is not without a medium; but here likewise, as in all other things, the progression is through media. If however, this be the case, it is not at all wonderful, that partial souls, in which the partible nature immediately exists, but the impartible through other media, which are elevated prior to them to intellects, should cause the divisions to become more numerous with the partible nature, and these to be more than with the impartible. I mean, for instance, that the sesquioctaves should be divided with the apotomae and the leimmas, and that this same diatonic genus should be in them, with two intervals, but which as it were define the diatessaron and diapente, the same ratios being preserved in the extremes; so that in these also, the psychogonic ratios take place, but with a more abundant difference. For of the middle genera, essence predominating, makes a divine soul, sameness a daemoniacal, and difference, a partial soul. These likewise predominating according to different modes, many divine, many daemoniacal, and many partial souls, are constituted; as Plato also indicates, when he says, that the Demiurgus assuming the second and third gradations of the mixture, gave

subsistence to partial souls. For by assuming in these that which is similar to this, we shall be able to assign the differences of them with reference to all the middle and the first souls, and likewise to give the following common definition of all of them. Soul is an essence, which is a medium between truly-existing essence and generation, being mingled from the middle genera, divided into essential number, bound together by all the middles, diatonically harmonized, living one and a twofold life, and being gnostic in one, and also a twofold manner. For by adding to this definition the peculiarities, we shall have the proper numbers of divine or daemoniacal, or partial souls, from the essential hypostasis of each. We shall likewise be very far from saying, that soul is the *entelecheia* of the body, or of the physical organ having life in capacity. For this definition, neither in asserting that soul pertains to a certain thing, says what it is, nor does it comprehend every soul. For divine souls are not the souls of organic bodies; nor does this definition avoid comprehending in itself the thing defined. For that which lives in capacity, has soul in capacity; all which inconveniences are avoided by the definition given by us above, which is truly a definition, possesses that which is common, and which extends to all the genera of souls, explains its middle essence, and by no means makes the object of investigation a part of the definition. We have however, been thus prolix, for the purpose of giving completion to the parturitions of our soul, though Plato should not speak of the supermundane soul.

But if some one should doubt, why Plato does not mention other souls, the divine, and the daemoniacal, it must be said to him in reply, that Plato assumes the same mixture in these. For though daemoniacal differ from divine souls, yet he surveys as one, all the undefiled genus of souls, when compared with the genesiurgic soul. At the same time also, through making mention of the souls that exists as extremes, and asserting that they derive their subsistence from the Crater, he manifests that the form of all the middle souls is from thence. But I mean by the extremes, the soul of the universe, and partial souls. For that he gives peculiar souls to the stars, and to the sublunary Gods, is evident from what is said in the Laws. For he there says, that we do not see the soul, but we see the body of them; and he inquires, how the soul itself moves the body? It is likewise evident from what has been before said by him in this dialogue. For he calls the stars divine animals. Whence therefore, do they possess the divine nature, and whence their peculiar motion? For if some one should say, that a divine animal does not at all differ according to the partible life, from the vilest animals on the earth, it would alone receive an *entelecheia* from the universe. Shall we not however, give souls to the sublunary Gods, who are the progeny of

Heaven and Earth, and of Ocean and Tethys? But in this case, how will they any longer be Gods? For they will either be more excellent than souls, or they will have souls. But if they are mundane Gods, divine souls will be suspended from them. And the same reasoning applies to daemons. If however, as we have said, Plato does not now mention these, it is not wonderful. For the mode of subsistence in them, is not similar to that of partial souls. For to all their souls, the immutable, the uninclining, and the not proceeding out of intelligibles, are common; but propensity to the realm of generation, audacity and a defluxion of the wings, originate from the souls that are now produced.

If also, we should again inquire, in what divine, daemoniacal, and partial souls, differ from the mundane soul, according to the psychogonic diagram; for it is not possible that secondary souls<sup>1</sup> should entirely consist of the same things as those that are prior to them? We must say, in answer to this inquiry, that the same ratios are in all of them. For Plato makes mention of the same as existing likewise in partial souls, such for instance, as sesquioctaves, sesquitercian, and sesquialter ratios. But the terms or boundaries, in which the ratios are contained, are different. For the terms which are assumed, in all the psychogonic diagram of the mundane soul, are primary ratios. Nothing therefore hinders there being duple ratios in divine souls, and that there should be an increase of these, if it should so happen in daemoniacal souls, after another manner. For progression increases multitude. There will either therefore be a difference in the terms, or in the ratios. But this is impossible in the latter. For, as we have already observed, he mentions these, as also existing in partial souls. Hence, a difference must be assumed in the terms; just as there is a difference in partial souls with reference to these, not only in the terms, but also in the divisions of certain ratios; so that the ratios are common, but the terms different. Impartibility therefore, or an exemption from the distribution into parts of partial souls, will be common to all daemoniacal souls. But an increase of the number of the ratios in partial souls, causes them to be in a greater degree partible than daemons, and to descend, instead of abiding on high. And such as are the decisions of my oracle concerning these particulars.

What however, is the meaning of the words, "*mingling he tempered?*" Shall we say, that the union in those lives has an arrangement more ancient and venerable than division? And how is it possible we should not assert this to be the case? For mixture is in things which are divided, and separation is consequent

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *τὰς δευτέρας* in this place, it is necessary to read, *ταὶ δευτέρας*.

to mixture.<sup>1</sup> In partial souls, on the contrary, Plato gives a precedaneous order to mingling. For he says, "*mingling he poured out*;" because in these, division is more abundant. And Socrates in the Phædrus says, that the horses and charioteers of other souls are mingled. The expression likewise, *he poured out*, is significant of a downward progression and an indefinite effusion. But if you understand the *pouring out* in such a way, as if spoken of liquid substances, perhaps you will see that this also is adapted to the soul. For moisture is a symbol of life. Hence both Plato, and prior to Plato the Gods, call the soul at one time a drop of the total vivification, but at another a certain fountain. Moreover, in the words, "*the remainder of the former things*," we must suppose by the former the middle genera are meant. For Plato cannot speak of the *mixture* which is there, because the whole of this was consumed, in the generation, distribution into parts, and harmony of the soul of the universe, as he there says. Of the middle genera however, it is evident that some of the natures are supreme, and intellectual, but others media, and others last. But analogy makes some to be first, others media, and others to subsist at the extremity. For the extremes being different, between which there are media, it is necessary that the media likewise should analogously differ. Hence, we before observed that the impartible in each soul is one thing, and that which is divisible about bodies another; just as a different body is suspended from a different soul. The extremes therefore being different, the media also will be necessarily different. And through things indeed, which rank as the first, the Demiurgus constitutes divine souls, but through media, daemonic souls, and through such as rank in the last place, partial souls. These last therefore, are now called, "*the remainder of the former*;" because in a certain respect they are similar, and subordinate to them. For the remainder is entirely assimilated to the whole of which it is a part, and is inferior to that which is more perfect, and has a precedaneous order. Hence, we must admit both those who say that these partial souls are the remains of the middle genera, and the divine Iamblichus, who attributes an exempt transcendency to the genera which give completion to divine souls, and at the same time preserves the similitude and variety of all the middle genera.

"And these after a certain manner indeed were the same, yet were

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *της μεν μίξεως, και εν διερρημεναις ουσαις της διακρισεως, και επομενης της μίξεως*, in this place, I read, *της μεν μίξεως, και εν διερρημεναις ουσαις, και της διακρισεως επομενης της μίξεως*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αριστων* here, it is necessary to read *αριστων*.

no longer pure and incorruptible similarly, and according to the same, but were of the second and third order."

Through what is here said, Timæus indicates the similitude of partial souls to those that are total, and their diminution, and different progression. For he not only describes the differences of them together with their alliance, according to the first and second demiurgic energy, nor alone according to their union with, and separation from the Crater of life, nor according to the transcendency, or deficiency of genera, but also according to the mode of mixture, which is the same, and yet not the same. For neither the mixture of the genera, nor the non-mixture of difference is similar. For difference is more abundant in partial souls. Hence in these, one of the horses is good, but the other bad; and consists of contraries, as it is said in the *Phædrus*, through the predominance of diversity. He shows therefore, that after a certain manner they are the same, and also according to the peculiarity of the whole composition. For the whole mixtures become no longer pure and incorruptible, according to the same, and similarly, but are of the second and third ranks; since in these there is diminution and arrangement. What therefore, are the natures which he calls pure and incorruptible; for they are not such as are impassive only? For it would be a small thing, if the divine differed from the partial genus of souls, in this alone. For this affliction of passivity accedes as the last thing, after the flight from real being, after the downward propensity and inclination, and after the defluxion of the wings; as *Socrates* also says in the *Phædrus*. It is better therefore to say, that the pure and incorruptible signify, the immutable, the uninclining, the inflexible, and the entire and undefiled form of essence, which is neither converted to secondary natures, nor receives any mutation, nor diminution of life, and which is established remote from all mortality, and is exempt from the laws of Fate. For these things are common to every genus of souls, which always transcend generation. But the contraries of these, are adapted to souls which are able to descend into generation, to change their life from intellection to action, to become at a certain time subject to the dominion of Fate, and to be mingled with mortal concerns. Neither therefore is the immoveable present with these according to the same things, since they sometimes proceed into generation; nor when it is present with them, is it present after the same manner. For that which is always intellectual, is more excellent than that which sometimes departs from its proper intellectual energy.

Since however, in these souls also there is an arrangement, or order, and some

of them are undefiled, being conversant with generation, and departing' from their own order, but for a short time, but others are involved in all-various flowers, and wander for very extended periods, Plato also indicates the difference of these by saying, "*that they were of the second and third order.*" For souls that descend, and are defiled with vice, are very much separated from those that always abide on high, and are without sin. But the media between these, are those souls that descend indeed, yet are not defiled with vice. For the contrary of this is not lawful, viz. to be defiled with vice, and yet abide on high. For evil is not in the Gods, but in the mortal place, and in material things. Again therefore, from what has been said, it appears that the first genus of souls is divine. For every where that which is receptive of deity, has a ruling and leading order, in essences, in intellects, in souls, and in bodies. But the second genus of souls is that which is always conjoined to the Gods, in order that through this genus the souls which sometimes depart from, may be recalled to the Gods. The third genus is that which descends indeed into generation, but descends with purity, and exchanges a more divine for a subordinate life, but is exempt from vice and passions.<sup>1</sup> For this is in continuity with the genus of souls, which always abides on high, and is always undefiled. And the fourth and last genus is that which abundantly wanders, which descends as far as to Tartarus, and is again excited from thence. It likewise evolves all-various forms of life, uses various manners, and at different times different passions, and assumes the various forms of animals, the daemoniacal, the human, and the irrational, but at the same time is governed by Justice, recurs from earth to heaven, and is circularly led from matter to intellect, but according to certain orderly periods of wholes. The words therefore, "*no longer pure and incorruptible, similarly, and according to the same,*" signify that partial souls are in a certain respect incorruptible, viz. according to essence alone; and that in a certain respect they are not incorruptible; viz. that according to energies, they are filled with all-various fatalities, are born along' with flowing and mortal beings, and that they do not possess these energies always after the same manner, and with undefiled purity, but sometimes in a greater, and at others in a less degree, there being an all-various inequality in souls, according

<sup>1</sup> For *ὁρμαινόμεναι* here, it is necessary to read *ἀφαισχυόμεναι*.

<sup>2</sup> This is the heroic genus of souls, which descends into mortality, partly for the benevolent purpose of leading back to the intelligible world, the fourth and last genus of souls, and partly in compliance with the law of Fate, which obliges souls of this third class to descend at stated periods into the realm of generation.

<sup>3</sup> For *εμφαισχυόμεναι* here, read *εμφορμαιόμεναι*.

to their habitude to the mortal nature, through which they are deprived of purity and incorruptibility according to life.

“ But having constituted the universe, he divided souls equal in number to the stars, and distributed each into each.”

Every order of souls is suspended from these two fountains, the demiurgic, and the vivific. And the first, the middle, and the last parts of this order, proceed from these, and are defined through these Gods. Since however, in this order, some souls are more total, but others more partial, and some do not depart from their proper principles, but others proceed as far as to matter, and some are leaders, but others have the relation of followers, the Demiurgus placed the former over the latter, subjected the more partial to the more total, distributed the multitude of souls according to genera, under their presiding Gods, and subjected according to herds, different souls to the government of different leaders. And now indeed, having constituted divine souls, he makes partial souls the attendants of them; and shortly after, he also arranges their vehicles when he produces them, under the divine circulations, and parts under wholes. For as soul is to soul, so is vehicle to vehicle, and both to both, according to geometrical composition. But of this hereafter. For now, not having yet made them to be mundane, he distributes them about the starry Gods. For the word *stars* manifests the souls of the starry bodies. He divides therefore, the multitude of souls, equal in number to divine souls, and distributes each into each star, having, says Plato, constituted the universe. Plato however, does not say that he made one mixture, as he did in the soul of the universe, causing it to be one from three wholes, essence, same, and different, and dividing souls from this by ablation. For he does not immediately from the mixture introduce the distribution of these souls about divine souls, passing by the division into numbers and harmonic ratios, and the doctrine of the vehicle, but he comprehends at once all things, viz. the mixture, the section into parts, and the possession of figure, in the words, having constituted the universe; from which likewise, all partial souls were distributed and adorned. But he constituted the multitude of all these souls. For the generation of each may be said to be a constitution; just as he asserted of the soul of the universe, through its completion from many things. For he then said, “ *Since all the constitution of the soul was effected conformably to the intention of its composing artificer.*” Having constituted therefore, all the multitude of souls, he divided



them equal in number to the stars, separating the former from each other, according to the peculiarities of the latter.

Will you therefore say that he distributed them equal in number, so that one partial soul is arranged under one of the stars, and that there are as many souls in quantity, as there are starry Gods? For this may appear to be evident by his adding, that each soul was distributed into each star. But how shall we say that this is a Platonic dogma, since Plato shortly after says, that the Demiurgus disseminated some souls into the earth, others into the sun, and others into the moon? For from these words, he leaves a multitude of souls in each star. May we not say therefore, that the equal in number must not be surveyed monadically, but according to analogy? For in numbers, the decad is analogous to the monad, thirty to the triad, fifty to the pentad, and in short, all the numbers after the decad, to all within it, and the second are equal in number to the first. Nor is the pentad on this account equal in quantity to fifty, or the triad to thirty; but they have the equal according to analogy alone. For what the triad is in monads, that thirty is in decads. Perhaps therefore, the equal in number is thus to be assumed in partial souls. For since in each of divine souls, there is a certain appropriate number, which it antecedently and unically comprehends, this number when expanded, defines the multitude of partial souls which are arranged under it. And the number indeed of the souls which are primarily suspended from it is less, but the power is greater; but of those that are secondarily suspended from it, the power is less, but the number is greater. Each however, proceeds analogous to it. For thus in numbers, the tetrad in tens, and in hundreds, and in thousands, is analogous to the first tetrad. These things therefore, may be said, in answer to the present inquiry.

It may likewise be added, that the form and the character accede to the attendants, from the leading Gods. But this form is number, defining the peculiarity of life. As many therefore, as are the leaders, so many are the forms of life which follow these, as for instance, Saturnian, Jovian, Solar, Lunar, and in a similar manner in the other Gods. For the form originating from on high, pervades as far as to the last attendants, and establishes all of them in a similitude with the leading God. For about every God there are more partial Gods; angelic orders unfolding divine light; demons, proceeding together with, or being the guards, or attendants of the God; and the elevated and magnificent army of heroes, previously repressing all the disorder arising from matter, connecting the divine vehicles, and purifying the partial vehicles which revolve about these, and assimilating the latter to the former. About every God likewise, there is a choir of undefiled souls, resplendent with purity, and a multitude of other

souls, at one time elevating the head of the charioteer to the intelligible, and at another, co-arranging themselves with the mundane powers of the Gods. And of these, some are distributed<sup>1</sup> about one, but others about another power of their leading God. On this account also, in solar souls, some are suspended from the Pæonian, others from the prophetic, others from the demiurgic, and others from the elevating power of the God. In other Gods likewise, all the souls which are the attendants of the same divinity, have not the same order, but some are distributed<sup>2</sup> about different powers of the God, and others participate more nearly, or more remotely, of the same power. All of them therefore, equally<sup>3</sup> partake of the common form of their God. For in the Gods themselves, union precedes multitude, and one sameness, the difference according to separate powers. Hence, through these things it is evident, how souls are equal in number to the stars.

It is necessary however, to make mention on this subject of the conception of Acyllus,<sup>4</sup> viz. that partial souls are said to be equal in number to the souls of the stars, not according to a division about them, but according to a similar generation with reference to them, so as to consist of the same equal quantity of numbers, of which each of the starry souls consists. For thus this man interprets the equality in number of partial to total souls, as signifying that each partial is divided into the same number of parts as the starry soul under which it is arranged, and distributed by the father. Hence also, the former is similar to the latter; so that all souls do not possess all-various numbers, but some less and others more, the ratios in all of them being the same. For Plato does not define the numbers, but the ratios of the parts. We however, have before observed, that nothing prevents partial souls from differing from those prior to them, in the multitude of the terms; and what the mode is of their difference, we have demonstrated. And thus much for this particular.

But now the first distribution of partial about divine souls is effected, before they become mundane. For both according to a supermundane and mundane co-arrangement, parts are woven together with wholes. So that if in the temples which are here, there is a certain establishment<sup>5</sup> of those that

<sup>1</sup> For *σενονται* here, which is evidently erroneous, I read *διανεπονται*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *απονονται* here, it is necessary to read *διαπονονται*.

<sup>3</sup> For *εκει* here, it is necessary to read *εκεινη*.

<sup>4</sup> This Acyllus is not mentioned by any writer besides Proclus, nor by him elsewhere.

<sup>5</sup> Proclus here alludes to that part of initiation into the mysteries which was called *θρονισμος*, or collocation on a throne. But this consisted in placing him who was to be initiated on a throne, clothed in a sacred and mystic dress, and accompanied with solemn rites; the other mystics in the mean time dancing about the throne.

are initiated, it will convey to us an image of this demiurgic co-arrangement of partial with total souls, and of their distribution about their leaders. For divine souls themselves are distributed about the powers of the total soul of the universe: for they proceed according to the multiform powers contained in it, and are *established*, some of them in the circulation of *the same* of this soul, but others in the periods of the circulation of *the different*. But again, about these divine souls, partial souls are arranged, distributing their total powers, being co-elevated with them to the intelligible, filled from them with immutable intelligence, and arranged by the numbers of their proper leaders. As therefore, these mundane divine souls ascend through the twelve Gods,<sup>1</sup> to the supercelestial place, thus also partial ascend to it, through divine souls. For they are united to them, according to the supermundane co-arrangement, which Timæus calls *distribution*, as being effected according to the divine law, which is seated together with Jupiter, as it is written in the Gorgias, and in conjunction with him adorns the more total and more partial orders in the world. Hence there is one similitude of all partial souls, and a distribution according to the empires of the Gods. And the Demiurgus is the cause of both. These things likewise pertain to souls in a supermundane manner. So that the differences of souls are not, as some say, from habitudes of a certain kind, but from their peculiar essence. For the co-arrangement of them is with different leaders, and the distribution of them is essential. For what they possess from the one fabrication, they possess according to essence.

Since however, partial souls are said to be distributed about the stars, it is evident that they have the fourth order from the soul of the universe. For with this soul, the souls of the celestial spheres, and also those of the sublunary spheres, which comprehend the whole elements, subsist. But under these are the stars, and such more partial genera of Gods<sup>2</sup> as are comprehended in the wholenesses of all the before-mentioned circulations. And lastly, under these are partial souls. Hence the soul of the universe is alone *universal*. The souls that are allotted the government of the circulations, are *universal partial*. Those that are comprehended in these circulations, are vice versa, *partial universal*. And in the last place, partial souls have alone a *partial* subsistence. Plato therefore calls all the divine souls that are comprehended in their wholenesses

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Through the twelve Gods that belong to the liberated order, and which are divided into four triads. Of these triads also the first, which consists of Jupiter, Neptune, and Vulcan, is demiurgic or fabricative; the second, consisting of Vesta, Minerva, and Mars, is of a guardian characteristic; the third, which is composed of Ceres, Juno, and Diana, is vivific; and the fourth, which consists of Mercury, Venus, and Apollo, is of an harmonic and elevating characteristic.

<sup>2</sup> And these are the satellites of the stars.

*stars*, whether in heaven, or in the sublunary region, giving to all of them a common name, from things known to all men. For all of them have entirely certain starry-formed vehicles; since Socrates also assimilates partial souls leaping into generation, to the stars, according to their vehicles. For he says, that some of them were disseminated by the Demiurgus about the earth, and the moon; as it would be absurd, if partial souls were alone distributed about what are properly called the stars, but the other Gods should not be leaders of the herds of souls, which exist in each element analogous to them; viz. the aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial Gods, concerning whom he says, that they become visible when they please.<sup>1</sup> But as we have said, he gives to them a common name from things obvious to all men, and in consequence of not neglecting to survey that which is sensible.<sup>2</sup>

41 E "And causing them to ascend as into a vehicle, he pointed out to them the nature of the universe,"

Such therefore as say, as the great Theodorus, that the vehicle of the soul is the nature of the universe, neither speak conformably to things themselves, nor to the words of Plato. For neither is the nature of the universe the vehicle of a partial soul; for it is sufficient to such a soul to conduct a partial nature rightly; nor can we co-arrange with what follows, the expression, *he pointed out*. Nor will they speak conformably to the nature of the thing, who look, not to the following, but to the former colon, and say that by the vehicle, a star is signified. For where is the vehicle of a partial soul, which falls into generation, said to be a star, even though you should speak of the corporeal star, since a star always abides on high? But it seems that both these were persuaded to adopt this opinion, from the Demiurgus not first constituting the vehicle, and afterwards causing the soul to ascend into it, though they ought to have seen, that in consequence of the vehicle being formed at the same time with the soul, it would be superfluous to represent the Demiurgus constituting the body first. To which may be added, that it has been before shown, that the Demiurgus produced bodies in conjunction with souls. If therefore, it be requisite both to follow things themselves, and the doctrine of Plato, it must be said, that the nature which is pointed out by the Demiurgus is one thing; the star under which the soul is arranged another, and this incorporeal; and this vehicle which is subservient to souls, another. It is

<sup>1</sup> Hence it follows that in each of the spheres of the elements, there is one leading God having a starry-formed vehicle, and numerous satellites about this divinity, in the same manner as in the spheres of the planets, and the sphere of the fixed stars.

<sup>2</sup> For *καθ' ὅσον* here, it is necessary to read *αὐτοῦ ὅσον*.

also requisite to say, that souls ascending into their vehicles, became citizens of the universe, proceeded into, and were arranged in subjection to the whole world; that souls likewise were divided together with the stars; and that they surveyed Nature and the whole mundane order, being themselves arranged above the nature of the world, but receiving their own proper mundane allotment. For in the first place, they were constituted; afterwards, they were distributed about the divine governments; and thus, in the third place, they ascended into vehicles, surveyed Nature, and were auditors of the laws of Fate; from all which, it is easy to perceive, that according to Plato, souls are superior to Fate, according to their highest life. For that which the father of wholes gave to them, is according to nature. Hence, as the [Chaldean] Oracle says, "By understanding the works of the father, they fly from the shameless wing of Fate. But they lie in God, drawing vigorous torches, descending from the father; from which descending, the soul plucks of empyrean fruits, the soul-nourishing flower."

What therefore is the vehicle of the soul, and how does the Demiurgus cause souls to ascend into it? It is requisite then to understand, that the great Iamblichus and his followers, are accustomed to say, that from all ether, which has a prolific power, the composition of the psychical vehicles is generated, divine bodies neither being diminished, nor constituting these vehicles by co-acervation, but proceeding according to divine lives, and giving *morphe* to partial pneumatic substances. It is necessary, however, to conceive in addition to this, what is more true, that the elaboration of these vehicles proceeds from demiurgic causes. For the maker of every corporeal hypostasis constitutes these, who also prepares seats for the Gods in the world. For he receives souls that are sent from the intelligible into the world, and gives different abodes to different souls. The Demiurgus of the universe likewise, constitutes them, and he the first of all. Hence also, he now causes them to ascend into vehicles, evidently producing the vehicle. For this was not fashioned in what has been before said, but the Demiurgus himself, having constituted this together with wholes, causes souls to ascend into it, and imparts to them the principle of their proper organs. For he is the Demiurgus of animals, and of the plenitudes of the universe. Hence, he not only produces souls, but he produces them together with appropriate vehicles. And on a survey of the conception of Plato, we shall find that it is truly admirable and arcane,<sup>1</sup> since he does not represent the Demiurgus as fashioning these vehicles from wholenesses which previously had an existence, as neither does he

<sup>1</sup> For *αἰεδες* here, read *αἰαίδες*.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Vulcan.

<sup>3</sup> For *απορητες* also in this place, read *απορητην*.

the vehicles of the planets and the fixed stars; but he says that the Demiurgus produced these, the junior Gods lending parts, and from these causing the bodies to coalesce. This therefore, is an evident argument that each of these vehicles is *in a certain respect* self-constituted, and not fabricated by an ablation of other things, lest it should be requisite that they should be again refunded into another thing. For every thing which subsists by an abscission of other things, since the abscission is accompanied with a diminution of the whole, must necessarily be entirely restored to the whole. For it is necessary that each of the wholes of the universe should always remain a whole; on which account also every vehicle of the soul of this kind is perpetual, and always the same vehicle is suspended from the same soul. For each is thus naturally adapted to subsist, as it was generated by the Demiurgus. For how can we any longer preserve the soul mundane, if we corrupt the vehicle? And how can that be any longer said to be mundane, of which there is nothing in the universe? For if partial souls were superior to a life in conjunction with vehicles, they would also be superior to divine souls themselves. And if they were inferior to such a life, how does the Demiurgus immediately on their being generated, introduce them into these vehicles, as he is now said to do? How likewise, do souls use vehicles, both in Hades, and in the heavens, if these bodies are not perpetually suspended from them? But it is evident that they do use them, both from what is asserted by Socrates in the *Phaedo*, and in the *Phaedrus*. For in the former, he says, *that souls ascending into vehicles, proceed to Acheron*; and in the latter, *that the vehicles of the Gods being easily managed, proceed in equilibrium, but the vehicles of other souls that follow the Gods, proceed with difficulty, and scarcely [obtain the vision of the supercelestial place]*. This therefore, may also be demonstrated through other arguments; and these things have been before clearly asserted by us, and are now recalled to our recollection.

From this likewise, we may survey the difference of partial and divine souls. For in the latter, the Demiurgus placed the bodies in the souls, as being on all sides comprehended in them; the souls not being converted to the subjects of their government, but employing one immutable intellection. But in the former, he causes the souls to ascend into vehicles; because they are adapted to be frequently vanquished by bodies, and to be converted to the natures over which they preside,<sup>1</sup> when they become parts of the universe; in the same manner as their vehicles are subservient to the laws of Fate; and no longer purely live under the divine light of Providence. And thus much concerning the vehicle of the soul.

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *πλῆρω* here, it is necessary to read *απλῶς*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ἐπισκοπεῖν* here, it is necessary to read *ἐπισκοπεύειν*.

It is worth while however, again to recall to our remembrance, but with a certain accurate consideration of what has been frequently said, that since the whole of our soul is a medium between an impartible essence, and that essence which is divisible about bodies, we clearly obtain this latter essence from its vehicle. For a connascent vehicle is suspended from our soul, having an appropriate life, in the same manner as the vehicles of divine and daemonic souls. And this life is the partial essence, of which the soul antecedently comprehends the paradigm; so that opinion is established in the soul as the paradigm of sense; but the power of deliberate choice, as the paradigm of the orexis in its proper vehicle, according to which it is moved to this, or to that place, and is impelled to do this thing or that. For these are proximately the partial natures in the soul, and prior to these, the difference in the soul of the all-various divisions of its essence, according to which it is distributed into parts, and possesses something which is impartible, and a whole. Since therefore, we assert these things concerning the separation into parts in the soul, it is worth while to inquire, what we should admit the impartible essence above our soul to be, since each of the souls superior to ours has an intellect<sup>1</sup> prior to it. For each of these partial souls has not an essential intellect above it. For if it had, it would always abide on high, in the same manner as the souls superior to it, in consequence of intellect always detaining it in the intelligible, through always imparting to it its light. We have therefore already said something concerning this, and more than once, and we shall now assert more clearly what we conceive to be the truth on this subject, and what divinity imparts to our intellect. Hence, we have frequently spoken concerning what the impartible is in each partial soul, it being a thing truly dubious, by extending our intellect to deity. For to leave an intellect to each, and this partial, is a thing by no means to be admitted. May we not say therefore, that each of these partial souls is essentially suspended from a certain daemon, every daemon having a certain daemonic intellect above itself? A partial soul therefore, has the same intellect as the daemon from which it is suspended, arranged as an impartible essence prior to it. Hence, the daemonic soul primarily participates of this intellect, but the partial souls that are under it, secondarily, which also makes them to be partial. For each has a peculiar partible nature, but possesses the impartible, in common with the daemons that are above these souls, and to whom the impartible is peculiar. Hence daemons abide on high, but partial souls sometimes descend, dividing themselves about bodies, as being more adapted to these. For in partial souls, the genus of difference is redundant, which makes them unable always to

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *our* here, it is necessary to read *ourr*.

energize according to all their powers, it necessarily follows, that they must be more familiarized with the life, which is divisible about body, and be more remote from an impartible essence, and thus preserve the analogous to each of the extremes; just as the most divine of souls, through a similitude to intellect, are more exempt<sup>1</sup> from partible natures, and are more united to the impartible essences above them, from which they are connascently suspended; and also establish an intellectual order in souls. It appears likewise, that the intellect of each daemon, as being a whole and one, is the intellect of the daemon that proximately participates it, but comprehends also, the number of the souls that are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of them.<sup>2</sup> Each partial soul therefore, will have, as an impartible essence, the proper paradigm of itself contained in this intellect, and not simply the whole intellect, in the same manner as the daemon who is essentially the leader of these souls. We say therefore, that the impartible of each partial soul which is above it, may be more accurately defined to be, the form of it, which is comprehended in the one intellect that is allotted the government of the demoniacal series, under which each partial soul is arranged. And thus both the assertions are true, that the intellect alone of each is established in the natures which always exist on high, and that each is a medium, between the impartible above, and the partible nature posterior to it. And thus much concerning these particulars.

But after what manner does the Demiurgus point out to these souls, the nature of the universe? Is it by converting them to the world, and preparing them to survey the reasons contained in nature? This however, is to make them less excellent, and to convert them from separate reasons to such as are inseparable from sensibles. But the Demiurgus, on the contrary, elevates souls to the intelligible, converts them to himself, separates them from matter, and fills them with divine powers and demiurgic intellections. May it not be said therefore, that having the cause of nature in himself, he converts souls to himself? For every one who points out, entirely looks to that which he indicates. But the Demiurgus alone looks to things prior to himself, and to himself. He beholds therefore the nature, which he indicates to souls, in himself. For he contains the unical principles of all things, and pre-established in himself powers effective of the generation both of other things, and of nature. And as he antecedently contains bodies incorporeally, thus also, he comprehends nature supernaturally. These things therefore are rightly asserted. It is necessary however to speak after

<sup>1</sup> For ἐξηρησθαι here, it is necessary to read ἐξηρησθαι.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of αὐτου in this place, it is necessary to read αὐτως.



another manner, not only placing idea in the Demiurgus philosophically, but likewise, as theologists teach, surveying Nature primarily, pre-existing intellectually in the vivific deity. For being suspended from thence, she governs this visible world, assimilates material to immaterial reasons, and refers corporeal to primordial motions. But it is necessary, to survey Nature secondarily, according ' to the mundane order of the vivific Goddess, conformably to what the Oracles say, *that immense Nature is suspended from the back of the Goddess*. From her primary subsistence however, in vivific deity, she proceeds into the demiurgic intellect. It is likewise requisite that souls should survey the fountains and roots of Nature in order that they may behold their own dignity and the total series from whence they are suspended, and that adhering to this, they should contemplate the universe. For by directing their view to Nature herself, they co-arrange themselves ' with Fate. As therefore, the Demiurgus himself, by antecedently comprehending the paradigm of Nature, governs the universe, thus also he is desirous that souls looking to the first and intellectual cause of Nature, should revolve on high, and conduct the whole world. For this is the highest allotment of souls. The Demiurgus therefore, points out to souls, that fountal Nature, which pre-exists in the whole vivific Goddess, conformably to that oracle itself of the Gods, which they delivered to their genuine mystics. But since souls have second and third lives, the Demiurgus also gives to them the reasons, or productive principles of these.

“ He also announced to them the Laws of Fate.”

71E

That this is the second speech of the Demiurgus, again proceeding to souls through words adapted to souls, is evident. The former speech however, of the Demiurgus, is immediately addressed to the junior Gods, as Gods of Gods. But the second speech ' indicates that the Demiurgus fills also these souls with words or reasons, but not immediately as he does the junior Gods. And the scope indeed, in the former speech, comprehends a representation \* of providential reasons, but in the latter, of the laws of Fate. Having therefore premised thus much, we say, betaking ourselves to the things which are the subject of consideration, that Fate must not be said to be a partial nature, as some of the Peripa-

<sup>1</sup> The words *δεύτερος δε κατὰ*, are omitted in this place in the original, but ought to be inserted.

<sup>2</sup> For *εαυτὰς* here, read *εαυτάς*.

<sup>3</sup> The words *η δε δευτέρα*, are also in this place erroneously omitted.

<sup>4</sup> For *εμφανίς* here, read *εμφανίον*.

tetics, such as Alexander [Aphrodisiensis] assert it to be. For this nature is imbecile, and not perpetual. But we antecedently assume from common conceptions, that the power and empire of Fate are very great and stable. Nor is it the order of the mundane periods, as Aristotle says, who calls the increase which deviates from order, preter-fatal, as if this order was constituted by Fate. And the cause of order indeed, is one thing, but order itself another. Nor must it be said, that Fate is soul in habitude, as Theodorus asserts it to be. For such a form of life is not a principle in wholes. Nor is it simply Nature, as Porphyry says it is. For many things which are supernatural, and out of the dominion of Nature, are produced by Fate, such as nobility, renown, and wealth. For where do physical motions bring with them the cause of these? Nor is it the intellect of the universe, as Aristotle again says in a certain work, if the treatise concerning the World was written by him. For intellect produces at once, all things which it produces, and is not at all in want of a government which proceeds according to a certain period, and a continued and well-ordered series. This however is the peculiarity of Fate, viz. a series of many causes, order, and a periodical production. But if it be requisite to comprehend concisely the whole form of it, we must say, that it is Nature according to its subject, but is deified, and filled with divine, intellectual, and psychical illuminations. For the order of the Gods who are called *Μοιρηγετῆ* [τῶν μοιρηγέτων καλούμενων] and the more excellent genera, terminate in Fate. For these impart powers from themselves to the one life of it; and the Demiurgus of wholes, collects and unites all these gifts, and all these plenitudes, and demonstrates them to be one power. For if the visible bodies are filled with divine<sup>1</sup> powers, by a much greater priority is Nature deified. And if the whole visible world is one, much more is the whole essence of Fate one, and has its composition completely filled from many causes. For being suspended from the providence of the Gods, and the demiurgic goodness, it is rendered one, and governed according to rectitude by these; since it is a reason consisting of reasons, one multi-form power, a divine life, and the order of things that have an arrangement prior to it.<sup>2</sup> Hence also the ancients, looking to this variety, and multiform nature of Fate, were led to different opinions concerning it. For some called it a God, on account of its participation of deity. others, a daemon, on account of the efficacions and at the same time multiform nature of its production; others, intellect, because a certain participation of intellect proceeds into it; and others, order, because every thing which is arranged, is invisibly comprehended by it. But Plato alone [truly] /

<sup>1</sup> The word *θεῶν* is omitted in this place in the original, but obviously ought to be inserted.

<sup>2</sup> Fate therefore is Nature deified, or Nature considered according to her summit.

surveyed the essence of it; for he calls it indeed Nature, but suspended from the Demiurgus. For how otherwise could the Demiurgus point out Nature, unless he contained the principle of it in himself? How likewise could he announce the laws of Fate, after pointing out the nature of the universe, except by constituting Nature, as the one connected receptacle of these laws? But in the Politicus, he in a still clearer manner, suspends the secondary life of the universe from Fate, after the separation from the universe of the one daemon that governs it, and the many daemons that are the attendants of that one. Hence, he removes from the world, their providential inspection of it, and only leaves it the government of Fate, though the world always possesses both these, but the fable separates the latter from the former. For he says, that Fate and connascent desire convolve the world; just as the Chaldean oracles say, "that Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws downward, in order that heaven may run an eternal course; and that the other periods of the sun, the moon, the seasons, night, and day, may be accomplished." Thus therefore, Plato also says, that the second period of the world is convolved by Fate, but not the first and intellectual period; all but clearly asserting, that he conceives this Fate which proximately moves the sensible world, to be suspended from the invisible providence of the Gods. For establishing prior to this Necessity, the mother of the Fates, he convolves<sup>1</sup> the world on her knees; as he says, in the [10th book of the] Republic.

And if it be requisite to declare my opinion, Plato places these three causes of order, successive to each other, viz. Adrastia, Necessity, and Fate; the first being intellectual, the second supermundane, and the third mundane. *For the Demiurgus, as Orpheus says, was nurtured indeed by Adrastia, but associates with Necessity, and generates Fate.* And as Adrastia was comprehensive of the divine institutions (*θεσμίων*) and collective of all-various laws, thus also Fate is comprehensive of all the mundane laws, which the Demiurgus now inscribes in souls, in order that he may lead them together with wholes, and may definitely assign that which is adapted to them, according to the different elections of lives. *For on this account, an erroneous choice leads the soul to a dark and atheistical life, but a pious choice conducts it to heaven, under the guidance of wholes;* because each choice is full of the laws of Fate, and souls, as Plotinus says, betake themselves to the place announced to them by the law which they contain. For this is the peculiarity of the providence of the Gods, to lead inwardly the subjects of their providential care. And why should this be wonderful, since Nature inserting material and

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *τροφεῖς* here, it is necessary to read *στροφεῖς*.

<sup>2</sup> In the original *θεσμων*, but it is obviously necessary to read *θεσμων*.

corporeal-formed powers in corporeal masses, moves them through these powers; earth indeed through gravity, but fire through levity? In a much greater degree therefore, do the Gods move souls through the powers which they disseminated in them. Hence, if they lead souls according to the laws of Fate, these laws are in souls, pre-existing indeed, intellectually in the Demiurgus; for with him the divine law is established; but existing in divine souls; for according to these, they are the leaders of the universe, and participated by partial souls; for through these, as they move themselves, they lead themselves to an appropriate place. And through deliberate choice indeed, they err, and act with rectitude; but through law, they distribute to themselves an order adapted to their former conduct. When therefore, souls become mundane, then also they survey the power and dominion of Fate, supernally suspended from providence, and receive the laws of Destiny. For the Demiurgus pointed out Nature to them, as something different from them, but he announced to them the laws of Fate, as inscribing them in their essence. For the demiurgic words, proceed through the essence itself of souls. As therefore, he inserted the words prior to these, in the junior Gods, thus also, he inserts these laws in partial souls.

“And showed them, that the first generation, distributed in an orderly manner to all of them, would be one, lest any particular soul should be allotted a less portion of generation than another.”

Souls are essentially supernatural, supermundane, and beyond Fate, because they have their first subsistence separate from this world; but according to their vehicles, and the allotments which they were destined to govern, they were generated mundane by the Demiurgus, and received this order. Hence, after the suspension from them of their vehicles, the Demiurgus announces to them the laws of Fate, by which they were allotted the government of bodies. Just as if some one being desirous<sup>1</sup> of political tumults and senatorial offices, should impart his wealth appropriately, but not yet perfectly,<sup>2</sup> such also is the condition of souls under Fate. For not only the vehicles of these, but likewise of the Gods themselves, are led by Fate. In order therefore, that these souls, together with their vehicles, may become situated under the dominion of Fate, it is necessary that they should descend, and associate with generation, which is the second

<sup>1</sup> For ἀγόμενος in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read ἐγόμενος.

<sup>2</sup> In the original οὐδ' οὕτως εἰσι αἱ ψυχαι πρὸ τῆς ἐμπόρευσης, but οὐδ' is evidently superfluous and erroneous. Something instead of it is perhaps wanting, as the whole of the sentence is obscure.

thing after their semination. For that is the leader; but this is a certain secondary distribution of the vehicles, under the divine circulation;<sup>1</sup> just as there was a distribution of souls themselves, into the souls of the stars,<sup>2</sup> and which was effected by the one demiurgic cause. Hence this distribution is perpetual, and it is impossible that there should be a mutation of such-like leaders. It is therefore also effected by Fate. For this power has dominion over periods, is connective both of total and partial periods, and is collective of similars to similars in divine and partial souls. For through the union of these with each other, their vehicles also are commensurate with each other. Hence, when a partial co-arranges itself with a total soul, the vehicle of it also follows the vehicle of the divine soul. And as the former imitates the intellection of the latter, so likewise the body of the former adumbrates the motion of the latter.

The first semination therefore, is that of vehicles, which not only clearly shows the soul to be mundane, but also co-arranges the whole composition of it under its proper leader. For it is one thing to be mundane, and another to be lunar, or Mercurial; since the latter is a more partial form of life. And as the soul having ascended into its vehicle becomes a citizen of the universe, so when it is disseminated in conjunction with its vehicle, it becomes a citizen of the lunar, or solar, or some other circulation. And the appendage indeed, of the vehicle of the soul to the universe, causes it to be more multitudinous than the supermundane life; and it is as it were, as some say, bisected. But the semination proceeding, causes the soul to obtain a more partial dominion. After the semination however, every soul has one definite generation; but souls make second and third descents, according to their own elections. There is therefore, one generation common to all of them. For it is necessary that every [partial] soul should descend into generation. For such a form of partial souls, not being able to abide on high immutably, becomes at certain times subject to the sceptres of Necessity. But these souls receive also from the universe, the mortal form of life, and this outward body, and in addition to these things, a physical habitude. By leading a good life however, they are also able while on the earth to be purified from the things introduced by Fate; so far as they have no communication with body, except what an abundant necessity requires. For what effect can the works of Fate have on the Coryphaean philosopher mentioned in the Theætetus, who astronomizes above the heavens, and who does not even know in what part of the earth he dwells? But when they are converted to the body, it is necessary that they should have communication with the gifts of Fate. And when they are

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *διαφορας* in this place, it is necessary to read *περιφορας*.

<sup>2</sup> There is an omission here in the original, of *των αστρων*.

vanquished by the mortal form of life, they become the slaves of Fate. *For the universe uses them as irrational animals.* And this again befalls them from themselves. For their choice was made after this manner, and having chosen, they lead a life conformable to their choice. It likewise happens to them from wholes. For every thing is conducted conformably to its natural aptitude; every form of life is of some utility to the universe; and nothing is left disorderly or indefinite in wholes; but all things are led to symmetry of life. Thus therefore, souls according to progression, proceed from a life which is always well-arranged, and the first, to the last and fated life, through lives of a middle condition. From an order likewise, which is above Fate, they are distributed under the laws of Fate, and travel through the Fates, under the throne of Necessity.

What however, must the first generation be said to be, which the philosopher now delivers, and which the Demiurgus proclaiming the laws of Fate, announces to souls? For there is not one opinion only concerning it. But the divine Iamblichus indeed, calls the semination of the vehicles the first generation; and what follows favours his assertion. For Plato adds, as continuous with this, "*But it was necessary that having disseminated them, &c.*" A certain other person however, interprets the first generation of souls to be, the one descent of them. For it is requisite that each of these souls should be entirely conversant with generation; since this is the peculiarity of them. He therefore, simply determines that there is one certain descent of each soul. But the solution delivered by our preceptor, is more accurate. For he says, that to every partial soul one descent is defined, not simply, but according to each period of *the divinely generated* nature. For it is not probable that any one partial soul, either of those that are called undefiled, or of those that are capable of being contaminated with vice, and of wandering, should for every period abide on high. For the soul which is able to abide on high for one whole period, immutably and without inclining to generation, cannot descend into generation, in another period. For it has preserved itself free from guilt, during the evolution of all the figures of the universe. *But there are always the same figures again and again.* Farther still, the life of a partial soul, is less extended than the period of the universe. Hence, if it is sufficiently able to remain<sup>1</sup> on high, through the whole of this period, it is allotted an immutable intellectual power. For it will live with invariable sameness through the whole of time. So that if the whole of time in its evolution, effects nothing new in this soul, it is one of the beings that always abide in a condition conformable to nature. Hence, it is necessary that every partial soul should make one descent in each

<sup>1</sup> For διαμονη here, it is necessary to read διαμονην.

period; but some souls a greater number of descents than others, in consequence of employing an abundant freedom of will. But Plato calls this descent the first generation. And this is evident from his adding, when speaking of the allotments after the first generation, "*that the depraved soul should, in the second generation, be changed into the nature of a woman.*" Hence he calls the first generation, the descent from the intelligible. But since the first takes place, after the semination of the vehicles, according to which souls first become subject to Fate, on this account he adds:

"But it was necessary, having disseminated them severally into the instruments [of time] adapted to each, that the most pious of animals should be born."

For this was necessary, after the semination into appropriate stars; and this is the first law of Fate, that every partial soul in each mundane period, should associate with generation. For it is necessary that the period of this soul should be less extended than the period of the universe, and that this should be common to all partial souls. But these souls differ from each other, according to the empire of the Gods; for different herds of souls are arranged under the dominion of different Gods; and also, according to the reasons which they exert. For of the souls which are under the government of the same divinity, some choose a life adapted to them, but others do not. And some partake of the same divinity, according to a different power, but others also according to a different order. For what, if some of the souls which are suspended from the prophetic power of the Sun, should exert a medical, or teletic<sup>1</sup> life, but others a Mercurial, and others a Lunar life? For there is not the same mode of variation in both. Farther still, souls likewise differ according to their deliberate choice. For though two souls should choose a teletic<sup>1</sup> life, it is possible for one to be conversant with it with rectitude, but the other in a distorted manner. For each life receives *the well* and *the ill*. So that if it be requisite to speak summarily, they are either under the dominion of the same power, choose the same life, and live after the same manner; or being under the same power, they do not choose the same life, and live similarly; or they are neither under the same power, nor choose the same life, nor live after the same manner. For this is the last difference of all of them. So many therefore, are the modes of differences. For as there are three, we must either deny all, or affirm all; or deny two, but affirm one; or

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *τελικον* in this place, it is necessary to read *τελεστικον*.

<sup>2</sup> Here also, for *τελικον*, read *τελεστικον*.

vice versa, and this in a three-fold respect: viz. the extremes, of the middle; or the first and second, of the last; or the remaining two, of the first. Hence it is necessary that there should be so many differences<sup>1</sup> at first, of the choice and life of the soul.

As we have said however, one descent in each period is common to all these souls, lest, as he says, a certain soul should be allotted by the Demiurgus, a less portion of generation than another, being alone besides others, frequently compelled to descend. That which is in our power therefore, is in these souls mingled with necessity. For by how much the more partial free-will becomes, by so much the more is it diminished according to power. But in divine and dæmoniacal souls, the life is liberated, unrestrained, and easy, and exempt from all necessity. Hence souls make from themselves their first descent, and are led by Fate. And in these, the freedom of the will is more abundant, because destiny also is essential to souls. For if the law of Fate in them, leads them to the first generation, much more will this be effected by the law which is in the universe, and by the power of Fate. But they make their first descent, or are disseminated about the visible Gods, in order that they may have these as their saviours; in their wandering about generation, and that they may invoke them as their proper curators. Since however, not only animals are constituted on the earth through souls of this kind, but likewise in the other elements; nor man alone, for this is known to us, but other animals more divine indeed, yet at the same time generated; for that which lives for the shortest time, does not immediately subsist after eternal animals, but that which lives for a more extended period; and it is necessary that those rational animals which live for the longest time should exist prior to those that are most obnoxious to death;—since this is the case, Plato comprehends all these in common, by saying, “*it was necessary that the most pious of animals should be born.*” For this is adapted, as I may say, to all the participants of intellect, and to those animals that are capable of being converted to the Gods. But in what follows, he speaks concerning the human nature.

16A 1 “Since however, the human nature is twofold, he showed them that the more excellent genus was that which would afterwards be called man.”

The human species indeed, has been already constituted, and every mortal nature, according to the demiurgic intellects; but the discourse dividing what has been constituted, first gives subsistence to that which is more excellent, and

<sup>1</sup> For διαφοράν in this place, read διαφορας.



afterwards to that which is subordinate in this species. For Plato knew that the male is more adapted than the female to the demiurgic intellect and the most divine of principles, and is more allied to immutable and undefiled souls. Hence he leads souls in their first descent into men. Thus also in the *Phædrus*, he leads the soul that knows most, into the generation of a man, and there likewise the second and third, and as far as to the soul of the ninth rank. What then, shall we say, it is impossible for souls that have recently arrived at perfection, to pass into women? Or is it necessary that the soul that lives apocatastatically, should pass into the life of a man; or shall we say, that it may also lead a life of this kind, when it comes into the nature of a woman? But if we admit the former, and not the latter, how can we any longer say, that the virtues of men and women are common? For if the latter never live cathartically, but the former frequently make apocatastatic lives, the virtues will be no longer common to them. To which may be added, the absurdity that Socrates having learned the mysteries of love from Diotima, should be elevated through her<sup>1</sup> to the beautiful itself; but that Diotima herself, who elevated him, and who surpassed in wisdom, should not obtain the same form of life, because she was invested with the body of a woman. But if we admit that women may live apocatastatically, it is absurd that souls should ascend from this nature, but by no means descend into it from the intelligible. For when they suffer a defluxion of their wings, they are nearer to a less excellent nature, than when they are winged, and the ascent is through the same things as the descent. This therefore, is also evident from history. For the Sibyll, when she proceeded into light, knew her own order, and manifested that she came from the Gods, by saying,

Between the Gods and men, a mean am I.

Such therefore, are the necessary consequences from the things themselves.

But Plato delivering the progression and diminution of life according to nature, first leads the soul into the generation of man, afterwards, into the generation of woman, and in the third place, into the brutal nature. For the soul descends from the undefiled and pure form of life, into that form which is robust, and retains intellect, but is material. From this it descends into that form of life which is material, and at the same time imbecile, but is receptive of an intellectual life. And from this form into that which is perfectly destitute of intellect. Thus also in the *Republic*, delivering the diminutions of life, he produces the timocratic from the aristocratic form of life; from this, the oligarchic; from the oligarchic, the democratic; but from this the tyrannic. And it may be said that it is possible for the tyrannic to be generated from the timocratic, and a

<sup>1</sup> For δὲ αὐτῆς here, it is obviously necessary to read δὲ αὐτῇ.

democracy from an aristocracy; but Plato describes, a gradually subsiding mutation of political concerns, and conformably to this he here leads souls descending from the intelligible, into men. For he makes from them an animal, which would afterwards be called *ανθρωπος*, man, receiving its appellation from grandeur and vigor of nature; according to which also, it is more adapted to souls that are now descending. And thus much may suffice, in answer to the before-mentioned doubt concerning the first descent of souls.

From these things therefore, we may collect as a corollary, that fabrication and this universe had not a temporal beginning. For if the universe was generated from a certain beginning, it is also necessary that the descent of souls should have taken place from a certain beginning, and that there should have been a first soul that descended. But the Demiurgus leads the first descent of each soul into the generation of man. Hence it is necessary that the descent which makes man, should not have been effected through woman, nor proceed into generation through this, the female not yet existing. Neither likewise, does the descent which makes man, impart a generation to woman, *since in this case it would be possible for the female to be generated, not from the male and female, but from a certain male alone.* If therefore, these things are impossible, it is impossible that the male and the female [should have had a temporal beginning.] But souls always descend into the male genera, prior to the female, the former not being generated from the latter. And the speech of the Demiurgus is addressed to beings which are always generated in the universe, and not to such as once received a temporal beginning. What then, it may be said, shall we assert of the male and the female? Are they not also in souls themselves, so that of these some are of a virile, but others of an effeminate nature? And how can it be said, that this is not necessary? For if these are in the Gods primarily, and in sensibles ultimately, it is also necessary that they should exist in the media. For whence is the progression of them as far as to a sensible nature derived, except through the middle essence? Farther still, if the Demiurgus by connecting each soul with a vehicle, produces a certain animal,<sup>1</sup> it is entirely necessary that the difference of male and female in the soul should at the same time be apparent. For this is the division of animal. Must we not therefore admit that these are in souls? And how is it possible we should not, since they are assimilated to their leading Gods? For as they derive every other form from them, so likewise, they receive from them the peculiarity of the

<sup>1</sup> In the original, there is nothing more than *ἀδύνατον μὲν εἶναι το ὄντιον, καὶ το ἀπὸ τοῦ, and something is evidently wanting. It appears to me therefore, that the addition of the words *τὴν χρῆσιν ἀρχὴν εἶναι*, is necessary.*

<sup>2</sup> Μη is omitted here, in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *τι ζωὴν* here, it is obviously necessary to read *τι ζωόν*.

male and the female. In their generation also, virile and effeminate souls are divided according to the genera of the animals which are here. But as they change the species<sup>1</sup> of life, so likewise they change these powers, some of them being rendered more effeminate, but others descending into a more robust and vigorous form of life. For that which has the form of bound in this sensible region, is more infinite than the infinite which is there [i. e. in souls prior to their descent]; so that the lapse will be entirely into that which is less excellent. The lapse, however, to that which is less excellent, is at one time, to that which is nearer to the more excellent, and at another, to that which is more remote from it, but is analogous to what is there arranged. Thus also it is said, that a Lunar soul descended into the nature of man, in becoming the soul of Musæus, and that an Apolloniæal soul became the soul of the Sibyl. The fable of Aristophanes likewise, in the Banquet, manifests that souls are divided according to the male and female, and that which is common from these [or that which is of the common gender]. It is also evident, that masculine souls do not entirely proceed into the generation of men, nor feminine into the generation of women, by Timæus saying, that every soul makes its first descent into men; and that this is natural to it, because in females, the cause is comprehended, as we have before observed, of the male in animals.

“And as souls are from necessity implanted in bodies, and one thing accedes to, but another departs from, these bodies.”

Souls while they abide on high with the father, and are filled with intelligence, from intellectual natures, are not at all in want of the mortal-formed life. For they use immaterial, pure, and starry-form organs, revolve together with the Gods, and govern in conjunction with them the whole world. But when they descend into generation, become connected with a material body, and are allotted an influxive and effluxive nature, the colligation of the mortal life, which derives its subsistence from souls themselves, becomes necessary, because souls antecedently comprehend the summits of this<sup>2</sup> life in the spirit. For this which is the principle of sense, derives its subsistence both from souls themselves<sup>3</sup> and from the junior Gods. From souls indeed, because they have dominion over the whole of the irrational life, which they likewise adorn; but they would neither govern nor

<sup>1</sup> For η'η here, read ε'η.

<sup>2</sup> For αὐτῶν here, it is necessary to read αὐτῆς.

<sup>3</sup> In the original, the words καὶ παρὰ τῶν ψυχῶν are omitted, but from what immediately follows, it is evident they ought to be inserted.

adorn it, unless they were causally the leaders of its essence. But it also derives its subsistence from the Gods, because parts energize together with wholes, and fecundity is present with partial souls, through a co-arrangement with wholes. If therefore, when souls were implanted in bodies, then the junior Gods produced the mortal life, and made another mortal animal, it follows, that the animation of the material body is one thing, whether it subsists in simple vestments, or in such as are composite and testaceous,<sup>1</sup> and the animation in the vehicle of the soul another. And the latter indeed, being immortal, the Demiurgus constitutes, but the former, which is mortal from the beginning, derives its subsistence from the junior Gods, because it is inseparable from material bodies. The peculiar life also of the vehicle differs from the rest, in the same manner as the immortal from the mortal-formed life. But the life which subsists in simple vestments, differs from the life in the composite body, because the latter follows the temperament of the body, but the former may be disciplined, and is able to predominate over the corporeal temperaments. The vehicles therefore are triple:<sup>2</sup> for they are either simple<sup>3</sup> and immaterial; or simple and material; or composite and material. Of these also the lives are three; the first, immortal; the second, more lasting than the body; and the third, perishing with the body. And thus much for this particular. But the word *implanted*, manifests genesiurgic semination, together with at the same time signifying that the form of life is self-perfect; just as a plant is ingrafted into another nature. The addition also of the words *from necessity*, manifest that the semination is material, but not divine and celestial.

“He declared to them that in the first place, one connascent sense, produced by violent passions, was necessary to all; in the second place, love mingled with pleasure and pain; and in addition to this, fear and anger, and such other things as are either consequent to these, or naturally discordant from being of a contrary nature.”

The Demiurgus comprehended all the material and mortal-formed life in three boundaries, and inserted the causes of this in souls, in order that they might rule over and subdue it. For dominion is not derived from any other source than essential precedency. The irrational life therefore, subsists intellectually in the Demiurgus, but rationally in souls. Nor is this at all wonderful, since body sub-

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *αστρεϊνός* here, it is necessary to read *αστρεϊνός*.

<sup>2</sup> For *τρία* here, read *τρία*.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of *ἄλως* in this place, it is obviously necessary to read *ἄλως*.

sists incorporeally in the intelligible causes of all things. What else however, can we say that each of these powers is, than a corporeal-formed and material<sup>1</sup> life, which is gnostic of things that fall on it externally, produces this knowledge through organs, is not dependant on itself, but on the things which it uses, is mingled with material masses, and knows that which it knows accompanied with passion? For not every passion which is produced in the animal, imparts to us a sensation of itself, but that which effects much agitation, as Socrates says in the *Philebus*. For it is necessary that a certain agitation should be produced about the sensoria. For neither are all the motions in the soul distributed as far as to the body, but there are some, such as the intellectual, which pertain to the soul itself<sup>2</sup> by itself. Nor do all the motions about the body extend as far as to the soul, but there are some which through their obscurity, are unable to move the soul. Sense therefore is produced, not from all passions, but from those that are violent, which cause much agitation. And the mortal-formed sense indeed is partible, is mingled with passions in its decisions, and is material. But there is another sense prior to this, in the vehicle of the soul, which is, as with reference to this, immaterial and pure, and an impassive knowledge itself subsisting by itself, yet not liberated from morphe; because it also is corporeal-formed, as being allotted its hypostasis in body. And this sense indeed, has the same nature with the phantasy. For one essence is common to both; yet externally proceeding, it is called sense; but remaining within, and beholding morphe and figures in the spirit, it is denominated the phantasy. So far likewise, as it is divided about the spirit, it is sense. Farther still, opinion indeed, is the basis of the rational life, but the phantasy is the summit of the second [or irrational] life. And opinion and the phantasy are conjoined to each other, and the irrational life is filled with powers from the more excellent life. But the middle of the irrational life is unreceptive of supernal forms, but is alone receptive of such as are externally situated. And at the same time, it is common, and knows that which is sensible passively. But the material sense is alone perceptive of things which fall on it externally, and move it, not being able to retain the spectacles in itself, in consequence of being partible, and not one. For it is divided about the sensoria. The impassive therefore and common sense is one thing; the sense which is common but passive another; and that which is distributed and passive another. And the first of these indeed, pertains to the first vehicle; the second, pertains to the irrational life; and the third, to the animation of the body.

<sup>1</sup> For *ἐνέρον* here, it is necessary to read *ενυλον*.

<sup>2</sup> For *αυτου* here, read *αυτης*.

After sense, however, Plato arranges desire.<sup>1</sup> But this is life indeed, and corporeal-formed, always reweaving the body, and alleviating its wants; about which also, pleasure and pain are surveyed. For these passions are likewise present with the other parts of the soul. For both in reason, and in anger, you may assume pleasures and pains. Corporeal pain and pleasure, however, are generated according to desire. For of the body the path to that which is preternatural, and the privation of life, produce pain; but the return to that which is conformable to nature, and the adaptation to life, produce pleasure. And that which in these passions is assuaged, or exhilarated,<sup>2</sup> is the *epithymetic* part. Since however, these two passions are primordial, and the fountains of the other passions, as Plato says in the *Philebus*, and in the *Laws*, hence through the mixture of these, he gives a generation to the other passions, and denominates love a mixture of pleasure and pain. For love pertains to all things. And so far indeed as the object of love is in its view, love is accompanied with pleasure; but so far as it is not yet present with it in energy, love is mingled with pain. Plato also characterizes the whole life of desire through love, because this passion is most vehement about it.

In the third place therefore, he enumerates anger. But anger is a life, removing every thing which pains and disturbs the body; on which account also the fear of the corruption of the body disturbs it. Excess however, and deficiency are surveyed about it, such as audacity and timidity, and the attendants on these, ambition, contention, and all such effects as are produced from astonishment<sup>3</sup> about mortal concerns; the superior soul employing this life, in order to the motion of the body. And these three genesiurgic powers indeed, have the following order. The body, as soon as it is born, according to the progression of generation, participates of sense. For it would not be an animal, nor would it possess appetite, unless it were generated sensitive. For appetites indeed, are accompanied with sense, but senses<sup>4</sup> are not entirely accompanied with appetites. Hence, the animal is in a greater degree characterized by the sensitive, than<sup>5</sup> by the orectic. But after the participation of sense, the body appears to

<sup>1</sup> *Desire* is admirably defined by the Pythagoreans to be a certain tendency, impulse and appetite of the soul, in order to be filled with something, or to enjoy something present, or to be disposed according to some sensitive energy; or of the evacuation and absence, and non-perception of certain things. See my translation of Iamblichus' *Life of Pythagoras*, p. 146.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *ἐαδύχμητον* in this place, it appears to me to be requisite to read *διαεχόμενον*.

<sup>3</sup> For *ποῦν* here, it is necessary to read *πρῶτον*.

<sup>4</sup> The words *αὐτὸ αἰσθησέν* are wanting in the original, but ought evidently to be inserted.

<sup>5</sup> Instead of *ἐν τῇ ορετικῇ* in this place, it is necessary to read *ἢ τῇ ορετικῇ*.

be pleased and pained. And it is contracted indeed, by the external cold, but refreshed by the swaddling bands, and led to a condition conformable to nature. But after desire, as an increase of years accedes, it exerts the passion of anger. For anger is now the power of a more robust and vigorous nature. Hence also of irrational animals, such as are more material, live according to desire alone, and participate of pleasure and pain; but such as are more perfect, are allotted a more irascible life. Prior however to these appetites, as we have said respecting sense, there is a certain summit of them in the pneuma or spirit of the soul. And this summit is a certain impulsive power, which is motive indeed of the spirit, but guards and connectedly contains the essence of it; at one time being extended, and distributing itself into parts; but at another, being led to bound and order, and regulated by reason.

“And that such souls as subdue these would live justly, but such as are vanquished by them, unjustly.”

How therefore can souls subdue these corporeal lives, except by possessing the causes of them? For through these they render them more concordant [with reason]. For every thing which naturally has dominion over the passions, contains in itself the reason [or productive principle] of them; in order that by looking to this, it may define the measures of their motions. Thus the anger in the breast was suppressed by Ulysses; for it had been already disciplined by him. But the soul also adorns external anger, in order that its motion may be just. If however, this inward anger in him had committed itself to passion and material motion, it would have entirely corrupted the other well-ordered disposition of his soul. Hence when souls subdue material passions, and adorn their inward lives, they live justly; but when they are subdued by them they imperceptibly fall into injustice. For following the immoderate appetites of the body, their powers become inordinate, and unadorned, and are extended about generation, in a greater degree than is fit. But how do they at one time follow justice, and at another not? For it was before said of them, “*Of those that are always willing to follow justice and you.*” May it not be said, that they are always indeed willing to follow justice and the Gods, but that they do not always follow them, for the reasons assigned in the Gorgias, which distinguish true will from the opinion which is governed by appearances? Or may it not be said, that souls follow justice and

<sup>1</sup> For *ἡμῶν* here, read *υμῶν*.

the Gods, in consequence of a divine nature presiding in them? For he who wishes that which is good, wishes to follow justice. For this is what was said in the before cited passage, viz. "*that a divine nature has dominion in those that are always willing to follow justice and the Gods.*" For the divine part of us naturally follows justice; but the irrational forms of life follow the divine nature which is in us.

"That he also who lived well during the proper time [of his abode on the earth] again proceeding to the habitation of his kindred star, should enjoy a happy life."

Again, these things are likewise effected by souls themselves. For being self-motive, they arrange themselves in an appropriate place. But they are also effected by Fate. For this power defines the appropriate allotments of each soul, and co-adapts them to the proper forms of life. And in the third place, they are effected by the Gods, who dispose in an orderly manner the parts of the universe. For they distribute to all things that which is according to desert; and on this account it is said, that Justice proceeding to the universe from the middle sphere of the Sun governs all things according to rectitude. As in wholes, however, Justice following Jupiter, is the avenger of those that desert the divine law, thus also, the energy of Justice about souls, adorns those that forget the laws of Fate, and exchange for a more excellent, a subordinate life. And thus much in common as to these particulars.

But what is *the proper time*, what *the kindred star*, and what *the happy life*? *The proper time* therefore, is such as that which Plato defines in the *Phædrus*, to the souls which are circularly led from hence, after the first generation, viz. a thousand years, or some other period of this kind. For as this time pertains to those that choose a philosophic life, so another period more or less extended, is adapted to those that make a different choice, this time not subsisting monadically, but being defined according to the form of life. But *the kindred star*, is that about which the distribution of souls and their vehicles is made. So that if there are some souls, which from the first, have their allotment about the earth, these after the first life, following Justice, and the Gods, will return to the ethereal vehicle of the whole earth, relinquishing the terrestrial bulk. And in this establishing themselves, and the organ connascent with them, [i. e. their ethereal vehicle,] they will themselves be filled with intellectual life, but will fill their vehicles with divine light, and demiurgic power. If also, there are certain souls that proceed about the Sun, these returning to their wholeness, will together with it dispose wholes in an orderly manner, being allotted through a co-ordination



with it, a power of such a kind, as not to depart from the intellection of themselves, in their providential attention to the universe. And *the happy life*, is that life which is defined according to the peculiarity of the leading powers. For these are in the order of demons, having partial souls in their possession, and elevating them to the intelligible, in the same manner as the leaders of the liberated Gods. Hence also, Plato elsewhere, calls these souls happy, as being suspended from these leaders who are happy (*εὐδαίμωνων οὐρανῶν*), i. e. who are beneficent demons. For every where, that which is proximately established above the nature which is thought deserving of its providential care, has the order of a beneficent demon with respect to it.

It is requisite also to survey the uninterrupted connexion of the theorems. For Plato constituted souls from the demiurgic and vivific cause, and after their generation, arranged different partial, under different divine souls, making the progression and distribution of them to be supermundane. After these divine souls also, he introduces partial souls into the universe, gives them vehicles, and distributes them about the stars. In the next place, he leads them into generation, and imparts to them the mortal form of life; and after these things, divides the lives of them, and distributes allotments adapted to their lives. For the progression to them, is from supermundane natures into the world; but their descent from total life, is into generation. Now therefore, since he speaks of souls that are restored to their kindred star, after their first generation, and says, that leaving the body they obtain a happy life, how can we show that these things accord with what is asserted in the *Phædrus*? For there he who chooses a philosophic life, is restored to his pristine perfection, through three lives. Or may we not say that the allotment which is here delivered, is not into that from whence each soul originally came; for that is effected through three periods, each of which consists of a thousand years; but is a return to the star, under which it was essentially arranged, and in conjunction with which, it possesses a common life? For it is possible for souls that have not led a philosophic life, to be elevated by Justice to a certain place in the heavens, and there to receive the reward of the life which they passed in the human form. For this is asserted in the *Phædrus* of the souls of those that are not philosophers. For the apocatastasis into the same situation again, is one thing, but the ascent to the kindred star another. For the former requires three periods; but the latter may be effected through one period. And the former elevates the soul to the intelligible, from whence it descended; but the latter leads it to a subordinate form of life. For there are different<sup>1</sup> measures of felicity, and the return is two-fold, one of ascending souls, but the other, of

<sup>1</sup> The word *διαφορά* is omitted here in the original.

those that have ascended. So that it is possible for the soul that arrives at its kindred star, either to be co-arranged with the mundane powers of its God, or to proceed still higher. Its recurrency however, to the intelligible itself, requires a period of three thousand years. For through this, the highest winged condition is effected.

“But that he whose conduct was depraved, should in the second generation, be changed into the nature of a woman.”

We have before observed, that Plato does not call the semination of souls the first generation, but the one descent from the intelligible, common to all partial souls. He calls therefore, the second descent, the second generation, and makes the second descent to be, into the nature of a woman; just as the third is into the brutal nature, indicating by this, the well-ordered diminution of life. Thus also in the Phædrus, he denominates all the lives successively after the first generation, conformably to the second lives.

“That both these, at the expiration of a thousand years, should return to the allotment and choice of a second life; each soul receiving a life conformable to its choice. And that in this election, the human soul should pass into the life of a brute.”

Plato here exhibits another order of life, and leads the soul from a more powerful to a more imbecile nature, and from an intellectual life, to one deprived of intellect. For why is it necessary that the soul should not descend from the first generation into the nature of a woman? For if the female genus subsisted through an aberration from the male, it would be necessary that souls recently perfected, should begin from that which is according to nature [i. e. should begin from the male only]; since that which is preternatural is every where posterior and adventitious. But since the female nature is also in the Gods, what should prevent souls, in this respect imitating their proper leaders, from not only choosing lives adapted to them,<sup>1</sup> but also the nature of animals allied to them? It is not however wonderful, that alternations should take place, as we before observed. For that the male and the female not only subsist in mortal natures, but also in the

<sup>1</sup> For αἰδω here, read αἰσθάνω.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of αὐτῆς here, it is necessary to read αὐτοῦ.

impartible<sup>1</sup> lives themselves of souls, may be inferred by again recollecting what was before asserted, viz. that these sexual differences are both in the natures prior, and posterior to partial souls. It is not proper however, to be incredulous, if in total souls, the vehicles are connascently conjoined to them, but in partial souls, they are sometimes conjoined, and sometimes not. For in the former the colligation is essential, but in the latter, is the effect of deliberate choice. Hence in the former, the division of the vehicles is annexed to the essence of the souls, but in the latter, to the differences of their choice. And this may be inferred from what is asserted in the Banquet, in the fable of Aristophanes. For there, as we have before observed, the divisions of souls according to these vehicles, and the alternations of choice in these, about the mortal life, are clearly delivered. If therefore, you understand in what is said, that the nature of woman is immediately implied, I should thus interpret the words. But if every form of life, which is imbecile, effeminate, and verging to generation, is symbolically signified through woman, as some prior to us, and these no casual persons, have thought, the words will not at all require such a solution as the above. But you may adopt either of these explications; though at the same time, it must be observed, that Plato studiously conceals many things through symbols. Whichever of these solutions therefore is adopted, it is evident that the soul in its first descent, is not implanted in the female nature.

From this also, I assume that according to Timæus, the soul, man, and in short the universe, are unbegotten. For if the soul was generated, and descended at a certain time into the first generation, it would impart the life of a man. But this man being entirely generated, would be generated from a female; and this female would have a soul, which is either the first that has descended; and if this be the case, the assertion of Timæus is false, who leads the soul in its first descent into the male; or it is not the first, and prior to this female, it is necessary that the soul of a male should have generated the soul which is in it. But again this male must have been generated a male from a female; or if this is not admitted, its existence must be from chance. If however this be the case, it will be in vain, a female not existing, from which and in which, the male may generate. This female likewise, in the same manner as the male, must either be from chance, and have a soul which is the first that descended, and was generated with it; or must be generated from the male. But this is impossible. Hence, neither of these was once generated, nor does the soul, and much less does the universe, pertain to generated natures.

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *μερίσται ζωῆς* in this place, it is necessary to read *ἀμερίσται ζωῆς*.

“ And that in case vice should not even then cease in these, but should remain according to a similitude of the mode of generation, then the soul should always be changed into a brutal nature correspondent to its disposition.”

It is usual to investigate what the descent of souls into irrational animals, must be said to be. And some indeed think, that what are called brutal lives, are assimilations of men to brutes. For it is not possible that a rational essence should become the soul of a brute. But others admit, that it may be immediately introduced into irrational animals. For they say that all souls are of a similar form, so that they may become wolves and leopards, and the marine fishes called *pneumones*. The true answer however to the inquiry is this, that the human soul may enter into brutes, but so as to possess its proper life, the inserted soul riding as it were on, and being bound by sympathy, to the brutal nature. And this indeed, is demonstrated by us through many arguments, in our Commentaries on the Phædrus; in which we have also shown that this is the only mode of insertion. If therefore it be requisite to remind the reader that this doctrine is Platonic, it may also be observed that in the Republic, the soul of Thersites is said to have been invested with the *nature*, and not the *body*, of an ape; and in the Phædrus, the soul is said to descend into a *brutal life*, but not into a *brutal body*. For the life is in conjunction with the proper soul. And here, Timæus says, that the soul is changed into a *brutal nature*. For the brutal nature is not the brutal body, but the life of the brute. And this, as we have said, may be assumed from our Commentaries on the Phædrus. But that it is impossible for a recently perfected soul to become the soul of a brute, we may recollect from this, that brutality is something beyond all human vice, as Aristotle also says. Hence, it is necessary first to have human vice, and thus afterwards the vice adapted to brutes. For it is not possible from the most contrary forms of life to have their perfect contraries. Hence Timæus says, “ *And in case vice should not even then cease in these,*” by *then* signifying in the descent into women; according to which mode of descent, becoming depraved, they are changed into a brutal nature of this kind. For from the first and more intellectual forms of life, the more irrational are produced through diminution; from the forms that are more remote from habitude, those that subsist in habitude; and the more imbecile, from the more robust. Since however, vice is multifarious, the brutal nature may be survey-

\* For *scurepwr* here, it is necessary to read *scopurepwr*.

ed in each; and on account of this, the soul may be connected with similar animals, as Plato shows in the *Phædo*. For the brutal<sup>1</sup> nature in injustice, renders men wolves; in timidity stags; and in gluttony asses. For each of these entirely possesses a certain transcendency, which departs from human depravity.

“And that it should not be freed from the allotment of labours, till following the revolution of that same and similar nature contained in its essence, it vanquishes those abundantly turbulent passions, tumultuous and irrational, adhering to it externally<sup>2</sup> afterwards from fire, water, air, and earth, and returns to the form of its first, and most excellent habit.”

The one salvation of the soul herself, which is extended by the *Demiurgus*, and which liberates her from the circle of generation, from abundant wandering, and an inefficacious life, is her return to the intellectual form, and a flight from every thing which naturally adheres to us from generation. For it is necessary that the soul which is hurled like seed into the realms of generation, should lay aside the stubble and bark, as it were, which she obtained from being disseminated into these fluctuating realms; and that purifying herself from every thing circum-jacent, she should become an intellectual flower and fruit, delighting in an intellectual life, instead of doxastic nutriment, and pursuing the uniform and simple energy of the period of sameness, instead of the abundantly wandering motion of the period which is characterized by difference. For she contains each of these circles, and two-fold powers. And of her horses one is good, but the other the contrary. And one of these leads her to generation, but the other from generation to true being. The one also leads her round the *genesurgic*, but the other round the intellectual circle. For the period of the same and the similar, elevates to intellect, and an intelligible nature, and to the first and most excellent habit. But this habit is that according to which the soul being winged, governs the whole world, becoming assimilated to the Gods themselves. And this is the universal form of life in the soul, just as that is the partial form, when she falls into the last body, and becomes something belonging to an individual, instead of belonging to the universe. The middle of these also, is the partial

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *θρωπτα* here, it is necessary to read *θρωδία*.

<sup>2</sup> In all the printed editions of the *Timæus*, the word *εξωθεν* is wanting in this place. For it is evident from the Commentary of Proclus, that it ought to be inserted. Hence, instead of *τον πολλων* (*lege πολλων*) *οχλον, και υστερον προσφυντα, κ. λ.* we must read, *τον πολλων οχλον, εξωθεν και υστερον προσφυντα, κ. λ.*

universal, when she lives in conjunction with her middle vehicle, as a citizen of generation. Dismissing therefore, her first habit which subsists according to an alliance to the whole of generation, and, laying aside the irrational nature which connects her with generation, likewise governing her irrational part by reason, and extending opinion to intellect, she will be circularly led to a happy life, from the wanderings about the regions of sense; which life those that are initiated by Orpheus in the mysteries of Bacchus and Proserpine, pray that they may obtain, together with the allotments of the sphere, and a cessation<sup>1</sup> of evil. But if our soul necessarily lives well, when living according to the circle of sameness, much more must this be the case with divine souls. It is, however, possible for our soul to live according to the circle of sameness, when purified, as Plato says. Cathartic virtue, therefore, alone must be called the salvation of souls; since this cuts off, and vehemently obliterates material natures, and the passions which adhere to us from generation; separates the soul and leads it to intellect; and causes it to leave on earth the vehicles with which it is invested. For souls in descending, receive from the elements different vehicles, aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial; and thus at last enter into this gross bulk. For how, without a medium, could they proceed into this body from immaterial spirits? Hence before they come into this body, they possess the irrational life, and its vehicle, which is prepared from the simple elements, and from these they become invested with *tumult*, [for the genesiurgic body,] which is so called as being foreign to the connate vehicle of souls, and as composed of all-various vestments, and causing souls to become heavy.

The word *adhering* likewise, manifests the external circumposition of a vehicle of such a kind as that of which he is speaking, and the colligation to the one nature contained in it; after which this last body, consisting of things dissimilar and multifarious, is suspended from souls. For how is it possible, that the descent should be [immediately] from a life which governs the whole world, to the most partial form of life? For this particular and indivisible outward man cannot be connected with the universe, but a prior descent into a medium between the two, is entirely necessary; which medium is not a certain animal, but the supplier of many lives. For the descent does not directly produce the life of a certain man, but prior to this and prior to the generation of an individual, it produces the life of universal<sup>2</sup> man. And as the lapse is from that which is incorporeal into body, and a life with body, according to which the soul lives in conjunction with its

<sup>1</sup> For ἀπαύσαι here, it is necessary to read ἀναπαύσαι.

<sup>2</sup> It appears to me, that the word καθολικόν is here wanting.

celestial vehicle; so from this, the descent is into a genesiurgic body, according to which the soul is in generation; and from this, into a terrestrial body, according to which, it lives with the testaceous body. Hence, before it is surrounded with this last body, it is invested with a body which connects it with all generation. And on this account, it then leaves this body, when it leaves generation. But if this be the case, it then received it, when it came into generation. It came however, into generation, prior to its lapse into this last body. Hence prior to this last body it received that vehicle, and retains the latter after the dissolution of the former. It lives therefore, in this vehicle through the whole of the genesiurgic period. On this account, Plato calls *the adhering tumult*, the irrational<sup>1</sup> form of life in this vehicle; and not that which adheres to the soul in each of its incarnations, as being that which circularly invests it from the first. The connascent vehicle therefore, makes the soul to be mundane; the second vehicle, causes it to be a citizen of generation; and the testaceous vehicle makes it to be terrestrial. And as the life of souls is to the whole of generation,<sup>2</sup> and the whole of generation to the world, so are vehicles to each other. With respect to the circumposition also of the vehicles, one is perpetual, and always mundane; another is prior to this outward body, and posterior to it; for it is both prior to, and subsists posterior to it, in generation; and a third is then only, when it lives a certain partial life on the earth. Plato therefore, by using the term *adhering*, and by suspending the irrational nature from the soul, according to all its lives, distinguishes this irrational nature from this outward body, and the peculiar life of it. But by adding the words *eternally*, and *afterwards*, he distinguishes it from the connascent vehicle in which the Demiurgus made it to descend. Hence, this vehicle which causes the soul to be a citizen of generation, is a medium between both.

Timæus therefore, knew the vehicle of the irrational life, which adheres to us prior to this outward body. For that this irrational and tumultuous crowd, which adheres to us, from fire, earth, air, and water, does not pertain to the first vehicle, is evident. For again, this must be urged, in consequence of some of the interpreters not fathoming the depth of the theory of Plato concerning the psychical vehicles. Hence, some of them destroying the [first] vehicle are compelled to make the soul to be sometimes out of all body. But others preserving it, are forced to immortalize the vehicle of the irrational life; neither of them separating

<sup>1</sup> For λόγον here, it is necessary to read αλογον.

<sup>2</sup> The original, which is evidently corrupt and defective in this place, is, εαι ως εχει ηχων προς την γενεσιν ολην. Instead of which, I read, εαι ως εχει η ζωη ψυχων προς την γενεσιν ολην.

the *connate* from the *adherent* vehicle, the prior from the posterior, and that which was fashioned by the one Demiurgus, from that which was woven to the soul by the many Demiurgi, though these are clearly distinguished by Plato. It is evident therefore, that this irrational crowd is not in the connate vehicle of the soul, into which the Demiurgus caused the soul to ascend, for Plato clearly says, that "*it adhered to the soul afterwards.*" It is likewise manifest, that neither is it the life in the testaceous body. For if it were, how is it that he says, that the soul in changing its bodies, will not be freed from the allotment of labours, till it subdues the tumultuous and irrational crowd, which afterwards adhered to it? He says therefore, that the soul exchanges one life for another, and that the irrational crowd adhered to, but is not connate with it. For this would be to change that which is appropriate and allied to it. Hence, in each of the lives of the soul, there is not a mutation of the irrational life, as there is of bodies. This life therefore, is different from the *entelecheia*, which is one in each body, and inseparable from it. For the one is inherent, descending with us into the realms of generation; but the other is changed together with bodies, from which it is inseparable. Hence, Timæus knew, that the irrational life is different from the life of the first vehicle, and from the life of the last body. It is different from the former, because he calls it *posterior*, and from the latter, because it is not changed in conjunction with the outward body. For it is necessary that the soul should subdue it, when it is present with it. For the soul is separated from the *entelecheia* of the body, and changing its bodies between the life of the ethereal vehicle, and the life of the testaceous body, it accomplishes the genesiurgic period. It is however, disturbed by the irrational life. But to the rejection of such vehicles as these, which are mentioned by Plato, who particularly names each of the elements, the philosophic life indeed, as he says, contributes; but in my opinion, the telestic art is most efficacious for this purpose; through divine fire obliterating all the stains arising from generation, as the Oracles teach us, and likewise every thing foreign, which the spirit and the irrational nature of the soul have attracted to themselves.

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In what is here said, Plato gives completion to the doctrine of the first fabrication, but is established at the beginning of the second; preserving indeed the



former, liberated, monadic, exempt, undefiled, and unmingled with subordinate natures; but suspending the latter from it, and delivering all the measures, the arrangement, and the boundaries of production, as the consequence of the latter, being perfected and governed by, and receiving all these, from the former. Such therefore, is the scope of the proposed words. Directing our attention however, to the demiurgic sacred law, we must not say, that it resembles the law of a city, which a human legislator establishes, as energizing only according to existence. For the demiurgic will precedes the energy which is alone established in existence, [for in a subsistence according to being:] and in short, it is not lawful to consider human as the same with divine concerns. For the former, though they are sometimes assimilated to a divine nature, yet are partly assimilated, so as in one respect to imitate the stability, in another the efficacy, and in another the perfective power, of divine natures. Nor must we admit, that a sacred law of this kind is ambiguous; as for instance, that if some one should make *these* things, *those* will follow, but if not, the opposites to these, will be the result, according to a dissimilar<sup>1</sup> intellection. For the father of wholes causally comprehends in himself, all effects; not apprehending them by indefinite, but by stable genera uniformly, and perceiving generated natures in an unbegotten manner, things contingent necessarily, and partibles impartibly. For time and place, were generated together with the universe. The Demiurgus therefore, of the universe, established in himself the principles of all things, without time, and without interval. Hence, it is necessary to admit, that the demiurgic *thesmos*, is the intellectual order, contained in the divine *thesmos*, which pervades through all things, is present with all things without impediment, and guards all things with purity. For I think that *thesmos* possesses something more than law, so far as deity also is more excellent than intellect. For we say that law is the distribution of intellect, but *thesmos*, divine order, and a uniform boundary. And thus much as to these particulars.

Proceeding however, to the words of the text, in the first place we shall demonstrate that Plato comprehends all the laws of Fate through the decad; because the decad also is connate with the demiurgic cause. For such goods as the Demiurgus imparts to the world, end in this number, all of them being ten. For the decad is mundane, as the Pythagoric hymn says; which calls it the universal recipient, ancient and venerable, placing bound about all things, and which is denominated the immutable and unwearied decad. All the above-mentioned laws of Fate therefore pertaining to souls are ten. For it is necessary that souls

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *αἰσχροῦ* here, it is necessary to read, *ἀσχητόν*.

should be disseminated; that there should be one common descent to all of them in each period; that the soul descending in the first generation, should descend into a pious animal; that the soul descending into the human nature, should first pass into the seed of man; that the soul which is in body, should produce partible and material lives; that the soul which vanquishes the material life, should be just, but the soul which is vanquished by it, unjust; that the just soul should return to its kindred star; that the offending soul, should again descend in the second generation, into the nature of woman; that the soul which was in the second generation, should in the third descent, pass into the nature of a brute; and in the last place, the tenth is the demiurgic law, which is the one saviour of the soul, being the life which elevates it to the period of the same and the similar, and causes the circle of its wandering in generation, to cease. All the above-mentioned laws therefore, are comprehended in the decad, because the Pythagoreans consider the decad as adapted to the Demiurgus, and to Fate. And these laws are disseminated in souls, in order that they may lead themselves; since the Gods wish to rule over self-motive natures, as self-motive; and likewise in order, that they may be to themselves the causes of the evils which may afterwards befall them, and not the Demiurgus. For unless they antecedently comprehended the laws of Fate, if indeed, they were always superior to Fate, they would not descend into generation; but if they are sometimes to be under its dominion, how could they be accused of deviations from rectitude, when they had not previously learned the punishment ordained for such deviations? In order therefore, that the Demiurgus might not be accused as the author of the guilt of souls, he established in their essences the laws of Fate.

Hence, the nature of evils must not be referred to divinity: for it is here said, that the maker of the whole world, is not the cause of them. And not only is this asserted of the Demiurgus in this place, but in the Republic also, the prophet who proclaims the decree of Lachesis says, "*that the electing soul is the cause [of the evil which may befall it] but God is blameless.*" So that divinity is neither the antecedent cause, nor at all the cause, of evils, but is blameless. For as it was said prior to this, divinity was willing that depravity should, as much as possible, have no existence. Evil therefore, must not be referred to a divine nature, nor must it be said, that it is without a principle. For if it is without a principle, it will be unadorned and indefinite, and will injure the whole fabrication of things. For what will be able to adorn it, if it has no principle in beings? Nor must a principle be given to it, but this total. For nothing that ranks as a whole, is receptive of evil. But all wholes perpetually preserve the same nature, undefiled, and free from evil. Hence, it is evident that evil subsists from a partial principle.

And after what manner does it subsist from this? Shall we say, according to a precedaneous hypostasis? By no means. For things which thus subsist are bounded, and have an end, and are according to nature to their generator. Evil therefore, is implanted in souls according to *parypostasis*, or a deviation from subsistence, either through a privation of symmetry, or through commixture, or in some other way. And Plato knowing this says, "*in order that the Demiurgus might not be the cause of the future depravity of each.*" For the term *future*, manifests the hypostasis of depravity to be adventitious, foreign, and externally implanted. But what is the legislative promulgation? For evils have prior to this been discussed. May we not say, that it signifies the one comprehension in the Demiurgus of all the laws of Fate? For *thesmos* is comprehensive of all laws. And the *thesmos* indeed in Adrastia comprehends the Saturnian and Jovian laws, and also the laws of Fate; but the *themos* in the Demiurgus, both comprehends, and gives subsistence to, mundane natures. The promulgation however with the addition<sup>1</sup> [of the words, "*all these things to souls,*"] signifies that the dominion of this *thesmos* is extended with all things, and that its providential inspection pervades to the last of things.

"He disseminated some of them into the earth, others into the moon, and others into the other instruments of time."

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It must not be supposed that this semination of souls was effected casually. For where in things which subsist perpetually with invariable sameness is it possible that the indefinite should intervene? Nor must it be thought to be a mere distribution of the generator. For the things which are disseminated, are neither alternative, nor such as act without deliberate choice. But this semination is supernally accomplished, conformably to the demiurgic intellect, and with which the will of souls themselves concurs. For each of them both knows and chooses its proper order, and establishes its vehicle in appropriate parts of the universe; each not being the same with the Gods about whom it is disseminated, as some say it is; thus making a part to be the same as the whole. For if this were admitted, the arrangement of leaders and followers would be confounded, and the order of undefiled souls, and of those that are not such, would be subverted. Nor does each of these souls connect itself with foreign parts, one with *these*, but another with *those* parts of the universe. For essential similitude precedes a semination of this kind. For what may some one assign as the cause of this division? Is it that partial ought to be without co-arrangement with total souls,

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *προθεσται* here, it is necessary to read *προσθεσται*.

and that their vehicles ought to be separated from total circulations? This, however, is impossible, for parts everywhere follow wholes. Is it, therefore, because souls differ from each other? And how, in short, do they differ from each other, since they subsist in immaterial forms? Shall we say then, that they differ from each other, but were not distinguished conformably to the precedaneous measures of divine souls? And how in this case, is ascent and perfection inserted<sup>1</sup> in them through divine souls? We must say therefore, that this semination is entirely defined, conformably to a divine and perfect intellect. And thus much as to this particular.

But let us in the next place, connect with this, a survey of the words severally. The semination of souls therefore, with their vehicles about the junior Gods, precedes every other fabrication of these Gods. For it is necessary that they should have leaders not only as souls, but as mundane natures; and that as being allotted the government of animals, they should be arranged under some of the divine circulations. The semination however, exhibits through the very name of it, the partible allotment of the vehicles; the power which is comprehensive in the invisible of all partial in total souls; and the prolific energy of divine bodies, according to which they fill from their own life, partial vehicles, with the peculiarity of themselves. For every thing that is sown receives something from its subject earth. Hence, from all that has been said, this is in the first place evident, that there is no dissemination about the soul of the universe. For it is not proper to oppose the semination about this soul, to that about other souls, nor the whole world to its parts. For if it were possible for a partial soul to remain on high, during the whole period of the universe, it would be possible<sup>2</sup> for a semination of souls to take place, about the soul of the universe. *But this soul indeed, is arranged in the world as a monad. For it is the co-arranged monad of the mundane souls, that distribute<sup>3</sup> the powers of it.* For with each of the divine bodies, a power of the soul of the universe is present. About this number however, the genera, that are superior to us and partial souls, are divided, these having the order of attendants. And in the second place, there is a semination of souls in each of the sublunary elements, and in the celestial spheres, and the stars. We have however before shown what the natures are about which the distribution of souls takes place; so that the semination also, is about the

<sup>1</sup> For ἀφῆκεν here, I read ἐφῆκεν.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of πάντα in this place, it is necessary to read παντα.

<sup>3</sup> For ἀδυνατον here, it is requisite to read ἐνιστατον.

<sup>4</sup> Instead of καταειρημενως in this place, it is obviously necessary to read καταειρημενων.

vehicles of them. For all of them contribute to the generation of time, some by themselves, but others together with wholes, in the same manner as the stars. And all of them are the instruments of time. For all the fixed stars, and every mundane God, being circularly moved, have entire periods of time, according to which, the whole time of the mundane life is measured; and they have likewise apocatastases, in common with this life, and with each other. But Plato only makes mention of those instruments of time, the apocatastatic periods of which may be obtained from sense. Dividing the whole world however, into heaven and generation, he assumes the moon, and the earth, as the extremes of these according to position, and is satisfied with these, because he is speaking of the division of the last souls, and the semination of the most partial vehicles, which are naturally adapted to mutation, and to approximate, and enter into the most gross corporeal masses.

After these particulars also, it is worth while to know in the third place, that vehicles are likewise disseminated about the fixed stars. For every part of the world is full of partial souls, who are spread under their saviour Gods, and follow the demons that are suspended from them. But whether any one of these partial bodies, is elevated above the Saturnian sphere;<sup>1</sup> or whether all of them are arranged in the planetary spheres according to an alliance with the fixed stars, deserves to be considered. For of the planets themselves, it is said by those who are skilled in these affairs, that different planets are allied to different signs of the zodiac. It is not therefore at all wonderful, if the vehicles of souls being in the planetary spheres, different vehicles should revolve in conjunction with different fixed stars. For some one may conceive this to be more rational, than to make them situated above the Saturnian sphere; since this place [i. e. the planetary sphere] is more adapted to variety of life, to a tendency to generation, and to a nature mingled from bodies that have a circular, and bodies that have a rectilinear, motion. It is better however to say, that there is a semination about the fixed stars, and that the vehicles which are purified, starry-form, and unincumbered, having a simple life, and a motion about intellect, and wisdom, and following the period of *the same*, ascend as far as to the inerratic sphere. For it would be ridiculous, that souls should be distributed about the fixed stars, and that there should be a semination of their vehicles about another thing. For as soul is to soul, so is vehicle to kindred<sup>2</sup> vehicle. It is better therefore to admit this,

<sup>1</sup> There is an omission in this place in the original, of the word *σφαίρας*, which evidently ought to be inserted.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *συνμυγες* here, I read *συγγενες*.

than to assert that souls are disseminated there, but that their vehicles<sup>1</sup> do not ascend as far as to the vehicles of the fixed stars; since everywhere parts hasten to wholes, when they subsist according to nature, unless they happen to be dissolved by things foreign to the natures to which they tend; the psychical vehicles being indissoluble, and immortal, through their generation from the one Demiurgus. These assertions therefore, are rather to be admitted than the former, respecting the semination and distribution of souls and their vehicles, both of them being effected by the Demiurgus.

Since also, the semination is of souls with their vehicles, and not of souls only, as was the case with the former distribution, Plato very properly says, that the Demiurgus disseminated some of them into the earth, but others into the moon, *indicating that each of these souls is now man, and the first man*; the definition here likewise prevailing, that man is a soul using a body, and the immortal man an immortal body. It is also necessary to separate this immortal from every mortal body, in order that man may become that which he was prior to his lapse into generation: for the semination is now of men, but not of souls. Very properly therefore is it said, that some of them were disseminated into the earth, but others into the moon. Hence these things must be observed together with what has been before said, and likewise that souls will never have a supermundane situation, not even according to those who admit, that there are other spheres beyond the fixed stars; though the highest and most simple of the vehicles participate of ethereal splendor. But the *distribution* is different from the *semination*. For the former, is of souls alone; but the latter, in conjunction with vehicles. Hence in speaking of the former, Plato says, the Demiurgus *distributed* each soul into each star; but here, that he *disseminated*, some into the earth, but others into the moon, because now they exert the human characteristic property. For there, [i. e. in the stars,] man is a soul using an immortal<sup>2</sup> body, and the man there is perpetual. The *distribution* therefore, is different from the *semination*, and the former is said to be, into the stars, but the latter, into the instruments of time. Hence it may seem, that each of these is into different places. For the earth is not a star, so that there will not be a *distribution* of souls about it; nor are the fixed stars said to be instruments of time, so there will not be a *semination* about them. But the planets alone, are both stars, and instruments of time; so that about these, there will be both a *distribution* and a *semination*. It is manifestly absurd however, that both these should not take place about the earth and the

<sup>1</sup> There is an omission in this place in the original of *τα οχηματα*.

<sup>2</sup> The word *αθάνατον* is omitted in the original.

fixed stars. For if it is the Demiurgus who both distributes and disseminates, both these are essentially inherent in souls; and if this be the case, it is necessary that both should be about the same thing; in order that the apocatastasis of every soul may be into one thing, and that it may not through the distribution make its apocatastasis into its kindred star, but be compelled to make it into something else, through a semination into something different from its kindred star. For that which is sown, is allied and adapted to that in which it is essentially disseminated. If therefore, these things are true, the earth also, must be said to be a star, not according to its visible bulk, but according to its ethereal and starry-form vehicle; since our vehicle likewise is a thing of this kind. It must also be admitted, that the fixed stars co-operate in the production of time. Hence these, so far as they have periods, though unknown to us, entirely measure the whole of time, some in one, and others in a different way. For there is not the same apocatastasis of all the fixed stars; but we have no certain indication from sense of their circulation, as we have of the revolutions of the planets.

All the parts of the world therefore, receive disseminated partial souls, and every mundane God is the prefect of partial Gods and souls,<sup>1</sup> distributed and disseminated about him, conformably to the demiurgic intellect. But Plato says, that the one peculiarly takes place about the stars, and the other, about the last of wholes, the moon and the earth; indicating by this, the proper dignity of each, viz. that the one is more divine, for it is incorporeal; but the other subordinate, for the semination is with bodies. This however, is evident from the precedaneous causes of the distribution and the semination, being mentioned by him separately at different times, each being into the same things; by which he manifests the difference of them with reference to each other. Hence, though there is a distribution of the soul about the earth, yet it is so far as the earth possesses something starry-form and incorporeal. And though there is a dissemination of it about a star, yet it is so far as it has something allied to earth; but this is corporeal. The earth and the moon likewise, were assumed in the semination, through their alliance to each other: for it is common to them, to produce shadow. And what the earth is in wholes, that the moon is among the celestial bodies; so that there will be an apocatastasis into the earth of the souls that were originally disseminated into it, and allotments of them in it. But it is not wonderful, if Plato says in the *Phædrus*, that the better allotments are celestial, but the last, subterranean. For there, it was solely his intention to speak of the extremes, neither mentioning the aerial, nor the terrestrial fortunate allotments. Hence,

<sup>1</sup> Ψυχῶν is omitted in the original.

when he mentions those that are last, he does not simply say that they are terrestrial, but manifests what they are from the tribunals under the earth; the divine allotments in the earth, so far as the earth is a divinity, being different from those of a punishing characteristic. As we have said however, the distribution must be distinguished from the semination. For semination especially pertains to certain corporeal natures; but distribution, being a separation according to form, (and not like semination, the placing<sup>1</sup> of some things in others,) transcendently pertains to incorporeal natures. But since the assertion that the Demurgus disseminated some souls into the earth, but others into the moon, has a reference, as we have said, to men, it may be assumed from the *Politics*, that Plato knew man that is an immortal soul, using an immortal vehicle. For he there says, that souls were men in the Saturnian period, according to which the immortal part alone of us lives. That he also knew another man, viz. the soul, which uses the middle vehicle, is evident from the *Phædo*, where he says, that men dwell on the summit of the earth, who live for a much longer time than the men that are here. Moreover, he likewise knew the last man, who lives in conjunction with this outward body. And every where man according to him is soul using a body; but either an immortal, or the second, or a composite body. Hence, by adding the difference of body, and of that which uses it, we shall be able to define man.

42 ~~42~~ 42 " But then after this semination, he delivered to the junior Gods."

What the semination is, whence it accedes to souls, that it is different from the distribution, and that it is the peculiarity of partible fabrication, has been frequently mentioned by us, in what has been before said. But it must now be shown who the junior Gods are. For it is evident that the mundane are called junior Gods. They appear however, to be thus denominated by Plato, either through comparing them with the ancient and venerable nature of the invisible fabrication, and the transcendency of power, and perfection of intelligence contained in it. For that which is more intellectual in the Gods is more ancient:

But Jove was born the first, and more he knows, says Homer. Or they are thus denominated, because they always make generation to be new; and when it becomes old and imbecile through its subject nature, again recall it to a subsistence according to nature by their motions, sending into it effluxions of all-various productive principles and powers, and thus render it perpetually new. Or, they are thus called, because having intellectual essences

<sup>1</sup> For *θεουσ* here, it is necessary to read *θεων*.



suspended from them, they eternally energize with the acme of intellectual vigor. For, as the poets say, Hebe pours out their wine, and they drink nectar, and survey the whole sensible world. Employing therefore immutable and un-deviating intellections, they fill all things with their demiurgic providence. Or they have this appellation, because Curetic deity is present with them, [or deity belonging to the order of the Curetes,] illuminating their intellectual conceptions with purity, their motion with inflexibility, and supplying the whole of them with rigid power, through which they govern all things without departing from the characteristics of their nature. Or, which is the truest reason of all the preceding, they are thus denominated, because the monad of them is called *recent God*. For theologists give this appellation to Bacchus, who is the *recent* of all the second fabrication. For Jupiter established him the king of all *mundane* Gods, and distributed to him the first honours,

'Tho' young the God, and but an infant guest.'

On this account also, theologists are accustomed to call the sun *a recent God*, and Heraclitus says that the sun is *a diurnal youth*, as participating of Dionysiacal power. Or, for a reason most appropriate to Platonic principles, they are thus denominated, because bodies which have generation are suspended from them; and the essence of these is not allotted a subsistence in eternity, but in the whole of time. They are junior therefore, not as once beginning to exist, but as being always generated, and, as we have before observed, subsisting in becoming to be, or perpetually rising into existence. For every thing which is generated has not the whole of what it possesses present at once, nor a simultaneous infinity, but an infinity which is perpetually supplying. Thus therefore they are called junior, as having a subsistence co-extended with time, and always advancing into existence, and as possessing a renovated immortality.

"The province of fashioning mortal bodies, and besides this to rule over whatever else remained necessary to the human soul, and over every thing consequent to their fabrications."

The delivery of the first fabrication is a communication and generation of demiurgic powers, exempt from every thing which the second fabrication produces proximately, a progression of production from the unapparent into the apparent, and a division of uniform power into the multiplied government of the world. But the

<sup>1</sup> In the original, and doubtless from Orpheus,

Καίτερ εόντι νεγ, καί νηπιγ ελκικινεσσ.

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formation of bodies assimilates the junior Gods to the unapparent fabrication. For that was the cause of bodies that rank as wholes, just as they are the causes of partial bodies, at the same time exhibiting a diminution of power. For of the body, of which they are the makers and formers, the Demiurgus also is the cause; but they are the formers of partial bodies, which are bodies endued with certain qualities. Hence body indeed is simply unbegotten as from time, and incorruptible, as was also the opinion of Aristotle. For, says he, there would be a vacuum if body could be generated external to the body of the universe. But this *particular* body is corruptible, as being of a partial nature; for the *wholes* of the elements derived their subsistence from total fabrication. The accession however of the human soul which remained<sup>1</sup> to be generated, assimilates the mundane Gods to the paternal power. For it is the province of a father to generate life; since the first father, and every father is the cause of life; the intelligible father indeed, of intelligible, but the intellectual of intellectual, and the supermundane of supermundane life. And hence, the mundane Gods who generate corporeal life are fathers. The fabrication however, adapted to these Gods, produces the nature of partial animals. For this partial animal, which is suspended from the immortal soul, consists of soul and body. The fabrication also of other things regards this: for parts are generated for the sake of the whole. But the *dominion* which the Demiurgus gave the junior Gods, excites their providential inspection, their connective power, and their guardian comprehensions. For without these, the bodies that are fashioned, and the mortal-form of life, would rapidly vanish into non-entity. Prior therefore, to the generation of these, the Demiurgus made their ruling Gods to be the guardians and saviours of them. In the junior Gods therefore, there are demiurgic powers, according to which they invest generated natures with forms; vivific powers, according to which they give subsistence to a secondary life; and perfective powers, through which they give completion to what is deficient in generation. There are also many other powers in them besides these, which are inexplicable by our conceptions.

426 "He likewise commanded them to govern as much as possible in the best and most beautiful manner the mortal animal, that it might not become the cause of evil to itself."

Of all that the one Demiurgus delivers to the junior Gods, it must be admitted that there are three most beautiful boundaries, the boniform will of him that

<sup>1</sup> For ἐξ ου σωματις, it is necessary to read ἐξω σωματος.

<sup>2</sup> For λυπηρς, it is requisite to read λυπηρς.

delivers, the perfect power of the recipients, and the symmetry of both these with each other. Of the demiurgic production however, of the junior Gods themselves, three elements, and these the greatest, must be again surveyed, viz. a reduction to *the good*, a conversion to intelligible beauty, and a liberated power sufficient to rule over all the subjects of its government. For as Phæus<sup>1</sup> himself, the Demiurgus of wholes, rendered the whole world as much as possible the most beautiful and the best, thus also he was willing that the second fabricators should govern the mortal animal in a way the most beautiful and the best; pouring on them indeed from intelligibles, beauty, but filling them with that boniform power and will, which he himself possessing fabricated the whole world. For thus generation also will participate of beauty and goodness, as far as it is naturally adapted to such participation, if the Gods, by whom it is connected and contained, adorn it, since they are themselves transcendently decorated with beauty and good.

If however, the second Demiurgi have such a nature as this, nothing evil or preternatural is generated from the celestial Gods; nor is it proper to divide the Gods in the heavens after this manner, as many do, viz. into the beneficent and malignant; for being Gods this is impossible. But the mortal animal is the cause of evil to itself. For neither disease, nor poverty,<sup>2</sup> nor any thing else of this kind is evil; but the depravity of the soul, intemperance, timidity, and every vice. Of these things however, we are the causes to ourselves. For though being impelled by others to these vices we are badly affected, yet again it is through ourselves; since we have the power of associating with the good, and separating ourselves from the bad. According to Plato therefore, we must not think that of the Gods some are malignant and others beneficent, but we must admit that all of them are the sources to mortals of all the good which they are able to receive; and that things which are truly evils are not produced, but are only signified by them, as we have before observed. For they extend terrific appearances and signs to those who are able to see and read the letters in the universe, which the framers of mortal natures during their revolutions write by their configurations. And though some one should derive a certain evil from the motions of the celestial Gods, so as to become timid or intemperate, yet they operate in one way, and their influences are participated by souls in another. For the efflux of intellect, says Plotinus, becomes craft in him who receives the efflux badly; the gift of an elegant life becomes intemperance through a similar cause; and in short, while

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Jupiter, who is so called in this place by Proclus, because he contains in himself by participation the Phæus or Protogonus, who is the paradigm of the universe.

<sup>2</sup> For *πενίαν*, it is necessary to read *μερία*.

they produce beneficently, their gifts are participated by terrestrial natures, after a contrary manner. Hence the givers who bestow beneficently are not to be accused as the authors of evil, but the recipients who pervert their gifts by their own inaptitudes. Thus also Jupiter in Homer blames souls as in vain accusing the Gods, while they themselves are the causes of evils. For the Gods are the sources of good, and the suppliers of intellect and life, but are not the causes of any evil; since even a partial nature is not the cause of evil to its offspring. What therefore ought we to think concerning the Gods themselves? Is it not, that they are much more the causes of good to their productions; since with them there is power, with them there is a self-perfect nature, with them there is universal goodness, to all which evil is contrary? For in its own nature it is powerless, imperfect, and without measure.

432<sup>2</sup> "At the same time he who orderly disposed all these particulars, remained in his own accustomed manner."

Plato every where, after having employed many words, summarily comprehends the multitude of them in the conclusion. For he knew that in the Demiurgus, one intellectual perception comprehends the multitude of intellectual conceptions, that one power connects many powers, and that a uniform cause collects into one union divided causes. Hence the words [prior to these] "*Having therefore instructed souls in all these particulars,*" and the words before us, "*He who orderly disposed all these particulars,*" lead the distinct energy of the Demiurgus to an united cause. Farther still, the word *all*, manifests that which is consummated from all its appropriate boundaries. But the words *orderly disposed*, indicate the order pervading through all beings, which the Demiurgus introduced to the mundane Gods, and to partial souls; demonstrating the former to be Demiurgi, but inscribing in the latter the laws of Fate. Moreover, the word *remained*, does not manifest station, and inflexible intellection, but *an establishment*<sup>1</sup> in the one. For according to this the Demiurgus is exempt from wholes, and is separated from the beings that intellectually perceive him. But this establishment itself is eternal, and always invariably permanent. These things therefore, are also indicated by the words *accustomed* and *manner*; the one exhibiting sameness of permanency; but the other the peculiarity of the demiurgic stability. For *manner* is indicative of peculiarity; since connective is different from immutable, and both these from demiurgic permanency.

<sup>1</sup> For ἀρπυιαί, it is necessary to read ἀρπυιαί.

“ But in consequence of his abiding, as soon as his children understood the order of their father, they became obedient to it.”

When the Demiurgus speaks, then the junior Gods have the order of hearers. When he intellectually perceives, then they learn; for learning is dianoetic. When he abides according to union itself, then his children intellectually perceive. For they always receive from him an inferior order. And as filled indeed from him, they preserve the analogy of hearers with reference to him; but as evolving his one power, they are analogous to learners. For he who learns evolves the intellect of his preceptor. As being deified however by him, they have the analogy of those that perceive intellectually. For intellect becomes divine, by its contact<sup>1</sup> with *the one*. The father therefore abiding, his children very properly intellectually perceive. For they are intellects participated by divine souls, that ride in the vehicles of undefiled bodies. But they intellectually perceive the order of the father presubstisting in him prior to the arranged effects, according to which order he became all things. For what Orpheus says of the monad of the junior Gods,

Though all things by the father Jove were form'd,  
Yet their completion they to Bacchus owe;

this also must be said of the junior Gods, viz. that they give perfection to the fabrication, which the father constituted by intellection itself; just as the [Chaldean] Oracle likewise says, “ These things the father understood, and the mortal nature became animated for him.” Mortal natures therefore, were fashioned and animated by the demiurgic intellection alone. But the junior Gods unfold his total production, through their own manifest fabrication, being filled from the demiurgic monad.

“ And receiving the immortal principle of mortal animal, in imitation of their artificer, they borrowed from the world the parts of fire and earth, water and air, as things which they should restore back again; and conglutinated the received parts together, but not with the same indissoluble bonds as those by which they were connected.”

Plato indicates to us, the separation of the second from the first fabrication,

<sup>1</sup> *Σαφφ* is erroneously printed for *αφφ*.

through many words and steps.<sup>1</sup> For if the Demiurgus orderly disposes, but the junior Gods are obedient to his mandates, the former by merely commanding is the cause of generated natures, but the latter being excited by the Demiurgus, receive from thence the boundary of the whole of their fabrication. And if indeed, he abides in himself, but they are moved about him, it is evident that he is eternally the cause of things which subsist in time, but that they, being filled from him, energize according to the whole of time. And if he perfectly establishes himself in his own accustomed manner, but they proceeding from him, unfold into light this united and ineffable disposition of himself, they derive from him secondary measures of fabrication.

Moreover, he is said to have a paternal dignity, but they are denominated his children, as expressing his prolific power, and his single goodness. And he indeed, is celebrated as delivering from his exalted abode the principles of fabrication; but they are celebrated as receiving the immortal principle contributing to the orderly distribution of mortals. He is said to have the fountain of the vivification of perpetual natures; but they are the causes of the subsistence of mortal-formed animals. And he indeed, extends himself as a paradigm to the many Gods; but they are said to imitate the demiurgic intellect. He is said to produce the whole world, and the plenitudes of it; but they are said to borrow parts from the fabrications of their father, in order to the completion of their proper works. And he indeed, employs all incorporeal powers; but they also employ such as are corporeal. He gives subsistence to indissoluble bonds; but they to such as are dissoluble. And he indeed, is said to insert a union more ancient than the natures which it unites; but they are said to introduce an adventitious union, and which is of an origin posterior to this, to the beings that consist of many contrary natures. And he is said to produce all things impartibly; but they with division, minutely distributing the subsistence of mortal natures into small and invisible nails. From these things therefore, the separation of the two fabrications may be assumed; but the union and contact of them may be surveyed from the words before us. For here a contact is effected of the second with the first fabrication; of apparent with unapparent, and of divided with monadic production.

Hence it is necessary that the lowest part of the first and unapparent fabrication, should coalesce with the summit of the second. For thus also the heavens are conjoined with generation [or the sublunary region,] the lowest of the celestial bodies exhibiting the principle of mutation; but the summit of the essence of

<sup>1</sup> For καὶ βαθεύω, it is necessary to read καὶ βαθύνω.

sublunary natures, being moved in conjunction with the heavens. Hence too, here also the rational soul is conjoined with the mortal form of life; viz. the lowest and most partial of the productions of the father with the highest of the natures generated by the junior Gods. For they indeed, as being certain fathers produce lives; but as fabricators, bodies. And they imitate indeed Vulcan by the fabrication of bodies, but Juno by vivification. But through both these they imitate the whole Demiurgus. For he is maker and father; but they fashion bodies by borrowing parts from wholes. For every where parts derive their composition from wholes. When, however, the wholes are incorporeal, they remain undiminished by the subsistence of the parts; but when they are corporeal, the parts that are generated from them diminish the wholes. Hence an ablation always taking place, but the parts always remaining, the wholes perish. And thus generation will no longer exist, and the works of the first fabrication will all vanish through the second, which it is not lawful to assert. That nothing of this kind therefore may take place in the universe, the composite parts are again dissolved, in order to fill up their wholes. And the generation of one thing is the corruption of another; but the corruption of one thing is the generation of another; in order that generation and corruption may always remain. For if generation existed at a certain time only, it would at a certain time stop, in consequence of consisting of finite things, and these being consumed. But these perishing, corruption also would stop, all things being destroyed. Hence if it is necessary that one of these should exist, the other also will exist. Every thing therefore which is generated from the second fabrication, is a composite and dissoluble, and deriving its composition from time, will also in time be again dissolved. The junior Gods therefore, are very properly said to borrow parts, which are again to be restored to their wholes. But they borrow them from the universe.\* For that which they borrow is fire, earth, water, and air; and they again restore them to the universe.† The father therefore wishes the wholes to remain which he generated and arranged. And thus much concerning all the fabrication of the junior Gods.

Let us however, direct our attention to each of the words of Timæus. The word *receiving* therefore, indicates how the junior Gods receive the immortal soul descending in its first vehicle: for he calls the whole "*the immortal principle.*" It also indicates, that every where, our concerns are providentially attended to by the Gods, above indeed, by the father, but beneath, by his children, if it be

\* For *παρτος*, it is necessary to read *παρτος*.

† Here also for *παρτος*, it is necessary to read *παρτος*.

requisite to speak in a divided manner. For our soul, at one time lives according to the characteristic of Jupiter, and at another according to that of Bacchus; but in its arrangement [on the earth,] it lives Titannically.' The

' This is admirably explained by Olympiodorus, in his MS. commentary on that part of the *Phædo* where Plato speaks of the prohibition of suicide in the *απορρητα*: "The argument," says he, "which Plato employs in this place against suicide is derived from the Orphic mythology, in which four kingdoms are celebrated: the first of *Heaven*, whom Saturn assaulted, cutting off the genitals of his father. But after Saturn, Jupiter succeeded to the government of the world, having hurled his father into Tartarus. And after Jupiter, Bacchus rose to light, who, according to report, was, through the stratagem of Juno, torn in pieces by the Titans, by whom he was surrounded, and who afterwards tasted his flesh: but Jupiter, enraged at the deed, hurled his thunder at the guilty offenders, and consumed them to ashes. Hence a certain matter being formed from the vapour of the smoke ascending from their burning bodies, out of this mankind were produced. It is unlawful therefore to destroy ourselves, not as the words of Plato seem to import, because we are in body, as in a prison, secured by a guard; (for this is evident, and Plato would not have called such an assertion arcane; but because our body is Dionysiacal, or the property of Bacchus: for we are a part of this God, since we are composed from the vapours of the Titans who tasted his flesh. Socrates, therefore, fearful of disclosing the arcane part of this narration, adds nothing more of the fable but that we are placed as in a certain prison, secured by a guard: but the interpreters relate the fable openly." *Και εστι το μυθικον επιχειρημα τοιουτον. Παρα τῆς Ὀρφικῆς τεσσαρες βασιλειαὶ παραδίδονται. Πρωτῇ μὲν, ἣν τὸν Οὐρανίου, ἣν ὁ Κρόνος διετέλετο, ἐκτεμνὼν τὰ αἰδοῦα τοῦ πατρὸς. Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Κρόνον, ὁ Ζεὺς ἐβασίλευσεν καταταρταρῶσαι τὸν πατέρα. Εἰς τὸν Διὶ διεδέχτο οἱ Διότσοι, οἳ φασὶ κατ' ἐπιβουλὴν τῆς Πριμῆ τοῦ περιαντὸν Τίτανος σφαρτεῖν, καὶ τὸν σάρκων αὐτοῦ ἀπογεῖσθαι. Καὶ τοῦτον ἀρχιθεὸς ὁ Ζεὺς ἐκερανίσωσε, καὶ ἐκ τῆς αἰθαλῆς τῶν ἀτμῶν τῶν ἀναδοθειῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἐλθεῖ γειομένη γεγεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Ὅν δει οὖν ἐξαγαγεῖν ἡμᾶς εαυτοὺς, οὐχ ὅτι ὡς Διὶ κεῖν λέγειν ἡ λέξις, διότι ἐν τινὶ δεσμῷ ἔμεν τῇ σωματὶ· τούτο γὰρ δῆλον ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τούτο ἀπὸρρητον εἴλεγε, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν δει ἐξαγαγεῖν ἡμᾶς εαυτοὺς ὡς τὸν σωματός ἡμῶν Διόνυσιακόν· οὗτος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἱμεν, εἴχε ἐκ τῆς αἰθαλῆς τῶν τίτανων συζυγίμεθα γενομένηων τῶν σάρκων τούτου. Ὁ μὲν οὖν σωτηρὴν ἐργῶν το ἀπορρητὸν δεῖναι, τὸν μῦθον οὐδὲν πλέον προστιθῆσι τὸν ὡς ἐν τινὶ φρουρᾷ ἔμεν. Οἱ δὲ εἰρηγῆται τὸν μῦθον προστιθεῖσιν ἐξώθεν. After this he beautifully observes, "That these four governments obscurely signify the different gradations of virtues, according to which our soul contains the symbols of all the virtues, both theoretical and cathartical, political and ethical. For it either energizes according to the theoretic virtues, the paradigm of which is the government of *Heaven*, that we may begin from on high; and on this account heaven receives its denomination *παρα τοῦ τα ἀνω ὄργη*, from beholding the things above:—or it lives cathartically, the exemplar of which is the Saturnian kingdom; and on this account Saturn is denominated, from being a pure intellect, through a survey of himself; and hence he is said to devour his own offspring, signifying the conversion of himself to himself:—or it energizes according to the political virtues, the symbol of which is the government of Jupiter; and hence Jupiter is the Demiurgus, so called from operating about secondary natures:—or the soul energizes according to both the ethical and physical virtues, the symbol of which is the kingdom of Bacchus; and on this account he is fabled to be torn in pieces by the Titans, because the virtues do not follow but are separated from each other." *Αἰνιττοῦνται* (lege *αἰνιττοῦνται*) *δε* τοὺς διαφερόμεν βαθμοὺς τῶν ἀρετῶν καθ' ἃς ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ συμβολὰ ἐχούσα πασῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν, τῶν τε θεωρητικῶν, καὶ καθαρτικῶν, καὶ πολιτικῶν, καὶ ἠθικῶν. Ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὰς θεωρητικὰς ἐνεργεῖ ὡς παραδειγμα ἡ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ βασιλεια, ὡς ἀνωθεν ἀρξάμεθα, διὸ καὶ οὐρανοῦ εἰρηγῆται *παρα τοῦ τα ἀνω ὄργη*.*



word *principle* however, does not simply manifest, that which is first in the composition of man, but that which is the leader and ruler of secondary natures. For this is that which is according to nature, and for this purpose it was produced by the Gods. As therefore, the Demiurgus constituted the soul of the universe to rule over the body of it, so likewise, the many Demiurgi established our soul as the principle in the mortal animal. If however, we do not rule over the mortal nature, the power which gave this arrangement to our soul is not the cause of this, but the indolence of that which is arranged. But the word *immortal* comprehends every nature which the Demiurgus constituted, both that which is in the vehicle, and the rational soul itself, which was perfectly produced by the father, who disseminated the whole of it, and from whom it originated. Again, however, Timæus shows, that the junior Gods are the vivific causes and fabricators of the mortal animal, but that they are each of these, in conjunction with motion, in order that their fabrications may be mortal.

Moreover, the words, "*in imitation of their artificer,*" are appropriate. For the junior Gods fabricate bodies, imitating the demiurgic characteristic of the father. And as he constituted the universe a whole from the wholes of the elements, so likewise they fashion partial bodies from partial bodies, in order that together with the imitation, diminution may be preserved, and that they may remain Demiurgi, but the Demiurgi of a partial fabrication. The expression also, *they borrowed*, manifests, that *the parts in us are more the property of wholes, and of things above us, than they are our property*. But if this be the case why should men grieve when they die? And why is dissolution dreadful? But how is it possible it should not be good, if the universe receives what is its own? For it is easy to perceive, that the parts in us belong in a greater degree to the universe than to us. For the places of all these are in wholes, and not in us. But "*the conglutination of the received parts together,*" evinces that the union in mortal natures is of posterior origin, and adventitious. For in the universe the whole precedes the parts, and *the one*, multitude. But in us, many things, and which are naturally sepa-

Η καθαρτικῶς ἔσθ, ἡ παρδείγμα ἡ κρείσσεια βασιλεία, εἰς καὶ κρείσσεια εἰρηται εἰς οὐ κοροῖσι τις ὡς εἰς το εαντον οραν. Διὸ καὶ κατατινὲν τα εικεῖα γεννηματα λεγεται, ὡς αὐτοὶ πρὸς εαυτον ἐπιστρέφων. Η κατ ται πολιτικῶν ὡν συμβολον ἡ τον εἰς βασιλεία, εἰς καὶ δημιουργοὶ οὐ ζῶν, ὡς περὶ τα δευτερα ενεργων. Η κατ ται θηικῶν καὶ φυσικῶν ἀρεται, ὡς συμβολον, ἡ τον εἰοισπον βασιλεία, εἰς καὶ σπαρττεται, ἐπεὶ οὐκ αἰτακο- λουδουσαι ἀλλήλαις αἰ τρεται. And thus far Olympiodorus; in which passages it is necessary to observe, that as the Titans are the ultimate artificers of things, and the most proximate to their fabrications, men are said to be composed from their fragments, because the human soul has a partial life, capable of proceeding to the most extreme division, united with its proper nature. And while the soul is in a state of servitude to the body, she lives confined, as it were, in bonds, through the dominion of this Titanical life.

rated from each other, are conglutinated, receiving a violent and renovated union. Hence the bonds of them are dissoluble; but the bonds of wholes are indissoluble, union there subduing multitude.

“But they gave them a tenacious adherence from thick set nails, invisible through their smallness; fabricating the body of each, one from the composition of all [the elements]; and binding the periods of the immortal soul in influxive and effluxive body.”

Because in what is here said, in the same manner as before, Plato constitutes the first vehicle of the soul that is a body,<sup>1</sup> from the elements, it is evident that neither is this body indivisible, as being generated from things which are to be returned. But it is not immanifest, that as that vehicle is one, this testaceous body likewise is in a similar manner generated one. The former however, has indeed a more simple union of simple vestments; but the latter a more various union, as being of a more composite nature. Hence there indeed, that which was composed of fire and water, air and earth, being analogous to a crowd, manifested we said, the second vehicle, and the life contained in it. But in what is now said, the testaceous body<sup>1</sup> is signified. For Plato in speaking of it, is not satisfied with things of a simple nature, but adds such as are adapted to an organic body. For it is not possible that this should alone consist of simple elements.<sup>1</sup> Beginning therefore, from things more imperfect and material, and producing things consisting of similar parts, and from these the organic body, he gives it to participate of soul. For the junior Gods borrowing parts from wholes, assumed such parts as are simple, and made the vehicles of irrational souls, which he before denominated, a tumultuous and irrational crowd, composed of fire and earth, air and water. But conglutinating these, they generated things of similar parts, the composition of which is from the four elements. And causing the things generated to adhere through thick set nails, they gave completion to the organic body. For this it is, which, as he says, is in want of *all small and invisible nails*,

<sup>1</sup> i. e. The aerial vehicle; for this is the first vehicle of the soul that is a body, the ethereal or perpetual vehicle, not having three dimensions, but being a superficies, in consequence of its attenuated and immaterial nature. Hence also the Chaldean Oracle exhorts, not to give depth to a superficies, and cause it to be terrestrial and humid, through an impure life.

<sup>2</sup> In the original in this place, there is an omission of *το οσπεωδες*; but I have no doubt this word ought to be inserted.

<sup>3</sup> There is an hiatus here in the original, which renders the two lines that immediately follow it unintelligible, and which I have not therefore attempted to translate.

through its composition from dissimilar natures; and of *thick set nails*, through the facility with which the composition may be dissolved.

We say therefore, that the *thick set and invisible nails* are the insertions of small and invisible elements, in the solid parts<sup>1</sup> of the body. But the colliquescence<sup>2</sup> is adapted to Vulcanian works; fire producing through rarefaction<sup>3</sup> in the colliquescence, a procession of all things through each other; just as in things which are melted together, the smaller enter into the larger parts, in the melting, and thus the mixture is effected. Hence it follows, that by conglutinating the things received, the junior Gods produce a body, not consisting of indissoluble bonds, but of parts which tenaciously adhere to each other, through thick set, small, and invisible nails. For liquefaction,<sup>4</sup> and conglutination<sup>5</sup> are necessary to the generation of things of similar parts, the latter of which, moisture imparts,<sup>6</sup> and the former, heat. For every thing is liquefied by fire, but conglutinated by water. Soul therefore accedes, after the union of many things of a dissimilar nature. And in the first place, the soul which is entirely mortal accedes. For through this, the effluxive body subsists, viz. through the physical, sensitive, and orectic life. But in the second place, the immortal soul accedes. For this does not enter simply into body, but into an influxive and effluxive body. And the former indeed, is generated with the body; but the latter, enters into the body. This therefore, is the order of fabrication, and is attended with a reason consentaneous to truth. For all generation begins from the imperfect, and regularly proceeds to the perfect. And in the universe indeed, fabrication proceeds from intellect and soul, as far as to bodies: for the generation is without time. [But in mortal natures, fabrication is in conjunction with body,] for it is temporal. Every thing however, which is generated in time, commences the generation from the imperfect. So that if there is any thing which does not begin from the imperfect, that thing was not generated in time.<sup>7</sup> Hence the universe was not generated in time. For the Demiurgus did not first constitute body but soul, as we have before observed; which manifests, that what is called generation, is when ap-

<sup>1</sup> For *τοῖς μελομενεστέροις* here, as there is no such word in the Greek language, I read, *τοῖς μελεσσι στέροις*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *συνταξιν* here, it is necessary to read *συντηξιν*.

<sup>3</sup> For *αραιωσις* in this place, read *αραιωσις*.

<sup>4</sup> For *ταξίς* here, read *τηξίς*.

<sup>5</sup> And for *καλλησις*, read *κολλησις*.

<sup>6</sup> Instead of *παρερχεται* in this place, it is necessary to read *παρεχεται*.

<sup>7</sup> The words within the brackets are omitted in the original; but I have no doubt ought to be inserted. So that there is wanting in the original, *ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θνητῶν, μετὰ τοῦ σώματος*.

<sup>8</sup> For *οὐκ ἀχρονόν* in this place, it is necessary to read *ὄν κατὰ χρόνον*.

plied to the universe, an unbegotten and simultaneous composition. And in the universe indeed, the whole subsists prior to the parts, and the one, to multitude; but in mortal natures the many are generated prior to the one; and these being liquefied through thick set nails, give completion to one thing. For simple bodies are liquefied, but the liquefied bodies are nailed, the nailed bodies are vivified, and the vivified bodies are co-adapted to the immortal soul.

From these things also, it is evident, that it must be said, the insertion of the soul according to Plato takes place at the time that the infant proceeds out of the womb: for then the fœtus is perfect, but not before. For nature would not in vain detain it in the womb, if it was perfect. When therefore the fœtus becomes one and a whole, then the immortal soul enters profoundly into it. But the fœtus becomes one when it is perfect, and is perfect when it has proceeded into light. For while it remains within, ' it is a part of another thing. The soul therefore, is not bound to the seed by the Gods, nor is it, as some think, emitted together with the seed, but when the body is now generated, the periods of the soul are connected with it.<sup>1</sup> For where in the seed is there a body generated from ' many and thick set nails? Hence, when the instrument is rendered perfect, then the Gods bind to it the soul that is to use it. And thus much as to this particular.

*But Plato calls the periods of the soul, the energies of it, which proceed into the animal and the twofold powers of the same and the different.* All the soul therefore descends according to Plato. For he alone gives to it two circles and two periods, and leads downward both of them. So that what Plotinus says, who contends that the whole soul does not descend, is a more novel assertion. With respect however, to the *thick set nails*, some suppose them to signify the conjunction of the triangular elements; but according to Iamblichus, they indicate the communion of physical productive powers, just as the colliquescence<sup>2</sup> signifies the demiurgic connection and union of them. But we have shown what the nails, the conglutinations, and the colliquescences are, and what the theory is, which is adapted to the nature of all these.

434 "These however, being bound in a vast river, neither vanquish, nor are vanquished."

Plato conjoining the soul to the body immediately, omits all the problems

<sup>1</sup> In the original there is an hiatus here. For the original is, τελειον δε, οταν εκελθη\*\*\* μειον γαρ αλλον μερος εστιν. This deficiency however, may be supplied by reading, conformably to the above translation, τελειον δε, οταν εκελθη εις φωι. μειον γαρ ειδον, αλλον (lege αλλου) μερος εστιν.

<sup>2</sup> For αυτοις here, it is necessary to read αυτης.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of συνταξιν in this place, read συντηξιν.

pertaining to the descent of the soul, the prophet, the allotments, the lives, the elections, the daemon, the erection of tents in the plain of Lethæ, the thunder and lightning, and all such particulars as the fable in the [tenth Book of the] Republic discusses. Neither does he here deliver those things which take place after the exit of the soul from the present life, viz. the terrors, the rivers, Tartarus, those savage and fiery daemons, the thorns, the bellowing mouth, the triple path, and the judges, in which we are instructed, by the fable in the Republic, in the Gorgias, and in the Phædo. What then, some one may say, is the cause of this omission? I reply, because Plato preserves that which is adapted to the design of the dialogue, and because he here assumes so much of the theory of the soul as is physical, delivering the association of the soul with the body. And Aristotle also, emulating Plato, in his treatise On the Soul, in consequence of discussing it physically, neither mentions the descent of the soul, nor its allotments, but in his Dialogues he separately speaks of these,<sup>1</sup> and makes them the leading subjects of consideration. And thus much as to these particulars.

This however, is to be investigated from the beginning, why the soul descends into bodies?<sup>2</sup> And the answer is, because it wishes to imitate the providential energy of the Gods, and on this account, dismissing contemplation, descends into generation. For since divine perfection is twofold, the one being intellectual, but the other providential, and the one subsisting in permanency, but the other in motion; the soul adumbrates, the stable,<sup>3</sup> intellectual, and unalterable energy of the Gods, through contemplation, but their providential and motive energy, through a genesiurgic life. And as the intelligence of the soul is partial, so likewise is its providential energy; but being partial, it is conversant with a partial body. Farther still, its descent contributes to the perfection of the world. For it is necessary, that there should not only be immortal and intellectual animals, such as are with the Gods, nor alone mortal and irrational animals, such as are the last of the fabrication of things, but likewise, such as subsist between these, viz. which are by no means immortal indeed,<sup>4</sup> but are able to participate of reason and intellect. There are however, many such animals as these, in many parts of the world. For man is not the only rational mortal animal; but there are many other such like genera, some of which are of a more daemonic nature, but others are more proximate to our essence. The descent likewise of a partial soul, contributes to the composition of all animals that are at one and the same time mortal

<sup>1</sup> For *περὶ αὐτῶν* here, it is necessary to read *περὶ αὐτῶν*. These Dialogues of Aristotle are unfortunately lost.

<sup>2</sup> See my translation of Plotinus, On the Descent of the Soul.

<sup>3</sup> For *σταθμον* here, read *μονιμον*.

<sup>4</sup> The original in this place is *αθανάτων μεν οὐδαμῶς δε οὐτά*; but *δε* ought evidently to be expunged.

and rational. Why therefore, are partial souls when they descend into generation, filled with such great material perturbation and so many evils? It is through the propensity arising from their free will; through their vehement familiarity with body; through their sympathy with the image of soul, which is called animation; through their total mutation from the intelligible to the sensible world, and from a quiet energy to one entirely conversant with motion; and through a disordered condition of being innately produced from the composition of dissimilar natures, viz. of the immortal, and the mortal, of the intellectual, and that which is deprived of intellect, of the impartible, and that which is endued with interval. For all these become the cause to the soul, of this mighty tumult and labour in the realms of generation; since we are disturbed by the abundant mutations, and sympathies which take place about the essence that is in continual motion. For we pursue a perpetually flying mockery. And the soul, by verging [to a material life,] kindles indeed, a light in the body, but becomes herself situated in darkness; and by giving life to the body, destroys both herself, and her own intellect [in as great a degree as these are capable of receiving destruction]. For thus the mortal nature participates of intellect, but the intellectual part of death, and the whole, as Plato observes in the *Laws*, becomes a prodigy, composed of the mortal, and the immortal, of the intellectual, and that which is deprived of intellect. For this physical law [which binds the soul to the body,] is the death of the immortal life, but vivifies the mortal body. Plato therefore, delivers in the *Phædrus*, the causes of descent arising from the soul, viz. oblivion, the defluxion of the wings, and such things as are consequent to these. But here he delivers to us the causes derived from the Gods. For these are they who conjoin the soul to the body. But he does not add at present, the manner<sup>1</sup> in which the soul apostatizes [from the orb of light], and through what forms of life, she proceeds [into the realms of generation]. And in the *Republic* he delivers the causes arising both from the soul herself and the Gods. For there the prophet and the Fates, the demon, and the lots, the paradigms and the elections of lives, are assumed. These particulars therefore, must be explored in those dialogues.

What however is here asserted, must be considered, viz. *what the river, the binding, and the vast* are; for this river is said to be vast: and also what it is for souls, neither to vanquish, nor be vanquished. The river therefore signifies, not the human body alone, but the whole of generation, with which we are externally surrounded, through its rapid, impetuous, and unstable flux. Thus also, in the *Republic*, Plato calls, the whole genesiurgic nature, the river of Lethe; in which are contained, as Empedocles says, Oblivion, and the meadow of Ate; the

<sup>1</sup> For *ours* here, it is necessary to read *ours*.

voracity of matter, and the light-hating world, as the Gods say; and the winding streams, under which many are drawn down, as the [Chaldean] Oracles assert. But the *binding* signifies, a co-impeded life, and a life which has arrived at the extremity. For then, being bound, it is prevented from proceeding, and being no longer able to proceed, it becomes situated at the end of its motion. But the soul, by communicating its powers to the body, obtains the end of its descent. Again, the *vast* indicates the multiplied, and in every respect divisible flux of generation. But the *neither vanquishing, nor being vanquished*, signify, that each of the essences that come together, preserves its own nature. For the congress of the soul and body is not effected by a mutual corruption, as in things that are mingled. For the body is not transferred to the essence of the soul, nor the soul to the peculiarity of the body; since in this case, neither would assimilate the other to itself. Hence neither is the soul vanquished by the body; for it does not become inanimate, nor does it vanquish the body, for it does not make it incorporeal. In another respect however, the soul subdues the body, as connectedly containing it; but is subdued by it, as being impeded by it in its intellection. Plato however, rather denies than affirms each of these, in order that we may conceive the peculiarity of each in the communion, and the unmingled union of them in the mixture.

“ But they carry and are carried with violence, so that the whole animal is moved indeed, yet in a disorderly manner. For it proceeds casually and irrationally, having all the six motions. Hence it is moved backward and forward, and again, to the right hand and the left, upward and downward, and wanders every where, according to the six differences of place.” 43 b

That the genesiurgic river, according to the whole of it disturbs the soul, but is especially ample in youth, in consequence of the influx and efflux being copious, has I think become evident through what has been said. Since however, the body being heavy, terrestrial, and cadent, is corrected by the soul, and the soul, which has an intellectual nature, is rendered destitute of intellect, through its communion with the body, hence he says, that souls *carry and are carried with violence*; the *violence* indicating the foreign and renovated nature of the vivification of the mortal animal; but the *carrying and being carried*, the action of the body and soul on each other. For the soul carries the body, inspiring it with the power

\* For το θνητον here, it is necessary to read τον θνητον.

of motion; but is carried by it through sympathy, to a genesiurgic nature. Hence he very properly says, that the whole animal is moved. For the body is moved through the soul, and the soul losing its own life, lives the life of the composite [of body and soul]. The whole animal therefore is moved. And after another manner also you may say that Plato asserts *the whole* is moved, in order to distinguish it from the universe. For this, as we have before observed, is not moved according to *the whole* of itself, but only in its parts. Since however the stars are moved with an advancing motion [or in antecedentia], each is moved according to the whole, and not according to the parts only; yet they are moved in an orderly manner, and not as we are: for they follow the universe. But Plato adds, *disorderly*; indicating by this, that the motion is material, and all-variously anomalous, and that it begins from the subordinate nature, the order being inverted. It is necessary however, in the same manner as in divine natures that the motion should originate from the more excellent nature. The expression likewise *casually*, signifies the rash and unstable nature of the motion; and the word *proceeds*, indicates the departure of souls from themselves; all which particulars are posterior to divine animals, in whom intellect is the cause of energy, and each proceeds and at the same time abides. The word *irrationally* follows also in a becoming manner. For where order fails there the irrational secretly enters. For reason is the cause of order and measure, and of the participation of good.

Moreover, the multitude of motions becomes apparent in these, and the number of all the motions of the mortal animal. For as bodies have three dimensions, and are mingled from contraries, contrariety being a duad,<sup>1</sup> and assuming the triad, produces this number of motions. For it is necessary that there should be only a triple interval, or dimension, because interval is reason [or a productive principle], proceeding from the impartible into matter, and investing it with *morphe*. And the impartible indeed is monadic; but progression is dyadic; and *morphe* triadic. For that which has proceeded, returning, or being converted to its principle, has bound and *morphe*. But it is necessary that there should be contrariety in the motions, according to position. For the extremities of every right line are opposed to each other. Hence of the three dimensions, the opposition according to the extremities will be the upward and downward, the right hand and the left, before and behind. The complication therefore of contrariety, with the triad of dimensions, produces the six motions; and this number is adapted to the animated body. For according to the Pythagoreans, the monad

<sup>1</sup> The word *αἰῶς* is omitted here in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

<sup>2</sup> For *δύας* here, read *δυάς*.



is analogous to a point; the duad, to a line; the triad, to a superficies; the tetrad, to a body; the pentad, to a body endued with a certain quality; and the hexad, to an animated body. This number of motions therefore, is appropriately attributed to mortal animals, whose generation proceeds from the even<sup>1</sup> number, and a formless nature. It is not proper however, to wonder, that animals should have so many motions, but inanimate natures only one motion; as that a clod of earth should only have a motion downward, but flame, a contrary motion. For we shall find by inspection, that frequently the extremes are more simple than the media, but the media more various than the extremes.<sup>2</sup> Thus for instance, we see, that nature and matter are more simple than body, and the irrational life and intellect, than the rational soul. But intellect indeed, is more simple, according to that which is more, and irrationality according to that which is less, excellent. It lives however, without deliberate choice, and conformably to nature. If therefore, in motions, we see that divine animals and inanimate bodies have a more simple motion, but the media abundantly wander, and are multiformly borne along, what occasion is there to wonder? For the simplicity indeed of divine motion, is more excellent than the variety in mortal natures; but the simplicity of inanimate beings is less excellent; just as divine bodies are essentially simple, according to that which is better than composite natures, but the inanimate parts of the elements are more simple than concrete masses, according to that which is less excellent,<sup>3</sup> as not having the proper life of living beings.

“For though the inundating and effluxive waves, which afford nutrition to the animal, pour along with impetuous abundance, yet a still greater tumult and perturbation is produced, through the passions arising from external impulsions; either when the body is disturbed by the sudden incursion of external fire, or by the solid mass of earth, or is agitated by the whirling blasts of the air. For from all these, through the medium of the body, various motions are hurried along, and fall with molestation on the soul.”

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *πεποιμενῶν* in this place, it is requisite to read, *πεποιμενῶν*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ἀπριον* here, it is necessary to read *ἀπριον*.

<sup>3</sup> The original is defective here, for there is nothing more than *τα δε μεσα ποιει* \* \* \*. This deficiency however, may be supplied by reading, conformably to the above translation, *τα δε μεσα ποικιλωτερα των αερων*.

\* The word *χειρον*, is wanting here in the original.

In what is here said, the philosopher refers to two causes all this tumult, viz. to the nutritive and sensitive life. But these causes are that which is orectic, and that which is gnostic, in the whole of the irrational nature; into which also, we are accustomed to divide all the powers of the soul, asserting that some of them are vital, but others gnostic. For the nutritive life, verging to bodies, produces an abundant flux in them; through their moisture indeed, emitting an abundant material efflux, but through vivific heat, receiving an influx of other things. But the sensitive life suffers by the bodies of fire, earth, air, and water, falling on it. Conceiving likewise all these passions to be great through the vileness of its life, it occasions tumult and perturbation in the soul. And to those indeed, who have arrived at maturity, all these have become habitual; but to such as have been recently born, the smallest things, through being unusual, become the causes of astonishment. For what a great fire is to the former, that the snuff of a candle is to the latter. What the magnitude likewise of very lofty mountains is to the former, that the smallest of stones is to the latter. For this is sufficient to give them pain, and by impeding their energies, to call forth their tears. And what stormy winds, and streams of water from the heavens, are to adults, that a small motion of the air, or a slip through a little moisture, is to infants. For sense being agitated through the percussion of all these, astonishes the soul of those that are recently born, and leads it into difficulty and tumult. These therefore, are in short, the causes of the perturbation of souls, viz. the motion of the nutritive power, and the percussions of sense. We must not however, fancy that the soul suffers any thing through these. For as if some one standing on the margin of a river, should behold the image and form of himself in the floating stream, he indeed will preserve his face unchanged; but the stream being all-variously moved, will change the image, so that at different times it will appear to him different, oblique, and erect, and perhaps divided and continuous. Let us suppose too, that such a one, through being unaccustomed to the spectacle, should think that it was himself that suffered this distortion,<sup>1</sup> in consequence of surveying his shadow in the water, and thus thinking, should be afflicted and disturbed, astonished and impeded. After the same manner, the soul, beholding the image of herself in body, borne along in the river of generation, and variously disposed at different times through inward passions and external impulses, is indeed herself impassive, but thinks that she suffers; and being ignorant of, and mistaking her image for, herself, is disturbed, astonished, and perplexed.<sup>2</sup> This passion however particularly exists

<sup>1</sup> There is an hiatus here in the original, which may be filled up by adding after *τον πασχοῦσα* the words *διαστρέφει ταυτην*.

<sup>2</sup> For *εξ αἰσθῶ* here, read *ἐκ αἰσθῶ*.

in children recently born; but it also exhibits itself in dreams in adults. Thus when some one, in consequence of nature being fatigued in the concoction of the food, fancies in a dream that he is weary, that he is journeying through a difficult road, that he is carrying burdens, or suffers something else of the like kind, then this passion becomes apparent. And it is possible from these things to survey the nature of the passions of children.\* And thus much may suffice at present as to these particulars.

It is requisite however, to proceed to the words of Plato and to say, that the *πνεύμα* manifest not the externally blowing wind, as some assert, but the congregated folly† existing in youth, and the abundant influx and efflux. But the *inundation* signifies, in the first place, that the pneumatic vehicle is agitated and made heavier; for it is this, which exhibits in itself stains and vapours; and in the second place, the soul, for it is disturbed by congregated impulses.

“And on this account all these were then, and are still now denominat-  
ed senses.”

According to Plato, the senses receive their appellation from passion. If therefore, we should say, that the senses are motions placed inwardly, the assertion would be attended with much † accusation, from grammatical\* observation. But if we should say, that the senses are mingled from inward motions and passion, perhaps ancient usage would testify in favour of the assertion. For sense (*αἰσθησις*) with four syllables, is a certain *αἰσθησις*,

ὅς τ' ἐπ' αὖτις ἔμεν αἰσώ (lege αἰσθῶν),‡

says Homer. But the word *αἰσθησις*, will be from *αἰσθῆναι*,§ and *θῆσις*;¶ sensible objects indeed being moved externally, but the motions tending through the body to the soul, and producing as Plato says, sensations. Very properly therefore, did those who first perceived the nature of the passion, and those in the present period, who did not entirely perceive it, thus denominate the senses. And those who now still give this appellation to the senses, do it because there is similarly

\* Instead of *πεδῶν* in this place, it is necessary to read *παίδων*.

† For *ἀφρορησις* here, it is requisite to read *ἀφρονησις*.

‡ For *πολλούς* here, it is necessary to read *πολύς*.

§ For *γρομμυσις* here, read *γρομμυσις*.

¶ i. e. “He groan’d, and breathed his last.” Il. xvi. v. 468.

§ The verb *αἰσθῆναι*, is from *αἶω*, which not only signifies to hear, and to blow away, but also to understand and know.

† i. e. Position.

a complication in them of passion and judgment, or of motion and position. For the motion of the soul itself alone, is impassive; but that which pervades from the body to the soul, is accompanied with passion.

"And these indeed, both then and at present, receiving' the most abundant and greatest motion, and being moved together with that incessantly flowing stream, and vehemently agitating the circulations of the soul, they entirely fetter the circulation of *the same*, flowing in a direction contrary to it, and restrain its energies, as it rules and proceeds; but agitate the circulation of *the different*."

Sense is of the present, in the same manner as memory is of the past, but hope of the future. Hence both then, and at present, sense moves the soul, in conjunction with the nutritive power, which through influxions, affords a remedy to the effluxions of the body, and again combines what it had analyzed, conformably to the web of Penelope. For this is "*the incessantly flowing stream*," which is very properly called a stream, because it is a part of the whole river of generation, which, as was before observed, is abundant. Together with this therefore, sense disturbs, and causes a tumult in the periods or circulations of the immortal soul; and fetters indeed the period of the circle of *the same*, but agitates the period of the circle of *the different*. For as there are twofold circles in it, in imitation of divine souls, the circle which surveys intelligibles, and which is the dianoetic circle, is only restrained in its energy, but sustains no distortion. But the doxastic circle is distorted, and this follows very properly. For it is possible to opine not rightly, but it is not possible to know scientifically, falsely. If however some one should say, that the dianoetic part of the soul may be ignorant in a twofold respect, and that the thing which suffers this will be distorted, let such a one learn from us, that twofold ignorance<sup>1</sup> does not simply pertain to *dianoia*, but begins indeed from thence, and is implanted in the doxastic part. For twofold ignorance, so far as it is ignorance, and a privation of science, so far, in consequence of being an immobility of the scientific power, it originates from *dianoia*. For ignorance subsists about that, about which science subsists. But so far as this ignorance also adds a false suspicion of knowledge, it subsists

<sup>1</sup> In the printed editions of the *Timæus* we find *ᾤσις* in this place; but it evidently ought to be, as in the text of Proclus, *παράδοξις*.

<sup>2</sup> Twofold ignorance is, when a man is not only ignorant, but is ignorant that he is ignorant. And this is the disease of the multitude.

in the doxastic part. For that which is nothing more than a false suspicion of knowledge, is this. And ignorance indeed, is only the privation of intellect in *dianoia* fettered,<sup>1</sup> and concealing its productive powers; but *αἴσθησις*, or a false suspicion of knowledge, is the privation of intellect in opinion, being a certain distortion of it. For being false, it injures its possessor. *For what evil is in action, that the false is in knowledge.*

The period of the circle of *the same* therefore, is alone fettered, and resembles those that are in captivity, and on this account, are prevented from energizing. This circulation however, remains in the souls that are bound without being distorted.<sup>2</sup> But the period of the circle of *the different* is agitated, being filled with false dogmas. For the proximity of this circle to irrationality, causes it to receive a certain passion from externals. From these things however, we are impelled to speak freely in opposition to Plotinus and the great Theodorus, who preserve in us something impassive, and which always perceives intellectually. For Plato assumes only two circles in the essence of the soul, one of which is according to him fettered, but the other is agitated; and it is not possible for either that which is fettered, or that which is agitated, to energize intellectually. Rightly therefore, does the divine Iamblichus contend against those who adopt this opinion. For what is it, that is faulty in us, when we recur to an intemperate imagination, through the excitation of the irrational nature? Is it not our deliberate choice? And how is it possible it should not be this; since according to this, we differ from those who imagine precipitately? But if the deliberate choice is faulty, how can the soul be guiltless? What also is it which makes the whole of our life to be happy? Is it not because reason possesses its proper virtue? We say entirely so. But if when that which is most excellent in us is perfect we are *wholly* happy, what hinders all of us from being now happy, if the summit of our nature always perceives intellectually, and is always with the Gods? For if this summit is [wholly] intellect, it is nothing to the soul; but if it is a part of the soul, the rest of the soul also will be happy. Who likewise is the charioteer of the soul? Is it not that which is most delightful to us, and as some one may say most capital? And how is it possible not to admit this, if it is the charioteer who governs the whole of our essence, who raises his head to, and surveys the supercelestial place, and is assimilated to the great leader [Jupiter], who drives a winged chariot, and is the first charioteer that proceeds into the heavens? But if that which is the summit in us is the charioteer, and he, as it is said in the *Phædrus*, at one time

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *πεκαίδευσμένης* here, it is necessary to read *πεκαδημένης*.

<sup>2</sup> For *ἀδιαττόφους* here, read *ἀδιαστροφῆς*.

sublimely tends to the place beyond the heavens, at another time enters into the heavens, and at another becomes lame, and suffers a deflexion of his wings, it evidently follows, that the summit of our nature subsists differently at different times. This therefore, the reader will find elsewhere more copiously discussed.

If however, these things are true, it is very properly said, that the period of the circle of *the same*, as it governs and proceeds, is fettered. For having a twofold perfection, practive and theoretic, it is deprived of each. For it is neither able to *rule over* the natures subject to its command, through their unstable motion, nor to proceed, i. e. to perceive intellectually. For to proceed is the energy of a circulation, and to proceed dianoetically, is the energy of dianoetic natures. The senses therefore, strike against this circulation, and flowing in a direction contrary to it, as tending inwardly from outward objects, they impede the intellectual energy. Hence the period of the circle of *the same* is deprived both of action and contemplation. What then, some one may say, is it immoveable? And how can the soul be immoveable? May we not say in answer to this, that it is moved indeed by itself, but neither with a corporeal motion, for it is incorporeal; nor with a phantastic motion, for it is unfigured; nor with a gnostic motion, for it is ignorant of itself; but with an essentially vital motion. For as to perceive intellectually, is the energy of intellect, and to exist is the energy of being; thus also to live, is the energy of life. For it does not possess an adventitious energy of life, but derives it from itself. For it is life-generating itself, and producing itself. But all life is motion. So that if every thing which lives is moved, that which lives from itself<sup>1</sup> will be moved, and that which always lives will always be moved, vitally, but not intellectually. Hence the soul is always moved, and yet not always. *For it is intellect in capacity, but life in energy.* And another third thing [i. e. matter] is in capacity only, but is not in energy. Since therefore, there is a triple order in us, viz. according to essence, according to power, and according to energy, our essence indeed, remains entirely the same, as being essence, as living, and as intellectual. For being the [first] image of intellect, it is intellectual; just as the first image of soul is animated. But the powers indeed, of dianoia are fettered, and those of opinion are agitated. And since the powers are analogous to the lives, the power of one of the lives [viz. of the intellectual life] is restrained, but another is shaken. For the essential life is always in motion. With respect to the energies however, those of dianoia are taken away, but those of opinion are distorted. And as these are analogous to that which is intellectual, it is evident that the soul is prevented from perceiving intellectually. The essence of the soul therefore, is per-

<sup>1</sup> For *εαυτο* here, it is necessary to read *εαυτη*.

petually vital and perpetually moved ; but the powers and energies, pertaining to its life and intellect, are naturally adapted to err.

“ So that they turn with every kind of revolution, each of the three intervals of the double and triple, together with the media and conjoining bonds of the sesquitercian, sesquialter, and sesquioctave ratios which cannot be dissolved by any one, except by him by whom they were bound. And besides this they introduce all the fractures and diversities of circles, which it is possible to effect.”

All things are in all souls, but appropriately in each, in some divinely, in others daemoniacally, and in others partially. For the media, the sesquialter, the sesquitercian, and the sesquioctave ratios, together with the leimna, are in all souls. For how could the soul otherwise know total harmony, and procreate ratios so beautiful, except she contained in herself the causes of them, being herself, according to her own order, a certain harmony of harmonies ; not consisting of things harmonized, since a harmony of this kind is in another thing, is alter-motive, and is suspended from another motive cause ; but of that which harmonizes itself, and is harmonized by wholes ? Hence, it has all harmonized ratios, and besides these, the divisions into seven of the circle of the different. For the demiurgic section <sup>1</sup> begins supernally from divine souls, and proceeds as far as to the most partial souls ; and besides this, such other things as we have surveyed about the soul of the universe. The mode of interpretation likewise is the same, except that we must add the peculiarity in each, adjoining, in some souls the divine, in others the daemoniacal, and in others the partial peculiarity. We have however before observed, that though all the ratios are in all souls, viz. the divine, the daemoniacal, and the partial, after the mundane soul, it is not at all wonderful that the bounding terms should differ, by each being more multiplied in the subordinate souls, than in those prior to them. For those of the soul of the universe were primary, or radical terms, (*πρῶται*) yet nothing hinders their being afterwards, the duple, or triple, or in short, multiples of these, which through diminution are multiplied in orderly ratios, as far as to partial souls. And in some of these, they are more multiplied than in others. For neither are all divine souls of equal dignity, nor all daemoniacal after these, nor all partial souls. And thus they have some things common to all of them, but others differing according to essence

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *το μεν* in this place, it is necessary to read *ταυτα*.

itself. It is also necessary to remember these things, not carelessly, in order that we may be able to assign the all-various differences in the generation of souls; of the mundane indeed with respect to the supermundane, according to the multitude, or diminution of parts; and also in the generation of the mundane, divine, dæmoniacal, and partial souls, according to the terms themselves, which are either radical, or more remote from those that are radical, the same ratios remaining.

All harmonic ratios therefore, exist in a partial soul, and exist essentially, and are not a concervation of posterior origin. For those things which the first Demiurgus produces, these are essentially inherent in beings, viz. the seven terms, the three media, the sesquialter, sesquitercian, and sesquioctave ratios, and the leimmas, which are now called colligations. It is evident therefore, that all these are essences. For things which always subsist after the same manner, and those which give completion to essence, are themselves essences. And it is necessary to view these particulars not mathematically, but physically. For the mathematical ratios and habitudes, which souls generate, through possessing the above mentioned ratios, are of a different kind. But if all the harmonic ratios are essences, it is evident that they have powers. For the one power, and the one form of the soul, are not generated from things deprived of power, and without quality. How likewise could the harmonic ratios operate, and produce other ratios, unless they had a power of generating? And how could they know, and excite other ratios, if they did not antecedently contain gnostic powers, or if these powers were unenergetic? It is necessary therefore that the ratios should be essences, and possess powers gnostic of all harmony; those indeed in the period of *the same*, of intelligible; but those in the period of *the different*, of sensible harmony. It is likewise necessary that they should energize when they are able; some indeed, about intelligibles; but others about sensibles. When however, being badly affected through oblivion, they become impeded, sense drawing down the soul to material natures, then, they remain indeed essentially; for they are perpetual, indissoluble, and immutable: but according to energy, they are turned with every possible kind of revolution. And again, according to power, they suffer all possible fractures and distortions. For this is common to both,<sup>1</sup> but not through the period of *the same*; since that is alone sluggish. But the circles in the period of *the different*, being seven, and all of them having all the harmonic ratios; for thus it was said of the soul of the universe they are turned and fractured. For what is here said by Plato, is concerning these media and the

<sup>1</sup> Viz. to both power and energy in the circle of *the different*.



colligation in the circle <sup>1</sup> of *the different*, as sustaining all-various injuries, by the senses and physical motions; but is not concerning those in the circle of *the same*. For this is alone fettered; but the circle of *the different* is agitated, and being agitated, suffers such things as he mentions.

Socrates therefore, in the *Phædrus*, assimilates the powers of the soul to a charioteer and horses, and asserts that one of the horses is better than the other. He also says, that sometimes the horses fight with each other, and the better of the two is victorious; but that at other times they hurry along irrationally, the better being vanquished and following the intemperate horse. But *Timæus* binding the soul through two media one of which is effective of sameness, but the other of difference, and one being allied to intelligibles, but the other to sensibles, says that these media are at one time discordant, fighting with each other, but at another time are fractured, <sup>2</sup> the better of the two being vanquished, and are transferred into an oblique situation; and at another, are all-variously turned, through the better being in subjection to the worse. For since the one pertains to sameness, but the other to difference, when the soul regulates each of the media, she then performs that which is her proper duty, one of these making one from many, and knowing *the one of the many*; but the other dividing one into many, and possessing a knowledge of things specifically distinguished. But when the soul vacillates, in the first place, there is a hostile contention in her, respecting what is the same with a certain thing, and what is different from it; in the next place, the worse medium is victorious, through tending to an all-various partibility, instead of surveying itself; and in the third place, there is a perfect debility of the better medium, in consequence of the soul delivering the supreme dominion and ruling authority to the less excellent medium. For of the two media, as we have before observed, through which the double and triple intervals collect <sup>3</sup> that which is divided into sesquialter, sesquitercian, and sesquioctave ratios, one medium was collective of the samenesses in all the parts, but the other of the differences consascent with it; just as the geometric medium was collective of essences. The medium therefore pertaining to sameness, leads the soul to a divine, but that pertaining to difference, to a mortal nature. Hence, the soul becomes irrational after this manner, the media in the circle of difference being fractured and turned, and prior to this, dissenting from each other; the turning perfectly drawing down this circle to the passions. For as the circle of *the different* was erect in the whole

<sup>1</sup> For *κεκλωγ* here, it is necessary to read *κεκλυσ*.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *κολασθαι* in this place, it is requisite to read *κλασθαι*.

<sup>3</sup> For *συνεδει* here, it is requisite to read *συναγει*.

soul of the universe, being perfectly free from any inclination to the subjects of its government, so in a partial soul it is turned, being wholly inclined to matter, falling into body, and entering profoundly into it; the fracture imparting a lation into multitude and variety, and producing a distribution into parts, through impotence and debility. For things that are fractured, fall off from their power, and become not one, instead of one. But the dissention produces nothing but contrariety and hostility. The turning therefore, entirely injures the erectness; the fracture makes the one to be many; and the dissention alone introduces hostility. And the effect indeed, produced by the dissention resembles that which happens to one who runs, but does not stand firmly, but the fracture resembles one who has now fallen, through having broken his limbs, and on this account becomes in an oblique position. And the turning is similar to one in a supine position, and who fixes his head in the earth, but raises his feet as much as possible on high. For an oblique position is a medium between that which stands erect, and that which is contrary to the erect; in consequence of the head in this situation being downward but the feet upward. The doxastic part therefore, becomes through the senses distorted, opines falsely, and is disorderly<sup>1</sup> and erroneous. For this is the circle of the *different*, as we have before observed, in which opinions and belief are produced, as was said of the whole soul of the universe. Hence this part becomes full of false opinion, being co-divided with the senses, and in sedition with itself. All these passions likewise pertain to the powers and energies of the soul; but the essence of the soul is indissoluble, except, as Timæus says, by its colligator. For he antecedently comprehends in himself, the definite causes of its ratios, and its circles. But that which is alone dissoluble, by the cause that perpetually connects it, is indissoluble; just as that which is produced by the good alone, is without evil; but that which is produced by evil alone, is depraved; and that which is produced by cold alone, is without heat. For it is not the province of the cold to impart heat, nor of good to vitiate, nor of that which connects to dissolve. So that the assertion that the soul is alone dissoluble by the Demiurgus, delivers the incorruptibility of it, though occultly.

43 E “So that they are scarcely connected with each other, but are borne along indeed, yet irrationally, at one time in a contrary, at another in an oblique, and at another in a supine position.”

The dissentions of the circles indeed, cause the composition of the ratios to be

<sup>1</sup> For πολυμελές here, it is necessary to read ἀλημμελές.

moved in contrary directions; but the fractures cause them to be moved obliquely; and the turnings, supinely. And these triple passions are surveyed about the rational soul; but they are also consentaneously seen about the irrational part. For when the rational soul accords, and also when it is discordant with itself, it in a much greater degree hostilely opposes the irrational soul. For the virtues follow each other; the dianoetical, the ethical; and the ethical, the dianoetical. How therefore are these three to be surveyed in the rational part? May we not say, that contrariety is to be surveyed, when opinion hostilely opposes opinion, and when the better is not subverted by the worse opinion? But in those that opine falsely there is entirely a certain true dogma, from which he who entertains a false opinion may be confuted. For how could Socrates have confuted Thrasymachus, Callicleas, and others who like these were unblushingly impudent, unless in them also there was a certain true dogma, from which being acknowledged by them in common, the conclusions that follow were deduced? When therefore, the same person says, that divinity is good, but that he does not providentially attend to all things, these dogmas<sup>1</sup> are contrary to each other, though he does not at the same time see, that the contrary to what he asserts follows from the position that God is good. But the oblique position takes place, when two dogmas are distorted, and are not able to preserve that which is consequent to them; for then they are said to be inconsequent.<sup>2</sup> And this position is oblique. For at the same time, the whole opinion falls to the ground, and becomes apparent to sense. Hence not one part of it is true, and the other false, but the whole is false. And such are the assertions, that justice is folly, and injustice wisdom. For he who fancies [that justice is folly, and at the same time says] that injustice is depravity, speaks contrary to himself; for at the same time he says, that justice is not folly. But he who says that justice is folly, and injustice wisdom, accords indeed with himself, but at the same time asserts both distortedly. Hence he is confuted with greater difficulty, and is more incurable than the other. And the supine position takes place, when the worse opinions entirely vanquish the better, and the informations of sense subdue the conceptions which are drawn forth from within. For in a passion of this kind, things more excellent are enslaved, and become subject to things subordinate.

Again, about the irrational part, contrariety may be surveyed, as for instance, in those that are continent. For in these the better fights with the worse, the imagination of beauty with the appetite of deformity. But obliquity is seen

<sup>1</sup> For *δαιγµατα* here, read *δογµατα*.

<sup>2</sup> Here also, for *απολυνθα*, read *ανακολουθα*.

in the equal symphony of judgment with appetite, when both are moved similarly and passively. And supineness takes place in intemperate lives, in which the rational is entirely spread under the irrational part. And here, you may see how the oblique disposition proceeds in a well-ordered manner from the contrary. For when after a great contest, the rational yields to the irrational part, then it is moved obliquely, and from this supinely. For in consequence of the worse continually vanquishing the better part, at last there is no need of contest, but the better part is enslaved and led wherever the worse part pleases. And this is the last form of life, just as the most perfect is that which accords with itself, is without obliquity, and is conformable to nature, and in which the more excellent part possesses its own order without hostile opposition. The concord likewise, is produced from temperance, the non-obliquity from fortitude, and the arrangement according to nature, from justice. But the contraries of these, are produced as follows: Dissension indeed produces contrariety, but the fracture, obliquity; for things that are fractured become oblique; and the turning, supineness. For it entirely inverts the order of leaders and followers. And the contrariety indeed appears to divulge the one life of the soul, and to make the rational life discordant with itself. But the obliquity produces irrationality itself: for this wholly tends to body, and to matter. And the supine position<sup>1</sup> causes the rational life to rank with plants. For in these the head is rooted in the earth. Such therefore, being the division, and such the passions, about the powers of the soul, Plato very properly says, *that they are scarcely<sup>2</sup> connected with each other*. For the existence of their essence, which is incorruptible as in mortal natures, connects them together. Hence, dissension, fracture, and a turning are produced, matter vanquishing form, the former of which is analogous to the feet, in the same manner as the latter is to the head.

“Just as if some one in a supine position, should fix his head on the earth, and raise his feet on high; for in such a situation, both the inverted person and the spectators, would mutually imagine the right hand parts to be on the left, and the left to be on the right. So with respect to the circulations of the soul, the very same affections, and others of a similar kind, vehemently take place; and hence, when any thing external occurs, characterized by the nature of *same*, or *different*, they denominate things

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *υπορη* here, it is obviously necessary to read *πρηνει*.

<sup>2</sup> For *μορη* in this place, read *μορμ*, this being the word used by Plato.

the same with, or different from others, in a manner contrary to the truth, and become false, and destitute of intelligence."

In what is here said, Plato tragically describes the last passion of the soul, in which the better part is deceived and enslaved, but the worse part tyrannizes; ignoble rule over Olympian, and material over divine natures. He also assimilates the head to our divine part, but our inferior part to the feet. For the former governs, but the latter has the order of the governed. For as he says further on, the slavery of that which is divine, and which rules in us, is similar to fixing the head on the earth, but the tyranny of the irrational part to the elevation of the feet; and that which happens from a figure of this kind, is analogous to what takes place about the soul. But it happens with respect to the body, that the right and left hand parts are seen in a changed position. Hence also, it happens about the soul, that things different, and things that are the same, are changed to the spectators. For *the same* is analogous to the right hand, but *the different* to the left, according to the Pythagorean custom. And such is the nature of the whole text.

But let us direct our attention to the particulars. In the first place, therefore, the order is to be surveyed, how Plato makes the body from a standing to be in an oblique position, but from an oblique, in a supine, and from a supine position, to have the feet raised on high. But fixing the head in the earth makes a figure of this kind. And in the soul, there is first a departure (from good); secondly, an obliquity of life; thirdly, an extension to matter,<sup>1</sup> a position towards generation, and a conjunction of that which is divine with that which is without God; and in the last place, the intolerable tyranny of stupid natures. Of politics likewise, that which is a lover of contention is constituted according to a contrariety of this kind; that which is a lover of riches subsists according to obliquity; that which is a lover of pleasure illegally exists according to a supineness of life; and that which is tyrannical according to the elevation of the feet. And this figure is described in what Plato now says.

In the second place, it is requisite to survey, how a figure of this kind exhibits the right hand parts on the left, and the left on the right, both to him who is in this position, and to the spectators. Let one person therefore, be supposed to look to the north, but another to the south. Of these, the former indeed, will have the right hand to the east, but the left hand to the west. But the other will have these vice versa. Let him however, who looks to the north be supine, not as Timæus [may seem to] say, having his head fixed in the earth, but his feet

<sup>1</sup> For *ολη* here, it is necessary to read *ολη*.

elevated, as we are accustomed to assert of him who lies in a prone position [but let his face be upward]. And again, he will have the east to the right hand, but the west to the left. In order however, that in the way mentioned by Timæus he may be supine, let his feet be raised, but his head be fixed on the ground, so that his face may be turned from the north. Looking therefore to the south, he will similarly have the right hand parts to the east, but the left hand to the west. The contrary however, ought to take place, as pertaining to those that stand, and look towards the south. Hence, he will fancy, since he looks to the south, that things situated to the east, are on the left hand, but those situated to the west, on the right hand. And the spectators likewise, will fancy this to be the case. He will therefore fancy things on the left to be on the right hand; and things on the right to be on the left hand; and this in consequence of his supine position. It is likewise evident, that he will apprehend things pertaining to the erect spectator, to subsist vice versa, though the right and left hand parts will be referred to the same things in both. For each looking to the south will fancy that the left hand parts are to the east, but the right hand parts to the west, and will say that if the one thus subsist, the rest also subsist after the same manner. This however will not be true with respect to him who has his face downward, though he should look to the south. It is well said therefore, that each will fancy things pertaining to both and not to one of them only, will have a vice versa position.

In the third place, it is requisite to show, how these things may be analogously surveyed in the soul. For the soul burying her reason, but exciting the phantasy and the irrational powers, becomes rather a plant [than a rational nature], and imitates the life of plants. For in these, the head is rooted downward, but all the rest tends upward, vanquishing the better part. Hence the soul forms a judgment of things contrary to the truth, and not only the soul that is in this condition, but that also which does not yet suffer this, but looks to her. It is evident therefore, that he who fixes his head downward, resembles those that are perfectly distorted; but that he who stands indeed, in a natural position, but by looking at the former, is similarly affected with him, resembles those that are distorted by others; just as the former is similar to those that are distorted by themselves. Hence, the soul imitating a physical life, thinks different things to be the same, and again, the same things to be different. For it thinks that pleasure is the same with good, though it is different from it; but it separates the divine from the good, and virtue from the beautiful, though they are the same. In consequence therefore, of thus thinking, the soul possesses the last life, departs from herself, and follows this life. Hence, her opinions are false, and are not only thus affected about same and different, but also about motion and permanency. For

they think that the nature which is perpetually in motion has stood still, as the multitude [i. e. the Christians of that time] do the sun, and also that what is permanent is moved, as some do the earth. And in many other particulars they survey things changed from what they are. These passions however happen about the energies of the circles in the period of *the different*. Hence also he says, that the seven circulations in the circle of the different, suffer these, and other such like affections. For one of the circles, viz. the circle of *the same*, is fettered, as was before observed. He therefore alone is endued with intellect, who uses the circle of *the different* rightly, but liberates the circle of *the same*; and he will entirely be one, who loosens the Prometheus of himself, who was bound by Epimetheus. For through this<sup>1</sup> [i. e. through possessing the last life], the soul becomes bound to the irrational order, which Epimetheus himself is said to adorn.<sup>2</sup>

“And in this situation, there is not any one of the circulations which possesses a ruling and leading authority.”

For as there are many periods in the circle of *the different*, in imitation of the soul of the universe, they are all of them injured, become distorted and imbecile, and are in servile subjection to the irrational motions, which it is not proper to call *periods*, because they hasten in a *right line* to generation. For *a period is a motion from the same to the same*. But every irrational knowledge and appetite, hastens from one thing to another different thing, being extended to that which is external to itself. For both the object of appetite, and the object of knowledge are external, the former to the irrational appetite, and the latter to irrational knowledge. Neither therefore does the period of *the same*<sup>3</sup> govern; for it is fettered, and resembles a king in chains, in consequence of being in the power of his enemies; nor the period of *the different*; for it is distorted, and resembles a general who favours the concerns of his enemies. Hence, this is truly a gigantic

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *δια γὰρ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἀλογον δεδραῖται τὰς*, in this place, which is evidently erroneous, I read *δια γὰρ ταύτην*, s. r. λ. But a great part of the above commentary is very obscure from its defective state. I have however endeavoured to render the translation of it as much as possible perspicuous.

<sup>2</sup> The Prometheus in man is the rational, and Epimetheus is the irrational part. But considered as divine powers, Prometheus is the inspective guardian of the descent of the rational soul, and Epimetheus is the guardian of the irrational soul.

<sup>3</sup> For *ταῦτα* here, it is necessary to read *ταύτων*.

war, making the earth-born genera that are in us, to be more honourable than the Olympic, and not as in wholes, subjecting inferior to more excellent natures.

“ But when certain senses, borne along externally, fall on the soul, and co-attract the whole cavity of it, then the circulations which are governed, appear to govern.”

It has been already asserted, that no one of the periods governs, or is a leader; and that our head is buried in matter, and our feet become elevated. But through the present words, it is added, that the mortal rule over the immortal natures. For the senses are *externally borne along*, because they announce externals; and they *fall on the soul*, because their enunciations are accompanied with passion. If therefore, *they co-attract the cavity of the soul*, viz. the whole of its essence; for the word *κεντρος*, *cavity*, is asserted as of certain things that are convolved; and prepare this<sup>\*</sup> to adopt whatever they assert, they become the leaders of the whole life of the soul, cause it to speak and think such things as they announce; and to fancy that which is apprehended by sense, and which a man touches, or eats, or drinks, has a true existence, but the intelligible, and that which is chosen by philosophy, to be a non-entity. These therefore, being the leaders, the appetites govern, and the multitude possess the sovereign power. But deliberate choice and reason having an arrangement in the part of things subservient, at length administer to the passions. Does therefore sense in reality lead and govern? And how is it possible, since it is mortal and material, that it should govern? But it appears indeed to govern reason, yet it is itself, and deservedly, governed by other things. For it is itself different [or characterised by difference]; and on this account it is suspended from externals, is vanquished by them, and is differently disposed at different times. But the irrational life is the cause to itself of slavery. Hence, it does not in reality govern, not having a ruling power which is incapable of being vanquished; but being subservient to other things it rules over natures better than itself, in consequence of their being deceived.

44A “ On account of these passions therefore, the soul becomes stupid at present, and was so originally when she was first bound in a mortal body.”

<sup>\*</sup> Instead of *ταυτα* here, it seems requisite to read *ταυτο*.



This is the conclusion of all that has been said concerning the incarnation of souls, from which Plato discovers the causes of their perturbation and tumult arising from generation; and finally, of the insanity in those that are recently born. And hence again, it is evident that he conceived the rational soul to exist also in children; but that it is fettered and sluggish,<sup>1</sup> being vanquished by other powers, and does not accede in a certain posterior time, as some fancy it does. For he delivers the causes through which though reason is present, yet it is not [effectively] present, and concluding the enumeration of these he says, that the soul through these, became stupid originally, when she was first bound in a mortal body, and is so at present. For what difference is there between being juvenile according to age, and juvenile according to life? As therefore, in those that are stupid when they have arrived at maturity, reason being present, is quiescent, in the same manner in those that are just born,<sup>2</sup> reason indeed is present, but being vanquished by stupidity, is sluggish.

“When however, the stream of increase and nutrition flows along with a less abundant course, the circulations being again restored to tranquillity, proceed in their proper path; in process of time become more regular and steady, and pass into a figure accommodated to their nature. Hence in this case, the revolutions of each of the circles, being according to rectitude, and calling both *same* and *different* by their proper appellations, they render him by whom they are possessed, prudent and wise.” 14B

Plato in the Phædrus, teaches us the felicitous life of the soul, according to which it revolves together with the Gods, recurs to the supercelestial place, and surveys Justice herself, Temperance herself, and each of the divine virtues; and again, he gradually leads it, from supreme felicity, and this blessedness, to at one time raising the head of the charioteer above the heaven, and at another entering within it; and from this through diminution, to surveying none of these blessed spectacles, yet still following from custom. For the lapse to souls is not directly from an abundant vision of the intelligible into generation, but proceeds through many media. In what is here said however, tragically describing the passions of the soul falling into generation, its turnings, fractures and streams, he wishes to

<sup>1</sup> For ἀρχαῖον in this place, it is necessary to read ἀργαῖον.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of νεοῖς in this place, it is requisite to read νεογνοῖς.

lead it gradually back to an intellectual life, and to a life conformable to its nature. But there indeed, a cessation taking place of things more excellent, and of the goods imparted by intellect and the Gods, things of a worse nature succeed, viz. lameness, a defluxion of the wings of the soul, oblivion, the meeting with [evil demons] and a gravitating tendency downward. Here however things of a worse nature ceasing, and also the impediments arising from matter, immediately the circulations proceed according to nature, and things more excellent present themselves to the view, viz. order, and reason, and a prudent and wise condition of being. For advancing to maturity of age, we become more prudent and considerate, and make the progression <sup>1</sup> of an equable and orderly life, nature being the leader. Why therefore, should Galen say, that the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body, and that when the body is moist, unstable, and in an all-various flux, then the soul is stupid and unstable; but when the parts of the body are properly adapted to each other, so that the whole is in symmetry, the soul acts with rectitude, and becomes prudent and wise? And how is it possible we should admit this? For as the immortal soul exists prior to the body, it is not lawful to make it intellectual through the body; but we ought rather to say, that the body becomes at one time an impediment to the soul, in its attainment of a well-ordered life; and at another, disturbs it in a less degree. As therefore, if we should dwell near a trifling and garrulous neighbour, we should not become more puerile through him, but it is possible for him to hinder us more or less from the enjoyment of a quiet life; after the same manner also, the connexion of the body at one time disturbs the soul, and at another, reinitiates the tumult. The soul however, does not even then become tranquil, till erudition accedes. The body therefore, is an impediment indeed, to the attainment of a prudent life, but is by no means effective of it. And thus much as to these particulars.

With respect however to the words of the text severally, it must be said, that "*the stream of increase and nutrition*" manifest the physical river. For it is necessary, that a greater increase taking place, there should be a greater quantity of nutriment. But the increase is greater, because nature which affords the increase, is then more powerful. For nature in those that are young, flourishes, and is very robust, but in those that are advanced in age, with whom, the soul is more considerate, nature is imbecile. And you may not only see, that the soul is contrarily affected by ages, but also by times. *For the soul, in those that are awake, is*

<sup>1</sup> There is an hiatus here in the original; and it appears to me that *την προόδον* is wanting.

*more vigorous, but in sleep is indeed sluggish, but then nature especially operates, and performs her proper work.* Hence it very reasonably follows, that when the physical stream is diminished, tranquillity and order take place about the soul. But it must be said, that "*the path of the circulations*" is a progression into prudence, equability, and order. For those that are advanced in years, are for the most part more prudent, more equable, and more steady than those that are young. And the several *circles*, according to which the periods of the circle of difference are divided, revolving with *rectitude*, must be said to be a renovation from fracture, and a perfect restoration to the circular form. For an unbroken line is a medium between a fractured right line and a circumference, imitating the simplicity, the equability, and the similitude of a periphery. But *the circulations themselves, and same, and different, are called by their proper appellations*, both in dialectic and sensible essences. For all things are no longer moved in a puerile manner; but there is an endeavour to connect and divide each thing appropriately. It must likewise be observed, that every where science and ignorance are defined about *this same and different*, either according to a right line, or according to alternation. For we affirm some things, which we ought to deny; and this is to conceive that which is *different* as if it were *same*. And vice versa, we deny some things, which we ought to affirm, in consequence of being ignorant of one of the things which we deny. Hence when the gnostic power is properly evolved we denominate all things conformably to their nature; asserting, that some things are the same with, but others different from, each other. Thus therefore, our circulations proceeding according to nature, render him who possesses them prudent and wise. Plato also, very properly here uses the word *γυγναισθαι*, because he who becomes prudent from these circulations, is physically moved. It also sometimes happens in addition to these things, that there is a right education; of which he says as follows:

"He therefore, who receives erudition, in conjunction with proper nutriment, will be perfectly entire and same, and will avoid the greatest disease."

44C

The natural path of souls to wisdom, is described through the above-mentioned words. But Plato connects with this political education, which is perfective of physical aptitude, and which through proper nutriment, imparts to the irrational nature, the habit of good conduct, and a life conformable to right opinion; but

through erudition nourishes the rational essence, by disciplines and dialectic. For it is necessary that the irrational part should be instructed by morals, but reason by disciplines, in order that the former may be obedient to the rational life, but the latter recurring to intellect, may survey the nature of beings. For these things taking place, the soul is rendered entire and same; *entire* indeed, as having all its powers unencumbered, and the circle of *the same* liberated from its fetters; but *same*, as having applied a remedy to the distorted period of the circle of *the different*, and restored it to an unfractured, and unoblique condition. Or it may be said, that the soul is *entire*, as pursuing wholes instead of parts, as raising herself from the astonishment produced by things below, exciting herself to intellect, and surveying from on high, and shaking off from herself, the briny waters of the sea of generation; but *same*, as returning to her own natural order, and running back to science. For ignorance is the greatest disease of the soul, burying and blinding its [intellectual] eye.

“ But he who neglects this, will, through proceeding along the path of life in a lame condition, again pass into Hades imperfect, and destitute of intelligence.”

The philosopher manifests through these things, that something is effected by the motion of nature and political erudition. For he calls him imperfect, who does not obtain right nutriment and erudition. For like one whose feet are injured, he walks indeed, yet not well; and is neither entirely deprived of motive parts, nor uses such as are entire and perfect. After the same manner therefore, he who neglects himself; and he is one who looks downward, dismissing the knowledge of himself; will proceed through the path of life in a lame condition, as alone having made a proficiency so far as he has been moved by nature. Hence Plato says, that he will *again* pass into Hades imperfect and destitute of intelligence, not being able to give perfection to his intellect; because the living are from the dead. And the passing into Hades, manifests the proceeding into that which is dark, and without splendour. For the departure to these, is not according to the good and wise God [Plato], through the downward-leading mouth into the subterranean place. For he who has not purified himself, cannot know that which is wholly pure and incorruptible.<sup>1</sup> Hence, he is sent to

<sup>1</sup> For *ακαθάρτων* in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read *ακαρτερών*.

that place, in which he will be purified; and he who has alone lived according to Fate, will be directed into the right path by Fate in orderly periods of time.

"These are particulars however, which take place afterwards; but it is requisite to discuss more accurately the things which are now proposed to be considered." 44C

The discussion of the composition of the body, both of the whole and the parts of it, and also of the irrational life, but not of the allotments of the soul, is consequent to the consideration of the incarnation of the soul. For the accurate discussion of the allotments is to be found in the speculations in the Republic; converting souls through it to a prudent and wise life. But it pertains to the physiologist to give perfection to the discussion of the animal. The philosopher therefore, very properly dismisses ethical speculations, but is transferred to the physical doctrine. Hence, he says, that these particulars, viz. the allotments of souls, take place posterior to those things which are now proposed to be more accurately discussed. And the sentence indeed, appears to be somewhat difficult; but at the same time, he says, that all that has now been asserted, will take place hereafter; and that it is requisite to speak of those particulars, which are now proposed by us to be discussed, and these are such as pertain to the life of the body. Others however, transposing the words, for the sake of perspicuity, write, *It is necessary to discuss more accurately the things now proposed to be considered.* But what follows is adverse to this transposition.

"Prior to these therefore, it is requisite to speak about bodies, according to the parts' of their generation, and about the soul, and to show by especially adhering to probable reasons, through what causes and providence of the Gods they were generated. For thus, and to those that proceed conformably to these things, it is requisite to discuss the particulars that remain." 4-C.

In what is here said, Plato defines the scope of what is about to be delivered,

\* i. e. To speak of the generation of the parts, of bodies. D

viz. that it is about the generation of bodies, and about the soul. For it was plainly said, that it was his intention to speak concerning both, and to show from what particulars the second Demiurgi constituted the soul and the body. But conformably to this, he had before asserted, that in constituting soul and body it was requisite to introduce the Gods, and to effect things consequent to these, viz. the divisions of the soul, and a more minute discussion of the parts of the body. For thus in the universe, after a common discussion of the whole, he spoke about the parts which it contains. That also which is the peculiarity of the Platonic philosophy, to suspend all generation from the Gods, he now does, by placing in the Gods the primordial causes of mortal bodies, and of the inseparable forms of life. Not that there are definite reasons [or productive powers] of partial natures, and of particulars, and things corruptible in the Gods; for a divine nature is very remote from partial fabrication; but that they preside over generated natures in an unbegotten manner, and over material natures immaterially, congregating from many partial and proximate causes, that which is partial in effects through perpetual motions, and through well-arranged and multiform causes. For as the first Demiurgus delivers [the production of mortal natures] to the junior Gods, so likewise the providence of these, proceeds through demons as far as to material and individual principles, using as adjuncts, definite natures, and the several peculiar motions of these which differ in their powers, and likewise employing all the proximate causes of generated beings; from which, that which is generated, derives its completion, is fabricated a partial nature instead of being the whole, and receives an hypostasis, circumscribed differently, and by different peculiarities. Here therefore, it is requisite to speak about the body according to parts; as for instance, about the head, the thorax, and the legs, and in each of these, about the parts contained in them: for these are organic. It is also requisite to speak about the mortal soul, which together with the body makes the mortal animal, this being the fabrication of the junior Gods; and likewise about the parts of it, both the gnostic and the theoretic. For if we properly apprehend these by a reasoning process, we shall have well discussed what pertains to man.

It is necessary however, that man in the same manner as the whole world should be considered perfectly, because man is a microcosm. For he has intellect and reason, a divine and a mortal body, in the same manner as the universe, and he is divided analogously to the universe. Hence also, some are accustomed to say, that his intellectual part is arranged analogous to the sphere of the fixed stars; but that of reason, that which is theoretic, is analogous to Saturn, and

that which is political, to Jupiter. Of the irrational part likewise, the irascible nature is analogous to Mars; that which is endued with the faculty of speech, to Mercury; that which is epithymetic, to Venus; that which is sensitive, to the Sun; and that which is vegetative, to the Moon. The luciform vehicle likewise, is analogous to the heavens; but this mortal body, to the sublunary region. In order therefore, that you may perceive the universe partially, the discourse about man is so arranged with all physiology. And thus much as to this particular.

But how are *the causes and providential energies of the Gods* to be divided? Is it not, that the former are hypostatic, or the sources of subsistence, but the latter are of a guardian nature; the former are the suppliers of essence, but the latter of good; and the former are effective of mortal natures, but the latter are the saviours of immortal souls? For the Gods providentially attend to these, receive them when they descend [into the realms of generation], and again, when they are willing to ascend, extend their hands, and impart the pity which dwells with them. Since however both the cause and the providence of the junior Gods, are multiplied and united; for whence could union be imparted from them to generated natures, unless those that produce them were by a much greater priority united to each other? on this account, Plato calls their demiurgic powers, the providence and causes of them. For there are many Demiurgi, and the production of each is multiform. And again, he unites the multitude of the Gods. For union and uniform power accede to all beings, and by a much greater priority to the Gods themselves, from the divine peculiarity; just as intelligence is present with wholes, and in a much greater degree with the intellectual orders themselves, from intellect. But when, in short, he refers the cause of generated natures to the providence of the Gods, he gives to them a first progression into existence, ineffable, and better than knowledge. Hence, Iamblichus rightly says, that it is not possible to collect syllogistically, how the Gods produce body, and the life which is in it, and how they connect both with each other. For these things are unknown to us. And indeed, we strenuously assert, that all things are constituted by the Gods, in consequence of looking to their goodness; but we are not able to know how they proceed from thence. The cause however, of this is, that to energize providentially, and to generate, are the prerogatives of a divine hyparxis, and possess an unknown transcendency. It has been shown therefore, what the subject is of the present discussion; but he again reminds us what the mode of it is, that it is mingled with probability. For so far as it is connected with nature, and the fabrication of mortals, so far it is accompanied with probability; but so far as it recurs to a divine intellect

itself, so far again, it participates of truth. And finally, he connects the mode and the end of the discussion. For he says, "*Thus, and to those that proceed conformably to these things, it is requisite to discuss the particulars that remain.*" But the word *thus*, pertains to the mode; and the words, *conformably to these things*, belong to the end. The end however, is to speak about the parts of the body, and to discuss minutely, what pertains to the mortal soul.

FINIS.



## ADDITIONAL NOTES.

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Vol. I. p. 1. *On this account we have prefixed the treatise of Timæus to these Commentaries.*

This treatise of Timæus, which has been transmitted to us through Proclus, is not however prefixed to the printed edition of these Commentaries. But the reader may find it in Gales' *Opuscula Mythologica*.

P. 4. *The two co-ordinations of things.*

These two co-ordinations are the followings: bound the infinite; the odd, the even; *the one*, multitude; the right hand, the left hand; the masculine, the feminine; the quiescent, that which is in motion; the straight, the curved; light, darkness; good, evil; the square, the oblong.

P. 14. *Who celebrate number, &c. and the tetractys.*

For a development of the manner in which the Pythagoreans philosophized about number, and also concerning the tetractys, see my *Theoretic Arithmetic*.

P. 17. *Our preceptor Sisyphus.*

This very extraordinary man was the first that thoroughly penetrated into, and developed the latent doctrines of philosophers and theologians of the highest antiquity. He did not write much himself, but committed the promulgation of his dogmas to Proclus.

P. 35. *Sirens.* The following beautiful account of the Sirens, is given by Proclus in his MS. Scholia on the *Cratylus*. "The divine Plato knew that there are three kinds of Sirens; the *celestial*, which is under the government of Jupiter; that which is *geneargic*, and is under the government of Neptune; and that which is *cathartic*, and is under the government of Pluto. It is common to all these, to incline all things through an harmonic motion to their ruling Gods. Hence, when the soul is in the heavens, they are desirous of uniting it to the divine life which flourishes there. But it is proper that souls living in generation, should sail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that they may not be allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when souls are in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom of Hades, there are Gods, daemons, and souls, who dance as it were round Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there."

P. 35. *Dialectic.* The dialectic of Plato, to which Proclus here alludes, is not the same with that dialectic which is the subject of opinion, and is accurately investigated in the *Topics* of Aristotle. For the former is irreprehensible and most expeditious; since it is con-

nate with things themselves, and employs a multitude of powers in order to the attainment of truth. It likewise imitates intellect, from which it receives its principles, and ascends through well-ordered gradations to being itself. It also terminates the wandering of the soul about sensibles; and explores every thing by methods which cannot be counted, till it arrives at the ineffable principle of things. The business likewise of this first of sciences, is to employ definitions, divisions, analyzations, and demonstrations, as primary sciences in the investigation of causes; imitating the progression of beings from the first principle of things, and their continual conversion to it, as the ultimate object of desire. For an ample account of this master science, see the notes to my translation of the *Parmenides* of Plato, and also my translation of *Select Works* of Plotinus.

P. 43. *Physical virtues.* The physical virtues are those which are common to men and brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather, they pertain to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament; or that they are the result of energies in a former life. Of these, Plato speaks in the *Politics* and the *Laws*. For an account of the other virtues, viz. of the ethical, the political, the cathartic, theoretic, and paradigmatic, see the Notes to my translation of the *Phædon* of Plato, and also the Additional Notes annexed to my translation of *Select Works* of Plotinus.

P. 58. *Scripture of twenty-four measures.*

The scripture of Jupiter, as we are informed by Proclus on the *Cratylus*, was, according to Orpheus, twenty-four measures in length; by which says he, the theologian signifies, the establishment of those two divine orders by Jupiter, the celestial, and supercelestial, and his reigning over two series of Gods, each of which is characterized by the number twelve.

P. 91. *For the relation subsisting among you, that Phæton, the offspring of the Sun, &c.*

The following explanation of the fable of Phæton, is given by Olympiodorus in his Scholia on the *Meteors* of Aristotle. "Phæton signifies a comet, by which considerable parts of the earth are at times destroyed. But he is said to have been the offspring of the Sun, because a comet is a sublunary body, consisting of a collection of dry vapours raised, and set on fire by the Sun. He is likewise said to have desired the govern-

ment of the chariot of the Sun, because a comet desires to imitate the circular motion of the Sun. He did not keep the track observed by his parent, because a comet does not move in a direction parallel to that of the Sun. He was blasted by thunder through the anger of Jupiter, because this comet was extinguished by moist vapours. On this account, he is said to have fallen into the river Eridanus, because the comet was extinguished through moisture. He was laments by the Helades, because the vapour proceeding from the dissolution of the comet flowed downwards, being of an aquatic nature, and in this respect corresponding to tears. The Helades were changed into poplar trees, because a juice distils from the poplar tree similar to amber; amber has a golden splendour; and gold is dedicated to the Sun. The fable therefore, obscurely signifies that the juice of the poplar tree is produced from moisture, similar to that which was produced by the dissolution of the comet."

P. 44. *The horses therefore, and charioteers of the Gods, are all of them good, &c.*

These are beautifully explained by Hermias in his Scholia On the Phædrus, as follows:

What are we to understand by the charioteer and the two horses? In the first place, this is to be considered respecting them, whether it is necessary to arrange them according to essences, or according to powers, or according to energies. For there are different opinions on this subject. I say then, that they must be arranged according to powers. For their arrangement cannot be according to energies, since the horses are represented energizing, but there are not energies of energies; and because the energies of the soul are at different times different, but the horses are always the same. For the soul does not receive different horses at different times, but always has the same. Not can the arrangement be according to essences, since even in our souls, the essences remain undisturbed with vice. For the essence of the soul is never vitiated; since if it were, it would perish. But the powers of it become depraved, and this is in a much greater degree the case with its energies. Plato himself likewise says, "that the horses and charioteers of the Gods are all of them good, and consist of such things as are good;" but of ours he says, "that they become depraved, and suffer a deprivation of the wings." It therefore, the essence of our soul remains undisturbed with vice, but the powers of it become distorted, the horses and charioteers may be very properly arranged according to powers. But this also Plato himself clearly proclaims, when he says, "Let it be similar to the connective power of a winged chariot and charioteer." It however, some one should say, that the words, "all of them are good and consist of things good," are spoken as signifying that these horses and charioteers are derived from beneficent causes, the words that follow will bear witness against this interpretation. For our horses and charioteers are from things that are good, as from causes; so that all of them according to this will be good. Plato, however, says that ours are defiled with vice. But Plato is not the first who assumes a charioteer and horses: for prior to him they were assumed by the divinely inspired poets Homer, Orpheus, and Parmenides. By

them however, as being inspired, they are mentioned without a cause: for they spoke enthusiastically. But since Plato introduces nothing into his philosophy, which he could not derive from a cause, let us show why, though he speaks with greater dignity about these particulars, he omits to mention the causes of them; in the mean time observing, that the theologists prior to him, appear to have assumed the charioteer and horses, as pertaining to powers. For Jupiter in Homer,<sup>2</sup> uses horses, while Neptune is said to unharness, and he does not always use them, but is represented as sometimes sitting on a throne. But if the essence of Jupiter consisted in ruling in a chariot, and Jupiter was the same as the charioteer, he would always drive a chariot. Now however, he is represented as doing other things. By the horses and charioteer therefore, the different powers of Jupiter are exhibited. In the mean time, it must be observed, that the assertions respecting a divine and human soul ought to be common.

Plato therefore, in the Timæus says, that the Demiurgus in constituting the essence of the soul, assumed a middle essence from the genera of being, viz. from [the three genera] essence, same and different. And this middle nature which he assumed, is a medium between an impartible essence and the essence which is divisible about bodies. But the irrational life, nature, and the participations of soul by the body, constitute the essence which is divisible about bodies. And again, the Demiurgus assumed a middle sameness, which is a medium between impartible sameness, and the sameness which is divisible about bodies. The like also takes place with respect to the middle difference. The Demiurgus likewise, says Plato, mingling these three, constituted the essence of the soul. These natures however, in divine souls, consist of pure and incorruptible genera, but this is not the case in our souls. But as Plato says, "the Demiurgus poured mingling, the remainder of the former mixture; in a certain respect indeed, after the same manner, yet not similarly incorruptible according to the same, but different from the first, in a second and third degree." The horses therefore, and the charioteer, are the powers of these three; and the one power of the soul, which is productive of these three powers, is the idea of the soul. The power therefore of being, i.e. of essence, which is one of the genera, is the charioteer; but the power of the same, is the letter of the two horses; and the power of the different, is the less excellent horse. Hence, if we conceive two horses and a charioteer, which are made to coalesce, then the one power which is generative and productive of the charioteer and the horses, is the idea of the soul. Power however, must here be understood conformably to geometricians, in the way they are accustomed to say, that a right line is in power a square. In what was before said therefore, Plato discussed the essence of the soul; but here, he speaks about its powers; and in what follows, about its energies. These therefore, being three, viz. essence, self-motion, and immortality, three powers are here assumed, analogous to them, viz. the idea of the soul, the horses, and the more partial lives of the horses. For the idea of the soul is assumed analogous to the

<sup>1</sup> For *ἵππους* here, it is obviously necessary to read *τάρτεες*.

<sup>2</sup> *Iliad*. viii. v. 410.

one essence of it, which uniquely possesses both self-motion and immortality. But the horses, and the self-motive nature of them, are assumed analogous to the self-motion of the soul. And the more partial lives of the horses, viz. the ascents and descents of the soul, the delivion of her wings, and the germination of them, are analogous to her immortality.

But why does he call the power of *the same*, and the power of *the different*, the horses, but the power of essence, which is one of the genera of being, the charioteer? It is evident therefore that all the genera participate of each other, but each is denominated according to that which predominates. And essence, which is now assumed in order to the composition of the soul, is the summit and is most perfect, and according to this has dominion over the rest. Hence the soul is not compelled to be moved according to essence.<sup>1</sup> But the remaining two which are the powers of *the same* and *the different*, are assimilated to horses, as being seen in motion and priore progression. These powers also are the circles or wheels of *the same* and *the different*. For considered as proceeding about the intelligible, they are horses, but as returning to the same condition, they are circles or wheels. And the better wheel indeed, which is the circle of *the same*, is that which revolves about intelligibles, and has the power of elevating the soul; on which account also, it is called volubile or agile. But the less excellent wheel, which is the circle of *the different*, and is generative, revolves about sensible and doxastic natures, and is called erect, when it possesses its proper virtue, and thus has an indication of the erect, and the unoblique, when it announces sensibles without distortion. Thus, for instance, if opinion wishes to perceive something sensible, pre-reflection, or deliberative choice is sufficient, and thus excites and extends the spirit. This also, if it should happen to be requisite sends forth rays through the eyes. But these dart forth to the sensible object, and sense being again lent back through the eyes, announces what it sees to the spirit, and from thence to opinion; and thus the reflexion or bending back, is not accurately a circle, but by running in a right line, from the goal to the barrier, and from the barrier to the goal, it imitates a circle. The whole of this likewise, is an erect circle. But when it announces any thing in a distorted manner, it is said to sustain all various fractures. This circle also, (in partial souls,) has a downward-drawing, and generative power. But in divine souls, it providentially attends to secondary natures.

We may likewise make the following division, and call the intellect of the soul, the charioteer; but the circle of *the same*, and the better horse, the diabolic part of the soul; and the circle of *the different*, and the less excellent horse, the doxastic part. But it must be observed, that diabolos participates of difference, and opinion of sameness. For every part which you may assume of the soul participates of both these. And if we survey indeed the horses and the charioteer, according to that which is highest in the soul, the supreme union of the soul with intelligibles and the Gods, will be the charioteer. But the better horse

will be that power of the soul, which always aspires after intelligibles. And the inferior horse, will be that power, which comes into contact with intelligibles, accompanied with division and transition. And these things indeed will take place, if you survey the charioteer and the horses, in the divine soul alone. But if you survey them in the doxastic soul, then diabolos must be assumed as the charioteer; the power of the doxastic part, which always desires to be co-arranged with diabolos, must be considered as the better of the two horses; and that power of it which aspires after generation, and the government of secondary natures, as the less excellent horse. It is possible also, by assuming the charioteer according to both diabolos and opinion conjoined, to arrange the better horse, as corresponding to the diabolic power alone, but the inferior horse, as analogous to the doxastic power. For it must be observed, that when the soul gives itself up to more excellent natures, then opinion resigns the whole of itself to diabolos, and wishes to pertain to it alone; though when it becomes weary, it wishes to energize by itself. And these things indeed, viz. the horses and the charioteer, we may survey in the rational soul alone.

Since however the soul descends so as to have the irrational nature woven together with it, and each of the horses resists, in being thus connected with the irrational form of the soul, we must not omit to consider these also when in this condition. For the soul possessed the former, according to the eternal progression of itself from the Demiurgos alone. But those of which I am now going to speak, the soul receives from the junior Gods, and from the connexion with the mortal form of life. The charioteer therefore, will here subsist according to opinion; but the better of the two horses will be anger; and the inferior horse will be desire. Hence, when opinion is in an erect condition, it produces the middle,<sup>2</sup> and rightly opinion man, and a middle charioteer. But when opinion is distorted, it produces the distorted man, and resembles a charioteer hurried along at the will of the horses. The doxastic horses, and charioteer therefore, when properly disciplined, produce for us the highest political man; but the diabolic horses and charioteer, the contemplative, or theoretic man. These horses however, and the charioteer, are changed, according to the spheres and the elements, and according to every form of life. For in the solar sphere, they are solar, in the sphere of Jupiter, they are Jovian, in the sphere of Mars, Martial; and in short, they are always established according to the peculiarity of the God [about which they are arranged]. And if indeed, they are established according to the divine form, they are divine; if according to the angelic, they are angelical; if according to the daemonical form of life, they are daemonical; but if according to the heroncal form, they are heron; and in a similar manner in all the other forms of life.

But what are we to understand by the word *μεσσηπος*?<sup>3</sup> And in the first place, let us see what a wing signifies. The wing of the soul therefore, is her anagogic power, which is especially seen according to the better of

<sup>1</sup> For the soul is eternal according to essence, but temporal according to energy. Hence according to the former it is immovable, but is movable according to the latter.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. Man of a middle class of excellence.

<sup>3</sup> This word means literally sub-winged.

the two horses. We denominate this horse therefore, a wheel, or rather the circle of the same, because it is a lover of the beautiful, aspires after intelligibles, and never resists the charioteer, but acts rightly, and also errs in conjunction with it. But the other horse, which is the downward-drawing and gesticulating power of the soul, gravitates to earth, and resists the charioteer. All souls therefore have wings: for all of them have all powers, and this is also the case with the charioteer and the horses. But in divine souls indeed, the wings are always unnumbered; and hence they are said to be winged, (*εὐρυπτερον*) but not sub-winged (*υποπτερον*). On the contrary, in our souls which are human, the wings are not always expanded, but are sometimes closed and sluggish. For we possess the power of them (since we never lose our powers); but we have not always the energy of them. Hence to us the term *sub-winged* is more adapted, in consequence of possessing the power, but not entirely the energy of wings. But to the Gods, the term *winged* is adapted, as having in efficacy, both powers and energies. Hence afterwards, he says of our soul, that *formerly it was winged*. Wishing therefore to assert that which is common both to divine souls and ours, he uses the word *sub-winged*. For all souls have an anagogic power, though some have it always, but others sometimes only in energy. Or it may be said that the term *sub-winged* is properly asserted, both of divine souls, and ours. Of divine souls indeed, because in them, the wings are about their lowest powers, and which are nearest to the earth; their energies being always established in intelligibles. But the whole of the term *sub-winged*, is adapted to our souls, because the *winged* is not properly true, when applied to them, except at certain times.

P. 53. *Platonic poetry into the divinely-inspired, and the artificial.*

As Proclus by divinely inspired poetry, signifies that which Plato in the *Phaedrus* calls the progeny of poetic mania, and as the enthusiastic energy is frequently mentioned in these Commentaries, the following account of enthusiasm, and the different kinds of mania mentioned by Plato in the *Phaedrus*, is added for the sake of the Platonic English reader, from the *Schoola of Hermias* on that Dialogue.

"Since Plato here delivers four kinds of mania, by which I mean enthusiasm, and possession or inspiration from the Gods, viz. the musical, the telestic, the prophetic, and the amatory, previous to the discussion of each, we must first speak about enthusiasm, and show to what part of the soul the enthusiastic energy pertains; whether each part of it possesses this energy; if all enthusiasm is from the Gods; and in what part of the soul it is generated; or whether it subsists in something else more excellent than soul. Where then, does that which is properly and primarily called enthusiasm subsist, and what is it? Of the rational soul, there are two parts, one of which is *dianoia*, but the other *opinion*. Again however, of *dianoia*, one part is said to be the lowest, and is properly *dianoia*, but another part of it is the highest, which is said to be

the intellect of it, according to which the soul especially becomes intellectual, and which some call intellect incapacity. There is also another thing above this, which is the summit of the whole soul, and must allied to the *one*, which likewise wishes well to all things, and always gives itself up to the Gods, and is readily disposed to do whatever they please. This too, is said to be the *one* of the soul, bears the image of the super-essential *one*, and unites the whole soul. But that these things necessarily thus subsist, we may learn as follows. The rational soul derives its existence from all the causes prior to itself, i. e. from intellect and the Gods. But it subsists also from itself: for it perfects itself. So far therefore, as it subsists from the Gods, it possesses the *one*, which unites all its powers, and all the multitude of itself, and conjoins them to the *one itself*, and is the first recipient of the goods imparted by the Gods. It likewise makes all the essence of the soul to be uniform, according to which it is connected with the Gods, and united to them. But so far as it subsists from intellect, it possesses an intellectual nature, according to which it apprehends forms, by simple perceptions, or intuitions, and not discursively; and is conjoined to the intellect which is above itself. And so far as it constitutes itself, it possesses the *diagnostic* power, according to which it generates sciences, and certain theorems, energizes discursively, and collects conclusions from propositions. For that it constitutes or gives subsistence to itself, is evident from its imparting perfection to itself, since that which radiates itself to perfection, and imparts to itself well-being, will much more impart to itself existence. For well-being is a greater thing than being. If therefore, the soul imparts that which is greater to itself, it will much more impart that which is less. Hence that which is primarily, properly, and truly enthusiasm from the Gods, is elicited according to this one of the soul, which is above *dianoia*, and above the intellect of the soul: which one is at another time in a relaxed and dormant state. This one likewise, becoming illuminated [by the Gods,] all the line of the soul is illuminated, and also intellect, *dianoia*, and the irrational part, and the resemblance of enthusiasm is transmitted, as far as to the body itself.

"Other enthusiasms therefore, are produced about other parts of the soul, certain *demons* exciting them,<sup>1</sup> or the Gods also, though not without the intervention of *demons*. For *dianoia* is said to energize enthusiastically, when it discovers sciences and theorems in a very short space of time, and in a greater degree than other men. Opinion likewise, and the phantasy are said thus to energize, when they discover arts, and accomplish admirable works, such for instance as *Phidias* effected in the formation of statues, and another in another art, as also *Homer* says<sup>2</sup> of him who made the belt of *Hercules*, 'that he neither did, nor would artificially produce such another.' Anger likewise, is said to energize enthusiastically, when in battle it energizes supernaturally.

Like Mars, when brandishing his spear, he rag'd.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> By an unaccountable mistake here *του δαιμονος* is inserted instead of *της ψυχης*; but the mistake is not noticed by the German editor of these *Schoola*.

<sup>2</sup> And in consequence of this mistake, for *αυτο* in this place, we must read *αυτα*.

<sup>3</sup> *Odyssey*, XI. v. 612.

<sup>4</sup> *Iliad*, XV. v. 605.

But if some one yielding to desire, should eat of that which reason forbids, and through this should unexpectedly become well, you may say that desire also in this instance, energized enthusiastically, though obscurely; so that enthusiasm is likewise produced about the other parts of the soul. Enthusiasm however, properly so called, is when this one of the soul which is above intellect, is excited to the Gods, and is from thence inspired. But at different times, it is possessed about the aptitudes of itself, by different Gods; and is more or less possessed, when intellect or dianoia is that which is moved. As therefore, when we inquire what philosophy is, we do not always accurately define it, but frequently, from an improper use of the word, call mathematics, or physics, philosophy, and science; we do the like also with respect to enthusiasm. For though it should be the phantasy which is excited, we are accustomed to call the excitation enthusiasm. Moreover, those who ascribe enthusiasm to the temperatures of bodies, or the excellent temperament of the air, or the ascendancy of exhalations, or the aptitudes of times and places, or the agency of the bodies that revolve in the heavens, speak rather of the co-operating and material causes of the thing, than of the causes of it properly so called. You have therefore, for the producing cause of enthusiasm, the Gods; for the material cause, the enthusiastically-energizing soul itself, or the external symbols; for the formal cause, the inspiration of the Gods about the one of the soul, and for the final cause, good.

"If however, the Gods always wish the soul what is good, why does not the soul always energize enthusiastically? May we not say, that the Gods indeed always wish the soul what is good, but they are also willing that the order of the universe should prevail, and that the soul through many causes, is not adapted to enthusiasm, on which account, it does not always enthusiastically energize. But some say that the telestic art extends as far as to the sublunary region. If therefore, they mean, that no one of the superlunary, and celestial natures, energizes on the sublunary region, they evidently assert what is absurd. But if they mean that the telestic, or mystic operators, are not able to energize above the lunar sphere, we say, that if all the allotments of souls are sublunary, their assertion will be true; but if there are also allotments of souls above the moon, as there are, (for some are the attendants of the sun, others of the moon, and others of Saturn, since the Demingus disseminated some of them into the earth, others into the moon, and others elsewhere,)—thus being the case, it will be possible for the soul to energize above the moon. For what the whole order of things imparts to the soul, for a very extended period of time, this the soul is also able to impart to itself for a short space of time, when assisted by the Gods through the telestic art. For the soul can never energize above its own allotment, but can energize to the extent of it. Thus, for instance, if the allotment of the soul was as far as to philosophy, the soul would be able, though it should not choose a philosophic but some other life, to energize in that life somewhat philosophically. There are also said to be certain supermundane souls. And thus we have shown how the soul energizes enthusiastically.

"But how are statues said to have an enthusiastic

energy? May we not say that a statue being inanimate, does not itself energize about divinity, but the telestic art purifying the matter of which the statue consists, and placing round it certain characters and symbols, in the first place renders it, through these means, animated and causes it to receive a certain life from the world; and in the next place, after this, it prepares the statue to be illuminated by a divine nature, through which it always delivers oracles, as long as it is properly adapted. For the statue when it has been rendered perfect by the telestic art, remains afterwards (endued with a prophetic power,) till it becomes entirely unadapted to divine illumination; but he who receives the inspiring influence of the Gods, receives it only at certain times, and not always. But the cause of this is, that the soul when filled with deity, energizes about it. Hence, in consequence of energizing above its own power, it becomes weary. For it would be a God, and similar to the souls of the stars, if it did not become weary. But the statue, conformably to its participations, remains illuminated. Hence the inaptitude of it entirely proceeds into privation, unless it is again de novo perfected and animated by the mystic operator. We have sufficiently shown therefore, that enthusiasm properly so called, is effected about the one of the soul, and that it is an illumination of divinity.

"In the next place, let us discuss the order, and the use of the four manias, and show why the philosopher makes mention of these alone. Is it because there are no other than these, or because these were sufficient for his purpose? That there are therefore, many other divine inspirations, and manias, Plato himself indicates as he proceeds, and prior to this, he makes mention of the inspiration from the Nymphs. But there are also inspirations from Pan, from the mother of the Gods, and from the Corymbantes, which are elsewhere mentioned by Plato. Here however, he alone delivers these four manias; in the first place, because these alone are sufficient to the soul, in the attainment of its proper apocatastasis, as we shall afterwards show; and in the next place, because he delivers the proximate steps of ascent to the soul. For the gifts of the Gods to all beings, are many and incomprehensible. But now he delivers to us the energies of the Gods which are extended to souls. He delivers however, these four manias, not as if one of them was not sufficient, and especially the amatory, to lead back the soul to its pristine felicity; but at present the series, and regular gradation of them, and the orderly perfection of the soul, are unfolded. As therefore, it is possible for the tyrannic life when suddenly changed, to become aristocratic, through employing strenuous promptitude, and a divine allotment, but the gradual ascent, is from a tyrannic to a democratic, and from this to an oligarchic life, afterwards to a timocratic, and at last to an aristocratic life, but the descent and lapse, are vice versa;—thus also here, the soul being about to ascend, and be restored to its former felicity, is in the first place, possessed with the musical mania, afterwards with the telestic, then with the prophetic, and in the last place, with the amatory mania. These inspirations however, conspire with, and are in want of each other; so abundant is their communion. For the telestic requires the prophetic mania; since the latter<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For μουσική here, it is necessary to read μαντική.

<sup>2</sup> And for μαντική, read μαντική.

interprets many things pertaining to the former. And again, the prophetic requires the telestic mania. For the telestic mania perfects and establishes oracular predictions. Farther still, the prophetic uses the poetic and musical mania. For prophets, as I may say, always speak in verse. And again, the musical uses the prophetic mania spontaneously, as Plato says. But what occasion is there to speak about the amatory, and musical manias; for nearly the same persons exercise both these, as for instance, Sappho, Anacreon, and the like, in consequence of these not being able to subsist without each other. But it is very evident that the amatory mania contributes to all these, since it is subservient to enthusiasm of every kind; for no enthusiasm can be effected without amatory inspiration. And you may see how Orpheus appears to have applied himself to all these, as being in want of, and adhering to each other. For we learn that he was most telestic, and most prophetic, and was excited by Apollo; and besides this, that he was most poetic, on which account, he is said to have been the son of Calliope. He was likewise most amatory, as he himself acknowledges to Musæus, extending to him divine goods, and rendering him perfect. Hence he appears to have been possessed with all the manias, and this by a necessary consequence. For there is an abundant union, conspiration, and alliance with each other, of the Gods who preside over these manias, viz. of the Muses, Bacchus, Apollo, and Love.

"It remains therefore, that we should unfold the nature of each of the manias, previously observing, that those which are internal, and originate from the soul itself, and give perfection to it, are of one kind; but the external energies of them, and which preserve the outward man, and our nature, are of another. The four external however, are analogous to the four internal manias. Let us consider therefore, in the first place, the internal, and which alone originate from the soul itself, and let us see what they effect in the soul. In order likewise, that this may become manifest, and also their arrangement, let us survey them on high, the descent, as Plato says, and debasement of the wings of the soul. From the beginning therefore, and at first, the soul was united to the Gods, and its unity to their one. But afterwards, the soul departing from this divine union, descended into intellect, and no longer possessed real beings internally, and in one, but apprehended and surveyed them, by simple projections, and as it were, contacts of its intellect. In the next place, departing from intellect, and descending into reasoning and dialectic, it no longer apprehended real beings by simple intuitions, but syllogistically, and transitively, proceeding from one thing to another, from propositions to conclusions. Afterwards, abandoning true reasoning, and the dissolving peculiarity, it descended into generation, and became filled with much irrationality and perturbation. It is necessary therefore, that it should recur to its proper principles, and again return to the place from whence it came. To this ascent and apocatastasis however, these four manias contribute. And the musical mania indeed, leads to symphony and harmony, the agitated and disturbed nature of the parts of the soul, which were hurried away to indistinctness and magnitudo, and were filled with abundant tumult. But the telestic mania causes the soul to be perfect and entire, and

prepares it to energize intellectually. For the musical mania alone harmonizes and represses the parts of the soul; but the telestic causes the whole of it to energize, and prepares it to become entire, so that the intellectual part of it may energize. For the soul by descending into the realms of generation, resembles a thing broken and relaxed. And the circle of the same, or the intellectual part of it is fettered; but the circle of the different, or the doxastic part, sustains many fractures and turnings. Hence, the soul energizes partially, and not according to the whole of itself. The Dionysiac inspiration therefore, after the parts of the soul are co-harmonized, renders it perfect, and causes it to energize according to the whole of itself, and to live intellectually. But the Apolloniac mania converts and co-excites all the multiplied powers, and the whole of the soul to the one of it. Hence Apollo is denominated, as elevating the soul from multitude, to the one. And the remaining mania, the amatory, receiving the soul united, conjoins this one of the soul to the Gods, and to intelligible beauty. As the gifts therefore of these manias are transcendently united, and are in each other, the gifts also on this account participate of, and communicate with, each other, and the recipient, which is the soul, possesses an adaptation to all the gifts. This therefore is the order, and these are the energies and powers within the soul itself, of these four manias.

"But let us also consider their external energies on man, and what they outwardly effect about us. The musical mania therefore, causes us to speak in verse, and to act and be moved rhythmically, and to sing in metre, the splendid deeds of divine men, and their virtues and pursuits; and through these, to discipline our life, in the same manner as the inward manias co-harmonize our soul. But the telestic mania, expelling every thing foreign, contaminating, and noxious, preserves our life perfect, and innoxious, and banishing an insane and diabolical phantasy, causes us to be sane, entire and perfect, just as the internal telestic mania, makes the soul to be perfect and entire. Again, the prophetic mania contracts into one, the extension and infinity of time, and sees as in one present now all things, the past, the future, and the existing time. Hence, it predicts what will be, which it sees as present to itself. It causes us therefore, to pass through life in an irreprehensible manner; just as the internal prophetic mania contracts and elevates all the multiplied, and many powers and lives of the soul, to the one, in order that it may in a greater degree be preserved and connected. But the amatory mania converts young persons to us, and causes them to become our friends, being instructive of youth, and leading them from sensible beauty, to our psychical beauty, and from this sending them to intelligible beauty; in the same manner as the internal amatory mania conjoins the one of the soul to the Gods.

"All the above-mentioned manias therefore, are superior to the prudent and temperate energies of the soul. Nevertheless, there is a mania which is co-ordinate with temperance, and which we say, has in a certain respect a prerogative above it. For certain inspirations are produced, according to the middle, and also according to the doxastic reasons of the soul, conformably to which artists effect certain things, and discover theorems beyond expectation, as Asclepius, for

<sup>1</sup> For *uno* here, it is necessary to read *unus*.

instance, in medicine, and Hercules in the practical life."

Afterwards, in commenting on what Plato says of the manna from the Muses, viz. "that it adorns the minute deeds of the ancients," Hermes observes, "that the inward energy in the soul of the poetic mania, by applying itself to superior and intelligible natures, imparts to subordinate natures harmony and order; but that the external divinely inspired poetry celebrates the deeds of the ancients, and instructs both its contemporaries and posterity, extending its energies every where." But Plato says, "that he who without the divinely-inspired mania of the Muses, expects to become a divine poet, will by this fancying, become himself imperfect; and his poetry will be vanquished and concealed by the poetry which is the progeny of mania." Hermes adds, "For what similitude is there between the poetry of Chirillus and Callimachus, and that of Homer and Pindar? For the divinely-inspired poets, as being filled from the Muses, always invoke them, and extend to them all that they say." For a fuller, and most admirable account of the poetic mania, and of the different species of poetry by Proclus, see the Notes on the 10th book of the Republic, in my translation of Plato, and also the Introduction to my translation of the Rhetoric, Poetic and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.

From what is here said by Hermes about enthusiasm, the intelligent reader will easily see that none of the Roman poets whose works have been transmitted to us, possessed that which is primarily, properly, and truly enthusiasm, or that highest species of it, in which the one of the soul is illuminated by a divine nature, and through transcendent similitude, is united to it. As to Virgil, indeed, the prince of these poets, though he invokes the Muse in the beginning of the *Æneid*, yet his invocation of her is but a partial and secondary thing. For he only calls on her to unfold to him the causes that moved a man of such remarkable piety as *Æneas*, in so many misfortunes;

Musa, multi causas memora, &c.  
and confiding in his own genius, he begins his poem without soliciting supernatural inspiration,

Arma, virumque cano, &c.

To which may be added that this placing himself before the Muse, resembles the *exo et meus rex* of Wolsey. On the contrary, divinely-inspired poets, as Hermes well observes, knock, as it were, at the gates of the Muses, and thus being filled from thence exclaim,

Εσσητε νυν μοι Μοῦσαι—

And,

Μῆτις αἰεὶ θεα—

And,

Αἰδρα μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα—

For being always extended to them, they dispose the

whole of what they afterwards say, as derived from their inspiring influence. With an arrogance, too, peculiar to the Romans, who as a certain Greek poet says, "were a people

"Beyond measure proud,"

he associates himself, in his 4th Eclogue, with the Muses, as their equal;

Siculus Musa, paulo majora canamus:

which reminds me of what Suetonius relates of Caligula, that he would place himself between the statues of Castor and Pollux, and confer privately with Jupiter Capitolinus, fancying that he was intimate with, and of equal dignity with these divinities. And as to the poets that have lived since the fall of the Roman empire, it would be ridiculous to suppose that they possessed this highest enthusiasm, as they did not believe in the existence of the sources from whence it is alone genuinely derived.

Plot. *As therefore, Jupiter in Homer, sends the Gods, who prebide over the mundane contrivance, to the Grecian war.*—

The following is the useful explanation of the recollective meaning of the Trojan war in Homer, is given by Hermes in his Scholia on the Phædrus of Plato:

"By then we must understand the generated and material place, which is so denominated from *mind* and *matter* (*νοῦς καὶ τὴν ὕλην*), and in which there are war and sedition. But the Trojans are material forms, and all the lives which subsist about bodies. Hence also the Trojans are called *genuine* (*ἀγνοῦντες*). For all the lives which subsist about bodies and irrational souls, are favourable and attentive to their proper matter. On the contrary, the Greeks are rational souls, coming from Greece, i. e. from the intelligible into matter. Hence the Greeks are called *foreigners* (*ἐπείροδες*), and vanquish the Trojans, as being of a superior order. But they fight with each other about the image of Helen, as the poet says [about the image of *Æneas*];

Around the phantom, Greeks and Trojans fight.\*  
*Helen* signifying intelligible beauty, being a certain *τὴν εὐχρηστικὴν τὴν οὐσαν*, attracting to itself intellect. An efflux therefore, of this intelligible beauty is imparted to matter through Venus; and about this efflux of beauty the Greeks fight with the Trojans [i. e. rational with irrational lives]. And those indeed, that oppose and vanquish matter, return to the intelligible, which is their true country; but those who do not, as is the case with the multitude, are bound to matter. As therefore, the prophet in the 10th book of the Republic, previously to the descent of souls, announces to them how they may return [to their pristine felicity], according to periods of a thousand and ten thousand years; thus also Calchas predicts to the Greeks their return in ten years, the number ten being a symbol of a perfect period. And as in the lives of souls, some are elevated through philosophy, others through the amatory art,

\* The German editor of these Scholia, instead of *πρᾶκτον*, which is the true reading in this place, and which he found in the Manuscript, absurdly substitutes for it *πυρρῶν*, as if Hercules was a pugilist. See my translation of the Dissertation of Maximus Tyrinus, On the Practical and Theoretic Life.

\* Vid. Olympiodor. in Aristot. Meteor.

\* For *ἀναλογίαν ψυχῶν* here, it is necessary to read *ἀναλογίαν ψυχῶν*.

\* Iliad. V. v. 451.

\* Conformably to this, Proclus in the fragments of his Commentaries, On the Republic of Plato says, "that all the beauty subsisting about generation from the fabrication of things, is signified by Helen; about which there is a perpetual battle of souls, till the more intellectual having vanquished the more irrational forms of life, return to the place from whence they originally came." For the beauty which is in the realms of generation, is an efflux of intelligible beauty.

and others through the royal and warlike disciplines; so with respect to the Greeks, some act with rectitude through prudence, but others through war or love, and their return is different [according to their different pursuits]."

P. 151. *The Plutonic hypotheses about the earth.*

See more on this interesting subject in the notes to my translation of the *Phædo* and *Gorgias* of Plato.

P. 175. *It is requisite that we should know something manifest concerning prayer.*

See an additional treasury of divinely luminous conceptions on this subject, from Iamblichus, Hierocles and Simplicius, in the notes to my translation of the *Second Alcibiades* of Plato; which, if the reader has not my *Plato* in his possession, he may also find in the *Additional Notes* to my translation of *Maximus Tyrus*, and in the *New Monthly Magazine*.

P. 292. *The essence which is without figure, &c. and the plain of truth.*

Proclus alludes here to the following passage in the *Phædo* of Plato: "The supercelestial place has not yet been celebrated by any of our poets, nor will it ever be praised according to its dignity and worth. It subsists however, in the following manner; for we should dare to affirm the truth, especially when speaking concerning the truth without colour, without figure, and without contact, subsisting as true essence, it alone uses contemplative intellect, the governor of the soul, about which essence the genius of true science resides." On these words Hierocles thus comments:

"Why does Plato say that no one of the poets prior to him have, or of those that may follow him, will celebrate the supercelestial place, according to its dignity and worth? For he was not so arrogant as to think, that he alone had deservedly praised it. But what is here asserted is a thing of the following kind: It we understand by poets those who are the third from the truth [according to what Plato says in the 10th book of the *Republic*], i. e. the multitude of merely human poets [for poets that are not divinely-inspired], so as to make Homer and Orpheus an exception to these; for these, and also Hesiod and Musæus, have spoken concerning this place, the truth of what is asserted will be evident. For no one among the multitude of such like poets and artists, has celebrated this place as it deserves; but this has been accomplished by divinely-inspired poets alone, such as Homer and Orpheus. But in what is here asserted, we are to understand all poets, so as to comprehend Homer likewise and Orpheus; it is evident that Plato must also include himself, as neither being himself able to praise of this place in a manner suitable to its dignity. It is not, therefore, as if he had said, No human poet has deservedly praised the supercelestial place; but this has been alone effected by Apollo and the choir of the Muses.

But how having said, that no one has celebrated the supercelestial place according to its desert, does he now say, "We should dare to affirm the truth?" Is it that the truth must be asserted, as subsisting in human conceptions? For it is possible to speak the truth, yet

not adequately. Thus he who says, that Socrates was not a bad man, nor impious, says indeed what is true, yet not what Socrates deserves to have said of him, as he does, who asserts that he was a good man, that he possessed scientific knowledge, was wise in divine concerns, and was dear to divinity. For he who says these things, praises Socrates in a way adequate to his desert. Plato therefore, says a thing of this kind, respecting the supercelestial place. But the words, "Especially when speaking concerning the truth," are asserted very aptly and theologically. For by *truth* here, he signifies the whole order of the Nights; and the *plain of Truth*, which he afterwards speaks of, obviously indicates these. Theologists likewise peculiarly establish *Truth* in that place. For Orpheus speaking about Night says, "that she possesses the truth of the Gods," and

To her, prediction wholly true was given.

She is also said to prophecy to the Gods. Homer too, indicates concerning this Goddess. For speaking about Jupiter, Sleep says,

Night, the great timer both of Gods and men,  
To whom I fled, preserved me from his wrath;  
For he swift Night was fearful to offend.

But Plato says, he shall dare to speak concerning it, because he is going to assert something affirmatively about it. The *truth* however, is, lest we should be led to something, inappropriate and vile, in such like doctrinal concerns. He is also concordant in what he says about the supercelestial place, with what he asserts [the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, about the first principle of things. For he there indicates this principle by negation; except, that he absolutely denies all things of the first principle; but of the supercelestial place, he denies some things, and affirms others. For the Goddess Night is superior to certain orders, but inferior to others; and is the first principle of things is superessentially, so Night is supercelestial [i. e. is above that intellectual order which is denominated Heaven]. Why, however, are souls not said to see Heaven, but to become situated in, and be conjoined with it; but are not conjoined with the natures above Heaven, but perceive them only? In answer to this, it may be said, that it is necessary contact should exist, as far as to a certain thing. Why therefore, as far as to this? Because neither are the Gods under Jupiter, said to be united to Phæbus, but this is alone asserted of Jupiter, and he is said to be united through Night as a medium.

But how does Plato say, that the supercelestial place is without colour? Is it in the same manner as we say, that nature and soul are colourless? But what is there admirable in asserting this? And if we admit this, what will there be transcendent in the supercelestial place, since the same thing is possessed both by nature and soul? May we not say, that Plato, in what is here asserted, very much follows the before-mentioned theologians, and disposes what he says, conformably to them? For after the order of Nights, there are three orders of Gods, viz. of Heaven, the Cyclopes, and the Centiman [for Gods with a hundred hands], the proper

<sup>1</sup> In the original in this place, *οὐδὲν* is omitted.

<sup>2</sup> *Iliad*, xiv. v. 259, &c.

<sup>3</sup> The Chaldean Oracles call the intelligible Gods *noyft*, and Night subsists at the summit of the order of Gods, which is both intelligible, and intellectual, and is therefore absorbed in the intelligible. Hence Homer divinely denominates Night, *noyft*.

<sup>4</sup> For *noyft* here, it is necessary to read *νύξ*, and to make the sentence interrogatory.



names of whom, Plato denies of the supercelestial place. For of the Gods which abide within Phænes, Heaven is the first that becomes visible from him; for Heaven and Earth first proceeded out of Phænes; and Heaven is first illuminated by the divine light of Phænes; since Orpheus says that Night is united to him.

No eye but that of sacred Night alone,  
Beheld Progenitors: O'er all the rest  
Were lost in wonder at th' unhop'd-for light,  
Which glitter'd from th' immortal Phænes' skin.

But that which is visible and illuminated, is coloured, since colours are certain illuminations. Hence Night and all the supercelestial place, being above Heaven which is visible, they are very properly said to be without colour. For night also is opposed to day, because the latter is illuminated and coloured. And through the privation of colour indeed, Plato manifests that the place of the Nights is above the kingdom of the Heaven; but through the *production of figures*, that it is above the order of the Cyclops. For theology says, that figure is first unfolded into light in these, and that the divinities, the Cyclops, are the first principles and causes of the figures which subsist every where. Hence theology says, that they are *manual artificers*. For this triad<sup>1</sup> is perfective of figures.

And in their forehead, one round eye was fix'd,<sup>2</sup>  
In the Parmenides likewise, Plato when he speaks of the straight, the circular, and that which is mixed<sup>3</sup> [from both these], obscurely indicates this order. But these Cyclops, as being the first causes of figures, taught Minerva and Vulcan the various species of figures.

These the first manu Artists were, who taught  
Phyllis and Vulcan all things.  
[says Orpheus]. We must not therefore wonder, on hearing that Vulcan and Minerva are the causes of figures. For Vulcan is the cause of corporeal figures, and of every mundane figure; but Minerva, of the psychical and intellectual figure; and the Cyclops of divine, and thence every where existing figure. Hence it is evident, that the supercelestial place is above the order of the Cyclops.

But by the *production of contact*, Plato manifests that this place is above the *Centiman*: for these first come into contact, as it were, with all the fabrication of things. Hence theology denominates them *hundred-handed*: for through the hands we touch, make, and distinguish all things. Farther still, the touch pervades through the whole body. Theology therefore symbolically calls these *hundred-handed*, as touching all the fabrication of things, and being the causes of it. The triad<sup>4</sup>, however, of the Centiman, is of a guardian nature. But Plato adduces negatively, what he found celebrated affirmatively by the theologist. For what Orpheus calls *Night*, that Plato denominates *without colour*. And what the former says negatively, is *without falsehood*.

Prediction without falsehood, was to Night  
Of all things given. [says Orpheus.]

That the latter celebrates, as having about it the *genus of true science*, and as being *truly existing essence*. Plato also having celebrated the supercelestial place by three negations, again adduces three affirmations, introducing three of them from being. For since this order is a triadic one, Plato very properly preserves the triad, both in the negative and affirmative conclusions. Or it may be said, that since it is both one and being, and is triadic according to each of these, he indicates the negative conclusions according to the superessential one, but the affirmative according to being. Here, likewise the first number is unfolded into light.

According to Hermias, the *Governor of the soul* signifies the *eye of the soul*, which he informs us, was also the opinion of Iamblichus; but I prefer the explanation of it given by Proclus, in these Commentaries, viz. that it is a partial intellect of the Mineral series.

In the next place, Hermias enumerates the different kinds of truth as follows: "Superior illuminate subordinate natures with the light of truth. We must extend the eye of intellect therefore to these four; viz. the one, which is the first principle of things; Phænes, who is the boundary of the intelligible; but the exempt principle of the intellectual Gods; (for the Nights are principles with which principle is co-ordinate) Jupiter, who is the king of the supermundane, but the boundary of what are properly called the intellectual Gods; and the Sun, who is the king of sensible natures. But each of these illuminates the beings that are under it, with the truth, which it possesses from an order placed above that which it illuminates. Thus, the Sun imparts supermundane light to sensibles; and hence the essence of it is said to be from supermundane natures. Again, Jupiter illuminates supermundane essences with intellectual light; Phænes illuminates the intellectual Gods with intelligible light; and the principle of all things is the intelligible Gods and all things, with the divine light proceeding from himself."<sup>5</sup>

Vol. 2. p. 116. So *rules say in the Phædrus that souls are carried round in a circle*.

This is well explained by Hermias in his *Schoola* on the *Phædrus*, as follows:

"Heaven [i.e. the middle of that order of Gods which is called intelligible and at the same time intellectual] and the celestial intelligence, convolves all these souls, who are at rest according to their proper energies. It also causes them to apply themselves to the intelligibles which are above Heaven, and to energize intellectually according to celestial intelligence. But the natures beyond Heaven are the Nights, which Plato calls the supercelestial place."

Vol. 2. p. 197. Time therefore, is a certain proceeding intellect, &c.

For much additional and most important information concerning Time, see the Notes at the end of my translation of Aristotle's *Physics*.

P. 397. The *Demurgus* was nurtured by *Adrastea*.  
"Adrastea (says Hermias in his *Schoola* on the *Phædrus*) is a divinity seated in the vestibules of Night,

<sup>1</sup> The triad of the Cyclops consists of Brontes, Steropes, and Arges. <sup>2</sup> Hesiod Theog. v. 145.

<sup>3</sup> The words *καὶ τὸ μίχρον* are omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted, as will be evident from a perusal of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides.

<sup>4</sup> This triad consists of Cottus, Gyges, and Briareus.

<sup>5</sup> For *εὖ* here, it is obviously necessary to read *εὖ*.

<sup>6</sup> Instead of *αὐτὴν* in this place, it is requisite to read *αὐτὴν* *αὐτὴν*.

and is the offspring of Melissus and Amalthea. Melissus therefore, is to be assumed as a power providentially attending to secondary natures; but Amalthea must be considered according to the unchanging, and the unblemished. Hence Adræsta was generated from unchanging Providence, and she is the sister of Ida.

The beautiful Ida, and Adræsta sprung  
From the same sire.

This Goddess therefore, uniquely comprehends and contains in herself at once, the centres of all laws, viz. of the mundane, and the supermundane, of those of Fate, and those of Jupiter; for there are Jovian and Saturnian, divine, supermundane, and mundane laws. On this account she is called Adræsta, because her legislative decrees are inevitable. Hence, she is said to be seated with brazen drums in her hands, before the cave of Night, and through the sound produced by her cymbals, to render all things obedient to her laws. For Planes indeed is seated within the cave, in the adytum of Night; but Night sits in the middle of the cave, prophesying to the Gods; and Adræsta sits in the vestibules, legislatively promulgating the divine laws. She differs however, from the justice which is there, after the same manner as the legislative differs from the judicial characteristic. And the justice which is there, is said to be the daughter of the Law and Piety, which are there. But Adræsta herself, who is the offspring of Melissus and Amalthea, is likewise comprehensive of Law. There therefore, are said to have nurtured Jupiter in the cavern of Night; the thought directly asserting that which Plato says about Jupiter. For Plato represents him fabricating, and promulgating laws. But divine law is imparted by Adræsta to the Gods also; for the order which is in them is derived from this Goddess. It is however, likewise imparted to the attendants of the Gods, and in common to all, and peculiarly to each.\*

P. 410. *The thousand years, which Plato defines in the Phædrus.*

For the sake of more fully understanding what Proclus refers to in this place, and also for the sake of the Platonic reader, the following translation of an extract from the *Scholia of Hermes on the Phædrus* is given. The text of Plato, respecting the first descent of the soul from the intelligible world into the realms of generation, on which the extract is a comment, is as follows:

"This is the law of Adræsta, that whatever soul attending on divinity, has beheld something of reality, shall be free from damage till another period takes place; and that it at all times always able to accomplish this, she shall be perpetually free from the incursions of evil. But when through an impotency of accomplishing this, she has not perceived reality, and from some tortuous occurrence and being filled with oblivion, and depravity, she becomes heavy and drowsy, breaks her wings, and falls again on the earth, then this law prevents her in her first generation, from being implanted in some brutal nature, but commands the soul, which has seen the most, to inform the body of a philosopher, or of one desirous of beauty; of a musician, or of one devoted to love. But it orders the soul whose perceptions rank in the second class, to descend into a legitimate king, or of a man studious of empire and war. But it distributes a soul of the

third order, into a certain political character, or the ruler of a family, or the master of a trade. And again, it distributes a soul of the fourth rank, into one engaged in gymnastic exercise, or in procuring remedies, and taking care of the body. But souls of the fifth order, it distributes into a prophetic, or certain telescopic life. In the sixth, it makes a distribution into a poetic or imitative life. In the seventh, into a husbandman, or an artificer. In the eighth, into a sophist, or popular character. And in the ninth, into a tyrannic life. But in all these, he who passes his life justly, will afterwards obtain a better condition of being; but he who acts unjustly, will pass into a worse state of existence. For no soul will return to its pristine condition till the expiration of ten thousand years; since it will not recover the use of its wings before this period; except it is the soul of one who has philosophised sincerely, or together with philosophy has been a lover of youth. These indeed, in the third period of a thousand years, if they have thrice chosen this mode of life in succession, and have thus restored their wings to their natural vigour, shall in the three thousandth year, return to their pristine abode."

The *Scholia of Hermes* on this passage, are as follows:

"Whatever soul, says Plato, following its proper God, is able to perceive something of intelligibles, will remain without injury during the whole of that period, i.e. will not fall into generation. For to fall into generation, is to be injured. And you may see how accurately here, in the same manner as before, he exhibits to us the difference between divine, and human souls. For he does not merely say, *if it has seen [reality]* but, *if it has seen something [of reality]*, i.e. if it has seen what is partially and individually real. If therefore, in the beginning of the period, it has seen something of real being, it will remain uninjured till another period. For the sacred law of Adræsta antecedently comprehends the progressions of all the Gods, and of all souls, and imparts that which is adapted to each. Hence, as the reward of having seen something of reality, in the beginning of the period, it will, during the whole of that period, remain on high, and revolve in conjunction with the Gods. For its adaptation to the period will sustain it; just as here, some things live for one solar period, others for two, and others only for a day, through being adapted to a certain position of the stars. Certain demons also by their sustaining and, keep souls from falling into generation, just as we see here, bodies that are well born, though they should be badly nourished, yet at the same time, remain healthy, through their natural condition from the beginning; and though they endeavour to perform certain debilitated actions, yet are prevented by certain good demons from accomplishing them. After the same manner therefore, the soul that has once beheld something of intelligibles, is assisted and supported by good demons and heroes, so as not to fall into generation in that period. But when the soul being unable to follow the Gods, no longer perceives something of reality, Plato enumerates many causes of its lapse into generation. The first cause therefore, which he assigns of this is, its inability of following the [perpetual] attendants of the Gods. The second is, its being unable to perceive something of intelligibles. The third is, a fortuitous occurrence; and this is probably

\* There is an omission here in the original, of *ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας*.

the occurrence of certain malefic demons. For the soul departing from the Gods, meets with evil demons, who enkindle its desires of associating with generation. Hence a similar thing takes place, as when some one follows his preceptor, Socrates for instance, or some other worthy teacher; for then he becomes modest and worthy, and participates of a certain good. But if he abandons his preceptor, he meets with intemperate and impudent men, who excite him to desires contrary to modesty and worth. The fourth cause, is the entire oblivion of intelligibles, and the power of the soul which is effective of difference, and of a life conversant with generation. For from these causes, the soul becomes heavy, is filled with the potion of oblivion, and fettered with the bonds of generation, and departs from and becomes entirely forgetful of intelligibles. For this is the depravity of the soul, which causes the defluxion of her wings, and her descent to earth.

But when Plato says, "*the soul falls again on the earth*," by *earth*, he may mean, *all generation*; he may also intend to signify this earth properly so called; and he may also mean this human body, into which the soul enters, through its most abundant participation of earth. The law of Adrasta therefore grants this to the soul in her first falling from the intelligible into generation, that she shall not enter into the body of a brute, but into that of a man. For Plato calls the first generation, the descent of the soul into the realms of generation, and her giving completion to this animal frame, after her vision of the intelligible.

In the next place, it must be observed, that the nine lives which are here delivered, differ from those mentioned in the [10th book of the] Republic. For the lives which are here delivered are nine, but those in the Republic, are infinite. The latter also, are allotted conformably to the elections of the soul, but the former are distributed, according to the reward and punishment merited by the vision of intelligibles. And in the latter indeed, the transition of the soul, is from a man into a brute, and from a brute into a man; but in the former, the transition is only into man, and this into the male, and not into the female. That likewise, which is the greatest thing of all, is this, that here, the soul first proceeds from the intelligible not-generation; but in the Republic, it proceeds from one life to another. And in short, by accurately surveying, you will find many differences between the former and the latter lives. Further still, this also must be mentioned by us as necessary, that here the species or forms themselves of lives, are enumerated, but not entirely the fortunes of them, and external circumstances, such for instance as a military, or royal life; nor entirely a life which is conversant with arms, and employs a fortune of a particular kind.

It remains therefore to be investigated, whether the whole extent of life is to be divided into these nine lives, or whether a certain other division besides these, is left, which will make for us, ten or more lives. For it is possible to divide the same thing, according to different conceptions, into a greater or less number of parts. Thus in the *Philebus*, the division is into three, but in the *Republic*, into five, lives. It must be demonstrated by us however, that now the whole extent of life may be distributed into these nine lives. These four things therefore, being surveyed about man, viz. *reason, anger, desire, and nature*, the soul descending into generation, lives either according to reason alone,

yielding in nothing to the passions, nor suffering any thing from them, and in this case, she produces the first life which is the philosophic. Or she lives according to anger, reason at the same time having dominion, and she produces the second life, which is royal and military. Or she lives according to desire, again reason possessing the empire of the soul, and she makes the third life, which is political, and also pertains to the acquisition of wealth. For this life is employed in procuring necessary food for the animal and the city. Or again, the soul is conversant with nature, reason still presiding, and she produces the gymnastic and medicinal life. For this life, is converted to nature and bodies, providentially attending to, and procuring remedies for them. Since therefore, we have proceeded, as far as to the end of the progression of life according to nature, the fifth life remains, which is the telestic, and which does not possess a peculiar power. For this life is converted to the Gods, and from thence affords a certain assistance to the lives that precede it. But Plato assumes here the prophetic and telestic life, not the enthusiastic; for this is philosophic in the extreme, and scientific, and the whole of it is inspired by divinity; but he assumes this arched and medicinal life, which through sacrifices and prayers, affords a certain aid to the human race. And these indeed, are the five lives, which are effected according to right reason, and are assimilated to the energies which subsist about divinity. For each of the Gods abodes, proceeds, and returns to the principle of his progression. Here therefore, the soul either abides in reason, and produces the philosophic life; or she proceeds as far as to nature, and produces the other three lives; or she is converted to the Gods, and produces the fifth life.

Of the remaining four lives however, which are imitative, and the images of those that are prior to them, two of them, viz. the sixth and the seventh, truly imitate those that precede them, the one through words, but the other through deeds. So that the remaining four, are imitative of the prior lives; but two of them imitate truly, and the other two dissimilarly. The sixth and seventh lives also, which are truly imitative, differ in this, that the one imitates through words, the philosopher, the king, and the remaining characters, and thus disciplines men; but the seventh imitates through deeds; for such is the artificer. And the eighth and ninth dissimilarly imitate; the one again through words, but the other through deeds. But in the *poetics*, consider every imitative character included, to which also the painter belongs; these characters, as Plato says in the Republic, being the third from the truth. For the *démagogue* character, he is to be assumed who levels a thing from non-being to essence, such as the carpenter, the potter, and the shoe-maker. Among these likewise, the *husbandman* is included, so far as he pays attention to nature, in order that her germinations may be healthy and most excellent. The *sophistical* however, and *popular* characters, differ in this, that the *sophist* is a teacher of the laws and virtue; but the *popular* character exercises rhetoric among the vulgar. But we must not now assume the distorted sophistical and tyrannical lives, but those that use these powers to a good purpose, the former by deception, but the latter by force. For it is possible to use these both well and ill, as Plato also infers. And thus much concerning the nine lives.

It now remains, that we should collect by human scientific reasoning, what the nature is of the intelligibles, by the contemplation of which the soul descends into the first, second, and following lives. The soul therefore, which has surveyed the beautiful, the wise, and the good, since these beginning from the first principles, proceed as far as to the last of things, descends into the first life. Hence also it is reasonable to suppose, that the soul which has surveyed wisdom itself, will choose the philosophic life; but that the soul which has surveyed the beautiful itself, will choose a life which is studious of elegance; and this Plato divides into the musical and amatory life. For receiving beauty either through the eyes, or the ears, we obtain a reminiscence of intelligible beauty. But the resistent to all the lives is to the good. Again, the soul which has surveyed the genera of being, will choose the second life. For a king establishes all things, and is therefore analogous to *permanency*,<sup>1</sup> from which also, he is denominated βασιλεὺς, i. e. from a *basis* and *stability*, and giving firmness to things; ἀπαρτη βασιλῆος, καὶ τοῦ εὐπαιτοῦ, καὶ τοῦ βελήκεαι, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐπαγmata. He likewise moves or excites all things, by arranging and adorning every thing, through which he is analogous to *motion*. He is also the cause of friendship and union to all things through common laws, which it is the province of *wisdom* to elicit. And he divides every thing, and represses whatever is hostile and injurious; and this is the employment of *difference*. He likewise rules over all things; and on this account he is said to be warlike, and a prince. But as causing all things [in the city] to exist, may he not be said to substantiate, to *essence*, in consequence of leading each thing from non-being to existence.

Again, when the soul has surveyed the genera of being more partially, and no longer totally, or has [principally] surveyed justice itself, she produces the third life: for those who are assigned to the third life, are in a greater degree conversant with justice. The soul which has surveyed health itself, and body itself, makes the fourth life. And the soul which has beheld the elevating Gods produces the prophetic or telestic life. The remaining four lives however, have surveyed similitude itself, and dissimilitude itself; but the two first have surveyed in a greater degree similitude, and the two last dissimilitude.

Plato therefore, having spoken concerning the lives, and the genera distributed to souls descending into generation, from the intelligible prior to generation, briefly discusses in what remains, the conduct of the soul during its life in condition, conformably to what is said in the Republic; viz. that the soul which has passed through this life in a just and holy manner, shall obtain a more excellent, but the soul that has acted unjustly, a worse, condition of being. Having likewise led the soul into the realms of generation, he again elevates it to the intelligible, and says, that every soul such as the souls of the multitude, is restored to the intelligible, through ten thousand years; but that the soul of a philosopher is restored through three thousand years. Since however, he makes mention of a period of a myriad, and of three thousand years, and farther still of the period of a thousand years, from a progression from generation into generation, let us first explain the mathematical meaning of what is said, and afterwards investigate what he wishes to indicate.

He defines then, in the Republic, the measure of the life of man to be a hundred years, this number being the square of ten, which comprehends in itself all the forms of numbers. Afterward, if you multiply a hundred by ten, you will produce the cube of a thousand. This, as being tetrahedral, and adapted to earth, Plato attributes to it, and says, that the progression of the soul under the earth, i. e. its progression from generation to generation, consists of a thousand years, in order that the punishment of its offences, or the reward of its good deeds, may take place in a tenfold degree. Farther still, this also must be pre-assumed, that the soul which is about to be restored to its pristine felicity, must have chosen a philosophic life. Let there be therefore, a soul that has lived the nine lives; but it remains after these, that one life which is apocatastatic, must, as we have said, be investigated; and thus we shall have ten lives. Hence since the progression of each life under the earth, consists of a thousand years, ten times one thousand will produce a myriad of years. Since also it is necessary that the soul which is returning to its pristine felicity, should have philosophized thrice, as Plato says, again three thousand years will be produced. Perhaps too, Plato assumed this from history. For thus Hermes Trismegistus received the appellation of Trismegistus, because he had thrice philosophized on the earth, and the third time knew himself. And Pindar<sup>2</sup> says,

But they who in true virtue strong

The *Card* purgation can endure;

And keep their minds from fraudulent wrong,

And god's contagion pure;

They find the starry paths of Jove

To Saturn's blissful tower remove.

Such therefore, as I have said, is the mathematical meaning of the words. And in short, three and ten multiply the journey of a thousand years under the earth, that is, the progression from generation into generation, and make three thousand and a myriad.

What then does Plato obviously signify through these numbers? It must be said, that three thousand and a myriad, are symbols of perfection. For Plato does not mean what the mathematical signification of the words seem to indicate. For if this were the case, there would be an apocatastasis of every soul in a myriad of years, and thus this world would become destitute of souls. But this is impossible, as is also evident from what is related of Andraus in [the tenth book of] the Republic, who was many thousand years under the earth, and yet was not able to ascend from the month, though other souls ascended from it. Plato therefore, does not intend to signify a mathematical and arithmetical multitude of years, but measures of perfection, and gradations of first, middle, and last souls. For some souls make their apocatastasis more swiftly, but others more slowly, and some require but a little, but others an abundant purification. And there is a perfect number, containing the beginning, middle, and end. Ten also is a perfect number, subsisting according to another term [i. e. according to a form different from that of three], and comprehending in itself all numbers. Three likewise, is analogous to three thousand, and ten to a myriad: for each of them is a monad, and is comprehensive of all numbers. On all these accounts therefore, Plato uses three thousand and a myriad, manifesting by these numbers, that those who philosophize perfectly, make their apocatastasis to the in-

<sup>1</sup> The genera of being are, essence, permanency, motion, sameness, and difference.

<sup>2</sup> Olym. ii. v. 123, &c.

telligible in a shorter time, as requiring but little or no purification; but that the souls of the multitude make their apocatastasis in a longer time, as being in want of much punishment and purification. A thousand also manifests a certain measure of the perfection of the soul that is purified under the earth; which having obtained, it again comes into generation, and having lived well or ill on the earth, again acquires its requisite perfection under the earth. Hence, these periods do not entirely manifest so great a multitude of years, so as that souls make their apocatastasis in such a great length of time, but they symbolically signify, a certain proper measure of perfection; through which the soul receiving what is adapted to it, and obtaining its perfection, is restored to its pristine felicity.

P. 411. *The happy life, &c.*

The supreme felicity of the soul in another life, consists in the vision of intelligibles in a much more perfect manner than can be effected by it in the present life. This vision, Plato in the Phædrus, calls initiation into the most blessed of mysteries. But his all-beautiful words are translated by me as follows: "We were then however, permitted to see splendid beauty, when together with that happy choir, we obtained that blessed spectacle and vision, we indeed following with Jupiter, but others with some other God, seeing and being initiated in these mysteries, which may be lawfully called most blessed. And these divine orgies were performed by us, who were then entire, and free from the evils which awaited us in a posterior time. We also beheld with closed eyes, and were ægyptic spectators in a pure light, of simple, stable and happy luminous apparitions, being ourselves pure, and free from the impression of that with which we are now surrounded, which we denominate body, and to which we are bound, like an oyster to its shell."

All this is thus admirably explained by Hermes, "Plato, every where says, that the sovereign Sun is analogous to the first principle of things. For as here the sun is the sovereign of the whole sensible world, so is the first principle in the intelligible world. And as from the sovereign Sun light descends, which composes, connects, and unites that which is visible with that which is visible; after the same manner also, the light proceeding from the first God, and which Plato calls truth, composes intellect with the intelligible. You see therefore that beauty unites this world. For it is, as it were, a light, emitted from the fountain of intelligibles to this visible world, allying and raising up all things to itself, and uniting the lover with the object of love. Hence also, elevation [to the intelligible] is effected through it." Plato therefore, summarily says, that intelligibles are the objects to which Love elevates. For the beauty, which is here, is obscure and sensible, (just as the light which is here, is mingled with air,) and leads us to the remembrance of beauty itself.

But when he says, "We were then permitted to see splendid beauty," he means beauty itself, communicating, without any mixture of its contrary. And the happy choir, in conjunction with which we then revolved, consists of divine souls, which on account of their united subsistence, are called a choir. But he now denominates a choir, that which he before called the army of Gods and demons. It is likewise properly called by him happy. For in reality, he who surveys those forms is happy and blessed.

Again, when he says, "We indeed following with

Jupiter," it must be observed, that it is the Timæus, he represents the Demiurgus when he is making the world, disseminating souls equal in number to the stars, i. e. equal according to forms. Hence, making some of them to be Solar, others Lunar, and others Jovian, &c., he disseminated some of them into the Earth, but others into the other instruments of time. Plato therefore now says, "We indeed following with Jupiter," as knowing his proper God [i. e. the God to whose series he belonged]. For this is the felicity of the human soul, to revolve in conjunction with appropriate Gods; since it is not possible to pass beyond the Gods.

When also he says, "Being initiated," he denominates initiation (*τελετη*) from the soul being rendered by it perfect (*κατα το τελειον την ψυχη αποκτελειν*). You see therefore, that the soul was once perfect. Hence, when it is on the earth, it becomes divided, and the whole of it is not able to energize by itself. He likewise says, "Which may be lawfully called." For the vision of them is not simply most blessed; since the perceiver sees, as being different from that which is seen. It is necessary however, that union should take place. The establishment therefore in these objects of vision, is most blessed. But it is necessary to know that *telete* (*τελετη*) is one thing, *mysteria* (*μυστηρια*) another, and *epopteia* (*εποπτεια*) another. *Telete* therefore, is analogous to that which is preparatory to purifications, and the like. But *mysteria*, which is denominated from closing the eyes, is more divine. For to close the eyes, is no longer to receive those divine mysteries by sense, but to behold them with the soul itself. And *epopteia* is to be established in, and become a spectator of them. He likewise says, "These divine orgies were performed by us," because to perform orgies, and the mysteries, is called *orgazein* (*οργαζειν*).

Again, when Plato says, "Being ourselves then entire," he speaks of those divine mysteries, as a spectator; and uses the word *entire* for perfect. When also, he says, "The evils which await us in a posterior time," he signifies that the communion of the body becomes the cause of the lapse of the soul. But by the word *stable*, he indicates the firm and constant nature of intelligibles. The expressions *closed eyes*, and *ægyptic spectators*, are derived from the Eleusinian mysteries. He also says, we were spectators "in a pure light, being ourselves pure," because the splendor in the sublunary region is not pure; for it is mingled with air. But we ourselves were then pure, because it is not lawful for that which is impure to be conjoined with that which is pure. And lastly, as oysters are bound to their shell, so are we to the body.

P. 451. *Socrates in the Phædrus says, that the horses of the soul sometimes fight with each other, &c.*

For the sake of the Platonic reader, I shall give the whole of the passage in the Phædrus, to which Proclus here alludes, together with the Scholia of Hermæas on it. The passage then, is as follows:

"But with respect to other souls, such as follow divinity in the best manner, and become similar to its nature, raise the head of the charioteer into the super-celestial place; where he is born along with the circumference; but is disturbed by the course of the horses, and scarcely obtains the vision of perfect realities. Other souls however, at one time raise; and at another depress, the head of the charioteers; and through the violence of the horses, they partly see indeed, and are partly destitute of vision. And again,

other souls follow, all of them affecting the vision of this superior place; but from being unable to accomplish this design, they are carried round in a merged condition, trampling on, and attacking each other, through a contention of precedence in their course. Hence the tumult, contest, and perspiration are extreme. And here indeed, many become lame through the fault of the charioteers, many break many of their wings, and all of them involved in mighty labour, depart destitute of the perception of reality; but after their departure they use a doxastic nutriment; through which there is a great endeavor to behold where the *plain of Truth* is situated. For from a meadow of this kind, that which is best in the soul receives convenient nutriment; and from this, the nature of the wing is nourished, by which the soul is enabled to ascend."

The following are the foundations of Plato's on this passage: "Plato's winged speckles representing divine souls, and those that always exist bound by the same, now passes to our paternal and human souls, which are sometimes able to follow divinity, and sometimes abandon a divine nature. Hence, he manifests them by the indefinite word *others*, as possessing much depravity and wandering. He also divides these triply, into first, middle, and last. For he had likewise given a triadic division to the natures of a superior order. Hence, of the spectacles, he says, that some are within the Heaven, others, in the sub-celestial arch, and others, beyond the Heaven. And again, of the spectacles beyond the Heaven he says, that the truly existing, *without colour, without figure, and without contact*. Prior to this likewise, he made a division into Jupiter, and Vesta, and the ten leaders; and again into Jupiter, Gods, and demons; or again, into Jupiter, and those that always follow him, when they are willing and able.<sup>1</sup> For universally, every thing which has once proceeded from the first principle, ought to be triadic. For being perfect it will have a first, middle, and last, conformably to what the [Chaldean] Oracle says, "*The triad measuring all things*." Thus therefore, respecting our souls, he says that some of them raise the head of the charioteer, i. e. the summit of our intellect, to the super-celestial place; but that others, sometimes raise the head, and sometimes do not; and that others, are not able to raise it, but are borne downward to generation. It must also be accurately observed, how he indicates the difference between our souls and those that are divine. For in speaking of our highest felicity, and assuming the soul which is most excellently assimilated to divinity, he says, that it is scarcely able, through being disturbed by the horses, to raise the head of the charioteer to the place beyond the Heaven; to perceive something of real beings; and thus to stand on the back of the Heaven, as in a watch-tower,<sup>2</sup> surveying different objects at different times. And divine souls indeed,

are said to be carried round by the circulation of the Heaven; but our souls, to be carried round in conjunction [*συνωρμασμέναι*] [with those that are divine].

But by the *head* of the charioteer, we must understand, the highest and most intellectual part of the soul, which uniquely possesses all the intellectual power of it. Since therefore, the soul is multipotent, and the other powers of it also wish to energize, hence souls of the first rank, are very properly said to be *disturbed* by the horses. But souls of the middle rank, which have not perfectly disciplined their other powers, are not merely said to be disturbed, but to be *forced* by the horses; and hence, at one time, they energize according to their summit, and at another again, according to their more subordinate part. And souls of the third rank, are entirely vanquished by the horses; on which account, being unable to raise the head of the charioteer, they become in a merged condition. And also examples of these three characters on the earth. And let an example of a soul of the first rank be a philosopher who is at leisure<sup>3</sup> with himself, and for contemplation, but who imparts good alone to the other lives of himself, and to every thing in his vicinity. But let the political character be the image of souls of the middle rank; at one time being extended to contemplation, and at another again, being converted to, and arranging things of a subordinate nature. And let souls of the third rank, be analogous to the vulgar and impassioned man. Moreover, there is a great extent in souls of the middle rank, in consequence of their perceiving some things, but not perceiving others. For some indeed, have seen many things, but have not seen a few; but others vice versa, have seen a few, but have not seen many things; and others, have equally seen some things, and have not seen others. This therefore, must be attended to; for it will contribute to our knowledge of the lives that are in a following order. Hence the souls that are the last of those that follow the Gods, as they naturally aspire after the super-celestial place, are convolved together with the Gods, but through their want of power to survey it, they tend downward. And at last, will and desire leave them; for will begins the first, and ends the last. As therefore, here on the earth, the vulgar and impassioned man, naturally indeed aspires after good, but is unable to distinguish and discover truly existing good, there also souls are affected after the same manner.

You may likewise assume other examples of the three orders of souls. Of the first order indeed, the temperate man; but of the second, the continent man, when, though there is a sedition between the subordinate and more excellent parts of the soul, yet at the same time, reason endeavours to preserve its authority. And of the last order, you may assume the incontinent, or the intemperate man as an example. And again, you may take, as an example of the first order, the worthy man, who neither accuses himself, nor another.

<sup>1</sup> And these, as they are sometimes willing and able to follow Jupiter, and sometimes not, make with Jupiter, a triadic division.

<sup>2</sup> For *εἰς ὀψάκη* in this place, I read *εἰς ὀψάκη*.

<sup>3</sup> Conformably to this Plato elsewhere says, that the genuine philosopher is nourished in truth and leisure. But at present, as true philosophy is not studied, and there are consequently, no genuine philosophers, every man is busily employed about external concerns, and no one is at leisure for speculations of the highest importance. "I am too busy, I have not a moment to spare for such things," is the common language of the high, and the low, the rich and the poor.

For the first of souls are not disturbed through their own depravity, but through the nature of the subject thing, it being such as to cause perturbation. Hence also, we may dissolve the doubt which enquires, how it is said, *that the soul when perfect and winged, revolves on high, and governs the whole world*? For so far as the soul follows the Gods, and gives itself to them, it is happy. But souls of the middle class must be arranged conformably to one who makes a proficiency, and who accuses himself alone.

Again, when Plato adds, that souls of the third rank are *carried round in a merged condition*, he does not say that they *fall*, but that they are *merged*, as being enslaved by the violence and sedition of other powers, but at the same time, are convolved together with the attendants of the Gods, through aspiring after the supercelestial place. And of divine souls indeed, it is said, that the circulation of the Heaven convolves them, in consequence of their being adapted to this, and giving themselves to the circulation. But of souls of the third class it is said, that they are jointly convolved, as being borne along by violence; they indeed treading in a right-lined progression to generation, but at the same time being circularly convolved, through their being still carried by the Heaven, and the attendants of the Gods, just as the inflammable matter at the summit of the air, is said to be circularly borne along. The souls therefore, become in a merged condition, in consequence of their genesurgic power gravitating, and wishing to energize; for with this power the irrational form of life is connected. When also it is said, that they *trample on each other*, it must not be supposed that they use feet there, but that one soul endeavours to be before another. The superior therefore, may be said to trample on the subordinate soul, and the subordinate to attack the superior. Souls of this kind however, are not extended to the intelligible, but look to each other, and contending with, endeavour to surpass each other.

Hence, a *perturbation* is produced in them of the diænetic part, but a *contest* of anger; for it is anger which aspires after honour and preëdency; and an *extreme perversion* of the epithymic and genesurgic part, which afterwards proceeds into generation. But it is said to be *extreme*, in contradistinction to the divine perspiration of ascending souls, which Plato mentions in what follows. Here however alone, in souls of the third rank, he blames the character, because it is the cause to them of a confusion of this kind; just as he says in the Republic, that it is impossible for the detestable condition of the city to be dissolved, without the depravity of the rulers. You may also assume from hence, that the whole soul descends according to Plato, if the character which is the summit of it, becomes depraved, and that one part of the soul does not, as

Plotinus says, descend, but another part abide on high.

Again, with respect to the *lame*ness of these souls, this becomes known from the motion of those persons that are lame. For these proceed slowly, and inelegantly, and are in danger of falling. Thus therefore, these souls also, are more dull and inelegant in their intellectual conceptions, and are always in danger of being drawn down into generation. Hence, Plato assimilates their intellections to the walking of those that are lame; since walking is adapted [as an image] to their transitive intelligence.<sup>1</sup> It is likewise beautifully observed by him, that many of these souls *break* their wings; for he does not say they *destroy* them, because the soul never loses its anagogic power; but its energies indeed become sluggish, and in this respect, may be said to perish, but the power remains broken. Farther still, we may derive an explanation of what is here said, from winged animals. For if any one of these *breaks* its wings, it is for a short time raised on high, through the winged nature which it possesses, but is again drawn downward. They *depart* therefore, he says, *destitute of the perception of reality*, i. e. they fly to that which is without God, and dark.

Heavens' exiles straying from the orb of light, [as Empedocles says]. But they depart *destitute*, or *imperfect* i. e. *unimproved*. For the vision of intelligibles is truly imitation. They likewise use *detractive nutriment*, i. e. they exert the reasons or forms of sensibles, and live according to these, no longer surveying intelligibles, but sensibles.

Farther still, in the words, *through which there is a great endeavour*, &c. he delivers that which is common to the three orders of souls, as well of those that obtain the vision of intelligibles, as of those that do not. So that the answer to those who enquire, why therefore, do all souls thus endeavour and weary themselves to obtain this vision is, that all of them desire to perceive real beings. But by the *nutriment adapted to that which is best in the soul*, he means that which is adapted to the intellectual part of the soul; for this is alone appropriately nourished by the intelligible. But the wing of the soul, which is the anagogic power of it, is not *appropriately*, but *alone* nourished by the intelligible, and by nothing else. And the *meadow* is the prolific power of forms. The meadow also may be said to be the Nights; for there the fountains of life are contained. That however, is another meadow which is mentioned in the 10th Book of the Republic, in which souls about to proceed into generation dwell for a time. And this meadow is the luminous appearance (*φασμα*) which is under the moon. The meadow in the Republic however, is analogous to that which is here mentioned. For in the former, the principles of nature, and of the life in generation, are comprehended.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For ἀνογοί here, it is obviously necessary to read ποιοί.

## ERRATA ET CORRIGENDA.

Vol. I. P. 9. At the bottom, for "*Through these*," read, Hence.

P. 18. For "*Full of the brass*," read, Full on the brass.

P. 249. In the Note, for "*See the Introduction to this Translation*," read,  
See the Introduction to the first edition of my Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, and my Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle.

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THE END.

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